

Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management: Historical Reflections and Conceptual Comparisons

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History invites but it neither commands nor compels people to follow what it teaches. Similarly, history, according to La Rochefoucauld, never embraces more than a small part of reality. Two themes of choice (or selectivity) and partiality pose special challenges for this particular article, which carves out and attempts to digest a specific slice of administrative reality as it presently exists on the American political landscape. The specific scene of the larger picture (or play) sketched here is sufficiently complex and involved, both historically and currently, that it cannot be enclosed by single term or concept. Instead, as the lengthy title indicates, three concepts are relevant to the focus of this necessarily selective and inherently partial discussion.

To the extent that one overarching theme does encompass this study, it is best described as an effort to review and analyze the administrative complexities of multijurisdictional relationships in the U.S. political system. The nature of these relationships have evolved over successive eras, periods, or phases.¹ Hence, the historical invitation approaches an imperative, especially in the anniversary context of this article. While history can provide the needed root(s) for contemporary understanding, without analysis and interpretation history offers little or limited fruit. Therefore, the historical reflections pro-

vided in the first part of this article subsequently give way to a systematic comparative effort. The comparisons center on the conceptual trilogy incorporated in the title: (1) federalism (FED), (2) intergovernmental relations (IGR), and (3) intergovernmental management (IGM).

The Roots of FED, IGR, and IGM

It is common and appropriate to trace the origins and character of federalism (FED) to the framers at the Philadelphia Convention and especially to Madison and his collaborators in *The Federalist*.² An alternate and perhaps more appropriate origin point for an administratively oriented entry to the topic, however, is Woodrow Wilson's classic essay on administration.³ The attention and significance that Wilson accorded FED in his oft-noted essay is regularly overlooked.⁴ Two themes, (1) effectiveness and (2) administrative responsibility, were prominent in Wilson's analysis and are reflected in the following quotations.

1. Our duty is, to supply the best possible life to a *federal* organization, to systems within systems: To make town, city, county, state, and federal governments live with a like strength and an equally assured healthfulness, keeping each unquestionably its own master and yet making all interdependent and co-operative, combining independence with mutual helpfulness. The task is great and important enough to attract the best minds.⁵
2. This interlacing of local self-government with federal self-government is quite a modern conception. . . .

The question for us is how shall our series of governments within governments be so administered that it shall always be to the interest of the public officer to serve not his superior alone but the community also with the best efforts of his talents and soberest service of his conscience?

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How shall this be done alike for the local part and for the national whole?⁶

The first passage conveys Wilson's vision of a strong and healthy set of interdependent "systems" of governance. It is remarkably contemporary and could be comfortably inserted into a recent presidential speech or a report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). His phraseology also suggests that Wilson perceived (perhaps dimly) what has, since the 1930s, been called *intergovernmental relations* (IGR).

In the second excerpt Wilson makes a direct link between FED and administration through the issue of administrative responsibility. For Wilson FED was clearly linked to the question: To whom and in what way are public administrators (officials) responsible? The administrator is, according to Wilson, subject not only to the claims of his or her hierarchical (or intergovernmental) superior, but also "the community" as well. It would not be an inaccurate or inappropriate reading to substitute "the public interest" for "the community" in Wilson's text, especially given the time and context of his 1887 article. Such a substitution calls to mind the exchange a half century later (1940–1941) between Friedrich and Finer over the nature of administrative responsibility and of how a public administrator could and should serve the public interest.⁷

The Friedrich-Finer debate occurred not only in close proximity to the "new federalism" of the New Deal.⁸ It also coincided with a new concept that had a significant link with a major public administration issue. IGR was the conceptual innovation; the issue was the politics-administration dichotomy.

