game1 crime
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DoesCrimePay.pdf
DOES CRIME PAY?*
James Q. Wilson UCLA
Allan Abrahamse The RAND Corporation
The legitimate and the criminal earnings of mid-rate and high-rate burglars, robbers, auto thieves, swindlers, and mixed types (mostly drug dealers) among state prison inmates in California, Michigan, and Texas are estimated and compared to the inmates' perceptions of their earnings. Crime appears to pay less than legitimate work for most mid-rate offend- ers; the reverse is true for most high-rate offenders. Inmates believe that they receive from crime much more than they do in fact. The earnings from crime per day spent in prison decrease as the number of crimes in- creases, suggesting that high-rate offenders commit crimes with little re- gard to the net yield. We suggest that career criminals do not maximize the net benefits of crime because they are highly present-oriented and quite opportunistic.
I t is w i d e l y a s s u m e d t h a t l e v e l s o f p r o p e r t y c r i m e a r e h i g h b e -
c a u s e c r i m e pays. C r i m e m a y p a y if t h e e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t s o f legiti-
m a t e e m p l o y m e n t ( t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f f i n d i n g a j o b t i m e s its w a g e )
a r e l o w e r t h a n t h e e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t s o f s t e a l i n g ( t h e y i e l d f r o m
c r i m e less t h e c o m b i n e d p r o b a b i l i t y o f a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , a n d in-
c a r c e r a t i o n ) . I n p u b l i c d e b a t e s , l i b e r a l s t e n d t o e m p h a s i z e t h e u n -
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f j o b s o r t h e l o w p a y f r o m jobs, w h i l e c o n s e r v a t i v e s
t e n d t o e m p h a s i z e t h e l o w p r o b a b i l i t y o r t h e l e n i e n c y o f p u n i s h -
m e n t . T h e logic o f t h e t w o p o s i t i o n s , h o w e v e r , is m u c h t h e s a m e .
M a n y e f f o r t s h a v e b e e n m a d e t o e s t i m a t e t h e e f f e c t s o n c r i m e
r a t e s o f b o t h j o b - r e l a t e d v a r i a b l e s ( c h i e f l y t h e r a t e s o f u n e m p l o y -
m e n t o r l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) a n d s a n c t i o n i n g v a r i a b l e s
( c h i e f l y t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a c r i m e will r e s u l t i n i m p r i s o n m e n t ) .
I n g e n e r a l , a n d s u b j e c t t o m a n y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a n d i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s ,
t h e s e s t u d i e s h a v e f o u n d t h a t h i g h e r r e p o r t e d r a t e s o f p r o p e r t y
c r i m e t e n d t o b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l o w e r r a t e s o f l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n a n d l o w e r p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f p u n i s h m e n t ( B l u m s t e i n , C o h e n ,
a n d N a g i n 1979).
* Correspondence should be directed to Professor James Q. Wilson, Graduate School of Management, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1481.
JUSTICE QUARTERLY, Vol. 9 No. 3, September 1992 © 1992 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
360 DOES CRIME PAY?
These estimates, t h o u g h useful in explaining w h a t conditions m a y lead to high or low levels of crime, are n o t v e r y h e l p f u l in ex- plaining career criminality. W i t h i n t h e economic f r a m e of analy- sis, career criminals m u s t be people who act as if t h e y f i n d t h e c u r r e n t n e t benefits of crime positive. Yet because m o s t people act as if t h e y f i n d t h e m to be negative, c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s - - t h a t is, high- r a t e r e p e a t o f f e n d e r s - - m u s t differ in some i m p o r t a n t respect f r o m noncriminals. It is n o t h a r d to imagine w h a t t h e s e differences m i g h t be; t h e y include differences in preferences, in tastes f o r risk, in a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d time, a n d t h e like.
A n o t h e r possibility exists, however. R e p e a t o f f e n d e r s m a y n o t simply have d i f f e r e n t p r e f e r e n c e s or tastes; t h e y m a y be m a k i n g m i s t a k e s or m a y be t h e victims of t e m p o r a l inconsistency. T h e m i s t a k e s are easy to imagine: t h e y m a y believe t h a t t h e y will gain m o r e f r o m crime or will r u n s m a l l e r risks of p u n i s h m e n t t h a n in fact is t h e case. " T e m p o r a l inconsistency" r e f e r s to people's ten- dency to act c o n t r a r y to t h e i r own l o n g - t e r m interests. In its acute form, this inconsistency explains m a n y addictions: a person t a k e s a drug, f o r example, because t h e d r u g is r e a d y a t hand, e v e n t h o u g h he k n o w s t h a t h e will feel miserable t o m o r r o w a n d t h a t h e increases his chances of being w r e t c h e d f o r t h e r e s t of his life. I n less acute forms, it explains w h y we r e f u s e to o r d e r a rich d e s s e r t at t h e beginning of a d i n n e r (we w a n t to avoid e x t r a calories) b u t will t a k e t h e dessert eagerly if t h e w a i t e r brings it to o u r table af- t e r we have finished t h e m a i n course. T h e r e is a growing litera- t u r e on t e m p o r a l inconsistency, designed to help explain otherwise puzzling aspects of p r e s u m a b l y r a t i o n a l behavior. (For example, t h e same person will b o t h gamble at L a s Vegas a n d b u y life insur- ance. Is this person risk-prone or risk-averse? He can't be both.) Some of t h e l i t e r a t u r e was compiled by E l s t e r (1986), a n d t h e p r o b l e m is a n a l y z e d t h o r o u g h l y b y Ainslie (1992).
In this article we e x a m i n e t h e gains (both e s t i m a t e d by a n ob- server a n d perceived by t h e recipient) f r o m crime a n d f r o m w o r k f o r state prison i n m a t e s in California, Michigan, a n d Texas. T h e d a t a w e r e obtained f r o m those prisoners who participated in t h e R a n d I n m a t e S u r v e y ( C h a i k e n a n d C h a i k e n 1982). P r i s o n inmates, of course, are people for w h o m n e i t h e r t h e l u r e of e m p l o y m e n t n o r t h e f e a r of sanctions was great e n o u g h to d e t e r t h e m f r o m crime. W h a t we l e a r n about t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s c a n n o t be genera- lized to a n y k n o w n population; o u r goal is to h e l p explain h o w re- p e a t e d o f f e n d e r s view t h e i r alternatives.
W h a t we k n o w about i n m a t e s ' behavior depends on t h e i r tell- ing i n t e r v i e w e r s h o w m a n y crimes t h e y have committed. Obvi- ously those r e p o r t s will contain errors. A n extensive analysis of
W I L S O N A N D A B R A H A M S E 361
t h e i r c o n s i s t e n c y a n d r e l i a b i l i t y was c a r r i e d o u t b y C h a i k e n a n d C h a i k e n (1982:223-51), w h o c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y of i n m a t e s gave i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t r e s p o n s e s a n d t h a t m o s t gave a n s w e r s w h i c h w e r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r official c r h n i n a l records. T h a t s e e m e d especially to b e t h e case w i t h b u r g l a r s , a g r o u p t o w h i c h w e shall p a y special a t t e n t i o n . T h o u g h s o m e i n m a t e s n o d o u b t c o n c e a l e d c r i m e s t h a t t h e y h a d c o m m i t t e d a n d s o m e m a y h a v e b o a s t e d of c r i m e s t h a t t h e y n e v e r c o m m i t t e d , t h e r e s e e m s n o t to be a n y p a t t e r n of bias in t h e r e s p o n s e s o r m a n y s t r o n g c o r r e l a - tions b e t w e e n e v i d e n t signs of bias a n d o t h e r p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s - tics. C h a i k e n a n d C h a i k e n c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e s e s e l f - r e p o r t e d c r i m e r a t e s p r o b a b l y w e r e stable w i t h i n a f a c t o r of 1.5. I n t h e fol- lowing discussion w e use d a t a f r o m this R a n d I n m a t e Study.
