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Documents and Time Tim Gorichanaz Drexel University, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Gorichanaz, Tim (2016) "Documents and Time," Proceedings from the Document Academy: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. DOI: https://doi.org/10.35492/docam/3/1/7 Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/docam/vol3/iss1/7

We were young, and we had no need for prophecies.

Just living was itself an act of prophecy.

—Haruki Murakami, The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, 1994

I.

From penciled words spring lighthouses, castles and sheep, signs warning of

clogwyni peryglus—dangerous cliffs—ferries from Ireland, sacred wells, Roman

ramparts, ancient swells and angular crags, burial rings, salty gusts and circling

birds… and the distant mountains of Snowdonia like an avalanche on the horizon.

I wrote:

I came across a farmer fixing a kissing gate at one point. This was on a path

not ten feet from a cliff into the sea. “Trying to get this gate to close is all,”

he said. “I had a spring, but it rusted. No spot for metal here.”

I remember this farmer, with his wrinkled Welsh smile, and I remember

remembering this farmer as I wrote those words late at night on Easter 2013, in my

guest room after a long day of walking. And I remember premembering my present

self, for whom I was writing, reading these words in some far off future which is

now (or, more precisely, was).

This futurepresentpast unfolds in my reading of a small, brown notebook.

The notebook is softcover, three inches by five and not a quarter-inch thick, and

inside it are written such banal observations as: “It was still 2hrs before my bus, so

I went to a restaurant”; and “I sat listening to accents and thinking about things like

denim vests”; and “I had 2 of the 4 peppers and had 3 eggs.” And yet what emerges

in reading is not at all banal. Images bubble up with phrases and thoughts, things I

didn’t or couldn’t record in the form of pencil scratches years ago. So the words I

wrote are not merely words, but triggers—for memories—reconstructed,

preconstructed, deconstructed. This is remarkable, and I’m afraid we rarely, if ever,

consider just how remarkable it is.

II.

Time is one of our great preoccupations. From the busy person, who struggles

against it, to the philosopher, who struggles to understand it, to the physicist, who

struggles to explain it. In my view, the discourse on time, which has spanned

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millennia and methodologies, has attempted to explain time from two points of

departure: the physical and the experiential.

The physical view of time has been the predominant view for most of

modernity (Lindley, 2015). The physical theories see time as that which is

measured by the clock and calendar and is necessary for the scheduling of

appointments and the routing of trains. Physical time is the physicist’s time: one-

dimensional, conceptually inextricable from space and pointing like an arrow

toward entropy (Hawking, 1988). It can be understood as a series of fleeting nows;

the nows that were are called the past, the now that is is called the present, and the

nows to come are called the future. This conception of time impinges on the way

that we, as beings in society, see the world—the reason we, as Stephen Hawking

says, “remember the past but not the future” (1988, p. 145).

Some have argued that the physical view of time does not fully capture the

complexities of the concept. A purely physical description of time cannot explain,

for example, how a person’s childhood may feel at once “like yesterday” and “like

forever ago,” or how a fifty-minute lecture may seem to fly by on a Monday but

crawl on a Friday. This was Henri Bergson’s (1889/2001) point in lambasting the

definition of time as “what a clock measures.” Using human experience as his point

of departure, Bergson sought to develop a theory of time that was non-homogenous.

Though Bergson’s theory was seen as iconoclastic, and boggling, by some of his

contemporaries (as chronicled by Canales, 2015), Bergson’s time was still

essentially one-dimensional and, for that reason, deemed insufficient by those who

sought a truly experiential view of time.

The time we experience, after all, does not march along in such a

straightforward manner. As we experience the present in everyday life, memories

from the past seem to dance with predictions of the future. We even modify these

memories in recalling them, effectively modifying our pasts. (Was the Welshman

really smiling?) This being the case, it would seem that the clock and calendar have

nothing useful to say about experienced time. On the contrary, they are the reason

that explorations of experienced time can be so jarring. Wisława Szymborska

(2015, p. 71) wrote beautifully of this sensation in a poem called “Travel Elegy”:

I won’t retain one blade of grass

as it’s truly seen.

