Assignment 2

Third World Liberation Comes to San Francisco State and UC Berkeley

Harvey Dong

Harvey Dong's "A Bookstore jor Everybody" also appears in this volume, page 122.

INTRODUCTION

Forty years have passed since the Third World Libera-tion Front (TWLF) strikes for ethnic studies. WhenSan Francisco State College (SFSC) students went on strike for a third world studies curriculum, students such as myself at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), were moved to call on our classmates to support them. We believed then that the best way to express our solidar- ity was to fight for the very same demands and principles at UC Berkeley. That way another front would be opened that would diminish the repression of the SF State strikers. The strikes left their mark on both campuses and especially changed how history was being taught.

The Third World Liberation Strikes that occurred in 1968-69 at SFSC and UCB had profound effects on the his- tory of Chinese in America. First, the strikes won civil rights changes in higher education—the institution of ethnic stud- ies curricula and programs. This new approach enabled the study of Chinese American history in a comparative context that was focused on looking at racial discrimination and the struggle for equality. Second, the strike movements caused a significant shift in the mind-set of many Chinese Ameri- can college-aged youth in the San Francisco Bay Area. The post-World War II path toward acculturation into main- stream society from the urban Chinatowns was replaced by another calling. Instead of working only for professional self-advancement, many Chinese American college students turned their attention toward fighting institutionalized rac- ism on their campuses and oppression within the Chinese American community. Not only was the study of American history revolutionized, the struggle for ethnic studies became part of a revolutionary movement.

Intemational events in the late sixties provided an impor- tant backdrop for the rise of Asian American activism. Revo- lutions in the third world, the rise of Black Power protests, and institutional racism in the educational system, which took the form of erasure of Asian Americans in history and

society, led many Asian American activists to become more resolved in their involvement. There was strong identifica- tion with the struggles for independence in former colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; intemal colonialism was a dominant paradigm for activists who saw themselves as part of an oppressed third world within the United States (namely, Asian Americans, African Americans, Chicanos, Latino Amer- icans, and Native Americans). This context helped them look beyond their individual ethnicities and see themselves as Asian Americans who were part of the third world.

The vehicles for their activism were the TWLF organiza- tions that led strikes for ethnic studies programs at SFSC and UCB. The SFSC TWLF Strike began on November 6, 1968, and the UCB TWLF Strike followed seventy-seven days later on January 22, 1969. Student activists from the two cam- puses were in communication as early as spring quarter of 1968, when the Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA) organized an issues forum on the UCB campus. Over ninety attendees listened to representatives from the Black Panther Party and the Chicano movement, as well as San Francisco Chinatown activists from Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action (ICSA).'̂ Presentations introduced topics on black identity, Asian American identity, and the concept of third world unity The Panther representative expressed apprecia- tion that Asian Americans were beginning to move along rad- ical political lines. This forum would be the first in a series of meetings that facilitated AAPAs political vision of solidarity with other racialized minorities.-^

YELLOW SYMPOSIUM

These types of meetings were preludes to a major Asian American political activism conference at the UC Berkeley campus. On January 11, 1969, the AAPA, the Chinese Stu- dents Club (CSC), and the Nisei Students Club (NSC) spon- sored a symposium titled "The Asian Experience in America/ Yellow Identity," also known as the "Yellow Symposium." Widely attended by Asian American (Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino) college students from throughout California, the symposium helped chart the direction for future Asian American activism. Asian American identity, Asian American

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Studies, community service, Asian student movements, and support for the Third World Liberation Strike at SFSC were focal points of the conference. Speakers included professors from Stanford, UC Berkeley, and UC Davis. Topics included • the history of Chinese and Japanese in America, presented by Stanford Lyman (Stanford University); the Asian policy of the United States, presented by Paul Takagi (UC Berkeley); and Asians in the "melting pot," presented by Isao Fujimoto (UC Davis).^

One unscheduled speaker who had impact was George Woo, representing ICSA and the SFSC TWLE Woo critiqued the idea of developing an Asian American identity devoid of community responsibility He called upon the student audi- ence to show their commitment to activism by passing a conference resolution in support of the SFSC TWLF Strike. Arguing that identity without action was only a form of "mental masturbation," Woo challenged students to look into the real conditions that people in the communities faced and called for a reversal of the traditional brain drain of educated youth from the community'*

According to conference organizer Bryant Fong, who was a member of UCB CSC and AAPA, "the issues were support for the strike going on at San Francisco State and the condi- tions going on in Chinatown itself. In Chinatovm the condi- tions at that time were ripe for change.,There was a lot going on. It was ripe for rebellion . . . a lot of youth were in motion. ICSA brought out things differently about what was going on. They were working with the gangs in Chinatown. They were working with Leways and Youth Council."^

A minority of conference goers had reservations about supporting the SF State strike. This reluctance was related to disagreement with the idea that Asian Americans were oppressed and suffered racial discrimination. While sup- porting the teaching of Asian. American history courses, they argued that these courses should bè taught within the traditional departments and not in separate Asian Ameri- can programs. The majority of conference attendees felt that this approach was too gradual and fraught with uncertain- ties. Largely influenced by the radicalism of the Black Power movement, the conference moved in the direction of self- determination. "Self meant the community and "determina- tion" meant political decision-making power. Applied to the TWLF demands for ethnic studies, self-determination meant not just having a few courses under a mainstream department but power and control over an entire school of ethnic studies or third world college for the benefit of the community

The Yellow Symposium eventually passed a resolution in full support of the SF State TWLF Strike, the demand for Asian American Studies, and the establishment of third world colleges on other campuses. The resolution was an important juncture for Asian American college students who were becoming more socially aware and no longer vidshed to seek improvement through individual advancement, which never worked well for the community*

The next day, Sunday, January 12, a statewide AAPA meeting was held to plan strategy and extend the discus- sion of the Yellow Symposium to build the movement on a broader basis. To the surprise of AAPA organizers, the gather- ing became an organizational meeting for the establishment of a loose-knit network of AAPA chapters nationally There were representatives from thirteen campuses in locations including San Francisco, San Mateo, Los Angeles, Berkeley, San Jose, Sacramento, New York, and Hawaii. Discussions focused on common projects, such as defining the content of Asian American Studies and facilitating community work in communities such as Japantown, Chinatovra, and Mani- latown. Berkeley AAPA took on the responsibility of chan- neling information to the various chapters. This working meeting furthered support for the SFSC TWLF as well as encouraging similar movement on other campuses.^

SIMILARITY IN DEMANDS

It was not an accident that student demands were similar on both sides of the San Francisco Bay The students demanded educational relevance that would meet the needs of their communities. This would be achieved through the establish- ment of ethnic studies programs that would include depart- ments of Asian American Studies, African American Studies, Chicano Studies, and Native American Studies. Curricula were to be "community-based" and students were to partici- pate in fieldwork in the relevant communities, such as Chi- natown, Manilatown, or Japantown.

