4 pages response paper

SPRING 201134

GRAHAM E. FULLER n AHMED ZEWAIL

TARIQ RAMADAN n AYAAN HIRSI ALI

BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY n OLIVIER ROY

ABOLHASSAN BANI-SADR n MOHAMED DELKATESH

RAMIN JAHANBEGLOO n EVGENY MOROZOV

The Arab Revolution

The Great Arab Revolt of 2011 has moved swiftly from the peaceful overthrow of

autocrats in the nation-states of Tunisia and Egypt to brutal repression in the tribal

societies of Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.

Meanwhile, the wired youth bulge of the Middle East that brought change

is dissipating into an impotent diaspora while the organized interests of the old

regimes and the once-suppressed Islamists charge ahead to power. This section

examines the revolt, the reaction and the power struggles in its aftermath.

Democratic Turkey Is the Template for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

TARIQ RAMADAN is professor of contemporary Islamic studies at Oxford. His latest book

is The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism (Allen Lane). Ramadan is

the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928.

oxford, england — Even as the mass demonstrations began in Tunisia, who would

have thought that Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime would have collapsed so quickly?

Who could have predicted that Egypt would soon witness such unprecedented popu-

lar protest? A barrier has fallen. Nothing will be the same again. It is quite likely that

other countries will follow the lead of Egypt, given its central and symbolic signifi-

cance. But what will be the role of the Islamists after the collapse of the dictatorships?

The Islamist presence has for decades justified the West’s acceptance of the worst

dictatorships in the Arab world. And it was these very regimes that demonized their

Islamist opponents, particularly Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which historically rep-

resents that country’s first well-organized mass movement with the political influence

to match. For more than 60 years, the Brotherhood has been illegal but tolerated. It

has demonstrated a powerful capacity to mobilize the people in each relatively dem-

ocratic election — for trade unions, professional associations, municipalities, parlia-

ment and so on — where it has been a participant. So, are the Muslim Brothers the

rising power in Egypt and, if so, what can we anticipate of such an organization?

In the West, we have come to expect superficial analyses of political Islam in gen-

eral and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. However, Islamism is a mosaic of

widely differing trends and factions, and its many different facets have emerged over

time and in response to historical shifts.

The Muslim Brothers began in the 1930s as a legalist, anti-colonialist and nonvio-

lent movement that claimed legitimacy for armed resistance in Palestine against Zionist

expansionism during the period before World War II. The writings from between 1930

and 1945 of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Brotherhood, show that he opposed colo-

nialism and strongly criticized the fascist governments in Germany and Italy. He reject-

ed use of violence in Egypt, even though he considered it legitimate in Palestine, in

resistance to the Zionist Stern and Irgun terror gangs. He believed that the British par-

liamentary model represented the kind closest to Islamic principles.

Al-Banna’s objective was to found an “Islamic state” based on gradual reform,

beginning with popular education and broad-based social programs. He was assassi-

nated in 1949 by the Egyptian government on the orders of the British occupiers.

Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolution in 1952, the movement was subjected to

Not only is Islamism a

mosaic of widely differing

trends and factions, but its

many different facets have

emerged over time and in

response to historical shifts.

SPRING 201142

violent repression. Several distinct trends emerged. Radicalized by their experience

of prison and torture, some of its members (who eventually left the organization)

concluded that the state had to be overthrown at all costs, even with violence. Others

remained committed to the group’s original position of gradual reform.

Many of its members were forced into exile: some in Saudi Arabia, where they

were influenced by the Saudi literalist ideology; others in countries such as Turkey and

Indonesia, Muslim-majority societies where a wide variety of communities coexist.

Still others settled in the West, where they came into direct contact with the

European tradition of democratic freedom.

Today’s Muslim Brotherhood draws these diverse visions together. But the lead-

ership of the movement — those who belong to the founding generation are now very

old — no longer fully represents the aspirations of the younger members, who are

much more open to the world, anxious to bring about internal reform and fascinated

by the Turkish example. Behind the unified, hierarchical facade, contradictory influ-

ences are at work. No one can tell which way the movement will go.

The Muslim Brotherhood was not leading the upsurge that brought down Hosni

Mubarak: It was made up of young people, of women and men who have rejected dic-

tatorship. The Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamists in general, do not represent the

majority. There can be no doubt that they hope to participate in the democratic tran-

sition, but no one can tell which faction will emerge in a dominant position. That

makes it impossible to determine the movement’s priorities. Between the literalists

and the partisans of the Turkish way, anything can happen; the Brotherhood’s political

thinking has evolved considerably over the past 20 years.

Neither the United States nor Europe, not to mention Israel, will easily allow the

Egyptian people to make their dream of democracy and freedom come true. The

strategic and geopolitical considerations are such that the reform movement will be,

and is already, closely monitored by US agencies in coordination with the Egyptian

army, which has played for time and assumed the crucial role of mediator.

