

Christianity and Philosophy

Christianity marks the most profound division in the history of philosophy; it separates the two great phases of Western thought. However, it would be wrong to think of Christianity as a philosophy; it is something quite different—a religion. Nor can one speak precisely of “Christian philosophy,” if the adjective “Christian” is meant to define the character of the philosophy. The only philosophy that we can call Christian philosophy is the *philosophy of Christians as Christians*; that is, that philosophy which is shaped by the Christian situation from which a particular philosopher begins to philosophize. In this sense Christianity has played a decisive role in the history of metaphysics, because it has essentially altered the presuppositions upon which man bases his thought and actions and, therefore, the situation from which he must philosophize. The Christian is *different* and therefore his philosophy is also different; for example, different from Greek philosophy.*

Christianity introduces an entirely new idea to interpret the existence of the world and man: the idea of the Creation. *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*: modern philosophy derives from this first sentence of Genesis. We saw that the Greek’s problem concerned motion: things are problematic because they move, because they change, because they come to be and cease to be what they are. Being is opposed by *non-being*, by something’s not being what it is. Beginning with the Christian era it is *nothingness*, the void, that menaces being.

* See my study “La escolástica en su mundo y en el nuestro” in *Biografía de la Filosofía*.

The Greek did not question the existence of all things, whereas this is exactly what the Christian finds strange and in need of explanation. It is possible that things might not have existed; and so their very existence—and not what they are—requires justification. "The Greek is alienated by the world because of its *changeability*. The European of the Christian era is alienated by its nullity or, better yet, its *nihilism*. . . . For the Greek, the world is *something* that changes; for the man of the Christian era it is a *nothingness* that seems to be or exist. . . . With this change of perspective *being* comes to mean something *toto caelo* different from what it meant in Greece: for a Greek, being means to be there, at hand; for the Western European, being means, first of all, *not being nothingness*. . . . In a certain sense, then, the Greek still philosophizes *from the point of reference of being*, and the Western European philosophizes *from the point of reference of nothingness*." (Zubiri: *Sobre el problema de la filosofía*.)

This basic difference separates the two great phases of philosophy. The problem is stated in two essentially different ways: it becomes a *new* problem. And, just as in the life of the Christian there are two worlds—this world and the other—there must be two different meanings for the word "being" if it is to apply in both instances; that is, to God's being and to the world's being. The concept of the *Creation* allows the being of the world to be interpreted *through the being of God*. On one hand we have God, the true being, the Creator; on the other hand we have the created being, God's creature, whose being is received. The *religious* truth of the Creation requires the interpretation of this being, and poses the *philosophic* problem of the creative and created being; that is, God's being and that of His creature. Thus Christianity, which is not philosophy, affects philosophy in a decisive way; and the philosophy that arises from the basic situation of the Christian is what may with precision be called *Christian philosophy*. This term involves neither Christianity's consecrating a philosophy nor the necessity of making an untenable attribution of the Christian religion to some philosophy; rather, it describes the philosophy which emerges out of the major problem confronting Christianity—that of its own reality before God. In a broad sense, this takes place in all European philosophy after the Greek era, and particularly in the first centuries of the Christian era and in medieval philosophy.

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St. Augustine

I. LIFE AND CHARACTER

St. Augustine is one of the most interesting figures of his time, of Christianity and of philosophy. His highly original and many-faceted personality leaves a profound imprint on everything to which he turns his hand. Medieval philosophy and theology, what has been called Scholasticism; all of Christian dogma; entire disciplines, such as the philosophy of the spirit and the philosophy of history, show the unmistakable mark he set on them. But there is more: the spirit of Christianity and of the modern age have been decisively influenced by St. Augustine, and the Reformation as well as the Counter-Reformation had recourse to his writings as a particular source of doctrine.

St. Augustine was from Africa. This must not be forgotten. He was, like Tertullian, from Africa, a son of that Romanized and Christianized Africa of the fourth century which was a hotbed of heresies, where varied religious forces coexisted, all animated by an extraordinary vehemence. He was born at Tagaste in Numidia, near Carthage, in 354. In his family background two quite different influences met: the influence of his father, Patricius, a pagan magistrate who was baptized only when dying, a violent and wrathful man of fiery sensuality (that sensuality which was later to trouble Augustine so greatly); and the influence of his mother, Monica, later canonized by the Church, a woman of great virtue and a deeply Christian spirit. Augustine, who loved his mother devotedly, was faced with inward struggles between the conflicting impulses of his double inheritance.

Aurelius Augustinus pursued his studies at a very early age in Tagaste, in Madaurus, and then, when he was seventeen, in Carthage. At this time he fell in love with a woman, who bore him a son, Adeodatus. It was also in this period that Augustine first felt the power of philosophic revelation, when he read the *Hortensius* of Cicero, which made a very strong impression on him. From that time on he acquired an awareness of the problem of philosophy, and his longing for truth was never to leave him until his death. He examined the Scriptures, but they seemed childish to him, and his pride frustrated this first contact with Christianity. He then began to seek truth in the Manichaeic sect.

Manes was born in Babylonia at the beginning of the third century, and preached his doctrines in Persia and much of Asia, even reaching India and China. Returning to Persia, he was arrested and crucified. His influence extended throughout the West also, and was a serious problem to Christianity well into the medieval period. Manichaeism contained many elements of Christianity and of various heresies, reminiscences of Buddhism, Gnostic influences and, especially, the fundamental concepts of Mazdaism, the Persian religion of Zoroaster. The point of departure of Manichaeism is the irreducible dualism of good and evil, light and darkness—in short, of God and the devil. All of life was held to be a struggle between the two irreconcilable principles. St. Augustine came to Manichaeism full of enthusiasm.

In Carthage Augustine taught rhetoric and oratory and devoted himself to astrology and philosophy. Then he traveled to Rome, and from Rome to Milan, to which city his mother followed him. There he met the great bishop St. Ambrose, theologian and orator, whose sermons he attended faithfully and who contributed greatly to his conversion. Augustine discovered at that time the superiority of the Scriptures and, not yet a Catholic, became alienated from the sect of Manes. Finally he entered the Church as a catechumen. From that time on he moved closer and closer to Christianity, studying St. Paul and the Neoplatonists. The year 386 was a decisive one for him. In a garden in Milan he was seized by a fit of weeping and discontent with himself, of remorse and anxiety, until he heard a child's voice ordering him to "take and read" (*Tolle, lege*). Augustine opened his New Testament and read a verse of the Epistle to the Romans which refers to the life of Christ as contrasted with the appetites of the flesh. He felt transformed and free, full of light; the obstacle of his sensual nature disappeared. Augustine was now fully a Christian.

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God and to religious and theological activities. The story of his life becomes the story of his works and his evangelical efforts. For a while he retired to a friend's country house with his mother, his son and a few pupils; from this sojourn came some of his most interesting writings. Then he was baptized by St. Ambrose and decided to return to Africa. Before leaving Italy he lost his mother, whom he mourned fervently; two years later, in Carthage, his son died. He was then ordained as a priest in Hippo in north Africa and later consecrated as bishop of the same city. His activity was extraordinary, and as the fervor of his soul became more and more a model for Christians, so did his writings continue to increase. In August of the year 430 St. Augustine died in Hippo.

WORKS. St. Augustine's output was copious, but uneven in scope and value. His most important works are those concerned with dogma and theology and those which expound his philosophic thought. The most valuable are the following:

The thirteen books of the *Confessions*, an autobiographical work in which St. Augustine, with an intimacy unknown in the ancient world, relates his life up to the year 387, at the same time indicating his intellectual development and the stages through which his soul passed before arriving at the truth of Christianity; in the light of this truth his whole life is illuminated as he confesses it all before God. This is a book without a counterpart in world literature, a work of the highest philosophical interest.

The other major work of St. Augustine is entitled *De civitate Dei* (The City of God). This is the first philosophy of history, and its influence lasted to the time of Bossuet and, later, Hegel.

We may include alongside these two books the three dialogues that St. Augustine wrote shortly after his conversion: *De beata vita*, *Contra Academicos* and *De ordine*. We might also name, among others, the *Soliloquia* and the *De Trinitate*.

St. Augustine adopts a number of Hellenic doctrines, especially those of the Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry. His knowledge of Plato and Aristotle is very limited and indirect; he knows much more of the Stoics, Epicureans and Academicians and, above all, Cicero. This invaluable stock of Greek philosophy passes into Christianity and the Middle Ages through St. Augustine. But he generally adapts the contributions of the Greeks to the philosophic necessities of Christian dogma; this is the earliest instance in which Greek philosophy as such comes into contact with Christianity. Thanks to these efforts, the stabilization of dogma takes a vast step forward and St. Augustine becomes the most important of the Latin Church Fathers. His philo-

2. PHILOSOPHY

POSING THE PROBLEM. The content of St. Augustine's philosophy is expressed most fundamentally in the *Soliloquies* in the statement: *Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.* (I desire to know God and the soul. Nothing more? Nothing at all.) That is, there are only two themes in St. Augustine's philosophy: God and the soul. The central point of his speculation will be God—hence his metaphysical and theological efforts; secondly, St. Augustine, the man of intimacy and confession, will bequeath to us the philosophy of the spirit; and lastly, the relationship of this spirit, which lives in the world, to God will lead St. Augustine to the idea of the *civitas Dei* and thus to the philosophy of history. These are St. Augustine's three great contributions to philosophy, and they form the three-part root of his thinking.