TYPES OF O F F E N D E R S
T o a n a l y z e t h e costs a n d b e n e f i t s of crime, w e h a d to g r o u p in- m a t e s into categories b a s e d on t h e k i n d a n d n u m b e r of t h e i r of- lenses. T h i s is n o t d o n e easily b e c a u s e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of o f f e n d e r s is h i g h l y s k e w e d a n d c r i m e specialization is r a r e . F i g u r e 1 shows t h e p e r c e n t a g e of p r i s o n e r s w h o c o m m i t t e d v a r i o u s n u m - b e r s of burglaries, a m o n g t h o s e w h o h a d c o m m i t t e d a n y b u r g l a r i e s a t all. T h e m e d i a n r a t e was 4.5 b u r g l a r i e s p e r y e a r ; o n e o f f e n d e r o u t of 20 c o m m i t t e d m o r e t h a n 260 b u r g l a r i e s p e r y e a r (or w o u l d h a v e d o n e so if h e h a d s p e n t t h e e n t i r e y e a r on t h e s t r e e t ) . 1 T h e m e d i a n b u r g l a r b e h a v e s v e r y d i f f e r e n t l y f r o m t h e m o s t active b u r - glar, a n d t h e average b u r g l a r scarcely exists. M o r e o v e r , h i g h - r a t e
o f f e n d e r s a r e n o t specialists. T h o u g h a f e w c o m m i t o n l y b u r g l a r i e s o r robberies, m o s t c o m m i t a m i x of crimes, w i t h v e r y d i f f e r e n t
payoffs.
W e divided t h e i n m a t e s i n t o five c r i m e t y p e s b y a p p l y i n g t h e following rule: w e a d d e d u p t h e n u m b e r of n o n d r u g p r o p e r t y of- l e n s e s t o w h i c h e a c h i n m a t e a d m i t t e d a n d t h e n c a l c u l a t e d t h e p e r - c e n t a g e each o f f e n s e was of t h e t o t a l f o r a given convict. E v e r y i n m a t e w h o said t h a t h a l f o r m o r e of his offenses w e r e r o b b e r i e s was l a b e l e d a robber. E v e r y i n m a t e w h o c o m m i t t e d r o b b e r y less t h a n 10 p e r c e n t of t h e t i m e was called a b u r g l a r / t h i e f if h e com- m i t t e d b u r g l a r y o r t h e f t at least h a l f t h e time, a s w i n d l e r if h e c o m m i t t e d a f o r g e r y o r e n g a g e d in a f r a u d at least o n e - t h i r d o f t h e time, a n d a n a u t o t h i e f if h e stole cars a t least o n e - t h i r d of t h e time. T h o s e w h o r e p o r t e d n o p r e d o m i n a n t t y p e of p r o p e r t y c r i m e ( a b o u t o n e - f o u r t h of all i n m a t e s ) w e r e l a b e l e d " m i x e d ; " as it t u r n s
1 T h e r a t e s displayed in t h i s figure a r e s o m e w h a t l o w e r t h a n t h o s e s h o w n in C h a i k e n a n d C h a i k e n (1982) because w e u s e d m o r e conservative assumptions.
362 DOES CRIME PAY?
Figure 1. Distribution of Annualized Burglary Rate among Prisoners Who Committed Burglary
1 0 0 . 0 %
7 5 . 0 %
5 0 . 0 %
2 5 . 0 %
0 . 0 %
77.6%
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0.9% 0.9% 1 1 % 1.3%
20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 100-120 120-140 140-160 160.180 180-200 200-260 >260
B u r g l a r i e s p e r Y e a r o n Street
out, most m e m b e r s of this group engaged p r i m a r i l y in selling drugs, t h o u g h t h e y dabbled in o t h e r crimes.
Because t h e m i x of crimes is r e l a t e d to t h e crime r a t e a n d be- cause t h e distribution of offenses is h i g h l y skewed, it m a k e s little sense to analyze t h e costs a n d benefits of crime f r o m t h e viewpoint of t h e average offender; for all practical purposes, t h e r e is no such person. I n s t e a d we e s t i m a t e d t h e costs a n d benefits of crime for each type of crime at two points in t h e crime r a t e distribution: t h e i n t e r q u a r t i l e r a n g e (between t h e t w e n t y - f i f t h a n d t h e s e v e n t y - f i f t h percentile) a n d b e t w e e n t h e f i f t i e t h a n d t h e n i n e t i e t h percentile. I n doing so we e l i m i n a t e t h e e x t r e m e s of t h e distribution, w h e r e r e p o r t i n g errors are l i k e l y to be most common, because some in- m a t e s a d m i t t e d to almost no c r i m i n a l i t y a n d o t h e r claimed ex- t r a o r d i n a r i l y h i g h rates. T h e first of t h e s e groups can be described as mid-rate offenders a n d t h e second as h i g h - r a t e (but n o t t h e highest-rate) offenders. Obviously, m e m b e r s h i p in t h e two groups overlaps.
In Tables 1 a n d 2 we list t h e n u m b e r of offenses of all k i n d s for t h e m e m b e r s of t h e mid-rate a n d t h e high-rate groups respec- tively w i t h i n each crime type. This ad hoc classification s y s t e m produces r e l a t i v e l y h o m o g e n e o u s groups: t h e m e d i a n b u r g l a r /
Table 1.
WILSON AND ABRAHAMSE
C r i m e s per Year on the Street for Five Groups of "Mid- R a t e " Offenders, by Type of Offense
363
Burglary/ Auto Offense Theft Swindling Theft Robbery Mixed
Number of Inmates 179 61 20 46 94
Burglary 10.81 1.17 4.27 1.48 4.58 Theft 11.12 2.22 2.13 0.71 3.94
Forgery 0.64 11.20 0.19 0.46 1.22 Fraud 0.51 11.49 0.09 0.64 1.61
Auto Theft 0.92 1.12 47.32 0.29 1.52
Robbing Persons 0.15 0.35 0.37 4.19 2.23 Robbing Businesses 0.11 0.16 0.39 7.25 2.34
Drug Sales 98.56 297.05 252.64 43.89 382.46
All but Drugs 24.26 27.71 54.76 15.01 17.45
Source: Chaiken and Chaiken (1982). a "Mid-rate" means offenses committed by inmates in the interquartile to 75th percentile) for each crime type.
range (25th
Table 2. Crimes per Year on the Street for Five Groups of "High- Rate ''a Offenders, by Type of Offense
Burglary/ Auto Offense Theft Swindling Theft Robbery Mixed
Number of Inmates 143 48 16 36 75
Burglary 43.83 8.03 23.02 3.88 13.35 Theft 53.30 11.84 8.34 2.41 10.84
Forgery 2.80 60.02 0.24 1.18 2.80 Fraud 1.65 39.93 0.00 1.10 4.01
Auto Theft 4.45 6.10 215.66 1.57 4.46
Robbing Persons 0.70 0.49 3.62 16.83 6.92 Robbing Businesses 0.43 0.51 1.29 16.03 6.55
Drug Sales 214.65 252.48 147.45 376.94 357.18
All but Drugs 107.15 126.93 252.17 43.00 48.93
Source: Chaiken and Chaiken (1982). a "High-rate" means offenses committed by inmates between the median and the 90th percentile for each crime type.
t h i e f , r o b b e r , s w i n d l e r , a n d a u t o t h i e f m o s t l y c o m m i t c r i m e s o f t h e
d e f i n i n g t y p e ; i n a d d i t i o n , all t y p e s , b u t e s p e c i a l l y t h e h i g h - r a t e t y p e s , s e l l d r u g s a s w e l l a s c o m m i t t i n g p r o p e r t y c r i m e s .