Writing in 1939–1940, coterminous with the beginnings of American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and *Public Administration Review* (PAR), G. Homer Durham focused attention on "Politics and Administration in Intergovernmental Relations."⁹ Durham explored how the new concept of IGR contributed to a revised theory of the politics-administration relationship. He noted that "the growing maze of relationships, legal and extralegal, within the federal system has radically altered any ancient bases-in-fact for such views as the separation of politics from administration."¹⁰

Durham's own words best convey his approach to blending politics and administration in an interjurisdictional context.

So what of politics and administration in intergovernmental relations? Their interlocking indicates the unreality of checks, balances, and divisions into politics and administration. As a guide to a "new theory of the division of powers," the idea of *administrative politics*, or the interrelations of public administrators in what appear to be increasingly more permanent offices with tenure, forms a more realistic concept. Too, with the importance of the Presidency emphasized, the political party emerges as an instrument of policy and consent in a new light. Questions of structure and function in the federal system preclude, under present boundaries and constitutional restrictions, the emergence of a more significant factor than the party in clearly defining the policy-phase of a new "administrative politics."¹¹ (*Italics in the original.*)

The emphasis and the confidence reflected in this passage are representative of the period that Newland has called the "founding years" and the "golden era" of public administration.¹² Three factors undergird Newland's claim for the era in which Durham wrote: (1) the accepted primacy of the executive, especially the President, (2) the symbiotic relationship between politics and administration as essential in government, and (3) the presence of a cohesive public administration network that produced a strong sense of community. These elements also formed a firm foundation for an emerging consensus about the character and content of IGR.

The term that Durham suggested, *administrative politics*, did not prosper, but it was clearly indicative of the search for an alternative conceptual framework to capture and characterize the major changes occurring in political, policy, and administrative relationships. The much-discussed separation of administration from politics would soon be demolished. In its place something akin to a continuum of politics-in-administration would emerge.¹³

Durham was unquestionably accurate in viewing IGR, conceptually and operationally,

as contributing to the demise of the dichotomy that others subsequently confirmed.¹⁴ Furthermore, his critique of the dichotomy and its connection to FED and IGR should not be underestimated. Dwight Waldo, for example, later (1948) noted: "There is a close similarity between the rigid politics-administration viewpoint and that philosophy of federalism that pictured state and nation moving noiselessly and without friction each in its separate sphere."¹⁵

Although Durham moved with the intellectual flow in attacking the politics-administration dichotomy, his analysis was not as prescient nor as predictive concerning two other variables he explicitly identified: (1) political party, and (2) professionalism (permanent tenure). Durham anticipated and projected the "importance of the (political) party" as an instrument in producing "a decentralizing of . . . power."¹⁶ In this respect he was a precursor of more extensive developments of the party-as-decentralizer thesis by David Truman,¹⁷ Morton Grodzins,¹⁸ William Riker,¹⁹ and William Buchanan.²⁰ Decline in party identification, party loyalty, and party efficacy are developments that have raised current questions about the relationship, if any, of the party system to centralizing and decentralizing forces. A 1986 ACIR report, calling for a strengthening and revival of political parties at the grass roots, serves as a reminder of the staying power and pertinence of the issue.²¹

Durham's oblique reference to professionalism touched on another variable whose effect he could, in the late 1930s, only partly perceive. The broad and strong centralizing effects of professionalism were not fully explored and confirmed until later. One subsequent and visible analytic exposition of the force of professionalism on interjurisdictional relations was presented by Beer in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1977.²² Beer's focus on "representational federalism," put the quietus, if one was needed, on the politics-administration dichotomy. Beer argued that new forms of influence had evolved in the United States, especially since the 1930s, and that the original federal arrangement accommodated them in a way consistent with its historical, flexible, and open-ended character.

Two contemporary structures of interest in Washington, according to Beer, are the

"technocrats"²³ and the "topocrats." The former represent the "new professionalism" in national, state, and local governments. They constitute the "professional-bureaucratic complex" of functional program specialists, most easily understood as the vertical linkages forming "picket-fence federalism."²⁴ The "topocrats" consist of the associations of political and administrative generalists at the state and local levels—governors, state legislators, mayors, county executives, and city managers. They have mobilized on behalf of varied common concerns to make their presence and influence felt in the halls of Congress, the executive branch, and even the judiciary.