God. This element of St. Augustine's thought has weighty consequences. One of them is the placing of love, charity, in the forefront of man's intellectual life. Knowledge is not to be had without love. *Si sapientia Deus est* (he writes in the *De civitate Dei*), *verus philosophus est amator Dei* (If God is wisdom, then the true philosopher is a lover of God). And with even greater clarity he states: *Non intratur in veritatem nisi per caritatem* (One cannot enter truth except through charity). Thus religion is at the very root of his thinking and sets his philosophy in motion. It is from St. Augustine that are ultimately derived the concept of the *fides quaerens intellectum* (faith seeking understanding) and the principle *credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order to understand)—a concept and a principle that are to have profound repercussions in Scholasticism, especially in St. Anselm and St. Thomas. The problems of the relationship between faith and knowledge, between religion and theology, are already posed in St. Augustine's work.

St. Augustine adopts the philosophy of Plato, but with important changes. In Plato, the point of departure consists of things; St. Augustine, on the other hand, bases his philosophy above all on the soul as the innermost reality, on what he calls the *inner man* (or the *interior of man*). Therefore, St. Augustine's dialectic in his search for God is *confession*. St. Augustine relates his own life. The soul is raised from the body to the contemplation of itself, then to reason, and finally to the light which illuminates it, God Himself. To arrive at God, confession begins with the reality of God's creation, and especially with the inner nature of man.

Since man is the image of God, he finds God, as in a mirror, in the intimacy of his own soul. To turn away from God is the same as to rip out one's own vitals, to empty oneself and to wane constantly. On the other hand, when man enters within himself, he discovers the Deity. But man can know God directly only by means of a *supernatural* illumination.

God, according to St. Augustine's doctrine, created the world from nothingness (not, that is, from His own being) and of His free will. St. Augustine also adopts Plato's theory of the *Ideas*, but in Augustine's system the Ideas are located in the Divine mind: they are the exemplary models according to which God created the things by virtue of a decision of His will.

THE SOUL. The soul plays an important part in St. Augustine's philosophy. What interests us most is not his specific theory about the soul, but, above all, the fact that he makes us aware of the peculiar reality of the soul in a way in which no one had done previously. The intimate analysis of his own soul which constitutes the theme of the *Confessions* is enormously valuable for the inner knowledge of man. For example, there is St. Augustine's contribution to the problem of experiencing death.

The soul is spiritual. The character of the spiritual is not merely negative, that is, not mere immateriality, but something positive, to wit, the faculty of *entering within oneself*. The spirit has a *within*, a *chez soi*, in which it can seclude itself—a privilege which it shares with no other reality. St. Augustine is the philosopher of the inner man: *Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas*, he writes in *De vera religione*. (Do not go outside, return within yourself; truth dwells in the interior of man.)

Man, who is at one and the same time rational—like an angel—and mortal—like an animal—has an intermediate position. But he is, above all, the image of God, *imago Dei*, because he is a mind, a spirit. In the triple division of the faculties of the soul—memory, intelligence and will or love—St. Augustine discovers a trace of the Trinity. The unifying factor in the person—who *possesses* these three intimately interconnected faculties, but who is not any one of them—is the single *ego*, which remembers, understands and loves, making a perfect distinction among these faculties, and yet preserving the oneness of life, mind and essence.

Using formulas analogous to Descartes' *cogito*, but different from Descartes' formula in their deep meaning and philosophic scope, St. Augustine affirms the internal evidence for the existence of the ego, which is exempt from any possible doubt, in contradistinction to the

dubious testimony concerning the existence of things furnished by the bodily senses and rational thought. "In these truths," he says (*De civitate Dei*, XI, 26), "there is no need to fear the arguments of the Academicians, who say 'What if you are mistaken?' Because if I am mistaken, I exist. Because the man who does not exist, truly, cannot be mistaken, either; and therefore, I exist if I am mistaken. And granting that I exist if I am mistaken, how can I be mistaken about my existence, when it is certain that I exist if I am mistaken? And thus, since I, the mistaken one, would exist even if I were mistaken, without a doubt I am not mistaken in knowing that I exist."

The soul, which by its natural reason, or *ratio inferior*, knows the things, itself and, indirectly, God, Who is reflected in His creation, can receive a supernatural illumination from God, and by means of this *ratio superior* can raise itself to the knowledge of eternal things.

What is the origin of the soul? St. Augustine is somewhat perplexed in the face of this question. He falters—and along with him so do all the other Fathers and all the early medieval philosophers—between generationism or traduciansim, and creationism. Is the soul engendered like the body from the souls of one's parents, or is it created by God on the occasion of the procreation of the body? The doctrine of original sin, which seems more comprehensible to St. Augustine if the soul of the child, like its body, proceeds directly from its parents, leads him to favor generationism; but at the same time he realizes the weakness of that theory, and does not reject the solution provided by creationism.

MAN IN THE WORLD. In the writings of St. Augustine, the moral problem is seen to be intimately connected with the theological questions of nature and grace, predestination and man's free will, and sin and redemption; but we cannot discuss these relationships in detail here. However, we must point out that this whole complex of theological problems has had a great influence on the later development of Christian ethics. Moreover, St. Augustine's writings—exaggerated and altered from their true meaning—were widely used in the sixteenth century by the leaders of the Reformation (remember that Luther was an Augustinian monk), and in this way an Augustinian root persists in modern Protestant ethics.

For St. Augustine, in the same way that man has a natural light which makes it possible for him to know, man has a *moral conscience*. The divine *eternal law* to which everything answers illumines our intelligence, and its imperatives constitute *natural law*. It might be likened to a transcription of divine law in our souls. Everything ought to be subject to a perfect order: *ut omnia sint ordinatissima*. But it is not enough

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for man to know the law; he must also love it. This is where the problem of free will arises.

The soul possesses a weight which moves and transports it, and this weight is love: *pondus meum amor meus* (my weight is my love). Love is active, and it is love which actually determines and qualifies free will: *recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas perversa malus amor* (and so a proper will is good love and a perverse will is bad love). Good love—that is, charity in the strict sense of the word—is the central point of Augustinian ethics. Therefore, its most significant and concise expression is the famous imperative *Love and do what you will* (*Dilige, et quod vis fac*).

In St. Augustine's writings, the philosophy of the State and the philosophy of history depend on God, just as ethics does. Augustine lived in days that were crucial for the Empire. The political structure of the ancient world was rapidly changing, to make way for a new order. The barbarians were pressing harder every day. Alaric succeeded in occupying Rome. Christianity had already deeply penetrated Roman society, and the pagans blamed the misfortunes that were happening on the abandonment of the gods and on Christianity. Tertullian had already had to confront these accusations, and to answer them St. Augustine embarked on an enormous work of an apologist nature in which he expounds the full meaning of history: *The City of God*.

The central idea of this work is that all human history is a struggle between two kingdoms: the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the World; that is, between the *civitas Dei* and the *civitas terrena*. The State, which has its roots in profound principles of human nature, is charged with overseeing temporal things: well-being, peace, justice. This gives it a divine significance as well. Following St. Paul's example, St. Augustine teaches that all power comes from God. Therefore, religious values are not foreign to the State, and the State must become saturated with Christian principles. At the same time, the State must lend its power to support the Church, so that the Church can fully realize its mission. St. Augustine believes that politics can no more be separated from the consciousness that man's ultimate goal is not worldly than can ethics. Man's goal is to discover God in the truth that resides in the interior of the human creature.

3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ST. AUGUSTINE

It has been said that St. Augustine is the last ancient man and the first modern man. He is a son of Romanized Africa, which had been

permeated with Greco-Roman culture and converted, a long time before, into an Imperial province. Augustine's century witnesses a world in crisis, threatened on all sides but still subsisting. The social and political horizon that he finds is the Roman Empire, the grandest creation in ancient history. The intellectual sources from which he draws sustenance are largely of Hellenic origin. Thus St. Augustine's thinking is nourished by antiquity.

This influence, furthermore, is the more profound because St. Augustine is not a Christian from the outset; his first vision of philosophy comes to him from sources which are clearly pagan, such as Cicero, one of the chief representatives of ancient man's way of life. Christianity takes a long time to conquer Augustine: *Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova!* (I came to love you late, you beauty at the same time so ancient and so new!), St. Augustine exclaims in the *Confessions*.

Ortega writes: "St. Augustine, who had remained immersed in paganism for a long time, who had for long seen the world through 'ancient' eyes, could not help but esteem the animal values of Greece and Rome. And in the light of his new faith, such an existence without God was bound to seem null and empty. Nevertheless, the evidence with which the vital grace of paganism asserted itself to his intuition was such that he used to express his esteem with an ambiguous statement: *Virtutes ethnicorum splendida vitia* (The pagans' virtues are splendid vices). Vices? Then they are negative values. Splendid? Then they are positive values."*

This is the situation in which St. Augustine finds himself. He sees the world through pagan eyes, and he fully understands the marvel of the ancient world. But from the standpoint of Christianity, all this—without God—seems to him to be pure nothingness and evil. The world—and with it, classical culture—has an enormous value; but one must understand and live it from the realization of God. Only then is it estimable in the eyes of the Christian.

St. Augustine, a frontiersman who lives on the boundary between two different cultures, not only knows and embraces the two, but also reaches what is most profound and original in both. He is, perhaps, the ancient thinker who best understands the overall significance of the Empire and Roman history. On the other hand, St. Augustine represents one of the most perfect realizations of the idea of Christianity, one of the three or four highest modes in which the new type of man

* Ortega adds the following note: "As is well known, this statement, which has always been attributed to St. Augustine, is not to be found in his works; but all his work paraphrases it. Cf. Mausbach: *Die Ethik Augustinus*."

has been expressed. Notwithstanding Scholasticism's great achievements, it derives essentially from St. Augustine. The last ancient man represents the beginning of the great medieval stage of Europe's history.

