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of state, which over time had the effect of creating tensions between the monarchy and an emerging military-bureaucratic class. In 1932 the absolute monarchy was overthrown by a military coup to be replaced by a constitutional monarchy. There have been nineteen coups in the country since then. Following the events of 1932, two principal internal conflicts have dominated the political life of the country. One was within the armed forces, including the police, for the dominant position; this was resolved in 1957 when Marshal Sarit Thanarat seized power on behalf of the army. More protracted has been the problem of establishing a political format acceptable to all competing interests, including the armed forces.

The issue of political format has tested the stability of the state on numerous occasions, with recurrent acts of military intervention serving as the vehicle of political change. After the Pacific War, during which Thailand was allied with Japan, constitutional govern ment of a kind alternated with direct military rule. Thai constitutionalism however, has constantly been subject to the tolerance of the military, who have removed or attempted to remove elected govern - ments on several occasions since the end of the Pacific War. The ability of the military to impose their will was facilitated during the 1960s and into the 1970s by the Vietnam War, to which Thailand was a party, as well as by the active insurgent role up to the end of the 1970s played by the Communist Party of Thailand. Moreover, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the ensuing third phase of the Indochina Wars during the 1980s also served to maintain the political centrality of the armed forces.

The political pre-eminence of the military began to be challenged from the early 1970s as a consequence of successful economic develop - ment, which was accompanied by social change foreshadowed by student activism. In addition, King Bhumibol, who had acquired considerable popular respect for his commitment to rural development, employed the aura of monarchy in

The Kingdom of Thailand, once known as Siam, is situated in the centre of the mainland of Southeast Asia with a land area of some 500,000 square kilometres. It is the only regional state not to have been subject to European colonial - ism. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy where the reigning King Bhumibol Adulyadej has exercised a unique personal authority over various political interests.

To Thailand’s west and north lie Myanmar, Laos is to its north and east, Cambodia is to its east and it shares a southern border with Malaysia. Thailand does not have a direct frontier with the People’s Republic of China but is separated from it by only narrow stretches of territory extending from Myanmar and Laos, which touch to its extreme north. Thailand has a population of almost seventy million, primarily composed of ethnic T’ai whose religion is the Theravada branch of Buddhism. In addition to tribal minorities, such as the Hmong in northern provinces, there is a significant concentration of Malay-Muslims (see Islam) in the southern provinces bordering Malaysia, where armed resistance movements continue to operate. The largest minority is that of ethnic Chinese, who comprise some ten per cent of the population. A considerable proportion, however, have intermarried into Thai families with a notable degree of cultural assimilation (see Chinese Com munities in Southeast Asia).

The origins of the Thai state date from the tenth century, when ethnic T’ai migrated from southwest China towards the central plain then under the control of the Cambodian empire based around Angkor. The current Thai state dates from the eighteenth century when King Rama I sited his capital at Bangkok and founded the Chakri dynasty, which is represented by its ninth incumbent, Bhumibol Adulyadej. From the mid-nineteenth century, modernizing Chakri monarchs opened the country to commercial contact with the west, with the rice trade as the staple basis for economic development. Western skills were drawn on to develop the machinery

Thailand, Kingdom of

Liow, Joseph, and Michael Leifer. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, Routledge, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/berkeley-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1864825. Created from berkeley-ebooks on 2018-06-18 18:48:52.

