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INSTRUMENTALITY AND THE DENIAL OF PERSONHOOD: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF OBJECTIFYING OTHERS

Jessica M. LaCroix, Felicia Pratto

Presses universitaires de Grenoble | « Revue internationale de psychologie sociale »

2015/1 Tome 28 | pages 183 à 211 ISSN 0992-986X ISBN 9782706123108

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Revue inteRnationale de psychologie sociale 2015 n° 1

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instrumentality and the denial of personhood: the social psychology of objectifying others

Instrumentalité et déni de la personne: la psychologie sociale de l’objectivation d’autrui

Jessica M. LaCroix* Felicia Pratto*

* Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269. E-mail: jessica. [email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract

Although recent social psychologi- cal objectification research has focused on men sexually objectify- ing women, there are numerous other domains and methods by which people treat others as objects. This paper incorporates Nussbaum’s (1995) delineation of seven ways to objectify a person with Holland and Haslam’s (2013) conceptualization of objectification as treating another person as a thing and denying the other ’s personhood. Four of the methods of objectification that Nussbaum (1995) describes – instrumentaliza- tion, fungibility, violability, and ownership – amount to treating another person as a thing, whereas the other three – denial of auton- omy, of agency, and of subjective experience – are means of denying

Key-words Objectification, instrumentality,

dehumanization

Mots-clés Objectivation,

instrumentalité, déshumanisation

Résumé

Bien que la recherche récente sur l’objectivation en psychologie sociale se soit concentrée sur l’ob- jectivation sexuelle des femmes de la part des hommes, il existe de nombreux autres contextes dans lesquels les individus traitent autrui comme un objet ainsi que de manières d’objectiver autrui. Cet article intègre la taxonomie de Nussbaum (1995), qui décrit sept façons d’objectiver une personne avec la conceptualisation d’Holland et Haslam (2013) de l’objectivation selon lesquels celle-ci correspond au fait de traiter autrui comme une chose et de lui nier le statut de personne. Quatre des méthodes décrites par Nussbaum (1995) –instrumentalisation, fongibilité, violabilité, et propriété – corres- pondent au fait de traiter autrui

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personhood. We review social psychological research that pertains to each of these seven means of objectification and show that objec- tification is distinguishable from closely related social psychological phenomena to the extent that 1) agents treat others as instrumental tools to achieve their own ends, and 2) agents deny others at least one aspect of personhood. This review not only includes research on interpersonal treatment, but intergroup treatment and institu- tional treatment as well.

comme une chose, alors que les trois autres – déni d’autonomie, d’agentivité, et d’expérience subjec- tive, sont des façons de nier le statut de personne. Nous passons en revue la recherche en psycholo- gie sociale qui se réfère à chacune de ces sept façons d’objectiver et montrons que l’objectivation est distincte de phénomènes connexes dans la mesure où les agents trai- tent autrui comme des outils visant à atteindre leurs propres fins, et où les agents nient à autrui au moins un aspect de leur personne. Cette revue ne se cantonne pas à la recherche sur les relations interper- sonnelles, mais envisage également les relations intergroupes et les institutions.

In studying objectification, social psychology has generally focused on sexual objectification and its consequences for women (e.g., self-objectification, Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Objectification, however, is a much broader phenomenon (Nussbaum, 1995), and because it is about relationships, social psychology can help clarify its conceptualization. At this stage, objectification is due a more thorough conceptualization; we will explore whether objectification has any fundamental properties, how it is distinct from other biases (e.g., stereotyping, dehuman- ization), and identify areas for future research.

At the outset, we acknowledge that to many people, the term “objectification” implies something objectionable. Treating people as objects can be morally problematic and can contribute to inequality, although the consequences of objectification depend on context (Nussbaum, 1995). Social philosopher Nussbaum specifies seven ways to treat a person as a thing, including treating others as instrumental, fungible, violable, and

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owned as well as denying others autonomy, agency, and subjec- tivity (see Table 1). Further, she posits that the presence of any one feature is sufficient to identify a case as objectification, although usually multiple features are present in a given case. Nonetheless, Nussbaum (1995, p. 261) identifies instrumentaliza- tion, or treating people as if they were mere tools for one’s own purposes, as “the most morally exigent notion” involved in the objectification of others. She argues that instrumentalizing others denies “what is fundamental to them as human beings, namely the status of beings[sic] ends in themselves” and explains that instrumentalizing others may leave them “ripe for other abuses as well – for the refusal of imagination involved in the denial of subjectivity, for the denial of individuality involved in fungibility, and even for bodily and spiritual violation and abuse” (p. 265). Instrumentalization may therefore be viewed as the root of objec- tification.