St. Augustine's thought contains something characteristic not only of Christianity but also of the modern epoch: intimacy. We have seen how he bases his philosophy on the inner man. He asks man to enter the interior of his own soul in order to find himself, and with himself, God. This is the great lesson which St. Anselm will learn first, and through him all of Western mysticism. In contrast to the flights into the external world that characterized ancient man, the man of the agora and forum, St. Augustine finds himself in the calm interior of his own ego. This leads him to affirm the ego as the highest criterion of certainty, in a statement which although reached by means of different suppositions, is similar to Descartes' *cogito: Omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re quam intelligit, certus est* (Every man who understands himself to be doubting, understands truly, and is certain of this thing which he understands).

More than anyone else in his time, St. Augustine achieved what was to constitute the very essence of another mode of being; his incomparable fecundity derives from this fact. The *Confessions* represents man's first attempt to approach himself. Until the advent of idealism—that is, until the seventeenth century—no one will achieve anything comparable. And when modern man, guided by Descartes, returns to himself and remains alone with his own ego, St. Augustine will again acquire profound influence.

St. Augustine determined one of the two great aspects of Christianity, that of interiority, and made it possible for that aspect to achieve full development. The other element remained in the hands of the Greek theologians, and therefore in the Eastern Church. This situation has in large measure determined European history, which since its birth shows the imprint of Augustinian thought.

Scholasticism

I. THE ERA OF TRANSITION

The ancient world ends approximately in the fifth century A.D.; if we focus our attention on the history of thought, we can consider 430, the year of St. Augustine's death, as the cut-off date. The Middle Ages extends midway into the fifteenth century, and 1453, the year in which the Byzantine Empire fell into Turkish hands, is frequently taken as its limit. This means we are dealing with ten centuries of history, too long a period to be studied as a *single* epoch. In such a long interval of time there are bound to be great changes, and a unitary exposition of medieval philosophy would necessarily have to pass over large differences.

There is, in the first place, a long gap of four centuries, from the fifth to the ninth, in which actually there is no philosophy. The world is essentially changed with the fall of the Roman Empire. The great political unity of antiquity is replaced by fractionization; waves of barbarians surge over Europe and cover it almost completely; they form barbaric kingdoms in the various regions of the Empire, and classical culture is overwhelmed. One important consequence of the Germanic invasions is often not sufficiently noted: the isolation. The social and political unity of the different peoples of the Empire is now replaced by the separateness of the barbaric states. Visigoths, Swabians, Ostrogoths, Franks form various unconnected political communities, which are a long time in establishing ties with their neighbors; and when these ties are finally established they do

not result in the reestablishment of the Western Empire, as was expected at the time, but in an entirely new community—Europe. Thus the elements of the ancient culture are all but lost and, above all, *dispersed*. The culture itself is not destroyed to the extent usually believed, and the proof of this is that later, little by little, it reappears. But very little of it remains *in any one place*. And so a new problem arises: to save what is found, to preserve the remains of the shipwrecked culture. This is the mission of the intellectuals of these four centuries; their labor is not—nor can it be—creative; it is only a process of compilation. In Spain, France, Italy, Germany, England, a few men, working along parallel lines, carefully collect everything that is known about antiquity and gather it in books of an encyclopedic nature. These books were not at all original; they were mere repositories of Greco-Roman knowledge. Nevertheless, these men save the continuity of Western history, and with their patient labor fill the hollow of those centuries of historic fermentation, in order that the new European community may arise later on.

A major figure of this time is St. Isidore of Seville, who lived in the sixth and seventh centuries (approximately from 570 to 646). Besides other theological and historical works of secondary interest, he compiled the twenty volumes of the *Etymologiae*, or *Origins*, a true encyclopedia of his time; it does not limit itself to the seven liberal arts, but includes all the religious, historical, scientific, medical and technical knowledge and practical information that he could unearth. The contribution to the common base of medieval knowledge made by this great personality of Visigothic Spain is one of the most significant of his time.

In Italy, the most important thinker of this period is Boethius, counselor to the Ostrogothic king Theodoric, who finally imprisoned him and ordered him beheaded in the year 524 or 525. While in prison Boethius composed a very famous book in prose and verse entitled *De consolazione philosophiae*. In addition, he translated into Latin Porphyry's *Eisagogé* as well as some of Aristotle's treatises on logic, and wrote monographs on logic, mathematics and music, and several theological treatises (*De Trinitate*, *De duabus naturis in Christo*, *De hebdomadibus*), the principal interest of which consists in their definitions, which were utilized by philosophers and theologians for centuries. Martianus Capella, who lived in the fifth century, was from Carthage but settled in Rome. He wrote a treatise entitled *The Marriage of Mercury and Philology*, an odd encyclopedia in which the studies which were to become dominant in the Middle Ages are systematized: the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic,

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geometry, astronomy and music). Together these subjects comprised the seven liberal arts. Cassiodorus, who, like Boethius, was a minister to Theodoric, is also important.

The British Isles were affected by the barbaric invasions to a lesser degree than the rest of Europe, and so in England we find important groups of scholars guarding the legacy of classical culture. In Ireland especially, there were monasteries in which the knowledge of Greek endured, something that was all but lost in the West. The most important figure in these circles was the Venerable Bede (now St. Bede), a monk from Jarrow (Northumberland), who lived from 673 to 735—that is, one century after St. Isidore. The Venerable Bede's most important work, which marks the beginning of English history, is the *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, known in English as the *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*. He also wrote other treatises, notably the *De natura rerum*, which was inspired by St. Isidore's work. Alcuin (739–804, approximately) was from the school of York, in England. He taught at Charlemagne's court for several years and was one of the moving spirits of the Carolingian intellectual renaissance, which was principally of English origin.

Alcuin's most important pupil was Rabanus Maurus, who established the school at Fulda, in Germany, where other intellectual centers were set up at Münster, Salzburg, and so forth.

Throughout this era of transition, the ancient wisdom of the pagan writers and that of the Fathers of the Church is preserved in disorganized fashion and without intellectual precision. No distinction is made as to disciplines of knowledge, and a systematic and congruent body of doctrines is of course completely lacking. This phase is concerned only with the accumulation of knowledge, but it prepares the way for the prodigious speculative labor of the following centuries.

2. THE NATURE OF SCHOLASTICISM

Beginning with the ninth century there appear, as a consequence of the Carolingian Renaissance, the *schools*, and with them *Scholasticism*, a special knowledge cultivated in the schools. In contrast to the seven liberal arts of the *trivium* and *quadrivium*, this knowledge is principally theological and philosophical. The school's work is of a collective nature; it is a cooperative labor and is closely connected with the ecclesiastical organization, which assures an unusual continuity of thought. In Scholasticism there exists—particularly from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries—a unitary body of doctrine which is preserved as a *common property*: a body of doctrine which the various indi-

vidual thinkers collaborate on and which they all use. In Scholasticism, as in all spheres of medieval life, the personality of the individual is not emphasized. Just as the cathedrals are immense anonymous works—or almost such, the results of entire generations' long collective labor—so medieval thought is continued uninterruptedly over a common base until the end of the Middle Ages. Therefore, the modern meaning of the word "originality" does not have application to Scholasticism. Frequently a writer in this period uses in the most natural way borrowed material which cannot be attributed to him lightly without danger of error. But it does not by any means follow that Scholasticism is homogeneous, or that it lacks eminent personalities. On the contrary: in the Middle Ages we find some of the most profound and perspicacious minds in all of the history of philosophy; and medieval thought, which is of a surprising richness and variety, experiences during the course of this epoch a definite and basic evolution which we will attempt to trace with some degree of precision. The volume of Scholastic writings is so great that we will of necessity have to limit ourselves to pointing out the major phases of the problems involved and to outlining briefly the significance of the medieval philosophers who most deeply influenced philosophy.

THE EXTERNAL FORM OF SCHOLASTIC WRITINGS. The Scholastic literary forms correspond to the circumstances in which they were developed; they maintain a close relationship with educational life, at first with the life of the schools and later with that of the universities. Scholastic teaching is first developed on the basis of texts that are read and commented on; it is for this reason that we speak of *lectiones* (lectures); sometimes these texts are from the Scriptures themselves, but frequently they are works of the Fathers of the Church, of theologians or of ancient or medieval philosophers. The *Liber sententiarum* of Peter Lombard (twelfth century) was read and commented on constantly. At the same time, the daily give and take of academic life leads to the *disputationes*, in which important questions (and, at the end of the Middle Ages, unimportant questions as well) are debated, and by means of which the participants become skillful in argumentation and in establishing proof.

