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DOI: 10.1037/13272-019 APA Handbook of Ethics in Psychology: Vol. 2. Practice, Teaching, and Research, S. J. Knapp (Editor-in-Chief) Copyright © 2012 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.

C H A P T E R 1 9

DECEPTION IN RESEARCH Allan J. Kimmel

Decisions about particular research questions and associated methodological issues are inextricably bound to ethical considerations, a fact that has grown out of an extended process of self-refl ection within the discipline of psychology. The link between meth- odology and ethics is perhaps no clearer than in the case of deception for research purposes, which, of all the ethical issues that have aroused debate within the discipline of psychology, arguably has proven to be the most contentious. Once used as a matter of course in human participant research, deceptive pro- cedures are now subject to rigorous scrutiny both within and outside the discipline: Their use must be justifi ed by the methodological objectives of the investigation; their potential for harm must be deter- mined and addressed; and their application must conform to professional guidelines, legal strictures, and review board oversight. This chapter considers the various issues and implications involved in using deception in research, including arguments for and against deception, frequency of deception in psycho- logical research, consequences of deception on research participants and the public ’ s perception of psychology, alternatives to deception, means for minimizing harm, and debriefi ng. The chapter con- cludes with suggestions for ethical decision making about when to use deception in research.

THE NATURE OF RESEARCH DECEPTION AND REASONS FOR AND AGAINST ITS USE

Ethical developments in psychology were promul- gated in large part by the dramatic rise in the use of

deceptive methodologies, a trend best exemplifi ed by research carried out within the areas of person- ality and social psychology. Deception largely emerged as a practical solution to the experimenter– participant artifact problem—the recognition that participants come to the research setting not as pas- sive automatons who respond mechanistically to the manipulations to which they are subjected, but as conscious, active problem solvers who often attempt to guess the investigator ’ s hypotheses to do the right (or good) thing ( Kimmel, 2006 ). Accordingly, the primary justifi cation for using deception in labora- tory settings has been a purely methodological one—that if researchers conformed to the letter of the law regarding informed consent and did not deceive participants at all, then many investigations would be either impossible to conduct or would result in biased fi ndings. In addition to deception, other strategies have been utilized to circumvent the potential validity problems linked to experimenter– participant artifacts, such as the employment of unobtrusive observations in naturalistic settings. Such research approaches also have given rise to ethical concerns, including the fear that they impinge on individual rights to privacy, confi denti- ality, and voluntary participation in research.

For a scientifi c discipline oriented toward benev- olent objectives associated with the betterment of humankind via an understanding of behavior and mental processes, the language of psychology ’ s methodology is replete with terms bearing pejora- tive connotations. Words such as deception , control , manipulation , confederate , coercion , and the like have

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become so much part and parcel of the research pro- cess that it is easy to forget their original meanings outside the research context. With regard to decep- tion, the everyday meaning of the term—the inten- tional effort to mislead people—is not lost within the research context, where the nature of the decep- tion that is employed may take different forms to satisfy research objectives.

Types of Research Deceptions Psychology researchers have used different kinds of research deceptions within both laboratory and fi eld settings for varying purposes. In laboratory studies, participants are at least aware that they are involved in a study, whereas participants in fi eld studies may or may not be aware of that fact. In either setting, deception may be of the active or passive sort.

Active deception is deception by commission, as when a researcher blatantly misleads the participant about some aspect of the investigation. Research procedures that represent examples of active decep- tion include (a) misrepresentation of the research purpose, (b) untrue statements about the research- er ’ s identity, (c) use of research assistants (called confederates , stooges , or pseudosubjects ) who act out predetermined roles, (d) false promises (including violation of the promise of anonymity or delivery of research incentives), (e) incorrect information about research procedures and instructions, (f) false expla- nations of scientifi c equipment and other measure- ment instruments, (g) false diagnoses and other reports, (h) use of placebos (i.e., inactive medica- tion) and secret application of medications and drugs, and (i) misleading settings or timing for the investigation. Passive deception is deception by omis- sion, as when the researcher purposely withholds relevant information from the participant. With pas- sive deception, a lie is not told; rather, a truth is left unspoken. Deceptions by omission include such research practices as (a) concealed observation, (b) provocation and secret recording of negatively evaluated behavior, (c) unrecognized participant observation, (d) use of projective techniques and other personality tests not identifi ed as such, and (e) unrecognized conditioning of behavior. Surveys of the psychology research literature reveal that the provision of a false purpose or cover story and making

false statements about the procedure or study mate- rials represent the most prevalent forms of active deception utilized by investigators; withholding information about the purpose of the research or aspects of the procedure represents the most com- mon form of passive deception ( Gross & Fleming, 1982 ; Kimmel, 2001 , 2004 ).

Deceptions differ according to the degree of severity of their potential negative effects, a crucial consideration that must enter into decisions about whether to proceed with a study as planned ( Law- son, 2001 ). Severe deceptions are those that create false beliefs about central, important issues related to participants ’ self-concept or personal behavior, as when an experimental manipulation leads partici- pants to believe they lack self-confi dence. Mild deceptions are those that create false beliefs about relatively unimportant issues peripheral to partici- pants ’ self-concept, such as misleading them about the research sponsor or study purpose ( Toy, Olson, & Wright, 1989 ). For example, mild deceptions are commonly used in studies measuring reaction time and memory, where participants are not forewarned that they will be faced with a recall test after expo- sure to stimuli or that their reaction time is being measured. Severe deceptions can be expected to cre- ate negative affect both during and after actual par- ticipation in the research (e.g., upset or anxiety linked to a reduced self-image), whereas mild decep- tions are unlikely to create negative beliefs and affect until the debriefi ng session at the end of the study (e.g., disappointment that the study was not really supported by an alleged sponsor).

The fact that psychologists are more likely to employ severe deceptions that are relevant to the fundamental beliefs and values of research partici- pants than are investigators in related fi elds, such as marketing and organizational research ( Kimmel, 2004 ; Smith, Kimmel, & Klein, 2009 ), to some extent explains why deception has long been such a central issue in psychology. Studies involving severe deceptions (e.g., undisclosed mood manipulations that leave participants feeling depressed) are harder to justify when ethical principles are applied and are more likely to encounter problems when sub- jected to committee review. Although mild decep- tions are unlikely to cause harm to participants,

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they still can be morally problematic ( Kimmel & Smith, 2001 ).

Deception in the research context may or may not be intentional ( Baumrind, 1985 ; Keith-Spiegel & Koocher, 1985 ). Nonintentional deception , which can- not be entirely avoided, includes absence of full dis- closure, failure to inform, and misunderstanding. Intentional deception , on the other hand, includes the withholding of information to obtain participation, concealment and staged manipulations in fi eld set- tings, and deceptive instructions and confederate manipulations in laboratory research. Absence of full disclosure does not constitute intentional deception, so long as participants agree to the postponement of full disclosure of the research purpose. But when the investigator ’ s purpose is “to take the person unaware by trickery” or to “cause the person to believe the false” for whatever reason (e.g., to induce persons into agreeing to participate or to reduce threats to causal inference), the study invariably involves inten- tional deception ( Baumrind, 1985 , p. 165).

