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DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM458

D R U G T RA F F I C K I N G A N D NA RCO -T ERRO RI S M

Judith Ann Warner

When politicians and journalists speak about the U.S. -Mexico border, drug traffi cking

is viewed as only part of the problem of border security. Preventing terrorist entry and

unauthorized immigration are the chief issues. Drug traffi cking occurs at all U.S. ports

of entry, including the U.S. -Mexico border, the U.S.-Canada border, airports, and sea

lanes. Despite the War on Drugs, cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamines and heroin

are regularly crossed and bring billions into the hands of criminals. Conceivably, height-

ened border enforcement could have an impact on Mexican drug traffi cking organiza-

tions (DTOs). Yet despite all of the eff orts made by the White House and Congress

to strengthen the border, drug smugglers can respond with ever more sophisticated

and brutal acts. Indeed, drug traffi cking represents a national security threat, because

widespread corruption and drug-related violence could destabilize the government of

Mexico (Grayson 2010).

Mexican drug traffi cking organizations grow and transport marijuana and her-

oin and are active in manufacturing “meth” (methamphetamines). Estimates are that

90 percent of cocaine sold in the United States enters through the Mexico border. Al-

ternately, the billions in profi t realized from drug sales have created money laundering

ventures and enabled the DTOs to purchase smuggled arms, including automatic weap-

ons. Th e subsequent corruption and drug-related violence causes further concern owing

to the possibility of “spillover violence,” including kidnappings, torture and homicide in

the United States.

Th e Dimensions of the Problem

Th e U.S. government has resisted the legalization of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine

because of their psychotropic eff ects. In the 1960s, the United States began to take inter-

national action to enforce drug prohibition (Andreas and Nadelman 2006). Th e major

focus was on the Colombia Cali and Medellín cartels and stopping the smuggling of

Colombian cocaine to Florida from the Caribbean. Another concern was cross-border

smuggling of marijuana and heroin from Mexico. Th e Drug Enforcement Adminis-

tration (DEA) was successful in stopping Colombian cocaine smuggling through the

Caribbean in the late 1980s and 1990s thanks to an increased naval presence. Colombian

cocaine cartels then turned to Mexican smugglers and began using their services, mak-

ing the U.S.-Mexico border the major route of entry (Payan 2006). Patrick Buchanan,

a media commentator, has referred to the change in drug smuggling routes from sea to

land as the “Colombianization of Mexico.”

Mexican government offi cials have an informal tradition of overlooking or actively

colluding with drug smugglers (Beittel 2009, 7–8). Th rough the 1990s, the acceptance

of bribes was part of a process of accommodation in which the ruling party, the PRI

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM 459

(Partido Revolucionario Institutional, or Institutional Revolutionary Party) operated

in tandem with Mexican DTOs (Velasco 2006; Grayson 2010). From the mid-1980s

through 1992, the U.S. government certifi ed the degree to which foreign governments

cooperated in stopping drug traffi cking (Beittel 2009, 2–3). Under pressure from the

United States, Mexican offi cials participated in crop eradication programs and made

some arrests. Th e working relationship between Mexican and U.S. offi cials was char-

acterized by mistrust. After 2002, the United States classifi ed countries considered to

be ineff ective against drug traffi ckers and associated this eff ort with sanctions aff ecting

assistance. When Vincente Fox became president of Mexico (2000–2006), his PAN

(Partido Acion Nacional, or National Action Party) ended the PRI’s 71-year hold on the

presidency and political appointments; it also inadvertently disrupted long-term rela-

tions of collusion and corruption with drug traffi ckers (Velasco 2005).

Th e destabilization of Mexican drug traffi cking interorganizational relations and ter-

ritorial control was an unexpected consequence of the development of a viable two-party

system in Mexico, its “democratic transition” (Velasco 2005). Immediately, as Mexico’s

democratic practice became stronger, President Fox began binational cooperation to

suppress drug smuggling. By 2006, some 79,000 Mexicans had been arrested on charges

related to drug smuggling (Cook 2007, 3–4). Statistics indicate that low-level drug

smugglers and dealers made up 78,831 of the arrests, hit men made up 428, lieutenants

74, fi nancial offi cers 53, and cartel leaders—the apex of decision making—15. Tijuana

DTO leader Francisco Arellano Felix and Gulf DTO leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillén

were arrested. Although Guillén was apparently able to continue operations from inside

a Mexican prison for a time, attempts by rival drug organizations to control lucrative

traffi cking routes (such as Interstate Highway 35 in Texas) led to turf wars character-

ized by spiraling violence and brutality in Mexican border cities and, later, throughout

Mexico (Cook 2007, 11–12).