E A R N I N G S F R O M C R I M E A N D F R O M W O R K
T o c a l c u l a t e t h e c r i m i n a l e a r n i n g s f o r m i d - r a t e a n d h i g h - r a t e
o f f e n d e r s , w e h a d t o e s t i m a t e t h e y i e l d ( a f t e r f e n c i n g ) f r o m t h e a v -
e r a g e o f f e n s e . F o r b u r g l a r y , t h e f t , r o b b e r y , a n d a u t o t h e f t , t h a t
364 DOES CRIME PAY?
a m o u n t was derived f r o m t h e N a t i o n a l C r i m e S u r v e y r e p o r t of av- erage losses by victims in those crimes. We could f i n d no pub- lished estimates of losses f r o m f r a u d a n d forgery, so we guessed. T h e value of stolen goods (burglary, t h e f t , a n d a u t o t h e f t ) was de- f l a t e d by t h e p e r c e n t a g e l i k e l y to be realized f r o m a fence (we guessed 20%); we set t h e value of stolen cash (robbery f r o m a per- son or a business) at 100 percent, even t h o u g h robbers also m a y t a k e watches a n d j e w e l r y t h a t m u s t be fenced. T h e a m o u n t real- ized m u s t be d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g all participants in a crime. T h e National C r i m e S u r v e y estimates t h a t t h e average r o b b e r y in- volves 1.7 criminals. We could find no e s t i m a t e of t h e average n u m b e r of participants in burglary, t h e f t , a n d a u t o t h e f t , so we ar- b i t r a r i l y set t h a t value at 1.7 as well. T h e yield f r o m d r u g sales has b e e n investigated by R e u t e r , MacCoun, a n d M u r p h y (1990), w h o concluded t h a t t h e m e d i a n dealer in Washington, DC, h a d n e t earnings (sales less p r o d u c t costs) of about $2,000 p e r m o n t h , or $12 per sale. These estimates, c o n v e r t e d into 1988 dollars, a n d t h e i r sources are s u m m a r i z e d in A p p e n d i x Table A1.
To convert criminal earnings into t h e equivalent of a daily wage, we e s t i m a t e d t h e days free on t h e s t r e e t p e r year, using t h e S h i n n a r a n d S h i n n a r (1975) model, d a t a on t h e probability of in- carceration, a n d t h e average t i m e served per i n c a r c e r a t i o n f r o m t h e B u r e a u of J u s t i c e Statistics. These estimates a n d t h e d a t a sources are s h o w n in A p p e n d i x Table A2. O u r e s t i m a t e s of s t r e e t t i m e correspond r e a s o n a b l y well to i n m a t e s ' r e p o r t s in California a n d Texas as to h o w m a n y days per y e a r t h e y w e r e free on t h e streets, b u t are significantly less t h a n r e p o r t e d by i n m a t e s in Michigan.
Obviously t h e s e e s t i m a t e s m a y contain substantial errors; some are p u r e guesswork. In g e n e r a l we t e n d e d to use t h e most generous estimates of t h e earnings f r o m crime. F o r example, we set t h e value of a stolen car at 20 p e r c e n t of its m a r k e t value, even t h o u g h m o s t stolen cars are recovered by t h e police (and h e n c e yield n o t h i n g to t h e thief). A m o n g cars t h a t are resold, t h e yield m a y be as low as 10 percent.
To e s t i m a t e t h e potential earnings f r o m legitimate employ- m e n t , we used t h e i n m a t e s ' o w n estimates of t h e i r h o u r l y earnings w h e n employed, adjusted to 1988 dollars (about $5.78 per hour). We c o n v e r t e d t h e s e estimates into a n n u a l income for t h e n u m b e r of days t h e y w e r e f r e e on t h e s t r e e t a n d r e d u c e d t h e m by a n esti- m a t e d t a x r a t e of 20 percent.
In t h e following tables we compare e s t i m a t e d criminal earn- ings w i t h legitimate earnings for t h e same period of t i m e f o r mid- r a t e a n d high-rate o f f e n d e r s in each crime group. L e t us begin
~ N AND A B R A H A M S E 365
w i t h b u r g l a r y / t h e f t . I n Table 3, C o l u m n 1 we r e p o r t t h e portfolio of crimes t h a t t h e typical m i d - r a t e b u r g l a r w o u l d c o m m i t i n a y e a r if h e w e r e f r e e o n t h e s t r e e t f o r t h a t long. C o l u m n 2 displays t h e n u m b e r of crimes h e can c o m m i t p e r year, given t h a t h e will be f r e e o n l y 86 p e r c e n t of t h e time. C o l u m n 3 shows t h e e s t i m a t e d earnings f r o m each crime a c t u a l l y c o m m i t t e d . A m i d - r a t e b u r g l a r f r e e on t h e s t r e e t will c o m m i t about n i n e burglaries, 10 thefts, a n d 85 d r u g sales, plus a s m a t t e r i n g of miscellaneous offenses. T h e to- tal e s t i m a t e d crime earnings f o r t h e y e a r are $2,368, tax-free. If this o f f e n d e r spent t h e same a m o u n t of t i m e w o r k i n g a t a legiti- m a t e job t h a t paid $5.78 p e r hour, h e w o u l d have e a r n e d $9,914 before t a x e s or $7,931 a f t e r taxes. F o r him, crime pays less t h a n working.
Table 3. Criminal Earnings of Mid-Rate Burglars/Thieves
C r i m e s p e r C r i m e s C r i m i n a l C r i m e Type Year o n S t r e e t a C o m m i t t e d b E a r n i n g s
Burglary 10.8 9.3 $ 498 T h e f t 11.1 9.5 274 F o r g e r y 0.6 0.5 82 F r a u d 0.6 0.4 66 A u t o T h e f t 0.9 0.8 364 R o b b e r y 0.2 0.1 40 Business R o b b e r y 0.1 0.1 29 D r u g Sales 98.6 84.5 1,014
Total 122.8 105.3 2,368
Note: If a m i d - r a t e b u r g i a r / t h i e f h a d w o r k e d at a legitimate job f o r t h e s a m e peri- od of t i m e (86% of t h e w o r k i n g h o u r s of t h e year) a n d h a d received t h e s a m e h o u r - ly wage h e r e p o r t e d l y received w h e n actually w o r k i n g ($5.78 p e r h o u r i n 1988 dol- lars), h e would have e a r n e d $7,931 p e r year a f t e r taxes, $5,563 m o r e t h a n h e e a r n e d f r o m t h e crimes h e committed. a T h e n u m b e r of crimes a n average m e m b e r of this group w o u l d c o m m i t ff f r e e on t h e s t r e e t f o r an e n t i r e year. h T h e n u m b e r of crimes an average m e m b e r of this group did commit, given t h a t h e w a s f r e e o n t h e s t r e e t 86 p e r c e n t of t h e year.
