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Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses

2009

A Study in Police Preparedness to Respond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey Jeffrey T. Dino Seton Hall University

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Recommended Citation Dino, Jeffrey T., "A Study in Police Preparedness to Respond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey " (2009). Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses (ETDs). 1. http://scholarship.shu.edu/dissertations/1

A STUDY IN POLICE PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATIONS TO PROVIDE A SAFER LEARNING ENVIRONMENT IN THE SCHOOLS OF BERGEN COUNTY,

NEW JERSEY

JEFFREY T. DIN0

Dissertation Committee

Charles Achilles, Ed.D., Mentor Daniel Gutmore, Ph.D.

Reverend Christopher J. Hynes, D. Min Daniel Simone Jr., Ed.D.

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Education Seton Hall University

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AND HUMAN SERVICES

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

APPROVAL FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

Doctoral Candidate, Jeffery Dino, has successfully defended and made the required

modifications to the text of the doctoral dissertation for the Ed.D. during this Spring

Semester 2009.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE (please sign and date beside your name)

Mentor: Dr. Charles Achilles 5-l--

Committee Member:

Committee Member:

External Reader:

The mentor and any other committee members who wish to review revisions will sign and date this document only when revisions have been completed. Please return this form to the Oftice of Graduate Studies, where it will be placed in the candidate's file and submit a copy with your final dissertation to be bound as page number two.

O Copyright by Jeffrey T. Dino, 2009 All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

The research in this study was conducted to explore the influence that the Bergen

County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of

all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is

mandatory for children to the age of 16 in New Jersey it becomes imperative that the

police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the

police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while

children are in attendance.

The survey used in the study was sent to all municipal police departments in

Bergen County, New Jersey (N = 68). Voluntary participation was requested from the

administrators of each police department.

This study can be described as cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental

research. There were three research questions which guided the study. The researcher

used descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two. To answer

guiding question three the researcher used Chi-Squared ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses. The

analyses were conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor

variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law

enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on

each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).

Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was

between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response

tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total

operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount

of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.

The study has contributed to decision making in the area of police training in

active-shooter tactics and training.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following words are offered as my sincere thanks to all of the people that

made this effort possible for me to complete. Some contributed more than others but no

one's advice, caring, knowledge and influence went unnoticed.

To Dr. Charles Achilles my mentor in this project, you have continuously made

my work better by your direction, enthusiasm for my topic, editing and command of the

written word. You took what I wrote and made it better each time you advised on it.

Thank you.

To Dr. Daniel Simone Jr., we started as classmates; you became my friend and

soon became a strong academic influence of mine. You have been there for me for a long

time and never got annoyed with my constant emails and questions, some of which were

in a panic. You always gave good advice, up to and including as a member of my

committee. I can not thank you enough.

To Dr. Daniel Gutmore, my committee member and student advisor, thank you,

and structure does influence behavior.

To Reverend Dr. Christopher Hynes, my committee member and friend, thank

you for always being there when I needed your help.

To Dr. John Collins, for your mastery of statistics and never ending assistance,

my eternal thanks.

To all of the people who provided constant encouragement and support, you all

know who you are; I would not have completed this project without the inspiration and

motivation I took from your words, thank you.

DEDICATION

The bloodiest battles are fought within

This work is dedicated to my wife Kendra and my children Rachel, Jake and

Christopher. I love you and thank you. Without your help, patience, and caring I would

never have been able to do this. No accomplishment really means anything unless it is

shared with those that love you.

Table of Contents

.......................................................................... Acknowledgements Dedication .......................................................................... List of Tables ..........................................................................

.............. Chapter I INTRODUCTION. PROBLEM AND PURPOSE Introduction ........................................................... Background ........................................................... Statement of the Problem ........................................... Purpose of the Study .................................................

................................................ Guiding Questions ........................................... Significance of the Study

Delimitations of the Study .......................................... ............................................. Limitations of the Study

................................................. Definitions of Terms Organization of the Study ...........................................

Chapter II

Chapter 111

Chapter IV

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE. RESEARCH AND THEORY ..................................................... Introduction ............................................................ Background ............................................................

...................................... Historical Summary of Events Traditional Police Tactics ...........................................

........................................ Legal Mandates for Change .................................................. New Police Tactics

.................................... Problems with the New Tactics School Resource Officer ............................................ Research and Theory Related to Police Administrators ......... School Violence ...................................................... Theoretical Framework. ............................................. Summary ...............................................................

DESIGN AND METHODS ........................................ Purpose ................................................................ Design .................................................................. Methods ............................................................... Population ............................................................ Instrumentation ...................................................... Conclusion ............................................................

......... PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA Introduction ..........................................................

.................................................... Collection of Data ................................................... Data and Findings . . . .

Descr~ptwe Statlstlcs ............................................

vii

Chapter V

References

Appendixes

Reliability Estimates ............................................. Answering Research Question 1 ................................... Answering Research Question 2 ................................... Answering Research Question 3 ................................... Summary ...............................................................

INTRODUCTION. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS. DISCUSSION. CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES. AND FUTURE STUDY ............................................................... Introduction ........................................................... Summary of Findings ............................................... Discussion ............................................................ Conclusions ........................................................... Recommendations for Policies and Practices ..................... .Future Study ..........................................................

........................................................................... Appendix A . Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Memo (05-01) Active-Shooter Policy Initiative ......................... Appendix B -List of Municipal Police Departments in Bergen County. New Jersey ........................................ Appendix C -Approval Letters; Bureau of Justice Statistics. Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. IRB Approval Form. IRB Approval Letter ................................................. Appendix D - Survey Questionnaire .............................. A ~ ~ e n d i x E - Solicitation Letter ................................... .. Appendix F . Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) Statistical Analyses ............. 119

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

Table 8

Table 9

Table 10

Table 11

Table 12

Table 13

Table 14

School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, - Requiring a Police Response to a Private Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the Implementation of a Planned Attack.. .....

Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table 1 (April .................................................. 20, 1999 to February 2008).

Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office Training Mandate of September 1,2005.. .........

Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid Agreements for Joint Responses.. .....................

Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning.. ...

Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of .................................................. September 1, 2005 (N = 45)

Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active-Shooter Training (N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible.. ........................................................................

Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active- ............................................................ Shooter Response..

Recoded Responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response.. .......................................................................

Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police ............................................. Departments in Bergen County.

Recoded Responses: Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments.. ...........................................................

(7a) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting BCPO ............................................................... the Model Policy..

(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy.. ..........................................................

Number and Frequency of Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ.. .......................................

Table 15 Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County. NJ ....... 73

Table 16 Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ .......................................... 74

Table 17 Recoded Responses: 2007 Forfeiture Program. Seized Funds as Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ .................. 75

Table 18 Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ .......................................... 76

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

Introduction

Police departments across the United States have made changes to the way they

will respond to critical-incidents that occur at schools located within their jurisdictions.

The attack at Columbine High School (April 20, 1999) has served as a catalyst for the

changes made by police agencies all over the country. In Bergen County, New Jersey

changes were mandated by a directive, Directive 05-01 Active-Shooter Policy Initiative,

from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office in a memo dated April 11,2005 (see

Appendix A). The memo clearly states that as of its distribution, it will become the

policy of the county to have a unified and consistent active-shooter response policy. This

policy, entitled the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter

Situations, was developed by and a final version was agreed upon by the Chiefs of Police

at their February 24, 2005 Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association meeting, and

became mandatory training for all sworn police officers in the county. Also contained in

the directive was a completion of training date of September 1,2005 for all sworn police

officers in the county.

The basis for this type of county-wide response policy is in the understanding of

the Chiefs of Police and other members of the law enforcement community in Bergen

County that critical incidents are likely to produce multi-agency responses. Thls

understanding includes critical incidents that occur in jurisdictions of small to mid-sized

police departments throughout the county, and will most likely require the use of mutual-

aid from neighboring municipal, county, state, and federal agencies to bring the event[s]

to a resolution. Therefore, when police officers of different agencies are working

together toward the successful resolution of a critical incident, they need to be trained in

similar tactics. For police officers from multiple agencies to work safely and swiftly

together in a critical-incident response they need the same basic awareness of tactics.

Experts agree that violence in schools has become more of a problem since the

late 1990s (Peterson & O'Neal, 2002). Society is increasingly exposed to violence and

police officers must respond to more and different types of violent situations. One type

of situation that is sadly becoming more common is the active-shooter in schools.

Routine-activities theory by Kautt and Roncek (2007) reveals schools as criminal

hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal

activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors (Kautt & Roncek,

2007). Active-shooters are not limited to education institutions; they are just as common

in the work place and in other venues. Police must develop policies and tactics fluid and

flexible enough that they may be employed in diverse locations.

As a first-responder to an active shooting in a school, police must quickly assess

and react to events taking place. To do this, police first-responders must have training in

making assessments and formulating plans to enter schools and save lives. After the

development of the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter

Situations by the Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association, and distribution of this

policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, police officers in Bergen County will

now respond to a critical incident like an active-shooter situation in a school setting in a

unified manner.

Although the terminology appears in the definition of terms section, it is fitting to

define this phrase now that has been coined by law-enforcement professionals and that is

used often in this analysis. The phrase is "Active-Shooter." An active-shooter is defined

as a suspect[s] whose activity is immediately causing death and serious injury. The

activity is not contained and there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury to

potential victims (Borelli, 2005).

Background

Prior to the mid 1960s, police responded and resolved many types of potentially

violent situations. These situations created a need for change in police tactics. The

catalyst for this change was the deadly event at The University of Texas (August 1,

1966), where Charles Whitman killed 15 people and wounded 31 others from the top of a

clock tower. After this event, the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams were born

(Borelli, 2005). These new and specially trained groups of police officers responded to

critical incidents of active-shooters in the process of killing innocent people; suspects

barricading themselves into dangerous situations, and hostage takers holding innocent

people captive. The new teams were trained in tactics that allowed for the successful

resolution of these situations.

Police officers not assigned to these specialized response teams were now being

trained to respond and secure the scene to allow time to pass when specialized teams

could respond. Time was considered the ally of the police to calm situations and allow

for the response of special teams and negotiators who came along.

Police departments everywhere again received a wake up call on April 20, 1999 in

Littleton, CO. The lesson that day was that the days of police responding to an incident

and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive were no longer acceptable when a violent actor was

already taking lives. The police tactic of buying time was not a viable strategy against an

actor[s] who had no intention of surrendering (Egan, 1999). A goal of the actors at

Columbine High School was not to get out alive, as is frequently the case with this kind

of event. In an active-shooter situation, suicide is often a part of the plan from the start

(Scanlon, 2001).

Police have now modified their assessment of what is expected by first-

responding police officers to a critical or violent incident at a school. The new ideas are

now taught in police academies all over the country that police are to respond, assess,

plan, and engage. Allowing time to pass is the opposite of what responding police

officers should do because violent events do not typically last more than 5 to 7 minutes

(Wood, 2001). Calculating the average number of people shot during these active-

shooting situations and the typical duration of the shooting, shows that once the shooting

starts, someone is shot every 15 seconds (Tactical Response, 2008). If responses are

divided into 15-second intervals, it is easy to see why police first-responders must not

wait to take action to stop the killing.

Statement of the Problem

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy

and only now has begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available

on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). Although violent crime

in schools and in general has been on the decline since the early 1990's (Kleck, 1999)

police agencies must adapt to changing societal trends where violent critical incidents are

becoming more common. In this adaptation, society should expect police officers to

respond to violent situations and resolve the issues they are confronted by. One such

issue is the active-shooter situation in a school, which is the foundation of this study.

In this study the researcher attempts to determine if police officers in Bergen

County are adequately prepared to respond and resolve an active-shooter incident in a

school quickly.

Purpose of the Study

The researcher's purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the

Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future

preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to

active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in

schools is mandatory for the children of New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police

departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police

officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children

are in attendance.

Guiding Questions

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2 . Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model

policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being

done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Significance of the Study

Up to this point, the literature in this field has presented an incomplete view of

police response to shootings, active-shooters, and critical incidents in schools. Much of

the literature and most studies this researcher has located on the topic are from the

perspective of the school administrators' response to these situations, attempts at

psychological profiles of the shooters and how the media interprets these events.

Therefore, what can be uncovered from a study of this kind can assist police

administrators in their preparation efforts to combat instances of dangerous and deadly

violent situations at schools to better maintain a safer learning environment in the schools

of Bergen County, NJ. As education administrators make the school facilities available

for police training, police become better prepared to respond to crisis situations in

schools.

Most police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey are similar in their

command structure. At the top, the chain of command has a Chief of Police or civilian

Police Director. Outside the internal command, each police department operates under

some direction by the county prosecutor's office, as the county prosecutor is the chief

law-enforcement officer appointed by the governor for that county. Although staffing

and area distinguish one police department from one another they are alike in many ways.

How they differ in their preparedness to respond to an active-shooter situation is the

foundation of this study.

Many different methods are available to train for critical-incident responses, and

experts in the field have not identified one method as better than any other. Each method

is similar in its make-up and basic goal - respond and save lives by confronting and

stopping the violent actor.

Delimitations of the Study

This study was designed to explore what police departments in one county

(Bergen) in New Jersey are doing to prepare themselves better for a critical-incident

response at a school after the distribution of, the Standardization of Patrol Based

Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office. The delimitations of the study were: only the 68 municipal police agencies in

Bergen County, NJ listed on the Bergen County Prosecutors office website were included

in the population (N=68), information to answer the guiding questions was derived from

the survey instrument provided to the Chiefs of Police the Civilian Police Directors or

their designees, the agencies provided with the survey instrument were also asked to

return the completed instrument in three weeks.

Limitations of the Study

Limitations identify potential weaknesses in the study that derive from the design

and methods of a study. The scope of this study focuses on the 68 municipal police

departments in Bergen County, New Jersey. All 68 municipal police departments were

included on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website. Since all municipal police

departments in the county were included as participants, the research methodology can be

considered a census. The number of agencies that return the completed survey

instrument is a limitation of the study. The survey instrument used to solicit data was

modeled after the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law

Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. The survey instrument,

along with original questions related to active-shooter preparation prepared by the

researcher was reviewed by a jury of experts in the field.

Since this study is focused on one county in the state of New Jersey which has a

total of 21 counties, the results of the study may not be indicative of the level of

preparations by the police departments in the rest of the state. Therefore, any conclusions

drawn from the study to apply to other municipal departments in the other counties,

county or state police departments, are the responsibility of the reader.

Another limitation of this study is that it is primarily focused on police response

to active-shooter and critical incidents in primary, middle, and secondary schools.

Although some mention is made of events that occur[ed] on college campuses, the study

is limited to how police are responding to the school incidents. College and university

active-shooter and critical incidents are mentioned to establish for the reader some key

events that were either a catalyst for change or an especially violent incident where police

had responded in the same manner as they would have to a lower grade level school.

A section on higher education or college campus violence would not be practical

in this study, as it would need its own study to truly report valuable information. Higher

education institutions are not considered to be schools in terms of law enforcement,

because the student body is comprised of adults. In addition many colleges and

universities have their own police departments or security agencies and these agencies

report to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report differently than a police department within a

countylstate as per the Clery Act for reporting campus crime. The law enforcement

agencies of state and private institutions may fall under the jurisdiction of the state

attorney general's office rather than the county prosecutor's office. This too would

eliminate campuses from the scope of this project as the present study is focused on

municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As a result it would not be

appropriate for the researcher to draw conclusions about the training and preparations of

campus police agencies when they work under different authority than those at the

foundation of this study.

Definitions of Terms

The following are definitions that are relevant to this study:

Active-shooter: "A suspect(s) activity is immediately causing death and serious

bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is a risk of death or serious bodily

injury to potential victims" (Borelli, 2005, p 2.).

Active-Shooter Team (AST): A team of three or four armed police officers tasked

with finding and stopping an active-shooter.

Critical incidents: terrorist activities, hostage taking, mass causality events, high-

risk repetitive crimes, riots, or bombings

Jurisdiction: The territorial range of authority or control.

Police Officer: Any sworn member of a state, county, citylmunicipal police

department empowered to uphold law and order with the power to arrest offenders for

crimes, misdemeanors, and infractions of law.

S. W.A.T. team: A team of police officers trained in Special Weapons And Tactics,

equipped to respond to a variety of dangerous situations.

Organization of the Study

Chapter I has presented an introduction of the problem behind the study, a

background, a statement of the problem, a purpose of the study, guiding questions,

significance of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, definitions

of terms, and a description of the organization of the study. Chapter 11 presents a review

of pertinent literature, research and theory whlch contains; an introduction, background, a

historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new

police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police

administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. In Chapter 111

the researcher describes the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose,

design, population, methods, instrumentation, and a conclusion. Chapter IV presents the

collected data and the analysis of the data collected by frequency distributions and Chi-

Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses. Chapter V includes a summary of findings, discussion,

and conclusions and recommendations for policy, practice and future research.