Nussbaum (1995, p. 259) recognizes that objectification has two key components when she states, “we are going to be at least as interested in the treatment that is denied to persons as in the treatment that accorded them[sic].” Holland and Haslam (2013, p. 463) likewise conceptualize objectification as consisting of two components, “the treatment of a person both as an object and not as a subject.” We allow that treatment as a thing includes Nussbaum’s (1995) instrumentalization, fungibility, violability, and ownership, and that treatment as a non-subject includes her denial of autonomy, of agency, and of subjective experience. However, we think the inherent moral objection to objectifica- tion is due to its non-reciprocal nature. That is, the “use” of others as tools without regard to their needs, desires, autonomy, and so forth is what constitutes objectification because it violates the fundamental human norm to reciprocate (e.g., Axelrod, 1984). Our central thesis is therefore more specific than Holland and Haslam’s (2013) and Nussbaum’s (1995) conceptualizations: We assert that the two necessary conditions of objectification are 1) that the Agent treats the Other not just as a thing, but specifi- cally as an instrumental tool to be used for the Agent’s particular purpose, and 2) that the Agent also denies or fails to acknowl- edge some aspect of the Other’s personhood – his or her autonomy, agency, or subjective experiences.

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To illustrate our thesis, we first turn to the most familiar example in social psychological research at present – sexual objectifica- tion. Sexual objectification is a focus on the utility of a person’s sexual functions or body parts, which are perceived as mere instruments or as if they represented the whole person (Bartky, 1990). This widely accepted definition of sexual objectification includes both our criteria of instrumentalization and ignoring other aspects of personhood, and research has shown that sexual objectification can entail all seven of Nussbaum’s (1995) processes. Beyond instrumentalization, Agents treat sexualized others as: 1) more fungible (e.g., Gervais, Vescio, & Allen, 2012), 2) more violable (e.g., Loughnan et al., 2010; Loughan, Pina, Vasquez, & Puvia, 2013), 3) as owned (e.g., commodification), 4) as less autonomous (e.g., Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2010), 5) as less agentic (e.g., K. Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2011), and 6) as having less subjectivity than nonsexual- ized others (Loughnan et al., 2010, 2013, 2015). Hence, the instrumentalization inherent in sexual objectification contributes to denial of personhood.

The goal of our paper is to extend the concept of objectification to include phenomena outside the sexual realm. Indeed, the concept of objectification as inhumane treatment of useful others stems from Marxist analyses of labor. This paper has two parts: the first explores research on how to treat a person as a thing using four of Nussbaum’s (1995) methods of objectification – as instrumental, fungible, violable, and owned – and the second explores how to treat a person as not a subject via her other three criteria – denying autonomy, agency, and subjectivity. Space limits preclude an exhaustive review, but our review is illustrative. Within each section we compare related social psychological research to our conceptualization of objectification – instrumen- talization plus denial of personhood – to determine what phenomena may or may not constitute objectification.

how to treat a person as an object

For each way of treating people as things, we present Nussbaum’s (1995) terms and definitions in italics before summarizing rele- vant research in social psychology (see Table 1 for a brief

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overview). In our review, we acknowledge that a number of common social-psychological processes relevant to treating people as things are not usually referred to as being about objec- tification. Note also that we take “treatment” to mean behavior as well as “psychological treatment” involving perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes.

Instrumentality. The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes. Both components of instrumentality, 1) that the Other is a tool, 2) who helps the Agent fulfill his or her goals, have largely been addressed by research on sexual objectification, as previously discussed. Work on person perception, stereotypes, and goal compatibility offer additional insights into the nature of instrumentalization and the conditions under which it is and is not a characteristic of objectification.

One of the most important and chronic kinds of social percep- tion involves instrumentality; “we often want to know what people can do to or for us and what we can do to them” (McArthur & Baron, 1983, p. 218). “Usefulness” has a positive connotation, although what the Other should do to be useful for the Agent may not be appealing to the Other. Stereotypes often prescribe ways that people could be useful, for example, in gendered work roles (Eagly & Steffen, 1984) or subtypes about task roles (e.g., jock; Ryckman, Butler, Thornton, & Linder, 1997). According to Nussbaum (1995, p. 265), “what is problematic is not instrumentalization per se, but treating someone primarily or merely as an instrument.” If a person is merely an instrument used to achieve the Agent’s goals, then the Agent is overlooking the Other’s personhood and engaging in objectification.

“Useful” people are not necessarily always objectified. A broad range of social psychological work shows people do not overlook others’ personhood if they have compatible goals. According to image theory, groups with similar power, status, and compatible goals are perceived as allies (Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995). Allies are useful but are not objectified because they grant each other autonomy and agency in order to meet the goals of all parties. Structurally, enemies contrast with allies only in having incompatible goals. Whereas Agents may attend to the subjec- tivity of enemies (e.g., intentions), they exclude enemy Others

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from their scope of moral concern, which can justify violation. Moral exclusion amounts to objectification only when Agents also instrumentalize enemies, otherwise it amounts to dehumaniza- tion. The “colony,” with lower power and status, is instrumental to “imperialists” and their exploitation serves only the goals of the imperialist and ignores the autonomy of the colony. Colonization thus constitutes objectification.

