EMAN

Discussion: Read about how the government has increased oversight of certain pathogens.  What’s scarier than the intentional release of a biological agent? The accidental release of one! With intentional release, you already know the intent is to inflict great harm. We also know there are many rogue nations, groups as well as lone wolfs out there who have tried to or have successful acquired biological agents to use as bioweapons. With accidental release, you might’ve placed your trust in someone (i.e., researchers, scientists, laboratorians) or something (i.e., CDC, USAMRIID, hospitals, research laboratories) to handle these dangerous biological agents in the safest manner possible yet…they had an accident. To prevent such accidents from occurring, the Federal Select Agent Program enhances the nation’s oversight of the safety and security of select agents. It does so by placing regulations and restrictions on those entities who work with, or possess select agents. Select Agents and Toxins List Since the publication of the Select Agent list and the implementation of programs at the CDC and USDA, the government has responded to concerns about certain types of research with policies governing "Dual Use Research of Concern." The link is to the NIH Office of Science Policy. Watch the video and read the policies there on DURC and Gain of Function (GOF) research for a good overview.  Dual-Use Research perspectives:  "Regulating the Boundaries of Dual-Use Research" (Science, 2012) "Implementing the new US Dual-Use policy" (Science, 2012) Discussion:  We have now looked at some instances of DURC vs. GOF research.  Is the US policies for oversight of dual-use research appropriate/comprehensive and state why.  If not, argue for either increasing oversight and state what new policies or practices are needed; or, argue for decreasing oversight and state why.