Chapter I1

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE, RESEARCH AND THEORY

Introduction

The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all

sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in their jurisdictions. This chapter presents a review of necessary adaptations

police agencies, both in New Jersey and the United States have made to allow them to

respond to critical incidents in school settings effectively, tactically and efficiently.

These adaptations were based on the education the law enforcement community received

from studying the events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton,

Colorado as well as from studying other critical incidents around the country. Although

the shooting at Columbine was not the first time a United States school had been the

scene of a deadly attack by either a student or an adult, it did however, have a lasting

effect on the law enforcement community. The attack effectively showed law

enforcement professionals that they were not adequately prepared to respond to this type

of situation and to gain control quickly.

Until the Virginia Tech massacre (April 16,2007) where 33 people were killed

and another 30 were injured (Shapira & Jackman 2007), the Columbine High School

incident was the most deadly shooting to take place in a school setting in the United

States, with 15 fatalities (Egan, 1999). The Columbine High School incident forever

changed how the law enforcement community will plan for, train for, and react to a

critical incident. In light of such an eye opening for U.S. law enforcement, police tactics

have been revised and have been adapted to allow police to respond more appropriately

to a critical incident of this nature. These new tactics lend themselves for a response not

only in a school setting, but in the work place, a private home, a night club or other venue

that may come under attack by a would be killer.

In chapter I1 the researcher reviews the history of the formation of police tactics

and what event was instrumental to the establishment of these traditional tactics. The

analysis addresses school settings including the Columbine High School tragedy, which

served as the catalyst for changes in tactical responses by police departments all over the

country. Historical events are an important component of this review because they show

how traditional police tactics to respond to critical incidents began, how they changed

and how they were sometimes inadequate. An understanding of what police response

tactics were is vital to understand how and why they need to evolve to be more effective.

The researcher then provides a description of traditional police response tactics,

why they are in need of revision and what these revisions include. Developing an

understanding of what the traditional tactics of police response were helps the readers

gain insight into why they have become ineffective in many situations. The researcher

next discusses legal mandates for change at the local, state and federal levels. A

description of the new police tactics to respond to critical incidents demonstrates how

police react to critical situations, in a post-Columbine era. An indepth description of

these new tactics, some dubbed Active-Shooter Response or critical incident response,

suggest the path the law enforcement community has followed to update and make

responses more tactically sound to respond rapidly and save more lives. Columbine and

other school settings have shown the need for cooperation among agencies in critical

incidents. The school backdrop remains a main theme in the present study because tax

dollars are used to fund both police and educational institutions. Because children are

required to go to school they become potential targets at the very institutions where their

attendance is mandatory.

The review then turns toward training, with a focus on the benefits of training for

preparedness and providing police officers with the necessary skills to complete their

mission to save lives. The problems associated with training police officers with the new

critical incident response tactics are explored. Some of these difficulties are getting

police officers to act like tactical teams and focusing on what is most important; the

mission at hand.

Related research and theory as they relate to both police and school violence are

discussed. Numerous theories and studies are critiqued as they form the foundation of

police response and why school violence happens and if there are effective indicators as

to who is committing it.

The analysis contains a summary followed by a section in which the researcher

describes how the evolution of these new tactics should progress so that police can

continue to be effective and relevant to our rapidly changing and ever more violent

society. If police are going to be challenged with resolving these types of critical

incidents they need training, training and more training.

The effectiveness of these new response tactics is crucial for police to be able to

protect the lives of children who are mandated to attend school, and the safety of all

citizens in all types of venues. Therefore an analysis of where police tactics were and

where they are going to be in the future is important to maintain the safety of our society.

Without periodic reviews of how police are preparing for their jobs, in an ever changing

society, the police become stagnate and ineffective. A review of response plans,

strategies and tactics allows for changes to be made for police to become more proficient

in their job performance. As more police agencies are exposed to these situations the

more the law enforcement community has the opportunity to study how to resolve the

situations in the safest manner.

Research and theory are presented through the use of relevant articles, studies,

professional journals, legal mandates, periodicals and books, as well as first hand

knowledge of the researcher and others, to provide the basis for this analysis.

Background

Until the mid 1960s all situations that required a response within a police

department's jurisdiction were handled by the department's patrol-first responders. This

meant that the "ordinary police officer" on a beat was called to handle whatever

happened while the officer was on duty. All calls for police service, such as drunk and

disorderly people to domestic violence to robberies and shootings, were taken care of by

the patrol squad on the street.

This changed on August 1, 1966 in Austin, Texas. Events on this date served as a

catalyst for change in American policing practices at the time. On August 1, 1966,

Charles Whitman, trained to shoot by the United States Marine Corps, forced entry into a

clock tower building at the University of Texas. In tote with him were three rifles, two

handguns, a shotgun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Oddly enough he also

brought with him a five gallon bucket of drinking water and some sandwiches. He had

obviously planned to be there for some time (Borelli, 2005).

From the top of the clock tower, Whitman killed 15 people and wound 3 1 others,

some as far as two blocks away. Prior to his assault on the university he had also killed

his mother and wife. The first two responding police officers on the scene at the

university, who incidentally just happened to be on campus, teamed with other

responding police and a civilian and made a brave move to launch their own assault.

This ad hoc team advanced on the tower from an underground passage and made their

way inside to confront Whitman. Armed with handguns and a shotgun the team was able

to draw Whitman's fire so he stopped shooting at innocent people on the campus. In the

gun battle that followed, the team killed Whitman and ended his killing spree (Borelli,

2005).

As with most critical or serious incidents that law enforcement professionals face,

there were both a debriefing and a subsequent study of the scene as well as the outcome.

Debriefings and studies of events are tools used to tweak tactics to make them more

effective in the future. This incident was no different. The University of Texas shooting

showed law enforcement personnel that there was a need for highly skilled professionals

to handle these types of situations in the future. The team of officers who came on scene

was courageous enough to take the battle to the killer, hut all situations like this may not

be handled in as brave a manner. Law enforcement professionals who reviewed the

incident concluded there was a need for tactically minded police officers to be specially

trained and equipped to handle a variety of situations. Born out of this incident were the

modem Special Weapons And Tactics teams, known as S.W.A.T. teams (Borelli, 2005).

Since the early 1970's, S.W.A.T. teams and similar teams with their own

interesting and unique monikers like Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and Emergency

Response Team (ERT) began to he formed in police departments all over the country.

This was also a time when military veterans were returning from the Vietnam Conflict

and there was an abundance of tactically trained and battle tested young men to form

tactical teams (Borelli, 2005). The term "men" is used here because at the time policing

in the United States was a maledominated profession. In 1971 after the end Vietnam

Conflict, only 1.4% of all police officers in the United States were women (Home, 2006).

Decades later females became more of a factor in law enforcement. Females in policing

by 2006 made up about 13 - 14% of sworn law enforcement officers in the US (Home,

2006).

The newly formed professional teams were tasked with responding to various

types of critical incidents. Team members became the experts on responding and

handling situations, although not in every agency were these professionals assigned to

this task exclusively. Most team members were assigned full-time to other areas of

policing and to the special team on a part-time basis. From the 1970s to the 1990s special

teams were called upon to handle situations that were above and beyond the capabilities

of patrol-first responders.

In the decade, from 1996 to 2006 there have been at least 80 incidents where guns

were either brought to schools to take hostages, or kill students andlor teachers and

principals in the United States (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Until April

2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (more commonly known as

Virginia Tech or VT) in Blacksburg, VA, the most deadly assault on a school was at

Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Shapira & Jackrnan 2007). The

result of this incident was 12 students and one teacher dead, at least 24 wounded and two

killers who committed suicide (Borelli, 2005). The Columbine High School tragedy took

the breath away from the American public. Not because they had not seen school

violence before. They certainly had, in the 3 years prior to the Columbine tragedy there

were at least 16 school violence incidences, most of which ended with deadly

consequences (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). However, this incident

highlighted the vulnerability of schools and campuses around the country.

What America saw the day of the Columbine High School tragedy, live via the

news media on scene, were police agencies and their officers respond to the school

campus and secure a perimeter. Some estimates are that approximately 120 police

officers responded to the scene (Shepard, 2006). None of the responding police

immediately entered the building to confront and/or stop the killing of students and a

teacher. Why did some of the 120 armed police officers a enter a building where lives

were being taken by two high school students?

Was this what was expected of police agencies, to sit and wait for a safe situation

to enter? In fact it was. The S.W.A.T. era had brought new policies for police responses.

Police officers were no longer being taught to act on and take care of every situation as

they had in the past. At one point in time the police were the last line of defense, now the

police called on their S.W.A.T. teams to be their last line of defense.

Historical Summary of Events

According to the School Violence Resource Center (2007) and an Infoplease

(2008) internet document, the attacks described in Table 1, were carried out or were

planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at

Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response

to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to intervene in

the implementation of a planned attack. Table 2 is a compilation or frequency

distribution of occurrences listed in Table 1 by state.

Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost

obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research

has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the

boys' own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence

specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). A review of Table 1 shows the absence of

absolutes in the events. It is important to note a quote from George Santayana, that

"those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p.

13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to he able to form a

complete picture of what could happen at any time.

Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the event on

October 4,2002 in San Antonio, TX describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred

inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some

occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place

in urban, suburban, and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. When seen

through the lens of masculinity theory, the killings of girls who had rejected assailants

can be explained as an effort to reverse the feelings of subordination and inadequacy the

assailants experienced as a result of being rejected (Klein, 2005). Victims were teachers,

students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged

from children (6 years old) to adults.

Table 1

School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, - Requiring a Police Response to a Private Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the Implementarion of a Planned Attack

1. April 20, 1999: Littleton, CO. Two boys, ages 16 and 17, shoot 35 students and 1 teacher before committing suicide. Twelve students and 1 teacher die.

2. May 13, 1999: Port Huron, MI. Two 14 year-olds plotted to kill at least 154 people at school in an attempt to outdo the shooting at Columbine High School. They were stopped when fellow students reported them.

3. May 20, 1999: Conyers GA. A 15 year old wounds six classmates.

4. October 28, 1999: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old and three 15 year olds planned on killing mostly black students, then die in a shoot out with police. The plot was reported by a parent.

5. November 19, 1999: Deming, NM. A 12 year old shoots a classmate in the head. The victim died the following day.

6. December 6, 1999: Fort Gibson, OK. A 71h grade student brings a handgun to school and opens fire. Four students are wounded.

7. January 29,2000: Cupertino, CA. A 19 year old planned to attack his high school with guns and explosives. He took photos of himself and his arsenal of weapons. When the photos were developed the drugstore clerk called the police.

8. February 29,2000: Mount Morris Township, MI. A 6 year old boy brings a .32 caliber semi auto handgun to school and kills a first grader.

9. March 10, 2000: Savannah, GA. Two students killed by a 19 year old student while leaving a high school dance.

10. May 11,2000: Prairie Grove, AR. A 13 year old seventh grade student who left the Prairie Grove Junior High in a fit of rage and a police officer were wounded after shooting each other in a hay field north of the school.

11. May 18,2000: Millbrae, CA. A 17 year old with a history of threatening other students with guns was reported to officials by fellow students when he threatened to do a "Columhine" type shooting.

12. May 26,2000: Lake Worth, FL. A 13 year old sent home from school returned with a handgun and kills a teacher.

13. September 26, 2000: New Orleans, LA. A student fought with another student, went home, returned with a gun, and killed the student he fought with earlier.

14. October 24, 2000: Glendale, AZ. A teenager held a teacher and 32 students hostage for an hour before surrendering.

15. January 10,2001: Oxnard, CA. A 17 year old entered school and took a girl hostage in an attempt to commit "suicide by cop." After S.W.A.T. arrived he was shot dead.

16. January 17,2001: Baltimore, MD. A student was shot and killed in front of Lake Clifton Eastern High School.

17. February 5,2001: Hoyt, KS. Three students, ages 16, 17, and 18 planned to do a school shooting. An anonymous caller reported the boys to the police using a tip line. When the homes of the three were searched police found guns, bombs and white supremacist drawings.

18. February 7,2001: Fort Collins, CO. A 14 year old and two 15 year olds plot to "redo Columbine." Several classmates alerted the police after overhearing them talking about it.

19. February 11,2001: Palm Harbor, FL. A 14 year built a bomb having a kill radius of 15 feet. The parents of another student alerted police of the bomber's plans.

20. February 14,2001: Elmira, NY. A high school student's plans for a school shooting were foiled after students brought the fact that he had weapons on him to the attention of the teacher. He carried 14 pipe bombs, 3 smaller bombs, a propane tank, a sawed off shotgun, and a .22 caliber pistol into the school by a duffel bag and also a book bag full of ammunition.

21. March 5,2001: Santee, CA. A 15 year old opens fire from inside a school bathroom shooting 15 and killing 2.

22. March 7,2001: Twentynine Palms, CA. Two 17 year old boys were arrested after police were tipped off by another student about a planned attack of their high school. A search of the boys' homes revealed a gun in one home and a plan in the other.

23. March 7,2001: Williamsport, PA. A 14 year old brings his father's handgun to school and shoots a classmate in the shoulder.

24. March 22,2001: El Cajon, CA. Three teens and two teachers were wounded at Granite Hills High School by gunfire.

25. March 30,2001: Gary, IN. A student was shot in the head while waiting for class to begin.

26. January 15,2002: New York, NY. A teenager wounded two students at Martin Luther King Jr. High School.

27. October 4,2002: San Antonio, TX. A 13 year old female middle school student fatally shot herself in the temple with a h a d g u n in the parking lot in front of a group of friends.

28. November 19,2002: Hoover, AL. Two 17 year old males were reportedly fighting in a hallway when one student pulled a knife and stabbed the other to death.

29. November 22,2002: Dallas, TX. A 15 year old male student was shot as he and fellow students try to wrestle a gun from another 14 year old student.

30. December 12, 2002: Seattle, WA. A 13 year old male fired a rifle in a middle school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the gun to kill himself.

31. December 16,2002: Chicago, IL. An 18 year old male high school student was fatally shot outside of Englewood High School, while trying to protect his sister from two other male students.

32. January 22,2003: Providence, RI. A 1 2 ' ~ grade student was arrested for firing a .22 caliber gun inside the school's cafeteria after an assistant principal broke up a fight.

33. January 27,2003: Cresent, OK. Three eighth grade middle school students were arrested for allegedly carrying pipe bombs into their school.

34. January 30,2003: St. Paul, MN. A 14 year old middle school student was stabbed in the shoulder. Two teenage males were arrested for the incident.

35. January 30.2003: Jenks. OK. A 17 vear old male student armed with a 9 mm - . handgun climbed onto the roof of the school's gym and threatened suicide. The student also had pointed the gun at an assistant principal.

36. February 5,2003: Westminster, CO. After several shots being fired in a high school courtyard, a 14 year old student was taken into custody.

37. March 1 I, 2003: Gilbert, AZ. Six youths were identified by police as plotting to do a "Columbine-style massacre" at their high school. Police and school officials found notes and plans for bombs as well as other violent plans.

38. March 17,2003: Guttenberg, IA. A 17 year old walked into his high school principal's office to thank the principal for listening to his problems. The boy then pulled a rifle out of his coat and shot himself in the stomach.

39. March 21,2003: Lawndale, CA. Two teenage high school males were arrested after police learned of a list the two had with names of students and teachers who were targets. An unfinished pipe bomb and directions to make the bomb downloaded from the internet were found in one of their homes.

40. April 1,2003: Washington, DC. A 16 year old male high school student was shot in the leg during a lunch time argument with another student.

41. April 16,2003: Addison, TX. A 12 year old student committed suicide by shooting herself in a private school bathroom.

42. April 23,2003: Houston, TX. A 16 year old male student received a 7 inch slash across the chest in a fight outside his high school during lunch period.

43. April 24,2003: Red Lion, PA. A 14 year old junior high student shot and killed the principal inside a crowded cafeteria then killed himself with a second gun.

44. May 23,2003: Texas City, TX. A bomb was found in the home of a 16 year old high school student who had plans to kill the school districts' chief of police.

45. September 18,2003: Atlanta, GA. A 14 year old Lovejoy High School student was arrested after police said he planned a "Columbine-style massacre" at his school.

46. September 24,2003: Cold Spring, MN. One student dead and another injured after a shooting in the high school. A teacher was able to talk the shooter into surrendering.

47. August 14,2003: Columbus, GA. A 14 year old girl went back to her middle school to visit old teachers. A fight broke out behind the school. As a crowd gathered one of the boys fighting took out a gun and started to shoot. The girl was killed.

48. August 30,2004: Maywood, IL. A 22 year old waiting to pick up his younger brother was shot and killed in a high school parking lot in an apparent gang related crime.

