TIF Case Study

63

Delusions of Dollywood: The Randy Parton Theatre and Tax Increment Financing G. Jason Jolley and William B. Klatt*

The City of Roanoke Rapids undertook North Carolina’s fi rst tax increment fi nancing (TIF) project in 2005 when it approved $21.5 million in TIF to fund the Carolina Cross- roads Music and Entertainment District. The Randy Parton Theatre, a central develop- ment in the district, proved to be an economic disaster and an embarrassment for the city. This paper traces the project history and identifi es factors contributing to its demise, which has compelled a city already facing economic diffi culties to obligate 13% of its annual operating revenue for debt service on the TIF. Roanoke Rapid’s experience informs other local governments considering TIFs for similar entertainment venues that often fail to deliver their purported economic benefi ts.

INTRODUCTION

I n 2004, North Carolina voters approved a referendum granting local governments authority to use self-fi nancing bonds for the purpose of tax increment fi nancing (TIF). The City of Roanoke Rapids undertook

the state’s fi rst TIF project, when in 2005, it approved $21.5 million to fund development of the Carolina Crossroads Music and Entertainment District, including the Randy Parton Theatre. However, the theatre was a

*G. Jason Jolley, is an assistant professor and the MPA director at the George V. Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University. His research has been published in Economic Development Quarterly, Business Strategy and the Environment, State and Local Government Review, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, & Financial Management , and other scholarly outlets. William B. Klatt graduated from the MPA program at the George V. Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University. His background is in nonprofi t management and development. His interests include public-private partnerships, social entrepreneurship, and worker cooperatives. Dr. Jolley can be reached by email at [email protected] .

64 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL

fi nancial failure due to a combination of overly optimistic fi nancial pro- jections, poor management, and unreasonable contract terms. Because of this failure, the City of Roanoke Rapids now obligates roughly 13% of its annual operating revenue for debt service on the TIF.

This paper discusses the case of the Randy Parton Theatre TIF. It seeks to (1) inform other local governments considering TIFs for similar entertain- ment venues of potential pitfalls, (2) contribute to the literature on why heav- ily promoted projects of public interest often fail to deliver their purported economic benefi ts, and (3) consider why the project failed despite approval from the state’s Local Government Commission (LGC), which is widely considered a best practice in state oversight of local government borrowing.

BACKGROUND In November 2004, North Carolina voters amended the state constitu-

tion to allow local governments to issue “project development fi nancing” bonds (Blocher and Morgan, 2008). These bonds could be issued without local voter approval to fi nance public and private investments intended to catalyze further private development in a community. Proponents felt that North Carolina was at a competitive disadvantage because it did not per- mit a fi nancing mechanism that was available in almost every other state (Blocher and Morgan, 2008). Similar efforts to legalize TIFs had failed in 1982 and 1993 (Parker, 2013).

TIF is typically used as an economic development fi nance tool by local governments, but its decentralized nature is blunted in North Car- olina because the state must approve local governments’ fi scal actions (Briffault, 2010). In 1931, in reaction to municipal bankruptcies during the Great Depression, North Carolina created a Local Government Commis- sion (LGC) to centralize and control local debts (Coe, 2007, 2008; Fesler, 1941; Ratchford, 1936). “North Carolina is the only state that issues local government general obligation debt” (Lawrence, 1994, p. 94, as quoted in Coe, 2008). The LGC makes a determination about whether to issue bonds based on (1) “whether the principal amount is appropriate,” (2) “the effect on property tax rate” (for general obligation bonds), and (3) “the bond’s marketability” (Coe, 2008, p. 761). The LGC model of approving and issuing local government debt has been hailed widely as a best practice for preventing local government fi scal crises and contributing to higher bond ratings (Coe, 2007, 2008).

Since the new law’s approval, very few TIFs have been completed in North Carolina. Reasons include the need for LGC approval, more restric- tive TIF requirements, and lower-cost borrowing options (Blocher and Morgan, 2008). Additionally, the negative publicity resulting from the Randy Parton Theatre project has deterred communities from pursuing this option (Blocher and Morgan, 2008).