Salutation and farewell

in a single glance.

For surplus and absence alike,

a single motion of the neck.

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An account of this sort of experienced time was attempted by Edmund

Husserl, who argued that time is the basis of consciousness. Husserl’s theory of

time-consciousness, as he called it, proposed that “the past and future are integrated

into the present of experience” (Keller, 1999, p. 64). These time-unified

experiences are also fused into a singular, inner experience of selfhood which is

disconnected from the outside world—what Husserl called the “transcendental

self.” Thus, through the integration of the tenses and the transcendence of selfhood,

individuals have a tenseless existence (Keller, 1999).

Husserl’s student Martin Heidegger responded to this theory with

revisionist admiration. First, Heidegger argued that lived experience only has

meaning in the context of the outside world—the two cannot be disconnected.

Moreover, Heidegger argued that Husserl’s view of time as a unity implies that

time exists as an entity; in this way, Husserl’s theory suffered the same limitation

as theories of physical time, for which time is an entity that can be measured by

tools like clocks (Keller, 1999). Instead, Heidegger saw time as a verb.

For Heidegger, time unfolds in being. This theory of time was articulated in

Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927/2010). Heidegger’s primary purpose in this book

was to develop a description of the way of being of human beings as an approach

to the study of being in general. Heidegger argued that humans are fundamentally

in the world—indeed, to be human, one must “always already” be in the world.

This already-in-world status forms our humanness. In being human, we are

preoccupied by the present but also oriented toward the future. In this way, past,

present and future are united in our being; Heidegger calls this unification being-

ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world (2010, p. 185). This fusion of past,

present and future echoes the non-sequential time-consciousness of Husserl, but

Heidegger seems to shed more light on how these three tenses actually coalesce and

function in concert. The past, present and future are not simultaneous, but they co-

exist and can co-determine each other (Keller, 1999). In being present, the past and

future interact: Our present-preoccupation reflects the interpretation of the self as

defined by the past; our past-definition reflects the entanglement with the

environment as directed toward the future; and our future-direction reflects

acquaintance with possibility.

In later writings, Heidegger demonstrated that this account of time

described not only the temporality of human beings, but of nature more widely—

that is, of being in general (Capobianco, 2014, pp. 33–34). In the essay “Time and

Being” (1969/1972), Heidegger frames time as four-dimensional: (1) the present,

(2) the past, (3) the future, and (4) the intelligibility of the unity of past, present and

future.

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III.

For all the academic discourse on the subject of time and on the subject of

documents, the two only coincide in a surprisingly small number of investigations.

There is much to be said about documents and time, however: From the physical

point of view, documents occupy space, and space is time; from the experiential

point of view, documents exist, and existence is time.

Just as the physical view of time has predominated in general, so too has it

predominated in discussions of documents—borne out, for instance, in the

apotheosis of Unix time. The dominance of physical time in the document literature

reflects the overarching research interests of information studies in general, whose

foci include organization, retrieval, measurement and seeking (Bawden &

Robinson, 2012). Time, of the physical sort, has found significant application in

information retrieval, where researchers have, for instance, developed methods for

processing temporal expressions in search queries (Berberich, Bedathur, Alonso, &

Weikum, 2010), extracting temporal expressions from document content

(Kanhabua & Nørvåg, 2008), and storing documents for long-term preservation and

access (Song, 2010). Physical time also underlies discussions of the evolution of

information and documents, in terms of both macroscopic, humanity-level

evolution (Bates, 2006) and the historical trajectory of single documents within

sociotechnical systems (Olsen, Lund, Ellingsen, & Hartvigsen, 2012). To this end,

the notion of “document life cycle” has been adopted in business knowledge

management (e.g., Microsoft, n.d.), but is rarely mentioned in academic research.