In 2005, confl ict over control of the “plaza” (territory) between rival Gulf and Sinaloa

DTOs in Nuevo Laredo and Laredo, among the principle ports of entry for cocaine

and marijuana, led to the deaths of 135 people. Most of these dead were cartel members,

but a journalist, city council member, 13 Mexican police, and the Nuevo Laredo police

chief were also killed. In response, President Fox sent federal Mexican troops to Nuevo

Laredo to control the situation. Texas Governor Rick Perry sent additional police and

equipment to aid the border cities. Both U.S. and Mexican offi cials have become con-

cerned that the major drug DTOs pose a threat to border security. In September 2008,

a total of 175 arrests were made in Mexico, the United States, and Italy to control the

violent Gulf drug cartel.

Felipe Calderón, the current Mexican president (2007–present), has increased law

enforcement activity against DTOs and narco-terrorism. He considers drug traffi cking–

related violence a threat to Mexico’s national stability (Beittel 2009, 3). Th e drug-related

lawlessness has spread geographically, escalated, and incorporated terrorist elements.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM460

Narco-terrorism is defi ned as using terror as a tactic to increase drug traffi cking profi ts

(Casteel 2003). In reference to other international drug traffi cking, the concept of narco-

terrorism also refers to using profi ts from drug traffi cking, such as heroin sales, to fund

terrorism. At present, Mexican DTOs have not formed ties to international terrorists.

Mexican drug traffi cking organizations have used hit men and gang-precipitated

torture and violence to intimidate the public and government offi cials (Cook 2007, 6–9;

Beittel 2009, 5–6). Th e Mexicans who have been killed include elected government

representatives, journalists, police chiefs and other law enforcement offi cers, prosecu-

tors, and civilians of all ages. Pamela L. Bunker, Lisa J. Campbell, and Robert J. Bunker

(2010, 145–146) of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation state: “Because many of the po-

lice forces and judicial systems in Mexico have been corrupted and compromised and

therefore arrest and prosecution rates are extremely low, the probability of ever being

brought to justice is almost non-existent for most individuals and groups engaging in

killings, torture and beheadings.”

Narco-terrorism involves the use of brutality and murder to intimidate the civilian

population and authorities. Individuals may be kidnapped for failure to pay drug debts

or in order to demand ransom payments. Forms of torture include beatings, knife cuts,

breaking bones, sexual abuse, and starvation. Extreme torture includes the use of acid,

water, fi re, electricity, water boarding, and suff ocation (Bunker, Campbell, and Bunker

2010). Prior to homicide or afterward, bodies may be subject to decapitation (decapitado),

quartering (descuartizado), placement in a car trunk (encajuelado), wrapping/binding in

a blanket (encobijado), sealing in a metal storage drum (entambado), or depositing in an

acid bath ( pozoleado, guisado) (Bunker, Campbell, and Bunker 2010, 146). Drug-related

killings in Mexico increasingly involve short-term torture such as infl icting nonfatal

wounds prior to death. Th ese tactics involve the intended eff ect of intimidation for po-

litical or economic gain, but they can also be ritualized, as when narco-cults (narco-

cultos) carry them out in a ritualized manner connected to a plea for divine intercession,

as when a sacrifi ce is made to Saint Death (La Santa Muerte). In Mexico, headless or

tortured bodies are being left in public places connected to marijuana growing regions or

cartel-controlled areas. Law enforcement offi cers who turn down bribes may fi nd their

names on lists attached to corpses.

Th e Mexican population perseveres and has taken action against the escalating vio-

lence, which can result in death and injury for civilians. In August 2008, a massive public

protest against the violence involving hundreds of thousands of marchers occurred in

Mexico City and throughout Mexico. In 2010, Mexican government estimates were

that, since 2007, some 22,700 people had been killed (Castillo 2010). In 2007, a total

of 2,837 were murdered. By 2009, the total killed reached 9,635, tripling the death toll.