The SFSC TWLF students made the following demands: L That a School of Ethnic Studies for the ethnic groups

involved in the Third World be set up with the students in each particular ethnic organization having the authority and control of the hiring and retention of any faculty member, director, and administrator, as well as the curriculum in a specific area of study

2. That 50 faculty positions he appropriated to the School of Ethnic Studies, 20 would he for the Black Studies Program.

3. That in the Spring semester, the College fulfill its commit- ment to the non-white students by admitting those that apply

4. That in the Fall of 1969, all applications of non-white stu- dents be accepted.

5. That George Murray and any other faculty person chosen by non-white people as their teacher be retained in their position.̂

The UCB TWLF students made the following demands: 1. That funds be allocated for the implementations of the Third

World College. a. Department of Asian Studies controlled by Asian people, h. Department of Black Studies as proposed by the AASU. c. Department of Chicano Studies. d. Department of Native American Studies.

2. Third World People in positions and power. Recruitment of more Third World faculty in every department and dis- cipline and proportionate employment of Third World

Third World Liberation Comes to San Francisco State and UC Berkeley 97

people at all levels from Regents, Chancellors, Vice-Chan- cellors, faculty, administrative personnel, clerical, custodial, security services personnel, and all other auxiliary positions and contractual vending services throughout the University system.

Specific demands for immediate implementation: a. Hiring of Third World Financial Counselors (Special Ser-

vices). b. Third World Chancellors in the University system. c. Third World people put in the Placement Center as

counselors. d. Third World Deans in the L and S Departments. e. Third World people in the Admissions Office.

3. Specific demands for immediate implementation: a. Admission, financial aid and academic assistance to any

Third World student with potential to leam and contrib- ute as assessed by Third World people.

b. 30 Work Study positions for the Chinatown and Mani- latown projects, and 10 EOP counselors, including full- time Asian Coordinator.

c. Expansion of Work Study program jobs to the AASU East campus Berkeley High School Project, to include at least 30 positions.

d. That the Center for Chicano Studies be given permanent status with funds to implement its programs.

4. Third World Control over Third World Programs. That every University program financed federally or otherwise that involves the Third World communities (Chicano, Black, Asian) must have Third World people in control at the deci- sion making level from funding to program implementation.

5. That no disciplinary action will be administered in any way to any student, workers, teachers, or administrators during and after the strike as a consequence of their participation in the strike.'

The students sought complete program autonomy with third world people in positions of power over decision mak- ing in all areas, including curriculum, admissions, promo- tions, research, and hiring. In its third world college pro- posal, the UCB TWLF argued that the primary reason for all this was to produce students with the knowledge, expertise, understanding, commitment, and desire to identify and pres- ent solutions to problems in their respective communities. The strikers believed this could only be done by the estab- lishment of an autonomous school of ethnic studies at SFSC and an autonomous college of third world studies at UCB with complete control over course curriculum, admissions,, and hiring.

It would be an understatement to say that the demand for establishment of ethnic or third world studies faced enor- mous opposition. College and university administrators were unwilling to accede to the idea of community-based pro- grams that involved students in decision making. Governor Ronald Reagan had taken a hard-line position against the student movements in general to rally conservatives behind him for a future presidential nomination bid. He supported repressive measures against the SFSC TWLF Strike and even- tually declared martial law during the UCB TWLF Strike.

The TWLF proposals were essentially a call to recast the foundations of the education system. They were also a

challenge to the state's 1960 Master Plan for Higher Educa- tion, which called for an "objective" system of testing in the secondary and higher educational systems. Students were tracked at an early age by intelligence tests to determine their fitness for continuing on to either a two-year junior college or a four-year university. This tracking system proved detrimen- tal to educational advances in minority communities because of the lack of good teachers and resources. Additionally, stan- dardized testing provided advantages to students from white middle- and upper-class backgrounds and disadvantages to students of color and poorer working-class students. The strikers addressed the fact that this was institutionalized rac- ism and that third world minorities were underrepresented on campuses such as SFSC and UCB. ̂ °

ICSA AND AAPA

Chinese Americans who participated in the TWLF move- ments were members or affiliates of ICSA at SFSC and AAPA at UCB. While students on both campuses held similar goals, their areas of focus differed. ICSA worked within the San Francisco Chinatown ethnic community, AAPA in a more dispersed panethnic setting.

According to Karen Umemoto, ICSA began in October 1967 and focused the bulk of its work on poverty-related issues within the Chinatown community. In July 1968 ICSA opened a basement office in Chinatown at 737 Clay Street. Its work included teen tutorial projects, youth advocacy, and participation in marches calling attention to socioeconomic problems within the Chinatown community. Militancy stemmed from having to deal with the conservative Chinese Six Companies establishment, which viewed ICSA as a group of young upstarts threatening its claim to be the sole rep- resentative of all Chinese in America. Its initial community base provided ICSA with the foundation for its demands.'̂ ^

Many ICSA members, rooted in the San Francisco Chi- natown community, sought an education with an urgent community focus. In one strike bulletin, ICSA members expressed reasons for participation in the strike:

Chinatown is a ghetto in San Francisco, there are approximately 50,000 Chinese of whom the vast majority live in Chinatown. It is an area of old buildings, narrow streets <Sr alleys, and the effluvia of a great many people packed into a very small space. At present, more than 5,000 new Chinese immigrants stream into this overpopulated ghetto each year, an area already blessed with a birthrate that is rising, and will rise more. Tuberculosis is endemic, rents are high and constantly rising, city services are inadequate to provide reasonable sanitation, and space is at such a premium as to resemble the Malthusian ratio at its most extreme. There are no adequate courses in any department or school at S.F State that even begin to deal with the problems of the Chinese people in their exclusionary and racist environ- ment.'̂

Because San Francisco State College was primarily a com- muter school with many students from the local ethnic com-

98 Harvey Dong

munities, organization along Asian American panethnic lines did not become as well established as at UC Berkeley, Fili- pino American students who participated in the SFSC TWLF Strike were members of Philippine Americans for Collegiate Fndeavor (PACF), founded in 1967, PACF focused on edu- cational opportunities for low-income Filipino American youth. It also saw third world solidarity as the way to create a new humanism to collectively control the destinies of third world people,^^ Japanese American students in the strike participated in an SFSC AAPA chapter that was an affiliate of the Berkeley AAPA chapter.

