Post a brief(200 Word APA Style) description of the three crisis-response organizations you selected. Then describe the roles of each organization as well as the relationships between and among them. Be specific and provide examples.

Nicholas Scoppetta Disaster Planning and Preparedness: A Human Story IN DECEMBER 2 0 0 1 , MAYOR-ELECT MICHAEL BLOOMBHRG ASKED ME

TO become the city's thirty-first fire commissioner. I had already announced that I would leave the Administration for Children's Services, where I had been commissioner for six years, and was plan- ning on leaving government. But, like all New Yorkers, I had watched in horror as events unfolded on September 11, 2001, ajid I knew that the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) was the hardest hit of all city agencies in the attacks. Being asked to help rebuild this storied New York institution was an honor, and saying yes was my duty.

Disaster preparedness is at the forefront of the FDNY's mission, as it is for first responders in cities and towns across the country. Even just a passing awareness of current events makes it clear why disaster preparedness is so important. At the time this conference was held, California was still reeling from some of the worst fires in its history. New Orleans had yet to be rebuilt. And for many people in New York, the memory of 9-11, our worst disaster, is still painfully fresh.

The New York City Fire Department has been on the ground in each of those disasters. In addition, in our day to day operations, the FDNY oversees fire and life safety for our 8 million inhabitants and the millions more who work and visit the city every day. We respond to all emergency medical and fire calls in the more than 321 square miles of the five boroughs. In 2007 our more than 11,000 firefighters put out over 50,000 fires. Our emergency medical technicians and paramedics responded to 1.3 million calls.

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In the last several years we have responded to a wall collapse and landslide on a busy highway, two building explosions, a single engine plane crashing into a high-rise apartment building, a huge fire at an ExxonMobil oil storage facility and a citywide blackout. All of these crit- ical situations were handled skillfully by our members with minimal loss of life.

In a city this size, literally anything can happen. So how to manage the monumental task of protecting it? Two elements are abso- lutely vital in this equation: capability and flexibility.

Capability is having the necessary tools at our disposal—including the most reliable and up-to-date equipment—and placing our resources in locations where they vdll be most accessible and effective. It means having plans at the ready to deal with the events that are hkely to occur. And most important, it means having well-trained first responders.

The importance of planning and preparedness cannot be over- stated. But of course plans and preparations alone will not come to the rescue in a difficult moment. We must have people who are capable of implementing those plans.

We simply do not know what the next major incident is going to be, and so we must be flexible. We have to be ready for whatever happens. It could be a chemical attack. It could be a Category 5 hurri- cane. It could be another blackout or brovmout. To put it another way, we plan for an event; we do not plan for the event.

Of course, the biggest event in the FDNY's history came on September 11, 2001. It was an event that changed everything for the department. And it brought the concept of disaster preparedness to the forefront in state and local governments across America as never before.

Before 9/11, our firefighters were mainly trained to respond to unintentional acts. While loss of life and unknown dangers were always part of the job, it was not until the World Trade Center attack in 2001 that the department was faced with the reality of responding to an attack deliberately designed to kill thousands upon thousands of people. That grim realization was compounded by the terrible losses this department suffered that day. The numbers are well known, but

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are no less astounding for their familiarity. 343 members were killed, vwth a combined 4,400 years of experience—all in the space of 102 minutes. We lost people of every rank: from firefighters straight out of our training academy to our highest ranking officers, including the chief of the department and the first deputy commissioner. Then came the retirements. In 2002, almost 1,300 uniformed members retired from the department. In 2003, 700 members retired. Before 9-11, about 500 people could be expected to retire in a year. In the last 6 years, 50 percent of the department turned over.

I became commissioner on January 1, 2002, three months after the terrorist attacks. We immediately turned our attention to the monu- mental task of rebuilding this great institution, which was at that time a department in mourning.

The first step was to get some help in figuring out what went right and what went wrong vwth our response on 9-11.1 asked the renowned consulting firm McKinsey & Company to analyze our response to the attacks, review our operations and procedures, and make recommen- dations as to how we could increase our preparedness.

McKinsey produced a comprehensive and detailed report, and in response to its findings, we set about implementing the recommenda- tions, including presenting the FDNY's first ever strategic plan.

McKinsey's report and our strategic plan laid out a road map for strengthening the department by setting a clear set of priorities. September 11 showed us that the rules of the game had changed. In response, our priorities had to change as well.