A head-on and commendably robust approach to modeling the complexities

of documents and time came from Jean–Paul Metzger and Geneviève Lallich–

Boidin (2004). Aspiring toward universality, the authors presented a framework

consisting of three universes: the documentary universe, which includes the

material aspects of documents; the social universe, which includes authors and

readers as they create and use documents; and the discursive universe, which

features commentary on documents. Each of these universes, the authors argue,

includes a time element. Documentary time includes the appearance, destruction

and modification of documents, as well as the “succession of chapters, paragraphs

and words in a text” (p. 17, translation mine), recognizing the temporal aspects of

the reader’s interpretation as part of documentary time. Social time is the time in

which society takes place, constituted by calendar dates, historical periods and life

stages. Discursive time, lastly, arises from the relationships between documents and

people which play out in a sequential order. After spelling out these three universes

and their respective times, the authors go on to identify a complex set of linkages

among the three universes, the complexity of which is exacerbated when it comes

to digital documents, finally concluding that, “At present, we are unable to go

further in clarifying the links among the three times. Could general laws really

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exist? Are we not dealing with as many links as there are documents?” (p. 19). This

impasse might have been predicted by Bruno Latour, whose work constitutes, in

Frohmann’s (2007) words, a “long campaign against the separation of material,

discursive and social realms” (p. 32). Latour instead favors a view of the social not

as a thing, but rather—recalling Heidegger’s view of time—as an unfolding

(Latour, 2007). I might also attribute some of the limitations of their model to their

appropriation of an essentially physical (if a tinge Bergsonian) view of time—that

is, as a progression of instants.

This discussion begs the question of whether experiential time could be used

in the study of documents and time in order to overcome the limitations of physical

time, just as limitations in conceptualizations of time in general were overcome

through an experience-based approach (Heidegger, 1972, 2010). The question of

how changes in technology coincide with changes in how we experience time has

already emerged in academic discourse (Day, 2014; Lindley, 2015), and documents

manifestly have a technological component (Lund, 2009).

To operationalize an experiential view of time in the study of documents

would necessitate studying information in use. This is a scantly researched area,

perhaps because of the complexities involved in its very conceptualization (Kari,

2007). Moreover, Raya Fidel (2012) identifies the highly contextualized nature of

any findings in studies of information use as a barrier, as such context-boundedness

prevents generalization, which is a value for many researchers.

Despite these challenges, more and more researchers are exploring

information in use (Case & O’Connor, 2016). One thread of this research concerns

people’s in-the-moment engagement with information—what Jarkko Kari (2007)

calls “engagement with information-as-thing”—which has yielded two budding

research areas: information experience and document experience. Information

experience is understood as “complex, multidimensional engagement with

information” (Bruce, Davis, Hughes, Partridge, & Stoodley, 2014, p. 4), with a

focus on

the way in which [people] engage with information and their lived worlds

as they go about their daily life and work … encompassing the many

nuances of that experience within different cultures, communities and

contexts. (Bruce et al., 2014, p. 6)

Bruce et al. identify information experience as both a research domain and a

research object; as a research domain, it offers a broad view of the experience of

human engagement with information; as a research object, an information

experience is a discrete instance of engaging with particular information (e.g., a

document). Particularly as a research object, information experience has only begun

to be explored. Of note for the discussion at hand is research in the area of document

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experience (document, in my view, constitutes a particular conglomeration of

information).