At UC Berkeley, AAPA used the "Asian American" concept as a vehicle for its political activism and self-determination. A major factor in bringing Asians together along panethnic lines was the belief that they shared a historical experience of racism and exclusion. Because Asian Americans made up less than 1 percent of a total U,S, population of two hundred mil- lion, Asian American solidarity became a political necessity Historical and pragmatic reasons emerged for Asian Ameri- cans to remove the negative "oriental" label and to come together under a new name.̂ '*

AAPA consisted of Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese Ameri- cans, many of them previously involved in the Civil Rights, Black Power, antiwar, and farmworkers' union movements. The majority of members were second-generation native- born Americans, though there were a few foreign-born members from Hong Kdng, Some were from urban Asian American communities such as San Francisco Chinatown; others had grown up in smaller cities or rural areas through- out California, In common was their general family experi- ence of immigration exclusion and institutionalized racism. The Vietnam War, the Black Power movement, and condi- tions in the Asian American community provided the back- ground for the transformation of many of these students into political activists. Leaders from campus social clubs such as the CSC (American born), the Chinese Students Association (foreign born), and the NSC (second generation) became AAPA leaders,

AAPA founder Victoria Wong, a second-generation Chi- nese American from the Salinas area, spoke about coming to political consciousness:

The first time you awaken is when you become politically aware. The second awakening is when you see all these Asian people talking the same way you are. This was the other part of my life which I always felt but could not yet identify . . , why t felt a little bit different ¡being the only Asian] going to Black Pan- ther Support Committee meetings. That's why the Yellow Sym- posium was important, , , the very concept of political power for Asian Americans was not really expressed before. We were always treated like new immigrants even though some of us were actually fourth and fifth generation," At a unique point in history, AAPA was able to bridge the

divides among various Asian ethnic communities. Home- land enmities, language and cultural differences, and geo- graphic isolation have long separated these groupings.

Regionalism was a norm, which AAPA activists consciously attempted to change with campaigns calling for a common Asian American interest. There were both cultural and prag- matic bases for this new panethnic solidarity Culturally many of the AAPA activists were Fnglish-speaking post- World War II baby boomers who had grown up in the same integrated neighborhoods. Many of them were 1,5-genera- tion or second-generation youth. Unlike their immigrant parents, they often associated with other Asian Americans to protect themselves within mainstream society, AAPAs ascen- dance was a continuation of this social trend in radical polit- ical terms.

In its October 1969 newspaper AAPA outlined its quick transformation since its founding in May 1968:

Since May, 1968, AAPA has grown from a small group of stu- dents and community workers to a powerhouse for Asian thought and action. AAPA is now a member of the Third World Liberation Front, Asian Association, and Asian Coalition. Some past activities of Berkeley AAPA include: Free Huey Rallies at the Oakland Courthouse, Chinatown Forums, McCarran Act lob- bies, MASC Boycott, Third World Liberation Front Strike, devel- opment of Asian Studies, and liaison with and development of other AAPÄS throughout the state.

Under the heading "Understanding AAPA," this issue fur- ther outlined the changes in political consciousness among Asian American college students:

The Asian American Political Alliance is people. It is a people's alliance to effect social and political change. We believe that the American society is historically racist and one which has system- atically employed social discrimination and economic imperial- ism, both domestically and internationally, exploiting all non- white people in the process of building up their affluent society The goal of AAPA is political education and advancement of the movement among Asian people, so that they may make all > decisions that affect their own lives in a society that never asks people to do so.'*

Whether organizing from a single- or panethnic view- point, Asian American students on both sides of the San Francisco Bay saw that their major strength lay in gather- ing support from their own communities, from fellow Asian American students on campus, from other third world stu- dents, and from the majority white student population. The single-ethnic focus of ICSA and its base of operations in San Francisco Chinatown placed it in the position of being the alternative to the Chinatown establishment. The panethnic focus of AAPA enabled it to go more broadly throughout the student population and the different Asian American ethnic communities for support.

THIRD WORLD LIBERATION FRONT AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE

Before their strike began, many Berkeley TWLF members gained protest experience by attending SF State TWLF Strike

Third World Liberation Comes to San Francisco State and UC Berkeley 99

activities across the-bay. The SF State Strike was a major impetus and model for the Berkeley TWLE The model was essentially to use direct mass actions to shut down the cam- pus, with the goal of forcing the administration to come to terms with the strikers. In the aftermath of the assassina- tion of Dr, Martin Luther King and the ensuing urban rebel- lions across America, TWLF strikers took a confrontational approach to disrupt the normal functioning of the campus.

At SFSC, the confrontational strategies were responses' to a buildup of unproductive negotiations, broken agree- ments, and increased police repression. Legal channels had run thin and more extreme measures had become the domi- nant form of interchange and communication between the college administration and students seeking social justice. Negotiations between the Black Students Union (BSU) and the administration over racism on the campus had dragged on unsuccessfully for three years. The BSU was incensed over the low enrollment of black students. In Novem- ber 1967 it was also incensed with the alleged racist over- tone in the Daily Cator student newspaper. This resulted in the newspaper offices being trashed and its editor beaten. Four BSU members, including graduate student and Black Panther Party member George Murray, were arrested and suspended,^'^

Murray's association with the Black Parithers resulted in a hearsay San Francisco Chronicle article stating that he had called on black and brown students to carry guns to protect themselves from "racist administrators." The reporter was not present at the moment of his alleged statement. Still, the arti- cle drew the quick ire of the college trustees and the mayor's office. This resulted in Murray's being suspended as a gradu- ate student and instructor for thirty days in October 1968,^^

Murray's suspension and the deadlock in negotiations over the formation of a Black Studies department led to further polarization between the BSU and the administration. This in tum led to the formation of the TWLF at SF State. The TWLF comprised six campus minority student organizations: the BSU, the Latin American Students Organization (LASO), the Mexican American Student Confederation (MASC), ICSA, PACE, and AAPA, Although the BSU instigated the formation of the TWLF its structure allowed for equality in group rep- resentation and decision making. A twelve-member central committee comprised two delegates from each organization. If there was disagreement, member groups were free not to participate in TWLF activities, ̂ ^

The relationship between the TWLF and white students at SF State was based upon the principle of "self-determination of third world peoples," In practice, this meant that whites played a supporting role that was negligible in terms of politi- cal decision making and strategy. Strategy and decisions were in the final hands of the TWLF organizations. White student supporters had been the majority in many of the picket lines at SF State. They also made up a majority of those arrested, including the four hundred arrested on January 23, 1969.-̂ °

CONDITIONS RIPF FOR PROTESTS AT UC

Conditions on the campuses were ripe for organized pro- tests, A 1966 race and ethnic survey conducted on the UC Berkeley campus showed a poor track record on minority enrollment. Blacks, Chicanos, and Native Americans com- bined made up L4 percent of the student body Of 26,000 total students, only 226 were African American (.87 per- cent), 76 Chicano (.29 percent), and 61 Native American (.23 percent). By comparison, blacks, Chicanos, and Native Americans made up approximately 19 percent of the pop- ulation of California, Statistics in 1970 showed an increase of 4,7 percentage points in the representation of these three groups at UCB, for a total of 6,2 percent. Released numbers included 1,020 African Americans (3,9 percent), 381 Chi- canos (1.4 percent), 166 Latinos (0,6 percent), 89 Native Americans (0,3 percent), 2,543 Asian Americans (9,7 per- cent), and 15,813 whites (60,1 percent),^^ Minority faculty appointments remained sparse. As late as 1980, only 1,8 percent of the faculty was African American. There were only two African American women with tenured or tenure-track status.