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the interest of democratization. Violent mili- tary reaction to student protest in October 1973 led to the removal of the military regime and its succession by a raucous democratic interlude which was brought to an end by decisive mili - tary intervention in October 1976. The tempes - tuous politics of the mid-1970s concurrent with the Communist victories in Indochina alarmed the king, who lent his weight to a period of more benign military rule in the 1980s under the leadership of the army commander and prime minister, Prem Tinsulanonda. Two abortive mili tary coups in 1981 and 1985 failed to arrest the gradual return to constitutionalism con - current with remarkable economic develop- ment by the end of the 1980s. In 1991, the military successfully removed the elected govern ment of Chatichai Choonhavan, but appointed a civilian caretaker prime minister, Anand Panyarachun, under pressure from the king. Massive vote-buying in the rural areas led to a victory by military-affiliated political parties during the elections of March 1992, intended to return the country to full civilian rule. The appointment of former army commander-in- chief, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, as un - elected prime minister provoked violent uproar in Bangkok led by the opposition Palang Dharma (Moral Force) Party, which only subsided with royal intervention and Suchinda’s resignation. Anand Panyarachun was reappointed acting prime minister over a technocratic govern ment. Elections in September 1992 produced a new civilian-based coalition with Chuan Leekpai, the leader of the Democrat Party, as prime minister. The return to civilian rule marked a notable, if temporary, decline in the prerogative political outlook of the armed forces. Political parties outside of the capital have tended to be fleeting constellations of personal and regional interests bound together in the main by consid - erations of patronage and not by coherent programmes linked to distinctive constituen- cies. After the 1991 coup, three new political parties were created. Five disappeared, while others splintered and regrouped. The frustra - tions of coalition govern ment were exemplified by the experience of the administration headed by Chuan Leekpai, which was thwarted in attempting to secure democratic amendments to

the constitution imposed by the military after 1991. His success in January 1995 in securing constitutional amendments in the interest of greater democratization was followed by loss of office through elections in July 1995, which were precipitated by the defection of Palang Dharma. A new seven-party coalition with the Chart Thai Party at its core and Banharn Silpa- archa as prime minister was formed without any threat of military intervention. That coalition collapsed and then lost power in elections in November 1996 to be succeeded by a six-party counterpart headed by former army commander, Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, leader of the New Aspiration Party. The onset of economic crisis following the dramatic floating of the currency in July 1997 precipitated the fall of his govern - ment and the emergence of a new political alignment with the Democrat Party at its core. Chuan Leekpai assumed high office for the second time in November 1997 with royal and military support. Initial success in coping with economic adversity gave way to intra-coalition tensions by the turn of the century. Elections to replace the appointed senate of soldiers and businessmen were held on 4 March 2000. Seventy-eight of the 200 winning candidates were then rejected by the election commission over allegations of malpractice. By that juncture, the Democrat Party had lost national standing partly through the decision to decorate Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, a disgraced former military dictator. The decline in the political fortunes of the Democrat Party lent significance to the rising electoral challenge of the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) founded by Thaksin Shinawatra in 1998. Thaksin, a noted businessman and former deputy super- intendent in the police, with a staunch following in the northeast of the country, had previously served as foreign minister and deputy prime minister under the Chuan, Banharn and Chavalit administrations, as well as, briefly, leader of Palang Dharma. Competing for the first time in the January 2001 elections – the first to be held under the 1997 constitution – Thaksin’s TRT promised universal access to healthcare and extensive rural development, and carried 248 of 500 elected seats in the National Assembly. Though TRT only required three more seats to

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form a govern ment, Thaksin chose to form a coalition with Chart Thai (which had won forty- one seats) and the New Aspiration Party (thirty- six seats), and merged TRT with Seritham Party (fourteen seats). He went on to be the first elected prime minister of Thailand to complete a full term in office. It was also during his term that a power struggle was triggered between the traditional middle class Bangkok-based elite and royalists on the one hand, and the rural masses, Thaksin’s support base, on the other.