The notion of nonintentional deception suggests that while full disclosure of all information that may affect an individual ’ s willingness to participate in a study is a worthy ideal, it is not a realistic possibility. Even the investigator with a sincere desire to dis- close all relevant aspects of a study ’ s purpose and procedure nonetheless may fail to reveal certain information. In part, this may be a function of the researcher taking for granted that participants have a basic level of knowledge about scientifi c procedures,

testing materials, and the research equipment used. In other cases, information provided to participants, such as that involving complex experimental research procedures, may not be fully understood. Certain participant groups (e.g., young children and the mentally impaired) have cognitive limitations that seriously limit the extent to which fully informed consent can be obtained.

When considering potential dilemmas involving the use of deceptive research practices, it is impor- tant to recognize that the effects of deception may benefi t recipients or others (e.g., self-insight, increased understanding of science, scientifi c advancement and progress) or harm recipients (e.g., mental anguish, loss of trust, increased suspicious- ness), and may be short or long term and immediate or delayed. Although most readily thought of as a practice that is employed during the data collection stage, deception may be used at each stage of the research process (see Table 19.1 ). Furthermore, deception can have consequences for each of the par- ties involved in the research process (see Table 19.2 ).

In sum, studies differ in terms of the nature and degree of deception used, and the timing during which deception is utilized. Because it is unlikely that researchers can convey everything about a study to participants, it may be that all behavioral research is disguised in one respect or another and that the range of ethical questions related to the use of deception must be thought of as falling on a con- tinuum. The style of the deception is not so much

TABLE 19.1

Use of Deception at Various Stages of the Research Process

Participant recruitment Research procedure Postresearch/application

Identity of researcher and/or sponsor Misrepresentation of purpose Violation of promise of anonymity

Purpose of research False information about procedures, measures, and the like

Breach of confi dentiality

Participation incentives Withholding information Misrepresenting implications of research results

Involving people in research without their knowledge

Concealed observation False feedback during debriefi ng session

Note . From “Deception in Marketing Research: Ethical, Methodological, and Disciplinary Implications,” by A. J. Kimmel and N. C. Smith, 2001 , Psychology and Marketing, 18, p. 669. Copyright 2001 by Wiley-Blackwell. Adapted with permission.

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the issue as is its probable effects. The justifi cation for using deception in research is of paramount importance because to deceive is to move people to act against their will and is a common reason for distrust ( Bok, 1992 ; Darke & Ritchie, 2007 ).

Why Deceive? When social psychologist Stanley Milgram (1963 , 1974 ) carried out his well-known series of experi- ments on obedience to authority at Yale University between 1960 and 1964, deception had not yet become a common fi xture in psychological research laboratories. Yet Milgram ’ s project, perhaps more than any other, aroused initial concerns about the ethicality of using deception to satisfy research objectives and gave impetus to the development of internal standards regulating the use of deception within the discipline of psychology ( Benjamin & Simpson, 2009 ). Other controversial deception stud- ies, such as the Stanford prison experiment in psy- chology, the “tearoom trade” research in sociology, and the Tuskegee syphilis study in biomedicine also greatly contributed to a rise in sensitivities and stim- ulated debate about deception in research (see Bok, 1978 ; Diener & Crandall, 1978 ; Kelman, 1967 ; Kim- mel, 2007 ). Milgram (1963) misled his volunteer

participants into believing that they were adminis- tering dangerous electric shocks to an innocent victim, an experimental confederate who was por- trayed as an ordinary research participant. The cen- tral deception in the obedience studies involved presenting the experiment as one pertaining to the effects of punishment on learning, with the volun- teers instructed to deliver increasingly stronger elec- tric shocks (up to 450 volts) each time the learner– confederate made a mistake on a simple memory task. In actuality, the learner did not receive shocks, but made a number of preplanned mistakes and feigned pain on receiving the punishment. The goal was to observe the extent to which participants obeyed the authority of the experimenter, who ordered them to proceed with the procedure despite their protests and the confederate ’ s apparent agony.

Milgram received high praise for his ingenious experiments, which in a broader sense were intended to shed light on the Nazi atrocities committed in obedience to the commands of malevolent authori- ties during World War II, and his research continues to resonate to this day (e.g., a 2009 special issue of American Psychologist was devoted to the obedience research). But the research eventually became the target of scathing attacks (e.g., Baumrind, 1964 ;

TABLE 19.2

Potential Costs and Benefi ts of Deception Studies

Recipient Benefi ts Costs

Participant Increased understanding of science and the research process

Self-insight (from personal content revealed by deceptive probes)

Infl icted insight Embarrassment Image of science lowered Mistrust of others

Researcher Capacity to elicit spontaneous behavior from participants Increased degree of methodological control Enhanced reputation from successful research endeavors

Legal sanctions (e.g., if confi dentiality is breached) Undermines integrity and commitment to the truth Tarnished image

Profession Facilitates attempts to determine validity of theories, previous research, and assessment instruments

Exhausts pool of naïve participants Jeopardizes community and industry support for

the research enterprise

Society Scientifi c advancement and progress Increased understanding of behavior Insight into applications toward the betterment of humanity

Undermines trust in expert authorities and science Increased suspiciousness (e.g., self-consciousness

in public)

Note . From “Deception in Marketing Research: Ethical, Methodological, and Disciplinary Implications,” by A. J. Kimmel and N. C. Smith, 2001 , Psychology and Marketing, 18, p. 668. Copyright 2001 by Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted with permission.

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Kelman, 1967 ), which centered on the potential adverse outcomes stemming from the deceptive methodology; specifi cally, that Milgram had sub- jected participants to extreme levels of stress and guilt as a result of their believing that they harmed innocent victims, that he should have terminated the experiment at the fi rst indications of participant dis- comfort, and that he alienated participants from future participation in research and harmed their image of the discipline. These points typify some of the common ethical arguments against the use of deception in psychological research, which, in one form or another, suggest that because it involves lying and deceit, its employment in research is mor- ally reprehensible and may have potentially harmful effects on each of the parties involved in the research or implicated by it ( Bassett, Basinger, & Livermore, 1992 ; Christensen, 1988 ; Kimmel & Smith, 2001 ; Ortmann & Hertwig, 1997 ). In short, critics of deception have decried its use on moral, method- ological, and disciplinary grounds:

Regardless of the anticipated research ends, it is 1. morally wrong to mislead research participants because deception is a clear violation of the individual ’ s basic right to informed consent and undermines the trust inherent in the implicit contractual relationship between the researcher and participant. Deceptive procedures could harm research 2. participants by lowering their self-esteem (via embarrassment or “infl icted insight”—i.e., unde- sirable self-revelations) and impairing their rela- tionships with others, or by serving as a model for deceptive behavior in participants ’ subse- quent actions. Deception places participants in a subservient, 3. powerless role in the research context and ulti- mately may help shape a negative attitude toward research participation. The use of deception may prove to be self-4. defeating to the extent that its use increases the suspicions of future research participants about investigators and the research process, thereby exhausting the pool of naïve participants. Deceptive techniques reduce the public ’ s trust in 5. social scientists and give the research professions

a poor reputation, thereby jeopardizing commu- nity and fi nancial support for the research enter- prise and public trust in expert authorities.

