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The Republic of Indonesia is the largest and most populous country in Southeast Asia. It comprises a distended archipelago of some 18,000 islands that extend from south of the Indian sub-continent to north of Australia; the most sizeable and important of these are Sumatra, Java (on which is located the capital Jakarta), the major portion of Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes) and West Papua Province (known as West Irian Jaya until 2007). They comprise a land area of almost two million square kilometres. Its population of around 260 million is the fourth largest after China, India and the United States. Some ninety per cent of its citizens profess an adherence to Islam and constitute statistically the largest Muslim community in the world. The degree of religious observance varies, however, and orthodox Islamic practice is diluted and combined regionally with underlying Hindu–Buddhist and animist traditions. Islam has been denied a prerogative place in political life through a state philosophy, Pancasila, which was enunciated before independence by the country’s first president, Sukarno. Pancasila enjoins all Indo - nesians to believe in a single deity but permits them to worship any god of their choice. This philosophy was introduced initially in the interests of religious and cultural tolerance but was then exploited to serve the cause of political demobilization during the authoritarian rule of the country’s second president, and former general, Suharto. An Islamic revival encouraged from the late 1980s for political advantage found expression in sectarian conflict between Muslims and the country’s Christian minority from the late 1990s attendant on an acute economic advers ity, which paved the way for the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998. A transitional rule under his constitutional successor, Vice-President B. J. Habibie, enabled a return to democratic practice, which was followed by the election in October 1999 of Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia’s fourth president. Although Indonesia is a unitary

repub lic, a law came into effect in January 2001 that gave provincial administrations greater autonomy in education, health, land rights and transport policies as well as investment appro - vals. Further changes were introduced to the political system in August 2002, when the People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indo - nesia, MPR) approved an amendment that required all legislators to be elected to office. Henceforth, the MPR could no longer elect the country’s president and vice-president. Instead, they would be directly elected with a significant majority of more than half of the popular vote and at least twenty per cent of the vote in half the provinces otherwise there would be a second round of elections. This amendment eventually saw Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party, PD) become the sixth president of Indonesia and the first to be directly elected through elections in 2004. Another significant change was the establish - ment of the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), which held its first elections in 2004, replacing the 200 unelected members of the MPR who represented various provinces, districts and municipalities across the country.

Indonesia is a unitary republic without historical antecedent within its contemporary territorial bounds, which were established by a waxing Dutch colonial rule from the end of the sixteenth century. Independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta on 17 August 1945 shortly after the end of a cruel Japanese occupation from March 1942. Full inter national status was attained only on 27 December 1949 after a bitter national revolu - tionary struggle against the returning colonial Dutch, who refused to transfer the western half of the island of New Guinea. In October 1965 an abortive coup (see Gestapu) attributed to the Communist Party of Indonesia paved the way to a fundamental change in Indonesia’s political system and priorities. The circumstances of the

Indonesia, Republic of

Liow, Joseph, and Michael Leifer. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, Routledge, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/berkeley-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1864825. Created from berkeley-ebooks on 2018-06-18 18:45:08.

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coup discredited Sukarno and enabled the armed forces led by Major General Suharto with Muslim support to take violent measures against the Communists and their alleged supporters. On 11 March 1966 Sukarno was obliged to transfer executive authority to Suharto, pro - moted to lieutenant general, who became acting president in the following year. Confirmed as president in March 1968, Suharto held office continuously with military support for over three decades. He secured re-election for a seventh successive term in March 1998 but was obliged to give up office within two months against a background of social and political unrest, known in the Indonesian political lexicon as era reformasi, generated by economic collapse. For the most part, however, his authoritarian rule had provided a stable background for notable economic development, which rested initially on the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas. Foreign direct investment enabled that process of development to extend to manufacturing for export, gener - ating high levels of growth. However, with accelerated development came a culture of corruption, to the advantage, in particular, of Suharto’s close family and business circle. The attendant structural weaknesses in the economy were exposed with the onset of devastating economic crises from the late 1990s. Never - theless, Suharto’s clout went beyond his years in office. Hutomo Putra Mandal, better known as Tommy Suharto, the youngest son of the former president was jailed for fifteen years for the assassination of a Supreme Court judge who had convicted him of graft. However, he was released from jail on 30 October 2006, serving just five years. The Indonesian govern - ment’s persistent attempts to charge Suharto with graft were never successful and the charges were formally dropped with his demise on 27 January 2008.

