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JAS I 2001, Vol. 26, No. 4, 270-280

copyright. 20011 by TFhe Association for Persons with Severe Handicicaps

A Deweyan Plerslpect'ive on Democracy and Inquilry 'in thle F'Ieldl ofI

Speclal iEducat'ion Sc)t Danorth

University f Miss ttri-S t [ouis

On whlat basis do siec38al edicators wi-k i iig ti tl-e area of severe discabi1lties maike deciseiioins" f7iis article provides an exploration of the practice of social incquirv in professional work theat drawns froni the clein-icriatc

ethics (f John Dewey. Dewev ienphasizies thi aeed fior kn-towledge to contribute to the dailx'Y c/u lei of fos"ifier-

ing equialty in lirhunian interactions and relationships. His

philosophv suppor ts the /ree developmnciit of itiailiv formis of social in7q iirv anad the c ditivaton- of a pluralist'ic dialogue valuiing dlivese perspectoves. This ariticle con7- cludes wit/ tia descriiption ovf adlisorv work witfin tie sel f-advocacv movenient 7as an example of Dewevxcee de- 11oc 'ticv in acti.oi

DESCRI1PTORS: Johbn Dwey, special education, denmocrcvc

For every wav of life that fails in its democracv limits the conitacts, exchanges, the commumica- tions, the interactions bv which experience is steadied while it is also enlarged anid enriched ...

the task of demi ocracy is forever that of ci eatiton ot a freer an-d more humane experience in which all share ancd all contribute. (Dewevy 1993, p. 245)

SpeciaL ecdlucatioin practitioniers make many decisions every day. Some come in rapid-fire moition, an almost

intuitive series of quick reactioas anidst the deluge of

numerous classrooma demr ands. Some comie msire slowly, occaurring in brief excxhanges between col- leanues, discussions about problems, options, dead ends, and hopefully solutions. Others come very slowlv,

dragging through long meetings itvolxving policies and

rules, in volving aEiput fro m and discussion across m-any parties with varied perspectives and values. What all of these decision-makino situations have in comrmon is the requirem ent that professionals handle a complex situ- ation that may be vie wed fiom i-nany perspectives in

Address all correspondence asd requests for reprints to Scot Daniforth, College of Education, 8001 Niatural Bridge Road, St. Louis, MO 63121-4499. F. asi: scotIurnal.edu

such a wav as to precipitate worthwhile action. Somne- how the professional iimust solrt thriough the inforimation and the perspectives onr the problem in o6ider to stand firmly eniough on ani answer to take a step ftorwarcd to do somiiethina worth doinrg.

But decision making occurs not mereliv in. a piece- meal fashion. as if otne's choices and actions in one moment have nio relevant connection to the circum- stance that precedes or follows. We should view pro- fessionl I decision makikig thi ough a less microanalytic lens, tocusineg not onix on the process of thought and choice within a specific moment, but on the broader sense of social purpose that encompasses and unites a profession a4s manr actions. We may- conceptualize profession-ial decisioni makling as a broad and deep stream of eitacted purpose and intent, an oni-going h tu- man etfort of a distinctlv moral nature. But how does a professional do this" On xwhat basis does one consider information, input, options, alternatives, and perspec- tives On wxhat basis does one make the many impor- tant decisions?

Traditionally, many resear hers have adIvised pirofes- sionals to listen-E to tthe adsvice of ouLtr special eduication knowledge base. For mIani (btit obviousil not all) is- sues, there is a social scietnce research literature that can be hiahly informative to practitio-ners. We researchers often bemnow-i the so-calledi -research-to-practice gap," the way that research findings tenid to grow old on ye- lowving pages rather than actively inform the practices of teachers.

In the past, because of the positiVist roots of mi6ost special education research (Skrtic, 1991 1996; foi cur- rent status of positivist roots, see Kauffman & Brigham. 1999), it was nIot uncommorn fto researilhers to clam that professionals should viexw research as preseriptive, to sonme extent dictating specific kinds of professional action This xway of viewing research helct that social scientists had methods of creatinig kinowledge that al- lowed us to (a) accurately lmap the biological acnd psy- chocagical dimensions of specific disabilitv condi- tions,9 and (b) authoritatively discern between erfec- tive (.xwh at w oirks") and ineffective ("what doesn't work,") professional practices and programs. In the lat- ter case, this claimi took the form of attemi pts to "sci-

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Dcemocracy andi Inquiry

entifically validate" professioinal practiies (Danforth. 1 999).

As the field of disability research has muatured over the past two decades, many special educators have gradually be/come uncon vinced that the idea that a single approach to research is superior and theref ore should be entrusted with prescribing professional ac- tion (D'anforth, 19)7; Heshusius, 1988, 198)a, 1989b; Kliewer & Drake, 1998; Patton, I998; Poplin, 1987, 1988; Skrtic, 1991. 1996). Certainly, the area of severe dLisabilities has been a leader in opening minds to the divergent voices and nondominant forrms of knowledge. In an era of cultural critique and the proliferation of research methods and phileosophies, special educators have moved inTcreasingly toward honoring the conmplex- ity and uncertain ground of professioial decisions.

As a contrast to the historically prior goal of acdhering to the findings of a particular brand of science, an al- ternative is to suggest that professioinal decisions he made in light of a worthwhile goal for community and humanity, an orienitation to soeial ethics. If our profes- sional mission is to bring benefit and hope to students considered to hlave disabilities and their families, it fol- lows that we exa'mine and take actioni amidst challeng- ing situ'ttions in the light of a serious concern for the ethics of social and commu nal living.