The arguments espoused by Milgram (1964 , 1974 ) and others (e.g., Benjamin & Simpson, 2009 ; Miller, 2009 ) in defense of the use of deception in the obedience experiments center on the theoretical or social advances gained from the research fi ndings; the avoidance of misleading fi ndings that might have resulted from the study had participants not been deceived (i.e., the deceptive procedure provided the necessary “technical illusions” for studying the power of a malevolent authority to elicit obedience; for a contrary view, see Patten, 1977 ); and that partici- pants would have an opportunity to learn something about psychology, to perhaps gain some positive insight about their own behavior, and to feel good about their contribution to the research process. The following arguments refl ect those typically posited as justifi cation for deceptive research procedures (e.g., Bonetti, 1998 ; Bortolotti & Mameli, 2006 ; Kimmel, 1988 , 1998 ; Pittenger, 2002 ):

Deception enables the researcher to increase 1. the impact of a laboratory setting, such that the experimental situation becomes more realistic, thereby enhancing the study ’ s internal validity. Deception can reduce the effects of participants ’ 2. motives and role-playing behavior in the experi- mental situation. Certain signifi cant areas of human life cannot be 3. experimentally studied in an otherwise ethical manner; that is, deception can create a reason- able facsimile of the topic of interest without placing individuals in compromising or danger- ous real-life situations for achieving research objectives. Potential negative effects resulting from decep-4. tion (e.g., threats to self-esteem, guilt, embar- rassment) can be reduced through intensive prescreening of participants or removed through careful postexperimental procedures, such as debriefi ng. Participation in deceptive research can serve as 5. an involving learning experience for participants, by providing insight into their own or others ’ behavior, as well as the research process.

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Clearly, there are compelling arguments both for and against the use of deception in psychologi- cal research. Although the argument can be made that deception in research—whether by omission or commission—represents a serious violation of human rights and is never morally justifi able ( Baumrind, 1971 , 1975 ), it generally is understood that the application of such a position would pre- clude research on certain essential topics, such as placebo effects or social attitudes, and thus would provide a signifi cant barrier to scientifi c advance within the discipline. The recognition that decep- tion may have benefi cial or harmful consequences for participants, society, and the scientifi c disci- pline of psychology has moved much of the ethical debate away from the question of whether decep- tion should be allowed at all to a focus on the circumstances under which its use could be con- sidered ethically acceptable ( Kimmel, 2003 , 2006 ; Smith et al., 2009 ).

TREATMENT OF DECEPTION BY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND ETHICAL CODES

Decision making regarding the propriety of using deception in a research investigation usually comes down to the weighing of potential costs and benefi ts, with the decision to proceed contingent on a pre- ponderance of likely benefi cial consequences, assuming no alternative approaches could be uti- lized to satisfy research objectives. Although not for- mally grounded in theories of moral philosophy, this cost–benefi t approach is consistent with conse- quentialist (e.g., utilitarian) theories, which hold that the morally right action would be the one that produces at least as good a ratio of good to bad con- sequences (e.g., in terms of welfare or utility) as any other course of action, including not carrying out the action at all ( Pittenger, 2002 ). Nonconsequen- tialist (e.g., deontological) theories maintain that the ethical evaluation of an action generally would refl ect an assessment of its consistency with binding moral rules or duties—such as to always tell the truth—and consequences are not of primary impor- tance. Such an approach would preclude the use of any deception in research because to deceive would

violate an overriding obligation always to be com- pletely honest with participants.

The cost–benefi t approach derived from conse- quentialist theories is incorporated within the pro- cedures utilized by most ethics review committees and provides a framework for the standards and guidelines that appear in human participant ethical codes worldwide ( Kimmel, 2007 ). In short, decep- tion in research is considered to be morally permis- sible to the extent that it is consistent with certain principles. In some respects, this position is analo- gous to how lying is treated in everyday life. Although lying generally is considered to be wrong, most people prefer to live in a world where some lying is permissible, such as white lies, lies to certain kinds of people (children, the dying), and lies to avoid greater harms. In these situations, it is impor- tant for the persons telling the lies to be able to justify their actions, if only to themselves. In the research context, a similar logic prevails, where the researcher ’ s justifi cation for deception is guided by ethical standards, governmental regulations, and external review.

Deception and Institutional Review The impact of governmental regulation on the use of deception in human research has been substantial. Before the establishment of federal regulations, few university departments of medicine ( Curran, 1969 ; Welt, 1961 ) and probably no departments of social and behavioral science ( Reynolds, 1979 ) required any type of committee review. In the 21st century, ethical review boards are commonplace in most research-oriented institutions, and now extend beyond psychology, sociology, and anthropology to social science fi elds less typically associated with committee approval, such as history ( Shea, 2000 ). Although unfunded studies no longer require insti- tutional review according to current U.S. federal regulations, most universities, hospitals, and other research settings likely require some form of review for the approval and monitoring of all human research conducted at those institutions (e.g., Cohen, 2007 ; Rosnow et al., 1993 ; Rutecki, Youtsey, & Adelson, 2002 ).

In the United States, federal safeguards concern- ing the rights and welfare of human participants in

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research have been in place as part of U.S. Public Health Service policy since 1966, although the ini- tial focus was limited to clinical research in the med- ical fi elds ( McCarthy, 1981 ; Seiler & Murtha, 1980 ). Signifi cant progress toward the development of guidelines for behavioral research came about with the signing into law of the 1974 National Research Act, creating the National Commission for the Pro- tection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav- ioral Research and initial requirements for the ethical review of human research by institutional review boards (IRBs), except for broad categories of research that posed little or no risk of harm. (More information on the development of federal regula- tions for research can be found in Chapter 16 of this volume.)

For the approval of research covered by the fed- eral regulations, an IRB at the institution where the research has been proposed must determine whether risks to participants are minimized by sound research procedures and are outweighed suf- fi ciently by anticipated benefi ts to the participants and the importance of the knowledge to be gained, the rights and welfare of subjects are adequately protected, the research will be periodically reviewed, and informed consent has been obtained. Informed consent includes (a) describing the overall purpose of the research, (b) telling participants their role in the study and why they have been chosen, (c) explaining the procedures, (d) clearly stating the risks and discomforts, (e) describing the benefi ts of the research to participants, and (f) offering to answer any questions and stating that the partici- pant may withdraw at any time without negative consequences. Although not rejecting the use of deception outright, the criteria for informed consent require researchers to justify the use of deception to review boards, unless the investigation constitutes a minimal risk study.

As behavioral scientists have become more vocal about the need for American psychologists to broaden their research focus to the 95% of the world ’ s popula- tion who are not Americans (e.g., Arnett, 2008 ; Cole, 2006 ), it is likely that an increasing number of studies will be carried out in countries where varying regula- tions apply. Ethical review boards are a common fea- ture of human research regulation in numerous

countries around the world. For example, all mem- bers of the European Union adhere to a directive ( European Parliament and Council, 1995 ) requiring ethics committees for research. A survey of review procedures in other European member states is avail- able online ( Privacy in Research Ethics and Law, 2005 ). For an overview of research review regulations in other countries, see Kimmel (2007) , Leach and Harbin (1997) , and Seligman and Sorrentino (2002) .