Under President Suharto’s proclaimed New Order, political participation was strictly controlled, while the media were subject to draconian controls. Parlia men tary elections were resumed in 1971 but political parties were compelled to merge into two groupings entitled to canvass popular support only every five years. The govern ment revived an association of

functional groups, Golkar, to serve as its electoral vehicle. Golkar secured approximately two-thirds of the votes cast in parlia men tary elections between 1971 and 1997 but lost support dramatically after the political downfall of Suharto. Members of parliament and political nominees, including representatives of the armed forces, made up the constitutionally supreme MPR, which re-elected Suharto to a seventh consecutive five-year term of office in March 1998. Suharto had previously assumed the title of ‘father of development’ in a demon - stration of his claim to legitimacy. By that juncture, however, Indonesia was deep in economic crisis. Suharto appeared determined to soldier on to the end of his term and had secured the appointment of B. J. Habibie as vice- president on the assumption that he would be a politically unwelcome successor. In the event, a reluctance to meet the economic priorities of the Inter national Monetary Fund served to accelerate the process of economic crisis, which gave rise to serious social and political unrest in Jakarta, in particular, including anti-Chinese violence. The catalyst in generating political change was a student-led activism, which was met by force from the security services killing four students at Trisakti University in Jakarta. It was in this turbulent context that Suharto found himself unable to reconstitute his cabinet and without the support of the armed forces’ leadership he decided to resign on 21 May 1998. The end of his personalized quasi-monarchical rule left a political vacuum distinguished by the absence of viable national economic and legal institutions. He was succeeded by Vice-President Habibie who restored the practice of democracy but attempted to use it to secure a fresh term of office. In January of 1999, President Habibie, in an unprecedented move, suggested the possi - bility of a referendum on independence for East Timor. This triggered a chain of events that culmin ated in inter national intervention and eventually, East Timorese independence on 20 May 2002. In the post-Suharto dispensation, there was a proliferation of political parties. Forty-eight of them contested parlia men tary elections in June 1999. The most successful was the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan (Democratic Party of Indonesia–Struggle,

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PDI–P), which secured 154 of 462 elective seats. It was led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the republic’s first president. The PDI (Democratic Party of Indonesia) was one of three legal parties during Suharto’s rule but PDI–P was its prevailing faction. A much diminished and divided Golkar came second with 120 seats. In third place with fifty-eight seats, in alliance with smaller parties, was the Islamic Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP), another legal party from the Suharto era. Fifth with fifty-one seats was the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB), which was new in form but represented the interests of the moderate Islamic Nahdlatul Ulama and its leader Abdurrahman Wahid, which had once been a constituent part of the PPP. The ostensibly constitutionalist but modernist-Islamic Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN) which also contested in the 2009 presi - dential elections, came last among the more successful participants with thirty-five seats. With the exception of the Islamic Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party, PBB) with fourteen seats, thirteen other parties secured six seats or less each. Amongst these thirteen parties that failed to have an impact on the elections was the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, PK) which reconstituted itself as the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS). The PKS eventually became a major player in Indonesian politics when it gained significant electoral ground in the 2004 elections as the best- organized of Indonesia’s Islamist parties. The parlia men tary elections placed Megawati as front-runner for president. However, she did not command a working majority either in the Parliament or in the MPR. Moreover, an Islamic- based coalition led by Amien Rais of PAN coalesced against her. In the event, Abdur - rahman Wahid was elected president on 20 October 1999 defeating Megawati by 373 votes to 313. She was then elected vice-president on the following day in an act of political reconcil- iation, while Amien Rais became speaker of the MPR.

President Wahid adopted a populist leader - ship style, marred by a willingness to tolerate acts of intimidation by members of the youth

wing of his party against his political detractors. An immediate major challenge for his presi- dency was the management of sectarian con- flict between Muslims and Christians on the Moluc can Island chain, with around 4,000 fatalities, as well as on Sulawesi and the island of Lombok. The Maluku Violence that saw a declaration of civil emergency in Ambon city in July 2000 was further exacerbated by the arrival of external militant forces such as Laskar Jihad, which turned the conflict into a full- fledged religious war. Religio-political violence was also engulfing Poso in central Sulawesi. The Wahid administration was unable to contain the violence and allowed it to simmer for almost two years. The violence was contained in 2002 only when Laskar Jihad was persuaded by its military patrons to unilaterally disband itself immediately after the Bali bombings in October. The early promise of President Wahid’s tenure gave way after six months to disillusionment at home and abroad as a result of his erratic style of leadership, which neglected economic priorities, particularly banking reforms and corporate restructuring. The rupiah continued to deteriorate and inflation was at ten per cent. In August 2000, he sought to reassert his authority through reconstituting his cabinet at the cost of alienating the majority parties in Parliament as well as his vice-president. However, he failed to impose any effective control over the armed forces beyond the removal of General Wiranto, former armed forces commander and minister of defence. President Wahid also faced immense pressure from the inter national community because of the deteriorating security situation in East Timor and the ensuing sectarian conflicts.