Ackn-owledging the priority of social ethics in profes- sioinal work allows us to recast our decision making in a broa'der light, incquiring how a given professional actilon might contribute to a social ethics of communal livi'ng that supports the developlment of peace, equality, and social justice. Cast in this way, the highly focused ques- tioni of a single professional deeision is iinseparable fronm broater ethical and political conversations about how we-professionals' families, iidividuals with disabili- ties, and others-might co-construct -the good life and the good society (Gouinlock, 1994, p. Xi)" together.

In recent years. mnany speciail eduLcators have claimed that the most hbopeful and useful tradition of social eth- ics available resides within the de'mocratic traditio is of the American heritage (Danforth, 1999; Edgar, 1998; Lipsky & Gartner, 1996; Skrtic, 1996). Edgar (199<, p. 163) hhas described democracy as a commoni cultural niarrative within the American tradition that provides tremendoes hope aind guidance for "how people of di- verse hackgrounds, talents, and personal ncarratives can live together in peace and justice." A deAmocratic ethics of communal living might provide not a narrow "one best way"' within which all should walk, but a multifac- eted and inclusive conceptuIal and practical umbrella, a social vision that accepts the diversity' of the many cul- tural traditions and human variations that make up this country and1 our schools, seeking the dcaily creation of social equality and individual dignity within our profes- sionial work.

The recent turin to a democratic ethics among special educators echoes siimilar conceptual developments in

the nascent field of disability studies (Charlton, 1998; Davis, 1997; Hahn, 1983, 1985, 1987; Linton. 1998; Linton, Mllo, & O'Neill, 1995; Thoinson, 1995). Dis- ability studies is a multi-disciplinary field of inquiry that discards the traditional psychological and m edical em- phiasis onI functional limitations. Working within or drawing from the humanities, disability studies scholars generally frame disa'bilitv within a minority group model that focuses on the social, econoinic. and politi- cal factors that limit the participation of individuals with disabilities in many aspects of society. The goal is not so much the treatnment of itidividual deficits in bio- physical or cognitive functioniing, but rather the fuller developmeient of inclusive denocratic communities that welcome and support persons of widely varied abilities, behavioral styl'es, and ph'sical iforms.

These democratic genres of disability scholarship in- form us that an; thoughtful inquiry concerning profes- sion'al work nmust be embedded within a broader dis- cussion of social and commiunal ethics, of how people of diverse abilities and bodily forms may live, learn, and work together in acn ethical nmanner. In this essay, I turn to the democratic philosophy of John Dewey as a source of wisdonm and guidan'ce. Dewey is ideal counsel because he spent a career spanning seven decades ex- amining issues concerning philosophy of: sience, the c )nnectioni betwee'n knowledge and practice, and the contributions of inquiry to democratic life.

In this article, we will explore John Dewey's philoso- phy of democratic ethics as a wav of understanding the role of so:cial inquiry in the practical dlecisions made each day by special educators and other service profes- sionals. From that Dewevan perspective, this paper will outline a broad understanding of how the practice of social inquiry might contrihute to the work of profes- sionals and the well-being of students and their fanmilies within the daily tasks of demeocratic living.

The Aristocratic Ideal and the Democratic Ideal

Every autocratic and a'uthoritarian scheme of so- cial action rests on a belief that the needed intel- ligence is confined to a superior few, who ... are endowed with the ability an d right to control the conduct of others; laying down principles a nd rules

anct directing the vays in which they are carried out. (Dewey, 1994, p. 266)

In 1 888, while still a young professor at the Univer- sity of Michigan, John Dewey published a paper that f'oreshadowed much of the philosophical work he would cdo over the next six centuries. In "The Ethics of Democracy." Dewey used the term "democracy"' not in reference to a form of government but as "can ethical conception ... a form of moral and spiritual associa- tion" (Dewey, 1993, p. 59). To explain his concept of

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democracy as a practical, daily ethics of human inter- action and communal living, Dewey contrasted: "the aristocratic ideal" with "the democratic ideal."' A]- though each ideal believes strongly that people should live together in an orderly and peaceful fashion, the two ideals differ greatly in explaining hbow that peaceful co- existence should be created, organized, and main- taimied.

The aristocratic ideal is based on Plato's notion of the small group of philosopher-kings whose keein insight and superior understanding provides a beacon of light and authoritative direction for the proper activities of all in the community. The multitude, the masses of common community members, are assumed to be un- able to understand what is best for theemselves and therefore must turnt to a small group of highly educated and intelligent leaders to find their proper place andi activities in society.

The few best, the aristoi; these know and are fitted for rule: but they are to rule niot in their own in- terests but in that of society as a whole. and there- fore, in that of every individual in society. They do not bear rule over the others; they show thenm what they can best do, and g-u6ide them in doing it. (Dewey, 1993, p. 60)

The aristoi, the aristocracy who provide a benevolent and paternal form of leadership, base their right to lead on the claim, of superior knowledge. T'hey are "fitted for rule" because they "know"; they knowxv what is best in a way that common persons unidoubtedly could not. Therefore, the prescriptions for the orderly and peace- ful society, including the planis for how each individual shall fit within the larger whole, are crafted by the :few and kindly setnt down to the masses who await and require direction.