By deciding to line up behind Mohamed ElBaradei, who has emerged as the chief

figure among the anti-Mubarak protesters, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership has sig-

naled that now is not the time to expose itself by making political demands that might

frighten the West, not to mention the Egyptian people. Caution is the watchword.

Respect for democratic principles demands that all forces which reject violence

and which respect the rule of law (both before and after elections) participate fully in

the political process. The Muslim Brotherhood must be a full partner in the process

of change — and will be, if a minimally democratic state can be established in Egypt

(though no one can define the intentions of foreign powers).

Between the literalists and the

partisans of the Turkish way,

anything can happen; the

Brotherhood’s political think-

ing has evolved considerably

over the past 20 years.

SPRING 2011 43

Neither repression nor torture has been able to eliminate the Brotherhood. The

opposite is true. It is only democratic debate and the vigorous exchange of ideas that

have had an impact on the development of the most problematic Islamist theses —

from understanding of the Sharia to respect for freedom and defense of equality. Only

by exchanging ideas, and not by torture and dictatorship, can we find solutions that

respect the people’s will. Turkey’s example should be an inspiration to us observers.

The West continues to use “the Islamist threat” to justify its passivity and outright

support for dictatorships. As resistance to Mubarak mounted, the Israeli government

repeatedly called on Washington to back his junta against the popular will. Europe

adopted a wait-and-see stance. Both attitudes are revealing: At the end of the day, lip

service to democratic principle carries little weight against the defense of political and

economic interests. The US prefers dictatorships that guarantee access to oil and

allow the Israelis to continue their slow colonization to credible representatives of the

people who could not allow these things to continue.

Citing the voices of dangerous Islamists to justify not listening to the voices of the

people is short-termist as well as illogical. Under both the Bush and Obama adminis-

trations, the US has suffered heavy losses of credibility in the Middle East; the same is

true for Europe. If the Americans and Europeans do not re-examine their policies,

other powers in Asia and South America may begin to interfere soon with their elabo-

rate structure of strategic alliances. As for Israel, which has now positioned itself as

friend and protector of the Arab dictatorships, its government may well come to real-

ize that those dictatorships are committed only to its policy of blind colonization.

The regional impact of Mubarak stepping down is huge, yet the exact conse-

quences are unpredictable. After both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the polit-

ical message is clear: With nonviolent mass protest, anything is possible and no auto-

cratic government is safe and secure any longer.

Presidents and kings are feeling the pressure of this historical turning point. The

unrest has reached Algeria, Yemen and Libya. One should also look at Jordan, Syria and

even Saudi Arabia: Preventive reforms have been announced, as if there were a com-

mon feeling of fear and vulnerability. The rulers of all these countries know that they

run the risk of the same destiny on Mubarak. This state of instability is worrying and

at the same time very promising. The Arab world is awakening with dignity and hope.

The changes spell hope for true democrats and trouble for those who would sacrifice

democratic principle to their economic and geostrategic calculations. The liberation of

Egypt seems to be just the start. Who will be next? If Jordan and Yemen follow, so will

Saudi Arabia — the heart of the Muslim world — and Riyadh would be in a critical

position, with no choice but to evolve toward a more open political system.

As for Israel, which has now

positioned itself as friend

and protector of the Arab

dictatorships, its government

may well come to realize that

those dictatorships are com-

mitted only to its policy of

blind colonization.

SPRING 201144

Around the world, among Muslims, there is a critical mass that would support

this move, the necessary revolution at the center. In the end, only democracies that

embrace all nonviolent political forces can bring about peace in the Middle East, a

peace that must also respect the dignity of the Palestinians.

s

It is highly likely but not

inevitable that the Muslim

Brotherhood will win the

elections to be held in Egypt

this coming September.

SPRING 2011 45

Prepare to Compete with the Muslim Brotherhood

AYAAN HIRSI ALI is the author of Nomad and Infidel. She is a fellow of the American

Enterprise Institute and founder of the AHA Foundation, which works to protect the rights

of Muslim women.

washington — In 1985 as a teenager in Kenya, I was an adamant member of the

Muslim Brotherhood. Seventeen years later, in 2002, I took part in a political cam-

paign to win votes for the conservative party in the Netherlands. Those two experi-

ences gave me some insights that I think are relevant to the current crisis in Egypt.

They lead me to believe it is highly likely but not inevitable that the Muslim

Brotherhood will win the elections to be held in Egypt this coming September.

As a participant in an election campaign, I learned a few basic lessons.

1. The party must have a political program all members commit to with a vision of

how to govern the country until the next election. Dissent within the party is a

sure way of losing elections.

2. Candidates must articulate not only what they will do for the country but also

why the other party’s program will be catastrophic for the nation.

3. The party has to be embedded in as many communities as possible, regardless of

social class, religion or even political views.

4. Candidates must constantly remind potential voters of their party’s record of

success and the opponent’s record of failure.