President Wahid’s popularity was steadily declining as he failed to address the dire eco - nomic situation of the country and the escalation of socio-political and religious conflicts. There - fore on the basis of incompetence along with accusations of corruption, President Wahid was impeached on 23 July 2001. Megawati replaced Abdurrahman Wahid as the fifth president of Indonesia. Megawati was able to bring about a measure of political stability but her govern- ment was dogged by issues of corruption, slow economic growth, separatist conflicts and escalation of terrorist activity in the country.

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Indonesia witnessed the deadliest terrorist attack on home soil on 12 October 2002 at the popular tourist resort island of Bali, which killed nearly 200 people. The island was again targeted in October 2005 by terrorists. On 9 November 2008, Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim and Huda Abdul Haq, members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, were executed for their role in the 2002 Bali bombings. Western targets continued to come under terrorist attack. Car bombs exploded on 5 August 2003 at the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, and outside the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004. The Marriott Hotel in Jakarta was again bombed in a July 2009 twin attack that also included the bombing of the Ritz Carlton Hotel. Indonesian counterterrorism operations, epitomized by the effective Densus 88, have managed to control the scourge of terrorism through operations that have led to the arrest and killing of several key terrorist leaders. At the same time, terrorist organizations have managed to survive through a combination of legal incapacities, displayed in the judiciary’s inability to outlaw JI, and metamorphosis, as factions of JI have over the years managed to transform themselves and relocate to other areas of Indonesia. Much maligned for the passivity of her govern ment, Megawati lost the presidency to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono after the 2004 election, and her PDI–P remained in opposition.

Although Indonesia showed signs of stabil - izing both politically and economically by the time Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s first term in office drew to a close, residual challenges re - mained in the form of Islamist vigilantism which found expression in organizations such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council, MMI) and the Islamic Com - munity Forum (Forum Umat Islam, FUI). These vigilante movements were well en trenched in Indonesian society through their association with inter national Islamist organizations which had local networks, and they became the self- proclaimed voice of disenchanted Muslims in Indonesia. It was pressure from such groups that forced a 2008 decree banning the Ahmad - iyah which was viewed as heretical and deviant by these fundamentalist movements. The decree in many respects made it easier for these

movements to resort to violence when closing down a number of Ahmadiyah mosques and disrupting their gatherings. The Christian com - munity was also not spared periodic violence against them. The moral postulations of these move ments were further justified by the state with the passing of the equally controversial anti-pornography bill in October 2008 which was aimed at pleasing certain segments of the Islamist parties and their supporters. While President Yudhoyono’s first term was generally viewed as a success, assessments of his second term have been considerably more ambivalent. Yudhoyono has been criticized for his inability to take firm decisions on critical issues, most notably on the matter of costly fuel subsidies that were popular but a huge drain on the country’s finances, his faltering campaign against cor - ruption, which became starkly evident with a series of high-profile corruption cases involv ing members of his own Partai Demokrat (Demo - crat Party), and his inability to rein in coalition members.

Indonesia’s parlia men tary elections of 9 April 2014 saw the PDI–P emerge with the most votes. Even then, its nineteen per cent fell short of the twenty-five per cent required for a party to nominate a presidential candidate of its own. In the event, the party now anchors a coalition that includes the PKB, which put in a strong performance to regain some of its previous lustre by securing nine per cent of the vote, and two smaller parties, the National Democratic Party and Hanudra. The coalition has nomin- ated popular Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, or ‘Jokowi’, as their candidate for the July 2014 presidential election. His vice-presidential candi - date is Yusuf Kalla, the former vice-president and Golkar party chairman, known to be a com - petent organizer and administrator. A second coalition emerged, comprising Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, PKS and PBB. Gerindra’s contro versial strongman Prabowo Subianto, a former military general and confidante of Suharto, and PAN leader Hatta Rajasa declared their candidacies as president and vice-president on 20 May. The July presidential race has been cast as a contest between a humble Jakarta governor whose popularity has been built on his broad appeal and willingness to engage with the grassroots,

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and a former Suharto-era general known for fiery rhetoric and promises of firm leadership, but who also carries the baggage of alleged past involvement in human rights abuses while serving in the military.

A separatist challenge in Aceh in northern Sumatra was mitigated with a ceasefire signed in May 2000. In the wake of continued violence however, martial law was imposed in Aceh in May 2003, putting the brakes on back-channel talks that had at the time begun to take place between the Indonesian govern ment and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Independence Movement, GAM). At the end of 2004, Aceh was hit by a major calamity when a tsunami caused the death of more than 150,000 Acehnese, with tens of thousands more missing, and the wholesale destruction of coastal villages and towns in Aceh (see Tsunami 2004). The humanitarian crisis that followed focused the attention of the world on Aceh and compelled both parties to set aside differences in order to cooperate in disaster relief operations. The disaster also created a new set of conditions for negotiations, which after a stuttering reboot culminated in the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, which allowed for special autonomy status, amnesty for GAM separatists and the withdrawal of govern ment troops from the region. In return, GAM undertook to abandon its goal of independence and to disarm. In the following year, a pro-GAM independent candidate and former separatist leader, Irwandy Yusuf, was elected governor of Aceh. Zaini Abdullah, co-founder of GAM who was directly involved in the negotiations leading up to Helsinki, succeeded Irwandy Yusuf in 2012.