The literary forms spring from this activity. First of all there are the commentaries (*Commentaria*) on the various books studied. Secondly, there are the *Quaestiones*, huge repertoires of problems which had been discussed, together with their authorities, arguments and solutions (*Quaestiones disputatae*, *Quaestiones quodlibetales*); when the problems are dealt with individually in brief, independent studies, the works are called *Opuscula*. Finally, there are the great doctrinal syntheses of the

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Middle Ages in which the general content of Scholasticism is summarized, the *Summae*. Outstanding among the *Summae* are those of St. Thomas, particularly his *Summa theologiae*. These are the principal forms in which the thought of the Scholastics is set forth.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY. What is the content of Scholasticism? Is it philosophy? Is it theology? Is it both, or something different still? The answers to these questions are not immediately clear. Of course, Scholasticism is theology; there can be no doubt about that. But it is no less true that if there is any philosophy in the Middle Ages, it is especially to be found in the works of the Scholastic writers. The next logical thought would be that theology and philosophy coexist in this period, that alongside Scholastic theology there is a *Scholastic philosophy*. At once there arises the problem of the relationship between theology and philosophy. An attempt is usually made to resolve this problem by resorting to the idea of subordination and recalling the old phrase *philosophia ancilla theologiae* (philosophy, the handmaiden of theology); from this viewpoint, philosophy is an auxiliary, subordinate discipline, which theology makes use of for its own ends. This conception is simple and apparently satisfactory, but only apparently. Philosophy is not and cannot be a subordinate science, used as a means to something else. As Aristotle already knew, philosophy is not useful for anything, and all the other sciences are more necessary than philosophy, though none is superior to it (*Metaphysics*, I, 2). On the other hand, judging from the facts, it is not certain that in the Middle Ages there was any philosophy separate from theology for theology to make use of. The truth of the matter is something quite different.

The problems of Scholasticism, like the problems of Patristic thought which preceded them, are primarily theological problems—one might say merely dogmatic problems, involving the formulation and interpretation of dogma, and at times involving rational explanation or even demonstration. These *theological* problems call forth new questions, and these are *philosophic* questions. Let us take as an example the dogma of the Eucharist. This is a religious matter which in itself has nothing to do with philosophy. But if we wish to understand it in some fashion, we must have recourse to the concept of transubstantiation, a strictly philosophic concept. This idea leads us into a different world, the world of Aristotelian metaphysics; the question of how the transubstantiation of which the Eucharist consists is possible, is stated in terms of the philosophic theory of substance. Similarly, the dogma of the Creation compels us to consider the problem of being, bringing us back to the realm of metaphysics. It is the same with all the other dogmas. Thus Scholasticism deals with philosophic problems that

arise in connection with religious and theological questions. But philosophy is not used as a tool in these cases; rather, the framework within which the philosophic problems are considered is rigorously determined by the actual situation from which they arise. Medieval philosophy is essentially different from that of the Greeks, principally because its questions are different and are based on different suppositions. The outstanding example of this difference is the problem of the Creation, which radically transforms the great ontological problem; as a result of this, Christian philosophy comprises a new period in the history of philosophy quite separate from the ancient period. At all times in our consideration of Scholasticism we shall be viewing it as a complex of theology and philosophy united by a special tie corresponding to the attitude toward life which gives rise to the speculation of the Christian theorist. It is St. Anselm's lemma *fides quaerens intellectum* (faith seeking understanding)—in which equal stress must be given to *fides* and *intellectus*, within the fundamental unity of the *quaerere*. The two poles between which medieval Scholasticism will move are joined together in this *quaerere*, this quest.*

We shall examine briefly the three major problems of medieval philosophy: those of the Creation, the universals and reason. In the evolution of these three problems, which have a parallel development, we will find concentrated the entire history of medieval thought and of the era as a whole.

* See my above-mentioned study, "La escolástica en su mundo y en el nuestro."

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The Great Themes of the Middle Ages

I. THE CREATION

We have already seen that the Christian point of departure is essentially different from the Greek's; that is, the Christian begins with the *nihility of the world*. In other words, the world is contingent, not necessary. It does not contain within itself its reason for being, but receives it from another, from God. The world is an *ens ab alio* (entity which derives its being from another), as distinguished from the Deity, who is the *ens a se* (entity which derives its being from itself). God is the Creator and the world is His creation: two profoundly different, perhaps irreducible modes of being. Thus, the Creation appears as the first metaphysical problem of the Middle Ages, from which, in fact, all the others are derived.

The Creation must not be confused with what the Greeks called *genesis* or *generation*. Generation is a type of motion, substantial motion. It presupposes a subject, an entity that moves, passing *from* a beginning *to* an end. The carpenter who makes a table makes it of wood, and the wood is the subject of the motion. This does not occur in the Creation; there is no subject. God does not manufacture or make the world out of a previously existing material, but *creates* it, sets it in existence. The Creation is a creation *from nothingness*—in Scholastic terminology, *creatio ex nihilo*, or more explicitly, *ex nihilo sui et subiecti*. But it is a principle of medieval philosophy that *ex nihilo nihil fit*, nothing can be made from nothing. This would seem to indicate that the Creation is impossible, that being cannot result from nothingness;

this principle would be the formula of pantheism. But the sense in which this phrase is used in the Middle Ages is that nothing can be made from nothing *without the intervention of God*, that is, precisely *without the Creation*.

This concept opens up between God and the world a metaphysical gulf which was unknown to the Greeks. Consequently, there now appears a new question, which affects being itself: can the one word "being" be applied to God and to His creatures? Is it not an equivocation? At most, one might speak of a new analogical conception of the Entity, in a sense much more profound even than Aristotle's. It was even denied that being can be applied to God at all; being is a created thing, distinct from its Creator, who is beyond being. *Prima rerum creatarum est esse* (Being is the first of the created things), said the medieval Platonists (see Zubiri, "En torno al problema de Dios"). Thus we see that the idea of the Creation, religious in origin, profoundly affects medieval ontology.

This Creation could be *ab aeterno* or within time. The opinions of the Scholastics are divided. They are not so much divided with regard to the dogmatic truth that the Creation did occur within time, as with regard to the possibility of demonstrating this rationally. St. Thomas considered that the Creation was demonstrable, but not its temporality, which could be known only through revelation. Moreover, the idea of a Creation dating from eternity is not contradictory, since being created means only receiving being from God, that is, *ab alio*, and this is independent of time relationships.

But a new question arises: the relationship of God to the world which has been created. The world is not sufficient unto itself for its existence; it does not have sufficient reason for being. It is maintained in its existence by God so that it does not lapse into nothingness. Thus, aside from the Creation, there is a need for *preservation*. God's action upon the world is constant; He must keep on causing it to exist at each moment. This is tantamount to a *continuing creation*. Thus, the world always has need of God and is constitutionally needy and insufficient. The early Scholastics believed it was so. The ontological basis of the world is found in God, not only at the origin of the world, but also at the present time, at all times. But in the nominalism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries this conviction wavers. The nominalists think that continuing creation is not necessary, that the world does not need to be maintained. The world is still understood to be an *ens ab alio* which is not self-sufficient and which has received its existence at the hands of its Creator, but the nominalists believe that the being which God gave the world when He created it is sufficient for its subsistence.

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The world is an entity with the capacity to *go on* existing by itself; God's participation in its existence, after His act of creation, consists merely of not annihilating it, of allowing it to exist. In this manner, the idea of continuing creation is succeeded by the idea of the relative self-sufficiency and autonomy of the world *as a creature*. The world, once it is created, can exist without further aid; it can be left to operate in accordance with its own laws, without the direct and constant intervention of the Deity.

We see that in the development of the problem of the Creation in the Middle Ages philosophers are led to grant the creature greater independence with regard to the Creator; this contributes to an estrangement from God. Following separate paths, all the great problems of medieval metaphysics lead man to a single situation at the close of the medieval period.

2. THE UNIVERSALS

The question of the universals is omnipresent in the Middle Ages. It has even been said that the entire history of Scholasticism is the history of the dispute over the universals. This is not true, but it is true that this problem is present in all the other problems and its development is closely connected with that of all the others. The universals are the genera and species, in contradistinction to individual things. The question is one of knowing what type of reality these universals possess. The objects which present themselves to our senses are individuals: this thing, that thing. On the other hand, the concepts by means of which we imagine these same objects are universals: man, tree. The things we see before us are conceived of through their species and genera. What relationship do these universals have with the things? In other words, in what measure do our perceptions correspond to reality? In this way there arises the question of knowing whether or not the universals are things, and in what sense. The idea we are to have of both the being of things and the nature of knowledge is dependent upon the solution to this problem. At the same time, a multitude of highly serious metaphysical and theological problems are connected with this question.

The medieval period begins with an extreme position, *realism*, and ends with the opposite extreme solution, *nominalism*. Of course, nominalism has origins almost as ancient as those of realism, and the history of both has many complications and various gradations. But the general line of historic development is the one that has just been indicated. Realism, which is the generally accepted position until the

twelfth century, maintains that the universals are *res*, things. The adherents of the extreme form of realism believe that the universals are present in all the individuals that fall under their headings (for instance, the universal "man" would be present in each individual man) and that, consequently, there is no essential difference between individuals, there are only accidental differences. The universals are prior to the individual things (*ante rem*). In essence there would thus be only one man, and the distinction between individual men would be purely accidental. This is tantamount to a denial of individual existence and comes dangerously close to pantheism. On the other hand, the realist solution had great simplicity, and was, moreover, adaptable to the interpretation of various dogmas—for example, that of original sin. If in essence there is only one man, Adam's sin naturally affects the essence of humanity, and thus all later men. Realism is represented by St. Anselm and, in its extreme form, by William of Champeaux (eleventh and twelfth centuries).

But adversaries of the realist thesis soon arise. Beginning in the eleventh century there appears what has been called nominalism, starting principally with Roscellinus of Compiègne. According to nominalism, it is the individuals that exist. There is nothing in nature that is universal. The universals exist only in the mind, as something posterior to the things (*post rem*), and they are expressed in words. Roscellinus arrives at a purely verbalistic interpretation of the universals; they are no more than exhalations of the voice, *flatus vocis*. But this theory, too, is very dangerous. If realism, exaggerated, threatens to lead to pantheism, nominalism, when applied to the Trinity, leads us to tritheism: if there are three persons, there are three Gods. Moreover, the Incarnation is very difficult to conceive of within the framework of Roscellinus' ideas. Thus, the first two solutions are imperfect and do not solve the problem. A long and painstaking mental effort, a large share of which falls to the Jews and Arabs, leads to more mature and subtle formulas in the thirteenth century, especially in the writings of St. Thomas.