THE RANDY PARTON THEATRE AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 65

THE CITY OF ROANOKE RAPIDS The City of Roanoke Rapids is located in Halifax County in northeastern

North Carolina, one of the state’s most economically disadvantaged coun- ties (Jolley, Nousaine, and Huang, 2012). The city’s population of 15,692 represents a 7.5% decline since 2000 (U.S. Census, 2010). The median household income of $35,388 is well below the state average of $46,450 (U.S. Census, 2014). Roanoke Rapids was once a hub for textile and other manufacturing industries, but globalization and industry changes led to the closure of most textile factories in the city (Gombach Group, 2012). As a result, many middle-class jobs disappeared. The city’s elected leadership saw an entertainment district as a means of creating jobs and strengthening the city’s tax base. Roanoke Rapids’ proximity to Interstate 95, the main highway on the East Coast, caused city leaders to believe that they could capture economic gain from travelers along this corridor by offering a world-class entertainment district (ERA, 2005).

THE CAROLINA CROSSROADS MUSIC AND ENTERTAINMENT DISTRICT

The Carolina Crossroads Music and Entertainment District was loosely based on Branson, Missouri, a rural tourist destination in the Ozark Moun- tains that includes retail stores and numerous hotels. Parker (2013) notes that before the Carolina Crossroads property (123 acres of farmland along Interstate 95) was developed, it had an assessed base value of $292,690. The TIF bond was secured fi rst by anticipated revenue from the theatre, next by the incremental increase in property taxes, and last by pledging the city’s sales tax (Offi cial Statement, 2007). The city’s fi ve-year plan for Carolina Crossroads envisioned $257 million in investment in “additional theaters, retail establishments, hotels, and a sports complex” (Parker, 2013, p. 37). Carolina Crossroads purchased the world’s second-oldest wooden roller coaster in the world, the Zippin Pippin, from a closed amusement park in Memphis, Tennessee; it was never installed in Roanoke Rapids and was eventually donated to a nonprofi t organization (Branson, 2007). Simi- larly, a massive billiards center was proposed but never built. Only the theatre, one small hotel, and an RV park were constructed (Parker, 2013).

HISTORY OF THE RANDY PARTON THEATRE Randy Parton is the lesser-known brother of country music star Dolly

Parton and the owner of Moonlight Bandits Productions, which was origi- nally hired to manage the theatre. As of 2004, Randy Parton had not had a song on the top 100 country charts in 20 years (Whitburn, 2008).

A regional economic developer, Rick Watson of North Carolina’s Eco- nomic Development Commission, fi rst conceived the project. Watson

66 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL

invited Parton to make pitches to several economically depressed towns (Carrington, 2011). Watson was terminated from his economic develop- ment position in 2006, and the commission accused him of working for Parton as a consultant while still employed by the state (Carrington, 2011; Mkokai1, 2007).

Parton had no prior experience in theatre management and invested none of his own money in the entertainment district (Carrington, 2011). Instead, the city borrowed $21.5 million to build a 1,500-seat theatre, expecting that the increased property tax revenues would recoup the investment. No projections of debt service were made publicly available, but the feasi- bility study projected enough development to cover the debt service via theatre operations and increased property taxes without requiring reliance on sales taxes.

The theatre was completed in March 2007 and turned over to Parton to manage (Carrington, 2011). His fi rst show, on July 26, was sold out, but crowds gradually declined, sometimes to less than 100 (Carrington, 2011, par. 9). By that point, it was alleged that Parton was often intoxicated at his nightly performances (Carrington, 2011). His original contract awarded him $1.5 million a year as an artist fee, but on November 20, 2007, the city scrapped that contract, removed him as theatre manager, and reduced his compensation to $250,000 (Carrington, 2011; Parker, 2013).

In December 2007 the project came “crashing down,” as David Zuc- chino of the Los Angeles Times reported:

The town’s mayor, who had been Parton’s biggest booster, confronted him in his dressing room before a show. Mayor Drewery N. Beale accused Parton of being drunk. He had two police offi cers drive the singer home, but not before Parton delivered a profanity-laced inter- view to a waiting TV crew (Zucchino, 2007).