Despite the growing prevalence of institutional review, various limitations to this form of ethical regulation have been noted, particularly in terms of what constitutes acceptable use of research decep- tion. Typically, review committees offer little spe- cifi c guidance on deception a priori (feedback on rejected research protocols generally may refer to problematic use of deception or insuffi cient informed consent) and researchers depend on the preferences of the individual IRB members who pos- sess varying personal norms and sensitivities for assessing costs and benefi ts ( Kimmel, 1991 ; Ros- now, 1997 ; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2011). IRBs can maintain inconsistent standards across time and institutions, such that a proposal that is approved without modifi cation in one institution may require substantial changes, or else be rejected, by a review board at another institution (e.g., Ceci, Peters, & Plotkin, 1985 ; Rosnow et al., 1993 ). Furthermore, there are limits on information that can be requested of citizens in varying research contexts. Thus, researchers often will be guided primarily by depart- mental norms (including those of other departments where they have worked or trained). Although codes of the relevant professional associations often refer to an important role for IRBs, typically it would be necessary to make recourse to the actual codes to obtain a priori guidance on the use of deception ( Smith et al., 2009 ).

The American Psychological Association ’ s Ethical Standards The current Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (the Ethics Code; American Psycho- logical Association [APA], 2010 ) is the result of a more than 50-year history of development and revi- sion, including substantial strengthening of its research guidelines in the wake of debate about the

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use of deception in controversial studies (cf. Kel- man, 1967 ). The research guidelines emphasize voluntary participation and informed consent as fundamental prerequisites for research with human participants, ethical requirements that date back to the 1947 Nuremberg Code, a general set of stan- dards formulated to prevent atrocities like those perpetrated by Nazi researchers, and the forerunner to all subsequent guidelines governing experimen- tation with human participants ( Schuler, 1982 ). Ethics Code Standard 8.07, Deception in Research, dictates that deception should be used only if (a) effective, nondeceptive alternative procedures are not feasible, (b) the research is not likely to cause physical pain or severe emotional distress, (c) deceptions that are integral features of the study ’ s design are explained to participants as early as possible during a debriefi ng, and (d) a study ’ s results are likely to be suffi ciently important (because of “the study ’ s signifi cant prospective sci- entifi c, educational, or applied value”). Standard 8.01, Institutional Approval, acknowledges that investigators may be required to obtain institutional approval through their IRB before conducting research.

Standard 8.07 is built on an ethical dilemma, one that brings into confl ict two of the profession ’ s core values, the value of advancing the science of psychol- ogy through research (as explicated in APA ’ s, 2009, Vision Statement and in Principle B, Fidelity and Responsibility, in the Ethics Code, the latter of which emphasizes psychologists ’ “scientifi c responsibilities to society”) and the promotion of truthfulness (as spelled out in the Ethics Code ’ s Principle C, Integ- rity, which maintains that “psychologists seek to pro- mote accuracy, honesty, and truthfulness in the science . . . of psychology”; Behnke, 2009 ). Although the standard incorporates a utilitarian approach for resolving this dilemma, it does not clarify how it can be determined that the results of a study are “suffi - ciently important” to adequately justify the use of deception. In fact, the various criteria spelled out for the use of deception in the Ethics Code have fueled extensive debate regarding interpretation of the prin- ciples and their implementation ( Kimmel, 2007 ; Schuler, 1982 ) and, despite obtaining feedback from researchers before the adoption of new versions of

the code, APA members never reached consensus as to the specifi c wording of the standards for research or how to apply them. (A separate code of ethics for members of the Association for Psychological Science [APS] currently does not exist. The APS board of directors approved a brief, general statement of prin- ciple that is consistent with the society ’ s interests in scientifi c and personal integrity but that does not put APS in the position of judging the conduct of its members. The statement requires APS members to adhere to all relevant codes of ethical behavior and legal and regulatory requirements.)

Despite its various limitations, the APA guide- lines have served as a model for other professional associations, including the Australian Psychological Society, the Canadian Psychological Association, and the British Psychological Society (cf. Kimmel, 2007 ; Leach & Harbin, 1997 ). The criteria for the use of deception in research in the current code of the American Sociological Association (ASA, 1999) are nearly identical to those of the APA (2010) . The ASA utilizes the same cost–benefi t approach, although it does allow a broader interpretation of harm and requires IRB (or equivalent) approval. Because soci- ologists commonly use nonexperimental methodolo- gies, the code acknowledges that informed consent may not always be possible or appropriate and sug- gests that it should not be an absolute requirement for all sociological research. Like psychology, the fi eld has abundant examples of controversial decep- tion studies ( Allen, 1997 ; Reynolds, 1982 ).

PREVALENCE OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES

Although rarely implemented during the discipline ’ s developmental period, the use of deception increased substantially as subsequent generations of psychologists became more thoroughly committed to the laboratory experiment and embraced decep- tion as a remedy for methodological concerns. By the mid-1970s, the practice of deceiving participants in personality and social psychology research, where the artifact problem was most salient, had become commonplace and, in the opinion of some (e.g., Kelman, 1967 ; Seeman, 1969 ; Warwick, 1975 ), was being employed as a matter of course, even in studies that did not require it for methodological

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reasons. For example, the percentage of studies using deception in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology rose from around 20% in 1960 to nearly 70% in 1975 (e.g., Adair, Dushenko, & Lind- say, 1985 ; Carlson, 1971 ; Gross & Fleming, 1982 ; McNamara & Woods, 1977 ; Smith & Richardson, 1983 ; Stricker, 1967 ).

Despite an apparent gradual decline in the employment of deceptive research procedures in recent years (e.g., estimates of the use of active decep- tions suggest a decrease from 59% during the late 1970s to 40% by the mid-1990s), evidence points to its continued use within a signifi cant number of stud- ies of human behavior ( Kimmel, 2001 , 2004 ; Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997 ; Vitelli, 1988 ), especially in applied areas of behavioral research that have evolved out of the root discipline of psychology. A content analysis of leading marketing and consumer behavior research journals published from 1975 to 2007 revealed a steady increase in rates of reported decep- tion from 43.4% to 80% for the coded investigations ( Kimmel, 2001 , 2004 ; Smith et al., 2009 ). Although a majority of the coded studies employed mild forms of deception (e.g., 70% during the 2006–2007 period), severe deceptions were observed in a further 11% of the coded investigations.

Developments in psychology—including atten- tion to new substantive domains and issues, such as preventive intervention research and health-related issues, and new contexts, such as the developing world—also point to an increasing likelihood that deceptions may cause inadvertent harm. Greater use of qualitative methodologies has brought research- ers closer to their participants in terms of physical proximity and intimacy, increasing the salience of ethical considerations linked to deception ( Sojka & Spangenberg, 1994 ). For example, a wide range of confl icts relating to deception can arise when researchers become active participants in the cul- tural or social contexts of the persons under investi- gation. In much fi eld research, one of the key issues emerges when the researcher must decide whether to use passive deception in terms of informing peo- ple that they are part of an ongoing research investi- gation. This is attributed in large part to the fact that, in the natural context, the distinction between everyday life and research often blurs.