49. September 14,2004: Memphis, TN. A 15 year old male was killed in a gang initiation "jump in" fight in a school bathroom that got out of hand.

50. October 7,2004: Newburyport, MA. A 15 year old male high school student shot and killed himself outside of his high school. A result of an argument with a female student.

51. November 17,2004: Hempstead, NY. A 17 year old was stabbed to death blocks from school in a lunch time gang related fight.

52. November 22,2004: Philadelphia, PA. An 18 year old former student was shot and killed as two others were injured in a shooting that occurred outside a high school.

53. November 24,2004: Valparaiso, IN. A 15 year old wielding 2 knives stabbed 7 classmates. No one died.

54. December 10,2004: Nine Mile Falls, WA. A 16 year old student shoots himself in the head in the entryway of h ~ s high school. He later died from his wound.

55. March 21, 2005: Red Lake, MN. A 16 year old kills his grandfather and companion at home, then a teacher, a security guard, 5 other students and himself at school for a total of 10 dead.

56. August 25, 2006: Essex, VT. A gunman looking for an old girlfriend bursts into an elementary school and kills a teacher.

57. September 13,2006: Van Nuys, CA. A student is shot and killed in a crosswalk in front of school in an apparent gang-related crime.

58. September 25, 2006: Las Vegas, NV. After getting off a school bus a student opened fire at the bus. None of the 34 students on board was injured.

59. September 27, 2006: Bailey, CO. An adult male sexual predator enters a school, assaults 6 female students, kills a girl trying to flee, then kills self as police make entry to stop him.

60. September 29,2006: Cazenovia, WI. A 15 year old student, disciplined the day before, enters school with multiple weapons and shoots the principal.

61. October 2,2006: Nickel Mines, PA. An adult male sexual predator enters a one room Amish school and kills 6 female students and self.

62. October 9,2006: Joplin, MO. A Columbine copy-cat, a 13 year old male, fires one round into the ceiling of the school as his gun jams. A teacher talked him into leaving.

63. October 18,2006: Orlando, FL. In a fight that began in lunch period over a girl, a 15 year old student was stabbed multiple times with a serrated knife. The student later died.

64. January 3,2007: Tacoma, WA. An 18 year old student shoots 17 students in hallway of Henry Foss High School

65. October 10,2007: Clevelmd, OH. A 14 year old student at Cleveland High School shot and injured two students and two teachers before shooting and killing himself.

66. February 11,2008: Memphis, TN. In a gym class a 17 year old Mitchel High School student shot and wounded another student.

67. February 12,2008: Oxnard, CA. A 14 year old boy shot a student at Green Junior High School causing the victim to become brain dead.

(School Violence Resource Center, 2007; Infoplease, 2008)

The researcher assembled Table 1 to highlight what was (and is) happening at

schools all over the country. Cohen and Felson (1979) wrote that several conditions

need to be present for some types of predatory violations to occur. They claim that for a

predatory violation to be successful an offender must possess criminal inclinations and

have the ability to carry out those inclinations, there must be a suitable target, and the

absence of a guardian capable of prevention of the criminal act must also be present

(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) continued to assert that the absence

of any one of the conditions described is normally sufficient to prevent predatory

violations. According to Small and Tetrick (2001) students are less likely to be victims

of serious violent and nonfatal crimes at schools than away from them. American

schools are relatively safe places for children to be. Beger (2003) contended that widely

publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have created the public

misconception that such behavior is commonplace. Although there are not deadly violent

acts at schools every day, these examples are an indication of the need for police to be

specially trained to respond to and handle serious assaults and killings on school campus'

around the country. Certain areas are more subject to crime because they have suitable

targets, and offenders subjectively perceive these areas as feasible locations for criminal

acts (Knautt & Roncek, 2007). Columbine became a wake up call for police who need

to be prepared for this type of incident (Associated Press, 1999).

Table 1 does not account for shootings on college campuses. College campuses are

likely to be patrolled by either campus police departments or campus security

departments. Although other police agencies would likely respond to a college campus

during a crisis in a mutual aid capacity, the focus of this research is the municipal police

departments' preparation. Violent situations, active-shooters, or critical incidents on

college campuses would be an excellent topic of a future study or research project.

Table 2 was assembled to reiterate for the reader that there is no one state in the

United States that is more susceptible than another to host violent events in schools or

private residences. Table 2 shows that events are just as likely in rural, suburban, urban,

wealthy, middle-class, and poor areas of the country.

Table 2

Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table I (April 20, 1999 to February 2008) State Freauencv State Frequency State Frequency State Freauency

AL 1 AR 1 AZ 2 C A * 10

CO 4 D.C. **1 FL 3 GA 4

IA 1 IL 2 IN 2 KS 1

LA 1 MA 1 MD 1 MI 2

MN 3 MO 1 NM 1 NV 1

NY 3 ,OH 2 OK 3 PA 4

RI 1 TN 2 TX 5 WA 3

WI 1 VT 1

* The city of Oxnard, CA had two reported incidents ** Washington D.C.

Traditional Police Tactics

Prior to the birth of the S.W.A.T. concept, ordinary police officers handled every

situation. The teams would respond to an incident, gather intelligence, formulate a plan

of action and execute the plan. After the arrival of S.W.A.T., patrol officers were taught

they need not be as aggressive and assume the risk of encountering armed gunmen or

assailants: professionals would handle that type of situation (Borelli, 2005). This became

the new and what is referred to from this time on in this study as the "traditional

response," in which the policing personnel were to respond and wait.

Police administrators began to advocate the training of patrol officers in a support

role for the specially trained teams. Police began to train for responding to critical

incidents, setting up perimeters and securing the area for the special response. Patrol's

response edict became to isolate, contain, and negotiate. These methods were used as a

sort of clock-stopping mechanism to buy time for the "specials" to arrive (Baker, 2005).

Present for the Columbine School siege was a School Resource Officer or SRO, a

police officer who is stationed at the school to handle whatever problem that may arise on

campus. Normally, this is the police officer who knows the layout of the school the best

and is most familiar with the school and how to move around in it. While stationed at the

school, this officer should be continuously gathering intelligence about the school, the

teachers, staff, and the students. This intelligence may be used for purpose of detection

and prevention of problems before they arise and deterrence of violent attacks. However,

this officer remained behind cover, safe, while students were still being killed in the

building, rather than to enter and confront the shooters (Kopel, 2006).

The traditional practice of containment of the situation and waiting for S.W.A.T.

to arrive had been in practice since the 1970s. Hostage takers and barricaded suspects

were very adequately handled by securing an area and calling for negotiators to come and

try to resolve the matter. Some events can be controlled by buying extra time and

allowing for reasoning with the aggressor to take place (Scanlon, 2001).

S.W.A.T. tactics are normally slow and deliberate movements made to insure the

safety of the team members. Once a team has made entry into a building or other facility,

members move slowly as a cohesive unit. The team members clear every space they

occupy and pass by before moving on to the next possible threat. The time needed by a

single S.W.A.T. team to clear a building the size of Columbine High School methodically

could be hours. At Columbine, three teams were eventually inserted into the building.

However, if there is an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding andlor killing

people, the first responding officers need to make a rapid assessment of the incident and

make entry to stop the suspect[s] (Scanlon, 2001). The breakdown of the traditional-style

police response at Columbine was that the first arriving officers responded, but then held

and waited for S.W.A.T. The S.W.A.T. team arrived and began its assessment and

eventual entry into the building. This entry was criticized by some as being too slow and

methodical, which is, incidentally, what these teams are known for, slow and methodical

searches (Egan, 1999).

The shooting in Columbine High School was over in 16 minutes, more than

double the average amount of time these types of situations last, which by some estimates

is between 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). The first-entry team entered the building at

approximately 46 minutes after the shooting had begun, or 30 minutes after the killing

had stopped. A review of the incident and its many hazards including the multiple bombs

and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) can certainly justify the type of slow

methodical response that S.W.A.T. used (Marx & Mayhood, 2001). However, to

horrified parents or concerned citizens watching the media coverage, the thought

certainly was that the police should go into the school and save the kids inside.

This slow response by a tactical team would be warranted by the information

police were developing about the numerous explosions that had already gone off inside

the school. They were also receiving information about the location of other explosive

devices planted in and around the school and in cars located in the parking lots. Police

were being told by students who escaped the school that there were as many as eight

gunmen in the building, snipers on the roof and gunmen in the ceilings (Associated Press,

1999).

The rule of thumb in most police circles is that the police cannot help anyone if

they are injured themselves. Had the S.W.A.T. team just rushed into the building they

very well may have been the next set of victims in the massacre. Bombs squads had also

responded and begun to make their own evaluations of the scene.

Police, prior to 1999, had been trained to make assessments, gather information,

set up command posts and make the proper notifications. There was no textbook

response for a situation like this one because this was a relatively new type of incident

(Associated Press, 1999). In this case police were just reacting.

For police to begin to deal with this situation effectively other resources were

needed to be requested to handle various parts of the job. Responding units need updated

and timely information on which location is the safest to respond. Officers need to know

the location of the command post so they will know where to report in once on scene.

The one aspect of this response that was glaringly absent was a determination by

someone, a leader, a supervisor, a ranking officer to give the order to make entry to the

facility and confront the shooter[s] to stop the killing of innocent people. This way of

thinking only came as a result of the Columbine tragedy. In the aftermath, the incident

was reviewed and dissected, and in doing so law enforcement professionals realized that

something needed to happen. These traditional police response tactics had been shown to

be ineffective for the Columbine type of crisis. Tactics that police were using needed to

change, was the conclusion recognized on the federal, state and local levels of law

enforcement.

Legal Mandates for Change

Following highly publicized campus shootings law makers have had to make

school safety more of a priority (Beger, 2003). In the wake of Columbine, the United

States government response to the issue of critical incidents in schools and on college

campuses has been to make grant monies available so that school administrators could

work with law enforcement personnel to implement safety programs (Bethel, 2005).

These anti-violence campaigns are useful in prevention and in the education of students

and educators.

Through the many pages and documents this researcher has reviewed to collect

details for the literature review, most of the literature in professional journals on this

topic was found to be directed toward school preparation and response: The law

enforcement element of this topic was not as widely discussed or researched. There

seems to be a failure to address the issue of the successful resolution of a violent andlor

critical incident in a school or on a college campus. Since the Virginia Tech massacre the

federal government made additional monies available for the training and equipping of

campus police officers to respond to critical incidents on campuses.

In January of 2002 the State of New Jersey passed legislation which created a

School Violence Awareness Week. This legislation was intended to make it known that

it is in the public interest of the state to designate a week in October of each year as

"School Violence Awareness Week" to provide students, parents, school district and law

enforcement personnel with an opportunity to discuss methods to keep schools safe from

violence, to create school safety plans, and to recognize those students in need of help.

In Bergen County, New Jersey a directive (Directive 05-01) was distributed to all

Police Chiefs within the county mandating basic training for all active sworn law

enforcement officers employed therein in a uniform and consistent active-shooter

response. This training was required to be completed by September 1, 2005. Bergen

County distributed a model policy to police agencies, to adopt as their own or modify as

necessary to suit the needs of their respective jurisdiction.

Not until July, 2007, did the State of New Jersey follow suit by mandating that all

police departments have and maintain a policy and procedure for an active-shooter

response. This directive created mandatory training of all police recruits in the topic area

of active-shooter response while recruits are engaged in a police academy training

curriculum (NJ Attorney General Directive 2007-01).

In September, 2007, a report, "K-12 School Security Task Force Report" was

presented to New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine. This report discussed the topic of safer

schools throughout the state and concluded with recommendations for a distribution of

model policies on topic areas such as: active-shooter, bomb threats, lockdown, evacuation

and a public information officer (School Security Task Force, 2007). (As of late 2008,

the researcher has not located the model policies to have been distributed).

Progress is being made in school safety. A U.S. Department of Education survey

found that 96% of public schools required visitors to sign in before entering the school

building (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). According to Garcia (2003) the

good news is that school homicide and violence is down, however the bad news is that

the number of rare multiple victim school shootings had increased in the mid 1990s.

New Police Tactics

Environment is a powerful inhibitor or facilitator of crime and situational

prevention strategies can affect its likelihood of occurrence (Cohen & Felson, 1979;

Weisburd et al., 2006). American schools have had to alter how they do business and

how they protect their students (Harper, 2000).

Active-shooters typically work within a plan they have developed. These plans

arc normally tactically laid out and well developed. These plans typically will include

rmdomly shooting victims, as many as they can, before committing suicide. Not many

of these actors are motivated by "getting out alive" or eventually having their day in

court; suicide is usually a part of the plan (Scanlon, 2001). Time, which had always been

the ally of the responding specialized teams en route to the crisis, is now worlung against

them (Egan, 1999).

The first responding police to the scene of an active-shooter situation are now

responsible for making a rapid assessment of not only all of the previously mentioned

criteria, but now they must decide whether to form up into teams and launch an assault of

their own. This assault goes by many different names. In New Jersey it is called Active-

Shooter Response by law enforcement, in Ohio it is called QUAD or Quick Action

Deployment, in other areas of the country it is known as Immediate Action Rapid

Deployment (IARD). Regardless of the name of the deployment tactics, most are nearly

identical in practice. They all are based upon the first responding police officers to a

scene, equipping themselves and forming up into three or four-person teams. These

teams are sometimes known as ASTs, short for Active-Shooter Teams. The officers or

teams then make an entry into the structure or facility that is under attack and as quickly

as possible find the aggressor[s] and stop them.

These types of tactics are situation-dependant though. They are not the answer to

every situation. If the officers are responding to a hank robbery or to a hostage situation,

these tactics are not appropriate. Police rushing into these types of events may cause

more harm than good. Time has always proven to be an asset when dealing with an event

in the absence of gunfire or killing. That being said, if there is shooting going on or if

people are being assaulted or killed the police have a moral obligation to make entry to

try to save innocent lives (Lloyd, 2000).

The premise behind the new system of tactics is quite simple. After an initial

assessment is made and information is provided to the police that there is an active-

shooter in a building or facility, the police will enter to locate and stop the shooting. This

is done in a rapid but organized manner and with tactics that have been shown to be

effective. The officers will form into three or four-person teams, preferably the latter. If

they have special equipment, they equip themselves as such. Some special equipment

may include: breaching tools (tools used to open doors and windows forcibly), assault

type rifles /long guns, extra gear such as ballistic helmets and tactical vests that carry

extra handcuffs and magazines loaded with ammunition or first aid equipment.

The team leader - whoever in the group is the most tactically minded or the best

thinker under pressure, regardless of rank - will direct the team to the chosen entry point.

In this regard the mission has the greatest chance for success; ability is put before ego

(Giduck, 2005). Safety is always a concern but speed is important. The team will stack

(a single-file formation) prior to entry into the building and perform a quick gear check to

make sure all team members have what they need. The team then enters the site.

Team members each have specific responsibilities. Once inside a structure the

team spreads out into a diamond formation. The front or first person inside is responsible

for all threats that are ahead of the team. The second person or the right side in the

diamond-style formation covers threats to the right of the group. This is typically the

team leader position. The threats may include windows or doors the group will pass.

The left side or third person will cover all threats to the left. The last or fourth person is

responsible for the rear safety, essentially to protect the group from any threat from the

rear and everything the group has already passed. This position is very difficult for two

reasons; this operator is (a) wallung backward and trying to keep up with members of a

team walking forward at a rapid and stressful pace, and (b) is walking blind into battle

with total reliance on other team members to cover their assignments.

One major difference between this type of entry and a S.W.A.T.-type entry is the

rapid movement past un-cleared areas. S.W.A.T. operators are taught to pass areas

they have not checked and cleared. An AST will move past everything until they

encounter, confront, and stop the shooter because they are moving to the sound of the

gunfire, or attack.

What makes this group so effective is that they are constantly moving toward the

actor or shooter. The group is directed either by updated intelligence from the command

structure outside the building or by intelligence they have gathered on their own inside

the building. Intelligence inside the building comes from various sources, such as from

students or teachers or employees running away from the source of violence to save

themselves, or from their own eyes, ears, and observations. Either way, the group's plan

is to move to the violent actor, confront him, contain him, stop him, arrest him, or engage

him in battle. There are basically three ways these situations end (a) suicide, (b)

surrender, or (c) termination (Borelli, 2005).

Problems with the New Tactics

These tactics may seem simple when explained in lay terms. The police respond,

assess the situation, and enter to stop the shooter. This sounds like an easy sell to police

officers. However, some parts of these tactics are very difficult to train for. The most

difficult aspect of this is to train the responding police officers that they must pass injured

victims and walking wounded: step over or around them if necessary to meet their

objective.