By this point, there was signifi cant public backlash against the TIF and its costs to the city. Many residents were upset that the city had never made public the feasibility study by Economic Research Associates (ERA), commissioned in 2005. It was marked as “confi dential” and not subject to “abstracting, excerpting, or summation,” but has since been posted on the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s School of Government website (Parker, 2013).

Among the resulting political fallout, Mayor Beale and two members of the city council were voted out of offi ce. Servicing the debt on the TIF bonds has imposed a signifi cant strain on the city. One attempt to sell the theatre for $7.1 million, leaving the city with $12 million in debt after the sale, fell through (Parker, 2013). HSV Entertainment LLC leased the building under a two-year lease in 2013 and used the theatre, now known as Royal Palace Theatre, for Internet sweepstakes gambling and

THE RANDY PARTON THEATRE AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 67

occasional shows (Parker, 2013). On May 6, 2015, the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce of the Eastern District of North Carolina announced an agreement not to prosecute software companies engaged in Internet sweepstakes in exchange for ceasing operations (USDOJ, 2015b) and that HSV Entertain- ment LLC will cease operations at the former Roanoke Rapids Theatre on May 16, 2016 (USDOJ, 2015a). The City of Roanoke Rapids is again left seeking a use for the theatre.

FEASIBILITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDIES The ERA feasibility study stated: “It is important to note that this analy-

sis is designed to evaluate the general market viability of the proposed concept, as opposed to the terms of a specifi c fi nancial arrangement” (ERA, 2005, p. 6). Although this was by no means the only problem with the feasibility study, the lack of potential contract stipulations can cer- tainly be considered a contributing factor to the project’s eventual failure.

One particularly troubling feature of the contract signed on June 30, 2005, was the stipulated priority of payments, which was as follows: (1) $750,000 toward Parton’s artist fee, (2) operating costs, (3) the balance of Parton’s fee, and (4) payments to the equity fund (Economic Development Agreement, 2007, p. 12). In other words, Parton would receive half of his $1.5 million salary even before costs of theatre operations were covered. Such an arrangement raises concerns that market viability was subordi- nated to ensuring a private artist’s compensation.

The feasibility study concluded that the theatre was a viable investment if several underlying assumptions were met, such as ensuring that “at least 200,000 square feet of retail” and two hotels were in operation before the theatre opened, that the theatre was competently managed, and that the theatre offered new content on a regular basis (ERA, 2005, p. 7)

Many of the assumptions were not realized. With regard to the fi rst element, as already noted, the theatre opened with no complementary retail stores or other recreational venues surrounding it. As for the second point—effective management—the city allowed an artist with no history of operating or managing a theatre to take full control of running the facil- ity. The ERA feasibility study called for a variety of shows, but Parton and his band were the primary act four days a week, leaving few opportunities for other artists to perform regularly. An economic recession did develop in 2007 but was not in full force until 2008, so the theatre’s early failure cannot be explained by this factor.

Other elements of the feasibility study appear questionable in retrospect. For example, there were already 1,000 bedrooms in 14 hotels within 10 miles of the theatre, but the economic development study argued for two additional 200-room hotels next to the theatre (ERA, 2005, p. 14).

68 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL

ERA also projected that a large portion of theatre revenues would be derived from the area’s more affl uent seasonal visitors, estimated at an average of 6,700 throughout the year (ERA, 2005, p. 16). Moreover, after observing that Interstate 95 had 14.9 million unique travelers passing the site each year, ERA estimated that 990,000 people a year would visit the entertainment district every year, although not necessarily the theatre. Finally, ERA noted the lack of entertainment attractions in the area, but what it perceived as an opportunity in the marketplace may have actually been a misunderstanding of demand.