One m i g h t suppose t h a t h i g h - r a t e burglars would do better. T h e y do, b u t n o t b y much. I n Table 4 we see t h a t high-rate bur- g l a r s / t h i e v e s w o u l d c o m m i t 322 crimes per y e a r if t h e y w e r e f r e e on t h e s t r e e t t h e w h o l e time, a r a t e a l m o s t t h r e e times as g r e a t as t h a t of m i d - r a t e b u r g l a r s / t h i e v e s , b u t t h e i r h i g h e r r a t e of crime exposes t h e m to a m u c h g r e a t e r risk of being caught a n d incarcer- ated. As a r e s u l t of being free on t h e s t r e e t o n l y 60 p e r c e n t of t h e time, t h e n u m b e r of crimes t h e y actually c o m m i t t e d is 193. T h e i r n e t t a k e f r o m t h e s e crimes is $5,711 p e r year. H a d t h e y w o r k e d for t h e same period at a job paying $5.78 per hour, t h e y w o u l d h a v e e a r n e d $5,540 a f t e r taxes. T h u s crime p r o d u c e d r o u g h l y t h e same income as work. If t h e y h a d m a n a g e d to avoid prison for t h e
366 DOES CRIME PAY?
Table 4. Criminal Earnings of High.Rate Burglars/Thieves
Crimes per Crimes Criminal Crime Type Year on Street a Committed b Earnings
Burglary 43.8 26.3 $1,412 Theft 53.3 31.9 916 Forgery 2.8 1.7 252 Fraud 1.6 1.0 148 Auto Theft 4.5 2.7 1,230 Robbery 0.7 0.4 130 Business Robbery 0.4 0.3 80 Drug Sales 214.6 128.6 1,543
Total 321.8 192.8 5,711
Note: If a high-rate burglar/thief had worked at a legitimate job for t h e same peri- od of time (60% of the working hours of the year) and had received the same hour- ly wage he reportedly received when actually working ($5.78 per hour in 1988 dol- lars), he would have earned $5,540 per y e a r after taxes, about the same as he earned from the crimes he committed. a The number of crimes an average member of this group would commit ff free on the street for an entire year. b The number of crimes an average member of this group did commit, given that he was free on the street 60 percent of the year.
w h o l e y e a r ( w h i c h , o n t h e a v e r a g e , t h e y c o u l d n o t d o ) , a n d c o m -
m i t t e d c r i m e s a t t h e i r f u l l s e l f - r e p o r t e d r a t e , t h e y w o u l d h a v e
e a r n e d a b o u t $9,540, a b o u t t h e s a m e a s t h e $9,240 ( a f t e r t a x e s ) t h e y
w o u l d h a v e e a r n e d f r o m a f u l l - t i m e j o b . I n o t h e r w o r d s , a p e r s o n
w h o c h o o s e s b u r g l a r y / t h e f t a s a n o c c u p a t i o n w i l l n o t d o b e t t e r
t h a n a p e r s o n w o r k i n g a t $5.78 p e r h o u r . I n a d d i t i o n , h e m u s t
w o r r y a b o u t t h e v e r y h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g a r r e s t e d a n d i m -
p r i s o n e d .
I n T a b l e 5 w e s h o w t h e s u m m a r y f i g u r e s f o r a l l f i v e c r i m i n a l
t y p e s , b o t h m i d - r a t e a n d h i g h - l e v e l , p l u s t h e r e s i d u a l o r m i x e d c a t -
e g o r y . C r i m e p a i d m o r e t h a n w o r k f o r o n l y o n e g r o u p o f m i d - r a t e
o f f e n d e r s , a u t o t h i e v e s . 2 C r i m e a l s o p a i d m o r e t h a n w o r k f o r a l l
h i g h - r a t e o f f e n d e r s e x c e p t b u r g l a r s / t h i e v e s , b u t o n l y i n t h e c a s e o f
a u t o t h i e v e s d i d i t p a y s u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e . ( A s w e h a v e p o i n t e d
o u t a l r e a d y , o u r e s t i m a t e s o f t h e n e t y i e l d p e r a u t o t h e f t a r e p r o b a -
b l y m u c h t o o h i g h . ) I n t h e c a s e o f h i g h - r a t e r o b b e r s , m o s t o f t h e
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n c r i m i n a l a n d l e g i t i m a t e e a r n i n g s i s e x p l a i n e d
b y t h e i r t a k e f r o m d r u g s a l e s ; r o b b e r y a l o n e d o e s n o t p a y m o r e
t h a n w o r k .
2 We suspect but cannot prove that the earnings from auto theft are far less than we have assumed. We know anecdotes from police sources about auto thieves who earn only $200 or $300 for each stolen car delivered to a chop shop. Insofar as this is true, the fence rate for auto theft is closer to 1 percent t h a n to 20 percent, making auto theft one of the least remunerative occupations.
WILSON AND ABRAHAMSE 367
Table S. Criminal and Legitimate Earnings per Year (1988 Dollars)
High-Rate Mid-Rate Crime Type Crime Work Crime Work
Burglary/Theft $ 5,711 $5,540 $ 2,368 $7,931 Robbery 6,541 3,766 2,814 5,816 Swindling 14,801 6,245 6,816 8,113 Auto Theft 26,043 2,308 15,008 5,457 Mixed 6,915 5,086 5,626 6,956
C R I M I N A L B E L I E F S VERSUS C R I M I N A L R E A L I T I E S
On the basis of these calculations, being a mid-rate criminal
does not pay very well unless one is an auto thief. High-rate crimi-
nality seems to pay better, but only if one assigns a value of 0 to
the costs of crime. As we shall see, once we examine the yield
from crime net of one major cost (time in prison), even high-rate
offending begins to look unattractive. If ordinary crime truly is a
mug's game, as someone once said, we must wonder why people
would enter so unprofitable a line of work.
Perhaps our estimates are wrong, however. Perhaps crime
produces much more cash than we have calculated. If we base our
estimate of criminal earnings not on the likely value of what is sto-
len but on the inmates' own report of how much they earned from
crime, a criminal career appears much more attractive. In Table 6
we compare our calculations with the inmates' reports of the yield
from crime. To make the two estimates comparable, we calculated
how much they would earn from crime per year if they managed
to be on the street full time, and divided this amount by 12.
Clearly the inmates believed that crime pays very well. In
every case but one (high-rate auto thieves), their estimates of the
monthly take from crime were much higher than ours; for mid-
rate burglars/thieves, it was nearly 12 times as high. Only for mid-
rate auto thieves and high-rate swindlers were the two estimates
even roughly comparable. Even so, we find the inmates' report of
earnings questionable.
All of the inmates' responses are suspiciously similar. No mat-
ter what the crime or how active they were, the inmates tended to
give r o u g h l y t h e s a m e answer. If w e set aside t h e o n e v e r y h i g h
f i g u r e (given b y m i d - r a t e r o b b e r s ) a n d t h e o n e v e r y low f i g u r e ( q u o t e d b y h i g h - r a t e b u r g l a r s / t h i e v e s ) , all of t h e i n m a t e s ' esti- m a t e s a r e w i t h i n a b o u t $1,000 of o n e a n o t h e r ; six of t h e 10 a r e w i t h i n 80 p e r c e n t of o n e a n o t h e r . It seems h a r d to b e l i e v e t h a t h i g h - r a t e robbers, w h o c o m m i t t e d m o r e t h a n o n e c r i m e a d a y w h i l e f r e e o n t h e s t r e e t , w e r e e a r n i n g less f r o m c r i m e t h a n mid-
368 DOES CRIME PAY?
Table 6. Self-Reported Criminal Earnings Compared to Estimated Criminal Earnings
Monthly Earnings Crime Type Inmates' Report Our Est'nnate
Burglary/Theft Mid-rate $2,674 $ 230 High-rate 1,881 794
Robbery Mid-rate 3,679 373 High-rate 2,924 1,339
Auto Theft Mid-rate 2,627 2,120 High-rate 2,753 8,693
Swindling Mid-rate 2,426 647 High-rate 2,033 1,837
Mixed Mid-rate 3,100 623 High-rate 2,719 1,048
r a t e robbers, w h o c o m m i t t e d one o f f e n s e p e r w e e k , o r t h a t high- r a t e b u r g l a r s / t h i e v e s , w h o c o m m i t t e d o n e c r i m e p e r day, w e r e e a r n i n g less t h a n m i d - r a t e b u r g l a r s / t h i e v e s , w h o c o m m i t t e d o n e o n l y e v e r y t h r e e days.