Although Asian Americans fared a little better than other minorities at the time of the strike, making up around 7 per- cent of the student population, this figure was challenged as misleading. Before the strike, a report sponsored by the cabinets of the CSC and the NSC acknowledged that Asian Americans appeared overly represented. Out of a campus total of 27,000 students, 2,000 were Asian American, though Asian Americans made up less than 3.5 percent of the state population (671,000 out of 19,171,000), Both clubs, how- ever, made four points related to these numbers. First, most of the students were from upper- and middle-class families, while access to higher education was still limited for those from poor urban and rural areas. Second, the Filipino Ameri- can population remained barely represented. Third, although Asian Studies existed, its focus was on international studies. Fourth, the Asians in faculty and administrative positions remained at the lower end of the employment scale, Asian Americans were riot present in executive positions,^^

FORMATION OF TWLF AT UC

Like the SFSC TWLF, the UCB TWLF emerged when African American students initiated demands and approached the other third world groups for reinforcements. Each group had previously approached the university separately and received a separate response. Lack of progress for several of the groups in negotiating their individual minority-based studies pro- grams had led activists to see the need for a TWLF coalition. In the view of the participants, third world solidarity was not an ideal but a necessity whose rationale would develop in process,^-'

100 Harvey Dong

Previously the African American Students Union (AASU) had conducted nine months of negotiations with the univer- sity administration for the establishment of African Ameri- can Studies. The AASU proposal was first submitted to the chancellor in April 1968. In November the chancellor asked AASU representatives to revise the proposal three times. It was then referred to the College of Letters and Science (LiïS) for review. L&S referred the proposal to the Executive Committee of the college, which met and revised it, making numerous deletions that had important effects on the pro- gram's community orientation and fieldwork and on student participation in its implementation. By December African American students and professors had been excluded from all meetings and decision-making positions. AASU mem- bers and Andrew Billingsley (an African American professor whose position was Assistant to the Chancellor for Estab- lishment of Black Studies) were barred from the Executive Committee meeting when these deletions were made. The university administration responded to the original twenty- two-page proposal submitted by students and professors with a one-page rejection.̂ '*

On January 15, 1969, a watered-down Black Stud- ies proposal was finally approved by L&S but was rejected soundly by the AASU. It was seen as an affront to the prin- ciple of self-determination, a continuation of white elites dictating the needs of racial minorities. According to AASU spokesperson Don Davis, "we submitted a program which was well conceived, air tight, and free from any basic flaws. We're not interested in anything less than what we proposed. We've made that clear again and again.... No matter what the [L&S version] said, it was wrong because we did not have power to determine our ovm destinies."^^

Meanwhile, MASC had been undergoing similar experi- ences. MASC had been involved in a table-grape boycott in support of a statewide United Farm Workers (UFW) strike. Involving thousands of Mexican and Filipino migrant farm- workers, the strike was one of the largest organizing drives in the Central Valley of California. At the UC Berkeley cam- pus, strike support work meant the boycott of table grapes and the demand that UC campuses stop all purchases. The campus boycott movement involved a five-month dispute between the university and the Chicano student activists.^^

By August 1968 MASC had reached an agreement with lower-level University Housing and Food Services officials to remove table grapes from dormitories and campus food facilities. Both Vice Chancellor O. W Campbell and Business Manager Scott Wilson of Housing and Food Services gave verbal approval for the immediate removal of table grapes.- '̂'

On October 1 anri-UFW elements in the state govern- ment, including Governor Ronald Reagan, Agricultural Sec- retary Earl Coke, and Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty, issued strong statements of condemnation of the UFW strike. Shortly thereafter, on October 11, UC Pres- ident Charles Hitch issued a statement of neutrality on the

UFW strike. He directed the purchasing departments of all nine campuses not to refuse to purchase any food as a policy decision. This situation set the stage for a half-hour meeting on October 14 between MASC representatives and President Hitch. After thirty minutes of deadlocked discussion. Presi- dent Hitch left the meeting. Eleven MASC representatives were then arrested for unlawful assembly and trespassing.^^

Three days later, on October 17, President Hitch partially agreed to the establishment of a Center for Mexican Ameri- can Studies and the appointment of a Chicano assistant to the president. By fall one course in Chicano history was taught at UC Berkeley, while the center actively recruited Chicanos around the state. Hitch had also given another verbal agree- ment to remove table grapes from the UC system.^^

MASC representatives considered these gains important steps toward something larger. Still, the gains were minus- cule. The new center had a budget of only $25,000. Final decision-making power, as in the African American Stud- ies program, still rested with a small white elite. MASC rep- resentative Manuel Delgado wrote, "The University gave them [Chicanosl, as a result of long negotiations and of the arrested eleven Chicanos, an assistant to the President whose contract stipulates that he can do no more than suggest."^"

In the spring of 1968 AAPA had begun negotiations with the university for the establishment of an Asian American Studies curriculum. The end result was the estabhshment of one course, Asian Studies lOOX: The Asian Experience in America, during the winter quarter of 1969. It was taught under the sponsorship of Professor Franz Schurmann from the History Department and Professor Paul Takagi from the Criminology Department. Six graduate students conducted the actual teaching of the course, which had an overflow attendance of four hundred students.