Despite the benevolent gentleness of this aristocratic model, Dewey rejects it in, favor of the democratic ideal. In his words, the aristocratic ideal has historically "failed because . . . the practical consequence of giving the fewv wise ard good power is that they cease to be wise and good. They become ignorant of the nieeds and requirements of the manivy they leave the many outside the pale with no real share in the commonwealth" (Dewey, 1.993. pp. 60-6I). Later in his career, Dewey would fully critique the assertion that a group of thinik- ers could claim to hold a higher, greater form of knowl- edge (Dewey, 1920, 1929) . At this early point, he con- centrates on the political and social implications of such a hierarchy of knoowledge. The lopsided distribution of power creates a social chasm between the elite aind the masses. The elite end up losing touch with the experi- ences, perspectives, and needs of the masses,. wvile the masses live in a society whose governan ce they do: nzot share. "A class of experts is inevitably so removed. fro(m common interests as to becoime a class xvith private interests and private knowledge, whiich in social nmatters

is no knowledge at all" (Dewev. 1927, p. 20)7). The very reason for the appointment of the elite experts to the post ol leadership. the superior knowxledge of that group concerning the well-being of all, fails within the social divisioni and inequalitv of the arrangement.

Dewey offers the democratic ideal as the pronmising and j1ust alternative. He explains that the democratic ideal involves an ethical understanding of the relation- ship between the inidividual anbd the community. In- stead of viewitng the individual and the larger society in opposition, Dewey's democratic ethics maintains that the well-beine of the commuinity and the development of individuals operate in reciprocal tandem. The goal of the demnocratic society is to assenmble communities of equality and social support such that the free expres- sion and full development of the individuality of each citizen is a paramount concern. The task of the inidi- vidual withtin the democracy is to contribute his or her unique talents and effort to the daily interactions and activities that construct and further the communitv of fireedom and equality.

At the heart of this is Dewey's belief in the complete dignitv and universal humaniity of every individual. At the bottom of it all, beneath our impressions of the characteristics, abilities, or social importance of any one person, ties no wav cf distinguishing the value of one person from the value of aniother. In true humanistic style. he calls us to understand all persons as equal in worth. Dewey states: "It means that in every person there lives an infinite and universal possibility; that of being a king anid priest" (Dewey, 1993, p. 63). Aristoe- racy casts indiividuals inito social roles based upon two classes of value: the knowing and the unknowing, the powerful and the powerless. A democratic ideal, ac- cording to Dewey, holds that no matter how we might feel or think about an individual, our practical axiom in all our actions is that a basic equality, dignity, aind pos- sibility inheres to each person.

Coupled with this understanding of the individtual is Dewey's ethical concept of democratic living within a commrnunity. He introdtuces this philosophy in his 1888 paper and extends it in his marny works through the nanny years (Dewey, 1916, 1920, 1925, -1927. 1929, 1930. 1939; (Gouintlock, 1994; Westbrook, 1991; Ryan, 1995). Three notable tlhemes recur in his writings on demo- cratic comnmnunity: (a) the creation of equality in mun- dane. daily activity; (b) the need for ani equal, inclusive dialogue amiiong the diversity of community members; anid (c) the role of free, cooperative, practical inquiry in a democracy. In the sections to follow, I will explain eacGh of these, concluding with the Deweyan urnder- standiing of how a social inquiry enacting values of free- don; cooperation, and practicality can serve and fortify a democracy. Ihis will present a notion of inquiry to the field of special education (and the broader professional. commumnty) as a philosophy of social knowledge that

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offfers promise and hope to those who seek to contrib- ute to democratic ways of living.

The Daly, Communal aking of Equality "Equa'lity . . . is not a natural possession but is a fruit

of the community... " (Dewey, 1927, p. 151). One could call Dewey's understa'ding of democratic com- munity an -over-the-side-fence" brand of associated living, a philosophy of social ethics that describes equal- ity not as an antecedent given but as a relational mode created and recreated in the face-to-face conversations and interaetions of common folk. Two neighbors lean against the fence that divides their properties. each standii g at the edge of her oxwn individuality, the par- tial weight of each set in equal proportion against op- posite sides if that common fence. As the neighbors lean, they talk about interests and con.cerns that are inevitably shared by persons who live side by side. It is in that brief or extended discussion, tlat mundane so- cial exchange that occurs daily in side yards, market- places. houses of worship, and schools, where the equality of persons can be made and rem-ade. In this sense, equality thrives not within abstract state'ments of pre-existing or natural rights, but through the actions taken each day by eitizens who carry on this `icommon narrative" (Edgar, 1998, p. 162) called demoeratic liv- ing. Equality resides not in the areater knowledge or worcis of elites, but in the associated conduct of plain folks who are muddling through as best as they can.

Elaboirating on the way Dew'ey frames the politi-s of society in terms of a practical ethics of human interac- tion and relationship, Kerr (1996) invites us to create cooperative, civi' spaces that foster "nurturance." She niotes that the act of nurturing rings of words like "love," "ciring," and "fully listening." Yet she hesitates to allow those well-known words and ideas aboct sup- portive reiationships to encapsulate her notion of "nur- turance." It is all this, of course, but it is something more. Kerr then invites us to engage in a little thought experiment as a way of explaining her demoeratie- relational idea.

What would it be like for you, Kerr asks us to imag- ine, if your experienee of the world was completely unrecognized, unnoticed, and unvalicdated by those around yion'? What if the way y/ou felt, thought, or viewed the events of your existence found no acknowl- edgment or reception among other persons?

That is, when you feet pain, no one will ackniowl- edge your discomfort. When you feel ebullient, 'io one will smile back. When yot grieve, no one will acknowledge your loss. When you report what you experience an reading a poem, no one will ac- knowled e your report, much less your experiene'. Others talk only of their own experiences and the facts of matters. (Kerr, 1996, pp. 41-42)

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To live without ainyone giving validation to your expe- rienice of the world wonlld be the purest form of isola- tion.