Indonesia returned to the United Nations in September 1966 and reinstated a declaratory policy of non-alignment, while forging close economic and political links with the United States and Japan as well as suspending diplo - matic ties with China. General Suharto presided over the end of the Confrontation with Malaysia and played a decisive role in cementing regional reconciliation through promoting the formation of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in August 1967. Within Indonesia, ASEAN was conceived as a vehicle for managing regional order to the exclusion of the major

powers. Indonesia’s central place within ASEAN was registered in June 1976 when its secretariat was located in Jakarta. Another cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy has been a strategic perspective that centres on an Archipelago Declaration proclaimed in December 1957. That declaration asserted the same right of jurisdiction over waters surrounding and intersecting the islands of Indonesia as over its land space. Indonesia’s archipelagic status, with prerogative rights, was recognized in the Convention con - cluded at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982, which came into force in 1994. After Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, Indonesia’s foreign ministers played leading roles in the diplomacy of the Cambodian conflict. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas served as co-chair of the inter national conference in Paris in October 1991 which re solved the conflict, although it was the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council that were instrumental in fashioning the final settlement. In August 1990, after the end of the Cold War, Indonesia restored diplomatic relations with China, which removed an impediment to a long-sought goal of assum - ing the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, whose summit was held in Jakarta in September 1992. Indonesia also hosted an APEC summit in Bogor in November 1994. Despite recurrent tensions with the United States over human rights, Indonesia has maintained an informal strategic relationship and has permitted US naval vessels access to the port of Surabaya for repair and supply, although the United States did impose an arms ban on Indonesia between 1999 and 2006 in response to human rights violations by the Indonesian military in East Timor and Irian Jaya.

The post-Cold War relationship with the United States was augmented indirectly in December 1995 through an unprecedented security agreement with Australia that then fell victim to acrimony over East Timor in September 1999, when Indonesia’s condition of economic adversity and inter national pressure obliged President Habibie to tolerate the intervention of a United Nations-sanctioned inter national force led by Australia to restore order and to transfer responsibility for the territory to the

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world body in October that year. The deepening of security cooperation with the United States and Australia in the past decade has no doubt been driven foremost by concerns over terrorism and the perceived need to strengthen Indo- nesia’s counter terrorism capabilities. This was particularly so in the early 2000s, when it was not yet clear that Indonesia’s security forces could handle the emergent terrorist threat in the form of JI, as well as the various sectarian crises that were spawning across the archipelago. As Indonesia recovered from the turbulence of the immediate post-Suharto era, it shifted its foreign policy orientation towards more pro - active leadership within ASEAN. Seizing upon its hosting of the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003, Indonesia rolled out the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II which provided a blueprint for the establishment of an ASEAN Commun- ity by 2020. Symbolically, this declaration was made twenty-seven years after the first ASEAN Summit was held, also in Bali, and when the foundational ASEAN documents – ASEAN Con - cord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation – were signed. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia pursued a foreign policy that extended beyond its traditional focus on ASEAN. Indonesia was a non-permanent UN Security Council member in 2008–9. By virtue of its size and potential, Indonesia was invited to join the G-20 forum in 2009, the only ASEAN country in the organization. Yudhoyono has also

promoted Indonesia’s democratic experience inter nationally through the Bali Democracy Forum. Indeed Indonesia’s confidence was demonstrated at a regional level when Indonesia took over the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011, two years before its turn. At the same time, it has also offered to play a mediation role in a number of conflicts ranging from the Israel–Palestinian conflict, to the South China Sea territorial claims, to the internal conflict raging in Thai - land’s southern border provinces.

see also: Ahmadiyah; APEC; Archipelago Declaration; ASEAN; ASEAN Community; Confrontation; Front Pembela Islam; Aceh Independence Movement; Gerindra; Golkar; Habibie, B. J.; Hatta, Mohammad; Yusuf, Irwandy; Jemaah Islamiyah; Kalla, Yusuf; Laskar Jihad; Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia; Maluku Violence; Megawati Sukarnoputri; Nahdlatul Ulama; New Order; Bali Summit (ASEAN) 2003; Pancasila; Partai Amanat Nasional; Partai Bulan Bintang; Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan; Partai Demokrat; Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; People’s Consultative Assembly; Prabowo Subianto; Suharto; Sukarno; South China Sea; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; Tsunami 2004; Wahid, Abdurrahman; Widodo, Joko; Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang; Zaini Abdullah.

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