METHODOLOGICAL AND DISCIPLINARY IMPLICATIONS OF DECEPTION

Researchers have evaluated deceptive procedures in terms of their methodological implications (and, to a lesser extent, disciplinary consequences), includ- ing degree of participant naiveté concerning the use of deception, consequences of suspicion on experi- mental validity, and the impact of deception on sub- sequent experimental performance. As noted, some have argued that the scientifi c costs and associated disciplinary consequences of deception can be considerable—that is, deception can lead to a deple- tion of the pool of naive participants, reduce com- munity support for the research enterprise, and undermine researchers ’ commitment to truth (e.g., Baumrind, 1985 ; Herrera, 1996 ; Hey, 1998 ; Olian- sky, 1991 ; Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002 ). Clearly, deception is less ethically justifi able to the extent that it does not provide the methodological and dis- ciplinary gains that are claimed.

In general, the fi ndings of studies that have examined the key methodological issues associated with the use of deception are anything but clear-cut. Overall, the body of research points to the effi cacy of deception in offsetting some of the undesirable methodological consequences associated with non- deceptive research, whereas other evidence suggests that under some circumstances deception actually can exacerbate methodological problems.

Deception and Participant Naiveté Levels Findings pertaining to naiveté levels among current or prospective participants show that within certain research circumstances, the continued employment of deception does have the capacity to reduce the pool of naive research participants. This is apparent from evidence that debriefed participants may com- municate the true purpose and other details of stud- ies to future participants, even when instructed not to do so, a tendency referred to as leakage ( Diener, Matthews, & Smith, 1972 ; Lipton & Garza, 1978 ). Despite fi ndings showing that deception can under- mine participant naiveté levels, there is little evidence suggesting that this is a common outcome. Overall estimates of suspiciousness regarding deceptions,

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research hypotheses, and the nature of experimental manipulations and assessment techniques have revealed extremely low levels of suspicion among participants. With the exception of a few early exper- iments on conformity revealing rather extensive suspicions (e.g., Glinski, Glinski, & Slatin, 1970 ; Stricker, Messick, & Jackson, 1967 ), estimates of the overall percentage of participants identifi ed as suspi- cious range from only 1.8% to 3% ( Adair et al., 1985 ; Kimmel, 2001 , 2004 ).

There has been little research on the extent of suspiciousness or leakage in the research setting, and investigators do not routinely probe levels of participant suspiciousness ( Adair et al., 1985 ; Kim- mel, 2001 , 2004 ; Stricker, 1967 ). On the basis of results to date, there does not appear to be a rise in participant sophistication corresponding to the ongoing use of deception in behavioral studies. Nev- ertheless, this conclusion must be somewhat tem- pered by the recognition that participants cannot always be counted on to be totally forthcoming in revealing their suspicions or knowledge about research procedures and hypotheses. Similarly, the quality of suspiciousness checks by researchers may be called into question, particularly if such efforts represent only cursory attempts to demonstrate the soundness of experimental manipulations. In some early investigations, researchers found that when they assessed suspiciousness by asking their partici- pants up to three postexperimental questions, only about 5% of the participants were classifi ed as suspi- cious; this percentage increased to about 40% when more extended questioning was utilized ( Page, 1973 ; Spielberger, 1962 ). More research is needed on the levels and sources of participant suspicious- ness, extent of leakage, and the impact of prior experience in deception studies on perceptions of researchers ’ honesty. Additionally, investigators need to more carefully evaluate the procedures they use to assess perceptions of the study and suspi- ciousness ( Taylor & Shepperd, 1996 ).

Impact of Suspiciousness of Deception on the Experimental Effect The issue of whether deception leads to greater levels of suspiciousness bears little import if, in fact, skepticism regarding research procedures or

purpose does not have an impact on experimental performance and it turns out that naive and suspi- cious individuals behave similarly under the same experimental conditions. Research on the effects of distrust on experimental performance has focused on various manifestations of the issue, including the general effects of self-reported suspiciousness (e.g., Stang, 1976 ; Stricker, 1967 ), the effects of experi- mentally induced suspicions through the use of some variation of forewarning (or prebriefi ng; e.g., Allen, 1983 ; Finney, 1987 ), and the infl uence of prior experience in deception experiments on subse- quent research performance (e.g., Cook & Perrin, 1971 ; Fillenbaum, 1966 ). Overall, the extant empiri- cal evidence regarding the effects of subject distrust is mixed, with some studies showing that the results produced by suspicious or preinformed participants (who are made aware that deception is to be utilized in the investigation) can differ substantially from those of naive participants (e.g., Newberry, 1973 ; Stang, 1976 ).

Other investigations have revealed that previous experience in deception research can affect perfor- mance in subsequent experiments, with prior decep- tion resulting in an increased tendency for favorable self-presentation (e.g., Silverman, Shulman, & Wiesenthal, 1970 ). However, some researchers have been unable to obtain performance effects from per- sons with foreknowledge about a deceptive investi- gation (e.g., Allen, 1983 ; Wiener & Erker, 1986 ). Such disparities in the fi ndings likely are linked to a variety of methodological considerations, including the specifi c procedure utilized to make the relevant comparisons between suspicious and nonsuspicious participants, the degree of specifi city of the suspi- cions, the types of persons studied, and the nature and degree of deceptions involved in the research. With respect to forewarning, evidence suggests that experimental performance is more likely to be altered to the extent that participants receive explicit details about the deceptive nature of the investiga- tion (e.g., after receiving a detailed tip-off of the true experimental purpose from a confederate) than when they merely are informed that the study might involve deception ( Allen, 1983 ).

The degree of intensity of the deceptions in a study is an important consideration, not only with

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respect to the methodological implications of partic- ipant suspiciousness, but also to general ethical concerns. If a prior deception is seen as mild and legitimate, participants simply may accept it and behave naturally, adhering to the instructions in current or later studies despite their suspicions. Assuming they have any impact at all on partici- pants, mild deceptions would be unlikely to affect performance in the investigation during which they are employed, but they could infl uence performance in subsequent experiments. For severe deceptions, performance could be affected in the ongoing study as well as subsequent ones. Even when a researcher chooses not to deceive, this decision will not offset the tendency for participants to conjecture about a study ’ s true purpose, with each person theoretically generating his or her own hypothesis (cf. Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001 ). These multiple hypothe- ses could be seen as operating as a form of error variance to the extent that they infl uence dependent measure values. Thus, it might be argued that by opting for deception, a reduction in error variance would result as a function of the deception having led to greater homogeneity among participants.

A further complication concerns the possibility that suspiciousness can operate differentially across the conditions of a study ( Diener & Crandall, 1978 ). Because different treatments are likely to cause dissimilar levels of suspicion, apparent treatment effects in some studies could be attributed to varying suspiciousness rates. If the rate of suspicion is not distributed randomly across treatment conditions, then omitting the data obtained from suspicious participants can increase the apparent treatment effects. Furthermore, the decision to eliminate sus- picious persons from a study could lead to the loss of truly random assignment to conditions. As a result, it would be diffi cult for the researcher to rule out the possibility that treatment effects were caused by selection biases or, for that matter, undetected suspicion that exists differentially across conditions ( Diener & Crandall, 1978 ). Although these prob- lems have no easy solutions, researchers should at least attempt to assess the effectiveness of each deception used in an investigation and the extent to which participants idiosyncratically perceived the experiment and its rationale ( Adair et al., 1985 ).