We find a l m o s t n o r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e n u m b e r of c r i m e s i n m a t e s a d m i t h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d a n d t h e i r s e l f - r e p o r t e d m o n t h l y c r i m i n a l income. We t h i n k it possible t h a t i n m a t e s r e m e m b e r e d individual c r i m e s m o r e c l e a r l y t h a n m o n t h l y i n c o m e s f r o m crime. As a result, w h e n a s k e d w h a t t h e i r t o t a l c r i m i n a l e a r n i n g s w e r e p e r m o n t h , t h e y t e n d e d to give a s t e r e o t y p i c a l a n d quite i n a c c u r a t e answer: " a b o u t $2,500."
It is possible, of course, t h a t t h e i n m a t e s ' e s t i m a t e s w e r e cor- r e c t despite t h e s e inconsistencies. T h e t a k e of i n c a r c e r a t e d o f f e n d - e r s m a y be m u c h h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g e loss r e p o r t e d b y victims. T h i s situation w o u l d be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h judges' g e n e r a l t e n d e n c y to s e n d t h e m o s t serious o f f e n d e r s to prison a n d to place lesser of- f e n d e r s on probation. Y e t t h e loot w o u l d h a v e t o be m u c h m o r e v a l u a b l e to m a k e s e l f - r e p o r t e d i n c o m e m a t c h s e l f - r e p o r t e d of- lenses. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e average m i d - r a t e r o b b e r a d m i t t e d to c o m m i t t i n g a b o u t 59 crimes p e r y e a r , 44 of w h i c h w e r e d r u g sales; y e t h e r e p o r t e d a c r i m i n a l i n c o m e of a b o u t $28,300 p e r y e a r . T h a t f i g u r e implies t h a t each c r i m e p r o d u c e d a n e t gain of $ 4 8 0 - - m u e h too high f o r d r u g sales, unless h e was a m a j o r dealer. A n d it is n o t l i k e l y t h a t h e was a m a j o r dealer. R o b b e r y was t h e typical o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h a m i d - r a t e r o b b e r was s e n t e n c e d ; of all of t h e m i d - r a t e r o b b e r s , o n l y o n e h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d of selling drugs.
WILSON AND ABRAHAMSE 369
I n general, t h e i n m a t e s ' descriptions of t h e m s e l v e s - - r o b b e r s , burglars, a n d so f o r t h - - m a t c h e d r a t h e r closely t h e crime f o r w h i c h t h e y h a d b e e n sentenced. This f i n d i n g suggests t h a t a l t h o u g h all of t h e o f f e n d e r groups dealt in drugs to some e x t e n t , few w e r e big e n o u g h dealers to be p r o s e c u t e d a n d convicted for t h a t offense. Street-level d r u g sales, of t h e sort t h a t t h e s e robbers made, yield about $12 each. T h e r e f o r e t h e r e m a i n i n g 15 p r o p e r t y crimes w o u l d h a v e h a d to yield about $1,850 e a c h - - a b o u t t h r e e t i m e s as m u c h as t h e typical r o b b e r y victim reports losing. Yet, despite t h e s t r o n g doubts raised by t h e s e facts a n d figures, we c a n n o t r u l e out t h e possibility t h a t i m p r i s o n e d criminals m a k e m u c h m o r e f r o m crime t h a n t h e average offender.
L e t us suppose for t h e m o m e n t t h a t t h e i n m a t e s w e r e correct a n d t h a t t h e y w e r e m a k i n g $2,500 to $3,000 a m o n t h f r o m crime. On this assumption, crime clearly paid t h e m m u c h m o r e t h a n le- g i t i m a t e work. As we see in Table 7, on average t h e self-reported cash r e t u r n s f r o m crime w e r e about t h r e e t i m e s as g r e a t as t h o s e f r o m legitimate w o r k for t h a t fraction of t h e y e a r in w h i c h t h e of- f e n d e r s w e r e free on t h e street. F r o m t h e cash benefits of crime, however, we m u s t d e d u c t t h e costs of arrest, prosecution, a n d in- carceration. T h e s e costs include stigma, cash outlays to cover t h e fees of l a w y e r s a n d b o n d s m e n , t h e loss of income for one's f a m i l y (if any), a n d t h e discomfort, violence, a n d loss of f r e e d o m associ- a t e d w i t h prison life (minus t h e benefits of f r e e r o o m a n d board w h i l e in prison).
Table 7. Self-Reported Criminal and Estimated Legitimate Earnings during Time Free on the Street
High-Rate Offenders Mid-Rate Offenders Crime ~l~yp e Crime Work Crime Work
Burglary/Theft $13,518 $5,540 $27,516 $7,931 Robbery 14,286 3,766 27,764 5,816 Swindling 16,478 6,245 25,532 8,113 Auto Thefts 8,248 2,308 18,604 5,457 Mixed 17,944 5,086 27,987 6,956
We h a v e no w a y of e s t i m a t i n g t h e s e costs. As a n a l t e r n a t i v e , we can calculate h o w m u c h t h e average m e m b e r of each crime group t h i n k s h e will e a r n for each day of actual incarceration. Ta- ble 8 gives t h e s e results. If m i d - r a t e b u r g l a r s e s t i m a t e c o r r e c t l y w h a t t h e y can e a r n b y stealing, t h e y do f a i r l y well: t h e y e a r n $529 for each day t h e y will spend in prison. High-rate auto thieves a n d robbers do r a t h e r poorly: e v e n ff t h e i r earnings f r o m c r i m e are as h i g h as t h e y t h i n k , t h e y still e a r n o n l y $30 a n d $66 respectively for