The course was envisioned to be the genesis for a larger Asian American Studies program. Weekly topics incorpo- rated international, third world, and community frame- works. The curriculum included the historical backgrounds of colonialism in China, Japan, the Philippines, and Korea; Asian American history, with specific topics on Asian Ameri- can labor history; current analysis of modem China and the Vietnam War; and present-day Asian American community issues.^'

In the first week of lectures AAPA called an after-class meeting for individuals interested in discussing the feasibility of a student strike for a third world college at UC Berkeley Twenty students from the class participated in the discussion. AAPA argued for joining with the AASU and MASC, whose individual negotiations with the administration for Black and Chicano Studies programs had reached critical impasses. AAPA members argued that their experiences showed that negotiations for Asian American Studies would be equally difficult. The discussions eventually moved from broad generalizations about supporting a third world strike to the . mechanics of organizing one.-'̂

Third World Liberation Comes to San Francisco State and UC Berkeley 101

According to Steve Wong, one of the students who stayed at the meeting and later participated in the strike, "I took that class because of the influence of the Civil Rights move- ment and antiwar movement. It was-a natural progression. By then I felt there shouldn't be so many national boundaries between people. The Asian concept, I felt, was much broader than the each-to-his-own-ethnic-group idea. 1 saw myself as a world citizen. Taking a course like Asian Studies lOOX was the way to do it."^-'

The semester before, Wong had been active in the San Francisco Chinatown YWCA tutorial project. Having grown up poor in Sacramento, he saw tutoring as an important component of social activism and a way to make the world better socially. He saw striking for a third world college as a way to make the world better by changing the balance of power politically.- '̂'

FALL 1968

In the fall quarter of 1968 at UCB, the AASU had begun to approach the Asian American and Chicano organizations about the possibility of fonning a TWLF to present common demands for a third world college. Responses varied accord- ing to the individual progress of each group's own negotia- tions with the university. MASC representatives had funda- mental questions about equal representation and power. Also, MASC had recently won a minor victory, the establish- ment of the Center for Mexican American Studies. According to Manuel Delgado, however, "we understood that there was a larger struggle for freedom, privilege and respect for third world people that we had to be a part of. We could not let our specific gains divide us."^^

Native American Students United (NASU), tbe fourth organization to become part of the TWLF, was the smallest group, with five members. NASU was still in its formative stages and was attempting to locate the few Native Americans present at the campus. It was not until the beginning of Janu- ary 1969 that NASU formally became a part of the TWLF Most of its members were subjects of a governmental reloca- tion program to assimilate Native Americans into mainstream America.^^

Solidarity among the third world groups was not a given. The pull for solidarity was influenced by revolutionary movements throughout the world that began to connect their causes; by the Black Panther Party, whose platform called for multiracial unity; and by the SF State TWLF activists, who had already developed third world solidarity as a major point of unity First and foremost, the grievances of the students and the severely inadequate response from the administra- tion warranted public sympathy and support from fellow students and staff. Once protest activity around student demands ensued, public controversy over the strike issues led to the refinerrient of the students' political rationale.

Third world anticolonialism. Black Power, and Marxism were ideas that the activists developed to formulate a counter- hegemonic ideology among their ranks.^^

White students and organizations met separately each week as the TWLF Support Committee, whose task was to solicit support and inform the broader student population

' about the issues of the strike. In many respects, these meet- ings became the main forum for carrying out policies of the TWLF Although decision-making powers were subordinated to the TWLF Central Committee, the Support Committee debated how to conduct strike support. Its meetings were attended by a broad spectrum of the radical left, including Students for a Democratic Society, Independent Socialist Club, Young Socialist Alliance, and nonaffiliated individuals.

RFPRESSION AND BROADENING . OF SUPPORT

Breakdown in negotiations led each TWLF to call a strike at its campus. At SFSC strikers combined picketing with enter- ing classrooms to call on other students for support. The SF Police Tactical Unit was called onto the campus multiple times. On the seventh day of the strike the unit engaged in a confrontation with two thousand strikers. The police clubbed students and at one point drew their weapons. Students and faculty demanded that SFSC President Robert Smith close down the campus, which he did, for an indefinite period.

Smith was under enormous pressure from those above him (a conservative. Republican-dominated board of trust- ees; state college system chancellor Glenn S. Dumke; Super- intendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty; and Governor Ronald Reagan) to keep the campus open at all costs. On November 25 Smith organized a BSU/TWLF-approved con- vocation to discuss the issues of the strike while the trust- ees met in Los Angeles to discuss the crisis. The convocation ended abruptly tbe next day wben striking students received letters of suspension. Smith resigned, citing inability to resolve issues amid the various political pressures. Immedi- ately the trustees named S. I. Hayakawa as the new president

Under Hayakawa confrontations between strikers and police intensified. On December 2 Hayakawa instigated a riot wben he personally attempted to force open the cam- pus. With the backing of 650 police, Hayakawa climbed onto the strike sound truck, ripped out its wires, shoved students away, and tossed into the air blue armbands, which were being passed out to students wbo were against tbe strike. Tbe armbands were emblazoned with the letter H, which meant support for Hayakawa. Anti-Hayakawa students rallied and marched to police-occupied classrooms, where confronta- tions occurred between thousands of strikers and police. More confrontational incidents occurred throughout Decem- ber. In January support built for the TWLF as three hundred

102 Harvey Dong

professors struck for their own union demands as well as TWLF demands. Other campus unions joined in support, with clerical, commons, and library workers honoring the picket lines. Teamsters Union drivers refused to cross picket lines, and deliveries to the campus came to a halt.

IMPORTANT STRIKE JUNCTURES AT UC BERKELEY

The experience of the SFSC TWLF was transferred to Berke- ley, where students were up against a similar institutional structure. Instead of the board of trustees, the UC student strikers had to deal with the Reagan-appointed UC regents, who were just as adamant about opposing student demands. Similar repressive measures were used to stem student pro- test. The university was concerned about its image of being too repressive toward minority students. At the same time, there was pressure from Governor Reagan, who felt that the university administration should take a hard line. Eager to win votes, Reagan took every opportunity to express his opposition to student protest.-''

On January 22 the first task for the TWLF was to station informational picket lines in front of various entries to the university Initial student responses were nondescript and dependent upon how spirited the chanting and singing on the picket lines was. Protestors borrowed chants from the Southern Civil Rights and Black Power movements with slight variations, such as changing "Black Power" to "third world power." Manuel Delgado recalled, "First we chanted, 'say it loud, I'm black and I'm proud. . . and then we alter- nated with I'm brovra and I'm proud, followed with I'm red and I'm proud, followed with I'm yellow and I'm proud, and I'm white and I'm proud. We even added I'm bourgeoisie and I'm proud. We all laughed.'"*"

That night a fire destroyed Wheeler Auditorium. A shocked TWLF Central Committee quickly issued a pub- lic statement disavowing any connection with the fire. UCB Chancellor Roger Heyns implied that the strike precipitated acts of violence; however, fire bureau laboratory tests failed to show evidence of arson. Through the duration of the strike, the campus administration and the press brought up charges of TWLF-sponsored violence and property damage to discredit the legitimacy of the strikers' demands."*^

Support from the campuswide American Federation of Teachers, Local 1570 (Teaching Assistants), occurred incre- mentally Initially Local 1570 called for a work stoppage between January 22 and January 27 in support of the strike. On January 27 a strike vote was taken, and support for the strike was narrowly defeated. On February 13 the police completely surrounded a Local 1570 picket line in support of the TWLF Strike and arrested thirty-six people, even though the line moved and allowed people through. The arrests cre- ated further momentum to support the strike. On February

18 Local 1570 voted to strike in support of the TWLF Strike and union organizing rights.'*^

On January 30 the UCB administration announced that disciplinary action would be taken against "identified stu- dents who violated campus regulations." In response the Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC) Senate, the goveming student body, passed a resolution con- demning "disruptive and violent tactics" and urged students and faculty to pressure the administration to implement a department of Afro-American Studies. The resolution also supported the administration's efforts to consider the pos- sible advantages of instituting a college of ethnic studies.