Means of treating a person as an object

Nussbaum’s property Example of relevant research

Interpersonal & intergroup examples

Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes.

High-power Agents are more likely to approach instrumental Others than low-power Agents (Gruenfeld et al., 2008).

A franchise manager pays employees as little as possible to maximize his own cut of the profits. The U.S. treats Mexicans as its reserve labor pool, tolerating their presence only when it needs more labor.

Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type and/or (b) with objects of other types.

Instrumental Others are more easily confused with other instrumental Others than with non-instrumental Others (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009).

A professional is indifferent as to which office assistant will email an announcement. When one Black US Supreme Court Justice retires, a different Black judge with different legal sensibilities is nominated.

Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, break into.

Abusive men perceive violence against their intimate partners as instrumental in asserting masculinity (Anderson & Umberson, 2001).

A parent humiliates and beats a child. A country invades or bombs another country.

Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.

Slavery and bonded debt (Bales, 2004).

An owner of a baseball team sells the contract for one of his players to another owner. Britain and France redraw the national boundaries of North Africa and the Middle East.

TaBle 1: Features of objectification accor-

ding to Nussbaum (1995)

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Nussbaum’s property Example of relevant research

Interpersonal & intergroup examples

Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self- determination.

Representation of women and minorities as mere side-kicks, as non-autonomous characters (Behm- Morawitz & Ortiz, 2013).

A husband tells his wife she has no right to decide where she sleeps. Nation-states ignore the claims of self-sovereignty made by indigenous peoples.

Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity.

When women athletes are portrayed as sexual objects, they are perceived as less capable, less strong, less determined, and less intelligent (Gurung & Chrouser, 2007).

Not trusting him to do it correctly, a wife selects what her husband will wear. Foreign and defense ministers assuming that other nations will capitulate to their postures.

Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account.

Sexually objectified Others are attributed fewer emotions, thoughts, and intentions (Loughnan et al., 2010).

An employer demands an employee work in conditions the employee judged to be dangerous. Historians do not bother explaining events from other culture’s points of view.

Note. Nussbaum (1995) conceptualizes objectification as any one of these seven properties. Holland and Haslam (2013) conceptualize objectification as consisting of at least one method of treating a person as an object and at least one method of treating a person as not a subject. We conceptualize objectification as consisting specifically of instrumentality (regardless of co-presence of fungibility, violability, and/or ownership) and at least one method of treating a person as not a subject.

Glick and Fiske’s (1996) conceptualization of ambivalent sexism also concerns both instrumentality and goal compatibility. Benevolent sexists assume women should be instrumental (e.g., by providing care) while hostile sexists punish women who “take” (men’s) high power roles. Here again, the mutuality of goals, and not just whether the Other is viewed as instrumental, influences whether attitudes towards the Other are benevolent or hostile. When benevolent sexists expect women to provide care, but fail to acknowledge that women have autonomy over their lives or also need care, they are objectifying women. When hostile sexists deem women’s self-determination unimportant even while

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acknowledging their instrumental capabilities (e.g., compe- tence), then they, too, are objectifying women. Parallel arguments can be made for how ambivalent sexism against men objectifies men (Glick & Fiske, 1999). In all instances, Agents use Others as tools to fulfill their own goals while overlooking aspects of Others’ personhoods.

The stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) also addresses goal compatibility and instrumentality in speci- fying that people are interested in 1) whether others will help or hinder goal attainment (warmth) and 2) whether others are capable of helping or hindering goal attainment (competence). Note, though, that some stereotypes imply that others are useless and perhaps not quite human (e.g., mentally challenged persons), but this does not make them objects unless they also serve a function (e.g., an object of ridicule). Only when Agents view Others both as useful (e.g., entertaining) and as a non- subject (e.g., non-autonomous) are they objectifying.

As with allies in intergroup relations and some stereotypes, inter- personal relationships may also be instrumental but non-objectifying. Fitzsimons and Shah (2008) had participants consider their friends, family members, or romantic partners as instrumental or noninstrumental for particular goals. Having active goals heightened participants’ accessibility of instrumental others, increased positive feelings towards them, and led partici- pants to approach them more readily than noninstrumental others. Further, participants who evaluated others in terms of goal-instrumentality were more successful in achieving their goals, indicating the potential functionality of perceiving others in terms of their usefulness. To the extent people care about the subjective states of their intimates (e.g., friends), such relation- ships include instrumentality but not objectification.

In contrast, experiments by Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, and Galinski (2008) explored how power facilitates instrumentalization “whereby the needs, interests, and experiences of those with less power are subordinated to those of the powerful” (p. 111). For the most part, results demonstrated that perceiving others in terms of their instrumentality can be functional (e.g., selection of job candidates). However, they also found a less functional and

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more objectionable outcome. When presented with an analytical performance goal and a moderately competent but highly attrac- tive female partner, high-power male Agents who had been primed with sex reported more willingness to work with the woman compared with high-power Agents who had not been primed with sex and low-power Agents, despite the woman’s lower instrumentality. Power-sex associations may contribute to sexual harassment by some men (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995) who instrumentalize women and ignore their self- determination and subjective experiences.