The thirteenth century contributes solutions of its own to the problem of the universals: these consist of a *moderate realism*. The adherents of this philosophy recognize that the true substance is the individual thing, as was maintained by Aristotle, whose authority St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas invoke. The individual is the first substance, *prôte ousia*. But this philosophy is not a form of nominalism; the individual is a true reality, but is an individual *of a species*, and is obtained from the species by individuation. Thus, in order to explain the individual reality, there is need of a principle of individuation, *principium*

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individuationis. St. Thomas says that *formaliter* the universals are products of the spirit, but that *fundamentaliter* they are based on the reality outside the mind. The universals, considered formally—that is, as such—are products of the mind. They do not have an independent existence, but are formed by the mind. They do, however, have a basis *in re*, in reality. The universal has an existence, not as a *separate thing*, but as an ingredient *of the things*. It is not a *res*, as the extreme realists claimed, but neither is it merely a word. It is *in re*.

Now it is necessary to find a principle of individuation. That is, what is it that makes this entity be *this one* and not *this other one*? St. Thomas says that an individual is nothing but *materia signata quantitate*. Thus, quantified matter is the principle of individuation. A certain quantity of matter is what individuates the universal form that shapes the matter. But it should not be forgotten that there is a hierarchy of entities ranging from primal matter to pure actuality (God). Primal matter cannot exist actually, because it is pure possibility. But “informed” matter may be form or matter, depending on how it is considered. For example, wood is itself a form, but it is the matter of a table. Thus, there is a series of hierarchic forms within a single entity, and there are essential forms and accidental forms. This principle of individuation raises a serious problem for St. Thomas: What about the angels? The angels have no matter; how is individuation possible among them? According to the Thomist solution, it is in no way possible. St. Thomas says that the angels are not individuals, but species. The unit among angels is not the individual, but the species, and each species is exhausted in each angel.

In the final period of the Middle Ages, the problem of the universals undergoes a profound development. By the time of John Duns Scotus, the great British Franciscan, and especially in the thought of William of Occam, there is a return to the nominalist formulation of the question. Scotus makes many distinctions; the *distinctio realis*, the *distinctio formalis* and the *distinctio formalis a parte rei*. The first or real distinction is the one that exists between one type of thing and another: for example, between an elephant and a table. The rational or formal distinction is the one that is made when considering one thing in its various aspects; it can be an actual or a purely nominal distinction. It is actual if, for example, we distinguish a vase as a recipient for water from a vase as a decorative object. A nominal distinction does not correspond to the reality of the thing, but merely to its designation. The *distinctio formalis a parte rei*, finally, is also a formal distinction, but rather than being a *parte intellectus*, it is a *parte rei*. That is, here also it is a question of things not numerically distinct, but in this case it is not

the mind that makes the distinction; the distinction is present in the thing itself. Thus, according to Scotus, a man has various *forms*: he has a human form, or *humanitas*, but he also has a form which distinguishes him from all other men. This is a formal distinction *a parte rei*, what Scotus, using an original term, calls *haecceitas*, or "thisness." *Haecceitas* consists in being *haec res*, this thing. Peter and Paul both contain full human essence, but Peter possesses an additional *formalitas*, which is "Peterness," and Paul possesses "Paulness." This is Scotus' principle of individuation, which is not only material, as in Thomist metaphysics, but also formal.

Scotus' position opens the way for nominalism. From his time on, and especially in the fourteenth century, the distinctions multiply and the existence of the individuals is increasingly proclaimed. Even in Scotus' conception, there are multiple *formalitates*, without excluding the *forma* of the species. Occam goes one step further and absolutely denies the existence of the universals in nature. They are exclusively creations of the spirit, of the mind. They are *terms* (hence the name *terminism* which is also given to this direction of thought). And the terms are merely *signs* for things; they are mental substitutes for the multiplicity of the things. They are not conventions, but *natural signs*. Things are known through our concepts of them, and these concepts are universal. In order to know an individual we must have recourse to knowledge of the universal, the Idea; if, with Occam, we understand the universals to be mere signs, knowledge becomes *symbolic*. Occam is the artificer of a great renunciation: man will renounce the possession of the things and will resign himself to remain only with the symbols of things. This is what will make possible mathematical knowledge, based on the use of symbols, and modern physics, which derives from the nominalist schools, especially that of Paris. Aristotelian and medieval physics desired to understand motion, the causes themselves; modern physics is content with the mathematical signs for all of that. According to Galileo, nature's book is written in mathematical signs; we thus have a physics that measures variations in motion, but no longer seeks the knowledge of what motion is. We see that, just as in the case of the problem of the Creation, the internal dialectics of the problem of the universals leads the man of the fifteenth century to turn his eyes toward the world and formulate a science of nature. The third great question of medieval philosophy, the problem of reason, will definitively center man's attention on the new theme of the world.

3. REASON

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beginning. The first sentence of the Gospel According to St. John says literally that in the beginning was the word, the *lógos*, and that God is *lógos*. This means that provisionally God is the word and, in addition, reason. Several especially important problems arise as a result of this situation, and in particular the problem of man's situation in the universe.

What is man? He is a finite entity, a creature, an *ens creatum*, one thing among the other things; like the world, man is finite and contingent. But at the same time man is *lógos*; according to all Hellenic tradition, man is an animal which possesses *lógos*. On the one hand, man is just one more thing in the world, but on the other hand, man, like God, is cognizant of the whole world and, again like God, possesses *lógos*. What is the nature of man's relationship with God and the world? It is an essentially ambiguous relationship; man is an entity which partakes of being in the sense that all creatures do, but man is also a spirit capable of knowing what the world is; that is, an entity which is *lógos*. The philosophers of the Middle Ages will say that man is a creature which exists halfway between nothingness and God: *medium quid inter nihilum et Deum*. Moreover, man's special situation was already pointed out in Genesis: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*. Man is made in the image and likeness of God. That is, the Idea of man, the exemplary model according to which man is created, is God himself. It is for this reason that Meister Eckhart said that in man there is something—a spark, *scintilla*, *Funken*—that is uncreated and uncreatable. This statement was condemned as pantheistic because it was interpreted to mean that man was not created. However, as Zubiri has clearly shown, its correct meaning is that man has a *scintilla*—that is, his very Idea—that is uncreated and uncreatable; and this concept is completely orthodox.

In what ways is Christian thought to influence philosophy? In order to know truth, one must enter oneself, one must turn one's attention within oneself, as we have already learned when discussing St. Augustine's contribution to philosophy. *Intra in cubiculum mentis tuae* (Enter into the chamber of your mind), St. Anselm too will say. Accordingly, if man wants to learn, the worst thing he can do is to begin to observe the things of the world, because truth is not in the things but in God; and man finds God in himself. Since truth is God, it can only be arrived at through *caritas*: we reach God only through love, and only God is truth. This is the precise meaning of St. Anselm's phrase, *fides quaerens intellectum* (faith seeking understanding). St. Bonaventure will call philosophy the journey of the mind toward God (*Itinerarium mentis in Deum*), and will say that this journey begins with

faith. This concludes the outline of the state of early medieval philosophy.

In St. Thomas, theory is rational, speculative knowledge. Theology rests on faith in so far as it is based on revealed, supernatural information; but man scrutinizes this information with his reason in order to interpret it and arrive at theological knowledge. Therefore, complete accord between God and human reason is assumed. If God is *lógos*, as St. John says, and if man is also defined by *lógos*, there is accord between the two and knowledge of the divine essence is possible. Theology can be rational even though based on revealed information. But if theology and philosophy both deal with God, how do they differ? St. Thomas says that the *material* object of theology and philosophy can be the same when both speak of God, but that their formal objects are different. Theology and philosophy approach the divine Entity by different paths, and therefore theology and philosophy have different formal objects, even though that Entity may be numerically the same.

We pass from this state of equilibrium in St. Thomas to a very different situation in Duns Scotus and Occam. For Scotus, theological knowledge is no longer speculative, but practical, moralistic. Man is a rationalizing animal and thus will create a rational philosophy, because this is a matter of *lógos*. But on the other hand, theology is supernatural; reason has little to do with it; it is, above all, *práxis*.

Occam exaggerates Scotus' ideas. For Occam, reason comes to be an exclusively human concern. Reason is, indeed, characteristic of man, but not of God. God is omnipotent and cannot be subject to any law, not even to the law of reason; Occam says that if it were otherwise, the divine will would be inadmissibly limited. Things are as they are—true, good, and the like—*because God wills them so*; the followers of Occam will say that if God wanted the act of murder to be good, or two and two to be nineteen, they would be so. Occam is a voluntarist and believes very strongly in the priority of the divine will; he does not admit of anything superior to God's will, not even reason. "One might say that, beginning with this moment, metaphysical speculation hurls itself into a vertiginous race in which *lógos*, which begins as the essence of God, ends up as merely the essence of man. At this moment in the fourteenth century Occam declares textually and in so many words that the essence of the Deity is arbitrariness, free will, omnipotence, and that therefore the need to rationalize is a property which is peculiar to human thought. . . . At this moment when Occam's nominalism reduces reason to a matter of *doors within* man, to a purely human quality instead of the essence of the Deity, the human spirit also becomes separated from the Deity. Alone, alienated from the world

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If God is not reason, then human reason cannot concern itself with God. At the end of the Middle Ages, the Deity ceases to be man's great theoretic subject, and this separates man from God. Reason concerns itself again with those objects to which it is appropriate, to a realm wherein it can be fruitful. What are these objects? Above all, man himself. Secondly, the world, whose marvelous order is just then being discovered; it is found to possess a mathematical as well as rational order. Symbolic knowledge, to which nominalism had led us, is adapted to the mathematical character of nature. And this world which is independent of God—who set it in motion by His act of Creation but who does not have to sustain it—becomes the other great object of concern to human reason when the Deity becomes inaccessible to reason. Man and the world are the two principal themes of the age; therefore, humanism and modern physics, the science of nature, come to be the two chief concerns of Renaissance man, who finds himself alienated from God.