Disciplinary Consequences of Deception Another set of considerations has to do with partici- pant reactions to having been deceived, and, in a broader sense, societal attitudes regarding the use of deception and its impact on perceptions of the disci- pline and science in general. The results of surveys intended to gauge reactions to deception, although now somewhat dated, have shown that most indi- viduals in the general population apparently do not have serious objections to its use for research pur- poses ( Collins, Kuhn, & King, 1979 ; Epstein, Sued- feld, & Silverstein, 1973 ; Pihl, Zacchia, & Zeichner, 1981 ; Rugg, 1975 ; Sullivan & Deiker, 1973 ). Rugg (1975) found this to be the case for several groups of individuals, including college professors and law- yers. Epstein et al. (1973) reported that college stu- dents generally accepted deception, with a majority of those questioned expecting to be deceived as par- ticipants in psychological studies. Although they viewed this as personally undesirable, they also believed that deception in research is permissible and appropriate. Similarly, Sullivan and Deiker (1973) found that psychologists tend to have more serious reservations about the use of deception than do college students. When presented with hypothet- ical experiments that differed in the amount of stress, physical pain, or threat to self-esteem infl icted on subjects, it was the psychologists who were far more negative toward the practices and the propriety of using deception in each instance than were the students.

Whether these fi ndings still apply in the contem- porary research context is uncertain, especially as the Internet and other newly emergent communica- tion technologies facilitate the rapid and widespread dissemination of information about ethically contro- versial research. News reports about indiscretions, lies, and a wide range of unethical behaviors at the highest levels of government and the boardroom are common in the 21st century; as a result, people sim- ply may conclude that researchers are no different from other professionals in using deceptive methods to achieve their ends, but that relatively speaking the consequences are far less severe. Nonetheless, a recent assessment of African American attitudes toward participation in medical research revealed a high level of mistrust of doctors, scientists, and the

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government, on the basis of real and perceived examples of exploitation, and indicated that these attitudes represented a prominent barrier to partici- pation in clinical research ( Corbie-Smith, Thomas, Williams, & Moody-Ayers, 1999 ).

Another question regarding the use of deception has to do with the belief that such practices refl ect poorly on the discipline and cast suspicion on the motives of behavioral scientists. For some time, crit- ics of deception have warned that its frequent and continued use would reduce participants ’ trust of psychologists and would lead them to adopt a nega- tive attitude toward behavioral research in general ( Kelman, 1967 ; MacCoun & Kerr, 1987 ). Relative to this concern, Sharpe, Adair, and Roese (1992) administered the Psychological Research Survey to university students during two time periods (1970 and 1989) and observed a high degree of similarity in respondents ’ attitudes about psychological research, suggesting that there had not been a pre- dicted increase in negative attitudes in the partici- pant population as a result of the continued use of deception during the 20-year span.

In a more recent investigation of psychological research attitudes, Snowden, Debbaut, Jachym, Gardner, and Lecci (2003) found that psychology students tended to have more favorable attitudes toward psychological research after having com- pleted a course in research methods in which, it is presumed, they learned about the use of and justifi - cations for deceptive research techniques. Epley and Huff (1998) reported that deceived participants experienced little negative impact from the aware- ness that they had been deceived in a study, but that negative effects were apparent for the negative feed- back received during the deception experiment. Deceived participants were found to be more suspi- cious over a period of 3 months following the initial investigation. Aguinis and Henle (2001) studied reactions to the research use of a deceptive tech- nique known as the “bogus pipeline,” a fake labora- tory apparatus that is presented as capable of detecting when participants are not giving honest responses during an experiment. Although the bogus pipeline often has been criticized on ethical grounds (e.g., Aguinis & Handelsman, 1997 ; Ostrom, 1973 ), participants perceived the technique

as a useful and ethical research method, even when other nondeceptive methods were available. These results may argue for a situation ethics approach to solving ethical dilemmas, whereby participants are asked whether they are concerned that certain ethi- cally questionable practices exist after being told the reasons for utilizing them.

DEBRIEFING AND RESEARCH ALTERNATIVES TO DECEPTION

Extant ethical guidelines and external review boards typically require that all deceived participants be fully debriefed within a reasonable period following their involvement in a study. Standard 8.08(a), Debriefi ng, of the Ethics Code specifi es that “psy- chologists provide a prompt opportunity for partici- pants to obtain appropriate information about the nature, results, and conclusions of the research, and they take reasonable steps to correct any misconcep- tions that participants may have of which the psy- chologists are aware.” This requirement, which also obliges researchers to minimize any apparent adverse consequences for the participant, often is cited as an important safeguard against some of the potential risks inherent in the use of deception. The debriefi ng session can serve a variety of functions, foremost of which are to provide researchers with an opportunity (a) to assess whether participants were adversely affected by the procedures, (b) to elimi- nate any harm or lasting false impressions about the study, (c) to assess the effectiveness of research manipulations and extent of participants ’ suspicions, and (d) to serve an educational role through an explanation of the purpose and relevance of the research ( Brody, Gluck, & Aragon, 2000 ; Sharpe & Faye, 2009 ; Tesch, 1977 ). It is during the debriefi ng period that psychologists should refer a participant to an appropriately trained provider if something problematic (such as severe depression) has been revealed about that person during the study. In spe- cial cases in which confi dentiality must be breached (e.g., studies in which certain individuals are revealed to be suicidal or intend to harm others), participants can be reminded of the limitations to confi dentiality that were agreed on during the con- sent procedure, if feasible (cf. Behnke & Kinscherff,

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2002 , for additional recommendations). As an addi- tional protection to participants, Standard 8.07 now stipulates that researchers “permit participants to withdraw data” after debriefi ng.

The effectiveness of debriefi ng in successfully correcting a participant ’ s misconceptions resulting from deception is questionable, particularly in cases in which the debriefi ng procedure involves only a cursory attempt by the researcher to inform participants that they were deceived. Effective debriefi ng may require both dehoaxing (i.e., con- vincing deceived participants that the information they had been given was in fact fraudulent and relieving any anxiety resulting from that informa- tion) and desensitizing (i.e., helping deceived participants deal with new information about themselves; Misra, 1992 ). It is possible that the realization that one has been deceived could result in a loss of self-esteem and embarrassment, in addi- tion to creating a negative attitude toward the researcher or science (e.g., Baumrind, 1985 ). In this light, it is important to recognize that the debriefi ng process, although designed to resolve ethical problems and provide a methodological check on research methods, paradoxically can have unintended adverse effects on participants ( Toy, Wright, & Olson, 2001 ). In some cases, it may be appropriate to withhold certain information during the debriefi ng (e.g., about individual differences) when it is judged that awareness could cause more harm than good to participants.