Thaksin’s administration, which consisted of his Palang Dharma allies, former student demonstrators from the 1973 protests and academics, received praise for policies which targeted rural poverty, the drug trade and public health, driven by a strong recovery from the 1997–8 Asian Financial Crisis that allowed the country to repay its debts to the IMF two years ahead of schedule. The means which delivered these excellent outcomes, however, were often controversial. For example, Thaksin’s legal ization of Thailand’s underground lottery system, under the Govern ment Lottery Office, allowed lottery sales of up to seventy billion baht to be used for rural social projects but was seen as a profit-making initiative and the root of social problems in the urban areas. Especially controversial was the ‘War on Drugs’, initially declared by King Bhumibol on the eve of his birthday in 2002. Having found measures such as border controls and educational campaigns ineffective, Thaksin launched a national effort in January 2003 to exterminate drug abuse in three months. This involved rewarding and pun - ish ing officials based on their ability to meet provincial arrest and seizure targets, and led to the creation of at least 2,800 ‘death squads’ mandated to carry out extrajudicial killings of suspected drug abusers and traders. A total of 2,604 resultant murders were recorded – not all of which could be linked conclusively to drug crimes. While the Narcotics Control Board widely publicized the policy’s effectiveness in reducing drug consumption, advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch held that many were accused on false charges, while serial drug users and traders continued despite the govern - ment’s best efforts. In addition to these criticisms, the Thaksin administration was accused of

‘policy corruption’, a term used to describe the diversion of state funding to companies linked to the Shinawatra family through infrastruc- ture or liberalization policies. These emerged as central issues following Thaksin’s re-election in 2005, which saw the highest voter turnout in Thai history. Soon after the TRT carried 374 seats, opposition politicians led by Sondhi Limthongkul of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), also a popular talk-show host, alleged abuses of power by the adminis - tration. The sale of the Shinawatra family’s stake in Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings (owned by the Govern ment of Singapore) for seventy-three billion baht in January 2006 pro - vided further fodder for his opponents. Protests took place daily outside Govern ment House, compelling Thaksin to dissolve parliament on 24 February 2006. The ensuing snap elections of April 2006 were widely boycotted, and though TRT again won a technical majority, gaining 462 seats, the Constitutional Court invalidated the results in May 2006. By this time, there had been two impeachment attempts against Thaksin, launched by a group of twenty-eight senators and the Thai university students’ network, respectively. Thaksin stepped down as prime minister following an audience with King Bhumibol on 4 April 2006, and appointed Chidchai Wannasathit of the TRT as caretaker prime minister in his stead. Non-parlia men tary players soon became involved. After nullifying the results of the April elections, the Court ordered fresh elections to be held in October, and called on the Electoral Commission to resign. Upon the Commissioners’ refusal, on the grounds of their constitutional independence, the Criminal Courts jailed them and removed them from their posts in July 2006. In the same month, despite earlier assurances in May that the army would not take advantage of the political upheaval, up to 100 army officials close to Thaksin were reassigned by the military high command, and by August tank movements were reported near Bangkok, prompting fears of a coup. President of the Privy Council and former general, Prem Tinsulanonda, heightened ten - sions further when he suggested in July that the Thai military owed greater allegiance to the King than to the govern ment. Protestors on

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the streets took sides in what came to be seen as a pro-Thaksin or pro-Monarchy standoff – a view promoted by Sondhi – with divisions exacer bated by claims that Thaksin had insulted the King, and Thaksin’s own comments that extra-parlia men tary organizations were seeking to overthrow the rule of law.

The Royal Thai Army, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, removed Thaksin’s govern ment in a swift coup d’état on the evening of 19 September 2006, marking Thailand’s first non- constitutional change of govern ment in fifteen years. By the time Thaksin, who was attend- ing a meeting of the UN General Assembly, announced a state of emergency by telephone from New York and attempted to transfer Sonthi from his post as army commander, both the deputy prime minister, Chidchai Wannasathit, and the defence minister, Thammarak Isaragura na Ayuthaya, had been arrested, and national radio and TV networks taken off air. Approach - ing midnight, the army-led Council for Demo - cratic Reform (CDR) issued two statements declaring the coup successful, and promised to return power to the people. Nevertheless, a third statement in the early hours of 20 September dissolved the cabinet, both houses of parliament and the Constitutional Court, and suspended the constitution. Martial law was declared nationwide. As a result of the coup, elections scheduled for 15 October did not take place. The CDR, representing all branches of the army and police, declared King Bhumibol head of state, granted General Sonthi the powers of a premier, gave itself the role of parliament and created a new National Police Commission under a police general, Kowit Wattana. It then ordered fifty-eight prominent civilians, many of whom were academics, to serve as advisors in various capacities, though most denied having been informed of their appointments and later chose to refuse their positions. The CDR also released an interim constitution in Septem ber 2006, renaming itself the Council of National Security (CNS), and appointed former deputy president of the Supreme Court, Nam Yimyaem, to lead a committee investigating allegations against the Thaksin administration. In October 2006, General Surayud Chulanont, former supreme commander of the army, was

appointed to high office. The CNS reserved a powerful executive role.