370 DOES CRIME PAY?
Table 8. Compensation per Day of Prison Time
Crime Type
Inmates' Estimate of Annual Criminal Average Days Criminal
Earnings during Time in Prison per Income per Free on Street year Day in Prison
Burglary/Theft Mid-rate $27,516 52 $529 High-rate 13,518 146 92
Robbery Mid-rate 27,764 135 205 High-rate 14,286 216 66
Swindling Mid-rate 25,532 45 570 High-rate 16,478 119 139
Auto Theft Mid-rate 18,604 150 124 High-rate 8,248 274 30
Mixed Mid-rate 27,978 90 309 High-rate 17,944 164 109
e a c h d a y i n p r i s o n . O f c o u r s e , t h e s e a r e g r o s s e a r n i n g s , w i t h n o a d -
j u s t m e n t f o r w h a t t h e i n m a t e s p e n t o n f o o d , s h e l t e r , c l o t h i n g , a n d
e n t e r t a i n m e n t w h i l e h e w a s f r e e a n d n o a d j u s t m e n t f o r t h e b e n e - f i t s o f p r i s o n ( f r e e r o o m a n d b o a r d ) . W e d o u b t s e r i o u s l y t h a t t h e s e i n m a t e s s a v e d m u c h m o n e y f r o m t h e i r c r i m e s a n d t h u s t h a t t h e y
h a d m u c h i n t h e b a n k t o c o m p e n s a t e t h e m f o r t h e i r t i m e i n c o n - f i n e m e n t . W e c a n n o t s a y h o w m u c h o f t h e b u r d e n o f b e i n g i n p r i s o n w a s l i g h t e n e d b y f r e e s h e l t e r a n d m e a l s ( t h a t is, h o w m u c h
t h e i n m a t e s w o u l d h a v e p a i d f o r p r i s o n r o o m s a n d f o o d i f p r i s o n e n t a i l e d n o o t h e r s a c r i f i c e s , s u c h a s t h e l o s s o f f r e e d o m a n d t h e e x -
p o s u r e t o v i o l e n c e ) . W e l e a v e i t t o t h e r e a d e r t o j u d g e h o w m u c h t h e " b e n e f i t s " o f p r i s o n a r e w o r t h .
T h e m o s t s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e o f t h i s t a b l e , h o w e v e r , is t h a t t h e n e t b e n e f i t s o f c r i m e - - - d e f i n e d h e r e a s t h e m o n e y e a r n e d p e r d a y
s p e n t i n p r i s o n - - d e c l i n e , t h e m o r e c r i m e s w e r e c o m m i t t e d . M i d - r a t e burglars e a r n $529 p e r d a y o f p r i s o n t i m e ; h i g h - r a t e burglars, w h o c o m m i t t e d n e a r l y f o u r t i m e s a s m a n y c r i m e s p e r y e a r , e a r n o n l y $92 p e r d a y o f p r i s o n t i m e - - - a b o u t o n e - s i x t h a s m u c h . I f w e a c c e p t t h e i n m a t e s ' e s t i m a t e s o f t h e i r c r i m i n a l e a r n i n g s , c r i m e b e - c o m e s l e s s p r o f i t a b l e , t h e m o r e t i m e o n e s p e n d s o n it. T h i s is t h e c a s e b e c a u s e h i g h - r a t e o f f e n d e r s s p e n d m o r e d a y s i n p r i s o n , b u t (if t h e i n m a t e s a r e t o b e b e l i e v e d ) e a r n l i t t l e m o r e f r o m c r i m e . T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s t r e n g t h e n s o u r s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e s e e s t i m a t e s b y in- mates a r e n u m b e r s p u l l e d f r o m a h a t r a t h e r t h a n a c c u r a t e s t a t e - m e n t s o f c r i m i n a l e a r n i n g s .
E v e n i f t h e y a r e a c c u r a t e , t h e s e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e v a l u e o f b e i n g i m p r i s o n e d a r e n o t v e r y l a r g e . D o e s c o m m i t t i n g r o b b e r y a t a h i g h
WILSON AND ABRAHAMSE 371
r a t e m a k e sense f i n a n c i a l l y ff y o u are paid $66 p e r d a y in prison, a s s u m i n g t h a t y o u save e v e r y p e n n y y o u e a r n f r o m t h e robberies? I n o t h e r words, w o u l d y o u be willing to become a h i g h - r a t e robber if y o u k n e w t h a t on t h e average, y o u w o u l d spend m o r e t h a n h a l f of a n y given y e a r in jail or prison in e x c h a n g e for a n a n n u a l s a l a r y (tax-free, to be sure) of $14,2867
EXPLAINING T H E DECISION TO C O M M I T CRIMES
Most r e a d e r s of this article, we expect, w o u l d r e f u s e t h e s e gambles, b u t obviously t h e i n m a t e s h a d accepted t h e m . W h y ? L e t us consider some possibilities.
First, t h e y m a y have f e l t t h e y h a d no a l t e r n a t i v e because no l e g i t i m a t e w o r k was available. A b o u t two-thirds of each group, however, r e p o r t e d having b e e n e m p l o y e d for some l e n g t h of t i m e d u r i n g t h e period ( g e n e r a l l y about a year) w h e n t h e y w e r e f r e e on t h e s t r e e t before being convicted of t h e i r c u r r e n t offense. While employed, t h e y e a r n e d ( t h e y said) b e t w e e n $500 a n d $700 p e r m o n t h . We do n o t k n o w w h e t h e r t h e y h e l d t h e s e jobs w h i l e com- m i t t i n g crimes or l e f t t h e m ( v o l u n t a r i l y or i n v o l u n t a r i l y ) before t u r n i n g to crime, b u t we do k n o w t h a t t h e y c h a n g e d jobs f a i r l y often. T h e average m e m b e r of each o f f e n d e r group h e l d approxi- m a t e l y two d i f f e r e n t jobs while on t h e street; a b o u t o n e - f o u r t h h e l d t h r e e or m o r e (see Table 9). We gain t h e impression t h a t t h e s e i n m a t e s w e r e n o t so m u c h e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e job m a r k e t as casual a n d r e l a t i v e l y unsuccessful participants in it.
Second, t h e i n m a t e s m a y h a v e h a d so g r e a t a p r o b l e m w i t h d r u g or alcohol abuse t h a t t h e y w e r e u n f i t for or u n i n t e r e s t e d in r e g u l a r 9-to-5 jobs. We k n o w t h a t a b o u t two-thirds of all t h e of- f e n d e r s in t h e s e five groups a d m i t t e d e i t h e r to h a v i n g a serious d r i n k i n g p r o b l e m or to h a v i n g b e e n r e g u l a r d r u g users. (Heavy d r u g use was m o r e c o m m o n t h a n h e a v y drinking.) It is p o p u l a r l y believed t h a t people t u r n to crime to f i n a n c e t h e i r d r u g habits, b u t drugs (or alcohol) are n o t too costly to be f i n a n c e d w i t h t h e pro- ceeds of e i t h e r legitimate e m p l o y m e n t or d r u g sales. T h e evidence g a t h e r e d by R e u t e r et al. (1990) in Washington, DC suggests t h a t m o s t street-level dealers can m a k e e n o u g h m o n e y f r o m some com- b i n a t i o n of p a r t - t i m e dealing a n d r e g u l a r e m p l o y m e n t to s u p p o r t r a t h e r substantial r a t e s of d r u g consumption. If t h e sole object of t h e o f f e n d e r is to obtain m o n e y , w h e t h e r f o r drugs or f o r o t h e r purposes, t h e safest a n d most lucrative criminal occupation is d r u g dealing. F o r m o s t i n m a t e s in t h e R a n d survey, we m u s t e x p l a i n w h y so m a n y c o m m i t t e d r e l a t i v e l y high-risk a n d (by o u r esti- mates) low-profit p r o p e r t y crimes. One reason m a y have b e e n t h a t t h e i r alcohol a n d d r u g problems w e r e so severe t h a t t h e y could
372 D O E S C R I M E P A Y ?
Table 9. Inmates' Employment Experiences
P e r c e n t a g e E m p l o y e d a t P e r c e n t a g e S e l f - R e p o r t e d
A l l d u r i n g M e a n N u m b e r w i t h 3 o r M o n t h l y O f f e n d e r G r o u p s W i n d o w P e r i o d a of J o b s M o r e J o b s E a r n i n g s
M i d - R a t e O f f e n d e r s B u r g l a r / t h i e f 71% 1.89 23% $574 R o b b e r 61 1.89 21 477 A u t o t h i e f 85 1.71 18 605 S w i n d l e r 66 2.25 30 661 M i x e d 67 1.97 30 568
H i g h - R a t e O f f e n d e r s B u r g l a r / t h i e f 66% 1.96 25% $547 R o b b e r 61 2.14 27 497 A u t o t h i e f 75 1.83 17 667 S w i n d l e r 71 2.12 35 724 M i x e d 57 1.79 23 524
a " W i n d o w p e r i o d " was t i m e f r e e o n s t r e e t d u r i n g t w o y e a r s p r e c e d i n g p r e s e n t con- viction. F o r all o f f e n d e r groups, a v e r a g e w i n d o w t i m e was 14 m o n t h s .
h o l d n e i t h e r a legitimate n o r an illegitimate job; t h e y could sell n e i t h e r used cars n o r illegal drugs w i t h a n y regularity.