Unless it is carried out with “care, effort, and vig- ilance,” persons already deceived once may question the validity of information provided during the debriefi ng ( Holmes, 1976 , p. 867). This is one rea- son that deceptive debriefi ngs are especially ill advised. The so-called perseverance process , whereby perceptions and beliefs created during a study con- tinue long after they have been discredited, also may cast doubt on the effectiveness of debriefi ngs to undo the effects of deceptive manipulations. It has been shown that self-relevant and non-self-relevant perceptions (e.g., created by deceptive feedback fol- lowing experimental tasks) may become cognitively detached from the evidence that created them; as a result, even after the basis for the perceptions are disconfi rmed (via a debriefi ng), individuals may

cling to the original beliefs ( Ross, Lepper, & Hub- bard, 1975 ). It is for these reasons that some researchers have recommended a process approach to debriefi ng, focusing on the psychological pro- cesses that underlie the effects of deception and debriefi ng, and structuring postexperimental proce- dures accordingly (for specifi c suggestions for designing thorough process-oriented debriefi ngs, see Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968 ; Mills, 1976 ; and Toy et al., 2001 ).

An effective debriefi ng interview should be treated seriously as an essential element of the research process. Thus, it can be argued that an inef- fective or incompetent debriefi ng negatively refl ects on the overall quality of the research. As the quality of the research is diminished through poor experi- mental design or inappropriately applied proce- dures, it becomes more diffi cult to ethically justify the use of participants ’ time, research funding, and the like ( Rosenthal, 1994 ). The researcher should bear in mind the functions of debriefi ng as an educa- tional tool as well as a method for identifying and ameliorating any adverse effects. Initially, the researcher should explain the procedures and rea- sons for them in language that is understandable to participants (which may require pretesting), includ- ing a discussion of the importance and relevance of the study. When deception is revealed, the researcher should sensitively explain that the proce- dure was selected as a last resort, apologize for hav- ing used it, and fully explain how the deception was carried out, perhaps by displaying and explaining specifi c research materials. During the entire pro- cess, the researcher needs to carefully monitor and appropriately respond to participants ’ affective reac- tions and comments, while encouraging honest feedback about the study.

Debriefi ng tends to be more diffi cult to carry out in nonlaboratory settings, especially in cases in which participants initially are unaware that they have been studied for research purposes, are no longer accessible to the researcher, or are unwill- ing to attend to the debriefi ng. In certain situa- tions, such as naturalistic studies of overheard conversations, debriefi ng participants once the observations have been made could do more harm than good. There is not much a researcher can do

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if a participant indicates displeasure at having been secretly observed, particularly given that the obser- vation already had been carried out. Moreover, the debriefi ng could raise levels of discomfort or para- noia in other public settings and have a negative impact on the image of scientists in general. A pilot study consisting of interviews with a representative selection of persons from the target group could be conducted to assess feelings about the observations and the appropriateness of debriefi ng actual participants.

Another somewhat more uncertain remedy for some of the potential adverse effects of deception is forewarning , a type of revised informed consent pro- cedure whereby researchers take steps to brief par- ticipants about the study at the outset, informing them that certain information may have to be with- held until the end of the investigation and that they are free to withdraw at any time. The researcher then can carry out the study only with persons who

are willing to continue. In Wendler ’ s (1996) view, forewarning addresses the ethical concerns associ- ated with intentional deception by ensuring the autonomy of participants and fulfi lling the research- er ’ s obligation to inform participants of the potential reasonable risks that might be encountered. It also likely confi rms participants ’ suspicions that a study involves more than meets the eye ( Pittenger, 2002 ), suggesting that some participants may be sensitized by the forewarning to engage in problem-solving behavior and attempt to identify the nature of the deception ( Geller, 1982 ).

In addition to forewarning, other alternative pro- cedures to deception in the laboratory setting have been proposed, such as role playing and simulations (for a discussion of these procedures, see Geller 1982 ; Greenberg, 1967 ). In general, these proce- dures, which are summarized in Table 19.3 , appear to have only limited potential and are unlikely to supersede the use of research deception.

TABLE 19.3

Research Alternatives to Deception

Research Alternative Methodology

Quasi-controls (e.g., Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991 )

Participants are asked to refl ect on what is happening during a study and to describe how they think they might be affected by the procedure. If no demand characteristics are detected, the researcher would develop a less deceptive manipulation and have the quasi-controls once again refl ect on the study. If they remain unaware of the demands of the study, the researcher could then use this lower level of deception to carry out the intended investigation. Key strength : Deception can be minimized without risking a corresponding increase in demand cues. Key drawbacks : Quasi-controls are time consuming and often more costly to carry out.

Simulations (e.g., Geller, 1982 )

Conditions are created that mimic the natural environment and participants are asked to pretend or act as if the mock situation were real. Variations include fi eld simulations (simulations in highly realistic staged settings), role-playing simulations (see the next item in this table), and game simulations (participants take on roles in staged situations lasting until a desired outcome has been attained or a specifi ed length of time has passed). Key strength : This approach preserves the key elements thought to underlie the dynamics of real-world phenomenon under study. Key drawbacks : Simulations are sometimes characterized by intrinsic deceptions; mundane realism is sometimes suspect.

Role playing (e.g., Greenberg, 1967 )

Research participants are enlisted as active collaborators in the investigation. Each participant is told what the study is about and is then asked to play a role as if he or she were actually participating in the actual study. Key strengths : In contrast to deception studies, participants in role-playing studies are fully informed; the strategy allows for a wide latitude of response, is capable of exploring complex behavior, and is a more humanistic alternative to deception research. Key drawback : Role-playing results may not replicate the results that would have been obtained in traditional research, especially counterintuitive ones.

Note . From Ethical Issues in Behavioral Research: Basic and Applied Perspectives (p. 101), by A. J. Kimmel, 2007 , Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Copyright 2007 by Wiley-Blackwell. Adapted with permission.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING

In their ethical assessment of deception in con- sumer behavior research, Smith et al. (2009) derived a set of morally justifi able principles that extend beyond those currently available in extant professional codes. On the basis of an application of social contract theory ( Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 ; Dunfee, 2006 ; Sayre-McCord, 2000 ), a nor- mative theory of ethics claiming that binding moral obligations can be identifi ed through the agreement and consent of moral agents, including researchers, participants, and other affected par- ties, Smith et al.’s principles specify the following: Principle 1, an adherence to APA ’ s standards on deception, informed consent, and voluntary partic- ipation; Principle 2, the use of deception as a last resort, once all alternative procedures are ruled out as unfeasible; Principle 3, researchers do not expose participants to risks of potential lasting harm or to procedures or risks that they them- selves would not submit to if similarly situated; Principle 4, participants be forewarned about the

potential use of deception; and Principle 5, researchers plan for participant vulnerabilities. These principles suggest a set of recommended practical steps for the researcher contemplating the use of deception and seeking justifi cation for it.