The presence of tensions between technocrats and topocrats is hardly new. It had surfaced even as Durham wrote in the late 1930s, but systematic investigation of the cleavages came later in a variety of forms and contexts.²⁵ The normative issue raised by the cleavage(s) should not be bypassed, however. What has been the effect of these new representational forms on other aspects of the democratic process? Have the technocrats and topocrats caused, as Beer fears, "dilutions of the popular will"? Despite corporate instead of personal representation, Beer concedes that the two entities have added significant strengths to the modern state. He wonders, however, whether "this may be at some cost to free government."²⁶

The origin of IGR was closely associated with the demise of the politics-administration dichotomy. It was also connected with the rise of new forms of association and organization that have altered the channels of political representation, policy articulation, and program implementation within the American federal system. Generalist administrators, of the genre about which Harlan Cleveland has spoken so eloquently, have moved to center stage in virtually all aspects of the policy process.²⁷ Likewise, the managers of specific functional programs, most recently called "policy professionals," have assumed featured roles.²⁸

We now turn from this historical review to the task of fitting the roles and functions of these clusters of administrative officials into a broader contextual and comparative framework. For that purpose it is useful to introduce the concept of *intergovernmental management* (IGM).

Intergovernmental Management (IGM)

The concept of federalism has two centuries of U.S. history, tradition, law, and practice behind it. The concept of IGM has a comparatively short half century of application to the American context, and it remains a term that falls somewhat short of either standardized or universal usage. By way of contrast, IGM appeared as a phrase on the public scene only recently—during the 1970s.²⁹ To date it seems ensconced in the esoteric vocabularies of small, specialized, and even self-interested segments of observer-practitioners of the U.S. governance processes. Among the purposes of this exposition of IGM is the aim to reduce if not remove the mist and mystery surrounding the term. A further intent is to advance the utility of the concept for both analytical and applied purposes.

Woodrow Wilson argued for and actively pursued strategic solutions to issues involving both FED and administrative responsibility.³⁰ Wilson's confidence in finding clear and constructive solutions to those issues may or may not have been justified, even in his day. Today, however, the complexity, variety, and seemingly intractable nature of interjurisdictional problems appears biased against major, strategic, or dramatic changes in the roles and functions of different political jurisdictions. With some exceptions, many if not most of the intergovernmental system changes have been modest, gradual shifts that have occurred incrementally. It took near-herculean presidential political efforts in 1981–1982, for example, to produce a noteworthy impact on national-state-local relations.³¹ Even then the central proposal of Ronald Reagan's New Federalism, the shifting and sorting out of functions, died aborning.³²

The emergence of IGM as a concept was associated with three important developments. One was the management-related consequences of national-level policy activism occurring chiefly in the 1960s, but carrying over into the 1970s. A second and related factor was the difficulty in implementing numerous intergovernmental programs, a difficulty that focused prime attention on management problems. A third aspect highlighting IGM has been the gulf or gap between career personnel and political

actors. These three developments, quite apart from the political and polarizing effects of "bureaucrat-bashing," have given public management and managers a deserved but not necessarily desired level of visibility.