The tragedy of this isolation is not only the experi- ence o'f anguish at lyving without relational validation and support. Kerr explains that living in a state of cor- plete social invisibility leads one to lose sight of oneself, to lose a sense of one's iwn identity. An individual comes to know himself or herself through the experi- en ce of having feeliings, thoughts, and perspective rec- ognized and even valued by others. To exist with no such mirroring back of one's experienlce from other persons strips one's biographv of weight, substance, and legitimacy. It is to walk on sand without leaving a foot- print. Indeed, as Kerr (1996, p. 42) concludes, "Your self, your soul, is lost."

In Deweyan style, Kerr tells us that the difficult task of creating a demicratic society amounts to multiple, cooperative efforts to nlake social spaces where "nur- turance" is possible, where individuals may construct worthwhile selves throutgh the mutual acknowledgment and validation of one another's experiences. In a demo- cratic community, we craft opportunities, civic spaces, where the personal stories of each may be equallv heard (e.g., Coles, 1989). "Social spaces, civic spaces, a safe, shared place to play with life as one actually ex- periences it; a place whbere others recognize, acknowl- edge, respect one's experiences-the self requires these and is constituted in them" (Kerr, 1996, p. 47). 'The practical activitv of demo cratic living amoutnts to imag- ining, arranging for, supporting, and furthering the cul- tivation of social opportunities where vxaluable selves can be made.

Kerr warns us of the difficulty of doing this. The structures and social habits of corporations, institutioins, and helping professions tend to work against nur- turance. Often the formalized procedures of profes- sional helpers preclude the informal, relational acts of nurturancee the co-construction of meaning in trustful interaction. The experienices, perspectives, and bio- graphic stories of disadvantaged groups are often de- valued, ignored, and sileneed. Often they are destoried by the very professionals v'ho seek to help.

What is needed, Kerr claims, are not armies of pro- fessionals devising formal, depersonalized interven- tions targeted at fixing up disordered lives. but 'messy, labor-intensive work and ... thoughtful listlening by persons who are willing and able to be curious about the lives of others and to make the experiences of oth- ers an integral part of their own stornes" (Kerr, :1996, p. 63). What is needed by professionals and nonprof-es- sionals alike is a demoeratic ethic that actively trusts and supports the priority of supportive, nurturing rela- tionships. Respect, equality, and the nourishment of self can occur in a civic society where social o(pportu- nities for mutual and equal sharing, hearinig, atnd telling abound.

T1-set----T --]f - _:_lir l}WI1ltJWl a;y

274 Dan

"Till the Great Society is coniverted into the Gr-eat Communitv, the puablic will rem-ain in eclipse. C'omll munieationi alone can create a Gireat Community" (Dewey, 1.927, p. 142). The Deweyan picture of demo- cratic living depenids oni processes of open and tree communication. It views the community as a m-iosaic multiplicity of dynamice social spaces where the plurality of diverse views and perspectives are inivitedi atnd ac- cepted. A sh-ared culture of equality and frceedom is created in the dialogue of varied, disparate, and eveni opposinig voices.

TFhe goal of public dialogue is not conformity, not a uniformity of opin-ion or belief, T'he gyoal is not to get everyonie to read from the same page, ch-ant the same syllables, buy into the same theory, engage in. the samne practices, in fact, to Dewey, conformity only occurs wheni democratic dialogue is halted, wvhen discussion is stagn-ated. "Conformity is the name of the absen-ce of vital interplay; the arrest and benumbinig of commiuni- cation' (Dewey, 1930, pp. 85-86). The only consensus required by dem'ocracy is the general agreemenit to ac- cept differences of belief in order to maintain the civil space of dialogue. What is shared is the valuinig of the equal opportunity to speak one's mind, to contribute what one can to the community, to offer forth wordis arising Ifrom onie's experience anid cultutral background, Conlformity of th ought and action are anathema to ani inclusive civic dialogue.

The purpose of this inclusive and diverse dialogue is moral. What citizens discuss, ei-ther directly or indi- rectly, through the specific issues an-d dilemmas that fill the daily conversationis fall unider the general. moral heiadingT of "How shall xve all live together? I-ow shall we bring about peace and justice?" There are no cer- tainties or absolutes regarding the outcomae of the moral dialogue (for it can always go this way or thiat). The distinctly moral dimensioni is en,acted not in the surety of the results, but within, the cooperative process of inclusive conversation. itself. Freedoma of speech, the equal hearing of diverse perspectives, th-e common. mu- tu-ally trusting sh-aring of the dialogue itself make for a social process of uniquely moral substance.

Essential to this process of discussion is the attitude of critique (see Patton, 1998). thre vigilanit axvareness of and opposition to the on-going prevalence Of SOCia,l in- equalities within the m-undane structures and habits of groups, organizations, professions, anid the capitalist marketplace. Dewey did not simiply paint a niaive and idealized picture of an egalitarian and just comrmunity thiat could be spread like vanilla frosting over a politi- cally tainited cake-a happy tale to coiver up the miany embattled, unjust social realities of American life. H-e was fully aware of the pervasive tendency of political power to tilt civic conversations and arrangements in) the favor of privileged groups. Onie reason hei con-tina-

foirthi

ously championied the need for marginalized groups to participate fully in all aspects of Amierican society was his awareness that these groups often bring an ohr wise unnoticed critique of the status quo. of the as- sumed *fairness of doing butsiness as usual (sce West- brook, 1991:. Ryan, 1995). A truly inclusive dialogue allows for the unique perspectives of the disempowered to conitribute critique of the customary practices of dominanit groups, thereby providing f'or opportunities for th e cor'rection of those' habituial practices anid the greater equalization of power.