In considering whether the aforementioned cases of instrumen- tality can be classified as objectification, the degree of mutuality and reciprocation is crucial; if one party uses the Other to its own ends and disregards the Other’s autonomy, agency, and/or subjective experiences, then we may label the behavior objectifi- cation. If one, rather than both parties behaves in this matter, then the relationship will also appear to be unequal.

Fungibility. The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other types. Some kinds of fungibility are due to social category use – getting any one of several friends to help unload a truck, or hiring one of a pool of similarly qualified job applicants. Psychological fungibility includes viewing outgroups as homoge- nous (e.g., Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) and making within-race errors while trying to distinguish between faces of people of other races (e.g., Anthony, Cooper, & Mullen, 1992). Without forgetting the humanity of friends, employees, and others, these examples do not constitute objectification.

However, “tokens” – fungible by virtue of one person standing in for a group – serve a representational function, such as diversity, exoticism, or posturing openness. Representing a token Other in stereotypic ways in mass media makes such characters inter- changeable (Behm-Morawitz, & Ortiz, 2013; Dill, 2009). For example, imbuing token women with “personality female syndrome” (i.e., emotional, petty, and vain; Sarkeesian, 2013) makes female characters interchangeable, while male characters are idiosyncratic and thus irreplaceable. Because female charac- ters are all alike, there is no need to have more than one (i.e., the

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Smurfette Principle; Pollitt, 1991), and doing so may present problems. Lino DiSalvo, the animation head of Disney’s Frozen (Buck, Lee, & Del Vecho, 2013), describes the difficulty in animating multiple female characters in the same film:

Historically speaking, animating female characters are really, really difficult, because they have to go through these range of emotions, but you have to keep them pretty … you can get them off a model very quickly. So, having a film with two hero female characters was really tough, and having them both in the scene and look very different if they’re echoing the same expression; that Elsa looking angry looks different from Anna being angry (quoted in Stampler, 2013).

One consequence of the reluctance to deviate from normative beauty standards can be erasure of individuality, as in the stan- dardization of beauty pageants (C. N., 2013). In fact, people who conform to ideal appearance standards, and even women with average bodies, are visually fungible with similar others (Gervais, Vescio, & Allen, 2012). When any category member will suffice for a purpose, individuals are usually not accorded self-determina- tion or agency and their subjectivity may be ignored, thus constituting objectification.

Research on interpersonal relationships provides additional insights about when fungibility is a feature of objectification. In exchange relationships such as employment, employers norma- tively can replace employees, especially if employees lack special skills or unique contributions (e.g., artistry). In contrast, the conceptualization of love as an attitude toward a particular person implies a lack of fungibility for the loved one. People in committed relationships limit their attention to attractive alterna- tives (Maner, Rouby, & Gonzaga, 2008), perhaps indicating the nonfungibility of their current partner. However, those for whom people feel lust, but not love, are more readily exchanged for similar others, so evidently sexual instrumentalization contrib- utes to fungibility (Förster, Özelsel, & Epstude, 2009). Of course, people do sometimes replace relationship partners with new or even old partners (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995), but whether this fungibility is a feature of objectification depends on 1) whether the replacement partner is perceived primarily as useful

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for some specific purpose (e.g., sex, emotional or financial support, see Jonason, 2013), and 2) whether the replacement partner’s personhood is trivialized or ignored, for instance, by dismissing the Other’s feelings or usurping the Other’s autonomy by lying about one’s intentions.

Violability. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, break into. Sexually objectified Others are perceived as less deserving of moral treatment and more deserving of pain (Loughnan et al., 2010, 2013), that is, as more violable. Similarly, Gervais and Davidson (2013) describe intimate partner abuse as dehumanization and treating the Other as a thing rather than a person (see Gold, Swingle, Hill, & Elfant, 1998, for a similar conceptualization regarding child sexual abuse). In cases of patri- archal terrorism, men systematically use violence, threats, and isolation to assert masculinity and to control their partners (Anderson & Umberson, 2001; Johnson 1995). Abusers literally get inside their victims’ heads (i.e., psychological violation), and victims spend such an exorbitant amount of emotional and cogni- tive energy trying to anticipate and manage violence that they are likely to become less emotionally responsive, more cognitively rigid, and less agentic (Smith, Smith, & Earp, 1999). Maltreatment therefore reduces these human nature traits, contributing to mechanistic dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). Researchers have noted a cycle of objectification, psychological violence (Gervais & Davidson, 2013), and sexual violence (Carr & Szymanski, 2011).