Yes, pass and leave the wounded: walk right past injured teachers and students

alike. The reason behind this unappealing and certainly unorthodox method of rescue is

to put an end to the shooting quickly. The primary way to reduce the number of potential

victims is to neutralize the shooter (Scanlon, 2001). One bright side to the new tactics is

that the team will communicate the location of the injured and any other available

information to the command post outside. The incident commander will decide to form a

rescue team specifically to retrieve the wounded.

If the inserted police officers who make up the ASTs get tied up with evacuation

efforts, with trying to treat and rescue the injured occupants of the building or by

searching rooms prior to passing, precious time is lost and the shooter is creating more

victims (Scanlon, 2001). A school or workplace could house hundreds of potential

victims. An effective use of the first responders is to install them into the area as

"hunters": they must hunt the aggressor, pass by all others, and focus on their mission to

stop the killing of innocent victims.

Acting as hunters is a difficult concept to train to a group of people who have

sworn to protect the citizens they serve. Most of a municipal police officer's job is

service-related. Police respond to more medical calls then they do to crimes in progress.

Police are accustomed to rendering first aid in a multitude of situations, from aid calls to

car accidents to slip and falls. Medical treatment would come more naturally to most

police officers than acting in a combat capacity.

The thouglit process behind this seemingly violent transition between police

officer and combatant is that people are dying waiting for you, the responding police

officer, to stop the person[s] doing the killing. To accomplish this, police must act more

like a military unit than a municipal police department. They must train to act fast and

with a maximum level of violence in order to take control of a bad situation therefore

saving lives (Giduck, 2005). Police have to be trained to think of these situations more as

a battle ground than a crime scene (Giduck, 2005). During the heat of battle, the focus

must be to stop the enemy by getting to and engaging the enemy quickly to end the

conflict.

The researcher acts as a trainer of these new tactics in a mid-sized municipal

police agency and along with a partner and co-trainer, identifies those police officers in

that agency who should never join the battle. Those that were identified should sooner be

sent to where nothing violent is occurring rather than risk their incompetence getting

brave police officers, willing to risk their own lives to save others, hurt or killed. These

police officers either lack the requisite skills to be a part of an ad hoc tactical team or just

cannot handle the stresses associated with this type of situation. Before the shooting

starts, is the time to take a realistic inventory of what human and material resources are

available to supervisors who will staff the command posts.

School Resource Officer

Many reports on the choice of a School Resource Officer (SRO) call for a

rigorous selection process for those who will be assigned to the schools. It just so

happens that these police officers are typically the first on scene at a school shooting

incident (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000). These police officers are stationed at area

schools and are positioned to be a vital part of a team inserted into a school. They should

have the best knowledge of the layout of the school and may also be able to identify the

actorlstudent doing the killing when only being provided with a name.

An SRO needs to be able to switch into a combat mode at the drop of the hat

because they have trained hard for this very type of situation. Let the teachers do the

teaching at the schools and have the police do the policing. The job of the SRO should

be to continuously be alert, prevent and react. In the absence of prevention they should

be able to switch gears and react to be the front line in the battle, bringing the battle to the

potential killer, whoever it may be (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).

To provide high quality protection for our children takes training and more

training. The training requires time in the schools practicing for these very types of

events. The training has to include planning for other aspects that go along with critical

incident response, such as setting up perimeters, evacuation routes, staging areas for other

responding services and the like. The agencies that fail to plan for this type of event to

occur in their jurisdictions will have the most difficulty dealing with violence when it

happens. And it could happen anywhere.

One difficulty in training police is that all police executives are not sold on the

costs and benefits of this training. Some police executives have been in policing for

many years. Therefore, it is highly likely that they came into police work with a different

mindset, one devoted to old-style policing where police responded and waited to secure

the area. Justification for spending money on new equipment and training for their police

departments when they had always relied on the local, regional or county S.W.A.T. team

to handle tough situations may be difficult for them. The rationale behind this sentiment

is that S.W.A.T. teams train for critical incidents, so let them handle it. It is their job.

The problem with this mentality is the time that is lost while S.W.A.T. is responding

cannot be reclaimed; as more time goes by more victims are likely to be injured or killed.

As stated in chapter 1, every 15 seconds another victim is shot during an event of this

kind (Tactical Response Staff, 2008) so time cannot be spent waiting.

Research and Theory Related to

Police Administrators

There is an assumption among organization leaders and theorists that structure

influences behavior (Ouchi, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979) action planning

specifies method and time frames for decisions and actions. Perrow (1986) described

rules that govern conditions of work and specify standard processes for carrying out

tasks, will help to ensure that similar situations are handled uniformly. Bolman and Deal

(2003) stated several of their assumptions of the structural frame; organizations: achieve

established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through

specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts

of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure.

Mintzberg's (1979) theory of action planning is a clear fit for police preparedness

because it accounts for how the job is done rather than specifically relying on the

outcome of the operation. In the type of police operation at the foundation of this study,

there will not always be positive results. Innocent people will lose their lives as police

move to their target. The police may have to pass by injured people on their way to

achieve their action plan. This tactical decision to save more lives by stopping the

shooter rather than to save the lives of the already injured can be applied to the heart of

Mintzberg's theory. The objective of success is more difficult to measure so it becomes

necessary to assess how the job is done. When innocent people die, it is difficult to call a

mission a success. However, using Mintzberg's action planning theory as a gauge,

persons in a debriefing session could look at the result of the mission: If lives were saved

by stopping the shooting was the mission a success?

The theory of rules discussed by Perrow (1986) can also be applied to police

training. This theory again allows for interoperability of police departments that

normally do not work together. If all agencies are training in the same tactics then the

likelihood of an operation that is jointly undertaken (interoperability) will be successful

greatly increases.

The theories that are a part of the foundation of the structural frame as discussed

in Bolman and Deal (2003) lend themselves rather neatly to the field of policing. Police

officers work under very structured conditions that are rule oriented. In the field of

policing there is a very clear chain of command and the structure of police departments

and their level of preparation will determine the outcome of the situations they face.

The assumptions described by Bolman and Deal (2003) that people in

organizations achieve established goals and objectives can be applied to police training

because there must be a clear and concise plan established to determine what tactics will

be taught. The assumption concerning increased efficiency and enhanced performance

through specialization and division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2003) applies to police

training for critical-incident response in that specialization and division of labor allows

police to train for specific tasks and excel in their performance. The more successful the

police officer is at their assigned task the more likely the mission will result in success.

To date, most research on school shootings has been conducted by psychologists

who have focused on mental illnesses and problems of the offenders however; little

attention has been paid to the social and cultural contexts of these incidents (Fox &

Harding, 2005). Less attention has been paid to the law enforcement aspect of this

problem. This researcher has found no studies focused on the best method for law

enforcement officers to respond and deal with a school shooting.

School Violence

According to Currie (1985) many theories on juvenile violence were flawed because

they were somehow separate from social policies, inequality, racism, unemployment and

neglect. Currie called the failure to address these other issues the "fallacy of autonomy"

(Currie, 1985, p. 185).

In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stated that low self

control in the pursuit of self interest causes crime. Their assumption is based on

parenting deficiencies for those that are more likely to express themselves defiantly and

in criminality.

Organizational deviance occurs when events that are created by or in

organizations do not conform to an organization's goals or expectations and produce

unanticipated and harmful outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p273). After a 2 year study,

O'Toole (1999) concluded that no research exists that has identified traits and

characteristics that can reliably distinguish school shooters from other students.

O'Toole's (1999) study asserted that many studies of school shootings were based

predominantly upon media accounts of the events. These accounts would often be flawed

because the media did not enjoy access to confidential law enforcement and school files

(O'Toole, 1999). O'Toole (1999) identified personality and behavioral traits that many

school shooters possess; although O'Toole stressed that none of the traits should carry

more weight than the other. O'Toole concluded the report with the recommendation that

school and police administrators use threat assessment to thwart possible attacks. A

threat was defined as an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against some

one or something. The threat can be oral, written or symbolic (O'Toole, 1999).

The U.S. Secret Service (2002b) advocates responsible bystander behavior where

students with knowledge of events or threats should inform responsible adults. This

would allow for problems to be addressed before they end in potential school violence.

Coordination and control help to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and

units mesh (Bolman & Deal, 2003). This theory is the premise behind having a unified

response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of

s t ~ c t u r e , police officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively

together.

Fox and Harding (2005) studied organizational deviance as a factor of school

violence. According to Fox and Harding (2005) rampage school shootings fit Vaughan's

definition of organizational deviance because the violence deviates from formal design

goals and normative standards or expectations.

Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) stated that using routine-activities theory and or a

lifestyle model to study juvenile exposure to violence is a useful tool. In their study, data

from a nationally representative sample demonstrates that routine-activity of lifestyles

that expose juveniles to violence serve as and important risk factor for juveniles

offending violently (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). However, Kurtz and Nofziger (2005)

pointed out that many studies of juvenile violence tend to focus on friends, family and

violent juveniles. The gap in the research appears to be that routine activities or lifestyle

create a situation where the juvenile may be an innocent bystander to violent crime

(Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). Juveniles become at risk because of the violence they witness

rather than the violence in which they are a participant.

According to Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Gottfredson and Payne (2005) recent

attempts to prevent serious violent crime in schools have been focused on identifying the

characteristics of the offenders. The study had been undertaken to try to successfully

identify potential shooters before they act (Gottfredson et al., 2005). A more accurate

way to track school violence is to identify the schools with elevated crime rates and

violent incidents (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The basis for this theory is that prior studies

on school characteristics as predictors of deviant or violent behavior have shown that

community characteristics, school structural characteristics along with variables outside

of the control of school administrators are effective predictors of the level of disorder in

schools (Gottfredson et al, 2005).

Optimistic bias (Chapin & Coleman, 2006; Weinstein, 1980) refers to the

perception that bad things happen to other people. Reduction of optimistic bias in regard

to school violence is an important step in creating an understanding in students' personal

risks, getting them to take threats seriously and taking self-protective measures (Chapin

& Coleman, 2006). The Chapin and Coleman (2006) study was the first study of

optimistic bias in the context of school violence. Other studies have used optimistic bias

to study violence in the context of violence against women and child abuse (Chapin &

Coleman, 2006). The validity of direct application of results the study may be

questionable in that it was conducted on a small scale in one county in Pennsylvania.

Policy recommendation for both police and school administrators may require the study

to be replicated on a larger scale.

Routine-activities theory (Kautt & Roncek, 2007) revealed that schools can be

criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and

criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors.

Pies (2007) called for a "distant early warning" system of indicators to identify

troubled students. This can only be done when the full resources of doctors, parents,

schools, and communities are combined to reduce the plague of violence in our culture

(Pies, 2007).

This information is equally as important to school administrators as it is to police

administrators that are trying to understand violence in schools. School administrators

can work toward intervention strategies when armed with knowledge of what types of

students have the potential to he violent and from what set of circumstances they come

from. This is not a be all and end all. There is no crystal ball to predict the future acts of

school violence. School administrators can work toward putting measures in place when

they become aware of students that may be in crisis mode as defined by the numerous

theories previously discussed. The true benefit of a mutual knowledge shared by both

police and school administrators is that information can be shared in a symbiotic

relationship to ensure a safer learning environment for all students.

Theoretical Framework

To establish a strong relationship between the number of police officers trained to

provide active-shooter training to other police officers and the frequency of training

police are doing to be better prepared to respond to active-shooter situations in the

schools and the variables that may have an effect on the training, consideration should be

given to theory and research in the field of study. Theories of organizational structures,

goals, and planning are part of the theoretical framework for the present study.

Organizations are designed to achieve established goals and objectives; increase

efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and division of labor; and

coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the

use of structure (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Therefore, when police agencies establish a

structured environment where training, planning and goal setting are stressed the result is

better preparation for critical incident response.

At the foundation of the present study is the Standardization of Patrol Based

Response to Active-Shooter Situations. In this standardization policy, the appropriate

response strategy involves immediate action and quick deployment by patrol forces to

stop deadly actions of criminal actor[s]. For police to delay deployment under these

circumstances may result in additional death or serious injuries (BCPO, 2005).

Summary

Parents and citizens are entitled to have their police agencies, at the municipal,

county, state and federal levels make adaptations to do more to enhance their quality of

life. To accomplish this, these agencies must work hard to prepare for events that have

become all too common in our society. School violence, work place shootings and

potential terrorist activity on US soil is now more than ever a reality.

School safety training and critical-incident drills have become mandated in New

Jersey and other states. As much as had been done to prevent fire deaths in schools,

needs to be done to prevent death at the hands of a violent adult or student in a school.

With fire sprinklers and alarms in every school, and fire drills and evacuation routes

preplanned, the likelihood of a student dying in a fire in a school in the US is minimal at

best. In fact, no child has died in a fire in the last 25 years in an American school.

However in the school year 2004/2005,48 people were killed at the hands of a violent

aggressor in schools (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).

Training and safety have a long way to go toward prevention of these types of

incidents. In the mean time there has to be more done for police to be able to effectively

minimize the causalities in our nation's schools. School adrmnistrators are more alert and

aware of potential problem students. Schools are being equipped with surveillance

devices to protect the potential victims contained therein. More needs to be done to

prepare for the most likely threat that may come to those in the building. To prepare for

the violent people who are allowed access to the facility.

This has to come from the police and their stepped up efforts of training and

planning for potential attack. With the initiation of tactics such as active-shooter training

and all of its kind, there needs to be a follow through. This will come at the hands of

forward thinking police executives that realize that there is a need for getting their

officers into schools to become more familiar with the interior layouts of the buildings.

Executives that understand that the officers that are assigned to schools in the capacity of

the SRO, are truly the best qualified to thwart or fend off an attack on the school. Police

executives must understand that the time of setting up and waiting for S.W.A.T. is no

longer an option. They need to realize that all of their police officers must be tactically

trained to be able to make a difference. They need to act in spite of any lack of help by

school administrators.

In 2004, a Columbus, Ohio police officer had stopped a deadly attack at a night

club concert. A gunman had entered the club and killed a band member on stage while

he was performing. An alert police officer trained in QUAD, (the Ohio version of active-

shooter training) entered the night club, encountered the suspect and shot him dead,

stopping the shooter's deadly assault before any more lives had been taken (Marx &

Mayhood).

In 2005 in Red Lake, Minnesota a 16 year old student killed a grandparent and the

grandparent's companion. The student went to his high school and shot a teacher, a

security guard, and five other students before killing himself. The Red Lake Police

Department had prepared for an event like this and trained for it at the school. They

relied on their training and made immediate entry into the school (School Violence

Resource Center, 2007). Their response time and school entry was 2 minutes. The police

officers found, confronted, shot, and wounded the violent student who then retreated into

a classroom and killed himself (Freed, 2005). Their training had paid off. Although

innocent lives had been lost, many more people could have been killed without the

immediate response by the police.

These two incidents have shown that rapid police response to a scene and

immediate police action will save lives. Violence can happen anywhere and if the police

have not prepared for it there is the potential for many lives to be lost.

This researcher believes plans need to be developed now for all facets of these

critical incidents. Road closure plans, staging areas, triage locations, debriefing sites,

contact lists and the like. During the mayhem of these encounters there is too much to do

to just wing it. Responses may need to be to a degree scripted to get as much essential

work done with a minimum level of thinking about the various contacts that may need to

be made. If a response plan exists some things on scene can become automatic and more

attention can be focused on other areas of concern that may need more attention.

Chapter I1 has presented a review of pertinent literature, research and theory

which contained; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional

police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new

tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical

framework, and a summary. Chapter 111 will include a description of the design and

methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods,

instrumentation, and a conclusion.

Chapter I11

DESIGN AND METHODS

Purpose

This chapter provides an overview of purpose, design, methods, population,

instrumentation, and conclusion. The purpose for this study was to explore the influence

that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and

future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response

to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in

schools is mandatory for the children of Bergen County, New Jersey it becomes

imperative that the municipal police departments of the county are able to provide a safe

learning environment while children are in attendance. Bergen County has 68 municipal

police departments that were included as participants in the study. The researcher

obtained a complete list of municipal police departments in Bergen County on the Bergen

County Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net, then added the number of police

officers employed by each municipality with information derived from the FBI's 2006

Uniform Crime Report, New Jersey full-time law enforcement employees (see Appendix

B).

The researcher was guided by the following questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County b rose cut or's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model

policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being

done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Because there is relatively little research in the field of police tactics and only

some theory, most of which is concerned with the psychological characteristics of the

actor[s], the researcher relied heavily on related literature and the descriptions of prior

events. The study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and

only now has begun to be seriously studied and therefore, there is a lack of information

available on police training (O'Brien, 2008a). The importance of this study is based in

the knowledge of "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"

(Santayana, 1905, p. 13).

Design

A survey instrument was assembled to gather information in several topic areas:

descriptive information, personnel, operations, specialized units, emergency preparedness

for Active-Shooter 1 Critical Incident response, equipment, and policies and procedures.