Th e border city of Ciudad Juarez has reported 4,324 deaths since 2006, the highest

rate in Mexico. From January to March 2010, the death toll was 3,365—violence of

epidemic proportions. Deaths in Ciudad Juarez included a pregnant employee of the

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM 461

U.S. Consulate, her husband, and another husband of a consulate employee (Lacey and

Th ompson 2010).

Drug traffi cking and unauthorized immigration are discussed as issues of lawlessness

along the U.S.-Mexico border, but most people in the region are law-abiding. Th e chief

problem has been that, as U.S. border enforcement has escalated, the smuggling of both

drugs and people has become more sophisticated. In Mexico, destabilization of relations

between drug traffi cking organizations (owing to the arrest of leaders and competition

for territory) is given as the chief reason for the increased violence. Nevertheless, DTOs

are suffi ciently powerful and well armed to engage in violent confl ict with law enforce-

ment and the Mexican military. It is questionable whether the death toll should be seen

as evidence of success from the pitting of drug traffi ckers against one another because of

the degree of harm to the civilian population as well as economic consequences, such as

loss of tourism and trade for Mexico.

Th is situation would not occur if there were not a demand for drugs in the United

States and a lack of economic opportunity in Mexico. President Barack Obama

(2009–present) and Hillary Clinton, his secretary of state, have acknowledged that the

United States shares responsibility for the problem because of the high demand for

drugs in the country and the relative ineff ectiveness of current programs in quelling that

demand.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER

Democrats and Republicans are united in using law enforcement as a means to combat drug traffi cking, but they do not emphasize the role of global inequality between the United States and Mexico as a factor in this trade. Drug traffi cking is estimated to be the most profi table form of organized crime worldwide. It is thought that some $80 billion per year is spent on drugs crossed through the U.S.-Mexico border region. Although the exact fi gure spent is unknown, U.S.-Mexico inequalities fuel this multibillion-dollar trade. Mexico has a high unemployment rate and a low minimum wage. The demand for drugs in the United States is high; there are an estimated 20 million users who are willing to pay high prices for drugs. The wage disparity between the United States and Mexico makes working for drug cartels attractive for many young Mexican men in border communities. Many of the recruits are low-skilled laborers who have a hard time fi nding jobs. Drug traffi cking skills—physical aggression, playing the role of a bodyguard, using a gun, and driving a vehicle across the border—can be learned quickly. The easy money earned from smuggling is much greater than what is available from legitimate employment in Mexico. It is actually surprising that the vast majority of Mexicans resist involvement in this criminal enterprise.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM462

Drug Traffi cking Organizations and Distribution Networks

In the 1980s, Mexico had one drug traffi cking organization, headed by Felix Gallardo.

When drug traffi cking in the Caribbean was brought under control, Colombian co-

caine traffi ckers joined forces with Mexicans. As the war on drugs heated up along the

border, interorganizational disputes marred the operation of the border-wide cartel,

and Gallardo (in prison) ordered it split into four separate organizations: the Gulf Car-

tel (Southeast Texas), the Juarez Cartel (Southwest Texas), the Sinaloa Cartel Federa-

tion (Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona), and the Tijuana Cartel Federation (California)

(Cook 2007, 1–2). Originally, the arrests of Tijuana Federation leader Javier Arellano

Felix and Guild Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillén led to an intercartel alliance.

Later, the U.S. Project Reckoning heavily disrupted the U.S. and European transport

networks (U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York 2008). Abroad, 600 arrests

were made and $72 million in currency was taken. Inside the United States, 12,000

kilograms of cocaine, $60 million in currency, and 750 arrests connected to 750 distri-

bution networks were major outcomes. Today, the territory of the Gulf Cartel is chiefl y

controlled by Los Zetas, a paramilitary group of former Mexican military who served

as enforcers for a period of time. Mexican drug organizations are known to operate in

195 cities and to send drugs to 230 cities.

Specialized professionals and high technology are stepping up the response of traf-

fi cking organizations—and the potential for violent confl ict. According to the FBI, the

Zetas, highly trained former Mexican soldiers, have become involved in smuggling both

drugs and people into the United States, probably displacing the Gulf Cartel. Th e Zetas

have surveillance operatives, checkpoints, and high technology. Th ey have been linked

to the possibility of smuggling special-interest entrants into the United States—that is,

individuals who may or may not be connected to terrorism who originate from sending

countries identifi ed as having terrorist organizations.