Academic faculty support was inconsistent and became dependent upon the increase in confrontations between police and strikers. On January 27 the overwhelming major- ity of third world factalty and administrators signed a pub- lic statement giving support to the strike. On February 5 the Academic Senate was reluctant to fully support resolutions favoring the principle of an autonomous college of ethnic studies organized by third world faculty and students. The resolution was tabled for a month. It was not until March 4 that the Academic Senate endorsed the establishment of an interim Ethnic Studies Department responsible only to the chancellor, with third world people allowed to formulate the curriculum."*^

After a short period of informational picketing the TWLF gave notice that unless demands were met, Sather Gate would be blocked. On February 4, 1969, the escalation of tactics entailed the sealing of Sather Gate Bridge, a major cross-campus thoroughfare, with shoulder-to-shoulder sta- tionary picketers blocking off the bridge."*"*

The TWLF's intention was to symbolically disrupt traf- fic flow in order to call attention to the demands and prin- ciples of the strike. Debates occurred immediately between striking and nonstriking students over the issue of freedom of access, although the existence of alternative access routes suggested this was a moot point. Though the TWLF intended the action to be largely symbolic, police overreaction further polarized the situation. Undercover police officers attacked the stationary line, attempting to arrest student protestors. Forty campus police and Alameda County sheriffs entered a pitched confrontation with demonstrators. The events culmi- nated in fifteen arrests and twenty injuries."*^

In the face of overwhelming police presence, on Febru- ary 5 the TWLF held a serpentine-formation protest march around campus. Instead bf holding ground in the traditional manner of sit-ins, the mobile, snake-shaped picket line allowed fiexibiUty in the face of police attack and enabled outreach to students beginning to sympathize with their fellow students. The disruptive effect was no longer con- tained within the traditional central campus rallying area but became more dispersed and difficult to contain."*^

Even during the peaceful informarional picket period, police misconduct was a heated issue. On January 29 AASU/

Third World Liberation Comes to San Francisco State and UC Berkeley 103

TWLF member Cordell Abercrombie was arrested and alleg- edly beaten. As a strike captain and chant leader with a bull- horn, Abercrombie had played a vocal role in maintaining strike line organization. According to TWLF spokesman Fernando Garcia, Abercrombie was arrested in the evening as he was walking across campus, Garcia stated that Aber- crombie was neither charged nor told of his constitutional rights when taken into custody. He was allegedly held and beaten in the Sproul Administration Building by six police officers.

On February 13 police moved to break up a moving picket line of one thousand strikers on Sproul Plaza, Police attempted to clear picketers walking on the administra- tion building steps, where several TWLF leaders persisted in remaining. Arrests were made, which resulted in physi- cal confrontation between police and protestors. Six uni- versity employees reported they had witnessed plainclothes Alameda County sheriffs beating arrested demonstrators in detention. The witnesses wrote an open letter to the Daily Californian to expose the violence,'*'' A February 13 edito- rial in the Daily Californian called upon students to oppose the police terror and support the demands of the TWLF It also pointed out that the teaching assistants' union, on strike because of police terror, might be fired for striking. The edi- torial asserted, "The blood-stained beasts stalk the campus. The police have suspended the constitution and are making arrests at will, and vwthout provocation. They then proceed to rarified forms of torture.'"''̂

Law enforcement used the strategy of isolating the leader- ship from the rank and file. Speakers at rallies and strike cap- tains were identified in police or media photographs and tar- geted for arrest. Sometimes this was comical: because Asian Americans "all looked alike," one would be arrested because he looked like another who had made a public statement to

BALANCE BETWEEN DIRECT ACTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations between the TWLF representatives and the chancellor's office mirrored the intensity of protest activity on the strike lines. Sometimes strike activities caused cancella- tion of negotiation sessions. One session was cancelled when a confrontation took place within window eyesight of both the TWLF negotiation team and Chancellor Roger Heyns, The daily strike activities and mounting support resolutions by professors, teaching assistants, and community organiza- tions constituted an important backdrop to the negotiations. Student response to campus repression rallied more wide- spread support. Both students and professors, who at first had marginally supported the strike, became drawn in as the atmosphere of martial law on campus limited them from doing campus business as usual.

The following events encapsulated the swings between strike activities and institutional response:

February 4: UCB, Twenty arrested and twenty were injured when plainclothes officers attempted to arrest strikers. Police declared strike support activity in Sproul Plaza an "illegal assem- bly" and ordered people to disperse.

February 5: UCB. Administration canceled noon rallies because of the possibility of violence—a clear case of prior restraint.

UCB. Governor Ronald Reagan declared a "state of extreme emergency" on the campus and surrounding areas to enable more California Highway Patrol to enter campus,

February 8: UCB, Chancellor's Office and TWLF Progress Com- mittee reached a tentative agreement on implementing commit- tee (2 students and 2 faculty from each group), but the agree- ment was then repudiated. Chancellor claimed that TWLF repudiated agreement; TWLF faculty claimed that Heyns said "key faculty" would not approve it.

February 10 UCB. Subcommittee of Dean Knight's Commit- tee on Ethnic Studies (headed by East Asian Studies Professor George DeVos) recommended that Third World faculty draw up the proposals for the creation of a College of Third World Stud- ies, TWLF criticized the report for excluding students and for forwarding the proposals to regular administrative and faculty channels, where TW faculty would be only ex-officlo (non-vot- ing) members.

February 19. UCB, Negotiations between TWLF and Chancel- lor Roger Heyns broke down on the powers of implementing committee. Chancellor claimed that the TWLF demand would "¡compromise] the integrity of campus academic review proce- dures" and if the TWLF would not accept his proposal, "we will, of course, seek other ways and other students and faculty mem- bers who are willing."

