Federal/State/Local Collaboration Networks in Disasters
Disasters and Intergovernmental Relations:
Part II
Legal/Political Relationships – Federal, State, and Local Agencies
PADM 804 – IGR AND IGM Dr. Harry McGinnis
• Except for a few disaster types (see examples to follow), state and local governments have principal responsibility for dealing with natural and technological hazards and disasters.
• State government responsibilities and authority are affirmed in the U.S. Constitution, which reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal government.
• The federal government has the principal responsibility for managing environmental and technological hazards that occur on federal lands such as military bases and U.S. Department of Energy (particularly nuclear) facilities, affect interstate transportation such as commercial aircraft and ships, and involve acts of war, terrorism, and other threats to national security.
• State governments have the principal responsibility for land-use regulation, building standards, and most other tools of hazard and disaster management.
• State governments, in turn, have delegated responsibility for a wide variety of public services to local governments, usually including the authority to regulate land-use and to determine building standards.
• State governments typically delegate the power to make laws applicable locally and the authority to tax and borrow to cities under their municipal incorporation laws.
• Towns, cities, and counties are granted limited power to make laws applicable within their own borders.
• In general, state constitutions and statutes give authority and power to cities and towns based upon their populations. Municipal incorporation laws frequently grant broad powers to large cities and much more limited powers to smaller cities.
• County governments usually are responsible for administering state programs and making local laws for rural and other unincorporated areas.
• Most local revenue is spent on public school systems and law enforcement.
• Because of their limited authority to raise revenue, local governments seldom have adequate funding to support “extra” public services, such as emergency management. • Most funding goes to core functions like law enforcement, education, and
road building and maintenance.
• Local governments may be required either to enforce building codes adopted by the state or to adopt the state code or choose a stronger local code (a mini/maxi code); or they may have the option of adopting a building code or not.
Local governments frequently lack the financial resources and technical expertise to enforce building codes effectively.
• For example, when Hurricane Hugo hit South Carolina in 1989, some communities in the state had no building code at all because they had chosen not to adopt one, some had a code but no inspectors, and a few had a code and inspectors.
• A major finding after the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in south Florida was that there were very strong building codes in place, but code enforcement was very lax in some communities. The result was far more damage to homes and businesses than should have occurred and more costs to insurance companies that assumed building codes were adequately enforced when they set the rates to insure homes and businesses.
• The State of South Carolina strengthened its building code after Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and the State of Louisiana strengthened its code after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
• County governments are agents of the state government in many program areas, such as welfare, and have offices through which state officials can deliver emergency management-related services, such as environmental protection and the regulation of hazardous materials and other potentially dangerous substances and activities.
• Because county governments act as agents of their state governments, as well as acting as full-service local governments, the county may be a good level at which to coordinate or direct emergency management efforts.
• Metropolitan areas may include many counties and cities and thereby require considerable political cooperation in order to have a coordinated and consistent disaster plan.
• The State of California, for example, has designated counties as the coordinators of disaster operations. Under the state’s “functional area” concept, counties are responsible for coordinating regional efforts under the statewide Standard Emergency Management System (SEMS).
• Because large cities often have more disaster experience, financial resources, and technical expertise than smaller cities and counties, they often provide leadership for regional disaster planning efforts and technical assistance for smaller communities.
Because of frequent disaster experience, officials in some large cities may well have more experience than their federal counterparts with particular hazard mitigation and disaster response operations.
For example, the New York City Police Department handles hostage cases daily and thus has more experience managing such events than its federal
counterparts. Dealing with hostage events in a crowded city where innocent bystanders may be hurt also provides critical lessons for law enforcement.
For local governments, sharing resources and helping neighboring jurisdictions may raise serious legal, political, and administrative
issues. For example:
• Who pays for the resources used in a disaster operation? For instance, who pays for the medical supplies used to treat victims?
• Who pays the medical bills for emergency personnel who may be injured in a disaster response? Will a local government’s health care insurance cover such costs?
• Who is in charge if it is a multi-jurisdictional response?
• Who authorizes use of private, leased, or loaned, equipment and who covers the cost of any equipment that is lost or destroyed?
• Who is responsible for providing information to the media and the general public?
• Who should be held responsible if the disaster response is slow or ineffective? Who should be sued?
• Who should be rewarded if the disaster response is very good?
To increase the resources available during a disaster response, local governments often enter into mutual aid
agreements with neighboring jurisdictions.
• Mutual aid agreements, for example, may define who is responsible for requesting assistance and which jurisdiction is responsible for the costs to those providing aid.
• Mutual aid agreements are normally formalized in “memoranda of understanding” or other documents so that all parties fully understand their terms.
• Mutual aid agreements usually have provisions for coordinated planning and training exercises to ensure that they will be fully functional when a disaster occurs.
One of the most frequently noted advantages of joint training and frequent contact among local emergency managers within a
metropolitan area or similar region is that coordination of efforts is easier when emergency managers know one another personally. (The same holds true for contact among federal, state, and local
emergency management officials.)
The improved coordination may be due to: • The officials being able to “put a face” with the name of the person with
whom they are interacting, thus making the contact more personal; • Improved understanding because officials better understand the verbal
and nonverbal communication of their counterparts; and • More trust in the intentions and reliability of their counterparts due to
the prior contact.