The emergence of IGM seems indicative of the present modest, marginal, and moderate approach to the resolution of current interjurisdictional issues. Some might even argue that IGM is indicative of the minimalism and myopia prevalent in contemporary American politics, public policy, and public administration.³³ Essays and research under the IGM rubric have blossomed in the past decade, and three defining features have emerged which exemplify its limited (but noteworthy) focus. *Problem solving*, *coping capabilities*, and *networking* are the three most common terms used in defining IGM. Together they emphasize its implementation focus as well as the centrality of the roles of policy professionals.³⁴

Robert Agranoff examined human service delivery programs in the early 1980s and defined IGM as "an emerging concept in the study of affairs between governments, reflecting the increase in public officials who work at the margins between their governments."³⁵ The activities that constituted IGM in a metropolitan context, according to Agranoff, "in no way lead to fundamental changes in the social structure or resolve complex problems within the metropolitan areas."³⁶ More broadly, Agranoff argued that the kinds of problems that IGM addresses "are not the type of fundamental solutions that eliminate major social problems nor do they lead to any substantial realignment in the federal system."³⁷

The problem-solving focus and implementation emphasis of IGM have been extensively illustrated in articles, essays, and monographs. The more controversial aspects of IGM, however, call for further comment. Only a brief clarification of selected issues can be attempted here.

IGM, with its strong emphasis on the word *management*, has gained modest usage but has also generated significant controversy. Controversy arises when its use suggests a clear hierarchical ordering in the relationships among American political jurisdictions.³⁸ Stephen Schechter addressed this issue early in the 1980s:

The popular acceptance of intergovernmental management is not a historically discrete occurrence. The starting premise of this article is that "intergovernmental management" (as that term has developed since 1974) is best understood not as a president's pipe dream but as the completion of the twentieth century revolution in public administration first enunciated by Woodrow Wilson. For its adherents, "intergovernmental management" is more than merely compatible with federalism; it is both the natural extension and resuscitating element of the twin commitment to federalism and managerialism in a time of scarcity—both of resources and leadership.³⁹

Schechter's concern was not the incompatibility of IGM with federalism "but simply that the *constitutional* relationship between the two has been largely ignored."⁴⁰ Elsewhere, Schechter sharply contrasted the different orientations of the terms:

The basic difference between federalism and managerialism, and hence the tension between them, has to do with ends and limits. The end of federalism, in the American system at least, is liberty; the end of managerialism is efficiency. In this sense, the challenge of *public* management consists largely in directing the "gospel of efficiency" to the constitutional ends of limited government.⁴¹

Sketched on a broader canvas, IGM might be construed as a major manifestation of two important and related organizational forces at work in U.S. political, economic, and social processes.

One of these forces has been called by a political theorist "the age of organization."⁴² Major and immense social, political, and administrative organizations, with associated large powers, must be managed. These organizations, their subcomponents, and their members must be enticed, herded, or goaded into action toward some asserted goal.

A second force associated with IGM is the escalation of regulation. The rise in regulation has been traced to a dramatic decline in trust and legitimacy—diminished trust in and

among public officials and plummeting legitimacy in the relations between citizens and administrative agencies. Increased litigiousness accompanies and compounds the "regulated society" and highlights the operational aspects of IGM.⁴³ Thousands of problems arise that must be solved by courts, by administrative appeals units and processes, or by mediation, negotiation, and bargained compromises emerging from specialized, boundary-spanning management skills.

With these issues and contexts as background, this article turns more directly to an exposition and clarification of IGM. It is a concept that captures and to some extent codifies an important dimension of contemporary policy-relevant and politically-significant administrative activity.

Comparing FED, IGR, and IGM

One approach to an understanding of IGM is comparative—to contrast it with the related concepts of FED and IGR. Comparisons are made on the basis of several political system features.

Table 1 lists six political system features in the left-hand column; the body of the table consists of brief characterizations of how these features are manifested under FED, IGR, and IGM. The system features that form the bases for comparisons are: (1) units involved, (2) authority relationships, (3) means of conflict resolution, (4) values, (5) political quotient, and (6) leading actors/participants. Space constraints limit the amount of attention that can be given to the descriptors contained in the body of the table.