Inquiry: Free, Practical, Cooperative John Dewey was one of the m-tost promineint and in-

fluential supporters of th-e developmnent of the new,, so- cial sciences in the first half of the 20th cenitury. That said. it would be an error for a niaive readier to dub th-is philosopher as a "~positivist" or "objectivist" based oni reading, a Dewey passage concerning the need for social researchers to adapt the approaches of the natur al sci- ences to the problems of the social world. He undoubt- edly champioined the moral utility of social science (in- cluding positivist or objectivist ap'proaches) in address- ing the wide ranige of problems facing the public in thec -modern era: however, a broad anid full reading of his works in the areas of epistemology, social science, and( ethics yields a complex vision of social inquiry that goes far beyond thei limited scope, purpose, and mnethods of aniy sinigle tiradition of research, In Dewrve, we see the

philosophical forerunner to the cuirrently developing mosaic of multiple research miethods-quanititative and qualitaitivc anid widely varied epistemologies (Dewey, 1916, 1920, 1925, 1927. 1929, 1930. 1939; Gouinlock, 1994, Westbrook, 1991: Ryan. 1995).

Dcewcv nevecr saw social scientists as ani elite group hiaving access to a greater form of knowledge than is available to the commoner. a "knowing" group that should prescribe policy anid actioni to) the masses. As Dewe-y scholar James Gouinlock explain-s.

Scienice is conceived as an instrument of hiuman liberation anid enrichment. Dexwey abhors the no- tion of having scientists rule communities:, anid h-e never advocatcd anything so authoritarian (and logTically absurd) as making the "right" hiuman chioice folioxving deductively f"romi scientific piropo- sitions. (CGouinlock. 1994,1 P. xxxiii)

Dewey held no illusion that natural or social science could somehow allow humians to coireetly or near- correctly represent the social worldi, whether that symi- bolic representation occurs in numbers (quantitative) or words (quialitative). He therefore did not see re- searchers as leading the way in prescribinig actions to professionals or layper-sons. Instead, be viewved social science researchers as the crucial providers of in- formed, r-ational opinions to the putblic on specific areas

Democracy and Inqiuilry

of expertise, creating well-reasoned statenents about particular issues beyond the expertise or interest of the layperson.

What Dewey envisioined for social inquiry was the applica tio n of specific attitudes and forms of thought- ope'n-mindedn ess, reflection, critique, flexibility, ex- perimentation, imagination, foresight--to the conscious contelRt of' one's experieince (see C'ampbell, 1993; Dewey, 13925, 1927, 1993). The purpose of inquiry is the further development of a democratic community of the nature outlined abhove. The next three sectionis of this paper will explain how Dewey viewed inquir y as free, cooperative, and prac tical.

Free Inquiry It may seem od d to many researc hers that inquiry be

described as "free." To those who work their wav through graduate courses in educational or psychologi- cal researclh methods, an inevitable lesson is that a re- searcher cannot just do whatever he or she wants. Are there not rules and p)rocedures to be followed? Dewey would agree and disagree in the same moment. Let me elaborate on this tension.

Dewey w)uld agree that not all humnan activity can be called social inquiryv In addition, inevitably, groups of researchers of various types who work oin certain kinds of issues will create proe sses and procedures for doing research within their field. Researchers in a givern area te'nd to construct norins concerni i-g researchl pro- cesses. In their nost unyielding and rigid form, these norms might be treated as "rules."

But, to Dewey, we cannot claim that otne set of re- search procedures or practices (or rules) atlows persons to grasp the deep truths of social reality better thaDs other approaches. To the contrary, the im'aginative and iinnovative character of inquiry requires a critical open- mindedness that extends no t only to the iumatn activi- ties urnder investigation, but includes the beliefs and actions of the investigators. Even the "researc n meth- ods" and the supporting theories must be in dou bt, in flux, utnder critical examination for purposes of re- construction to new circumstan'ces arnd problemns. For Deweey, solidifying those practices and theories into 'rules" that preclude alteration and innovation squashes inquiry beneath the hardenini of custom and tradition.

Dewey would advise researchers to take only mo- mentary and provisionaI satisfaction from the correct- ness of their methods or findings in order to maintain the exploratory attitude and demoeratic goals of in- quiry. In a sense, once a group of researchers are con- vinced they have found the best way of doing research, the way holding claims to truth that carsnot be denied, then they have disco ntinued their exploration of human experience. Dewey would say that thev have stoppe'd doing research,. He warned repeatedly against taking

comfort in the inertia a'nd complacency of tradition, the way that the customary practices of the past can be- corne enshrined and defended to the detriment of cre- ativity, exploration, and the daily fostering of demo- cratic living.

It is as true of the history of modern science as it is of the hist ry of painting or music that its advances have been initiated by in dividuals who freed themi- selves from the bonds of tradition aind custom when'ever they found the latter hamppering and in- quiry their own p'owers of refiction, observation, and construction. (Dewey, 1994, p. 262)

His goal for social inquiry was not the standardization of socially authorized methods, but the continuous, cre- ative cultivation of a wide range of inquiring practices from a diversity of perspectives.

Social inquiry, in this sense, is a 'quality of an atti- tude' (Dewey, 1993, p. 55), a mental stance of opei- mindedness and vigilance in the exploration of human experie'nce. It is "better understood as a meintality for approaching and dealing with problems than a protocol for setting out in advance our responses to possible coniditions. It offers . . . no guarantees of success" (Campbell, .1993, p. 18, italics original). The goal of this attitude is the utilization of human experience as an experimerntal crucible, an opportunsity to generate ideas that may guide one toward social action. Often this mieans quuestioning habituat or customary ways of view- ing or thinking about social situations and problems in order to create new opportunities for action in serviee to a democratic way of living.

The focus of this attitude (called both "scientific' and "experimental" by DeweyT) is the construction of knowledge that attends to specific problems and con- texts in order to create conceptual anci practical support for ethical problem-solving in a given situation.