The ERA feasibility study was accompanied by an economic impact study conducted by the Carolina Center for Competitive Economies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Luger and Israeli, 2005). The UNC study utilized IMPLAN, an economic impact modeling soft- ware, to examine the economic impact of a proposed entertainment district in Roanoke Rapids. The UNC study, like the ERA study, assumed rapid development of the Randy Parton Theatre and surrounding developments. It projected $33.7 million in direct investment in 2005, $58.5 million in direct investment in 2006, $147.7 million in 2007, and $172.2 million in 2008 for a total direct investment of $412 million (Luger and Israeli, 2005). It also estimated that the theatre would operate at 50% capacity in 2006 and 2007 and at 70% capacity in 2008. Because no marketing study accompanied the impact study, it is presumed that the City of Roanoke Rapids provided the data used for IMPLAN modeling.

TIF STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE The LGC approved $21.5 million in project development fi nancing for

the Carolina Crossroads Music and Entertainment District, which com- prised the activities shown in Table 1 (City of Roanoke Rapids Capital Project Ordinance for Theater, 2006). The bonds were secured by a letter of credit from Bank of America, N.A. (Offi cial Statement, 2007).

Parton spent $2.4 million of the $3 million in capitalized startup costs within the fi rst two years of the project. In a written statement, Parton (2008) indicated that $1.5 million was used for theatre fi xtures and equip- ment, but city offi cials reported that Parton spent a portion of the fund on trips to Las Vegas and liquor store purchases ( USA Today , 2008).

As Table 2 indicates, the City of Roanoke Rapids has spent between 10% and 13% of its annual operating revenues on debt service for the theatre and TIF district. As noted above, annual debt service payments are to be made from (1) net facility revenues, (2) incremental property taxes from the 123-acre TIF district created by the city, and (3) general sales tax revenues (Offi cial Statement, 2007).

As demonstrated in Table 3, the theatre generated less than $67,000 in revenue from 2012 to 2014, so the fi rst intended source of revenue has

THE RANDY PARTON THEATRE AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 69

been virtually nonexistent. Determining the incremental property tax rev- enues associated with the TIF is more diffi cult. These fi gures are not listed separately in the annual auditor’s reports on the city’s budget and actual revenues. The only restricted assets listed in the auditor’s fi nancial state- ments are unexpended bond proceeds related to the Carolina Crossroads

Table 1: Carolina Crossroads Music and Entertainment District Bond Allocation

Activity Amount

Theater acquisition $12,885,021

Capitalized startup costs $3,000,000

12-month interest reserve $1,118,000

Bond anticipation notes interest $225,000

Capitalized interest $1,214,839

Debt service reserve fund $1,914,640

Cost of issuance $300,000

Underwriter’s discount $142,500

Reimbursement of advanced project costs $700,000

Total project appropriations $21,500,000

Source: City of Roanoke Rapids Capital Project Ordinance for Theater (2006).

Table 2: TIF Payments as a Percentage of Annual City Operating Revenue 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Annual operating revenue

$16,423,353 $13,450,468 $13,986,159 $15,133,518 $14,406,966 $14,047,881

Annual TIF payments $1,657,100 $1,755,968 $1,769,878 $1,756,196 $1,779,983 $1,786,179

% of annual operating revenues

10.1% 13.1% 12.7% 11.6% 12.4% 12.7%

Source: City of Roanoke Rapids Financial Statements and Independent Auditor’s Report (2009–2014).

Table 3: Randy Parton Theatre Income: Budget vs. Actual 2012 2013 2014

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual

$0 $61,817 $80,000 $0 $13,550 $4,994

Source: City of Roanoke Rapids Financial Statements and Independent Auditor’s Report (2009–2014). Note: No revenue was reported for 2009–2011.

70 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL

TIF. It can be presumed that this increment also contributes very little to the debt service, given the limited development. Only a small hotel and an RV park were developed in the TIF district. The city is primarily using sales tax revenues, which previously went to the general fund, to ser- vice this debt, thereby placing additional fi scal stress on an economically depressed municipality.