K. F. Latham (2014) introduced the notion of document experience,

drawing principles from phenomenology, pragmatism and reader-response theory

to offer a methodology for describing and interpreting human experiences with

documents. This methodology is centered around the concept of document

transaction, which positions the document as the momentary coming-together of a

person and an object. A document transaction is the mechanism by which a

document comes to be. The document is neither the object nor the person, but

something that arises when the two meet (Wood & Latham, 2014). The transaction,

and thus the document, constitutes “its own thing, a moment that can only exist by

the fusion of the person at that moment with the object in that place” (Latham, 2014,

p. 549). Building on this, Daniel Carter (2016) called for a broader view of

document experience that considers how a document’s infrastructural context

impinges on an individual’s experience of that document. As researchers continue

to develop an understanding of document experience, it may prove useful to

incorporate an experiential theory of time into that understanding. In a way,

Johanna Drucker has called for just such an account of documental time, with direct

applications in humanities research:

Humanists deal with the representation of temporality of documents (when

they were created) [and] in documents (narrated, represented, depicted

temporality), the construction of temporality across documents (the

temporality of historical events), and also the shape of temporality that

emerges from documentary evidence (the shape of an era, a season, a period,

or epoch). They need a way to graph and chart temporality in an approach

that suits the basic principles of interpretative knowledge.

Conceptions of temporality in humanities documents do not

conform to those used in the social and empirical sciences. In empirical

sciences, time is understood as continuous, uni-directional, and

homogenous. Its metrics are standardized, its direction is irreversible, and

it has no breaks, folds, holes, wrinkles or reworkings. But in the humanities

time is frequently understood and represented as discontinuous, multi-

directional, and variable. Temporal dimensions of humanities artifacts are

often expressed in relational terms: before such and such happened, or after

a significant event. Retrospection and anticipation factor heavily in

humanistic works, and the models of temporality that arise from historical

and literary documents include multiple viewpoints. Anticipation,

foreshadowing, flashbacks, and other asynchronous segments are a regular

part of narratives, and they create alternative branchings, prospective and

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retrospective approaches to the understanding of events that cannot be

shown on empirical timelines. (Drucker, 2014, pp. 75–76, emphasis hers)

IV.

In effort to establish a theory of documental time that satisfies the needs of

information-in-use and humanities researchers, the theory of document transaction

can be revisited through the lens of Heidegger’s (1972, 2010) theory of time.

For Heidegger, time is the unfolding of being. Time occurs as the past

directs the present toward the future. If a document constitutes the conceptual

fusion of person and object, then it also constitutes the melding of the past, present

and future of both the person and the object. These temporalities intersect at the

present—the moment of the transaction, which is the moment of the document. This

understanding of documental time is represented in the figure below. Visually, it

echoes the convergence of the person’s and object’s lifeworlds illustrated by Wood

and Latham (2014, p. 41).

A document, then, arises from the past of the person and the object, it manifests in

their shared present, and it directs the future of both.

A human is composed of ancient molecules, including a set of organisms

upon which the human is co-dependent, which are constantly being exchanged with

molecules from the environment (Meadow, Altrichter, Bateman, Stenson, Brown,

Green, & Bohannan, 2015). In a very real sense, then, a person is their environment,

and the environment is the person. This worldliness is inextricable from

humanness; it is a person’s most primordial past, and it colors their evolving past

as they grow. Memories, for instance, are embedded with the environment that bore

them. In the same way, an object’s environmental embeddedness is a characteristic

of its primordial past. By virtue of being an object, it always already has a

relationship with other objects. Objects, indeed, are composed of objects.

Worldliness directs the future in that the future must also be worldly. A human

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makes plans and imagines possibilities, and an object also has a worldly future: It

may be blown away, disassembled or destroyed. It may erode and fade, or become

humid or brittle. And insofar as human and object intersect—in present, documental

moments—an object may change hands, be altered and interpreted, become the

subject of stories, make an impression upon a person, constitute a marriage or

graduation, and any number of other futurepresentpast possibilities.

Again prescient, Szymborska (2015, p. 162) observed:

We read the letters of the dead like helpless gods,

but gods nonetheless, since we know the dates that follow.