Sexual assault may be the most obvious illustration of violability; the perpetrator physically penetrates the other’s body. Here, as with patriarchal terrorism, legitimizing ideologies and prejudicial attitudes promote objectifying behavior (e.g., Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). Sexually objectifying women facilitates violating them: it is linked with self-reported sexual aggression (Gervais, DiLillo, & McChargue, 2014), acceptance of abuse in relationships (Tully, 2012), and men with stronger implicit associations between women and objects (e.g., object, tool, device) report stronger willingness to rape (Rudman & Mescher, 2012). Physical, psycho- logical, and sexual abuse fit with our conceptualization of objectification when violence against the Other is viewed as

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instrumental (e.g., to exert dominance, for pleasure) and the victim is denied autonomy, things that provide agency (e.g., employment, transportation; Bush, 2011), and/or the victim’s subjective experiences are dismissed or co-opted for the use of the abuser. Violability may also co-exist with perceptions of ownership; social psychological research has shown that men who grew up in honor cultures expect that sexually jealous men will be violent against women whom they presume to own (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).

Additional arenas of violating the Other’s boundary integrity include intrusive gaze, unwanted touching, and conversational interruptions. Power asymmetries are predictive of such boundary violations. Many women report experiencing intrusive gaze and harassment perpetrated by men (e.g., Fairchild & Rudman, 2008; Lahsaeizaheh & Yousefinejad, 2012), which can contribute to subsequent self-objectification and body shame (Kozee, Tylka, Augustus-Horvath, & Denchik, 2007). High-status people are more likely to touch low-status people on the shoulder or arm (i.e., as a display of dominance), while low-status people are more likely to initiate handshakes (i.e., to gain status; Hall, 1996). Similarly, verbal interruptions illustrate status and boundary penetration; high-status people are more successful at inter- rupting low-status people (Menz & Al-Roubaie, 2008), and men are more likely to interrupt than women (Anderson & Leaper, 1998), which curtails how much of women’s personhood can be communicated. Additionally, in an experiment, when women felt that men were gazing at them sexually, they revealed less of their personalities thus preventing others from gaining information about their personhood (Saguy, Quinn, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2010).

As with individuals, research on intergroup relations has explored how groups may be treated as violable and lacking in boundary integrity. For example, whole peoples and nations are violated when their homelands are invaded, bombed, their populations maimed and killed, or their cultures destroyed. Similarly, their ecologies and natural resources can also be violated. When such instances of violation are coupled with instrumentalization, for example under conditions of slavery or colonization, we would label it as objectification. We discuss these instances in more depth under the sections on ownership and denial of subjectivity.

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Ownership. The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc. Ownership is acted out when people control others’ freedom, presume that control of others is their right, or exchange others for something else. A man asking a woman’s father for her hand in marriage, and exchanging daughters between family groups as wives are examples of treating women as owned by other people. Greater tolerance of violence against women who exercise autonomy in their sexual lives, who are accused of adultery, or who have been raped are attempts to control women’s sexuality, but they also concern ownership of inheritances, titles, privileges, and children (e.g., Daly & Wilson, 1988). Likewise, controlling women’s move- ments (e.g., by cloistering) is actually about which children should inherit wealth and title (e.g., Hager, 1992).

Agents can also objectify Others by acting as if they own things that belong to the Other, including the fruits of their labor, their skills, and their natural resources. Slavery and bonded debt are not only still practiced around the globe, they are aided by globalization and growing income inequality (Bales, 2004). As Nussbaum (1995) and others have noted, underpaying people for their labor and restricting their other income options objectifies via ownership.

Like slavery, colonization has modern instantiations. Today, governments, multi-national corporations, and extra-legal entre- preneurs like narco-traffickers are invading, destroying, and controlling indigenous peoples’ homelands (e.g., Hondros, 2007; McSweeney & Pearson, 2012). Such behavior not only assumes ownership, but has other features of objectification: Others’ physical property is instrumental, their autonomy is removed, they are often individually and collectively violated, their subjec- tive experiences are disregarded, and natural resources are treated as fungible because new ones can be expropriated. Experiments demonstrate a psychological reason people may legitimize colonization: Ownership is attributed to the person who was necessary to extract the resource, not to the first person to pursue it or possess it (Friedman, 2010).

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how to treat a person as not a subject

Denial of autonomy. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and selfdetermination. The denial of autonomy and self-determination is implicit in the concept of instrumental- izing Others as tools to meet an Agent’s own ends – tools enable others to do things; they do not set their own goals and tasks. Empirical research shows that the mass media often represent women and minorities as mere sex objects or sidekicks and hardly ever as autonomous main characters (Behm-Morawitz & Ortiz, 2013; Dill, 2009). Even recent advertising that portrays women’s self-sexualization as a form of autonomous self-expres- sion (i.e., the midriff figure; Gill, 2008) continues to restrict women’s autonomy in that the only acceptable self-sexualization is that which conforms to a narrow ideal – young, thin, white, and heterosexual. Thus, women are still objectified, and “they must also now understand their own objectification as pleasurable and self-chosen” (Gill, 2008, p. 45). That women’s self-sexualization conveniently mirrors men’s ideals and ideologies is another way Agents deny Others’ autonomy, by presuming that Others’ goals are the same as the Agents’ goals (Pratto & Pitpitan, 2008), such as the idea that women desire their objectification as men do – with “self-determination ecstatically relinquished” (MacKinnon, 1989, p. 139).