The inquisitive attitude depends on two pre mises:

First, that those concepts, gen-eral principles, theories, and dialectical developments be shaped and tested as tools of inquiry.

Secondly, that policies and proposals for action be treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed. They . .. will be entertain ed subject to constant and well- equipped observation of the consequences that en- tail when acted upon, and subject to flexible and ready revision inl the light of observed conse- quences.... (Dewey, 1994, p. 259)

In the first point, Dewey explains that the verv methods used within social inquiry are subject to examinination, critique, and revision. They are formed and refornied within the practice of research and reflection. He fol- lows with a se'cond premise that views research findings as temporary, provisional knowledge that are modified,

276

revised, and overturned by those who utilize the knowl- edge. To Dewey, the bottom-line value of the knovl- edge does not rely on the correctness of thfe research methods (reliability, vaiidity. etc.), but resides in the usefuliness of the knowledge for specific persons in spe- cific situations. As such, the final. authority on kntoxvl- edge is always the practitioner who may choose to ac- cept it as guidance, revise it to suit particular purposes. or reject it as irrelevant to the circumstances.

Here we see that Dewey does not make our custom- ary, sharp distinetion betwveen "knowledge-makers" (researchers) and "knowledge-users" (practitioners). We tend to view the researchers as making knowledge and the practitioners as usinlg that knowledge in prac- tice. Dewey democratizes research itself by viexving in- quiry as a form of social initelligence that can be pro- duced and used by virtually all persons. This radical extensioni of the menrtalities of social inquiry, a plural- ization and even deprofessionalizationi of social science. is an example of how Dewey blurs thee boundaries be- tween the democratic goals of free speech and free in- quiry. To Dewey, a democracy requires not only free communication among diverse opinions, but open ac- cess to tools aid habits of inquiry that respects the ability of the commion person to inivestigate a social situation and offer possible solutions. Democracy "'will have its consummation when free, social inquiry is in- dissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving com- munication" (Dewevy, 127, p. 1-84). The de mocratic dialogue is enriched and given moral substance by not only the diversity of voices, but the inclusion of miLul- tiple ways of knowing (epistemologies) and describing social phenomena.

This raises the question, are social science research, as many special educators tend to think about it, and inquiry, as "quality of an attitude" (Dewey, 1993. p. 55), different thingas? Or are the one in the same? tUndoubt- ed,ly. Dewey blurs the lines betweetn the two, yet he does make some cdistinctions. For Dewey, the formal research concducted bv trained specialists in a field such as psychology or special education is ideally a highly focused, specific example of the attitude a nd practice of inquiry. All that I am describing inquiry as within this article is eniacted in the xvork of the best researchers. In this sense, research is an enactmient of iniquiry xithin a social science tradition. The difference between the two lies in the concentrated and specialized nature of the research methods and subject miiatter uneder scientific examination. Social science research shines a concen- trated, narrowly gauged light oni highly specific con- cerns. whereas inquiry as a miode of intellectual vigi- lance and openniess shared among commun-iity members casts a broader light of common interest. Dewey viewed social science as providing vell-reasonecd advice freely distributed to the lay community. That larger community then continues the on-going venture of in- quiry by including this information within the larger

D3antforth

mix of factor-s anid perspectives put forth in tthe demo- cratic dialogue seeking the common good (Dewey. 1927, 1994). Just as a comrmlnunity building a new town hall would consult experts in the areas of architecture5 engineering, and construction5 a community providing services for persons with severe disabilities wxould be seek the counsel of researchers and knowledgeable spe- cialists. In addition, however. Dewey would have that community conisult the persons and families receivinig throse services to find out how they can best be sup- ported (Gouinlock, 1994).

Within the context of our contemporary special edu- cation struggles over differing philosophies and ap- proaches to research and knowledge. Dewey is simul- tanreouslv tiraditional and radical. To traditional special education and psychological researchers who tend to view their wxork as incremental in nature. building gradually within a progressive history toward more pre- cise laminations of the truth, Dewev (19935 1994) would offer support and encouragement. Although not con- curring with the epistemology of the objectivist tradi- tions, he would support the continued social utility of quantitative methods of analysis. Similarly, he would fully support and encourage the continued pursuit and maoral purpose of the various interpretive, qualitative, and historical traditions.

Yet Dewey (1993. .1994) would vigorously critique researchers wearing either stripes or spots to avoid han- dling or packaging knoxwledge in such a way as to sub- vert or subdue the niecessary democratic dialogue of the broader comnmunity%. It is crucial that research from the social sciences, scholarship from the humanities, and various forms of professional expertise be produced. expressed, and critiqued within ain ethic of democracy, within a conversation that places the equalitv and well- being of the community and com-imunity members as the highest ideal. Knowledge of any sort is rendered subordinate to ancd in service to democracy, and not vice versa.

Practical Inquiry actioni is at the heart of ideas . " (Dewey.,

1994, p. 132). Dewey's blurring of the social roles of "knowledge-makers" (researchers) and "knowledge- users" (practitioners) is intentional, uniting our coimi- mon ideas otf research" and 'practice" unider a broad notion. of living with an inquisitive attitude, with a mentality of explorationl and reflection. His under- standmng of the relationship between knowledge and the piractical affairs of persons in everyday life is typical of the American pragmatist philosophers. C harles Pierce, William James, and recent neo-pragmatists Richard Rorty and Cornel West (see Danforth, 1999: Marcell. 1 974; Murphy. 1990: West, 1989). The pragma- tists evaluate the xvorth of an idea (theory. belief, state- ment of fact) in termis of the practical utility and ethical

Democracy and Inquiry

implications of allowving that idea to guide one's ac- tions. Simply put, "If one buys this idea, what can one do with it and where will it get one in efforts to con- tribute to democratic living."