We now see how the three deepest questions of medieval philosophy—the problems of the Creation, the universals and reason—combine to lead to this new situation in which we find modern metaphysics.

cerned with logic and ethics and is important mainly because he was the center of an intellectual nucleus which achieved further development in the eleventh century.

In this century the extreme realism we have mentioned is in vogue; it has a notable representative in Odon, of Tournai, where there was a very popular school. Odon applied his realism principally to the problems of the meaning of original sin and the creation of the souls of children; according to him, the latter question involved only the appearance of new individual, accidental qualities of the single human substance.

This realism is opposed by the opinion of the *nominales* (nominalists), the *sententia vocum*, which declares that the universals are *voces* (terms), not *res* (real things). The leader of this group is Roscellinus of Compiègne, who taught in France, England and Rome toward the end of the eleventh century. This budding nominalism scarcely outlived Roscellinus; it reappears only in the last centuries of the Middle Ages, and then it is based on different suppositions.

2. ST. ANSELM

LIFE AND WORKS. St. Anselm was born in 1033 and died in 1109. He was from Aosta, in Piedmont. As a member of the medieval Christian community and of the European community which had begun to take shape, he did not restrict his life and activity to the country of his origin, but lived principally in France and England. He went first to the abbey of Bec, in Normandy, where he spent many years, the best and most important of his life. He was prior and then abbot of Bec, and ultimately was named Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1093; he remained in that office until his death. St. Anselm's entire life was devoted to study and religious activity, and in his last years he was concerned with upholding the Church's rights as a spiritual power, which were then being seriously threatened.

St. Anselm is the second great medieval philosopher, Scotus Erigena being the first. Strictly speaking, St. Anselm was the founder of Scholasticism, for it is only with him that this movement acquires its definite character. On the other hand, he is immersed in the Patristic tradition of Augustinian and Platonic (or, more precisely, Neoplatonic) origin. The intellectual influences which differ from those of Patristic speculation and later strongly affect the character of Scholasticism are not yet evident in him: the influences of the Arabs and, through them, Aristotle. St. Anselm is a faithful Augustinian; in the preface to his *Monologium* he writes: *Nihil potui invenire me dixisse quod*

non catholicorum Patrum et maxime beati Augustini scriptis cohaereat. He is aware of his constant conformity with the Fathers of the Church and particularly with St. Augustine. Nevertheless, we already detect in Anselm the great lines which are to define Scholasticism, and in fact his work constitutes a first synthesis of it. Thus, medieval philosophy and theology are profoundly influenced by his thought.

St. Anselm wrote several books. Many are of predominantly theological interest; there are numerous letters full of doctrinal substance. The most important philosophical works—all short pieces—are contained in the *Monologium* (*Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei*—A Model for Meditation on the Reason of Faith) and the *Proslogium*, which carries as a motto the phrase which summarizes the meaning of all his philosophy: *Fides quaerens intellectum* (Faith seeking understanding). He also wrote the reply to Gaunilo's book on the fool, the *De veritate* and the *Cur Deus homo?*

FAITH AND REASON. St. Anselm's theological—and philosophical—work is primarily concerned with proofs of the existence of God. This is the topic which receives most discussion in his writing and the one most closely associated with his name. However, these proofs cannot be properly understood unless one is aware of the whole range of St. Anselm's thought.

St. Anselm begins with faith; the proofs are not meant to lend support to faith, but are themselves supported by faith. His principle is *credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order to understand). In the *Proslogium*, his major work, he writes: *neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam* (For I do not wish to understand in order to believe; rather, I believe in order to understand). However, this is not a question of something distinct from faith; faith itself desires to know, seeks intellection, and this desire for knowledge arises from the internal character of faith. St. Anselm distinguishes between living faith, which is actually operative, and dead faith, which is useless; living faith is founded on *dilectio*, love, and this is what gives it life. This love makes man, who is separated from the face of God by sin, anxious to return to God's presence. Living faith wants to contemplate the face of God; it wants God to reveal Himself in the light, in truth. Therefore, living faith seeks the true God, and this is *intelligere*, understanding. "If I did not believe, I would not understand," adds St. Anselm; that is, without faith, or rather, *dilectio*, love, he could not attain God's truth. This is a clear echo of St. Augustine's statement, *non intratur in veritatem nisi per caritatem*, which in turn is perhaps fully understood only in the light of St. Anselm's work.

Thus we see that theology relates in a special way to St. Anselm's

religion; however, in his writings St. Anselm stands through standing, or with can reach intelligence stand, he should definition of the in

THE ONTOLOGIC various proofs of the one he expounds Kant, has generally proof of the existence entire history of philosophy named Gaunilo at Gaunilo's objections of the argument that of St. Anselm accepted it with modification with certain alterations established its importance Hegel afterward recognized in the nineteenth century especially by Father argument is a central mere logical argument metaphysics. This is proof.

We cannot here examine. * It will be sufficient Anselm's point of departure: the faith of not seen Him. This faith a *fides quaerens intellectum* the possibility of demonstration the thirteenth† psalm hath said in his heart, of God into question for meaning it lacks without his famous proof in the

* See my book *San Anselm*
† [Psalm 13 in the Vulgate]

religion; however, the result of theology does not so relate. In his writings St. Anselm says that "The Christian should approach understanding through faith; he should not approach faith through understanding, or withdraw from faith if he cannot understand. When he can reach intelligence, he will be contented; and if he cannot understand, he should worship" (Epistle XLI). This statement is a clear definition of the intellectual basis for all of St. Anselm's philosophy.

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. In his *Monologium*, St. Anselm gives various proofs of the existence of God, but the most important proof is the one he expounds in the *Proslogium*, and which, since the time of Kant, has generally been referred to as the ontological argument. This proof of the existence of God has had enormous repercussions in the entire history of philosophy. Even during St. Anselm's lifetime a monk named Gaunilo attacked the proof, and St. Anselm himself replied to Gaunilo's objections. Later on, opinion was divided and interpretations of the argument differed. St. Bonaventure took a position close to that of St. Anselm; St. Thomas rejected the proof; Duns Scotus accepted it with modifications; Descartes and Leibniz made use of it, with certain alterations; then Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, established its impossibility in an apparently definitive way. Yet Hegel afterward restated the proof in different terms, and still later, in the nineteenth century, it was studied in depth by Brentano and especially by Father Gratry. Up to the present day the ontological argument is a central theme of philosophy, because it involves not only mere logical argumentation, but also a question that concerns all of metaphysics. This is the reason for the singular renown of St. Anselm's proof.

We cannot here enter into details of the interpretation of the argument.* It will be sufficient to indicate briefly its essential meaning. St. Anselm's point of departure is God, a hidden God who does not manifest Himself to man in his fallen state. This is a religious point of departure: the faith of man, who was made in order to see God but has not seen Him. This faith seeks to understand, to practice theology: it is a *fides quaerens intellectum*. But there does not yet appear the necessity or the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God. St. Anselm cites the thirteenth† psalm: *Dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus* (The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God). This denial calls the existence of God into question for the first time and gives St. Anselm's proof a meaning it lacks without the fool's statement. St. Anselm formulates his famous proof in these terms: When the fool says that there is no

* See my book *San Anselmo y el insensato* [Obras, IV].

† [Psalm 13 in the Vulgate, Psalm 14 in the King James Version.—TRANS.]

Finally, in addition to his more strictly philosophical works, St. Albertus Magnus applied himself to theology as well, and here, too, made use of the intellectual framework of Aristotelian thought, thus anticipating the mature achievement of St. Thomas.

St. Thomas Aquinas

LIFE AND WORKS. St. Thomas, born at Roccasecca about 1225, was of the family of the Counts of Aquino. His first studies were in the monastery of Monte Cassino. In 1239 he went to Naples to take up the seven liberal arts; there he studied the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) with Peter Martin and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) with Peter of Ibernica. He also studied in the faculty of arts at the University of Naples, and it was in Naples in 1244 that he donned the Dominican habit. Shortly afterward he started out for Paris with the Master-General of the Order, but his brothers, angry over his becoming a monk, kidnapped him en route and carried him off to Roccasecca. The following year he went to Paris, where he met St. Albertus Magnus, under whom he studied there and, later, in Cologne. In 1252 St. Thomas returned to Paris, where he became a master in theology and where he lived and worked for some years. From 1259 to 1269 he taught in various cities in Italy (Agnani, Orvieto, Rome, Viterbo). He then returned to Paris, his true center of activity. Afterward he resided in Naples; he set out from Naples in 1274, answering the summons of Gregory X to attend the Second Council of Lyons. But his health could not support the overwhelming intellectual labor to which he was committed: he fell ill on the journey and died at Fossanova on March 7, 1274.