Presuming that Others’ goals are the same as Agents’ goals is not just an interpersonal issue. Claiming that Others lack indepen- dent goals or the capacity for independence, as is done to children, adolescents, the elderly, ethnic minorities and others, can serve to publically justify practices and policies that restrict the Others’ self-determination, such as denying education and voting rights. Agents can restrict Others’ autonomy using the rationale that it is the Others’ best interest (Jackman, 1994; Pratto & Waker, 2004). Though it may be in some cases (e.g., children), when restricted autonomy is coupled with instrumentalization, for example as mentioned above in instances of exploitation, slavery, and colonization, we would label it as objectification.

Inertness. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity. In their work on mind perception, Gray and colleagues define agency as “the capacity to act, plan

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and exert self-control” (K. Gray et al., 2011, p. 1208). Haslam (2006, p. 250) identifies agency as a human nature characteristic; denying agency implies the Other’s behavior is “caused rather than propelled by personal will,” which contributes to inertness and mechanistic dehumanization. Lack of agency, i.e., inertness, is attributed to low-power people, those perceived with the “colony” image, victims of violence, handicapped people and others (e.g., Eicher, Pratto, & Wilhelm, 2013; Fiske et al., 2002). As with denial of autonomy, stereotypes that describe groups as inert can justify preventing those groups from exercising agency. For example, poor people (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007) and immi- grants (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013) are stereotyped as lazy, and this accusation is deployed to say that they are undeserving of resources.

Several experiments have demonstrated that sexually objectified targets are attributed less agency (K. Gray et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2015) and competence (Loughnan et al., 2010) than nonsexualized targets. Additionally, participants instructed to focus on appearance rated women as less competent than partic- ipants instructed to focus on the whole person (Heflick, Goldenberg, Cooper, & Puvia, 2011). Women athletes, who are strong and active, are also perceived as less capable, less strong, less determined, and less intelligent when they are sexualized (e.g., Gurung & Chrouser, 2007).

Media entertainment normally portrays women as lacking agency. For example, the “women in refrigerators” media trope (Simone, 1999) describes the tendency for strong female characters to be inexplicably violated – captured, tortured, disempowered, or killed – as a means of providing main male characters with moti- vation to seek revenge and thus advance their own storylines. The women in refrigerators trope combines a variety of Nussbaum’s (1995) properties of objectification – explicit inert- ness removes agency and autonomy, women characters are physically violated, and their deaths are instrumentalized for the purpose of main male characters’ plot lines. Further, women characters tend to be visually fungible and their names are often trivialized versions of male characters’ (e.g., Batgirl, Supergirl), which can imply they are owned. Women characters who exercise

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agency in these narratives subsequently have it removed, thereby reinforcing gender stereotypes and implying a “lesson” – women’s agency will be punished.

Denial of subjectivity. The objectifier treats the object as some thing whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account. Research on dehumanization and sexual objectifica- tion demonstrates that denial of subjectivity is an aspect of objectification. Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012) identify two dimensions of humanness as 1) human uniqueness: learned traits of civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity, and 2) human nature: innate, universal traits of emotionality, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, individuality, and depth. Denial of human uniqueness contributes to animalistic dehumanization – perceiving people as animals – and as mentioned under our discussions of fungibility, violability, and inertness, denial of human nature such as individuality, emotionality, and agency contributes to mechanistic dehumanization – perceiving people as objects – and facilitates erasure of their subjectivity. Not caring about others’ subjective experience enables one to hold them outside the scope of moral concern (H. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) and can facilitate instrumentalization, fungibility, violence, and ownership (e.g., Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995).

Sexual objectification research has explored a variety of ways in which the Agent denies the subjectivity of the Other. Sexualized targets can be dehumanized both as animals (whose subjective experiences are considered less important than human ones to most people, e.g., Vaes, Paladino, & Puvia, 2011) and as objects (e.g., Rudman & Mescher, 2012). Sexualized female targets are more likely to be dehumanized than nonsexualized female targets (Puvia & Vaes, 2013), and sexualized Others are also denied subjec- tivity in that Agents attribute them fewer emotions, thoughts, intentions (Loughnan et al., 2010) and less suffering (Loughnan et al., 2013; but see K. Gray et al., 2011 and Holland & Haslam, 2013). Focusing on the appearance of a woman (but not a man) led observers to perceive her as less warm (i.e., as having less human nature and as more object-like) than when instructed to focus on other aspects of her person (Heflick et al., 2011; see also Morris & Goldenberg, 2015).

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Cognitive processes might contribute to the denial of other’s subjective experience. People tend to believe that their percep- tions are reality, with the consequence that people whose perceptions differ seem unrealistic and biased (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). Further, people have the illusion that they know others better than others know them (Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross, 2001). Both of these biases entail a denial of the veracity of Other’s subjectivity. Coupled with instrumentalization of the Other, they constitute objectification.