We greatly enhanced the training given to our members of all ranks, both fire and emergency medical services (liMS). When I came to the department, our firefighters spent 13 weeks at our training acad- emy before coming on the job. Now, they study and train for 23 weeks.

We have also stepped up our more specialized training. We trained more than 3,600 fire and EMS members in advanced ) lazardous materials response, which is nearly five times the number we liad before 9-11.

In addition, we devised two advanced-level courses for our offi- cers: one in conjunction with Columbia University that focuses on

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management, and another with West Point that focuses on combating terrorism. These two programs give our senior members a level of train- ing and education unprecedented in the department's history.

One of the key points made in the McKinsey report was the depart- ment's need for a technologically sophisticated operations command center. In 2006 we opened a $17 million state of the art facility located in our headquarters. The New York Gity Fire Department Operations Genter (FDOG) gives us unprecedented situational awareness and the ability to direct operations remotely. There we have access to maps, building records, and information on local infrastructure that helps our commanders make informed tactical decisions. The FDOG has the capability to receive real-time video feeds so commanders in the FDOG can see how the incident is progressing. And it is our critical point of contact with city, state, and federal agencies.

There have been several instances when the FDOG proved critical to our operations. In May 2007 a fire broke out on the roof of the build- ing that housed the leather goods company Goach in Manhattan. From the street it looked as though the top fioor and roof were on fire. Our video feed showed that the fire was confined to wooden storage sheds on the roof This entirely changed our tactics and allowed firefighters to quickly suppress the fire.

We made other crucial improvements in technology. Most impor- tant, we deployed new handie-talkie radios to the field. These radios provide significant advantages over the models that were in use on 9-11. Our current radios also support many more channels and use the ultra-high-frequency (UHF) band, which allows for greater penetration in buildings and, crucially, allows for interoperability with other agen- cies, including the Police Department, which uses UHF. In addition, we developed a system for mobile communication in high-rise buildings that consists of handie-talkies, high-powered post radios, and battahon car repeaters. In effect, we devised a mobile communications system that is similar to the system used by the military that we carry with us.

We have made improvements to the equipment that we give our members to improve their safety. Last year we deployed radiation detectors and new masks that protect from chemical and biological

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agents. We also began using new and improved personal safety ropes that allow our firefighters a secure way to escape a building should they become trapped.

One issue that became glaringly clear after September 11, 2001 was that better coordination and information sharing was needed between first responder agencies. Until then the FDNY had functioned on its own, with little thought given to seeking outside help. After the devastating attacks, however, we realized, along with most other agen- cies, that cooperation is absolutely vital.

In 2005, Mayor Bloomberg and the Office of Emergency Management developed a Citywide Incident Management System, known as CIMS, a protocol for managing emergencies that involve multiple agencies. CIMS defines how citywide emergencies or large- scale multiple incidents will be managed, and uses as a template the National Incident Management System known as NIMS.

Another major change was our development of Incident Management Teams. IMTs are made up of emergency professionals to respond to and provide support at large-scale events that are likely to last more than 24 hours—the kind of event where first responders can quickly become overwhelmed.

The FDNY learned how helpful IMTs could be in the immediate aftermath of 9-11, when the massive recovery operation was under way at the World Trade Center. The IMT concept had been developed by the United States Forestry Service primarily to deal with natural disasters. After the attacks, a Forestry Service Incident Management Team came to New York and offered to help the FDNY effort at Ground Zero. It turned out they were of enormous assistance with logistics and planning, keep- ing our members fed and supplied with everything they needed and effectively putting a management imibrella over the recovery operation.

This was a departure from how things were normally done. As one chief put it at the time "if you had told us six weeks ago that the Forestry Service would be bailing us out, we would've had you committed."

We began training our members in Incident Management proto- col in 2003. Then, in 2005, disaster struck the Gulf states in the form of

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Hurricane Katrina. And when the call for help came from Louisiana, we

were in a position to respond. Within 24 hours, we had 350 firefighters medically evaluated,

inoculated, and on their way to New Orleans, including 24 members of our Incident Management Team. They arrived to find the city in sham- bles and the New Orleans Fire Department exhausted and drained. Our members were able to help not just put out fires, but also transport supplies and establish a command support structure. In total, 650 of our members were activated for duty in New Orleans—at full strength, the entire New Orleans Fire Department had about 700 members.

In October we sent 7 IMT-trained members to Cahfomia to help the agencies there deal with the fires that were sweeping across the state. They were put to work dealing with logistics, making sure that the people fighting the fire had all the water, fuel, food, and sanitary supplies they needed. In August 2006, we sent a team to forest fires in Idaho. We will soon have 150 members trained in this management specialty.