Figure 19.1 suggests that the initial step in the decision-making process is the determination of whether a planned study calls for the use of any active or passive deceptions. Given likely constraints in identifying passive deceptions, Smith et al. (2009) have recommended that researchers consider whether they would want to be provided with cer- tain omitted details of the study if similarly situated (Principle 3). A second step is to assess the availabil- ity of effective alternatives to deception (Principle 2) when deception is identifi ed. For example, as an alternative to negative mood manipulations that have aroused ethical concerns, such as those involv- ing the presentation of false feedback to participants concerning their skills or intelligence (e.g., Hill & Ward, 1989 ), participants instead could be asked to write an essay describing one of the sadder experi- ences in their lives.

FIGURE 19.1. Decision-making tree for deception studies. From “Social Contract Theory and the Ethics of Deception in Consumer Research,” by N. C. Smith, A. J. Kimmel, and J. G. Klein, 2009 , Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, p. 494. Copyright 2009 by the Society for Consumer Psychology. Reprinted with permission.

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Should it be determined that alternatives to the original deception are unavailable, Step 3 in the deci- sion tree ( Figure 19.1 ) would require the researcher to make a careful determination of the potential risks imposed by the deception, even assuming the use of such remedial measures as forewarning, debriefi ng, and desensitization. Given the diffi culties of predict- ing the potential harmfulness of a procedure, researchers could employ persons to serve as quasi- controls (see Table 19.3 ) who are representative of those who would participate and have them evaluate a scenario describing the study ’ s procedure, with appropriate researcher probes (e.g., “If something were to upset you about this study, what would it be?”). In this way, researchers could identify poten- tially harmful aspects of the research and modify pro- cedures accordingly (or drop the study). Returning to the example of mood manipulations, if it is learned that respondents would be extremely upset by a pro- cedure that provides them with false, negative feed- back about their performance on a task allegedly designed to assess their abilities, another nondecep- tive mood manipulation would have to be found as an effective alternative. Should the alternative also prove upsetting when considered by quasi-controls, another alternative would be needed; if none are available, a decision must be made about whether to conduct the study at all in its present form.

Consistent with Smith et al. ’ s (2009) assertion that exposure of participants to potentially lasting harm is not permissible, Step 3a in the decision tree requires the determination of potential risks when investigating vulnerable populations whose mem- bers may be particularly susceptible to the harmful consequences of deception (Principle 5). Smith et al. have recommended that researchers consider the potential effects of deception on the most vulnerable members of the participant population (e.g., by imagining the reactions of vulnerable participants, such as the shyest student or least secure friend) or again by employing quasi-control participants. Should risks to vulnerable participants be identifi ed, procedures that enable the screening out of such individuals from participation would be necessary (Step 3b).

Beyond ensuring that participants are not harmed, a fi nal step in the decision-making process

(Step 4) would require that participants be treated with dignity as important stakeholders in the research process. Participants can be thought of as another granting agency, donating their time instead of money ( Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991 ). It can be argued that deception undermines the dignity of research participants in the sense that to be lied to is to presume that one is unworthy of the truth; how- ever, the use of forewarning helps to preserve dig- nity by enabling participants to “opt in” to the deceptive situation ( Smith et al., 2009 ; Wendler, 1996 ). If the decision tree is carefully followed and deception is unavoidable, its use would be consid- ered as ethically justifi ed, subject to the four caveats listed at the bottom of Figure 19.1 .

In his partial replication of the Milgram obedi- ence studies, Burger (2009) incorporated several safeguards consistent with the ethical decision- making approach described here. On the basis of the observation that the 150-volt level of Milgram ’ s pro- cedure enabled accurate estimates as to whether par- ticipants would continue to be obedient or not to the end of the research paradigm, Burger employed a “150V solution”; that is, the study was stopped sec- onds after participants decided what to do at the crit- ical juncture. This modifi cation of the original procedure did not represent an alternative to decep- tion, but it substantially reduced the risk of harm by eliminating the likelihood that participants would be exposed to the intense stress levels experienced by many of Milgram ’ s participants. It may be conjec- tured that any alternative to the deception procedure utilized in the original obedience studies would have undermined the intent of the replication, which was to determine whether obedience levels in the current era are similar to those obtained by Milgram some 45 years earlier. Among the other safeguards included in the replication to further ensure the welfare of participants were a two-step screening process to identify and exclude vulnerable participants; a repeated assurance to participants that they could withdraw from the study and still receive the mone- tary incentive; immediate feedback to participants that no shocks were received by the learner; and the choice of a clinical psychologist to run the experi- ments who was instructed to stop the procedure as soon as any adverse effects became apparent.

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Before running the study, Burger (2009) also might have conducted pilot tests to gauge representative participants ’ reactions to a description of the research procedure, and actual participants might have been forewarned about the possibility of deception (assuming this could be done without unduly arous- ing suspicions about the legitimacy of the shock apparatus) or asked to agree to participate fully knowing that certain procedural details would not be revealed until the end of the research experience.

CONCLUSION

Deception represents an important research tool for psychologists and continues to serve as an essential means for overcoming the potential validity threats associated with the investigation of conscious human beings. Yet, for good reasons, it is an approach necessitating a careful balance between methodological and ethical considerations. When the methodological requirements of an investigation lead the researcher to conclude that the only way a study can be carried out is by employing deceptive research tactics, the decision to deceive necessarily results in additional ethical responsibilities: its use must be justifi ed by the anticipated gains of the investigation; extreme care must be taken in its application to protect against potential harms; and it should be used only as a last resort, when effective alternatives are unavailable. Considering the variety and breadth of existing nondeceptive research meth- odologies, it is hoped that investigators will progres- sively explore these potentially rich sources of data as a matter of course so that deception and its corre- sponding ethical obligations need not be invoked.

To be sure, the days during which deception was used more out of convention than necessity and accepted without comment are long past. Con- fronted by an increasingly daunting array of ethical guidelines, government regulations, and institu- tional review, investigators now are compelled to weigh methodological and ethical requirements and choose whether and how to incorporate deception within their research designs. The practical diffi cul- ties imposed by attempts to cope with these two sets of demands are linked to the recognition that the most methodologically sound study is not necessarily

the most ethical one. Most behavioral scientists, when caught up in situations involving confl icting values concerning whether to use deception are will- ing to weigh and measure their sins, judging some to be larger than others.

The nature and degree of deceptions used in the 21st century pale in comparison to those employed by researchers during earlier decades (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2011), which no doubt is refl ective of increased sensitivities to the dignity and welfare of participants as well as trepidation concerning the way a study might be evaluated by an IRB. As to the threats posed to researchers by the growing role of external review, Mueller (2003) argued that the reg- ulatory approach commonly followed by many IRBs is to eliminate all risk (including everyday risks, such as simple embarrassment) rather than to exer- cise the best judgment in evaluating research pro- posals. As a consequence, in the view of some observers, participation in research over time has become much safer than many of the everyday activ- ities in which people engage ( Diener, 2001 ). Ros- now (1997) expressed this sentiment somewhat differently when he noted that contemporary researchers are subjected to a higher level of profes- sional ethical accountability than other professionals who supposedly serve as society ’ s guardians of human rights—such as lawyers, politicians, and journalists—who routinely engage in various forms of deception. Given the arguments on both sides of the ongoing debate concerning the role of deception in the research process, it is likely that our thinking about its use as a research methodology will con- tinue to evolve into the foreseeable future.

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