People often project how other individuals and ally groups think and feel based on themselves (e.g., Eicher et al., 2013; Krueger & Clement, 1994), but they do so less for those with lower cultural status – colonies, enemies, and barbarians (Eicher et al., 2013). Of these three, only colonies are instrumentalized by Agents and hence objectified. Enemies and barbarians have incompatible goals, may be perceived as useless, and are often violated; they are treated is as if they are worthless things, dehumanized and dispensable, rather than objectified.

Another self-centric way that the subjectivity of Others is over- looked is via ideologies that claim that what is beneficial or harmful for powerful groups is equally beneficial or harmful for subordinated groups. The world’s most recent history of coloni- zation embodied this ideology in the “White man’s burden,” and coupled with the instrumentalization, violability, and ownership we have already discussed regarding colonization, this consti- tutes objectification. Similarly, stereotypes often prescribe that Others’ subjective experience suits the lower-power roles to which they have been consigned. For example, putting up barriers to women obtaining paid work has been justified by stating that their natures really have them preferring to “stay home” (see Pratto & Pitpitan, 2008, for a review). As Nussbaum (1995) intuited, cases of objectification often include multiple criteria, and here we present findings in which dehumanization, and also somewhat ordinary cognitive processes, contribute to denial of subjectivity – treating a person as a non-subject.

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discussion

While the most familiar objectification research has tended to focus on the sexualization of women, additional research has explored a variety of ways in which Agents may objectify Others outside the sexual realm. Going beyond studying sexual objectifi- cation requires a broader understanding of why so many kinds of Others get objectified in ways other than for sexual control or pleasure. We began our review with Nussbaum’s (1995) seven ways to treat a person as a thing – as instrumental, as fungible, as violable, as owned, as lacking autonomy, as inert, and as one whose subjective experiences need not be considered – and with Holland and Haslam’s (2013) identification of two necessary conditions of objectification: that a person is treated as 1) an object, and 2) not a subject. Four of Nussbaum’s (1995) proper- ties entail treating a person as an object – instrumentality, fungibility, violability, and ownership – and three entail treating a person as not a subject – denial of autonomy, of agency, and of subjectivity (see Table 1). We agree with Holland and Haslam (2013) that there are two necessary conditions of objectification but argue that treating a person as an object must first entail treating a person as instrumental, or as a tool for one’s own purposes, analogous to Bartky’s (1990) definition of sexual objec- tification. Instrumentalization may then lead to perceiving an Other as fungible, violable, and/or owned, but only when instru- mentalization is present and coupled with denial of at least one aspect of personhood do we apply the objectification label.

We have shown that a variety of social psychological phenomena can contribute to instrumentalizing others (e.g., person-perception, stereotypes, goal activation, power). In some contexts, instrumen- talization predicts fungibility (e.g., Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009), violability (e.g., Anderson & Umberson, 2001), and/or ownership (e.g., slavery). People may also be treated as fungible, violable, and owned independent of instrumentality, and these three features are not necessary features of objectification (e.g., Cikara et al., 2010). We proposed that in order for a case to classify as objectification, the Other must be perceived as merely instrumental (Nussbaum, 1995), i.e., useful but lacking autonomy, agency, and/or experiences. Much of the research we reviewed supports our proposal.

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Research on media portrayals of women and minorities (e.g., Dill, 2009), stereotypes and legitimizing myths (e.g., Pratto & Pitpitan, 2008), paternalism (e.g., Jackman, 1994), dehumanization (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2012), and moral concern (e.g., H. Gray et al., 2007) explore how Others are denied autonomy, agency, and subjective experiences. However, denial of autonomy is not necessarily a required feature of objectification (e.g., Loughnan et al., 2013), and in some instances, Agents may co-opt Others’ agency or emotions for their own purposes (e.g., capi- talism, intimate partner violence). As Nussbaum (1995) explains, “one’s purpose in using a tool may turn out to require concern for its experiences” (p. 260). In these and similar cases, Agents deny or ignore at least one aspect of the Other’s personhood while instrumentalizing another.

Determining who is a useful tool can be functional for both perceiver and target (e.g., Gruenfeld et al., 2008), but this becomes objec- tifying if the Agent ignores or hinders the Other’s goals (e.g., Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995). Reciprocation and goal compat- ibility prevent instrumentality from becoming objectification (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Nussbaum, 1995), and even “the psychic costs” of self- objectifying may depend on goal compatibility (Gruenfeld et al., 2008, p. 124).

According to objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), psychological costs of self-objectification include shame, anxiety, reduced flow (i.e., less enjoyment from being fully absorbed in a challenging mental or physical task), and reduced attention to physiological cues and subjective experience. While Fredrickson and Robert’s objectification theory focuses specifically on the body and it’s potential for use by others, according to our conceptual- ization of objectification one may also self-objectify by focusing on the instrumentality of other aspects of the self (e.g., skills or ability). Of course, in order to classify as objectification as we have identified it, one must also simultaneously curtail his or her own autonomy, agency, or subjectivity. These additional psychic costs – reduced autonomy and agency – may be less troublesome to the extent that the context in which one is self-objectifying is characterized by goal compatibility or reciprocity, for example in some employment or intimate relationship contexts.