Here in New York, the department has partnered with multiple agencies both at drills and tabletop exercises and at real-life events. And it has paid off. For example, in July 2007 a 24-inch steam pipe that lay underneath a busy street in Midtown Manhattan exploded. A geyser of superheated steam and debris burst through the pavement. Our response had to be coordinated among several agencies: the police. Con Edison, the Department of Health, the Department of Environmental Protection, and the Office of Emergency Management. We successfully set up a unified command, under a protocol established by the Cityvdde Incident Management System.

And, in what was perhaps the most groundbreaking inter- agency project in our history, in September 2007 we partnered vdth the Department of Homeland Security in an intelligence-sharing proj- ect that included fire departments from across the country. It is well known that it is highly unusual for federal government to share intelli- gence reports with local governments. We now receive these reports— an indication of just how much that paradigm has changed.

A couple of public misperceptions persist about the FDNY's response on 9-11. The most prevalent is that chaos and confusion

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reigned at the site before the buildings collapsed. While there were flaws in the responses of all the emergency agencies, including the FDNY, video footage and photographs show that firefighters and fire officers acted in a cohesive, disciphned, and professional manner in accordance with their training. Moreover, they had received training specific to the World Trade Center. Firefighters and fire officers knew the buildings well. They even conducted drills in them and tested the radio repeater system.

Firefighters, it is often said, are a special breed. And that is no cliché. They love to fight fires, they crave the action. They are the last man out. They are always anticipating "the big one." But no one in the department could ever have imagined that "the big one" would happen in the way it did.

For the firefighters who responded to the World Trade Center after the planes hit and who faced the job of rescuing trapped civilians, the awesome severity of the situation was immediately and terribly clear. Put simply, no one had seen anything üke thi.s before. Not even the most senior men with 30 or 40 years on the job. Not even the two highest-ranking officers. Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro and Chief of Department Pete Ganci.

As they drove across the Brooklyn Bridge together to get to the burning Trade Center, Chief Nigro said to Chief Ganci: "This is going to be the worst day of our lives." Chief Ganci was killed in the collapse of the Trade Center towers.

Despite this grim reality, firefighters and fire officers like Captain Terry Hatton did their job. Terry was a well-respected officer in command of one of our elite units. Rescue 1. A fellow firefighter and friend recounts that he saw Terry in the command ]5ost set up in the North Tower that morning. Terry said: "I love you, brother. This might be the last time I see you." They hugged, anticipating the worst, then Terry went up into the building. He never made it out.

Another remarkable story is that of Battalion Chief Orio Palmer. Chief Palmer—an accomplished athlete and marathon runner—took an elevator to the fortieth floor of the South Towei- and from there proceeded to the upper floors, on foot, carrying 75 pounds of equip-

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ment, looking for trapped survivors. As he made his way toward the massive fire, he methodically radioed crucial information and warn- ings about breached walls and nonworking elevators. He climbed all the way to the seventy-eighth fioor, just below the impact zone.

There he found numerous bodies and fire. On the tape of his radio transmissions, he is heard gasping, shocked at what he sees. He called for two hose lines. He realized the fire is too big to put out, but hoped to soak down the stairways and get above the firestorm raging on the eight fioors above him to rescue people trapped there. He radioed one of his officers, who is a few fioors below him, calling for the hose lines. The response came back immediately: "we're on our way."

Minutes later the radio falls silent. There is a deafening roar as 91 fioors of steel and concrete collapse, crushing Chief Palmer, his team, and hundreds of others.

The poet Emerson wrote "There is properly no history; only biog- raphy." I think that, in times of life-threatening crisis, in times of disas- ter, the most important protagonists are often ordinary men and women who, in the course of their everyday tasks, perform extraordinary deeds.

Responding to a disaster requires logistical and tactical planning and scientific calculation. But disaster response is also a human story, a contest between personal will and adversity, and of the human spirit challenging terrible odds.

It is the story of people like Chief Ganci, Captain Hatton, Chief Palmer, and the chiefs who currently direct operations at the Department, Chief of Department Sal Cassano, Chief of Operations Pat McNally, First Deputy Commissioner Frank Cruthers, and the thousands of others who responded to the Trade Center attack, overcame the stag- gering losses, and went on to build a stronger, even more dedicated and better prepared department.

Our safety, our future, perhaps our very existence may well

depend on such people.

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