Th e Calderón government has confi scated 70 tons of cocaine, 4,000 tons of mari-

juana, and 43,000 tons of methamphetamine precursor ingredients (Berrong 2009). Th e

Mexican cartels have been able to thwart every eff ort to stop traffi cking because they are

fl exible and adaptive organizations. Tony Payan (2006), an international relations and

foreign policy specialist, characterizes the war on drugs at the border as a cat-and-mouse

game in which the United States has tactical victories such as drug seizures and arrests

but is losing in the confl ict. U.S. escalation in personnel and technology has always re-

sulted in DTO adaptation and a continued supply of drugs.

Drug Transport Methods at Border Crossings and Border Checkpoints

Heroin and cocaine have been too valuable to risk crossing in between ports of entry,

as U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents could become aware and seize the load. As a re-

sult, most drugs are crossed through ports of entry. Social networks built on corruption

on both sides of the border facilitate drug transport. Attempts are made to bribe U.S.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM 463

Customs offi cers, sheriff s, and law enforcement personnel, and some give in to the off er

of large sums of money.

DTOs often use vehicles rather than human carriers (“mules”) because it is impos-

sible for customs to inspect every vehicle and item that crosses the border. Th e Bureau

of Transportation Statistics indicates that the following numbers of vehicles, cargo con-

tainers, and individuals crossed in 2009: 2,432,495 trucks, 1, 555,466 loaded truck con-

tainers, 146,058 loaded rail containers, 6,348 rail passengers, 135,775 buses, 1,445,200 bus

passengers, 40,576,475 personal vehicles, 91,139,705 vehicle passengers, and 23,538,289

pedestrians. Checking is done at random or on the basis of customs offi cers’ intuition,

depending on signs of anomalies or driver nervousness. All roads located past the bor-

der leading into the U.S. interior also have checkpoints that are frequently manned by

offi cers with drug-sniffi ng dogs. Payan indicates that many of the vehicles that cross

drugs go through points of entry (POEs) rather than between them. It is estimated that

70 percent of drugs are crossed through the southwestern border in this way. Mexico has

become the major supplier of marijuana, brown heroin, and Colombian cocaine.

In the past, cars, vans, and pickup trucks have been the favorite vehicle for crossing

drugs. Today, this method is used by small operators. Hidden compartments in ordinary

places in the vehicle are created. Th e drugs are then basted with masking scents tested

by the cartels’ own drug-sniffi ng dogs. Vehicles are crossed in two ways. Th e fi rst involves

going to the checkpoint and hoping that drug-sniffi ng dogs, the reaction of the driver

to stress, and the thoroughness of the inspection will not expose the drugs. Th e second

method is to cross cars in groups and let one be caught, distracting offi cials from the oth-

ers. Often workers are placed in locations where they can see if an inspector is distracted.

But the best way to smuggle drugs is to bribe a U.S. offi cer working at a port of entry to

let drugs pass through. Several cases in which law enforcement has been bribed turn up

every year. A single corrupt offi cial can allow massive quantities to be crossed, preventing

other drug enforcement activities from stopping the fl ow.

Since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, tractor trailer

trucks have been extensively used to transport drugs. Th is is the preferred method of

the largest cartels. Th e escalation of technologies used in the war on drugs has made it

harder to bribe offi cials because of the risk of being caught. Now the drug cartels must

spend millions on bribes in order to fi nd Americans working at ports of entry who will

take the risk.

Diversifi ed Organized Crime Tactics

Controlling two types of smuggling, of people and drugs, has allowed the DTOs to use

unauthorized migrants as a border-patrol diversion in order to cross drugs in a diff erent

area. Undocumented immigrants pay protection money to the cartels; then the cartels

divert the immigrants to certain routes designed to attract USBP activity and remove

attention from the route through which drugs will be smuggled.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM464

Fencing, National Guard troops, and additional USBP personnel have made it more

risky to use traditional drug smuggling routes. Th ere has been a signifi cant increase in

the amount of cocaine and marijuana seized. National Guard groups placed along the

Arizona border have resulted in a signifi cant increase in detained unauthorized migrants

as well. It is plausible that this has cut into the DTOs’ profi t margins, prompting them

to use of alternative methods.