A reader, in the present, apprehends a letter, affording a document. The reader has

memories of a long-gone loved one: the writer. The writer’s past, present and future

(from the reader’s perspective, all past) are infused in the past of the letter. As the

reader engages with the letter in their present, they grapple with the possibilities

and impossibilities of the future, given the past and present. The result in this case:

helplessness in the face of death. But that helplessness emerges only at first—by

the end of the poem, the reader experiences redirection.

V.

This unfurling, as it were, of documents and time reveals one last frontier to be

explored before its conclusion. Certain kinds of documents (engaging with the

letters of the dead, perhaps) engender the sublime: numinous experiences (Latham,

2014). Such encounters have been described as “unified experiences” (Wood &

Latham, 2014, p. 95), wherein the past, present and future of both the person and

object commingle to an extraordinary degree. Such experiences may also transcend

space as well (Latham, 2014). These experiences are awe-inspiring, deeply personal

and often connected with reverence, spirituality and a feeling of transportation.

Such singular experiences beg an addendum to my conceptualization of

documental time. The theories of time outlined above all sought to characterize

time in general—as it is in its “average everydayness,” as Heidegger (2010, p. 16)

would say. But it would seem that in such powerful moments as numinous

experiences, time may be experienced differently.

Indeed, another theory of time has been put forward which relates to time

as experienced in the particular mental state of Buddhist enlightenment. As a

spiritual experience, enlightenment defies intellectual description, but it has been

described as the attainment of absolute emptiness and unity, which entails the

fundamental loss of self. In the view of Dōgen, a Zen monk who lived in thirteenth-

century Japan, enlightenment also constitutes a rupture in the experience of time,

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which is characterized by radical impermanence (Michelazzo, 2011). Along with

the sense of self, all notions of duality disappear—including temporal distinctions

such as permanent–impermanent, continuous–discontinuous and past–present–

future (Michelazzo). In other words, Dōgen, like Heidegger, describes the

unification of past, present and future. But whereas Heidegger’s time is future-

oriented, Dōgen’s is present-total. In Dōgen’s words: “Life is absolutely life, death

is absolutely death; spring is absolutely spring, summer is absolutely summer; each

in itself is no more and no less—without the slightest possibility of becoming”

(Abe, 1985, p. 64, as cited in Michelazzo, 2011, p. 81).

This numinous view of time, I argue, can be used to explore the temporality

of numinous document experiences. Time in these experiences is fundamentally

present-oriented. Though in all document experiences the past and future come to

bear on the present, in numinous document experiences the boundaries between

past, present and future are fully ruptured. This sheds further context on some of

Latham’s (2014) findings, which exposed numinous document experiences as

transportive in both space and time.

VI.

Time is wrapped up in, and wraps up, everything. Time is everything, and

everything is time. Put more precisely, if opaquely: Everything times. My purpose

here has been to shed a bit of light on the mechanism of time—enough, I hope, to

demonstrate that time, particularly when it comes to documents, is not entirely

inscrutable.

Still, I fear I have done nothing to temper the mystique of time. Actually,

perhaps that is for the best. Indeed, I hope that I have exposed time in its average

everydayness as a stupefying conundrum. For we often disparage the average and

the everyday, and I would not want to rob them of their due. As it is, the average

and the everyday receive scant admiration—we tend to be much more interested in

those special moments we call experiences. But, as I’ve discovered, there is much

wonder to be had in the world, even in a boring, gray afternoon of sifting through

old notebooks.

As I opened with some of my own writing from a trip to Wales, it seems

fitting to close with the writing of my favorite Welsh poet, R. S. Thomas (1993, p.

379), whose lyric virtuosity I could only imitate:

Where are you? I

shouted, growing old in

the interval between here and now.

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The “interval between here and now,” we are now prepared to see, contains both

the past (shouted) and the future (growing old). Indeed, if this discussion has served

to elucidate anything, it is only what the poets have been saying all along: There is

much more to the present than merely the present.

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Proceedings from the Document Academy, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 7

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/docam/vol3/iss1/7 DOI: 10.35492/docam/3/1/7