February 26, Heyns broke off negotiations because of "violence" of the strikers. This occurred at the time of the brutal arrest of MASC member Manuel Delgado, After he was arrested, Ysidro Macias was clubbed on the back of his head and arrested. He was unconscious for several hours. This incident resulted in stu- dent confrontation with police, who used clubs and teargas

February 27: UCB, First use of National Guard on campus. Police used teargas to drive students off campus. This repre- sented intense pressure from Governor Reagan's office to inter- vene in campus negotiations,"^

By the end of February there was apprehension among AAPA members that the strike might be getting.out of hand. Clashes with police were becoming intense, with a large police presence and the introduction of CS tear gas dropped by helicopter. By February 22 the university had announced that 127 individuals had been arrested. Arrested students were immediately placed on interim suspension and barred from strike participation. There was fear that the eventual declaration of martial law by Governor Reagan would make negotiations for third world college d e m a n d s exceedingly difficult. At a press conference, the governor argued for mar- tial law He stated that the police had run out of tear gas and that the National Guard would be present to replenish the depleted supply and to provide support to law enforcement,'^

104 Harvey Dong

On the evening of Thursday, February 20, an emergency AAPA meeting was conducted to discuss how to handle the confrontations with police. There was debate late into the night. Positions were polarized. The "soft-liners" felt that the violence had gotten out of hand. The strike was being taken over by "crazy white radicals" and was no longer controlled by third world people. They feared that the ongoing negotia- tion between the TWLF and the chancellor's office would be replaced by military martial law. The "hard-liners" felt that there was a need to intensify the protests and that the only basis for negotiations was the mass pressure on strike lines. One argued that it was a question not just of fighting for a third world college but of defeating a power structure that was responsible for the slaughter in Vietnam,^^

The resulting vote was twenty to "cool it" and seven to continue on the same militant path. The other TWLF leaders were contacted, and on the following day TWLF monitors went among the crowds of students and high-school youth and gave the directive that no violence should occur. Three thousand strikers and protestors rallied outside the Febru- ary 22 regents' meeting attended by Governor Reagan, This was one of the largest support rallies and one of the more peaceful. According to one local newspaper, strike leaders and monitors went into the crowds asking them to "be cool, no rock-throwing and don't give Reagan an excuse to call out the guard,"^^

According to the Berkeley Daily Gazette, this was also the largest show of organized law enforcement presence in Berkeley history. Over twenty law enforcement agencies formed a mutual-aid force of six hundred police and highway patrol officers. Over three hundred riot police were in visible view of the protest, and three hundred more were stationed in nearby parking garages. Fifty armed National Guardsmen were present with equipment vehicles and an army heli- copter. One thousand more National Guard soldiers were encamped on a military facility in nearby Alameda .^'^

The cooling-off tactic did prove that the TWLF was sin- cere about negotiating for a settlement. At the same time, strikers felt that little had been resolved other than the need for more pressure. The regents voted to suspend students when there was "reasonable cause to believe" they had vio- lated campus rules. Negotiations with the chancellor con- tinued but remained inconclusive. As violence and arrests continued—including the arrest of strike leaders and the use of tear gas—the chancellor broke off meetings. Finally, Gov- ernor Reagan officially ordered the National Guard onto the campus, effectively making it an armed camp,^^

On March 4 the Academic Senate voted 550 to 4 in sup- port of the formation of an interim Ethnic Studies Depart- ment responsible only to the chancellor. The Senate allowed for third world student participation in the formulation of course curriculum and promised that the department's struc- ture would be "of sufficient flexibility to permit evolution into a college," The chancellor announced that the depart-

ment would "immediately offer four-year programs leading to a B,A, degree in history, culture, and contemporary experi- ence of ethnic minority groups, especially Black Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Ameri- cans." Study of each of the four groups would constitute a division within the interim department.^^

President Hitch announced final approval of the forma- tion of this department, to begin instruction in fall quarter 1969. In response, the TWLF announced the immediate sus- pension of all strike activities, with the stipulation that the strike could be reactivated at any moment if negotiations over the third world college demands reached any impasse,^^

Meanwhile, at SF State, President Hayakawa stated his opinion that granting ethnic studies was the only way to move past three semesters of student strife. He acknowl- edged that third world student frustrations stemmed from being excluded from academic opportunities. At the same time, he drew a distinction between students who partici- pated because they wanted inclusion and other students who participated because of New Left ideologies. He supported the former but asserted that there was nothing he could do for the latter, 5̂ The assumption here was that third world students were willing to work for reforms whereas many of the white students were members of leftist organizations whose goals did not include reforms.

The TWLF Strike at San Francisco State College was somewhat more successful than that at Berkeley, The first school of ethnic studies in the nation was established and was eventually able to confer degrees in ethnic studies, American Indian Studies, Asian American Studies, Black Studies, and La Raza Studies, UC Berkeley, on the other hand, received budget allocations for a single Department of Ethnic Studies with subdivisions in Asian American, Afri- can American, Chicano, and Native American Studies, There was disagreement among Berkeley TWLF strikers over how far an interim Ethnic Studies Department could develop and consternation over the fact that future generations of students might not be able to continue pressing the univer- sity for the original goal of a third world college. In many respects, the ending of the strike was more a stalemate than a final settlement.

CONCLUSION

The TWLF Strikes became an important training ground for many future community activists. The daily strike activities, the conflicts with the administrations, and the many alliances created became important learning tools for the future. The strike settlements were uplifting for the third world student movement, previously without institutional power and now in partial institutional control. Student energies turned to building programs previously seen as pipe dreams and to legitimizing Asian American and ethnic studies.

Third World Liberation Comes to San Francisco State and UC Berkeley 105

The challenge was how to develop the programs while maintaining the original goals and purposes of educational relevance and community orientation. The balancing act at times leaned toward bridging the campus and community, but more often the focus was on legitimization on campus at the expense of the community. There are still many cam- puses today where students are fighting for the establishment. of Asian American Studies and ethnic studies programs. And colleges that have these programs still face ongoing battles against program marginalization and budget cuts.

Unquestionably the establishment of ethnic studies pro- grams has been one of the chief legacies of the TWLF Strikes. Similar programs have grown nationally in over 250 univer- sities, colleges, and high schools. Both UC Berkeley and SF State University now provide undergraduate and graduate degree programs in ethnic studies. Still, the most important but often forgotten legacy of the stakes was the building of solidarity among the different racial and ethnic groups that truly wished to change the educational environment. This solidarity found value in future struggles such as the Interna- tional Hotel antieviction movement and the Alcatraz Island Native American movement, when many former TWLF par- ticipants were involved in struggles within their own ethnic communities but were linked in cooperation.

NOTES

1. Bryant Fong, interview by author, 2001. 2. Ibid, tn 1968, Yuji Ichioka and Emma Gee initiated a small

Asian American caucus within the Peace and Freedom Party in the Berkeley/East Bay area. Ichioka was a history graduate student at UC Berkeley Both Ichioka and Gee were involved in the Civil Rights movement in the American South. The cau- cus became the forerunner to the AAPA, the first self-named group that called itself "Asian American," a term that Ichioka proposed.

3. AAPA Newspaper 6, no. 2 (January 1969); Bryant Fong, inter- view by author, 2001.

4. Bryant Fong, interview by author, 2001. 5. Ibid. Leways was a Chinatown street youth self-help organiza-

tion that ran a soda fountain and pool hall on Jackson Street and was dedicated to community service and change. Youth Council funded employment training as the youth arm of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity poverty program. It concentrated on the swelling Chinatown youth population during this period.