St. Thomas was a man of pure spirituality. His whole life was dedicated to philosophical and theological labors and inspired by religion. He was a man of singularly simple and kindly ways, devoted heart and soul to the great intellectual task which he fully accomplished. Testimonials by those nearest to him tell of the profound affection which he inspired in his closest friends. These included his teacher, St. Albertus Magnus, who at a very advanced age set out for Paris to defend his pupil's doctrines, which had been condemned by Bishop Tempier, and who in the latter years of his life deeply mourned the death of St. Thomas; St. Thomas' biographer, William of Tocco; and, above all, his fellow Dominican and faithful friend, Brother Reginald of Piperno. The Church canonized Thomas, acknowledging, along with his sainthood, his great importance in Scholasticism. St. Thomas has been given the name of *Doctor angelicus*.

The works of St. Thomas are more as apologetic as the *Catena aurea* (the Catena aurea of the Gospels). Other works are especially expounded in a series of writings, notably the *Summa contra Gentiles* (On the Being of God), the *Summa theologiae* (On the Essence of the Intellect), and the *Quaestiones disputatae* (Miscellaneous Questions)—*De anima* (On the Soul), *De sensibus* (On the Senses), *De virtutibus* (On the Virtues), *De non-believers* (On Non-Believers), *De theologia* (On Theology). Among the most important of his thought and, in the *theologiae*. These works, if St. Thomas is to be called philosophy. Beginning with the major texts, the productions of St. Thomas, especially the *RELATIONSHIP* of his adaptation of Aristotelian Scholasticism. The works of St. Thomas from Christian doctrine and, above all, the Peripatetic writings, translations from Aristotle, involved paraphrasing difficulties, St. Thomas' Aristotle's text close affinity with Brentano, using this, the expository points to that of the general lines of the

The works of St. Thomas are very numerous. Some are of interest more as apologist writings or as exegeses of sacred texts, for instance, the *Catena aurea super quattuor Evangelia* (The Golden Chain on the Four Gospels). Others are strictly theological, dogmatical or juridical. Here we are especially interested in his works on philosophy and the systematization of theology, in which Thomist philosophy is most particularly expounded. In first place come his *Commentaries on Aristotle*, a long series of writings in which he studies and analyzes the thought of the Stagirite. In second place are the *Opuscula*, short treatises on philosophy or theology, rich in doctrine, among which are the works *De ente et essentia* (On Being and Essence), *De unitate intellectus* (On the Oneness of the Intellect), *De principio individuationis* (On the Principle of Individuation), and so forth. In third place are the *Quaestiones quodlibetales* (Miscellaneous Questions) and the *Quaestiones disputatae* (Disputed Questions)—*De veritate* (On Truth), *De potentia* (On Potentiality), *De anima* (On the Soul), and so forth. Lastly, there are the theological treatises, especially the *Summa contra Gentiles* (The Summa Against Non-Believers), the *Compendium theologiae ad Reginaldum* (Compendium of Theology Addressed to Reginald) and, above all, St. Thomas' most important work, the great systematic exposition of his own thought and, indeed, of Scholasticism in its entirety: the *Summa theologiae*. These are the Thomist writings that must be borne in mind if St. Thomas is to be studied from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy. Beginning in the thirteenth century itself, these became the major texts of Scholasticism, and a large part of the subsequent productions of Scholasticism consisted of commentaries on books by St. Thomas, especially on the various parts of the *Summa theologiae*.

RELATIONSHIP WITH ARISTOTLE. St. Thomas accomplished the adaptation of Aristotle's Greek philosophy to the Christian thought of Scholasticism. The general content of his thought, therefore, derived from Christian dogma, the Church Fathers, the earlier medieval tradition and, above all, Aristotle. St. Thomas labored extensively over the Peripatetic writings, using principally William of Moerbeke's direct translations from the Greek. Instead of St. Albertus Magnus' long and involved paraphrases, which were imprecise and full of unresolved difficulties, St. Thomas wrote commentaries in which he followed Aristotle's text closely and tried to explain it fully. There is undoubtedly a close affinity between the minds of St. Thomas and Aristotle; Brentano, using a felicitous word, speaks of a *congeniality*. Because of this, the exposition of St. Thomas' doctrines is equivalent in many points to that of Aristotle's; this occurs in the area of logic, in the general lines of their physics and metaphysics, and in the outline of

their psychology and their ethics. But it should not be forgotten that St. Thomas, at a distance of sixteen centuries, utilizes these same Aristotelian ideas with very different ends in mind, and, above all, that he and Aristotle are separated by the development of Christianity. Moreover, St. Thomas was too brilliant a philosopher simply to submit to the Aristotelian system, and the general meaning of his system is profoundly different. One need only remember that all of St. Thomas' intellectual activity was directed toward the establishment of *Christian theology*, which is based on suppositions completely alien to the Hellenic mind.

Aristotle's great problem concerned the modes of being; he was attempting to solve the question that had painfully racked Greek philosophy since the times of Parmenides. His principal solution of this problem was the elaboration of the theory of substance, which was closely related to the Entity as such and to God understood as the prime mover: that is, the establishment of metaphysics, the "sought-after knowledge," and the complete systematization of the problem of knowledge. In addition, Aristotle's doctrine of the oneness and changelessness of the Entity achieved the restoration of physics, which had been called into question by the Eleatics. The problems that concern St. Thomas are very different: above all, the demonstration of the existence of God and the explanation, in so far as possible, of His essence; the rational interpretation of the dogmas or the isolation of the core of their suprarational, but not antirational, mystery (for example, the Trinity, the Creation of the world, the Eucharist); in another direction, the doctrine of the spiritual and immortal human soul; ethics, oriented toward the supernatural life; the problem of the universals; and many others.

Thus, two quite different things are involved, and the very common expressions, *Aristotelico-Scholastic philosophy* or *Aristotelico-Thomist philosophy*, are misleading. They are meaningful only if applied to these medieval systems which we are studying; here they signify the assimilation of the Aristotelian system into Scholasticism. But they cannot be understood as names for a *single philosophy* comprising the systems of Aristotle and of St. Thomas. Thus, strictly speaking, the two above-mentioned terms are not equivalent, and the second one is inexact: there is no Aristotelico-Thomist philosophy, but a *Thomist philosophy* pure and simple, and Thomism is *Aristotelico-Scholastic* in the sense which has just been indicated.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY. For St. Thomas, there is a clear distinction between philosophy and theology: they are two sciences, two different kinds of knowledge. Theology is based on divine revelation,

philosophy or rightly, that s by God, when true; God is whereas reason can be no conf be a discord wi

Thus, these of investigation the viewpoint tially coincide through reason existence of G Nevertheless, t cause if reason truths. In the preferable to p *fides quaerens int* tially possible t application of theology is the s alongside the th considers philos strictly speaking

Revelation is between revelat of revelation. T with a revealed has gone astray. In this sense phi science, but to r imposition; on t is most proper to guard, but it is P knowledge.

THE DIVISION the origin of philo things are know but inasmuch as suffice for the hu philosophy is tha universe and its c

philosophy on the exercise of human reason. It has been said, and rightly, that strictly speaking, theology is not practiced by man, but by God, when He reveals Himself. Philosophy and theology must be true; God is truth itself and it is impossible to doubt revelation, whereas reason, properly used, also leads us to truth. Therefore, there can be no conflict between philosophy and theology, since this would be a discord within the realm of truth.

Thus, these are two independent sciences, but with a common area of investigation. The difference between them arises, above all, from the viewpoint of their *formal objects*, though their *material objects* partially coincide. There are revealed dogmas which can be known through reason—for example, as St. Thomas will point out, the existence of God and many of His attributes, the Creation, and so on. Nevertheless, the revelation of these dogmas is not superfluous, because if reason alone were used, very few people would know these truths. In the cases where rational *understanding* is possible, this is preferable to pure belief. Here we encounter a softened allusion to the *fides quaerens intellectum*; St. Thomas now believes that it is only partially possible to try to understand the object of faith rationally. The application of reason to themes which are also topics for faith and theology is the so-called *natural theology*; there is thus a natural theology alongside the *theologia fidei*. This natural theology is what St. Thomas considers philosophy, and the most important aspect of philosophy; strictly speaking, it is *Thomist philosophy*.

Revelation is the criterion of truth. In the case of a contradiction between revelation and philosophy, the error can never be on the part of revelation. Therefore, the disagreement of a philosophic doctrine with a revealed dogma is a sign that the doctrine is false, that reason has gone astray and has not arrived at truth; it thus jars against truth. In this sense philosophy is subordinated, not exactly to theology as a science, but to revelation. But this does not operate as a hindrance or imposition; on the contrary, philosophy sets up as its norm that which is most proper to it; that is, truth. Revelation keeps philosophy on its guard, but it is philosophic reason itself that will have to seek out true knowledge.

THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. For St. Thomas, as for the Greeks, the origin of philosophy is awe; the desire to know is satisfied only when things are known in their causes. St. Thomas is a good Aristotelian; but inasmuch as the first cause is God, only knowledge of God can suffice for the human intellect and satisfy philosophy. The goal of this philosophy is that there be depicted in the soul the entire order of the universe and its causes; *ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi et causarum*

ejus. The human soul (which in Aristotle's work had already been compared with the hand, because, just as in a certain sense the hand is all the instruments, so the soul is in a certain way all the things) envelops the totality of the universe with its knowledge, and thus rises above its position as a mere creature in order to share in the character of the spirit, in the image of the Deity.