U.S. Border Patrol Confrontations with Cartel Smugglers

Th e greatest risk that USBP offi cers take lies in dealing with drug smugglers and traffi ck-

ing organizations. Th e USBP makes more drug smuggling arrests than any law enforce-

ment agency, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Drug smugglers

use violence to avoid arrest and will risk killing USBP offi cers. In eff ect, a major activity

of the USBP has become drug interdiction rather than immigrant apprehension.

USBP offi cers’ jobs involve working individually in remote regions away from wit-

nesses. In cases of human smuggling, they may face resistance, but drug smugglers may

try to kill them. In June 1998, Alexander Kirpnick was shot and killed while attempting

to apprehend fi ve marijuana smugglers in the desert hills near Nogales, Arizona. Similar

killings occurred in 2008 and 2009.

One issue in confronting drug smuggling is that the USBP is literally outgunned. Th e

drug cartels have access to automatic assault rifl es, while each USBP offi cer has only a

revolver. Former Laredo, Texas, Sheriff Rick Flores (2005–2008) points out that smug-

glers have automatic assault weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and Kevlar helmets

with level-four body armor similar to that of the military.

Th e violence of drug smugglers’ reactions to attempts to stop and arrest them has

increased. In the past, the sight of law enforcement would result in smugglers dropping

the drugs or abandoning vehicles. Human smugglers would be arrested with the rest

of the group. Currently, drug cartels are fi ring on the USBP, engaging in reckless high-

speed chases, and initiating standoff s at the U.S.-Mexico border. Th e United States has

no jurisdiction to pursue any smugglers into Mexico.

DTOs control increasingly sophisticated technology. Spotters using high-power bin-

oculars, and encrypted radios are placed in the mountains. Despite the placement of

interior checkpoints, smugglers slip through by crossing private property. Th e income

realized from drugs allows them to invest in high technology, and they have even been

able to decipher the USBP’s encrypted communication.

Spillover Violence and Unintended Eff ects of U.S. Border Policy

Both Mexican and U.S. national security is threatened by narco-terrorism. Director

of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano believes that drug-related violence in Mexico has

the potential to spill over to the United States. Spillover violence incidents include

traffi cker-to-traffi cker homicide and planned attacks on U.S. citizens, offi cials, or physical

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM 465

infrastructure (Peters 2009). Since Mexican DTOs have drug distribution networks

reaching numerous U.S. cities, such attacks could become widespread. Th ose attacks that

have already occurred in the United States involved mainly border cities. Such incidents

have included inter-DTO homicide, kidnapping of smugglers or family members, and

attacks on USBP offi cers. Th e National Drug Assessment,  (Department of Justice

National Drug Intelligence Center 2009, 16), states that “Direct violence similar to the

confl icts occurring among major DTOs in Mexico is rare in the United States.” Indirect

violence such as kidnappings and DTO confl icts may be more frequent. DTO “disci-

pline” can include kidnapping, beating, torture and murder of organization members

who fail to deliver drugs or money. Drug users may be kidnapped if they do not pay.

Phoenix, Arizona, reported 267 kidnappings related to drug or human smuggling in

2009 (Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center 2009, 16). At present,

U.S.-Mexico border cities are not experiencing heightened violence. For example, only

17 murders were reported in El Paso in 2008, and there were 13 through December 25,

2009 ( Johnson 2009).

In Mexico, kidnapping is a major problem. Th rough 2005, hundreds of Mexicans

and sixty American citizens were kidnapped (Blumenthal 2005). Drug-related violence

includes murder of government offi cials, journalists, and innocent bystanders. Th reats

have been made against Americans news media and journalists. DTOs seek to intimi-

date government, law enforcement, and the media as a way of reducing press coverage

and public reaction. Th e U.S. State Department advises Americans to be alert and take

precautions when they are traveling in Mexico.

Peter Andreas (2009), a political scientist, suggests that that there is an unintentional

and reinforcing impact of the U.S. attempt to control its southern border with Mexico and

the expansion of drug and human smuggling. He refers to this eff ect as unintentionally

symbiotic and points out that the criminal justice complex at the border has been greatly

expanded as a result. Th roughout most of the 20th century, the southern border has been

ineff ectively policed and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as it was then known,

now renamed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and a part of the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security, did a largely symbolic job. Today, the worsening of the prob-

lem necessitates new strategies that may result in overturning past policy.