The 2006 coup deeply polarized Thai society and precipitated a political crisis pitting sup - porters of Thaksin against the royalists, sending convulsions across the country. From January 2007, specific charges by the Financial Institu - tions Development Fund and the attorney general were brought against Thaksin, who was residing in the UK, under an Assets Examination Committee selected by the junta. In June, Prime Minister Surayud declared that he would per - sonally guarantee Thaksin’s safety if the latter returned to Thailand. Thaksin, who had by this time purchased Manchester City Football Club, eventually arrived in Bangkok in February 2008, and pleaded not guilty to charges of crim - inal corruption in March. A month-long return to the UK was granted by the courts, but from June 2008 Thaksin’s travel requests were denied, and arrest warrants issued when Thaksin subsequently skipped bail to attend the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. Arrest warrants were also issued for Thaksin’s wife Potjaman, who was found guilty of violating stock-trading and land sale laws in July, but had left the country with her husband. Thaksin was officially found guilty of abusing his power as prime minister in October 2008, and both Thaksin’s and Potjaman’s visas were revoked by the UK.

On 19 August 2007, Thai voters approved a newly drafted constitution in a referendum, after the junta banned public criticism and threatened not to relinquish power if the referendum was not passed. The new Constitutional Tribunal then found the TRT guilty of bribing two smaller parties to cooperate in the 2006 elections, and dissolved it; party executives, including Thaksin, were banned from politics for five years. TRT reformulated itself into the People’s Power Party (PPP) to contest the December 2007 elections, the first general election since the coup, under the leadership of Samak Sundaravej and managed to win 233 out of 480 parlia men tary seats, going on to form the govern ment via the vehicle of an alliance with five smaller parties. PPP’s victory precipitated a round of protests by the PAD which culminated in the movement seizing Govern ment House. In September, Samak was forced to resign after the Constitutional Court

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found him guilty of being paid to appear on a cooking programme after he came to power. Samak was replaced as PPP leader by party vice- president, Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law. Somchai’s appointment promp - ted an escalation of protest and violence leading to the PAD’s seizure of the govern ment’s tem - porary offices at Don Muang Airport and the closure of Suvarnabhumi Airport. The PPP and two coalition partners were subsequently dis - solved and its leaders barred from politics for five years after being found guilty of electoral fraud. Power then switched hands to the Demo - crat Party and party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, through a parlia men tary vote in December 2008 which was helped by several Thaksin loyalists who were persuaded to change their allegiances. Meanwhile, pro-Thaksin followers of the PPP formed the Pheu Thai Party in September 2008.

Thailand’s tumultuous politics persisted under the Democrat govern ment when the United Front for Democracy Against Dictator - ship (UDD) opposed Abhisit’s appointment and thrust Thailand into a state of paralysis. Mass protests were mobilized in Bangkok and Pattaya in 2009, the latter the site of an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit and East Asia Summit which Thailand was hosting. These protests proved an embarrass - ment for the Thai govern ment which had to postpone the Pattaya meeting and see to the evacuation of delegates who included senior officials and ministers from regional states. A new round of protests in March and April 2010 resulted in heavy UDD casualties, including more than fifty deaths. At the July 2011 elections, the opposition Pheu Thai Party won a land- slide victory under the leadership of Yingluck Shinawatra, youngest sister of Thaksin. This victory and Yingluck’s successful defeat of a no-confidence vote in late 2012 enabled Thaksin to continue exercising a measure of influence over Thai politics. Nevertheless, Yingluck was no mere surrogate, and of her own accord laboured to improve relations with the military that were strained considerably during her brother’s tenure, her initiatives included the addition of military officers from Internal Security Operations Command to the Prime Minister’s Office.