System Features

1. The types of entities or jurisdictions involved in boundary spanning interactions constitute the first system feature. For FED the primary historical focus has been on national-state relationships with considerably lesser attention devoted to interstate relations. A distinctive feature of IGR has been its extensive interjurisdictional focus. It has commonly included consideration of all possible combinations and permutations of interaction(s) among every type of U.S. political jurisdiction.⁴⁴ A few of these are noted in the second column of Table 1.

Table 1
Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management:
System Features and Illustrative Contrasts between Federalism (FED),
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), and Intergovernmental Management (IGM)
(A Framework for Comparative Analysis)

<i>System Features</i>	<i>FED</i>	<i>IGR</i>	<i>IGM</i>
1. Units Involved	National-State, Interstate.	National-State-Local, State-Local, National-Local, Interlocal.	IGR units plus: Politics-in-Administration Continuum, Public-Private Sector Mix.
2. Authority Relations	National Supremacy (Contingent Hierarchy).	Perceived Hierarchy (Asymmetric Orientations).	Nonhierarchy Networks (Matrix Management).
3. Means of Conflict Resolution	Laws, Courts, Elections.	Markets, Games, Coalitions.	Bargaining/Negotiation, Dispute Settlement, Coping.
4. Values	Purposes (Mission).	Perspectives (Policy-in-Administration).	Products, Program Results (Management).
5. Political Quotients(s)	High Politics (Partisanship).	Policy Making (Coordination).	Implementation (Problem Solving).
6. Lead(ing) Actors	Elected Politicians.	Administrative Generalists.	Policy Professionals.

IGM encompasses all of the jurisdictional interactions included under IGR. Writers, researchers, and practitioners using the IGM concept, however, have employed the term to include two extrajurisdictional dimensions. One is the politics-in-administration continuum referenced earlier. This takes explicit account of the intrusion of politics into management and vice versa.⁴⁵

A second dimension folded into the IGM concept is the mixture of public-private sector relationships. The delivery of public programs and services has increasingly involved third-party intermediaries from the nonprofit, independent, and for-profit sectors. "Contracting out" and "privatization" are two terms that capture some of the extraordinary changes in public administration activity that have been reflected in the concept of IGM.⁴⁶

The addition of these two dimensions or continua to the formal governmental entities involved under FED and IGR adds significantly to system complexity. The added complexity reflects the reality of managing under condi-

tions where there is no sharp demarcation of political versus administrative activities and roles. Furthermore, the involvement of private and nonprofit sector organizations in the conduct of public programs may be relevant, prominent, or even crucial for securing results. This produces a blurring or blending among the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in the conduct of public policy.

2. Authority relations constitute a second system feature specified in Table 1. The pattern of power distribution varies under the three different concepts. In the case of FED, while power may be fragmented and variably clustered, it is ultimately lodged in last-resort cases in the hands of the *national* government. In IGR the power distribution pattern is posited as less hierarchical; asymmetric relations in terms of power are common, although there may be some persistence in perceived superior-subordinate relationships. Lovell has argued that it is not surprising to find IGR circumstances in which no one is "in charge." Coordination or concerted action may occur in a vari-

ety of ways, sometimes more by accident and by informal links than by force or by central direction.⁴⁷

The nature of authority relations in IGM is preponderantly nonhierarchical. The presence and pervasiveness of networks create the presumption of widely if not evenly shared power distribution patterns. There may be varying dependency-autonomy power patterns among specific entities in a network, but across the complete network there is no prime, single, or central source of guidance. The intraorganizational pattern of matrix management is a precedent and analog for interjurisdictional relations.⁴⁸

3. One proposition widely accepted in organization theory is Downs's assertion about interorganizational conflict. Downs argues that every organization operates in an environment in which it is in some degree of conflict with other organizations in that environment.⁴⁹ The extensiveness of conflict in political and organizational systems mandates consideration of the means by which conflict is resolved. The particular conflict resolution mechanisms chiefly associated with FED, IGR, and IGM are specified in Table 1.