A practical knowledge is a temporary, provisional belief about the way things are and how one might act in order to create improvement. We would broadly de- fine "'improvement" as a modification that better culti- vates and furthers a democratic ethics of community and interpersonal relationship, creating opportunities f r the fulfillment of Kerr's "nurturan ce' through so- cial arrangement and interpersonal sharing. In th-is way, thought and action are unified.

A Deweyan approach for the practitioner involves continuous reflection and self-interrogation, asking oneself a cycle of questions about belief and actioin:

1. How do my actions contribute to the making of democratic community?

2. How do my actions detract from the making of democratic community?

3. What beliefs do I currently hold (about myself., my students, their families, the curriculum, and so on) that support my acting in ways that detract from the making of democratic communtity?

4. How can I revise those beliefs so that they support m'y acting in more democratic ways?

5. What specific new actions might I now take given my revised beliefs?

The goal of self-questioning (or questioning with a col- league) is one of developing what Coles (1989) calls the "lmoral imagination," the intellectual and practical re- sources for using personal experience to the expansion of self and the improvement of community.

Notable examples of this process occur within teacher action research, a form of (primarily) qualita- tive inquiry utilized by teachers to understand specific problem situations and rec-onceptualize them in ways that -reate opportunities for social action (Elliott, 1991; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 1993; Hubbard & Power, 1993; Kincheloe, 1991; Rogers, Noblit, & Ferrell, 1990). In addition, this kind of deep questioning o-curs in reflec- tive teaching processes whe'n a professional draws from academiic theories and personal experien ce to fashion and refashion a situational, personal theory that drives innovative action (Ross, Cornett, & MeCutcheon, 1992).

Cooperative Inquiry Cooperative inquiry produces knowledge that is both

practical and social, uniting persons froni various strata and segments of society in efforts to build community, solve problems, and further democratic relations. "Ex- perts" and "nonexperts" cone together to address im- portant issues, construteing knowledge of personal sig- nificancce and social utility. Such efforts create the in-

formal, self-educating organizations and groups that are necessary to the task of cultivating opportunities for equality amidst the prevalent andI numerous forms of social injustice that occur in American society (Camp- bell, 1993).

Meyer, Park, Grenot-Scheyer, Schwartz, and Harry (1998) describe cooperative inquiry as participatory re- search, a multi-methodological approach that unites the traditionally distinct researchers. practitioners, and re- search participan ts in a comn on effort to answer ques- tionis of practical salience. An acute awareness to cul- tural differences and hierarchies as well as the politics of knowlvedge highlight their approach. The overall goal is to bring together university personnel trained in re- search methods with those persons whom the new knowledge will most personally concern-school work- ers, community members, family members, and stu- dents-in a collaborative effort to use social science techniques to bring about knowledge supporting social change on the local level. Meyer et al. (1998) sum up this participatory research process in five central action goals:

* Involving coinstituent groups, the people affected by our work, at every stage of decision-making in research, from deciding what to study to how to interpret findings

* Supporting community members as research par- ticipants in roles such as observers in schools and c immunities as well as collaborators on specific action research projects emerging from specific concerns, interests, and ideas of a community, school, classroom and inquiry

* Recasting the traditional advisory group from the passive role of listening to project or school "show and tell" stories to involving them in our work so that they are an integral part of what we do

o Becoming, as "university types," connected to schools and communities in new ways that al- though labor intensive and not for everyone, are better suited to truly understanding not only the data but the circumstances that produ ced those data

* Reflecting the crucial impact that cultural diversity and demographic realities have on how we do re- search: who is in the best position to do that re- search; and how to ensure that our interpretations are valid; and for which communities and under which circumstances.... (p. 18)

The goal of conducting a social investigation into lived situations to produce useful knowle-dge is wed to an enacted valuing of social equality within the relational dynamics of the research process. Knowledge construc- tion and community-building are conjoined in action.

277

278 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Danfotirh

Conclusion: Self-Advocacy Advisi~nga

Brieflyl, in concltision, I xwill desciibe oine example of professional decision making anid actionf that embodies the Deweyan approach to demoicratic coinmtinitv. In- creasingly, we find disability service professionals t ak - ing the role of advisors to self-advocacy organizations, thereby' embracing the democratic ideal in two specific wavs: in terms of the social goals oif the miovement anid in the egalitarian m-anner in wvhichi advisois contribute to tne cooperative work of advocacy groups. 'I'he ptur- P,-)os of examining the wvork of professionals ser-ving as

self-advocacy group advisors is to provide onie illtistra- tioni of Dewey'"s dem-ocratic ethos in action, not to) in- dicate that all professionals must enagage in a specific activity ini order to cultivate dlemocracy.

'Ike self-advocacy movementi' is an on-going effort toi expand anid enrich democracy by reversing the histori- cal trendis of incarceration anid stigmatization for min(i vi'dtials with cognitive disabilities. It is a grass roots effort to ctiltivate equality and dignity in the lives of persons who had been previotisl, xcviewel its lesser- cit- zens. In the tradition of the wiomen's movemient and the civil rights miovemient, the self advocacey movem-ent in- volves the downitroddeni, dlevaltiedl and banishedi in teaching the rest of society politicaml andi mtoral lessons about human valuationt and equnalityx

In 1974, eight residenits and ex-r-esidients of ani Or- egon institution for persons "wvith mnental retardation" met hin a grotip hfome toi start a small revolution. 'i'hev formied the first self-advocacy, group wit kini thei United States. Thi-is wvas the birth of what is now called People First, an, interniational alliance of thiousanids of persons with cognitive dlisabilities. Later. Self-Advocates Be- cominig Empoweredi and othier similar groups fbrined. Self-advocacy groups nosy operate in countries around wvorld, including the Unitedi States. C'anada, Eniglanid, Auistralia, and Japan (Dybwadl & Bersani, 1996:1 Felka, 1997; Ward & Meyer, 1999: Williams & Shoultz, 1982).