Strategies to Address the Problem

Th e War on Drugs and Expansion of Drug Traffi cking

Th ere are two views on whether border security initiatives are curbing drug traffi cking.

Payan (2006) feels that despite the expansion of USBP and Drug Enforcement admin-

istration personnel on the border, the quantity of drugs seized each year continues to

increase, along with the total volume of drugs being traffi cked. Drug traffi cking organi-

zations are so successful at moving product that the price of drugs on the street in urban

cities has declined. Th e federal government’s border-control policy has not succeeded

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM466

in controlling the cartels. Th e alternative view, put forth by the House Committee on

Homeland Security, is that federal and state eff orts to secure the border have resulted

in the cartel’s current eff orts to control human smuggling and enter into extortion, be-

cause drug seizures are making inroads on their profi ts. Th e controversy over whether

the U.S.-Mexico border can be controlled cannot be resolved by examining rates of

seizure of drugs, as supply can be increased if seizures are increased. Only information

on street prices and availability can resolve this issue, and such data have not been a

major concern in the debate over the impact of escalation in border security personnel

and technology.

Th e Mérida Initiative

Th e United States’ primary international program for control of drug traffi cking is

called the Mérida Initiative (Seelke and Ribando 2009). Mexico, Central America, the

Dominican Republic, and Haiti are participants. Issues addressed include drug traffi ck-

ing, arms smuggling, money laundering, and transnational organized crime. For three

years, $1.4 billion in technological assistance and training will be provided. In particular,

helicopters, speedboats, and computerized intelligence systems for data sharing were to

lead the investment. After an expenditure of $700 million, Congress voted to withhold

funds pending review of the program’s effi cacy (Landler 2009).

Can yet another United States program for control of international traffi cking suc-

ceed? Drug traffi cking through the U.S.-Mexico border has ties with transnational

organized crime in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. De-

veloping nations lack the funds, training, and technology to confront drug transit and

associated crime. Furthermore, organized crime thrives in ungoverned social space (Ve-

lasco 2005; Grayson 2010). Weak national governments need to be strengthened and to

gain credibility (Olson and Donnelly 2009). Democratic governments, as opposed to

dictatorships, are not considered absolutely essential, but they are seen as being more

eff ective at controlling crime. Th e widespread bribery and collusion of government and

law enforcement offi cials allows drug traffi cking organizations to gain political control.

Th e lower standard of living and salaries increase the attractiveness of criminal off ers,

especially where law enforcement and judiciaries are weak.

Mexican citizens have protested and reform of law enforcement is occurring in Mex-

ico. When local police proved ineff ective owing to bribery and intimidation, the federal

police were reorganized as a national police force. As drug-related violence escalated, the

Mexican military was brought in. Twenty-four thousand military personnel have been

involved in countertraffi cking; they are thought to have had some eff ect in reducing

violence, but primarily by displacing it or creating a condition of stalemate (Cook 2007).

Local, state, and federal police and increasingly the military have been bribed and even

recruited for work with drug traffi cking organizations (Velasco 2005, 106–108).

Both police and the military have low salaries and poor working conditions. Less

educated applicants are attracted to the low-prestige occupation of law enforcement.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM 467

Police are easily corrupted because of their low pay and the Mexican history of cor-

ruption, particularly at the municipal and state levels. Th ere is an established social cli-

mate that will be diffi cult to challenge or change without improving salaries and living

conditions (Velasco 2005). Th e Mérida initiative and other U.S. binational programs

support the professionalization of Mexican law enforcement.

Eff orts are being directed toward reform of Mexico’s judicial system. Mexico has an

inquisitorial justice system but is enacting reforms that would move it toward adver-

sarial justice, as in the United States (Olson 2008). Prosecution in inquisitorial systems

involves evidence collection by prosecutors, who issue recommendations that lead to

closed-door verdicts. Th e individual is not presumed innocent until proven guilty. Oral

prosecution and defense, cross-examination of witnesses, and defendant access to evi-

dence is limited. People are held until they can establish their innocence. It is thought

that Mexico will have switched to an adversarial system of justice by 2015.

President Calderón has strengthened control over the Mexican military, but it is

incomplete (Cook 2007; Grayson 2010). Reports of human rights violations point to

disappearance, torture, murder, and arbitrary detention (Amnesty International 2009).