PATTERNS OF OVER-PROMISING The economic and fi scal impacts of various tourism-related venues have

been widely studied in the academic literature; these have included major league sports stadiums (Rosentraub, 1999; Swindell and Rosentraub, 1998), amusement parks (Hildreth and Wong, 2002), and convention centers (Sand- ers, 1992, 2002, 2005). It has been argued that the “number-laden” feasibil- ity studies created by accounting or economic fi rms lack validity (Sanders, 2002, p. 195) and are overly optimistic in their projections (Sanders, 2005). Likewise, efforts to build convention centers are usually undertaken by busi- ness and political leaders even when public support is lukewarm (Sanders, 1992). These convention centers are often funded through public investment that sometimes circumvents direct voter approval (Sanders, 1992). The Randy Parton Theatre experience parallels these observations. The theatre was undertaken using TIF, which did not require voter approval but relied on support from local political and economic development leaders—even as the public was not granted access to documents about the project—and suffered from overly optimistic feasibility and impact studies.

Hildreth and Wong (2002) noted that many amusement parks fail because of the lack of surrounding amenities. The Randy Parton Theatre was developed in a vacuum without the benefi t of agglomeration or clus- tering of other tourism-related businesses. Even the feasibility study indi- cated that the theatre’s success hinged in part on these complementary businesses and amenities. The effort to brand the Randy Parton Theatre in a similar fashion as Branson, Missouri, or Dollywood in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, resembles the framing of amusement park developments (Hil- dreth and Wong, 2002). Successful amusement parks transfer a portion of the tax burden to tourists (Wong, 1996), but this did not happen in Roa- noke Rapids. Instead, the debt service burden from the TIF exacerbated the fi scal stress on the community.

Lastly, the transfer of wealth from taxpayers to selected individuals, a common theme in studies of publicly subsidized sports stadiums, happened here with Randy Parton. As Rosentraub (1999) pointed out, the Texas Rangers baseball team received more than $130 million in tax subsidies. Former President and Texas Governor George W. Bush paid $606,000 for a share of the Rangers, which he later sold for $15 million. Similarly, Par- ton received a substantial salary associated with the failed theatre project.

THE RANDY PARTON THEATRE AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 71

The Randy Parton Theatre case also calls into question the LGC’s abil- ity to prevent local fi scal crises in communities using TIFs. For a general obligation bond, the LGC evaluates the bond amount, effect on property taxes, and marketability/interest rate (Coe, 2007). For revenue bonds, the LGC requires a feasibility study examining “future revenues and expenses and future service demand” (Coe, 2007, p. 41). The executive commit- tee minutes recording the LGC’s approval of the Carolina Crossroads TIF (on March 16, 2006) contain a statement that the LGC found “that the proposed projects are feasible.” Yet Parker (2013, p. 700) noted that LGC approval was “based primarily on an assessment of the city’s capacity to repay the bond debt” rather than “the market feasibility or management capacity of the theater.” It is not clear whether the LGC is equipped to assess TIF project feasibility.

LESSONS LEARNED The Randy Parton Theatre experience offers several lessons for other

communities considering similar ventures through TIFs or other fi nance structures with high sunk costs and substantial debt obligations.

First, communities should be cognizant of the motivations of policy entrepreneurs and project champions. In the Randy Parton Theatre case, Rick Watson, a regional economic developer, was working with Parton to sell the theatre concept to communities, resulting in what Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003, p. 31) called “appraisal bias of the project promoter.”

Second, communities should question the assumptions and numbers contained in feasibility studies, which are often optimistic and laced with inaccuracies. At a minimum, sensitivity analyses should be used to exam- ine worst-case scenarios should projects falter or be signifi cantly delayed. In this instance, it would have been apparent to the City of Roanoke Rap- ids that sales taxes would be required if limited development occurred and theatre performance waned.

Third, complementary factors such as surrounding amenities should be considered (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter, 2003; Hildreth and Wong, 2002). The consultant described existing tourism assets, but without considering whether these were complementary with the proposed project, and no survey of current tourists was conducted to determine why they visited the area and if a theatre amenity would be an additional attraction.

CONCLUSION Technically, the Carolina Crossroads TIF has not failed from a fi scal

perspective, because the city is not in default and has been able to success- fully make the debt service payments. However, the project is a miser- able failure from an economic development and governance perspective.