Third, w h e t h e r or n o t t h e y could find jobs or w e r e substance abusers, t h e i n m a t e s m a y have b e e n t e m p e r a m e n t a l l y disposed to overvalue t h e benefits of crime a n d to u n d e r v a l u e its costs. T h e r e is a great deal of evidence to support t h e t h e o r y t h a t p r o p e r t y of. f e n d e r s are i n o r d i n a t e l y impulsive or p r e s e n t - o r i e n t e d (Wilson a n d H e r r n s t e i n 1985, ch. 7). Consider a n o f f e n d e r w h o is on t h e s t r e e t c o n f r o n t i n g a n o p p o r t u n i t y for a c r i m e - - a d a r k house, a n unat- t e n d e d car, or an u n d e f e n d e d liquor store. T h e yield f r o m giving w a y to t h e t e m p t a t i o n to burgle t h e house, steal t h e car, or rob t h e liquor store is l i k e l y to be o n l y a few h u n d r e d dollars at best b u t t h e s e dollars are i m m e d i a t e l y available (for robbery) or are avail- able a f t e r only a s h o r t delay while a fence is f o u n d (for auto t h e f t or burglary). T h e costs of crime, on t h e o t h e r hand, are d e l a y e d considerably. K l e i n et al. (1991:36), f o u n d t h a t t h e average a m o u n t of t i m e t h a t elapsed b e t w e e n a r r e s t a n d s e n t e n c i n g in 14 populous A m e r i c a n counties was 146 days for b u r g l a r y a n d 175 days for rob- bery. F o r most people, even a r e m o t e chance of prison is a deter- r e n t f r o m crime, b u t t h a t is n o t t h e case for r e l a t i v e l y h i g h - r a t e offenders. To t h e m , even small s u m s of m o n e y are attractive w h e n t h e serious p e n a l t y is n o t to be paid u n t i l five or six m o n t h s in t h e f u t u r e .
T h e R a n d I n m a t e S u r v e y ( C h a i k e n a n d C h a i k e n , 1982) a s k e d t h e i n m a t e s to e s t i m a t e t h e probability t h a t various good a n d bad things w o u l d h a p p e n to t h e m as a r e s u l t of "doing crime." I n Ta- ble 10 we show t h e s e estimates for m i d - r a t e a n d h i g h - r a t e offend- ers. T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y of t h e i n m a t e s believed t h e y h a d
WIL.qON AND ABRAHAMSE 373
Table 10. Inmates' Estimates of Good and Bad Outcomes from Crime
Outcome by Offender Group Even Chance
Percentage Believing
High Chance or Certain
Mid-Rate Offenders Bad outcomes
Arrested 88.1% 65.4% Imprisoned 86.4 61,5 Injured or killed 86.9 56.4
Good outcomes High living 77.5 30.6 Expensive things 80.1 35.0 Being own man 79.0 46.4
High-Rate Offenders Bad outcomes
Arrested 88.6 68.0 Imprisoned 87.8 60.5 Injured or killed 90.4 64.6
Good outcomes High living 82.9 33.6 Expensive things 84.2 38.7 Being own man 81.1 46.2
a t l e a s t a n e v e n c h a n c e o f b e i n g a r r e s t e d , g o i n g t o p r i s o n , o r b e i n g
e i t h e r i n j u r e d o r k i l l e d a s a r e s u l t o f d o i n g c r i m e ; a b o u t t w o - t h i r d s t h o u g h t t h e r e w a s a h i g h c h a n c e o r t h a t i t w a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e s e t h i n g s w o u l d h a p p e n . ( A l t h o u g h t h e d a t a a r e n o t s h o w n h e r e , o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n o f t h e s e i n m a t e s b e l i e v e d t h a t c r i m e w o u l d
l e a d t o t h e i r h a v i n g f r i e n d s a n d a f a m i l y . ) A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y t h o u g h t t h e r e w a s a t l e a s t a n e v e n c h a n c e o f c r i m e
l e a d i n g t o " h i g h l i v i n g , " " o w n i n g e x p e n s i v e t h i n g s , " a n d ' % e i n g m y o w n m a n . " O n l y a b o u t o n e - t h i r d t h o u g h t i t w a s l i k e l y o r c e r t a i n
t h a t t h e s e p l e a s a n t t h i n g s w o u l d h a p p e n .
T h e s e c o n v i c t e d c r i m i n a l s h a d a g l o o m y ( a n d , g i v e n t h e t i m e t h e y s p e n t i n p r i s o n , r e l a t i v e l y a c c u r a t e ) a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e c o s t s o f c r i m e . I t is r i s k y , d a n g e r o u s , a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h a v i n g f r i e n d s o r f o r m i n g a f a m i l y . W h y , t h e n , d i d t h e y c o m m i t c r i m e s ? B e c a u s e t h e y also t h o u g h t t h e o d d s f a v o r e d s o m e g o o d o u t c o m e s , s u c h a s i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d h i g h living; b e c a u s e ( w e c o n j e c t u r e ) t h e y h e a v - i l y o v e r v a l u e d t h e n e a r t e r m ; a n d b e c a u s e t h e y b e l i e v e d t h a t o v e r t i m e t h e b e n e f i t s o f c r i m e w o u l d b e m u c h h i g h e r t h a n i n f a c t t h e y a r e . T h e b e n e f i t s w o u l d o c c u r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h o r s h o r t l y a f t e r c o m m i t t i n g t h e c r i m e , a n d t h e y w o u l d o c c u r w i t h e a c h a n d e v e r y c r i m e . S o m e c o s t s ( s u c h as p r i s o n ) w o u l d o c c u r o n l y m a n y m o n t h s a f t e r c o m m i t t i n g t h e c r i m e ; o t h e r s ( s u c h a s t h e r i s k o f i n j u r y , d e a t h , o r a r r e s t ) w o u l d n o t o c c u r a t a l l f o r m o s t o f t h e c r i m e s t h e y c o m m i t t e d . I ~ s s t h a n 3 p e r c e n t o f al l t h e b u r g l a r i e s a n d l e s s t h a n
374 DOES CRIME PAY?
2 p e r c e n t of all t h e robberies of persons r e s u l t e d in a n arrest. T h e o n l y crime t h a t carried a h i g h risk of a r r e s t was r o b b e r y of a busi- ness place (more t h a n 11% of such crimes w e r e followed by an arrest). W h e n a s k e d to r e f l e c t on a criminal career generally, t h e i n m a t e s f o u n d m u c h t h a t was unpleasant, b u t t h e y also believed t h a t t h e r e w a r d s w e r e high (recall t h e i r o v e r e s t i m a t e of t h e m o n t h l y financial r e t u r n s f r o m crime). W h e n a c r i m i n a l opportu- n i t y p r e s e n t e d itself, t h e i m m e d i a t e benefits probably s e e m e d m u c h g r e a t e r t h a n t h e d e f e r r e d costs. W h e n t h e i n m a t e s r e f l e c t e d a f t e r w a r d on t h e i r crimes, t h e y could j u s t i f y t h e i r impulsiveness to t h e m s e l v e s by e x a g g e r a t i n g t h e benefits of crime.