This order of the universe is threefold. In the first place, there is an order which the human intellect finds as already existing: the order of the things, of nature, of true being. This type of order is the order of natural *philosophy* in a strict sense, or physics, whose object is the *ens mobile*; it is also the concern of mathematics, but especially of *metaphysics*, which, according to the Aristotelian definition, studies the *ens in quantum ens* (the entity as an entity) and culminates in knowledge of God. Secondly, there is the order of understanding, which is the object of rational philosophy or logic. Thirdly, the order of the acts of will, an order produced by man; this is the moral order, and it is the object of moral philosophy or ethics; in its collective dimensions this order includes the sciences of the State—economics and politics. This is an outline of the Thomist philosophic disciplines. We cannot here enter into a detailed discussion of this division of philosophy, for this would take us too far afield; it will suffice to explain briefly the most interesting features, those that are responsible for this scheme's position of esteem and influence in the history of philosophy.

METAPHYSICS. According to St. Thomas, who adopts the Aristotelian doctrines, being is the most universal of all concepts. *Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cujus intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit* (that which first comes under one's apprehension is the Entity, the understanding of which is included in all things, whatever one apprehends). But, as Aristotle had earlier shown when confronting Platonic doctrine, this universality is not that of the genus; the Entity is one of the *transcendentals*, which are present in all the things without intermingling with any. These transcendentals are *ens, res, aliquid, unum et bonum*. And as special forms of the *bonum* referring to understanding and desire, we have the *verum* and the *pulchrum*, truth and beauty.

The two principal meanings of the word "being" are essence and existence; the Scholastics had long debated the difference between these terms. St. Thomas affirms the actual difference between the essence and existence of creatures, which are contingent entities. However, there is no such difference between the essence and existence of God. God's existence follows necessarily from His essence. This is the concept of *aseity* or *self-existence*, to be an *ens a se*; it plays an

essential role in the theology.

St. Thomas rejects methods of proving

(1) By motion: no other mover; if it turn, and so on to infinity, there will be no mover if there were no efficient cause; there is a cause, because other than God. (2) By the possibility of the world: if it did not exist, and it existed and in which it is necessary in which is necessary in perfection; there are or less approximate degrees of the absolute completely perfect, perfection and all being in the world: intelligent entities are not by chance but because of intelligent Entity which is the goal, and this Entity

These are the five ways which inspire them is that by means of His vision but not *what He is*. By observing His creature's causality, by means of which Thomas distinguishes the world from God is by means of mere supernatural light. St. Thomas says: *quidam vident lucem*

The world has been created. Creation consists of voluntary and free action but according to St. Thomas, God is the cause of the world and also the exemplary cause of all things; all goals direct themselves towards Him.

With respect to

essential role in the proof of the existence of God and in all of theology.

St. Thomas rejects St. Anselm's ontological proof and gives five methods of proving God's existence; these are the famous *five ways*. (1) By motion: motion exists; everything that moves is moved by another mover; if this mover moves, it will require another mover in turn, and so on to infinity; this is impossible, because there would be no mover if there were not a first, and this first mover is God. (2) By the efficient cause: there is a series of efficient causes; there must be a first cause, because otherwise there would be no effect; and that *first cause* is God. (3) By the possible and necessary: generation and decay show that there are entities which can be or not be; at one time these entities did not exist, and there must have been a time in which nothing existed and in which nothing came to be; there must be an Entity which is necessary in itself, and it is called God. (4) By the degrees of perfection: there are various degrees of all the perfections which more or less approximate the absolute perfections, and therefore they are degrees of the absolute perfections. Thus, there is an Entity which is completely perfect, the highest Entity; this Entity is the cause of all perfection and all being and is called God. (5) By the ordering of the world: intelligent entities tend toward a goal and an order, not by chance but because of the intelligence which directs them; there is an intelligent Entity which orders nature and which impels it toward its goal, and this Entity is God.

These are the five ways, briefly stated. The fundamental idea which inspires them is that God, who is invisible and infinite, is demonstrable by means of His visible and finite effects. Thus, *that God is*, is known, but not *what He is*. But it is possible to learn something about God by observing His creatures, and this is effected in three ways: by means of causality, by means of excellence and by means of negation. St. Thomas distinguishes at least two possible modes of seeing: one mode is by means of mere natural reason, and the other is by means of a supernatural light. Some see the light, he says, but they are not in the light: *quidam vident lumen, sed non sunt in lumine*.

The world has been created by God; we have already seen that the Creation consists of placing the world in existence by means of a voluntary and free act of God; revelation adds that this occurs in time, but according to St. Thomas this is not rationally demonstrable. God is the cause of the world in a double sense: He is the efficient cause and also the exemplary cause; moreover, He is the final cause, since all goals direct themselves to God.

With respect to the universals, St. Thomas' doctrine is one of

moderate realism, as has already been pointed out. The universals are real, but exist only in abstract form; the species appears only in an individual state, and the principle of individuation is the *materia signata* (signate matter). This gives rise to the theory that each angel is a species rather than an individual, since the angels are immaterial.

THE SOUL. Thomist doctrine regarding the soul differs from the traditional Scholastic doctrine, which was of Platonic-Augustinian origin, and approximates Aristotle's theory, which it adapts to the Christian viewpoint. In accordance with Aristotelian psychology, St. Thomas interprets the soul as a *substantial form* of the human body, the first principle of its life. The soul is what makes the body be a body—that is, a living body. There are as many souls or substantial forms as there are human bodies; St. Thomas rejects the theory that there is a single soul for all mankind, which was of Arabic origin and which reappears with force in Latin Averroism. He also denies that the body and the soul are two complete substances, and that the soul gives the body life but not corporeality. St. Thomas believes that the soul and the body form a *substantial union*; that is, the soul and the body together, and without the help of any other form, constitute the complete and single substance which is man. The Council of Vienna (1311–12) described the rational soul as the intrinsic and essential form of the human body.

On the other hand, the *human* soul—in contrast to the animal soul—is a *subsistent form*; that is, the intellect or understanding has an operation of its own in which the body does not essentially participate; therefore, the intellect can subsist and exercise that operation even though it is separated from its corporeal substratum. Thus the soul is incorporeal and is not composed of matter and form; and it is spiritual, since it possesses reason and is a *mens*. Therefore, the human soul is incorruptible and immortal; its immateriality and simplicity preclude decomposition and decay; its spirituality and consequent subsistence prevent it from accidentally destroying itself when the human body decays. Thus the human soul is immortal, and would perish only if God were to annihilate it. St. Thomas finds further proof of personal immortality in man's desire to continue to live; and, he adds, since this natural desire cannot be in vain, all intellectual substance is incorruptible.

ETHICS. Thomist ethics is based on the framework of Aristotelian ethics, but it keeps the Christian point of departure constantly in mind. Ethics is *motus rationalis creaturae ad Deum*, movement by the rational creature toward God. The goal of this movement is bliss, which consists in the direct vision of God. Therefore, man's ultimate goal is God,

and this goal is a St. Thomas' ethic the human will which is, as it were,

St. Thomas' philosophy of politics and society exists *in* versa. Power depends on kinds of government participation on tyranny to be the Church.

THE RESPONSE radical innovation Platonic-Augustinianism made the opposed Thomism

First Thomism were the work of were primarily in substantial forms. L (1277) was that aimed at certain first restricted to the by the action of two Dominican, and J

But simultaneously came triumphal immediately there schools. In 1323 St. this the Church Thomist system.

NEO-THOMISM. has continued with commentaries on philosophy. Theology is Thomist contribution. However, after the Scholasticism in the second half of the 19th century, the movement was initiated by the Church and especially

and this goal is achieved through knowledge, through contemplation; St. Thomas' ethics has a clear intellectualist nuance. The first law of the human will is *lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei* (the eternal law, which is, as it were, the reasoning of God).

St. Thomas' philosophy of the State is subordinated to Aristotle's philosophy of politics. Man is by nature an *animal sociale* or *politicum*, and society exists for the benefit of the individual, and not vice versa. Power derives from God. St. Thomas studies the possible kinds of government, and considers monarchy tempered by full participation on the part of the people to be the best form and tyranny to be the worst. In any event, the highest power is that of the Church.

THE RESPONSE TO THOMISM. St. Thomas' system represented a radical innovation within Scholasticism. Its opposition to many Platonic-Augustinian doctrines and clear preference for Aristotelianism made the Franciscans hostile to it. Even a few Dominicans opposed Thomism.

First Thomism elicited written challenges; the principal attacks were the work of William de la Mare and Ricardus de Mediavilla and were primarily in reference to the theory of the oneness of the substantial forms. Later it attracted official condemnations. The first (1277) was that of Étienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, and was aimed at certain Thomist propositions. This condemnation was at first restricted to the diocese of Paris, but later was extended to Oxford by the action of two Archbishops of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, a Dominican, and John Peckham, a Franciscan.

But simultaneously and with greater strength Thomism was welcomed triumphally; this occurred first in the Order of Preachers, immediately thereafter at the University of Paris, and soon in all the schools. In 1323 St. Thomas was canonized, and from that time until this the Church has particularly insisted on the high value of the Thomist system.

NEO-THOMISM. St. Thomas' influence on theology and philosophy has continued without interruption; since his death, the number of commentaries on his *Summa theologiae* and other works has been multiplying. Theology in particular has drawn new life from the immense Thomist contribution, which gave it a precise and rigorous structure. However, after the Middle Ages and the transitory splendor of Spanish Scholasticism in the sixteenth century, Thomist thought lost fecundity. In the second half of the nineteenth century intense intellectual movement was initiated which was enthusiastically supported by the Church and especially by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris*