U.S. DIPLOMACY

1 The New Frontiersmen and the Old Guard 1961-0ctober 1962 Allowing for reasonable exceptions and a wide latitude of variation, the typical New Frontiersman is about 46 years old, hightly energetic, distinctly articulate and refreshingly idealistic. In short, he as much in common with the man the American people have chosen as their President.

-M. B. SCHNAPER, 1961 [Note 1]

The disaster of the Vietnam War would dominate America's memory of a decade that began with great promise. In the 1960 presidential election, John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Dwight Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon. Despite a narrow margin of victory, the new president exuded confidence. His clarion call, "Let us begin anew," evoked the prospect of a new era of prosperity and opportunity. [Note 2] Although he was only five years younger than Nixon, Kennedy at forty-three seemed youthful and vigorous compared to his opponent and the "old timers" of Eienhower's administration. A witty, attractive man, Kennedy was a World War II hero and Pulitzer Prizewinning author who had gained considerable political experience as a congressman and senator. His rhetoric exhorted America's youth to "pay any price" and "bear any burden" to extend the virtues of their country to the rest of the world. [Note 3] The idealism that Kennedy seemed to personify Page 2 DERELICTION OF DUTY would be lost in a place that, in 1960, was of little interest or significance to Americans.

A campaign issue that Kennedy had taken up with some vigor was that of the need for reform in national defense strategy and the management of the Department of Defense. Truman administration Defense Secretary Robert Lovett advised Kennedy that reform in the Pentagon would be "painful" but was "long overdue." He told him that his defense secretary should be "an analytical statistician who can . . , tear out the overlap, the empire building. [Note 4] Lovett urged the president-elect to consider the forty- four-year-old president of the Ford Motor Company, Robert Strange McNamara, for the job.

When World War II began, Robert McNamara was serving on the business faculty at Harvard University, teaching the application of statistical analysis to management problems. Initially disqualified from military service because of his inability to pass an eye examination, he became a consultant to the War Department to develop statistical controls within the Army Air Corps supply system. After spending the first year of the war teaching at the Army Air Forces Statistical Control Officers School, McNamara requested an assignment to the Eighth Air Force in England. McNamara arrived in England in February 1943 and after three weeks, sought a commission as a captain. The professor turned-military-officer became part of a traveling statistical control group that analyzed maintenance, logistics, and operational problems in England, India, China, and the Pacific. McNamara often met resistance from military officers who discounted his new methods. A lieutenan colonel in 1945, he left the Army an ardent believer in the need for sta tistical management and control over military organizations. [Note 5]

After World War II, McNamara, with several of his Army Air Corp statistician colleagues, joined Ford. They were known collectively as th Whiz Kids, a term later associated with the young analysts McNamara brought with him to the Pentagon. At Ford, McNamara preferred the academic milieu of Ann Arbor to the corporate culture of suburban Detroit. His drive, ambition, and analytical talents led to his appointment, in November 1960, as the first company president who was not member of the Ford family. One month later R. Sargent Shriver, John F. Kennedy's brother-in- law, visited McNamara on behalf of the president

Page 3 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD elect. Although he intended to remain at Ford, McNamara agreed to fly to meet Kennedy. [Note 6]

Among the qualities that Kennedy admired was self-assurance. During his second meeting with Kennedy, McNamara surprised the president-elect and his brother Robert with his assertiveness. He handed Jack Kennedy a contract stipulating that he be given free rein over appointments in the Department of Defense and not be expected to engage in purely social events. Kennedy read the document and passed it, unsigned, to his brother. [Note 7]

McNamara seemed the man for the job. The Kennedy brothers swept McNamara out the front door of the brick Georgetown house and introduced the secretary of defense-designate to the bevy of reporters waiting outside in the freezing cold.

Kennedy worried most over the appointment of a secretary of state. Reluctant to alienate any of his key Democratic constituencies, he settled on everyone's second choice, Dean Rusk. Rusk, a former Rhodes scholar from Georgia, was a professor of government and dean of faculty at Mills College in California, when, in 1940, he was ordered into active military service as an Army captain. He served initially in Washington as an intelligence analyst. With the advent of American involvement in World War II, Rusk left the capital for the headquarters of the China, Burma, and India theater of operations. The quality of the cables that the young staff officer sent to the War Department caught the eye of Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. General Marshall summoned Rusk to Washington, where he joined Col. George A. Lincoln's Strategy and Policy Group to help develop long-range politico- military contingency plans. In 1946 Rusk joined the State Department and, in 1950, became Secretary of State Dean Acheson's assistant for Far Eastern affairs. In 1952 he left the State Department to head the Rockefeller Foundation. During his years of government service, Rusk built a solid reputation for loyalty and trustworthiness within the Democratic establishment. The unprepossessing, introspective Rusk provided a conspicuous contrast to the confident, assertive McNamara. Lovett and Acheson had recommended Rusk enthusiastically, and, after a brief interview, Kennedy decided to appoint him. [Note 8]

Kennedy had considered McGeorge Bundy for secretary of state, but concluded that he was too young. In 1953, Bundy, at thirty-four, was appointed dean of Harvard University's Faculty of Arts and Sciences. His formative years were spent in the best schools of the Northeast--Groton, Page 4 DERELICTION OF DUTY Yale, Harvard --and in association with some of the most influential people in the twentieth-century United States. He assisted Henry Stimsor (William Howard Taft's secretary of war, Herbert Hoover's secretary of state, and Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of war) in the preparation of his memoirs. He also helped Dean Acheson prepare a collection of his personal papers for publication. Bundy was known for an abruptness and imperious demeanor with those he considered his intellectual inferior., but he could also be effusive and engaging in a social setting. [Note 9] Kenned chose him as special assistant for national security affairs (usually called national security adviser).

Kennedy placed a premium on academic qualifications and superior intellect. McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy all shared distinguished academi backgrounds. Moreover Kennedy wanted men who shared his broad interests and could engage in wide-ranging, informal discussions. Perhaps the most important determining factor of each man's relative influence would be his ability to establish a close personal rapport with the president. Rusk, who preferred established procedures and protocol, had difficulty adjusting to the president's freewheeling style. Socially he remained distant from the president and was the only senior official Kennedy did not address by his first name. McNamara and Bundy would prove more adept at securing the president's confidence and affection. [Note 10]

The president's personal style influenced the way he structured the White House staff to handle national security decision making. Having no experience as an executive, Kennedy was unaccustomed to operatimg at the head of a large staff organization. He regarded Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC) structure as cumbersome and unnecessary. Immediately after taking office, he eliminated the substructure, the NSC by abolishing its two major committees: the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Kennedy resolved not to use the NSC except for the pro forma consultation required by the National Security Act of 1947. In place of the formal Eisenhower system Kennedy relied on an ad hoc, collegial style of decision making in national security and foreign affairs. He formed task forces to analyze particular problems and met irregularly with an "inner club" of his most trusted advisers to discuss problems informally and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of potential courses of action. [Note 11] Page 5 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD

Kennedy's dismantling of the NSC apparatus diminished the voice of the Joint Chief's of Staff (JCS) in national security matters. Under Eisenhower military officers connected with the JCS were assigned to the Planning Board and the OCB. Through these representatives, the JCS could place items important to the military on the NSC agenda. During NSC meetings Eisenhower considered differing opinions and made decisions with all the Chiefs in attendance. Kennedy's structural changes, his practice of consulting frankly with only his closest advisers, and his use of larger forums to validate decisions already made would transcend his own administration and continue as a prominent

feature of Vietnam decision making under Lyndon Johnson. Under the Kennedy-Johnson system, the Joint Chiefs lost the direct access to the president, and thus the real influence on decision making, that the Eisenhower NSC structure had provided. [Note 12]

Diminished JCS access to the president reflected Kennedy's opinion of his senior military advisers. Kennedy and the young New Frontiersmen of his administration viewed the Eisenhower JCS with suspicion. Against the backdrop of Kennedy's efforts to reform the Defense Department, and under the strain of foreign policy crises, a relationship of mutual distrust between senior military and civilian officials would develop. Two months after Kennedy assumed the presidency, tension between the New Frontiersmen and the Old Guard escalated over a foreign policy blunder in the Caribbean. The Old Guard in the Pentagon were soon relegated to a position of little influence.

The Bay of Pigs shattered the sense of euphoria and hopeful aspiration that surrounded the New Frontiersmen during their first months in Washington.[Note 13] In early 1960 the Eisenhower administration had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to form, arm, and train a Cuban exile force for the purpose of overthrowing Fidel Castro's government in Cuba. When Kennedy took office, a brigade of approximately fifteen hundred men located in secret Guatemalan bases comprised this "Army of Liberation." Embarrassed by the anti-Castro training camps, President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes asked Kennedy to have the force removed from Guatemalan soil by the end of April. Faced with the choice of using or losing the exile brigade, the president approved a plan designed to support the invasion while preserving his ability to deny U.S. involvement. [Note 14] Page 6 DERELICTION OF DUTY

After dark on April 16, 1961, the invasion force set out for the Bay, Pigs, Cuba. The invaders soon discovered that their American destroy escort would not accompany them after they moved to within twenty miles of their homeland. Any hopes of gaining surprise were futile: The Kennedy administration had failed in its attempts to suppress news articles that revealed the plan for a U.S.-sponsored invasion, and the invasion was a hot topic of conversation on the streets of Havana. Castro was awakened at 1:00 A.M. on April 17 with the news of the brigade's arrival. Unmarked antiquated planes attacked the Cuban Air Force base but failed to destroy many of Castro's fighters. Denied American air cover, the ships supporting the landing force were either sunk or fled from the area. Castro's jet fighters attacked the exile brigade from above as his ground forces began pushing them back to the sea. The "liberators" were running out of ammunition. On April 18 Kennedy, with the support Secretary of Defense McNamara, fended off requests from the Joint Chiefs and others to provide direct American support to the besiet brigade. The next day, in the face of incessant attacks, the abandoned exile force surrendered. Of the approximately thirteen hundred men actually reached the beaches, almost twelve hundred were taken prisoner and about one hundred were killed in action. [Note 15]

John Kennedy had not considered the consequences of going forward with the Bay of Pigs invasion. The president's informal style and struture of decision making did not allow for a systematic review of planned invasion of Cuba. Under Eisenhower a White House intelligence office closely monitored C1A plans and operations. Eisenhower, had approved only planning and preparation for the invasion. When Kennedy abolished the intelligence office of the OCB, he impeded staff's ability to gain familiarity with and take control of the Eisenhower administration's policies and programs. The C1A was able, therefore, to present the plan for the invasion as a decision already made by Kenney's predecessor. [Note 16]

Although the president took public responsibility for the Bay of failure, he placed a large measure of blame for the disaster on poor military advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He thought that his senior military advisers should have been more assertive with their doubts about the operation's chances for success. [Note 17] For their part the JCS believed Kennedy's ire was misdirected. The president consulted the JCS , after he had made the decision to launch the invasion. The military ser- Page 7 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD vices had provided personnel on special assignment to the CIA, but remained unaware of their activities. The Chiefs were skeptical about the operation's chances of success and stated that the landing could only succeed if the landing force controlled the air. They blamed the president for not consulting them earlier and thought his decision to leave the landing force stranded on the beach reprehensible. [Note 18] The Bay of Pigs debacle not only exacerbated mutual distrust between the president and his senior military officers but spurred an intense desire on the part of John Kennedy to overthrow the Castro regime. [Note 19]

Meanwhile another foreign policy challenge had developed in Laos a landlocked nation in Southeast Asia positioned among China, Cambodia, Thailand, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. In its effort to deny control of the country to Pathet Lao communist guerrillas, the Eisenhower administration had alternately provided military assistance to, and acted to weaken, the Lao government in Vientiane. When Kennedy took office in January 1961, the Pathet Lao had seized key objectives on the strategically vital Plain of Jars and threatened the fragile American-supported government of Prince Boun Oum. By late April the president was considering U.S. military intervention.

Smarting from what they believed had been unfair criticism after the Bay of Pigs, the Chiefs were determined that any commitment of U.S. military force not suffer from the indecision and lack of firepower that had been evident in the abortive Cuban invasion. They told Kennedy unambiguously that military action in Laos could involve the United States in a large-scale land war in Southeast Asia and might escalate into a confrontation with China. They recommended that if any troops were deployed, they should arrive in a strength of at least sixty thousand men. [Note 20] Army general Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Army Chief of Staff George H. Decker warned Kennedy not to take action unless he was prepared to use nuclear weapons to "guarantee victory. [Note 21] A military commitment in Laos reminded Lemnitzer and Decker of the same sort of limited, costly, protracted commitment that the generals had experienced in Korea. After a meeting at the State Department on Laos, Rusk asked Lemnitzer, "Lem, do you think we can get the 101st [Airborne Infantry Division] in there?" The general responded, "We can get it in all right, it's getting it out that I'm worried about. [Note 22] Page 8 DERELICTION OF DUTY

During the Laotian crisis, the president was again dissatisfied with the advice of the Joint Chiefs, whose thinking he regarded as outmoded and unimaginative. He found the JCS estimate of the number of troops needed excessive and ordered only ten thousand Marines, then stationed in Japan, to prepare for deployment to Laos. He believed that strategic options in military affairs should give him more flexibility than a stark choice between inaction and large-scale commitment. Meanwhile preparations for the deployment of the Marines, coupled with diplomatic activity, seemed to have a positive effect on Moscow's attitude toward the Laotian problem [Note 23] Eventually Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to negotiations aimed at developing a neutral Laos.

The May 1961 international conference on Laos assembled in Geneva and lasted until July of the following year. The U.S. government considered the outcome less than favorable. [Note 24] The diplomatic settlement left the Pathet Lao in control of roughly the eastern half of the country, a region that North Vietnam used to supply and reinforce the Viet Cong insurgents in their fight against the American-backed South Vietnamese regime. [Note 25] The unfavorable Laotian settlement, combined with the apparent connection between American threats of Marine deployment and Soviet willingness to negotiate, reinbrced Kennedy's opinion that JCS advice was of limited value and heightened the distrust between the president and his senior military advisers.[Note 26]

The New Frontiersmen were men of action, and the Chiefs' reluctance to take military action short of a large-scale deployment upset them. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman and White House Assistant Michael Forrestal, son of the late secretary of defense, thought that the military had gone "soft." With respect to Laos, they "beat their chests until it comes time to do some fighting and then they start backing down," Hilsman wrote in 1962.[Note 27]

Because the front line against Communism had not been drawn in Laos, South Vietnam would become the principal focus of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Under those circumstances Kennedy brought into his administration a man who would exert great influence over two presidents' decisions to escalate American involvement in Vietnam.

Reeling from the wave of public criticism following the Bay of Pigs and aware of his increasingly troubled relationship with the JCS, Kennedy Page 9 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD told his staff that he needed someone to be "my advisor to see that I am not making a dumb mistake as Commander in Chief. ;Note 28] To provide him with military advice and to coordinate the efforts of the White House staff, Defense Department, and intelligence agencies, the besieged president looked to former Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Davenport Taylor.

Max Taylor seemed the model of the soldier-statesman. Inspired by his Confederate grandfather's Civil War tales, Taylor pursued a military career with great enthusiasm from an early age. When his sixth-grade teacher asked him to name his professional ambition, the young Taylor wrote "major general." Twelve years later he graduated fourth in the West Point class of 1922. A talented linguist, Taylor later returned to the Military Academy to teach Spanish and

French. During assignments in China and Japan, he became proficient in Japanese.[Note 29] It was, in part, his reputation as both a warrior and a scholar that made the general attractive to Kennedy.

Taylor earned a reputation as a successful combat commander during World War II. He began the war on General Marshall's secretariat, but soon rose to command the 101st Airborne Division in Europe. He returned to Asia in 1953 to lead the Eighth Army in the closing months of the Korean War.

In 1955, when Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway retired without a second two-year term because of his unhappy relations with the Eisenhower administration, Taylor was named his successor. [Note 30] Like Ridgway, Taylor soon became frustrated by his inability to persuade the president or his indecisive secretary of defense, Charles Wilson, that a larger and more capable Army was vital to America's national security. [Note 31] Taylor served a full four years but retired eighteen months before Eisenhower relinquished the presidency to John E Kennedy. The fifty- eight-year-old had been a general officer for sixteen years. When he retired, Taylor was "thoroughly fed up with the Pentagon and . . . its ways. [Note 32]

Taylor's frustration stemmed in part from Eisenhower's subordination of military policy to domestic economic priorities. Eisenhower believed that the United States, engaged in protracted competition with the Soviet Union, had to husband American economic strength as the basis for prevailing in the Cold War. [Note 33] When the fighting in Korea ended on July 26, 1953, the president developed a lower-cost strategy for national defense, the "new look." The new look rejected Ridgway's and Taylor's Page 10 DERELICTION OF DUTY arguments that American military forces must remain "balanced" in size or configuration with those of the Soviet Union and relied instead on the military doctrine of "massive retaliation." To maintain a credible deterrent against Communist aggression, massive retaliation gave top priority in the defense budget to the Air Force and nuclear weapony. Under the new look, the Army dropped from twenty to fourteen divisions (a reduction of nearly five hundred thousand soldiers) while the Force expanded from 115 to 137 wings and added thirty thousand a men [Note 34] To achieve economy as well as security in national defense, the new look sought to combine the threat of nuclear force with alliances, ready reserves, and psychological and covert operations.[Note 35] On January 1 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations that the administration would "depend primarily on a great capacity to retaliate instantly" to achieve a "maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. [Note 36] In addition to his desire to cut costs, the lesson of the Korean War--that the American public would not support a protracted, limited conflict in a distant land weighed heavily Eisenhower. [Note 37]

In contrast to Eisenhower, Kennedy had been sympathetic to Taylor's argument that massive retaliation be supplanted with a military doctrine of "flexible response." In The Uncertain Trumpet, a scathing critique of I ke's defense policy published soon after the Army Chief's retireme Taylor called for "the unqualified renunciation" of the doctrine of massive retaliation. He wrote that reliance on the threat of "blasting [our enemies] from the face of the earth with atomic bombing if they commit aggression against us or our friends . . . offers no alternative other than reciprocal suicide or retreat." His proposed military strategy of flexible response would "give multiple choices to our political leaders" and all them to "cope with threats of many gradations, extending from subversive insurgency. . , to limited war -- conventional or nuclear -- and finally to unlimited nuclear war." To rebuild its ability to fight conventional wars, Taylor argued that the United States had to expand and reinforce its ground forces overseas and create a robust strategic reserve of ground and air forces on its own soiI. [Note 38]

Kennedy became enamored of Maxwell Taylor's ideas. Two weeks before declaring his candidacy for the presidency, Kennedy wrote to Evan Thomas, Maxwell Taylor's editor, with an assessment of The Uncertain Trumpet. The book had persuaded Kennedy that "we have not brought Page 11 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD our conventional war capabilities into line with the necessities." The senator thought that Taylor's critique of American defense policy and structure deserved "reading by every American. [Note 39] It was Kennedy's and Taylor's first contact in what would become a relationship of mutual respect and great affection. Taylor's ideas were evident in Kennedy's first presidential address on defense policy, in which he stated that "any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part of the free world with any kind of weapons, conventional or nuclear, must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift, and effective. [Note 40] Taylor would help Kennedy effect a doctrinal shift

that influenced deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam. But first Kennedy needed Taylor to redress the balance of the president's troubled relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On April 21 President Kennedy telephoned Taylor, who had just taken over as president of the recently opened Lincoln Center perbrming arts complex in New York City. Distraught over the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy asked Taylor to come to Washington immediately for consultation. Nine weeks later Taylor returned to active military duty to take an unprecedented White House position as "Military Representative of the President." The president outlined his duties: 1: The Military Representative is a staff officer to advise and assist the President with regard to those military matters that reach him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Military Representative is not interposed between the President and any of his statutory advisors or advisory bodies such as the Secretary of Defense, JCS or the NSC but maintains close liaison with them and is prepared to give his personal views to assist the President in reaching decisions. He is available to represent the President when the latter desires senior military representation at home or abroad. 2: The Military Representative has an analogous function of advice and assistance in the field of intelligence. He is not interposed between the President and the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] or the intelligence community but Page 12 DERELICTION OF DUTY watches the functioning of the intelligence apparatus of the government to assure that it meets the present and future needs of the President. 3: In the so-called Cold War planning and action, the Military Representative will check on the use of our military and intelligence assets and verify the effectiveness of their integration and employment. 4: The Military Representative has no command authority except within his own office. He may, however, call directly on any department or agency of the government for information necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities. [Note 41]

Qualifications in the text reflected Kennedy's desire to avoid criticisn from the JCS and members of Congress who might view the position a an infringement on the statutory responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs.

The Joint Chiefs had reason to believe that Taylor would assert himsel in areas that had been the sole responsibility of the JCS. Taylor's experience as Army chief of staff led him to recommend radical reform in th JCS organization. He had left the Eisenhower administration exhauste from "well nigh continuous conflict" with his civilian leaders and fello, officers of the Joint Chiefs. [Note 42

Taylor's difficult experience stemmed, in part, from the institution conflict endemic in American democratic government. After World War II questions of defense policy figured prominently in the continuin power struggle between the executive branch and Congress. Dissent from members of the Joint Chiefs could weaken the president's position wit the legislature and undermine an administration's policy decision: Although Eisenhower had described the Chiefs' statutory right to appeal to Congress as "legalized insubordination," Taylor disapproved of the president's expectation that military officers mold their advice to the- views and feelings of superiors and accept public responsibility for police decisions that they opposed. Taylor thought that Eisenhower was obsessed with "loyalty and teamplay," and castigated him for creating an environment in which members of the administration pressured the JCS to accept a "preconceived politico-military line." In Taylor's view the military's "ultimate loyalty" to the Constitution and the people, as Paage 13 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD embodied by their congressional representatives, outweighed personal fealty to the commander in chief. He believed that Congress and the public should be aware of the dissenting views of the nation's top military leaders. [Note 43] However, Taylor revised his opinions on the proper relationship between the military and the commander in chief when he returned to government service under Kennedy.

The formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflected the tension between the need to integrate military advice into the national security policy process and the desire to retain civilian control over the defense establishment. In January 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had established the JCS to satisfy the exigencies of America's newly formed military alliance with Great Britain. During World War II the JCS planned and directed U.S. military strategy, managed materiel and manpower, and coordinated among the nation's military allies. In 1944 Congress began hearings on postwar defense organization and examined the issue in earnest after the war.[Note 44] After a two-year debate,

Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 to "provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States." The act and its amendments in 1949 established the CIA, created the NSC to coordinate policy for the president, and created a loose confederation of the armed services under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The new Department of Defense consisted of OSD, the JCS, and the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (the Marine Corps remained within the Department of the Navy). The act, which was essentially a compromise between Army and Navy proposals, shifted responsibility away from individual service secretaries and gave OSD authority over the "national military establishment." The legislation stipulated that the full-time members of the JCS include a chairman and the military heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The commandant of the Marine Corps would vote only on matters directly affecting his service. Congress provided the JCS with a staff to aid the Chiefs in their advisory and executive functions. [Note 45]

Congress designated the Joint Chiefs as the "principal military advisors" to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. [Note 46] The legislators concluded that the most senior professional officers from each of the services could offer the best military advice to the "national command authority." Testifying before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs on May 1, 1946, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal Page 14 DERELICTION OF DUTY argued that reliance on "a single military genius" would risk "mistakes o judgment." Meeting together, each Chief would have to "justify his case before a group of intelligent partners. [Note 47] Congress was persuaded that the JCS, meeting together as a corporate body, comprised the best forum from which to obtain military advice.

However, interservice competition for scarce resources impinged or the Chiefs' ability to cooperate in the interest of national security Differences among the Chiefs centered on the definition of "roles and missions" of the services. The way the Chiefs defined roles and mission determined force size and structure and the research, development, and procurement of new weapons systems. Conflicts between the services led to inefficiency and redundancy. During his second term as president Dwight Eisenhower grew increasingly concerned that, if the Chiefs did not cooperate, transcending narrow service views, civilians less familiar with the complexities of warfare, such as the secretary of defense, might assume the Chiefs' responsibilities. [Note 48]

Eisenhower sought a structural solution to the problems of service parochialism and inefficiency. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 aimed to centralize control over the services, remove redundancie streamline command channels, and provide for tighter civilian control the Pentagon. Although Congress expected the act to affirm JCS respon sibility to provide military advice and plan military operations within unified commands (geographical commands that included forces from all four services), the law permitted the OSD to share the Chiefs' advisory role and removed the JCS from the chain of command that ran from the president to the commanders in the field. The secretary of defense would direct the unified commands while the Joint Chiefs performed execution functions, such as translating guidance from the secretary into military orders and directives. Although the Chiefs retained their charter as "principal military advisors," the wide latitude given to the secretary of defene, to provide for more effective and efficient administration would permit strong-willed secretary to concentrate power in his hands. {Note 49] The erosion the Chiefs' power and influence, which Eisenhower had predicted, was closer to becoming a reality. Centralization in the Department of Defene did nothing to attenuate interservice rivalry. Indeed, Eisenhower's defense policies intensified competition between the services.

In The Uncertain Trumpet Taylor advocated even greater centralizatic of JCS advisory responsibility. Deeply affected by conflict among the

Page 15 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD Chiefs, Taylor wrote that he would "dissolve" the organization and replace it with a single defense chief of staff, who, as the senior military officer of the U.S. government, would report directly to the secretary of defense and the president. Taylor recognized that pressures from within the military services colored the advice of JCS members. If a chief were seen as abandoning that service's interest, he risked losing all credibility and respect. Taylor's plan called for an advisory body, independent of the military services, called the Supreme Military Council. The council would consist of senior officers from each of the services who were either retired or on their last tour of duty. [Note 50]

Aware of Taylor's views, the JCS chairman, General Lemnitzer, had been less than enthusiastic about Taylor's appointment as military representative of the president, and Kennedy moved to defuse potential criticism from the Pentagon. Brig. Gen. Chester "Ted" Clifton, the president's military assistant, telephoned McNamara's military

assistant to discuss the formal announcement of the president's decision to place Maxwell Taylor on the White House staff. Clifton observed that Taylor's duties would be "laid out very carefully" so that members of Congress and the press sympathetic to the JCS would not deem Taylor a usurper of the Joint Chiefs' advisory responsibilities. The White House statement would say only that the matter had been "discussed" with the secretary of defense and the joint chiefs of staff. The president directed, however, that General Lemnitzer attend the formal announcement and "stand by to come out with a hurrah." Kennedy also indicated his expectation that Secretary McNamara publicly convey his enthusiasm in some fashion. [Note 51]

The president privately acknowledged that Taylor's responsibilities could easily have been performed by the Pentagon's senior military men. [Note 52] He was not only dissatisfied with the Joint Chiefs' advice but also frustrated by his inability to establish with them the kind of friendly rapport that he enjoyed with the rest of his staff and with many of his cabinet officials. To Kennedy generals and admirals were too formal, traditional, and unimaginative. Bundy confided to Taylor's principal assistant that Kennedy "would never feel really secure" about the military until "young generals of his own generation in whom he has confidence" filled the top uniformed positions in the defense establishment. Bundy knew that it was important to Kennedy that the top military men be able to Page 16 DERELICTION OF DUTY "conduct a conversation" with the president to give him a "feeling of confidence and reassurance.' [Note 53] Taylor would strive to satisfy the president's need. Kennedy's new personal adviser found the president "an amazingly attractive man -- intelligent with a ready wit, personal charm an ability to inspire loyalty in the people around him." He soon cultivated a warm friendship with the president and his family. [Note 54]

Taylor knew that the Chiefs and the secretary of defense viewed him a competing voice in national security issues. The retired general move to head off potential animosities and assured his old friend Lemnitz that he would be more of an ally than a source of competition. He told Lemnitzer that his "close personal relations with the President and his entourage" would help to ensure that the Chiefs' advice reached the president. [Note 55]

When he arrived in Washington on April 22, Taylor's first responsibility was to conduct an investigation of the decision to mount the Bay Pigs invasion. Although he concluded that the Chiefs were "not directly responsible" for the misadventure, he criticized them for not warning the president more urgently of the dangers. When the administration sought military advice on narrow questions about the operation, the Chiefs gave competent answers but offered no overall assessment because "they hadn't been asked. [Note 56] Taylor concluded that relations between the commander in chief and the JCS had reached "crisis" level. [Note 56]

To address the problem he drafted a memorandum outlining what the president ought to expect from the Chiefs in the area of military advice The memo ordered the JCS to initiate advice as well as respond to specific requests. Moreover the Chiefs should fit "military requirements in the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective plttern." The president used Taylor's memo as the basis for a meeting with the Chiefs on May 27, 1961. One month later he signed a slightly revised version, which he designated National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 55. [Note 57]

Taylor's memorandum revealed how much his few weeks' association with the Kennedy White House had changed his thinking about the advisory role of the JCS. When he left the Eisenhower administration, believed that the Joint Chiefs should provide narrowly focused military advice with "limited, if any, attention to political or economic facts since these components of national strategy had qualified spokesmen Page 17 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD elsewhere in the governmental structure. [Note 58] After witnessing the "crisis" that grew out of mutual dislike and distrust between the president and the Joint Chiefs, Taylor abandoned his previous view that the JCS should not "take into account the views and feelings of superiors," and supplanted it with an acknowledgment of "the importance of an intimate, easy relationship, born of friendship and mutual regard between the president and the Chiefs." He revised the conviction that he had held as Army chief of staff that the JCS should remain a "nonpolitical body" whose loyalty to the Constitution and the people superseded allegiance to any particular administration. [Note 59] When Taylor arrived in Washington, the Joint Chiefs were in the middle of scrambling to keep up with the new defense secretary's demands for information and quantitative justifications for existing policies and programs. President Kennedy had given McNamara thirty days to accomplish a complete review of defense policy and the organization of the Pentagon. McNamara was to develop a program to eliminate waste and inefficiency. Anxious to provide "active,

imaginative, and decisive leadership" in the Department of Defense and abandon "the passive practice of simply refereeing the disputes of traditional and partisan [service] factions" that had characterized the efforts of Eisenhower's defense secretaries, the new secretary undertook a comprehensive analysis of his department. [Note 60]

The Joint Chiefs were unable to respond to McNamara's demands fast enough, and their cumbersome administrative system exacerbated the administration's unfavorable opinion of them. [Note 61] Any issue that came before the Chiefs first went to "action officers" of each of the services, who worked on a "flimsy" copy of the proposal. When the action officers reached consensus, they forwarded the issue on buff paper to experienced colonels called "planners." Each planner incorporated his service's position into the paper. The paper, now green in color, rose to the three-star operations deputies of each service, who, if in agreement with the position in the paper, acted for the Chiefs. If the operations deputies could not agree, or if the matter was of critical importance, the issue went before the Chiefs themselves. If the JCS could not reach a consensus opinion on the subject, the dissenting members prepared letters of nonconcurrence and forwarded them to the secretary of defense for decision. Page 18 DERELICTION OF DUTY The system, based on compromise at every level, often resulted in ambiguous, watered-down proposals. [Note 62]

Interservice rivalry complicated an already cumbersome administrative system. Since the Air Force had become an independent service in 1947, the bickering over the organization and employment of military aviation, which had begun in the early 1920s, had worsened. Historian Earl Tilford, Jr., emphasized that the Air Force, "like an illegitimate child at a family reunion . . , felt less than comfortable with its origins, and all the more so since its primary reason for being was based on the unproven doctrine of strategic bombing. [Note 63] The Marines constantly felt threatened by the Army. The Navy, Air Force, and Army each sought important roles within American nuclear strategy and continental defense. Each service feared that another might usurp its role and thereby undercut its structure, its ability to develop future weapons, and thus its ability to wage war. Split decisions in the JCS often resulted from one or more of the services challenging another's justification for the development or procurement of particular weapons. [Note 64] This unhealthy competition often took on the character of an argument between selfish children and undercut further the credibility of the Joint Chiefs as an advisory body.

McNamara quickly lost patience with the Chiefs' unresponsiveness and squabbling. His answer to the mutually reinforcing problems of parochialism and administrative inefficiency became familiar: increased centralization in the OSD. [Note 65] Kennedy gave his new secretary of defense carte blanche, and McNamara took advantage of it. Drawing on his experience with analytical methods and statistics, he forced new management techniques on a reluctant department. He brought in an army of bright young analysts to assist him, and used the wide latitude given the secretary of defense in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 to create a staff structure that mirrored military staff functions. Freed from dependence on the JCS for analysis, McNamara exerted civilian control over what had before been almost exclusively military prerogatives. [Note 66] McNamara's principal staff included young men such as Department of Defense General Counsel John McNaughton (a Harvard Law School professor who replaced Paul Nitze as assistant secretary of defense for inter- Page 19 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD national security affairs in 1963), Special Assistant Adam Yarmolinsky (a longtime Kennedy aide), Charles J. Hitch (former president of the University of California), and the man some referred to as the "chief whiz kid," Alain Enthoven, for whom McNamara created a new Office of Systems Analysis. The defense secretary gave his team "full backing," and the young civilians discharged their responsibilities and exerted their authority with vigor. [Note 67]

McNamara's Whiz Kids were like-minded men who shared their leader's penchant for quantitative analysis and suspicion of proposals based solely on "military experience.'' [Note 68] Many of them had worked in think tanks and research corporations, such as RAND, and they were eager to apply their techniques to the problems of the Defense Department. Taylor recalled that "cost-effectiveness charts appeared on all the walls, and a whole host of requests for information and advice flooded the JCS. [Note 69] The two most important offices were Paul Nitze's International Security Affairs (ISA) and Alain Enthoven's Systems Analysis divisions.

Enthoven quickly became McNamara's point man in establishing firm civilian control over the Defense Department. His flair for quantitative analysis was exceeded only by his arrogance. [Note 70] Enthoven held military experience in low regard and considered military men intellectually inferior. He likened leaving military decision making to the professional military to allowing welfare workers to develop national welfare programs. Enthoven suggested that

military experience "can be a disadvantage because it discourages seeing the larger picture." He and many of his colleagues believed that most people in the Department of Defense simply tried to "advance their particular project or their service or their department." He was convinced that "there was little in the typical officer's early career that qualifies him to be a better strategic planner than . . , a graduate of the Harvard Business School." He used statistics to analyze defense programs and issues and then gave the secretary of defense and the president information needed to make decisions. Enthoven saw no limits to the applicability of his methods. [Note 71]

McNamara's autocratic style and the condescending attitude of his young civilian assistants deeply disturbed the Joint Chiefs and other military officers in the Pentagon. The military viewed Enthoven and the rest of McNamara's staff as adversaries. Differences arose between the JCS and McNamara's office over new management techniques, the military budget, and weapons procurement. The officers resented the lack of Page 20 DERELICTION OF DUTY respect for military experience among those whom they nicknamed derisively McNamara's "happy little hotdogs.'' [Note 72] Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay recalled that McNamara's Whiz Kids were the most egotistical people that I ever saw in my life. They had no faith in the military; they had no respect for the military at all. They felt that the Harvard Business School method of solving problems would solve any problem in the world . . . . They were better than all the rest of us; otherwise they wouldn't have gotten their superior education, as they saw it. [Note 73] Although united in their vexation with McNamara and his staff, the Chiefs remained divided on substantive defense issues. [Note 74]

McNamara, who had promised to act "decisively and effectively to accomplish . . . solution[s]," intervened to resolve issues of contention between the Chiefs. He battled with the Air Force and Navy over his plan to develop a fighter jet common to all the services, the notorious TFX. [Note 75] His and Enthoven's belief that submarines and unmanned missiles were more efficient and effective nuclear deterrents than bombers ran afoul of the Air Force's traditional preference for piloted aircraft. McNamara's opposition to the B-70 bomber program soured his relations with the Air Force until Curtis LeMay retired in 1965. [Note 76] The Army, neglected during the Eisenhower years, benefited from McNamara's belief in strong conventional forces to fight limited wars. In less than one and one-half years in office, McNamara added more than three hundred thousand troops to the Army. [Note 77] Differences over defense allocations and structure diminished the Chiefs' influence relative to the defense secretary's civilian analysts.

The initiative that displeaseed all the services equally was McNamara's method for determining the military budget. Although each of the chiefs opposed the new budget system, McNamara's requirement that each service prepare an unconstrained estimate based on perceived needs kept the Chiefs divided over how defense dollars should be allocated. After receiving uncoordinated service estimates, the Whiz Kids would make recommendations to McNamara on what he should retain and what he should cut from each of the proposals. The Joint Chiefs felt that they had no real influence over the budget process. Adm. David Lamar McDonald later accused McNamara of dishonesty for never admitting Page 21 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD that there was in fact a real ceiling on the budget, and expressed his frustration that "the whiz kids. . , decided what we could get along without," cutting programs without explaining their decisions to the people who would "have to fight" with the weapons and equipment. [Note 78]

Officers on Taylor's personal staff warned the general that the Kennedy administration was making a deliberate effort to minimize the military's influence over defense policy. Air Force major William Y. Smith had observed a "general trend to downgrade the influence of military leaders in the determination of policies." Part of the responsibility, Smith observed, rested with the Chiefs. Citing the inability of the Joint Chiefs to abandon their preoccupation with service interests, he predicted that unless they began to project their advice "outward and upward" and address policy concerns rather than narrow service interests, the prospect for harmonious civil-military relations would remain dim. [Note 79] Taylor's principal assistant, Col. Julian Ewell, blamed the dominance of McNamara's civilian advisers for the weakening of the Chiefs' voice in issues of national security. He shared Bundy's view that no matter what the JCS did to improve their own operation, "the progressive tightening up of the McNamara regime might tend to cancel it out." [Note 80]

Taylor discovered that McNamara often suppressed JCS advice in favor of the views of his civilian analysts. On several defense issues McNamara either failed to consult the JCS or did not forward their views to the White House.

Taylor's staff reported that, in addition to McNamara's strict control over the JCS, greater centralization in the Kennedy White House prevented military advice from reaching the president. The president had increased his reliance on ad hoc gatherings of "principals" that usually included Bundy and McNamara. Informal committees with responsibility for particular issues conducted closed deliberations and often sent papers directly to the president. Ewell observed that loose associations of second-level officials in the White House and the Defense and State departments furthered their own defense agendas by working "across channels by personal contact" and calling on their associates who were "members of the club, and whom they [could] count on to agree with them." The members of Kennedy's inner circle protected their ideas with ideological fervor. The New Frontiersmen believed that to effect change they had to "ignore . . . the minor frictions involved in changing policy." Ewell found that a "moralistic approach" inspired Kennedy's closest advisers to make judgments "which the actual circumstances support only very tenuously." [Note 81] Page 22 DERELICTION OF DUTY

Having concluded that the Joint Chiefs were more an impediment thar an asset, Kennedy moved to replace the "holdover" chiefs of the Eisenhower administration with his own men, who would be less likely to resist his administration's defense policies. [Note 82] JCS chairman Lemnitzer had taken an unequivocal position on Laos and believed that the United States should be prepared to use its full power before deciding to intervene anywhere. [Note 83] Although Lemnitzer's advice may have been appropriate under Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation, it was anathema to Kennedy's and Taylor's conception of flexible response. When Gen Lauris Norstad, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cormmander, announced his intention to retire in September 1962, Kennedy designated Lemnitzer as Norstad's replacement in order to create a vacancy in the chairmanship. He then broke the traditional rotation between the Army, Navy, and Air Force and installed Taylor as the new chairman. [Note 84] Taylor, who had ostensibly retired from military service for years before and had condemned Eisenhower for replacing the Chiefs in similar fashion, thus pushed aside Adm. George Anderson, who had assumed that he was next in line for the job. [Note 85] Simultaneously, Kennedy and McNamara forced Army Chief of Staff Decker, who in April 19th had told McNamara that "we cannot win a conventional war in Southeast Asia," to retire after only two years in the job. [Note 86] McNamar: based on Taylor's recommendation, designated the deputy commander in chief of the European Command, Earle G. Wheeler, as Decker's replacement. [Note 87] With his own man as chairman of the JCS, Kennedy would no longer need a "military representative." When Taylor moved across the Potomac River to the Pentagon, the president abolished the White House position.

On October 1, 1962, Taylor took over as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found the Chiefs, still embittered over what they regarded Kennedy's unfair criticism in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, engaged ongoing battles with civilian officials in the OSD. The Chiefs saw Taylor's selection as the imposition of a Kennedy man on an organizatic designed by law to give impartial military advice to the commander chief. [Note 88]

Taylor quickly cultivated a warm relationship with the man who many of the military officers in the Pentagon deeply resented. [Note 89] Taylor and McNamara found common ground in their belief in the need for Page 23 THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN AND THE OLD GUARD administrative reform in the Pentagon, faith in the "flexible response" strategy, and utter devotion to their commander in chief. Like McNamara, Taylor concluded that the answer to problems of service rivalry and administrative inefficiency was increased centralization of power in the chairmanship and the OSD. Taylor had once lamented the indecisiveness of Eisenhower's defense secretaries, and he lauded McNamara for tackling the tough problems of the department. [Note 90] The bond of respect between the two men was mutual. McNamara considered Taylor "one of the wisest, most intelligent military men ever to serve." [Note 91] Much to the chagrin of the other Chiefs, Taylor and McNamara formed a partnership. Taylor's overwhelming influence with the secretary of defense and the president made opposition to his views futile. [Note 92]

Historian Robert Divine observed that "Vietnam can only be understood in relation to the Cold War." [Note 93] Indeed, Cold War crises during Kennedy's first months as president shaped advisory relationships within his administration and influenced his foreign policy decisions until his assassination in November 1963. Already predisposed to distrust the senior military officers he had inherited from the Eisenhower administration, the Bay of Pigs incident and Laotian crisis motivated the president to seek a changing of the guard in the Pentagon. After the Bay of Pigs, an unsatisfactory diplomatic settlement in Laos, confrontation with the Kremlin over divided Berlin, and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's bullying rhetoric persuaded Kennedy that the United States needed to make its "power

credible." "Vietnam," Kennedy concluded, "is the place." [Note 94] Vietnam, however, loomed in the background while the New Frontiersmen confronted in the Caribbean what would become the best known of Kennedy's Cold War crises. Page 335 NOTES CHAPTER 1

Note 1. The New Frontiersmen: Profiles of the Men Around Kennedy, edited by the Evening Star (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), pp. vii-viii.

Note 2. John E Kennedy, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 2. Page 336 NOTES TO PAGES 1-4 Note 3. lbid., p. 3.

Note 4. Robert Lovett as quoted in Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 137, 207; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 131-32. Note 5. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon, pp. 207-9; Douglas Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense: From Forrestal to

Namara (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1980), p. 77; Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), pp. 28-37; Paul Hendrickson, The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and Five Lives of a Lost War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), pp. 98-101. Note 6. Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense, p. 77. Note 7. Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 84-86.

Note 8. For a description of Rusk's life, from his boyhood through his appointment as secretary of state, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), chaps. 1 through 7; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 270-71; Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense, pp. 82-83; The New Frontiersmen, pp. 17-23; David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 32-37; Joseph Kraft, Profiles in Power (New York: New American Library, 1966), pp. 177-84.

Note 9. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 270; Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp. 43-46; Kraft, Profiles in Power, pp. 163-75. Bundy collaborated with Henry L. Stimson in On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), Stimson's memoirs.

Note 10. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp. 36-37; Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 256, 260. Taylor observed that Kennedy preferred to conduct business with individuals who shared his outlook on life; Maxwell D. Taylor, "Defense Strategy Seminar," speech presented at the National War College, 8 July 1963, General Taylor's Speeches, Box 20, File T-415-69, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, Special Collections Branch, National Defense University Library, for Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as "Taylor Papers").

Note 11. Taylor recalled that the NSC became "little more than a sort of registration office" for decisions that President Kennedy had already "made in the comparative privacy of the oval office." Maxwell D. Taylor, "Trends in National Security Planning," speech presented at the Naval War College, 14 March 1963, General Taylor's Speeches, Box 20, File T-415-69, Taylor Papers; William E Bundy, unpublished manuscript, Papers of William P. Bundy, chap. 3, pp. 2-3, at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (hereafter cited as William Bundy, unpublished manuscript). The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library is hereafter cited as LBJ Library. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993, tape recording, Washington, D.C.; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967),

Page 337 NOTES TO PAGES 4-7

Note 11 (continued) pp. 55-56. President Lyndon Johnson continued the Kennedy practice. For an insightful comparative analysis of Eisenhower's and Johnson's national security structures, see John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989). Maxwell Taylor took a sympathetic view of the Kennedy policy process. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 279-80. The Taylor quotation is from his speech "The National Security Act of i947 and the Evolution of the DOD."

Note 12. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, interview by author, 26 July 1993, audio tape, Point Loma, California; Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993; Memorandum, Colonel Ewell for General Taylor, 6 February 1962, Box 17, File T-257-69, Taylor Papers.

Note 13. William Bundy recalled that the Bay of Pigs shook "for good what had been an almost ebullient confidence within the Administration." William Bundy, unpublished manuscript, chap. 3, p. 26. Walt Rostow confirmed Bundy's observation. Walt W. Rostow, second interview by author, 21 October 1993 (handwritten notes), Austin, Tex.

Note 14. Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), pp. 61-62, 90.

Note 15. Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure, pp. 114-50; Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 294-309; Herbert S. Parmet, JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (New York: Dial Press, 1983), pp. 157-79; Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Touchstone, 1993), pp. 83-84.

Note 16. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993. Goodpaster, while serving as military assistant to President Eisenhower, was the first to present the proposal for an invasion of Cuba to the president. Goodpaster remained in the Kennedy White House for several weeks to assist in the transition between administrations. Goodpaster cited the lack of continuity between the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations due to the new president's overhaul of the NSC structure as the primary cause of the Bay of Pigs incident. Paul Nitze observed that the Kennedy system resulted in a "perpetual state of reaction to one crisis after another rather than working toward long-term goals," and was characterized by an inability to learn from past mistakes. Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988), p. 252.

Note 17. Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 148. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993; Theodore C. Mataxis (public affairs officer for both General Lemnitzer and General Taylor from 1961 to 1964), interview by author, 19 February 1993, tape recording, Chapel Hill, N.C.; Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 607; Robert E Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, In His Own Words: The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years, ed. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 241; William Bundy, unpublished manuscript, chap. 3, p. 26.

Note 18. David M. Shoup, Oral History Transcript, 7 April 1967, John E Kennedy Library, pp. 13-23; Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 Page 338 NOTES TO PAGES 7-9

Note 18 (continued) February 1993; Curtis LeMay, "Inquiry," interview in USA Today, 23 July 1986, p. 9A; Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay (New York: Crown Publishers, 1986), pp. 353-56.

Note 19. Anatoli 1. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), p. 82.

Note 20. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Note 21. Walt W. Rostow, interview by author, 21 October 1993, Austin, Tex., handwritten notes. Note 22. This vignette is related by Roger Hilsman in Ted Gittinger, ed., The Johnson Years: A Vietnam

Roundtable (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. 8. Note 23. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 87-88. Note 24. Walt W. Rostow, interview by author, 21 October 1993; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 217-19. Note 25. Charles A. Stevenson, The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954 (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1972), pp. 179, 181. Note 26. Walt W. Rostow, interview by author, 21 October 1993; Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 88. Note 27. Moya Ann Ball, Vietnam-on-the-Potomac (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 90. Note 28. Memorandum for Record, Telephone Conversation between General C. V. Clifton and Captain Means

Johnson, 24 June 1961, in the Personal Papers of Robert S. McNamara, Record Group 200, Box 63, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as McNamara Papers). President Kennedy was tormented with guilt over his decision to withdraw support for the landing force. Walt W. Rostow, interview by author, 21 October 1993.

Note 29. For Taylor's childhood and military career, see John Taylor, General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen (New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 11-31. See also, Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), chaps. 1 through 10.

Note 30. Ridgway retired after only two of the usual four years due to his differences with Eisenhower. Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 39; E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953-1957 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), pp. 121-26.

Note 31. Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 23; Swords and Plowshares, pp. 170-71; "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD," speech presented at the National War College, 13 February 1978, Lectures and Articles 1946-1986, Taylor Papers, pp. 5-10. On October 9, 1957, Neil McElroy replaced Charles Wilson as Secretary of Defense. Neither had much influence on the development of defense policy, and Eisenhower relied primarily on JCS chairman Adm. Arthur Radford and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles

Page 339 NOTES TO PAGES 9-13

Note 31 (continued) for national security advice; Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense, pp. 44-71; Borklund, Men of the Pentagon, pp. 138-83.

Note 32. Maxwell Taylor, "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD." Note 33. Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 150-56;

Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books), 1982, p. 169; Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 64-65; Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson, pp. 16, 100-104.

Note 34. Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p 37. Note 35. For a compact summary of the New Look, see Duane Windsor, "Eisenhower's New Look Reexamined:

The View from Three Decades," in Joann P. Krieg, ed., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 147-50. See also, Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), pp. 14-24; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 171-72; Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, pp. 33-39.

Note 36. John Foster Dulles as quoted in Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, p. 27. Note 37. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, pp. 33-34; Windsor, "Eisenhower's New Look Reexamined," p.

149; Richard M. Saunders, "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency," Political Science Quarterly 100 (Spring 1985), p. 99.

Note 38. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, chap. 8 passim, especially pp. 137, 146, 153. Note 39. Letter from John E Kennedy to Evan Thomas, 17 December 1959, as cited in Taylor, General Maxwell

Taylor, p. 8. Note 40. John E Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget," 28 March 1961, in John W.

Gardner, ed., To Turn the Tide (New York: Harper Brothers, 1962), p. 59. Note 41. Taylor quotes in full the directive that President Kennedy signed on 26 June 1961 to establish the position

in "Trends in National Security Planning." Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 179-81,195-97. Note 42. For an account of General Taylor's childhood and career through 1958, see his autobiography, Swords

and Plowshares, chap. 1 through 11; Maxwell D. Taylor, "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD." The quotation is from Swords and Plowshares, p. 170.

Note 43. For a discussion of this dilemma, see Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Foreign Affairs 42 (January 1964), pp. 255-68. The Eisenhower quotation is from Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 356. Taylor, "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD," p. 7; The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 18-20; Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 57. Page 340 NOTES TO PAGES 13-15

Note 44. Andrew J. Goodpaster, "The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Security Structure," in Amos A. Jordan, Jr., ed., Issues of National Security in the 1970's (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 222; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 4 vols. (New York: Viking Press, 1963-1987); for this point, see Volume 2, Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942, pp. 283, 298-300. A debate on postwar defense organization began briefly in March of 1944 but was postponed until after the war.

Note 45. Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Role and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Chronology (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff Historical Office, 1987), pp. 1-36; Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1989 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff Historical Office, 1989), pp. 17, 21; U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, December 31, 1958, Box 17, File T-259- 69, Taylor Papers. In practice the Marine Corps Commandant was given wide latitude in determining what issues

related to his service. For a portion of the debate over defense organization, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482, 79th Congress, 2d Session, 1946.

Note 46. The following laws codify the Joint Chiefs' major responsibilities: Statutes at Large, LXI, 253, sec. 211; LXI, 875, sec. 211; LXIll, 203, sec. 1; and LXIII, 579. For a summary of organizational changes in the JCS from 1942 to 1989, see Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1989.

Note 47. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Unification of the Armed Forces: Hearing Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, 79th Congress, 2d Session, 1946, pp. 31-35.

Note 48. Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Transcript, 1973, Columbia University Oral History Project, pp. 53-56. Note 49. Public Law 85-599, August 6, 1958. See also, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1969 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff Historical Office, 1970), p. 24. For the evolution of the Department of Defense structure between the years 1945 and 1960, see John Charles Binkley, The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Security Policy Making: Professionalism and Self-Perceptions, 1942-1961 (Ph.D. diss., Loyola University, Chicago, 1985). See also Goodpaster, "The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Security Structure," pp. 230-31.

Note 50. Theoretically the separation between these officers and their services would mitigate service parochialism. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, chap. 9 passim, especially pp. 175-78.

Note 51. Memorandum for Record, Telephone Conversation between General C. V. Clifton and Captain Means Johnson, 24 June 1961, Box 63, McNamara Papers.

Note 52. Ibid. Page 341 NOTES TO PAGES 16-18

Note 53. Memorandum, Colonel Ewell for General Taylor, 6 February 1962, File T-257-69, Box 17, Taylor Papers. Note 54. Taylor, "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD."

Note 55. Taylor, Note 56. Taylor, "Trends in National Security Planning." "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of

the DOD," pp. 15-16. Taylor's associates in the investigation were Attorney General Robert E Kennedy, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and recently retired Chief of Naval

Operations Adm. Arleigh Burke. Note 57. Taylor, "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD," pp. 15-18. See also NSAM 55,

President to CJCS, 28 June 1961, as read by Maxwell D. Taylor in "Military Advice: Its Use in Government," speech delivered at the annual meeting of the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, February 15, 1964, in Vital Speeches 30, no. 11 (March 15, 1964), p. 339. See also Willard J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), p. 16; Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 605. Note 58. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, p. 21. Note 59. For these contrasting earlier and later views compare Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 18-21, and Swords and Plowshares, p. 252. Note 60. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. x.