Six of the eight sections of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey

were borrowed with permission (see Appendix C). The survey instrument then

comprised of 58 questions which were assembled to gather descriptive information. A

total of 51 questions were borrowed from the LEMAS survey instrument and 7 original

questions designed by the researcher. Permission was granted via telephonic and email

contact with Dr. Brian Reaves, the lead statistical administrator of the survey for the

Bureau of Justice Statistics. Specifically, Dr. Reaves stated in an email correspondence

that permission was granted to use certain questions from the original LEMAS survey

tool. The original survey instrument was not a copy-written document and was therefore

public domain. However, a request was made from Dr. Reaves that the Bureau of

Justice Statistics not be mentioned in the new survey instrument: a request which was

honored by the researcher.

A pilot study was then conducted to determine face validity of the survey

instrument. Some comments received from the respondents of the pilot study included

that the survey was lengthy and time consuming. See the instrumentation section of this

chapter for more information on the results of the pilot study and specific comments

made by the participants for the revision of the survey instrument.

As a result of the feedback generously provided by the participants of the pilot

study of this project, a total of four questions were used from the original LEMAS survey

instrument. Questions originally designed to gather information about the number of

full time police officers working for a law enforcement agency, total dollar amount in

operating budget of the agency, total dollar amount in seized funds made by the agency,

and total calls for service responded to by the agency. All questions were based on the

2007 calendar year, the last complete year of operation of the agency prior to this study

taking place. After further review of the research tool, the researcher realized the survey

tool distributed in the pilot study gathered a large amount of information that shared little

relevance to this research project. Several of the topic areas previously mentioned were

deleted to comply with the suggestions of the participants of the pilot study.

The remaining eight questions included in the revised survey instrument for this

research project were developed by the researcher in conjunction with a jury of experts.

The final survey instrument used in this study comprised of 11 questions (see Appendix

D). These questions were specifically tailored to provide answers to the guiding

questions of this research project.

The present study is a type 2 design, that Johnson (2001) calls a cross-sectional,

descriptive study. It is cross-sectional because the data are collected from participants at

a single point in time. According to Johnson (2001), if the researcher is describing

phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of phenomenon then the study is

descriptive non-experimental research. The data directly apply to each case at a single

time and comparisons are made across the variables of interest (Johnson, 2001, p. 9).

The present study sought to answer the following questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.

Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of

Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What

factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police

departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

This study can be described as a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental

research by the use of the Johnson (2001) descriptions. According to Witte and Witte

(2004) the present study collected qualitative data because when a single observation is a

word or a code that is representative of a class or category, the data are qualitative. Witte

and Witte (2004) also suggest that descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs and

averages can be used to organize and summarize information about a collection of

observations. The researcher proposed to use descriptive statistical methods to address

guiding questions one and two of this project. Through the use of frequency distributions

the researcher addressed the data gathered from the survey instrument to answer the

guiding questions.

To answer guiding question 3 the researcher used the Chi-Squared (@) statistical

method. Analyses were then conducted to determine what relationship the independent

or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn

law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007)

had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to

train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).

Methods

This study relied solely on self reported data by agents of police departments.

According to Kerlinger (1986) "It can even be said that non-experimental research is

more important than experimental research.. ." (p. 359). Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996)

stated causal -comparative methods are the easiest quantitative approach to looking into

cause and effect relationships between phenomena. One of the objectives of this study

was to find which of the independent variables discovered in the survey instrument had

the most effect on the type and frequency of training being done in municipal police

departments of Bergen County. Because all of the 68 municipal police departments in

the county were included in the study it was considered a census. The researcher

proposed to have all 68 of the municipal police departments existing in Bergen County,

NJ participate in the study. A letter asking for permission to send each of the police

agencies a survey was sent to the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. The researcher

received a letter from the prosecutor's office granting permission to send the survey to

the municipal police agencies (see Appendix C). In the permission letter was a request

for the researcher to share the findings of this project with the prosecutor's office.

Furthermore, in a follow up phone conversation the researcher had with First Assistant

Prosecutor William Galda, it was made known that this research project stimulated

interest in a topic that had been put aside for a period while other important topics were

being handled. The project sewed as a catalyst for the prosecutor's office to look into all

the policies that municipal police agencies had submitted since the distribution of the

training memo at the foundation of this study. This leads the researcher to conclude that

prior to any data collection this research project has been a useful tool in reigniting

interest in an area that may have been forgotten.

The rationale for soliciting participation from each of the municipal police

departments in the county is in the similarities and differences of the police departments.

Responses to the survey instrument from police departments of varying staffing levels,

economic prowess, and setting (urban 1 suburban) will paint a more accurate picture of

what training is occurring within the county in the realm of active-shooter response. The

primary objective of this study was to determine what influence the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all

sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in their jurisdictions. Each identified municipal police department in the

county was sent a survey instrument (N=68) along with completion instructions and a

cover letter requesting the Chief of Police, civilian Police Director or their designee

complete and return the survey to the researcher.

The final survey instrument comprised of 11 fact based questions was sent to a

jury of experts in the field. The experts agreed that the survey was easy to understand,

easy to complete, and took very little time to locate the information to answer the

questions. The original questions borrowed from the LEMAS survey come with a

reported 90% reliability estimate as provided by the lead statistician for the survey, Dr.

Reaves of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The LEMAS survey is distributed to police

agencies across the United States every three years and has been determined to be both a

valid and reliable tool.

All information being requested by the survey is accessible to the researcher

through the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), however it is the contention of the

researcher that in the form of a survey instrument the most current and accurate data will

be collected which will make the resulting information more timely and relevant. If the

researcher were to request all information being sought in this study through OPRA the

information gathered may not be the most current as record updating is not a daily

occurrence in governmental agencies, and this process would add a significant amount of

time to the project as well.

Once the voluntary participant police agencies return the surveys to the researcher

a Cronbach's Alpha test will be conducted to determine a reliability coefficient.

Cronbach's Alpha is a test reliability technique to provide a unique estimate of the

reliability for a given test (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). This will be reported in more detail in

chapter IV.

Prior to mailing the surveys, they will be coded with a control number known

only to the researcher to track the responses as they are returned. No questions will be

asked to specifically identify any agency based on the responses provided by the

participants. No personal or identifying information will be asked of the person or

representative of the police agency that has completed the survey. This is another layer

of anonymity built in to the present study. All surveys as they are returned to the

researcher will be stored in a locked fire resistant safe in the home of the researcher to

maintain the security of the data. This information will be maintained for a period of no

less than three years. The survey is also completely voluntary in nature. The study was

approved by the Seton Hall University Institutional Review board on December 17,2008

(see Appendix C).

Population

All of the police agencies used in this study are located in Bergen County, NJ, and

each falls under the direction of the Bergen County Prosecutor's office jurisdiction.

There are a total of 68 municipal police departments included in the study. Some of the

distinctions of the police agencies are: number of sworn officers, square mileage

patrolled by the agency, equipment, and specialized services available by the agency.

Police departments were approved to participate in this study through a permission letter

approved by the Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli. Police departments were

then sent a cover letter with an explanation of the study and survey instrument to

complete and return to the researcher.

Instrumentation

The LEMAS survey instrument was adapted to the specific needs of this research

project. Wording of selected questions was changed to reflect the timeframe under study.

Section V community policing and section VI emergency preparedness which is specific

to terrorist activity were not used. A new section V with original questions formulated by

the researcher along with a jury of experts in the field of policing, emergency

management, and tactics was substituted to help the researcher answer the guiding

questions of this research project. The researcher developed questions which replaced

the original section V of the study and sent them electronically to Dr. David Klinger of

the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of The University of Missouri - St.

Louis; Dr. Stephen Hoptay, Lieutenant with the New Jersey State Police, Office of

Emergency Management, Special Operations Section; Dr. Daniel Simone, Captain with

the Hohoken (NJ) Police Department; Sergeant David Champerlain of the Modesto (CA)

Police Department, Special Victims Unit; and John Gnagey, Executive Director of the

National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) for feedback. With feedback and expert

advice from the aforementioned experts in the field, questions were developed and

accepted for use in the study.

A pilot study was then conducted on August 1,2008 with the survey instrument in

three municipalities in New Jersey that are in neighhoring counties to Bergen; Morris and

Passaic. In Passaic County the researcher contacted Chief Joseph Borell of the

Bloomingdale Police Department, and Lt. Paul Dring of the Wayne Police Department.

In Morris County the researcher contacted Chief Brian Spring of the Pequannock Police

Department. The aforementioned police departments were selected for the pilot study for

two reasons; (a) they are in neighhoring counties to Bergen, (b) they are a representative

sample of the number of police officers in municipal police departments in Bergen

County. The Bloomingdale Police Department has 16 full-time police officers,

Pequannock has 30, and Wayne has 116. These numbers are very similar to the Bergen

County staffing levels for small, medium and larger sized agencies listed in the 2006 FBI

Uniform Crime Report (FBI, 2006).

Each of these police administrators was provided with the survey instrument and

asked to complete it using the attached directions. They were then asked to contact the

researcher via email as soon as it was completed to provide constructive feedback and

make any necessary revisions or recommendations to make the survey instrument

stronger. The pilot study was conducted from August 1,2008 to August 6,2008.

Chief Borell suggested that the overall appearance of the survey seemed a bit

cluttered and lengthy. Once the Chief began to work on the study, the cluttered feeling

disappeared and the ease of the survey questions became apparent. A comment was

forwarded that the survey seemed a bit too long, with 58 total questions. The Chief stated

the survey instrument was well written and it was clear to the reader what was being

asked. Chief Borell stated the survey took an estimated 45 to 50 minutes to complete.

Chief Borell suggested shortening the survey to include only the information that was

most necessary for the study. With a completion time estimated at approximately 60

minutes, the survey taker may lose interest. Chief Borell made one last comment that was

especially important; the survey should be completed by an agency head. The necessity

of this was born out the type of information being sought, that is budget items, training

hours, and salaries.

Lt. Dring also suggested the survey be completed by a member of the police

department's administrative staff, in the Lieutenant's words, "upper command staff'.

The Lieutenant cited some of same the reasons Chief Borell did for this need. Lt. Dring

stated the survey took approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete which was even

longer than the time taken by Chief Borell. This estimation was closer to the latter due to

malung several in-house phone calls to gather information that was not immediately

available to the Lieutenant. Lt. Dring also recommended the survey be shortened to

maintain the interest of the participant.

Chief Spring estimated the completion time for the survey at about 90 minutes.

This was consistent with the prior two responses. Chief Spring did not feel as though any

one question was too difficult to answer, and that they were all very clear in what they

were asking. Chief Spring's final comment about the questionnaire was that no revisions

were necessary and all of the questions were clear, concise and relevant but the survey

took a substantial amount of time to complete.

The time to complete the survey was estimated at approximately 60 to 90 minutes

by each of the pilot study participants. This was a duration which seemed to be too long

for each of the participants. Each participant in the pilot study did recommend that an

upper level or command staff member such as the Chief or top administrator complete the

survey as they would have the easiest access to the information requested. The result of

the pilot test was that significant revisions were made.

The survey was pared down from 58 questions to 11 in total. The 11 total

questions were those that would specifically be used to answer the guiding questions of

this research project. The new survey instrument was then sent to four new participants

that agreed to answer the survey and provide feedback. The information gathered from

the new participants, all administrative level police officers; was that the survey was well

written, the questions were clear and concise, the survey took about 10 to 15 minutes to

complete, and the survey should not be an imposition on a police administrator to

participate in the study due to the ease of the completion of the survey instrument.

The final survey instrument coded with a control number was mailed along with a

cover letter of explanation, and a self addressed stamped envelope to facilitate a more

likely return mailing of the completed survey to the researcher. The researcher mailed

the surveys on December 18,2008 and asked the participants to return the 1 1 question

survey by January 7,2009. The researcher allowed a third week for any late mailings

before beginning any statistical processes.

By using frequency distributions the researcher will demonstrate to the reader;

how many police departments in Bergen County, NJ had an active-shooter response plan

in effect prior the training mandate established by the county prosecutor's office, how

many agencies share radio interoperability with neighboring and bordering jurisdictions

since the training mandate, which kinds of equipment purchases were made by police

departments to facilitate forced entry into structures since the mandate, what kind of

training is being done to practice for a future active-shooter event, how many officers

have been trained to instruct other police officers in this type of response tactics, how

often police are training for these kinds of events, how many police departments have

adopted the model policy distributed by the county prosecutor's office or created their

own policy and why. Then the information collected on the number of sworn police

officers, total budget, total in seized funds, and number of calls for service will be used as

variables in a Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis to see which has the most influence on

the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the

frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in

schools in Bergen County, NJ.

Conclusion

In Chapter 111 the researcher described the design and methods of the study by

discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, and instrumentation. Chapter IV will

present the collected data along with an analysis of the data collected by using frequency

distributions and Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses to determine which variables have

the most influence on Active-Shooter preparation being done by police departments in

Bergen County, NJ.

Chapter IV

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Introduction

The researchers' purpose for conducting thls non-experimental study was to

investigate the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had

on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County,

New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions.

The investigation was narrowly focused on answering the following guiding questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? @)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.

Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of

Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What

factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police

departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Collection of Data

Table 1 provides a list of events complied by the researcher that were carried out

or planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack

at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police

response to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to

intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. A review of Table 1 shows the

absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note that "those who cannot

remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore,

similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of

what could happen at any time.

Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the example

which occurred on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX, describes a female actor. Most

attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms;

however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The

events took place in urban, suburban and rural settings across all socio-economic strata.

Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors

in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults.

For this study, a survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of

experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous

flow of back and forth dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts until a

final version was selected. This process was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 111.

This final survey instrument, consisting of 11 questions, was then distributed as a

pilot study for feedback. After the determination that the final 1 1 question survey was to

be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed with permission from the

Bergen County Prosecutor's Office to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen

County, NJ. The mailings took place on December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of

solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the

researcher by January 7,2009 (see Appendix E). The researcher then allowed for another

7 days for returns to account for the large volume of mail during the holiday season.

In total 68 surveys were mailed on December 18,2008, one to each of the 68

municipal police departments in Bergen County as listed on the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net. On the January 14,2009 cut off date for

returned surveys, 46 surveys were returned to the researcher resulting in a return rate of

68%. Of the 46 returned surveys, 1 was returned with all of the questions crossed out and

no responses selected with a notation added which read "This causes me concerns on

security issues." Therefore, all descriptive statistics and analyses are based on 45 returns

(N = 45).

Data and Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Survey question l a was designed to learn if, prior to the September 1,2005

mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office for active-shooter response

training, police agencies had a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event

of an active-shooter in a school. Table 3 indicates that slightly more than half of the

responding police agencies did not have a written plan which specified response actions

to an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a mandate to

either develop their own plan or adopt the response plan as distributed was a step in the

right direction toward getting police departments in the country to plan for this type of

critical incident response.

Table 3

Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office Training Mandate of September 1,2005 Response n %

Yes 21 46.7 No 24 53.3 Total 45 (N) 100.

Survey question i b provided information on the number of police departments

(21) that indicated they did have a written response plan, and had a mutual aid or

cooperative agreement between neighboring and or geographically bordering

jurisdictions. Table 4 shows that of the 21 police departments that indicated they already

had a response plan prior to the prosecutor's office mandate, 18 had an agreement with

neighboring police departments for mutual aid responses. These results showed that

administrators in police departments that did develop a response plan saw the need to

work cooperatively with neighboring departments.

Table 4

Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid Agreements for Joint Responses Response n %

Yes 18 86. No 3 14. Total 2 1 100.

-

Survey question 2 was developed to find out if respondents had, after the

September 1,2005 training mandate, radio communications interoperability with

geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 5 shows that of the 43 responses to

question number 2,40 police departments did have radio communication interoperability

with geographically bordering jurisdictions. This is another success of the distributed

response model policy. The response model policy created awareness for radio

communications interoperability between agencies that will respond to a crisis together.

Table 5

Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning Response n 9%

Yes 40 93. No 3 7. Total 43 100.

Survey question 3 was created to find out what types of tactical response gear the

police departments of Bergen County either purchased or acquired since the September 1,

2005 mandate. Table 6 indicates the types of response gear and the number of police

departments reporting they acquired the respective items. The table shows that ballistic

shields and carbine or patrol rifles were acquired more than other response gear items.

Table 6

Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of September 1, 2005 (N = 45) Gear Item Police Departments that Acquired Gear

n % Ballistic Helmets 34 76. Ballistic Shields 42 93. Battering Rams 19 42. Bolt Cutters 29 64. Carbine or Patrol Rifles 36 80. Hallagan or Pry Bars 32 71. Sledge Hammers 24 53.

Survey question 4 provided information on the types of training activities the

respondent police departments participated in to prepare their officers better to respond to

an active-shooter event in a school in their jurisdiction. Table 7 displays which types of

training exercises and the number of agencies that participated in those exercises. The

table includes percentages of Bergen County municipal police departments that

participated at least once in each training category (multiple choices were possible). Of

the various types of training listed, 39 police departments (87%) participated in active-

shooter training in empty schools. This training is helpful for familiarization with

response tactics and acclimation to the interior of schools. When police officers become

familiar with the areas they may need to respond to in a crisis situation they may perform

better under stressful conditions in those settings. The number of responses shows that,

on average, responding police departments participated in 2.8 types of training.

Table 7

Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active- Shooter Training ( N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible. Type of Training Number of Police Departments

n % Table TOD 15 33. ~ u l t i - ~ e ' p t . Table Top 9 Training in Empty School 39 Training in School wl Actors 24 Multi-Dept. Training in Empty School 26 Multi-Dept. Training in School w/ Actors 15

Survey question 5 was created to learn from the responding police department

administrators, the number of police officers in their agencies who were trained to train

other police officers in active-shooter response. Table 8 reports the frequency

distribution of responses. Question 5 responses were then statistically collapsed into

logical groupings for later statistical analysis. The collapse was done using natural and

logical break points.

Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response Number of Officers Trained n %

0 2 4.4 1 1 2.3 2 16 35.5 3 13 28.8 4 8 17.7 5 2 4.4 6 1 2.3 7 1 2.3

20 1 2.3 Totals 45 (N) 100.

Table 9 displays the recoded data from survey question 5. Data recoding was

done to logically develop the groupings into a low number of officers trained (0-2

officers), a medium number of officers trained (3 officers), and a high number of officers

trained (more than 3 officers) to train other police officers in active-shooter response.

- ---

Table 9

Recoded responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response Officers Trained n % Low Number of Officers Trained (0-2 Officers) 19 42.

Medium Number of Officers Trained (3 Officers)

Hi& Number of Officers Trained 13 29. Total 45 (N) 100.

Table 8 shows one outlier police agency that reported 20 police officers trained to

train other police officers, otherwise the scale of responses ranged from 0-7. Of the 45

police department administrators who responded to this question 29 (or 64%) reported

that their agencies had either 2 or 3 officers trained to train other police officers in the

active-shooter response tactics.

Survey question 6 was created to learn how often police administrators, since the

September 1,2005 training mandate, required their police officers to participate in

training for active-shooter response whether it was practice scenarios, table-top exercises

or roll-call discussions. These responses too were reported as frequencies then recoded

and re-reported in statistically collapsed groups for later statistical analyses. These

groups were also created using natural and logical break off points. Table 10 shows the

frequency distribution of responses to the amount of training that is being done for

municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As indicated in Table 10, of the 45

police department administrators that answered this survey question, 29 answered that

they required their officers to participate in training either bi-annually or yearly.

Table 10

Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police Departments in Bergen County

Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) %

Monthly Quarterly Bi-annually Yearly Never

Total 45 (N) 100.

Shown below, Table 1 I reports the recoded responses from survey question 6

reported in Table 10. These responses were later used for statistical analyses.

Table 1 1.

Recoded responses, Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) %

Once a Quarter or Monthly Bi-annually Once a Year or Never

Total

Survey question 7a provided information on whether or not police departments

had adopted the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Standardization of Patrol

Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy and the reasons which led to

the adoption. Table 12 lists the responses provided by agencies that did adopt the model

policy.

Reoccurring themes developed from the responses provided for why agencies did

adopt the model policy were either standardization, or having all police officers in the

county being trained in the same tactics. Table 13 displays (question 7h responses) the

reasons police administrators indicated why they did nor elect to implement the BCPO

policy as written.

Table 12

( 7 a ) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting the BCPO Model Policy R e s ~ o n s e s n

Response checked but no comment added Added agency specific material Adopted their policies and created additional policies All All officers on same page Allowed numerous agencies to utilize the response procedures with generic roles for each officer Already studied and used Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) policy was sufficient for our needs Consistency through out area agencies Everyone then operates the same Felt BCPO policy worked best for our agency Good S.O.P. Helped develop the plan It was deemed sufficient and appropriate It was our intent to remain consistent with the agencies in Bergen County It was very similar to our original policy and would prevent conflict Policy fit our needs and was crafted by Bergen County Police Chiefs Association Policy was a good fit for our department Presumably much time and effort and input was acquired to make the policy one of the best possible Standard through the county Standardization Standardization with other agencies we would expect to work with Standardized policy with contiguous police departments The model policy allows us to be on same page as surrounding departments The policy fit our requirements with minor modifications To best conform with BCPO To conform to standardized countywide training, realizing mutual aid would be necessary To maintain uniformity with surrounding jurisdictions and county police Took model and modified it to meet needs of our jurisdiction We have the same training and procedures of the other agencies responding We will provide the minimum mandated training to comply with the BCPO directives

Total 32

Table 13

(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy

Responses n

Response checked but no comment listed BCPO policy allows for 3 person teams, we mandate minimum of 4 person teams BCPO policy and added National Tactical Officers Assoc. (NTOA) techniques Created from other agencies models but similar to BCPO policy Formulated to borough schools, used several parts of BCPO policy Had a similar policy in place Had standard NTOA policy in effect prior to BCPO policy In effect prior to BCPO mandate, covers all relevant training equipment etc.. . To better our own immediate needs To conform to the department size and availability

Total 10

Although the responses in Table 13 were provided as reasons why agencies did not adopt

the model policy, most respondents indicated their original policy was as least similar to

the BCPO model policy or they used parts of the model policy to form their own.

Survey question 8 was developed to learn the number of sworn, full-time police

officers in the police departments of Bergen County, NJ. Table 14 shows the number of

sworn police officers and the frequency of agencies reporting that number of personnel.

Table 14

Number and Frequency of Police Oflcers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ. Police Officers n %

12 2 4.5 13 4 8.9 15 3 6.7 16 1 2.2 17 1 2.2 18 5 11.1 20 4 8.9 21 1 2.2 22 5 11.1 24 1 2.2 26 1 2.2 28 1 2.2 3 1 3 6.7 32 2 4.5 37 2 4.5 43 1 2.2 44 1 2.2 45 1 2.2 46 1 2.2 48 1 2.2 50 1 2.2 63 1 2.2 65 1 2.2

109 1 2.2

Total 45 (N) 100.

Table 15 shows the responses listed in Table 14 which were derived from survey

question 8 that have been recoded for statistical analyses. Recoding was done using a

statistical collapse with natural and logical break points to create a grouping system of a

small number of police officers (1-20), medium number (21-30) and large number (31 or

more). Recoded responses were used for later statistical analyses.

Table 15

Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ. Number of Police n %

-Number (1-20 Full-time Police Officers)

Medium Number (21-30 Full-time Police Officers)

Large Number (3 1 or More Full-time Police Officers)

Total 45 (N) 100.

Survey question 9 provided information on the (2007) operating budgets in U S

dollars of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. Given that each of the

police departments surveyed listed a different dollar amount, only the recoded data were

reported in the current study. Original data were collapsed into low total operating

budget ($0.00 - $250,000.00), medium total ($250,000.00 - $3,000,000.00), and high

total ($3,000,00 1.00 or more).

Of the 45 responding police administrators 40 (89%) answered survey question 9.

Of the 40 responses, 31 (78%) of the operating budgets were in the low and medium

ranges. This represents almost 78 % of the responses. Only nine of the agencies reported

having a budget in the high range of $3,000,001 .OO or more, representing approximately

22.5 % of the responses. Table 16 shows the recoded data from survey question 9.

Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen

Total Operating Budget ($0.00 to $250,000.00)

Medium Total Operating Budget ($250,001.00 to $3,000,000.00)

H&& Total Operating Budget ($3,000,001.00 or more)

Total 40 100. * no response n = 5

Survey question 10 was designed to learn the amounts in U.S. dollars that each

municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ reported in asset forfeiture funds in

the year 2007. The year 2007 was selected because it was the last complete year prior to

this study being conducted. Agency administrator who responded to this survey question

listed varying amounts that were specific to their agencies only. For that reason, the

responses were collapsed into manageable categories using natural and logical break

points.

The categories used were low forfeiture program ($0.00 - $200.00), medium

forfeiture program.($201 .OO - $10,000.00) and high forfeiture program ($10,000.00 or

more). Table 17 shows the response to survey question 10. Of the 45 responding

agencies, 4 4 (98%) provided data.

Table 17

Recoded Resuonses: 2007 Forfeiture Proaram. Seized Funds as Reuorted bv Police - , Departments in Bergen County, NJ Forfeiture Category n %

Low Forfeiture Program - ($0.00 - $200.00)

Medium Forfeiture Program ($201.00 - $10,000.00)

H~J& Forfeiture Program ($10,001.00 or more)

Total

Survey question 11 was created to determine the number of calls for service that

each municipal police agency reported they had received or responded to in 2007. For

reporting purposes each of the agencies reported a different total of calls for service.

These numbers were broken into workable categories, again using a statistical collapse

based on natural and logical break off points. These new categories were low annual

service calls (0-10,000), medium annual service calls (10,001-15,000) and high annual

service calls (15,001 or more). Table 18 shows the recoded data only for responses to

survey question 1 1.

Table 18

Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported bv Police Departments in

Service Calls n %

Low Annual Service Calls - (0- 10,000)

Medium Annual Service Calls (10,001-15,000)

Annual Service Calls (15,001 or more)

Total 45 (N) 100.

Reliability Estimates

After the completed surveys were returned to the researcher and the descriptive

statistics were derived from them, a Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a

reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8,9, 10 and 11. The questions

were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem

(2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha

was .75. Cronbacb's alpha reliability estimate normally ranges between 0 and 1.

Although there actually is no lower limit to the coefficient, the closer Cronbach's Alpha

coefficient is to 1 .O, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem &

Gliem, 2003).

George and Mallery (2003) provided the following rules of thumb in reference to

Cronbacb's Alpha scores: "- > .9 -Excellent, - > .8 - Good, - > .7 - Acceptable, - > .6

- Questionable, - > .5 -Poor, and < .5 -Unacceptable" (p. 231). Thus, for the current

work, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

Answering Research Question 1

Research question 1 asked how have training efforts changed for police

preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer

learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued

by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers

to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response

capabilities on the topic?

Descriptive statistics reported earlier in this chapter have shown that training

efforts have changed for police preparedness to respond to active-shooter situations in

schools to create safer learning environments since the September 1,2005 training

mandate, in the amount of training required by police department administrators. Of the

45 surveys returned to the researcher with survey question 6 answered, 43 (96%)

indicated that the police agency required training in active-shooter response either

monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or yearly. Only 2 of the 45 reporting agencies responded

that it was never required to train in these response tactics.

Research question l(a) asked how training efforts are exposing officers to realistic

environments. This was answered by survey question 4. Of the 45 responding police

department administrators 39 (87%) indicated that their officers had participated in

training in empty schools. This type of training is realistic as it is places officers into a

real setting and creates familiarity for the police officers for responses during emergency

conditions.

Question l(b) asked how police departments have augmented response

capabilities. Survey question 3 was designed to answer this question. It was learned that

42 of the 45 responding police department administrators indicated that their agency had

purchased ballistic shields to augment their officers' response to a critical incident of this

sort. Thirty six of the 45 responding agencies reported their agencies had purchased

carbine or patrol rifles to further enhance response capabilities. At a reduced percentage

agencies reported purchasing other equipment items such as; ballistic helmets, battering ,

rams, bolt cutters, Hallagan or pry bars, and sledge hammers.

Answering Research Question 2

Research question 2 was also answered using descriptive statistics. The question

asked why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization

of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? This question was

answered by responses to survey question 7. Reoccurring themes developed from the

responses showed why agencies adopted the model policy: (a) standardization or (b)

having all police officers trained in the same tactics. It is apparent that police department

administrators are aware of the importance of having standard practices that all officers

can be taught. The reality of a critical incident is that neighboring jurisdictions will also

respond to supplement the response capability of the municipality suffering the crisis.

The additional responding officers need to know the same fundamental tactics the

officers in the jurisdiction in crisis know. In this respect police officers from various

municipalities can form ad hoc teams to respond to the crisis appropriately.

Reasons stated for not adopting the model policy as distributed were that police

departments already had a similar policy in place prior to the distribution of the model

policy. Other agencies created similar policies that were more specifically tailored to the

need of their specific jurisdiction. And lastly others stated they used parts of the model

policy to develop their own policy.

Answering Research Question 3

To answer research question 3 the researcher used Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical

analyses to determine which factors account for the variability in the number of police

officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training

being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools (see Appendix

F) .

After recoding all data in the responses to survey questions 8,9, 10, and 11 into

three categories, those responses were independent variables for Chi-square ( ~ 2 )

statistical analyses. The responses to survey questions 5 and 6 were also recoded to

provide the researcher with dependant variables for analysis. According to Witte and

Witte (2004) an independent variable is manipulated by the investigator, and a dependant

variable is measured, counted, or recorded by the investigator.

In the first statistical analysis completed, the number of sworn full time police

officers was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to

train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-square (;O)

statistical analysis results indicated a value of 2.47 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,650

(no statistical significance). In other words, the number of full-time sworn police officers

in a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect

on the number of police officers in the agency that are trained to train other police

officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the second statistical analysis completed, the total operating budget of a police

department was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained

to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. A Chi-square ( ~ 2 )

statistical analysis indicated a value of 2.72 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,604 (no

statistical significance). Results show that the total operating budget of a municipal

police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number

of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the third statistical analysis completed, the number in U.S. dollars in forfeiture

funds reported from municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ for the year

2007 was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to

train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant

variable. The Chi-square (@) statistical analysis results were statistically significant,

unlike the other two analyses. Results indicated a value of 17.68 (df = 4) and a p value of

(sig.) ,001. In much social science research, statistical significance is indicated at p I .05,

so .001 indicates statistical significance (Witte & Witte, 2004).

It appears that the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset

forfeiture influences the number of police officers the agency has trained to train other

police in active-shooter response tactics: This seized money seems to be used for

additional police training. As is normally the case in asset forfeiture at the municipal

police level, seized money is maintained in an account by the county prosecutor's office

for approved usage by the municipal police department. This money can be approved by

the county prosecutor's office to be allocated for items and expenditures outside the

normal operating budget of the agency. Training typically falls under this realm. Based

on this finding one can assume that training in municipal police departments may he paid

for by seized forfeiture funds.

In the fourth statistical analysis completed, the number of annual service calls for

the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the number of police officers

trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a

dependant variable. Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis results indicated a value of ,868

(df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,929 (no statistical significance). The number of calls for

service in 2007 had no effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police

officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the fifth statistical analysis, the number of sworn full-time police officers was

used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter

tactics was used as the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis

indicated a value of 7.38 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,117 (no statistical significance).

The p value indicated a lack of statistical significance. The number of full-time sworn

police officers had no effect on the amount of required training in active-shooter response

tactics.

In the sixth statistical analysis, the total operating budget of a police department

was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter

tactics was used for the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis

indicated a value of 11.95 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,018 which was statistically

significant. Again, the result of the statistical analysis is showing a relationship between

available money and training. There appears to be a relationship between the total

operating budget and the amount of training being done by police officers in active-

shooter response tactics in Bergen County, NJ.

In the seventh statistical analysis, the amount of dollars reported by the police

agencies in asset forfeiture was used as the independent variable and the amount of

required training in active-shooter tactics used for the dependent variable. The Chi-

Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis indicated a value of 5.36 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,252

(no statistical significance). The statistical analysis showed that there is no relationship

between the amount of dollars in forfeiture funds reported and the amount of required

training in active-shooter response tactics.

In the eighth and final statistical analysis, the number of calls for service reported

for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the amount of required

training in active-shooter response tactics was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-

Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis indicated a value of 8.93 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,063

(no statistical significance). However, the p value being within ,013 of an indication of

statistical significance does warrant some explanation. It appeared that although there is

not a statistically significant relationship between the number of calls for service reported

by police officers and the amount of active-shooter tactics training being required it does

seem that a relationship on some level does exist. The number of calls for service does

seem to have a relationship at some level to the amount of training being done. Busier

police departments are going to be less available to do as much training as those that are

not as busy. If the number of calls for service is greater in one agency, their officers are

needed to respond to calls for service and would be unable to become unavailable to

participate in training.

Summary

In Chapter IV, the researcher used several sections such as an introduction,

collection of data, data and findings, descriptive statistics, reliability, answering research

question 1, answering research question 2, answering research question 3 to present

information. The reported descriptive statistics learned from the survey instrument that

had been distributed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ

presented an interesting look at the types of equipment purchases, training being done

and policy changes made as a result of the distribution of the model policy discussed

throughout.

The researcher also reported on the Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses done to

determine any relationships between the indicated dependant and independent variables

of this study. Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first

was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments

and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter

response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the

total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the

amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.

Chapter V will include an introduction, summary of findings, discussion,

conclusions, recommendations for policies and practices, and future study.

Chapter V

INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY O F FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS,

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND FUTURE STUDY

Introduction

This study was developed from the personal interest of the researcher in police

tactics to respond to active-shooter situations. In beginning the study, the researcher

determined that the focus would be on municipal police departments of Bergen County,

NJ. In 2008 the researcher was a police supervisor in a municipal police department in

Bergen County and in this capacity was responsible to train other police officers in these

tactics.

The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations

of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is

mandatory for the children to age 16 in Bergen County, New Jersey the municipal police

departments of the county must provide a safe learning environment while children are in

attendance.

The researcher sought a suitable survey instrument designed to gather appropriate

information to answer the research questions at the foundation of the study. These

research questions were:

1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to

active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office (BCPO)? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments?

(b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy?

3 . What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being

done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

The researcher located the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics (USDOJ), Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics

(LEMAS) survey instrument. With permission from the USDOJ, the LEMAS survey

instrument was amended and the questions specifically tailored for the needs of the

current study. A revised survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of

experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous

flow of dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts. The survey instrument

consisted of 11 questions and was redistributed as a pilot study for feedback, as was

reported in chapter 111 in greater detail. After the determination that the final 11 question

survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed to all of the

municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailing took place on

December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the

voluntary participants return the survey to the researcher by January 7,2009. Through

the use of the survey the guiding questions were then answered in chapter IV.

Summary of Findings

The descriptive statistics from the present study developed a picture of what has

been done by police agencies in Bergen County to prepare for an active-shooter event in

a school. Prior to the distribution of the model policy more than 50% of the police

departments in Bergen County did not have any type of plan in effect for dealing with

this type of crisis in a school. This policy then forced the remaining police agencies to

either adopt the distributed model policy or develop their own plan for implementation.

Through this study it was also learned that 86% of the agencies that already had

response plans prior to the distribution of the model policy, had also included a mutual

aid plan to get assistance from neighboring jurisdictions when the crisis occurred. This is

a clear example of forward thinking on the part of the administrators.

In addition, the respondent police agencies also understood the importance of

radio communications interoperability with the neighboring jurisdictions. This was

evidenced by 93% of the police departments creating radio communications

interoperability with neighboring agencies as a result of the distributed model policy.

This allows for multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another on the same radio

frequency to provide for faster and more direct radio communications.

This study shed light on the types of equipment police departments made as a

result of the model policy distribution. It was indicated that 93% of the agencies that

responded reported purchasing ballistic shields, 80% purchased carbine or patrol rifles,

and 76% reported purchasing ballistic helmets.

As for training, 87% of the police departments reported training in empty schools

in their jurisdictions. This creates familiarization with the interior and exterior of the

schools which could make the difference of saving a life during a crisis situation.

Sadly, only 20% of the police departments reported training as being mandatory

on a quarterly basis, 22.2% on a bi-annual basis, and still only 42% required training on a

yearly basis. This is simply not enough to get good at tactics. At best once or twice a

year can only help to refresh your tactics. It is hardly enough to make improvements and

become skilled in what is being taught and trained.

A Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for

responses to survey questions 8 , 9 , 10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform

the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item

reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha was .75. For the

current study, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

The following relationships were determined to be lacking statistical significance:

(a) the number of sworn full time police officers as an independent variable and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,

(b) the total operating budget of a police department as an independent variable and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,

(c) the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 as the independent variable and

the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter

response tactics as a dependant variable, (d) the number of sworn full-time police

officers as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter

tactics as the dependent variable, (e) the amount of dollars reported by the police

agencies in asset forfeiture as the independent variable and the amount of required

training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, and (f) the number of calls for

service reported for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the amount of required

training in active-shooter response tactics as the dependant variable.

The present study also determined two statistically significant findings. The first

of these findings was the relationship between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by

municipal police departments in 2007 and the number of police officers trained to train

other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Based on results from this

research, the more seizure funds available to police department administrators the more

police officers in their agencies are being trained to train the other police officers in their

respective police departments in active-shooter response tactics.

The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total

operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount

of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. Both findings indicate that there

is a direct relationship between available finances and training of police officers in

active-shooter response tactics. Simply put, police departments with larger budgets and

more available money are training more often than agencies with smaller budgets and

less money available. Therefore the assumption can be made that the more money

allocated toward training will better prepare police officers to be able to respond to and

effectively deal with an active-shooter situation in a school.

Discussion

If Ouchi (1977) is correct in the assumption that structure influences behavior, the

conclusion can be made that more training designed to train police officers to respond to

active-shooter situations will create better prepared police. Mintzberg's (1979) theory of

action planning accounts for how a job is done rather than specifically relying on the

outcome of the operation. With this theory in mind the assertion can be made that when

more police officers are designated to train others in essential response tactics then the

responding police should be more likely to he successful in the completion of their

mission, which is to save lives.

Scanlon (2001) described the premise of an active-shooter, who is seriously

wounding andlor killing people, and the need for the first responding officers to make a

rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s]. This ability to

rapidly assess and form an ad hoc team is essential to properly ending these types of

crisis situations. However, police departments in Bergen County are not devoting enough

time, energy and resources to training toward this end and if the time comes when the

tactics are needed there will be a break down in their capability to bring the situation to a

quick resolution. There needs to be more frequent training.

Giduck (2005) recommended that police try to change their rnindset from police

officer dealing with a crime scene to a military unit dealing with a battlefield. If 42% of

police departments are training but once a year in the necessary skills and tactics it would

likely be an impossible task to effectively train to appropriately handle these situations as

they may arise. Training once a year serves the officers more as a reminder of tactics

rather than a training of learned skills. Training is a repetitive process where skills are

ingrained through repetition, practice, critique, and correction. Once a year is simply not

enough for officers to become efficient in the necessary skills they will need to possess to

work safely and swiftly to bring a conflict of this nature to an end.

Lloyd (2000) called it a moral obligation for police to make entry and intervene in

an ongoing active-shooter situation. The purchases described in this study of tactical and

entry equipment displays the commitment of Bergen County Police Departments toward

this end. The entry equipment purchased offers the police the ability to make a forced

entry to breach any location to quickly gain access and begin their mission. The tactical

equipment is a testament to properly equipping the officers that will most certainly be

placed in harms way to complete their mission. Although there is no specific

recommendation on equipment purchases the more tools at the disposal of the police

officers the easier it will be to do their job.

Coordination and control as presented by Bolman and Deal (2003) helps to ensure

that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh. This theory is the premise behind

having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents.

Through the use of structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work

safely and effectively together. This goal is met by the establishment of the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy

distributed by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. It seemed to be a priority of the

police administrators when they indicated reasons why they adopted the model policy,

that all police officers are aware of the same basic tactics. The reality is that multiple

jurisdictions will respond to the same scene to assist in bringing the crisis to a resolution.

This can be done by training all police officers who may respond in the same tactics so

each can work with any other.

Conclusions

It seems clear to the researcher that the police administrators that provided

answers to the distributed survey questionnaire at the foundation of this study are quite

aware of what needs to be done in the event of an active-shooter situation in a school of

their jurisdiction. What seems to be lost is that these tactics when initially trained are

perishable skills, and like anything else that is taught, it will go away when not properly

reinforced. What is lacking in Bergen County is the correct measure of reinforcement of

the tactics. Police officers are simply not training enough to become really prepared and

efficient at the necessary skill sets to tackle the situations which have formed the basis of

this study.

Numerous documents have been written based on research conducted on who

commits these violent acts in our nation's schools. Klein (2005) asserted that popular

discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role

gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was

ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys' own stated reasons for this

violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein,

2005). This researcher has found that aside from a rare exception or two, predominately

young white males from the ages 11 - 18 years old, mostly loners and with relatively

easy access to firearms are the perpetrators (Scanlon, 2001). With the type of

information collected by agencies like the FBI in their July, 1999 paper entitled "The

school shooter: a threat assessment perspective" (O'Toole, 1999) and the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in their "Guide for Preventing and Responding to

School Violence" retrieved from the IACP website in February 2007 (Kramen, Massey,

& Timm, 1999), school officials have been preparing for violent students, with the

assistance of their law enforcement partners. Identification of the potential offenders is

the first step toward limiting this kind of behavior in the future. Prevention can come

from close partnerships between law enforcement and schools in early detection of

potential assaults as well as in sharing information about those identified as having the

potential to be involved in this behavior. Sending better prepared police to respond to

these crisis situations in the schools is a direct result of the amount of money that is being

allotted for training. '

For law enforcement personnel to take their tactics to the next level, they must

begin now to prepare for future acts of school violence and/or terrorism. As a result of

this research project the researcher now knows that the amount of funds allocated toward

training is going to make the difference in sending better prepared police officers into a

potential battle. No one thought it would have been possible for the acts of September

11,2001 to have been perpetrated against the US, on US soil. After the events of

911 112001 occurred, the law enforcement community was left with the realization that the

US was no longer immune from the acts of violence the rest of the world has had to

endure for centuries. Future acts of active shooting in schools and terrorism are a reality

and police officers must be prepared to face them.

Just as the law enforcement community has learned lessons from the Columbine

High School tragedy, so too have the next wave of potential attackers and terrorists been

planning their next attack. Through after action investigations, it is known that school

attackers and terrorists study police responses and know all about tactics the likes of

active-shooter, QUAD, and IARD that have been discussed herein. US law enforcement

must begin now to prepare for potential attacks by active-shooters and terrorists on our

most precious targets, our children (Giduck, 2005). What could make American citizens

feel more vulnerable than an attack at a school? Persons in other countries have been

dealing with this reality for years and are prepared to handle situations like this at a

school. Countries like Israel have placed armed guards on every school bus and in every

school. School buses are armored to minimize potential injuries from an attack. School

campuses are fortified territory (Giduck, 2005). Short of having armed guards on

armored school buses and inside schools, more must be done to train police in response

tactics. To accomplish this goal more money must be directed toward the training of

tactics like those proposed in the Standardization of Patrol Based Response for Active-

Shooter Situations.

Law enforcement policy makers need also to begin cooperative efforts with

military units for training in handling battlefield type conflict, much like they would be

facing in a terrorist attack on a school. Terrorism experts like Giduck who authored

"Terror at Beslan" (2005) conclude that the terrorists will attack the US again. It is also

likely that a potential target will be an unsuspecting school. The terrorists are not at all

like the loner child who brings a gun to school. They come with tested and rehearsed

battle plans, reinforcements, surveillance and counter surveillance measures in place

(Giduck, 2005).

The terrorist's goal is not to he arrested or contained; it is to kill as many victims

and police responders as possible to gain notoriety for their cause (Giduck, 2005). Our

future is now: Policing in the US must adapt now for the threats of the future which will

most certainly be at the hands of terrorists who will, like they have in the past, attack

when and where we are least expecting them to. That certainly could be a school. Law

enforcement personnel need to make more adaptations to their training now to be able to

respond to an event they will face (Giduck, 2005). With one hurdle cleared the next one

is right in front of us.

Recommendations for Policies and Practices

Since police officers may face the need to respond to a critical incident (active-

shooter situation) in the schools of their jurisdictions, the responsibility for training in

response tactics becomes increasingly paramount. In that respect all responding police

officers to an active-shooter situation, must at least be aware of the same tactics. In

Bergen County, NJ this topic was addressed in 2005 when the prosecutor's office

distributed a memo requiring a unified and consistent active-shooter response.

However, this researcher believes that more needs to be done than just blanket

familiarization with a response policy. As was discovered in this research there is

disparity in the amount and type of training being done. Not enough training is taking

place to respond effectively to an active-shooter situation. More training needs to

become the rule rather than the exception. If not enough training is being conducted, the

training and interest will not be sustained. When times get really tough, in a critical

situation the natural tendency is to revert to the original process of how things were done

in the past (Palazzolo, 2009). Here, how thing3 were done in the past simply will not be

enough to save lives effectively.

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy

and some situations only now have begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of

information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a).

The researcher located no research to determine what the best tactics are to respond to

active-shooters in schools and the science of the study police tactics. Since no data are

available to study to make a truly scientific determination to apply to policy the advice of

the experts like Giduck must be followed. More training is certainly necessary to provide

the community with a prepared and capable police department.

Based on the findings of this study more money and effort needs to be directed

toward training budgets. Police departments with more funds available are doing more

training. Since the critical incidents that may present themselves are not specific to

jurisdictions with sufficient training budgets, funds must come from somewhere to

prepare police to respond to crisis situations. If police departments are unable to fund

their own training, a county-wide or state-wide training program should be available to

police departments for continuous training.

The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office should establish and maintain a county-

wide training division. One responsibility for this training division should be providing

standard and mandatory continuing training to the police in the county in mutual aid and

critical incident responses. The training should be provided at not cost to the local police

departments of the county to ensure cost to the agency is not preventing officers from

being trained in the most current tactics available.

Future Study

Numerous research projects and studies have been conducted on the topic of

school violence prevention. But what happens when it happens? What about when the

prevention efforts are not effective to stop the violence before it happens? There needs to

be research on the best practices of police response tactics to school shooter situations.

Special attention needs to be paid to the evolution of tactics and how they are changing

based on prior responses and the successfulness of the police operations in those

incidents. To accomplish this S.W.A.T. tactics should be studied to determine which, is

the best fit to adapt to train to patrol officers.

More research needs to be done in the topic area of police training and the amount

of funds required for that training to be successful. A comprehensive study needs to be

conducted to determine the dollar amount that needs to be allocated per police officer to

allow for similarly trained police in effective tactics. An in depth study should be

focused on tactical equipment and which pieces are best for police to use during crisis

situations.

There should be future studies done to determine what police officers in other

counties in New Jersey are doing to prepare for these types of situations they may face in

schools. There should also be a study done to compare what is being done from state to

state and as a result try to determine which training is the most cost effective, the most

beneficial and which fits best for patrol officers.

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Appendix A

BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

To: All Bergen Cwnty ChiPC(

From: Prostcuror Joha L. Mobad

SmbJe: Dirarthr W01 Active Shooter PnEey ln*irtive

n k DLccrivr shall .)so serve to acknowledge tbe b u d work and effort tk3Lumll Aid and Special Opaadorfl Committee, Tralnlng and Education C m m h c of tat Be- Coruty P o k e Chiefs' AoralmUaa, wboae work w*a iwfrumcntrf in t h ~ fam~xlatloa of rhfr polin;

cc: CblCf M k b U l MWdrgt Btm Aasirtant Prw~rsculor Wllhm J. Gads ExccatCve AI~irtaot Prouccuior Frank Pucdo

Appendix B

List of 68 Bergen County Municipal Police Departments

Agency Number of officers Agency Number of officers

Allendale Alpine Bergenfield Bogota Carlstadt Cliffside Park Closter Cresskill Demarest Dumont East Rutherford Edgewater Elmwood Park Emerson Englewood Englewood Cliffs Fair Lawn Fairview Fort Lee Franklin Lakes Garfield Glen Rock Hackensack Harrington Park Hasbrouck Heights Haworth Hillsdale Ho-Ho-Kus Leonia Little Ferry Lodi Lyndhurst Mahwah Maywood Midland Park ~ o n t v i l e Moonachie New Milford North Arlington Northvale

Nonvood Oakland Old Tappan Oradell Palisades Park Paramus Park Ridge Ramsey Ridgefield Ridgefield Park Ridgewood River Edge River Vale Rochelle Park Rutherford Saddle Brook Saddle River South Hackensack Teaneck Tenafly Upper Saddle River Waldwick Wallington Washington Township Westwood Wood-Ridge Woodcliff Lake Wyckoff

Appendix C

Jell'Ditm 1 ! 7 Knolls Road

Dear Mr. Dino:

'The purpose of this letter is to p n t you p m i s s i o n to use o limited numbcr of questk from the BJS Law Enforcement Maaagement and Administrative Slatistics (I FMAS) survey qwauonuairr firr your study of policc dcpenments in Bcrgsn County. Ncw Jer This pwnissinn is yranlcd fnr the purposcs of rile R q e n Cuunty data collectiuu only and any future &la cullecrions basal un thz I.EMAS survcy instnrrnenl will also requ a request to BJS for permission lo use the I.EMAS questions. If any l i i h c r infnrmali is needed reganling this letter ol'prtuiasion, please contact me by email at .-%tiru~.reave%Nsdqj.~;-or by phone at 202-616-3287.

1 EMAS Program hfanagcr Bureau of histice Statislics I1.S. Damanem of Jumice

September l5.20U8

John L. Molinelli. Prnsecutor k r y e n County P m s ~ u t o r ' s O l l i ~ 10 Main Skeet Ilackensack, SJ 07601

Dear Prosecutor Molinelli.