6. Ibid. 7. The only documentation of the Yellow Symposium and state-

wide AAPA meeting was "Area Movements—AAPA," AAPA Newspaper 6, no. 2 Qanuary 1969).

8. SF State Strike Committee, On Strike: Shut U Down (1968), 3. George Murray was an English Department lecturer who was dismissed for his participation in the Black Panther Party.

9. "TWLF UCB Strike Demands," Solidarity Newsletter (1969), 3. 10. Research Organizing Cooperative, Strike at Frisco State: The

Story Behind It (San Francisco: 1968), 2-8. 11. SFSC Strike Committee, On Strike (1968), 6. 12. ICSA, SF State Strike Bulletin, 1968.

13. "Statement of the Philippine-American Collegiate Endeavor: Philosophy and Goals." PACE, SF State College, mimeograph (1967).

14. This would change remarkably during the next decade due to the effects of the 1965 Immigration Act and the ensuing refugee migration in 1975 with the fall of Saigon. New condi- tions again challenged the basis for Asian American panethnic unity as the Asian American population balance shifted toward larger numbers of foreign-born Asian immigrants.

15. Victoria Wong, interview by author, 2001. 16. "Understanding AAPA," AAPA Newspaper 6.5, no. 7 (1970),

4-5. 17. W H. Orrick J r , Shut It Down! A College in Crisis: San Francisco

State College, October 1968-April 1969 (San Francisco, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969),

• 2 2 . 18. Ibid., 34-35. 19. Ibid., 100-101. The egalitarian decision-making aspects of the

TWLF at SF State were forwarded to TWLF-Berkeley during the formative stages of the Berkeley organization. Strike leader Richard Aoki emphasized this point in a 1995 Ethnic Studies 41 course panel at UC Berkeley

20. Class attendance during the strike was 20 percent, according to the American Federation of Teachers, or 68 percent, accord- ing to the college administration. Ibid. The relegation of whites to a supporting role in the TWLF finds its genealogy in a 1964 strategizing session of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a major civil rights organization, that resulted in the exit of all white members. White membership in SNCC was viewed as an encumbrance to building grass- roots black leadership. Blacks were to develop the Black Power movement and whites to organize against racism in their own white communities. See Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Atvakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, Mass.: Har- vard University Press, 1995), 144.

21. The earlier figures are from an essay by Matthew Dennis in the Free Speech movement book The Third World Liberation Front Strike of 1969 (unpublished). The 19 percent figure for African American, Chicano, and Native American California popula- tions is found in 1970 census materials in State of California Department of Finance archives, dof.ca.gov/html/demograp/ race7090.xls. There was no Chicano census category; the His- panic category combined the majority Chicano population

. with Latinos. The 1970 student demographic materials are from UC Berkeley archives. Office of Student Research, UC Berkeley, Fnrollmentsfrom Fall 1970 to Fall 1985 (2001).

22. NSC and CSC, Fact Sheet by Nisei Students Club and Chinese Stu- dents Club ofUC Berkeley (Berkeley: unpublished, 1968).

23. Berkeley Third World Liberation Front, Strike 1969 (Berkeley: unpublished, 1969) (hereafter cited as TWLF Strike 1969).

24. Ibid. 25. L&S essentially did not want to allow African American fac-

ulty and students control over the department or its admission of freshman students. M. Dennis, "Unpublished Report," in Ethnic Studies 41 Course Reader, UC Berkeley (1995). See also Steve Duscha, "Third World Votes—Strike Wednesday" Daily Caiifomian,January20, 1969.

26. TWLF, Sirifee 1969. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Manuel Delgado, presentation at conference entitled "The

Third World Strike: Historical Lessons. Crossing Over: A Strat- egy Session and 30 Year Commemoration of the UC Berkeley Third World Strike" (Berkeley: unpublished, 1999) (hereafter cited as "Historical Lessons").

106 Harvey Dong

30. Manuel Delgado, TWLF Strike Status (Berkeley: unpublished, 1969).

31. Bryant Fong, interview by author, 2001. 32. Ibid. 33. Steve Wong, interview by author, San Francisco, 2001. 34. Ibid. 35. Delgado at "Historical Lessons." 36. L. Boyer at "Historical Lessons." 37. From a pure social-science viewpoint, the TWLF can be

depicted as a utilitarian instrument, a temporary coalition formed so each group can gather its share. Once progress is made, the coalition is demobilized and each racial group con- tinues in its own space. While this may have been true in the beginning stages of the struggle, the political consciousness of the activists, influenced by context and by their participation, needs to be an important part of the analysis.

38. SFSC Strike Committee, On Strike! (1968), 49-51. S. I. Hay- akawa served as president of SFSC from 1968 to 1973. A con- servative Japanese American and Republican Party member, he later was elected to the U.S. Senate and served from 1976 to 1983. Hayakawa's perspectives were consistently in line with those of Ronald Reagan, who was California governor from 1966 to 1974 and U.S. president from 1980 to 1988.

39. M. Kitchell, Berkeley in the 6O's (Berkeley: Kitchell Films, 1990).

40. Delgado at "Historical Lessons." 41. TWLF, Strike J 969. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid.

44. J. Bartl, "Strike Violence Grows, Police Invade Campus," Daily Califomian, February 5,1969,1.

45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. R. Dillion, "Sproul Beatings Reported," Daily Califomian, Feb-

ruary 19, 1969; Michael Hall, "Jim Nabors Beaten, Arrested in Confrontation at Sproul Plaza; ACLU Threatens Lawsuit," ibid. According to a statement by the TWLF, on February 13, 1969, statements signed by twelve university employees and inde- pendendy by others recounted indiscriminate severe beatings by police in the basement of Sproul Hall. TWLF, Strike 1969.

48. Editorial, "The Horror," Daily Califomian, February 13, 1969, 1.

49. Richard Aoki, interview by author, 2001. 50. TWLF, Strike 1969. According to the Berkeley Daily Gazette, on

February 20, over a thousand National Guard were on standby, at the Berkeley Marina and in Alameda. "How Long Will the Guard Remain?" Berkeley Daily Cazette, February 22,1969,1.

51. G. Cant, "Police Mass on Campus," Berkeley Daily Gazette, Feb- ruary 22, 1969, 1.

52. Arnold Li, interview by author, San Francisco, 2001. 53. Cant, "Police Mass on Campus." 54. Ibid. 55. L. Ling-chi Wang, Chronology of Ethnic Studies at U.C. Berkeley

(Berkeley: unpublished, 1997). 56. Ibid. 57. TWLF Strike] 969. 58. Orrick, Shut it Down! 172.