72 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL

The economic benefi ts from the project never materialized, and the city is draining sales tax revenues to cover the debt service, further exacerbating the strain on city services and undermining the ability to invest in other projects.

The Roanoke Rapids case also highlights the risks involved in using TIFs as a means of spurring economic development. Although TIF can be a successful tool in developing infrastructure and spurring economic activity, the failure of a TIF district can have a long-lasting impact. The decision to use tax revenues, such as sales tax revenue, not directly associated with the TIF should place a higher burden of proof on local offi cials to demonstrate project feasibility and allow for more transpar- ency in the decision-making process, even at the risk of empowering public opposition.

References Blocher, J., and J. Morgan (2008). “Questions about Tax Increment Financing in North

Carolina.” UNC Community and Economic Development Bulletin, 5, Available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2597&context=faculty_ scholarship .

Branson, J., (2007). “The Zippin Pippin—Elvis’ Favorite Ride—Is Donated to Save Liberty Land.” Memphis Flyer , April 26, 2007. Available at http://www.memphisfl yer.com/ TheDailyBuzz/archives/2007/04/26/the-zippin-pippin--elvis-favorite-ride--is- donated-to-save-libertyland .

Briffault, R. (2010). “The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government.” The University of Chicago Law Review, 77(1), 65–95.

Carrington, D., (2011). “Randy Parton Theatre Still Haunts Roanoke Rapids, City Strug- gles with Debt from Failed Entertainment Project.” The Carolina Journal Online , October 31, 2011. Available at http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_ exclusive.html?id=8427 .

City of Roanoke Rapids (years from 2009 to 2014). City of Roanoke Rapids Financial Statements and Independent Auditor’s Report for the Year[s] Ended June 30, 2009[, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014] .

City of Roanoke Rapids Capital Project Ordinance for Theater (2006). Capital Project Ordinance for Theater , February 28, 2006. Available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/ www.sog.unc.edu/files/RRdocumt-Capital%20Project%20Ordinance%20for%20 Theater.pdf .

Coe, C.K. (2007). “Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North Carolina Approach.” Public Budgeting & Finance, 27(3), 39–49.

Coe, C.K. (2008). “Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: Emerging Best Practices.” Public Administration Review, 68(4), 759–767.

Economic Development Agreement (2005). Economic Development Agreement: Moon- light Bandit Productions LLC, City of Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, B&C Roa- noke, LLC, and Roanoke Rapids Entertainment One, LLC , June 30, 2005. Available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/fi les/RRdocumt-Economic%20Devel- opment%20Agreement.pdf .

Economic Research Associates (ERA, 2005). Randy Parton Theater Feasibility Study , April 15, 2005. Available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/fi les/ RRdocumt-ERA%20market%20feasibility%20study-complete.pdf .

THE RANDY PARTON THEATRE AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 73

Fesler, J.W. (1941). “North Carolina’s Local Government Commission.” National Munici- pal Review, 30(6), 327–334.

Flyvbjerg, B., N. Bruzelius, and W. Rothengatter (2003). MegaProjects and Risk: An Anat- omy of Ambition . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gombach Group (2012). Roanoke Rapids Historic District. Living Places . Retrieved from http://www.livingplaces.com/NC/Halifax_County/Roanoke_Rapids_City/Roanoke_ Rapids_Historic_District.html.

Hildreth, W.B., and J.D. Wong (2002). “The Theme of Public Finance in the Amusement Park Industry.” Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, 95, 409–415.

Jolley, G.J., A.N. Nousaine, and C. Huang (2012). “Effective at the Margins: Outmigra- tion and Economic Development in Rural North Carolina.” Sustainable Agriculture Research, 1(1), 2–12.

Lawrence, D. (1994). Financing Capital Projects in North Carolina (2nd ed.). Chapel Hill, NC: Institute of Government, University of North Carolina.

Luger, M., and K. Israeli (2005). Economic Impact Analyses of Proposed Entertainment District in Roanoke Rapids, NC and Advanced Vehicle Research Center in Northamp- ton County NC . Carolina Center for Competitive Economies, UNC Chapel Hill. Avail- able at http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/fi les/RRdocumt-center%20 for%20competitive%20eco-05%20report.pdf .