My name i s Jeiftcy D i m I mn a 1 ; year veteran Police w e a n 1 with thc Mahwah Police Deportment. I .m alsn a &xlciral d d a t c a1 Seton H ~ l l IInivmiQ'. 1 nm paporing my dissertation on police p ~ p a n u l n c s s to rcspond to active shooter situntions in schwls 01'Uergen County, N. Thc dissertation is focl~wd on how thc municipl pulice duparuncnts of Hergen County are preparing to respond lo an activc shouler situation siucc tlw distribution of your directive marked 05-01 Actiw Shootcr Policy Initintive.

The p w p c of this ietkr is lo rqucsl your pcnnission for me tn send each of the 68 municipal police agcncics of Bergen County n copy of a survey qurstio& lo ask hem lo complclc and rcturn tn me. The s w e y contains q w l i o n u borrowed hm the L.sw Enfnrcemcnt Management and ~Uminislrruivr Statistics survey and qucstion~ thmt were prepared with the a s s i s t w e of a jury ol'cxprts in the fields of policing police tactics. and emergency mamgemenl.

I'hiu rlscarch study has k e n approved by Seton I I d University. All information gatherd will be kept strictly confidential and no identifying characteristics of any ngency will be asked for or d i s s e m i ~ t c d .

I ~vould like lo lake 1h1s opportunity to thank you for my and dl considwdliun you give this request. If h r c arc any questions I can he c n n k k d mytine at 973650- IlZh5.

L M O I I N ~ U I Cuvnh Promulor Office of the County Prosecutor

County of Bergen

HACKENSACK. NEW JERSEY 07601 Jolw L. Hmwh UI (201) 646-1300 Tnsl L h ~ t

Joseph Macellam Chmt orlktallvn

October 8.2008

Mr. J e f h y Din0 1 17 Knolls Road Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

Re: Active Shooter Preparedness Survey

Dear Mr. Dino,

In regard to your request to send a questionnaire to the municipal police departments in Bergen County to assess how the departments are prepared to respond to an active shooter situation. that request, and the form proposed by you are approved. It is my understanding that you are sending out this questionnaire in furtherance of your doctoral degree at Seton Hall University. This office approves of the questionnaire that you wish to use, and also is interested in the results that will flow from the responses that you receive. Please provide this office with a summary of your tindings, if possible. I commend you on yow choice of topic, and wish you much success in your efforts to achieve your doctoral degree. If at any time I, or this office, can be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me at 201 -226-5104.

William J. Galda First Assistant Prosecutor

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH, DEMONSTRATION OR RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

PROJECT TITLE: A ShdV in Police hemredness to Resoond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Lea& Environment in tbe Schools of Bernen Countv. New Jmev.

Dr. C n a b millerr f h G ,Lh& L 1011W RESEARCHER'S ADVISOR ORDEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR DATE

1Please pint or type out name below -lurê

DIRECTOR. 0 SETON W UNlVERSlN INSTINTICt+U R M E W BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH

Jefiky Dino 117 Knolls Road Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

December 17,2008

Dear Mr. Dino,

The Seton Hall University lnstitutional Review Board has reviewed the information you have submitted addressing the concerns for your proposal entitled "A Study in Police Preparedness to Report to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey". Your research protocol is hereby approved as revlsed thmugh expedited review. The 1RB reserves the right to recall the proposal at any time for full review.

Enclosed for your records are the signed Request for Approval form, and the stamped Letter of Solicitation. Make copies only of this stamped letter.

The Institutional Review Board approval of your research is valid for a one-year period from the date of this letter. Durina this time. any changes to the research ~rotocol must be reviewed and a~oroved hv the IRB ~ r i o r to their imdementation.

Accodmg to federal regulations, continuing review of already approved research is mandated to take place at least 12 months after this initial approval. You will receive communication from the TRB Office for this several months before the anniversary date of your initial approval.

Thank you for your cooperation.

I n harmony with federal regulations. none of the investigators or research stoffinvolved in the study rookpurr in thejinol decision

Sincerely,

~rciessor Director, Institutional Review Board

cc: Dr. Charles Achilles

Appendix D

3. S h c c 11. S r p ~ m k r 1. am I n i m i . ~ m w h t e . did your a p c y pu.rh.St a, .quire .my d,k 101kri.g lym dtm*.l rownw gar?

Man ,.la11 l h a t q p l )

- Raills<,r hclmca

: H d h c ,hicids

I I. Emer the tof.1 mmmkr a l r d b far umkr rccciwd by your sgemcy duri.8 XW7. lrdsls arc not nrallshlr. prorldc an ~sllmalr nnd mark ,. I *r. mr huhu

Appendix E

SETON HALL I . B .

UNIVERSITY

December 18,2CfJ8

Dear Chief,

MY name is Jefiev Dino and I am a Sergeant of Police with the Mahwah Police ~ e p a r t m e i t . I am also a doctoral candidate a dissertation at Seton Hall University. My study is on Active Shooter preparedness by municipal police denanments in Bemen Countv. NJ. The ournose of this letter is to ask for Your assistance - . . . . with this project.

My request is for you to please spare a few minutes out of your day to complete the attached survey and mail it back to me by January 7,2008. The survey contains 11 questions that should not take very much of your time. I can assure you that no part of this survev will be seen bv anvone other than me and mv dissertation committee.

~ i c r the dam 1s c o ~ ~ ~ ~ c d from all panwpantr & I 68 munlctpal police depanmcnts in Bcrgen Counlyl. the surveys wlll be stored in a locked fire res~slant box in my home for three years as iscustomary in doctoral research. Further, all surveys will be coded with a control number and your agency name will not appear anywhere on the survey. These layers of security are to ensure your anonmitv and reassure vou that vour . . answers to the questions in the survey will be kept private and confidential.

After you complete the survey, please mail it back to me using the self addressed stamped envelope provided with the survey.

.

This shldy has been approved by Seton Hall University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) and bv the Berren CountvProsecutors Office. If vou have anv auestions - . . about the survey or about any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 973-650-0565 or my mentor Dr. Charles Achilles 973-761-9668. If you have any questions about subject's rights in this research please contact Dr. ~ " z i c k a at the-RB at 973-313-6314.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in my academic endeavor.

Respectfully

A, 11 Jeffrey T. Dino

Seton Hall UnhremHy InsliMional Review Board

3EC 17 2008 M Date OEC 17 mrJ

Approval Date

Appendix F

Crosstabs

Crosstab

Case Processing Summary

Medium Low Number Number of

of Trained Trained Officers in Officers in

Active Shooter Active Shooter

Q8R ' Q5R Q9R " Q5R Q10R Q5R Q l l R ' Q 5 R

Response (0 - Response (3 2 Officers) Officers)

28R Small Organization (1 - Count I 9 1 5 20 ~ull-time Authorized ~ ~ ~ t ~ d count I 5.8 Positions) % of Total 20.0% 11.1%

Cases

Std. Residual I .2 ( -3 Medium Oraanization Count I 5 1 3 - (21-30 Full-time Expected Count 3.8 2.6 Authorized Positions) % of Total 11.1% 6.7%

Std. Residual .6 .2 ~ ~ ~- Large Organization Count 5 5 (More than 30 Full-time ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ d count 6.8 4.6 Authorized Positions) % of Total

11.1% 11.1%

Total Valid

Std. Residual -.7 .2

rota1 Count 19 13 Expected Count 19.0 13.0 9h of Total 42.2% 28.9%

Missing

N 68 68 68 68

N 45 40 44 45

High Number of Trained Officers in

4ct1ve Shooter Response

(More than 3 Officers)

6 5.8

13.3% .1 1

2.6 2.2% -1.0

6 4.6

13.3%

.6

13 13.0

28.9%

N 23 28 24 23

Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Percent 66.2% 58.8% 64.7% 66.2%

Total 20

20.0 44.4%

9 9.0

20.0%

16 16.0

35.6%

45 45.0

100.0%

Percent 33.8% 41.2% 35.3% 33.8%

I N of Valid Cases I 45 1 1

Chi-square Tests

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60.

Low Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Res~onse 10 -

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

,650

,600

,490

Pearson Chi-square

Likelihood Ratio

Linear-by-Linear Association

2 Office;) 29R Low Total Operating Count 11

Budget ($0 - $250,000) Expected Count 8.6 % of Total 27.5% Std. Residual I .8

MediumTotal O~erating Count I 4

Value 2.473a

2.753

,475

Budget (5250bol - Expected Count 5.4 $3,000,000) % of Total 10.0%

Std. Residual -.6 High Total Operating Count 3 Budget (More than Expected Count 4.1 $3,000,000) % of Total

7.5%

df 4

4

1

Std. Residual

rota1 Count Expected Count 18.0 % of Total 45.0%

Medium Number of Trained

Officers in Wive Shooter Response (3

Officers) 5

5.7 12.5%

-.3 4

3.6 10.0%

.2 3

2.7

7.5%

.2

12 12.0

30.0%

High Number of Trained Officers in

4C1ive Shooter Response

(More than 3 Officers)

3 4.8

7.5%

-.8 4

3.0 10.0%

.6 3

2.3

7.5%

.5

10 10.0

25.0%

Total 19

19.0 47.5%

12 12.0

30.0%

9

9.0

22.5%

40 40.0

100.0%

Chi-square Tests

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

,604

Likelihood Ratio I 2.777 Linear-by-Linear Association 2.086 a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The

minimum expected count is 2.25.

df 4 ' Pearson Chi-square

N of Valid Cases I 40

Value 2.729"

4

1

I . I 4 9 596 I

Crosstab

Q5R

%if Total I 22.7% 1 4.5% 1 11.4%

Low Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Res~onse 10 -

I 2 officers) I &cers) I officers)

Medium Number of Trained

Officers in Active Shooter Res~onse (3

210R Low Forfeiture Program - Count 2007 ($0 - $200) Expected Count

Std. Residual 1 .O

High Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Response

(More than 3

2 5.0

10 7.3

Program - 2007 ($201 - Expected Count $10,000) %of Total

Std. Residual High Forfeiture Program - Count 2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count

% of Total

Expected Count I 19'0 I 12.0 %of Total 43.2% 29.5% 27.3%

5 4.6

Medium Forfeiture count I 4 1 9 1 0 -1.3

Std. Residual -.4 -1 .I

Total 17

17.0 38.6%

- 13

13.0 29.5%

- 14

14.0 31 .8%

- 44

44.0 100.0% -

.2

5.6 9.1%

- .7 5

6.0 11.4%

1.6

rotai count I 19 1 13 1 12

3.8 20.5%

2.6 2

4.1 4.5%

3.5 .O% -1.9

7 3.8

15.9%

Chi-square Tests

I I I ~ s y m p . Sig. I I value I df I (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-square 1 17.685a 1 4 ( ,001 Likelihood Ratio 1 19.551 1 4 1 ,001 I Linear-by-Linear Association ( 1 . 1 1 1 5 9 1

Q11R * QSR

N of Valid Cases I 44

Crosstab

I

I

Low Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Res~onse 10 -

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.55.

1 2 office&) 31 I R Low Annual Service count 10

Calls - 2007 ( 0 - 10,000) Ex~ected Count 8.9 %of Total I 22.2% Std. Residual

Medium Annual Service Count Calls - 2007 (10,001 - Expected Count 15,000) % of Total 8.9%

Std. Residual 1 -5 Hiah Annual Service count I 5 ~ a i i s - 2007 ( More than Eqected Count I 5.1 15,000) % of Total 11.1%

Std. Residual

rota1 count Expected Count % of Total 42.2%

Number of of Trained Trained Officers in

Officers Officers Total 21

21 .o 46.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

45 45.0

100.0%

Chi-square Tests

1 Likelihood Ratio 1 ,883 1 4 1 ,927

Value

I Linear-by-Linear Association I 3 5 1 1 I 5 i 2 N of Valid Cases I 45

Pearson Chi-square I .86ea ( 4 ( ,929

-

df

a. 4 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.47.

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

Q8R " Q6R Q9R * Q6R Q1OR " Q6R Q l l R ' Q 6 R

Cases Valid

N 45 40 44 45

Percent 66.2% 58.8% 64.7% 66.2%

Missing N

23 28 24 23

Total Percent

33.8% 41.2% 35.3% 33.8%

N 68 68 68 68

Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Crosstab

I Q6R I Once a I Quarter or Monthly Bi-annually

Q8R Small Organization (1 - Count 5 8 20 Full-time Authorized Expected count 6.2 4.4 Positions) % of Total 11.1% 17.8%

Std. Residual -.5 1.7 Medium Organization Count I 4 1 1 (21-30 Full-time Expected Count 2.0 Authorized Positions) Total I 8 . 1 2.2%

Std. Residual .7 -.7 Large Organization Count I 5 1 1 (More than 30 Full-time Expected Count 3.6 Authorized Positions) % of Total

Std. Residual .O -1.4

rota1 Count 14 10 Expected Count 14.0 10.0 % of Total 31.1% 22.2%

Chi-square Tests

I I I I ~ s y m p . Sip. I 1 value 1 df I (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-square 1 7.38Ba 1 4 I .I17 I Likelihood ~ a t i o ( 7.617 1 4 1 ,107 1

Once a year or Never

7 9.3

15.6% -.8

4 4.2

8.9% -.l

10 7.5

22.2%

.9

21 21.0

46.7%

Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

Total 20

20.0 44.4%

9 9.0

20.0%

16 16.0

35.6%

45 45.0

100.0%

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00.

.478

45

1 I

Crosstab

Quarter or I ( Monthly 1 Bi-annually 1 Q9R Low Total Operating Count I 8 1 2 I

Budget ($0 - $250,000) Expected Count 5.7 3.8 % of Total 20.0% 5.0% Std. Residual 1 .O -.9

MediumTotal Operating Count 2 6 Budget ($250,001 - Expected Count 3.6 2.4 $3,000,000) % of Total 5.0% 15.0%

Std. Residual -3 2.3 High Total Operating Count 2 0 Budget (More than Expected Count 2.7 1.8 $3,000,000) % of Total

5.0% .O%

Std. Residual -.4 -1.3

Total Count 12 8 Expected Count 12.0 8.0 % of Total 30.0% 20.0%

Linear-by-Linear Association

I 1.811 ( 1 I 1 7 8 I

Chi-square Tests

Once a year or Never

9

9.5 22.5%

-.2

Total 19

19.0 47.5%

12 12.0

30.0%

9 9.0

22.5%

40 40.0

100.0%

Pearson Chi-square Likelihood Ratio

N of Valid Cases I 40 I a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The

minimum expected count is 1.80.

Value 11 .955a 12.269

df 4 4

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

.018 ,015

Crosstab

Quarter or Once a vear 1 Monthly I Bi-annually I or ~ e b e r 1 Total

QlOR Low Forfeiture Program - Count I 7 1 4 1 6 1 17 - 2007 ($0 - $200) Expected Count

% of Total Std. Residual

Medium Forfeiture Count Program - 2007 ($201 - Expected count $10,000) % of Total

Chi-square Tests

Std. Residual

High Forfeiture Program - Count 2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count

% of Total Std. Residual

Total Count Expected Count % of Total

5.4 15.9%

.7 3

4.1 6.8%

-.6 4

4.5 9.1%

-2 14

14.0 31.6%

Pearson Chi-square Likelihood Ratio

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.95.

3.9 9.1%

.1 5

3.0 11.4%

Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

1.2 1

3 2 2.3% -1.2

10 10.0

22.7%

Value 5.362a 5.578

7.7 13.6%

-.6 5

5.9 11.4%

1.729

44

17.0 38.6%

13 13.0

29.5% -.4

9 6.4

20.5% 1 .O 20

20.0 45.5%

df 4 4

14 14.0

31.8%

44 44.0

100.0%

Asymp. Sig. (Psided)

,252 ,233

1 .I89

Crosstab

I Q6R

%if Total 1 17.8% 1 13.3% Q11 R Low Annual Service Count

Calls - 2007 ( 0 - 10,000) Ex~eCted Count

Monthly 8

6.5

Std. Residual

Medium Annual Service Count Calls - 2007 (10.001 - Expected Count 15,000) % of Total

Std. Residual High Annual Service Count Calls - 2007 ( More than Expected Count 15.000) % of Total

Std. Residual

Total Count Expected Count % of Total

Once a year or Never

7 9.8

15.6% -.9

4 5.6

8.9% -.7 10

5.6

22.2%

1.9

21 21.0

46.7%

Bi-annually 6

4.7

Chi-square Tests

Total 21

21 .o 46.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

45 45.0

100.0%

.6 5

3.7 11.1%

.7 1

3.7

2.2%

-1.4

14 14.0

31.1%

.6 3

2.7 6.7%

.2 1

2.7

2.2%

-1.0

10 10.0

22.2%

Pearson Chi-square Likelihood Ratio Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.87.

df 4 4

1

Value 8.93ga 9.482

5.405

45

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

.063 ,050

.020