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distinguishing objectification from other prejudicial biases

Relying on well-considered theorizing about objectification, dehumanization, and the senses of many researchers, we argued that objectification entails both treating others as tools and not as subjects. This specification distinguishes objectification from other biases. People who are deemed useless may be mentally fungible with equally worthless others, may be violated, and may be discarded rather than owned. Such treatment constitutes exclusion rather than objectification and can be seen in every- thing from anti-immigrant laws to genocide. Note, however, that when accusing or portraying Others as useless serves the Agent’s goal (e.g., establishing dominance), such an action does constitute objectification. Conversely, in caring relationships in which other people and their goals, feelings, and experiences are respected, recognizing their uses is not objectifying.

Our definition of objectification includes only one part of dehumanization – mechanistic dehumanization. Animalistic dehumanization, for example, in war propaganda, does not erase others’ agency, but animalized others such as enemies, primi- tives, or incompetents are treated as anti-useful or useless. Mechanically dehumanized Others are useful for limited purposes, and because their subjectivity can also be disregarded, this kind of dehumanization is objectifying.

Social categorization and stereotypes are essential to fungibility and usually to denial of subjectivity, but whether they produce instrumentalization depends on their contents. Some groups are stereotyped as useful in particular roles (e.g., maids) and agentic (e.g., CEOs) even if they are not respected (Eagly & Steffen, 1984); disrespect may be one way of dismissing subjectivity and may thus objectify. When people pity those they view as incom- petent (e.g., “disabled” people), that action is instrumentalizing because it serves to elevate Agents, although we doubt Agents realize it. Pity coupled with stereotyping “incompetent” people as mindless would then be objectification. As mentioned previously, tokens serve representational functions, and the disrespect inherent in treating a person as sufficient to represent a group is

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also objectifying. Research focusing more on what kind of func- tions Others serve for Agents, and how Agents’ actions (rather than perceived qualities of Others) contribute to objectification would significantly broaden the understanding of the phenom- enon. For example, experiments could test whether identifying an Other as a tool increases an Agent’s perceived ability to cope with challenges, whether an Agent incorporates an Other’s skills in his or her own identity, or whether dismissing another person as “useless” leads that person to be forgotten or elevates an Agent’s personal or collective self-esteem.

Besides establishing that using people as tools is the key way that people treat others as things, there are broader implications of our conceptualization of objectification. First, our conceptualiza- tion works equally well at the intergroup as at the interpersonal level. Second, common processes people engage in, such as social perception, goal-pursuit, and projection, might contribute to some of the processes of objectification. The normality of these processes may prevent some people from recognizing objectification, espe- cially if they overlook or do not care about whether reciprocation is occurring. Third is that self-centricism is likely to prevent people from considering what other people’s goals and feelings are, so that they do not see that pursuing their own goals may instrumen- talize other people. The two previous insights demonstrate the importance of learning how being objectified is experienced and how Agents react to such information. Fourth, positions of power encourage objectification (Gruenfeld et al., 2008), but objectifica- tion can also contribute to inequality.

Future directions

This review and discussion identified three important areas for future empirical inquiry. One is that rather than focusing on prop- erties that other people are perceived to have, researchers could focus on how Agents’ actions instrumentalize Others, and also how Agents’ actions attempt to actually limit people’s autonomy and agency, or produce Others’ subjective experiences. Similarly, more attention to how people resist objectification is important, and indeed necessary if researchers are to remember the agency

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of these people (e.g., Fairchild & Rudman, 2008). Second, we know little about frequent combinations of methods of treating people as things. We identified practices with such co-occurrences, such as colonization including instrumentalization, violation, and owner- ship, but lack systematic observation or principles regarding co-occurrence. Perhaps different kinds of goals, levels of familiarity, roles, and socialization patterns produce different patterns of objectification. Further, we do not know how various means of objectification co-occur, facilitate, or reinforce one another. For example, while researchers have identified goal activation (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008) and power (Gruenfeld et al., 2008) as predictive of instrumentality, additional predictors have not been fully tested. Finally, the ways objectified Others use objectification to serve their purposes are understudied. For example, people can “play along” when they are treated as objects in order to get something they want, or may confront those who objectify them, which is an exercise of agency (e.g., Fairchild & Rudman, 2008).

Objectification is a “slippery, but also a multiple, concept” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 251). This is exactly why we attempted to clarify its conceptualization, but it is also why researchers from a variety of perspectives – social-structural, institutional, cultural, intergroup and interpersonal – and from many disciplines, such as commu- nication sciences, anthropology, sociology, legal studies, economics, and psychology can contribute to its understanding.

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s d e G

re n o b le

Instrumentality