Amnesty International (2009) documented fi ve cases involving 35 individuals in a pe-

riod of 12 months during 2008–2009 and has released information on other incidents.

It is diffi cult to prosecute military personnel. Amnesty International (2009, 5) released

the following quotation: “If you report us, something worse will happen to you, and no

one will do anything to us because we are soldiers.” Crimes committed by the military

are tried in a separate military judicial system, which may violate the Mexican Consti-

tution. Amnesty International (2009, 22) indicates that

when abuses are committed by members of the military the response of the state at

all levels is ineff ective. Th e failure of both civilian and military authorities to take

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, DRUGS, AND THE BORDER

Drug demand creates pressure at the border, where the United States is trying to exer- cise sovereignty, prevent the entry of drugs, and conduct trade. Controlling drugs po- tentially compromises the North American Free Trade Agreement transborder economic connection, which promotes opening the border instead of closing it. In the confusion of apprehending migrants and letting trade goods fl ow across the border, both drugs and humans have often gotten through.

The logic of securing the border to open it for trade is contradictory. The reason for considering globalization as a factor in the expansion of this problem is that many na- tions have opened their borders to increased trade and tourism, generating new criminal opportunities. The U.S.-Mexico border smuggling issue is a part of a larger global crime nexus in which powerful international organized crime syndicates operate. The linkage between Colombian cocaine cartels and Mexican drug traffi ckers refl ects globalization.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM468

timely eff ective action to prevent and punish these grave human rights violations

is tantamount to complicity. In some instances, the lack of cooperation by some

military and civilian authorities with relatives or other relevant authorities, such as

court offi cials or members of the [National Human Rights Commission] trying

to establish truth and justice may even amount to concealment.

Steps taken within the military justice system to investigate these abuses and

hold those responsible to account do not constitute a real intent to bring the per-

petrators to justice. Th e lack of independence and transparency of the military

justice system ensures victims and relatives are frequently denied access to justice.

Consequently Mexico appears to be unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out

investigations and prosecutions against its military.

Th e United States will withhold 15 percent of Mérida funding if human rights vi-

olations by the military are not effi caciously handled (Seelke and Ribando 2009). In

general, equity and transparency are needed to increase the credibility of the Mexican

justice system and reduce corruption within it (Olson 2008). Th e Mérida initiative seeks

to provide resources for investigating and prosecuting crime related to drug traffi ck-

ing. Unfortunately, Mexican law enforcement lacks scientifi c and legal skills. Organized

criminals are present within all sectors of the criminal justice system, from patrol to

prison, and without oversight.

Controversy ensued when the U.S. Joint Forces Command (2008, 36) labeled Mexico

a potential “failing state.” Mexican President Calderón and other offi cials reacted ex-

tremely negatively to this assertion and maintained that there is no area in Mexico that

is not under state control. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Clinton 2009) stated that

she does not believe that Mexico has any “ungovernable territories.” Mexican authori-

ties maintain that DTOs are weakening and that they are turning on each other owing

to diminishing market share (Associated Press 2009). Jane’s Information Group (2009)

has taken the position that drug traffi ckers only need to subvert the state through cor-

ruption rather than defeat it.

Mexico, a developing country with a limited budget, has a power asymmetry with

the United States. Th is asymmetry contributes to the drug interdiction issue, because

Mexico sees U.S. intervention as a challenge to its national sovereignty. Mexico resists

any U.S. troop involvement on its soil. In Latin America, the United States is perceived

as having a unilateral drug strategy rather than taking part in cooperative multinational

eff orts. Th e Obama administration inherited the Mérida initiative and is changing direc-

tion. A new emphasis will be placed on developing law enforcement and communities

(Th ompson and Lacey 2010). Law enforcement training and technology and improved

screening of drugs and vehicles at crossing points will be renewed and expanded. Th e

latest concern is building economic opportunity in communities aff ected by poverty and

crime. Th e biggest shift has been away from military assistance.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM 469

Reducing U.S. Drug Demand

In the 1960s, the United States instituted an international drug prohibition policy. Presi-

dent Richard Nixon began the War on Drugs, which critics have considered a damaging

policy that undermines U.S. interests in Mexico and other drug exporting nations. In

Mexico, eff orts have included crop eradication and drug interdiction. A policy debate is

being waged over the effi cacy of these eff orts. Advocates believe that the supply of drugs

has been reduced. Critics consider that drug prices are lower than ever, but the U.S.

government does not report this fact. Th e Obama administration is making a departure

from the rhetoric of the War on Drugs. On March 25, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton said: “Clearly what we are doing has not worked. . . . Our insatiable demand for

illegal drugs fuels the drug trade” (2009).