Note 61. Eugene Zuckert, Oral History Transcript, 18 March 1969, sec. 1, p. 54, LBJ Library. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993; Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993. Note 62. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993. Goodpaster described the JCS organization as "ponderous, stultified, and heavily influenced by service interests." See also Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Interview, 18 March 1969, Columbia University Oral History Project, pp. 53-56; Henry W. Buse, Oral History Transcript, 1971, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C., pp. 166-67; Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 88-129; Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 22- 25.

Note 63. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991), p. 284. Note 64. Bernard Rogers, interview by author, 12 March 1993, Washington, D.C. For tension between the Air Force and the Navy over aviation, see Memo to Air Force Chief of Staff" from It. General David Burchinal, 2 April 1963, Folder 8, Box 134, General Curtis LeMay Papers, Special Collections Branch, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. (hereafter cited as LeMay Papers). For an Army

perspective, see General H. K. Johnson, Oral History Transcript, 1972-1974, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Institute for Military History, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., vol. 1, sec. 3, pp. 3-4 (hereafter cited as H. K. Johnson, Oral History Transcript). See also Norman Paul, Oral History Transcript, 21 February 1969, tape 1, pp. 20-22, LBJ Page 342 NOTES TO PAGES 18-20

Note 64 (continued) Library. For Marine Corps distrust of the Army, see Buse, Oral History Transcript, 1971, p. 168. In his oral history Army general Harold K. Johnson argued that the Marine Corps should be kept small due to its "head down and charge" mentality. For a contemporary document linking the Joint Chiefs' lack of influence to service parochialism, see Julian Ewell, Memorandum for General Taylor, Subject: Review of Staff Functions: A Look Backward and Forward, 31 January 1962, File T-257-69, Box 17, Taylor Papers.

Note 65. In 1949 Secretary of Defense Forrestal recommended increased centralization to ameliorate interservice rivalry.

Note 66. Presidential adviser Walt W. Rostow observed that Kennedy entrusted "extraordinary and rarely diluted" authority to McNamara. McNamara had "undisputed primacy in the Pentagon." Walt W. Rostow, Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 161. For a description of how McNamara used changes to the National Security Act of 1947 to consolidate power in the Pentagon, see Binkley, "The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," p. 169.

Note 67. Memo, Subject: Administration of the Department of Defense, undated (filed under June 1961), Box 13, McNamara Papers. Nitze became secretary of the navy.

Note 68. Alain Enthoven, Oral History Transcript, 29 July 1970, tape 1, p. 6, LBJ Library; David Lamar McDonald, The Reminiscences of Admiral David Lamar McDonald (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1976), pp. 359-61; Shoup, Oral History Transcript, 7 April 1967, JFK Library, p. 3; Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993; Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993.

Note 69. Colin S. Gray, "What RAND Hath Wrought," Foreign Policy 4 (Fall 1971), pp. 111-29. The Taylor quotation is from Maxwell Taylor, "Defense Strategy Seminar," speech presented at the National War College, 8 July 1963, File T-415-69, Box 20, p. 12, Taylor Papers.

Note 70. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 243; Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993; Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993.

Note 71. Alain Enthoven, History Transcript, 29 July 1970, tape 1, p. 6, LBJ Library; Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 73-116. Quotations are from pp. 73, 89, 91. For Enthoven's views on the universal applicability of systems analysis, see pp. 307-8.

Note 72. H. K. Johnson, Oral History Transcript, 1972-1974, part 1, sec. 6, pp. 2-3; McDonald, Reminiscences, pp. 359-61; Shoup, Oral History Interview, 7 April 1967, JFK Library, p. 3; Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993; Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993.

Note 73. LeMay, Oral History Transcript, 28 June 1971, p. 7, LBJ Library. Note 74. The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Shoup, expressed frustrations similar to General

LeMay's. He noted that McNamara

Page 343 NOTES TO PAGES 20-22 Note 74 (continued) would question the basis for organizations that the services had "been working on for a hell of a lot of years and perfected these organizations in combat .... So we really questioned his audacity ... we really gave him a low mark in that regard." Shoup, Oral History Transcript, 7 April 1967, JFK Library, p. 3. See also Harold K. Johnson, Oral History Transcript, 1972-1974, part 2, sec. 11, 1-2; Norman Paul (assistant to McNamara), Oral History Transcript, 21 February 1969, tape 2, p. 2.

Note 75. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993. For a detailed account of this bureaucratic battle, see Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968). Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 204-23.

Note 76. On the B-70 controversy, see Curtis LeMay, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 4-13. See also Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 223-24. The Air Force also resisted McNamara's initiative to revise strategic nuclear targeting. Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 106-11.

Note 77. Roger Trask, The Secretaries of Defense: A Brief History, 1947-1985 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1985), p. 29.

Note 78. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993; McDonald, Reminiscences, pp. 359-60. Note 79. Memorandum for General Taylor from Major William Y. Smith, Subject: Review of Staff Functions: A

Look Backward and Forward, File T-257-69, Box 17, Taylor Papers. Note 80. Memorandum for General Taylor from Colonel Julian J. EweU, 6 February 1962, File T-257-69, Box 17,

Taylor Papers. Note 81. Memorandum for General Taylor, 16 April 1962, File T-129-69, Box 17, Taylor Papers. McNamara did

not present to President Kennedy the JCS position on a proposed decrease in the Atomic Energy Commission's budget. The memo identified Alain Enthoven as a part-time member of the "club."

Note 82. The Kennedy White House used the term "hold-overs" to describe the members of the JCS inherited from the Eisenhower administration, Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 607-8; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 252. Walt Rostow stated that the relationship between Kennedy and the Chiefs under Chairman Lemnitzer was "a nightmare. It was just awful." Walt Rostow, Oral History Transcript, 21 March 1969, sec. 1, p. 33.

Note 83. Lyman Lemnitzer, Oral History Interview, part 2, Lemnitzer Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, 4 May 1972, pp. 56-57.

Note 84. Earle G. Wheeler, Oral History Interview, 21 August 1969, sec. 1, pp. 3-4, LBJ Library; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 252.

Note 85. Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993. Anderson had begun interviewing members of Lemnitzer's staff to determine if he would retain them after assuming the chairmanship. Page 344 NOTES TO PAGES 22-25

Note 86. Decker quotation is from Edward Johnson, Memorandum of Conversation, 29 April 1961, Edward C. Keefer, ed., FRUS, 1961-1963: Laos Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 150-54.

Note 87. Stephen E Kenney, Vietnam Decision-Making: A Psychological Perspective on American Foreign Policy (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1978), pp. 40-42.

Note 88. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993. Theodore C. Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 113-114.

Note 89. Bernard W. Rogers, interview by author, 12 March 1993, Washington, D.C., tape recording; Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by author, 9 March 1993.

Note 90. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 175-176; "Trends in National Security Planning," p. 15; "The National Security Act of 1947 and the Evolution of the DOD."

Note 91. Robert S. McNamara as quoted in James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989), p. 51.

Note 92. Taylor acknowledged that the influence of the JCS was low prior to his chairmanship. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 260; Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, eds., Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978), p. 282; Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 422, 427; Buse, Oral History Transcript, 1971, pp. 174, 179, 206-7; Theodore Mataxis, interview by author, 19 February 1993.

Note 93. Robert Divine, "Vietnam: An Episode in the Cold War," in Lloyd Gardner, ed., Vietnam: The Early Decisions (forthcoming from Austin: University of Texas Press), p. 4.

Note 94. Karnow, Vietnam, p. 265.