Parlia men tary debate over a proposed amnesty bill crafted to provide amnesty for criminal offences committed by both sides of the political divide triggered a new round of pro - tests and violence in October 2013. Anti-Thaksin forces rallied against the bill behind former deputy prime minister, Suthep Thaugsuban (himself under investigation for alleged offences that would have been absolved under the pro - posed bill), on grounds that its passage would have paved the way for Thaksin’s return to Thai land. Anti-Thaksin sentiments soon turned against the Yingluck govern ment, accusing it of corruption, and calling for her resignation and the formation of a nebulous ‘People’s Council’ to lead the govern ment in the interim. In the circumstances, the prime minister responded by dissolving Parliament and calling snap elections, scheduled for 2 February 2014. The run-up to polling day saw some of the bloodiest protests in recent Thai history even as the Election Commission advised a postponement of the polls and the opposition Democrat Party omin - ously declared its intention to boycott the elec - tion. When the Democrat Party last boycotted elections, in 2006, they triggered a chain of events that led to a military coup and a backroom deal that led to its formation of a minority govern - ment. The disputed general election went ahead on 2 February despite the less than fortuitous circumstances and attempts by anti-govern ment protestors, who by then had coalesced into the People’s Democratic Reform Council, to disrupt polling. Even then, the protestors were able to force polling to be rescheduled in several Bangkok districts as well as in the southern pro vinces when they succeeded in shutting down numerous polling stations, in so doing compli cating an already contentious situation. In the event, the results of the elections were nullified by the Constitutional Court a month later on grounds that twenty-eight of 375 wards were prevented by anti-govern ment protestors from holding a ballot, leaving the country without a functioning govern ment. Equally bizarre was the court order that no force could be used to remove protestors against the govern ment, even in the event that the business of running the govern ment was being obstructed. Meanwhile, the caretaker prime

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minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, faced charges of negligence and malfeasance for her role in approving a rice-pledging scheme introduced in 2011, when the govern ment purchased rice from farmers at inflated prices in a move to shore up rural incomes. The Constitutional Court subse quently found her guilty of abuse of power for a deceptively routine act of transferring a bureaucrat, and forced her resignation on 7 May.

In the early hours of 20 May, army general Prayuth Chan-ocha declared martial law in a move to quell escalating unrest. Several days later, while leaders of the former Pheu Thai govern ment and the anti-Thaksin People’s Democratic Reform Committee were locked in a conclave organized by the military to discuss the political impasse, a coup was launched, the nineteenth since 1932. Four days later, coup leader Prayuth sought and received royal endorsement in the form of a royal decree announced at a ceremony where King Bhumibol was absent. This was followed by the detention of leading political and public opinion leaders, and the imposition of a public curfew. Assur - ances were given by coup leaders that political reform and elections would follow, but no timeline was given.

For many years, the monarchy has stood as a pillar of stability in contrast with the mercurial quality of partisan politics in Thailand. Yet even the monarchy has not been able to escape the tumultuous tides of political change currently engulfing Thailand. The role of King Bhumibol as political mediator in the conservative demo - cratic interest has waned and will not necessarily be sustained should he be succeeded by his only son and phlegmatic crown prince, Maha Vajiralongkorn. Partly as a consequence of ill health, King Bhumibol’s role during the political crisis following the 2006 coup was noticeably muted, although his part during the coup itself has been the subject of much speculation, with many taking the view that such an event would not have transpired without the King’s know - ledge, if not tacit consent. Such suspicions were reinforced when the King appointed interim prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, and senior member of the CNS, Chalit Pukbhasuk, to the Privy Council in 2008 and 2011 respectively, and when Queen Sirikit presided over the cremation

of a PAD protestor killed during demonstra- tions in October 2008. Given the state of the King’s health, attention has shifted to heir apparent, Crown Prince Maha. Eccentricities aside, the Crown Prince does not give the impression of sharing his father’s sense of duty and is not as well regarded by the Thai people, most of whom prefer Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn. This has raised questions regarding the future relationship between the throne and the state which is likely to become increasingly pertinent given increasing popular scrutiny of lèse majesté legislation in Thailand. Moreover, against the backdrop of a society polarized between pro- and anti-Thaksin camps, the Crown Prince’s close relationship with the former prime minister has alienated him from his father’s closest allies.