Critics of U.S.-Mexico drug policy believe that demand reduction among U.S. citi-

zens would limit the earnings of drug traffi cking organizations. Th e Obama administra-

tion has begun new initiatives for drug treatment and prevention (Hananel 2010) and

seeks to abandon the phrase “War on Drugs.” Drug Czar Gil Kerlikowski has stated:

“Calling it a war really limits your options. . . . Looking at this both as a public safety

problem and a public health problem makes a lot more sense.” Th e Obama plan calls for

reducing the number of fi rst-time users by 15 percent over fi ve years and sets other goals

for reducing driving under the infl uence of drugs, chronic drug usage, and drug-related

deaths. Community antidrug programs will screen for drug use and mainstream medical

facilities will be involved. Health personnel are encouraged to ask about drug use.

Th e debate on how to control drug use includes the idea of harm reduction through

legalization. Norm Stamper, a former Seattle police chief, favors the legalization of

drugs through state-run stores or distribution by registered pharmacists (Kristof 2009).

Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times op-ed columnist, points out that the drug war

had three major impacts: (1) it greatly increased drug users in prison populations from

41,000 in 1980 to 500,000 in 2009; (2) it empowered organized crime and terrorists who

make billions in profi t; and (3) the money spent on law enforcement, $44.1 billion, could

be spent in other ways, including treatment and prevention. It has been argued that drug

treatment is more cost-eff ective than interdiction.

Mexico has preceded the United States in adopting harm reduction by passing a law

to decriminalize possession of small amounts of drugs. Individuals will not be prose-

cuted but instead referred to drug treatment programs. Individuals will be required to

enter a treatment center if they are found in possession of drugs a third time. Th is mea-

sure is in response the development of an internal drug addiction problem and designed

to free up prison space for dangerous criminals. Critics of decriminalization argue that

it will increase addiction.

In 2010, President Obama authorized 1,200 National Guard troops for the border

and sought increased funds for border law enforcement (Archibold 2010). Th e New York

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NARCO-TERRORISM470

Times responded in an editorial that “adding a thousand or so border troops won’t stop

the cartels or repeal the law of supply and demand” (“Editorial” 2010).

Conclusion

Drug traffi cking and the associated violence is the major problem at the U.S.-Mexico

border. Every escalation in border security by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, the

DEA, and other federal agencies has been met with adaptation by the drug cartels.

Although many offi cials in Mexico and some law enforcement offi cers in the United

States have been bribed, both Mexico and the United States are increasingly choosing

to confront the cartels. Mexico estimates that the trade is based on 20 million users

in the United States. Th e law enforcement approach to the war on drugs has not re-

duced the demand. Th is suggests that reducing the motivation of American citizens

for using drugs and rehabilitating drug users would be an alternative way of reducing

demand.

Th e United States has engaged in many wars: a war on drugs, a war on terrorism, and

confl ict in Afghanistan and Iraq. Has it won any of these wars? What are the criteria

for deciding? Th e United States is pursuing its strategy of constantly escalating a quasi-

military struggle for control of the Mexican border. Th is strategy has never worked, and

Mexican drug traffi cking organizations adapt to change more rapidly than the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security bureaucracy is able to do. It is unlikely that this problem

will soon be resolved in the future any more than stopping cocaine smuggling in the

Caribbean to Florida ended Colombian drug smuggling.

Th e United States may have waited too long to deal with the demand for illicit drugs

in the United States. Th e billions of profi t from drugs paid into Mexico, a country with

a great deal of poverty, provide the motivation to engage in illegal traffi cking. Drug lords

are highly adaptable in fi nding ways to provide drugs, start habits, and maintain fi xes.

Imprisonment has not slowed demand. It remains to be seen if the prevention and treat-

ment strategy of the Obama administration can be more eff ective.

See also Border Fence; Human Smuggling and Traffi cking; War on Drugs (vol. 3)