One of the cenitral tenets of the self--advocacy moi(ve- ment is that persons with disabilities shoiuld have miuch.- greater control over the services they receive than the professioiials ori mamnage ment bureaucracies. As self- advocate Michael Kennedy says. "We lon"t vwanit our lives controlled by systems and people who work for themi" (Kennieds & Shoultz, 1996. p. 28). 'Ibhis shift in the arena of dlisabilitv politics often challenges thei ex- pertise anid authomitv of professionals to make dlecisionis thiat imi-pact ithe lives of ser-ved persons (Beckwith, 1996). The very individuals who hiave traditionally beenl thec subjects to be measured anf-d classified by psycho- logical researchi, the population.s to be documented, treated, modified, andi placedt are asking (or demiand- ing) toi sit. at the head of the decision-making table. Those h-istorically asstmmied to, be lacking the initellectual competence necessary to author their own lives are

seeking self-control and asking to live as equal citizens with in the democratic community.

Many professionals who view the self-advocacy m-ovement as a cultural shift toward the formation of more egal itaraian and incluisive comnmun ity' have takeni roles as advisors to local chapters of People First and Self-Advocates Becoming Empowered.T1h e decisioni to take this r-ole and the many decisions an-d actionis taken within this adivisory role exemplify the Dcweyant demo- cratic impulse. Ideally,, advisors are not leaders withini th-e self-advoicacy gyroups. Advisors are typically unpaid voluniteers selected bv the group (Shoultz, 1994). They play a background, support role. They attend meetings andt offer adlvice, opinions, or information on an as- needied basis. Also, they are a resource of knowledge about ser-vice delivery systems, rules, and laws. T'hey are a conduit to otheri sources of informationi, including the knowledgTe developedl by researchiers, professionals, and policy makers (Cone, 1997:, Shoultz. 1994).

'Ino the extent that professionials stich as special edlu- cators are educated to critically read research, and to the dlegree required withiin thc various situations faced by the self idvocacy group, advisors miay draw guid- anice from the disabilitv research literature. That guid- aiice takies plaice in light of the self-defined nieeds and priorities of the self-advocates who comprise the group. In specific instances, as needed, advisors may benefit i'rom consulting ctirrent disability research. I-or ex- amiple, self-adv ocates frequently' seek ways to arrangee for- commiuniitv living opportuniities. Self-advocates arc likelv to) find that the cuirrenft research knowledge on conmmunity initegration (e.g., C(ihernets. 1995; Klein., 1992; Ra cino, Walker, O'C'onnor, & Taylor. 1993) pro- vidles helpful information for discussion andt use within the self advocacy group.

Although the advisor typically brings a fair degree of knoxvledge to the group, Shouiltz (1994) explainis th-at the advisor tinst strike a careful balance in order to be supportive and helpful while refusing to take the lead. Flow does onie providle wise counsel while allowing ami-ple space and opportuniity for the self-empowerment of labeled personi-s?

The advisor role can be tricky', because its purpose is to help members gain power over their own lives and their owni miovement. If the advisor does too little. nothing miay happen wvithin thie group, btit if the adivisor- tries to lead or control the group, the miembers may find it difficult to learn or exercise their capabilities. A good advisor believes ftillv in the potential of people with developmnental dis- abilities, incltidinig th-ose xvith severe disabilities. Mem-bers may experienice their advisor as one of the only people in thieir lives wvho believes in. their abilitv to groxv, to make decisionis, solve problems, become leaders, and contribtite to conmtiunities. (p. 26)

278

Democracv anid Inquiry

Shoultz's description of the advisor role echoes Dew- ey's emphasis on the interpersonal challenge of creating equality in the everyday interactions of neighbors, coil- leagues, and friends. Equality, in this sense, is a social achievemenit brought about through the careful coop- eration of individuals who remain ever mindful of is- sues of power and equity.

When handled well, the advisor's role is one of pa- tient and trustworthy accompaniment, traveling side- by-side with self-advocates, listening to their stories of being bruised and contained by systems ostensibly de- signed to bring them benefits. Crafting equal relation- ships with oppressed individuals is assumed each day to have a larger moral value, embodying the first steady but small step toward the development of a targer com- munity of equality. Acdvisors who bring a background of professional training and experience, including edu- cational experienrce with formal social science research on disabilities, are in a unique position to embody the mental habit of inquiry within the context of nurturing and deep relationships.

To return to the words of Donna Kerr (1996, p. 63), advisors are offered the opportunity to eclipse the com- mon standardization and detachment of professional activity in favor of engaging in "messy, labor-intenisive work . . . thoughtiul listening by persons who are willing and able to be curious about the lives of others and to make the experiences of others an integral part of their own stories." The opportunity of eqtuality occurring within this co-constructed relational space, within this social movement seeking the cultural redress of oppres- sive circumstances, takes place in the interpersonal muddiness of mingled personal stories. Labeled ancd un- labeled personis alike can lean on one another, crafting valuable selves in the act of sharing, inquiring deeply and openly about the practicalities and choices all along the way.

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Article received: May 25, 201Q0 Final acceptance: November 3, 2000 Editor in Charge: George Singer

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TITLE: A Deweyan perspective on democracy and inquiry in the field of specialeducation

SOURCE: The Journal of the Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps 26 no4 Wint 2001

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