Mkokai1 (2007). “JLF’s Don Carrington discusses the Randy Parton Theatre.” December 17, 2007. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMBZuiar6Fc .

Offi cial Statement (2007). Offi cial Statement $21,500,000 City of Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina Music and Entertainment District Special Revenue Bonds Series 2007 .

Parker, A. (2013). “Still as Moonlight: Why Tax Increment Financing Stalled in North Carolina.” North Carolina Legal Review, 91(2), 661–719. Available at http://www. nclawreview.org/documents/91/2/parker.pdf .

Parton, R. (2008). “Randy Parton Written Statement Regarding Roanoke Rapids, N.C. Theatre Project.” PR Newswire , February 8, 2008.

Ratchford, B.U. (1936). “The Work of the North Carolina Local Government Commis- sion.” National Municipal Review, 25(6), 323–368.

Rosentraub, M.S. (1999). Major League Losers: The Real Cost Of Sports and Who’s Pay- ing for It . New York: Basic Books.

Sanders, H.T. (1992). “Building the Convention City: Politics, Finance, and Public Invest- ment in Urban America.” Journal of Urban Affairs, 14(2), 135–159.

Sanders, H.T. (2002). “Convention Myths and Markets: A Critical Review of Convention Center Feasibility Studies.” Economic Development Quarterly, 16(3), 195–210.

Sanders, H.T. (2005). “Convention Mythology.” Journal of Convention & Event Tourism, 6(1–2), 99–143.

Swindell, D., and M.S. Rosentraub (1998). “Who Benefi ts from the Presence of Profes- sional Sports Teams? The Implications for Public Funding of Stadiums and Arenas.” Public Administration Review, 58(1), 11–20.

UNC School of Government (n.d). Roanoke Rapids TIF Summary . School of Government, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

USA Today (2008). “N.C. City Parts with Randy Parton.” USA Today , March 3, 2008. Avail- able at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/music/2008-03-03-3390447037_x.htm .

U.S. Census Bureau (2010). Decennial Census . Washington, DC: Author. U.S. Census Bureau (2014). “Roanoke Rapids (City), North Carolina.” State & County

Quick Facts . Available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/3756900.html . U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce Eastern District of North Carolina

(USDOJ, 2015a). “HSV Entertainment LLC Agrees to No Longer Supply Internet

74 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL

Sweepstakes at the Roanoke Rapids Theatre.” May 6, 2015a. Available at http://www. justice.gov/usao/nce/press/2015/2015-may-06_02.html .

U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce Eastern District of North Carolina (USDOJ, 2015b). “Sweepstakes Software Providers Sign Agreements Stopping Their Ability to Provide Alleged Illegal Sweepstakes Software to Internet Cafes Through- out the State of North Carolina.” Available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nce/ press/2015/2015-may-06.html .

Whitburn, J. (2008 ). Hot Country Songs 1944 to 2008 . Nashville, TN: Record Research. Wong, J.D. (1996). “The Impact of Tourism on Local Government Expenditures.” Growth

and Change, 27(3), 313–326. Zucchino, D. (2007). “At Randy Parton Theatre, Show Goes On Without ‘Star.’” Los

Angeles Times , December 17, 2007. Available at http://www.latimes.com/news/la-na- parton17dec17,0,497630.story?page=1#axzz30BFK4LhW .

Authorized Electronic Copy

This electronic copy was prepared for and is authorized solely for the use of the purchaser/subscriber. This material may not be photocopied, e-mailed, or otherwise

reproduced or distributed without permission, and any such reproduction or redistribution is a violation of copyright law.

For permissions, contact the Copyright Clearance Center at http://www.copyright.com/

You may also fax your request to 1-978-646-8700 or contact CCC with your permission request via email at [email protected]. If you have any questions or concerns about

this process you can reach a customer relations representative at 1-978-646-2600 from the hours of 8:00 - 5:30 eastern time.

©

Authorization.indd 59Authorization.indd 59 12/13/2014 10:07:0012/13/2014 10:07:00