There are also mechanisms for improving the coordination of emergency management efforts across state boundaries,
between state and local agencies, and among local governments.
• For example, the governors of southern states entered into an agreement in 1993 to provide mutual assistance in the event of major disasters. In 1995, the Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact was opened up to other, non- southern states and renamed the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
• The compact addresses issues like legal liability, essentially letting governors “deputize” the emergency personnel brought into the state so that they will enjoy the same immunity from liability as other state employees and agents (Southern Governors Association, 1995).
• During the Hurricane Katrina and Rita disasters in 2005, approximately 66,000 personnel were deployed under the EMAC system. They provided essential services in the States of Louisiana and Mississippi and the program proved a critical mechanism for collaboration in disaster operations.
• EMAC requires that governors formally request assistance and that funding be available or, at least, expected to cover the negotiated expenses.
• The program’s After-Action Report following the devastating 2004 hurricane season pointed out the crucial roles of governors in requesting assistance. The Florida governor had been actively involved in EMAC and requests for assistance quickly followed his declarations of state emergency. The Alabama governor was less experienced, but the state emergency management director had served as a senior official in FEMA and was familiar with the system.
• There were serious problems in initiating EMAC assistance during the Katrina and Rita response. The Louisiana governor’s office was slow to formulate and issue its requests. The disconnection between the governor’s office and local emergency management and emergency response agencies made it difficult to identify needs and to determine what kinds of EMAC resources to request.
• The states with statewide mutual assistance compacts to facilitate sharing of resources among cities and counties were more familiar with the EMAC process and were better able to request aid.
• The states with well-developed incident management systems also were better able to integrate EMAC personnel and material into their disaster operations (Waugh, 2007).
• FEMA is implementing a system of partnerships among federal, state, and local governments; nonprofit organizations; and private firms to facilitate the sharing of information and coordination of emergency management efforts.
• FEMA’s Emergency Information Infrastructure Partnership (EIIP) initiative is designed to improve communication and the sharing of information among public, nonprofit, and private emergency management organizations and individuals(see the FEMA website www.fema.gov) (Goss, 1998).
• The Global Emergency Management Network Initiative (GEMINI) is a bilateral effort between the U.S. and Canada to link national emergency management information systems. FEMA is the U.S. representative in the development of the network.
A report to Congress and FEMA by the National Academy of Public Administration in 1997, The Role of the National Guard in
Emergency Preparedness and Response, recommended action to reconcile the federal and state responsibilities of the National Guard so that the Guard can be used better in state disaster
operations and, through mutual aid agreements, in other states.
At present, National Guard units are subject to federalization in the event of a national emergency and thus have a critical role in national defense.
Consequently, there are problems if combat and combat support units are engaged in disaster operations and unavailable for federal service. (The
same issue arises over the use of regular military forces in disaster operations when they may be needed to respond to an international crisis
or a threat to the U.S. itself).
Federal law, namely, the posse comitatus law, prohibits the use of federal troops in law enforcement operations, and this raises issues concerning the use of National Guard units
in law enforcement roles during disasters, particularly civil disorder-related disasters.
But the reduction of National Guard commitments to provide combat units may free up units for emergency management, disaster relief, and state civil disorder (law
enforcement) work (NAPA, 1997).
Federalization of the National Guard was a contentious issue during the Katrina disaster because the governor of Louisiana refused to allow a federalization of the Louisiana Guard. The National Guard is one of the principal tools of governors to
respond to disaster and they are understandably reluctant to give up that tool.
Many units of the National Guard in Louisiana and Mississippi were deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan during the Katrina disaster and unavailable to aid in the disaster
response. Some Guard units were still using radio equipment from the Vietnam War era (Waugh, 2006).
• There are also organizations that represent government officials and emergency management and response agencies. For example, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is an organization that promotes the professionalization of the fire services, encourages adoption of fire codes, and addresses technical and administrative issues faced by fire chiefs. Membership in the IAFC is based on government position and, thus, the association represents individual jurisdictions, as well as the profession at-large.
• Emergency management issues are also addressed by associations of public officials and governments, such as the National Association of Governors, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Municipal League, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the National Association of Counties.
Emergency managers, emergency responders, planners, and other related officials also have professional associations that address emergency management issues and concerns. Such associations are typically
nonprofit organizations open to individuals who may or may not be employed in an emergency management-related agency. Many include students, college faculty, private consultants, and others
interested in the field.
Examples include the International Association of Emergency Managers, the National Emergency Management Association, and the Association of Contingency Planners (see Session No. 7 on the role
of nonprofit sector agencies), as well as broader professional groups such as the American Planning Association, the American Society for Public Administration, and the American Public Works
Association.
- Disasters and �Intergovernmental Relations: Part II��Legal/Political Relationships – �Federal, State, and Local Agencies
- Slide Number 2
- Slide Number 3
- Slide Number 4
- Slide Number 5
- Slide Number 6
- Slide Number 7
- Slide Number 8
- Slide Number 9
- Slide Number 10
- Slide Number 11
- Slide Number 12
- Slide Number 13
- Slide Number 14
- Slide Number 15
- Slide Number 16
- Slide Number 17
- Slide Number 18
- Slide Number 19
- Slide Number 20
- Slide Number 21
- Slide Number 22