An additional threat to stability in Thailand is an ongoing ethnic Malay insurgency in the southern border provinces of the country. After a decade or so of relative calm, political violence in the south erupted in January 2004 when militants launched an audacious raid on an arms depot in the province of Narathiwat. This ushered in a new cycle of insurgent vio- lence that has witnessed more than 5,000 deaths. The southern Thailand Insurgency remains premised on an ethnic Malay struggle against discrimination and injustices, and for minority recognition. It has however taken on an increas - ingly religious colour as the Muslim insurgents make more frequent reference to Islam as a motivating factor (see Insurgency, Southern Provinces). While the Thai govern ment has embarked on several parallel dialogue tracks facilitated either by neighbouring states or Euro - pean NGOs these have generated little traction, not least because of the evident reluctance of the Thai govern ment to come to terms with conse - quences of several early policy missteps that resulted in the deaths of locals and further alienation of the Malay community.

Further afield, Thailand’s geographic location and historical experience have moulded a foreign policy outlook of signal consistency over time. Thailand was a beneficiary of Anglo- French imperialist competition whereby the two European states found it politic to have an interposing buffer between their respective

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colonies in Burma and Indochina. Before colonial intervention in mainland Southeast Asia, Thai - land had experienced armed invasion from Burma as well as competition from Vietnam for influence in the trans-Mekong zone. Suspicion of both close and near neighbours survived the end of colonialism, while during the Pacific War Thailand enjoyed Japanese support in prose - cuting irredentist claims against Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Malaya. After the Pacific War, Thailand secured inter national rehabilitation with US support. Prime inter national concern came to focus on Indochina, where the restored French colonial position was subject to strong challenge from the Communist Party of Vietnam, perceived as a more fearsome historical enemy. Independent Burma, subject to ethnic minority rebellion, was a lesser priority. Indeed, Thai military support was provided for Karen and Shan rebels close to the common border.

Fear of a resurgent Communist Vietnam with dominion over Laos and Cambodia was rein - forced with the advent of a Communist China in 1949. Concurrently, US containment policy served both the domestic and foreign policy inter ests of the postwar Thai military regime through diplomatic, material and security sup - port. Thai troops participated in the Korean War under the United Nations flag and its govern - ment signed the US-inspired Manila Pact, the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, in September 1954. In February 1955 Thailand contributed further to this attempt to shore up the non-Communist position in the region by providing the headquarters of SEATO (South - east Asia Treaty Organization) which served as an institutional base for the Manila Pact until dismantled in 1977. Thailand remained asser - tively anti-Communist until the fall of Indochina in 1975, sending troops to Vietnam and per - mitting US aircraft to bomb North Vietnam from its airfields. In addition, Thailand cooperated with Malaysia and the Philippines in ASA (Asso - ciation of Southeast Asia), and more vigorously in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). With the Communist victories follow - ing US disengagement, though, diplomatic relations were established with the People’s Republic of China and successor govern ments in Indochina.

Thailand began to exploit growing antag - onism between China and Vietnam, and between Vietnam and Cambodia, to maintain a physical buffer in Indochina and eliminate external patronage for the Communist Party of Thailand. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in Decem- ber 1978, Thailand, with its ASEAN partners, mobil ized inter national opinion in its strategic interest and gave territorial asylum to Cam - bodian resistance insurgents. Particular support was pro vided for the ousted Khmer Rouge, who were supplied with equipment from China. Pressure on Vietnam during the 1980s culmin - ated in a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict at the Inter national Conference on Cambodia in Paris in October 1991, facilitated by the end of the Cold War. Thailand progressively repaired relations with Vietnam and endorsed the outcome of elections in Cambodia conducted in May 1993 under United Nations auspices (see UNTAC) but its military establishment sustained its links with the Khmer Rouge for reasons of financial advantage and also of geopolitical insurance lest the govern ment in Phnom Penh come under Vietnamese influence. These links disintegrated with the Khmer Rouge, while correct rather than close ties have been maintained with the govern ment in Phnom Penh.

With the end of the Cold War and the Cam - bodian conflict, the civilian govern ment of Thailand engaged more vigorously in regional multilateral dialogue with ASEAN at its core. It reconciled with Vietnam and welcomed it into the Association. It also sought to modify, albeit without success, the Association’s rule of non- interference in the domestic affairs of regional partners where domestic circumstances spill over borders with an adverse effect. In that respect, frustration was experienced in trying to promote a working relationship with the military regime in Myanmar through a policy of so-called Constructive Engagement intended partly to counter Myanmar’s close ties with China. Geography and history have combined also to sustain a traditional strategic perspective to wards the trans-Mekong of Indochina required as a buffer if it cannot be dominated. Defence cooperation has been sustained with the United

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States and with Singapore, in particular, among ASEAN states.

Cambodia has emerged as Thailand’s most pressing foreign policy concern in recent years as their Preah Vihear Temple Dispute erupted into hostilities in 2008. Relations between the two countries soured further during 2009–11 marked by the mutual withdrawal of ambass - adors, a move initiated by Bangkok in retaliation for the Cambodian govern ment’s appointment of Thaksin as economic advisor. Thai and Cam bodian military presences in the disputed area have been scaled back since the advent of the Yingluck Shinawatra govern ment, as both parties await an impending Inter national Court of Justice clarification of its 1962 ruling which awarded the temple but not the adjoining land to Cambodia. In the south, Thailand maintains stable though at times uneasy cooperation with Malaysia, whose role in the management of the insurgency in the southern provinces is critical.

In December 2003, Thailand was accorded ‘major non-NATO ally’ status by the United States in recognition of its deployment of Thai medical and engineering units to both Afghan - istan and Iraq. At the same time, relations with China have also deepened. Thailand’s chairman - ship of ASEAN in 2008–9 came under heavy scrutiny and criticism after Bangkok was forced to change the location of the fourth East Asia Summit (EAS) from Bangkok to Chiang Mai in October 2008 because of political unrest in the capital. After several other postponements,

includ ing the cancellation of the rescheduled April 2009 meeting in Pattaya when protestors seized the premises forcing the emergency evacuation of delegates to the embarrassment of the Thai hosts, the EAS eventually met in October 2009 in Cha-am and Hua Hin.

see also: Abhisit Vejjajiva; Anand Panyarachun; ASA; ASEAN; Asian Financial Crisis 1997–8; Banharn Silpa-archa; Buddhism; Bhumibol Adulyadej; Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, General; Chart Thai Party; Chatichai Choonhavan; Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia; Chuan Leekpai; Constructive Engagement; Democrat Party; East Asia Summit; Hmong; Indochina Wars; Insurgency, Southern Provinces; Inter national Conference on Cambodia, Paris 1991; Islam; Karen; Khmer Rouge; Maha Vajiralongkorn, Prince; Manila Pact 1954; New Aspiration Party; Overseas Chinese; People’s Alliance for Democracy; People’s Power Party; Pheu Thai Party; Preah Vihear Temple Dispute; Prem Tinsulanonda, General; Samak Sundaravej; Sarit Thanarat, Field Marshal; SEATO; Shan; Somchai Wongsawat; Sondhi Limthongkul; Sonthi Boonyaratglin, General; Suchinda Krapray - oon, General; Surayud Chulanont, General; Thai Rak Thai Party; Thaksin Shinawatra; Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal; Thammasat University Massacre 1976; United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship; UNTAC; Vietnam War; Yingluck Shinawatra.

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