This view is s u p p o r t e d by t h e findings of Piliavin et al. (1986). T h e y e s t i m a t e d t h e effect of a v a r i e t y of individual-level variables on self-reported crimes a n d self-reported a r r e s t s a m o n g 1,497 of- f e n d e r s w h o w e r e participating in a job t r a i n i n g program. This was a high-risk group: t h e average o f f e n d e r h a d a c c u m u l a t e d m o r e t h a n n i n e arrests a n d t h r e e convictions a n d a l m o s t all h a d served t i m e in jail or prison. As expected, young, u n m a r r i e d m e n w h o were d r u g users a n d who h a d c o m m i t t e d m a n y crimes in t h e past w e r e t h e m o s t l i k e l y to c o m m i t a n e w crime or to be rear- r e s t e d w h i l e t h e y w e r e in t h e t r a i n i n g program. W h e n t h e s e fac- tors w e r e h e l d constant, t h e o t h e r variable t h a t was associated s t r o n g l y w i t h t h e commission of n e w crimes was t h e offenders' be- lief, expressed to an i n t e r v i e w e r some n i n e m o n t h s earlier, t h a t t h e y h a d f r e q u e n t (i.e., daily or w e e k l y ) opportunities to c o m m i t crimes. By contrast, t h e probability of c o m m i t t i n g a n e w crime was n o t affected by t h e i r beliefs about t h e relative riskiness of crime. ( W h e t h e r t h e s e perceptions w e r e in accord w i t h r e a l i t y was n o t examined.) Piliavin e t al. speculated t h a t o f f e n d e r s are d r a w n disproportionately f r o m those whose behavior is c o n t r o l l e d only w e a k l y by consequences t h a t are distant, t h a t h a v e a low probability of occurring, or t h a t v a r y o n l y m a r g i n a l l y f r o m case to case. Given t h e i r opportunistic inclinations (and, we w o u l d add, t h e i r e x a g g e r a t e d beliefs about t h e profitability of crime), t h e y will be d e t e r r e d o n l y by sanctions (or opportunities for legitimate work) that are immediate, that have a high probability of occur-
ring, or that can be made to change dramatically. 3
s The Piliavan et al. (1986) study had at least two limitations: it included no direct measure of actual earnings from either crime or work by which one could test the realism of the offenders' beliefs about the profitability of crime, and the authors employed a dichotomous dependent variable (arrest/no arrest or crime/no crime) that may have masked important differences in the frequency with which offenders broke the law.
WILSON AND ABRAHAMSE 375
CONCLUSIONS
I n sum, o u r impression is t h a t t h e c r i m i n a l careers of incarcer- a t e d o f f e n d e r s in California, Michigan, a n d Texas are n o t v e r y lu- crative. According to o u r estimates, based on t h e n u m b e r of offenses t h e y r e p o r t e d h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d , crime is a losing proposi- tion, e v e n in simple cash-flow t e r m s , for a l m o s t all m i d - r a t e of- f e n d e r s a n d pays only m o d e s t l y f o r even h i g h - r a t e offenders. B y t h e i r o w n estimates, t h e s e i n m a t e s e a r n a m o d e s t l y good income f r o m crime ( a r o u n d $25,000 per full y e a r of s t r e e t time). We have good reasons for believing t h a t t h e s e e s t i m a t e s are considerably exaggerated; e v e n if t h e y are accurate, t h e y c o n s t i t u t e r a t h e r small c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e n u m b e r of days m o s t of t h e o f f e n d e r s will spend in jail or prison. T h e n e t benefits of c r i m e - - t h a t is, t h e pro- ceeds of crime u s e d to c o m p e n s a t e o f f e n d e r s for t i m e in p r i s o n - - are small, especially for high-rate offenders.
I m p r i s o n e d criminals are aware t h a t crime carries g r e a t risks. Indeed, t h e y are r a t h e r fatalistic: t h e y believe t h a t crime in gen- e r a l is v e r y l i k e l y to lead to arrest, i m p r i s o n m e n t , a n d even death. B u t t h e y do n o t c o m m i t crimes " i n general;" t h e y c o m m i t particu- lar crimes, a n d t h e y believe (wrongly, we t h i n k ) t h a t a n y given crime will b r i n g substantial r e t u r n s .
Does creme pay? To someone c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e commission of a n y given crime, t h e a n s w e r is t h a t it pays r e a s o n a b l y well. T h e odds of being c a u g h t a n d p u n i s h e d for a n y given b u r g l a r y or t h e f t are quite small. T h e w o n d e r is t h a t m o r e people d o n ' t steal. Does a c r i m i n a l c a r e e r pay? F o r t h e i n m a t e s of t h e s e t h r e e state pris- ons, t h e a n s w e r is a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y "no."
If a c r i m i n a l c a r e e r d o e s n ' t pay, w h y are t h e r e so m a n y career criminals? O u r t e n t a t i v e a n s w e r is t h a t t h e people who become ca- r e e r criminals do n o t t h i n k in c a r e e r terms; t h e y t h i n k opportunis- tically. A " c r i m i n a l c a r e e r " is w h a t one observes retrospectively as t h e characteristic of people w h o have seized criminal opportuni- ties, e v e n t h o u g h sooner or l a t e r t h e odds will catch up w i t h t h e m (and e v e n t h o u g h t h e criminals k n o w this). We conjecture t h a t m a n y r e p e a t o f f e n d e r s e i t h e r misjudge t h e n e t benefits of crime or display t e m p o r a l inconsistency in especially s t r o n g form. Commit- t i n g a n y single crime of t h e sort t h e s e m e n u s u a l l y p e r p e t r a t e d is r e l a t i v e l y profitable. E a t i n g a single slice of chocolate cake is also profitable; it tastes good, a n d we do n o t gain a n y m e a s u r a b l e w e i g h t f r o m one slice. High-rate, r e p e a t offenders, however, com- m i t crimes well past t h e point w h e r e m o s t of t h e m will realize a positive yield; in this regard, t h e y are like binge eaters who go on ea~;ing cake even t h o u g h it m a k e s t h e m s u b s t a n t i a l l y worse off.
376 DOES CRIME PAY?
I f t h e c o s t s o f c o m m i t t i n g a s e r i e s o f c r i m e s w e r e p r e s e n t e d a l l
a t o n c e - - t h a t is, a t t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e f i r s t c r i m e w a s b e i n g
c o n t e m p l a t e d w t h e r e w o u l d p r o b a b l y b e f a r f e w e r c a r e e r
c r i m i n a l s . I f a l l o f t h e c o s t s o f a c a r e e r o f a d d i c t i o n , a l c o h o l i s m , o r
b i n g e e a t i n g w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e p e r s o n c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e f i r s t
s n o r t o r t h e f i r s t s w a l l o w , t h e r e w o u l d p r o b a b l y b e f a r f e w e r a d -
d i c t s , a l c o h o l i c s , o r g r o s s l y o v e r w e i g h t i n d i v i d u a l s . B u t t h a t d o e s
n o t o c c u r , a n d w e c a n t h i n k o f n o e a s y w a y t o m a k e i t o c c u r .
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