The constitutional base of FED and the prominence of courts as decision units specifying enforceable rules of law are generally acknowledged. Hence the courts and statutes under FED arrangements are significant vehicles of conflict resolution. The popular election of nearly 500,000 public officials in the United States makes elections another important means of conflict resolution (as well as creation). Additionally, in many states and in most local governments, a variety of referenda elections are held to resolve specific issue conflicts.

Markets, games, and coalitions are three broad categories of structuring competition and resolving conflicts in an IGR context. The literature on IGR games is modest but noteworthy.⁵⁰ More extensively and rigorously developed in IGR is the concept of markets. Dating chiefly from the 1950s, the idea of governmental entities operating as firms in a market environment has assumed significant proportions.⁵¹ One need not adopt one or another of the philosophical positions surrounding the public choice approach to make constructive

use of a market perspective.⁵² Anton has revised and extended the coalitional approach to IGR by relying on "benefits coalitions."⁵³

The concepts and behavioral domains of bargaining and negotiation serve as hallmarks for IGM conflict resolution strategies. More specific mechanisms under these rubrics are mediation and dispute settlement processes. Literature on these mechanisms has expanded rapidly in the 1980s.⁵⁴

The problem-solving thrust underlying IGM encourages, perhaps demands, movement toward agreements that involve continued or continuous subsequent interactions among parties to the conflict. This contrasts with court cases under FED which tend toward authoritative termination of interparty contacts. It also differs from markets, games, and coalitions under IGR where contacts may be distant or nonexistent and interparty relations may focus chiefly on assuring that all players abide by some set of prespecified rules.

4. The fourth system feature specified in Table 1 is a values component. This feature references the scope, content, and intent the user has in mind when employing one of the three concepts. For FED the value or aim, as mentioned by Schechter, may be variously described as liberty, freedom, or constitutional rights. These broad but fundamental values of an ordered society are purposes fostered by FED when viewed as a set of constitutional arrangements. They were values the founding fathers sought and promoted through constitutional "rules of the game."

By way of contrast, IGM posits as an underlying value or end, the notion of achieving specific or concrete program results. Schechter referred to "efficiency" and managerialism," not necessarily in a favorable light, as the ends or aims of IGM. Clearly, the problem-solving thrust used as one of the defining features of IGM gives the term a results-oriented bias.

For IGR, neither the specific, programmatic, results-focused bent of IGM nor the global, systemwide values of liberty and freedom of FED appear appropriate. Indeed, one reason IGR was coined in the 1930s was the lowered value content and reduced connotative character of the concept. IGR developed and appeared to gain greater usage because of its denotative

nature. As a descriptive term, IGR emphasizes an understanding of the images, orientations, or perspectives of the various actors operating between and among political jurisdictions. This predominantly descriptive and analytic nature of IGR is inadequate to convey the results-focused emphasis of IGM.

5. A fifth system feature is indicated by the term "political quotient." The term is intended to convey the popular scope and public visibility of the issues covered under each concept.

The types of issues associated with FED tend to be ones that Bulpitt classified as "high politics" in the United Kingdom.⁵⁵ Illustrative of such issues in the United States are those connected with "new federalism" during the Nixon and Reagan Administrations, the "creative federalism" of the Johnson Administration, and similar broad-based, politically-charged policy initiatives. The level of partisanship linked to FED issues is substantial and the locus of decision making on these issues tends to be in Washington, DC. Both the visibility level and the locus for action on these issues come from potent centripetal forces in the political (or social) system. These characteristics promote what might be called a "politics of the center."

If high- and centrally-based politics dominate FED issues, then low-level, implementation-oriented politics characterize IGM activities. Note that politics is not absent from problem-solving and implementation efforts. IGM issues, and the strategies associated with their resolution, simply contain notably lower visibility, more limited scope, and lesser political quotient(s).

IGR matters, on the other hand, are posited as having intermediate levels of politics and partisanship. Advocacy of substantive policy is present, but in a constrained and confined context. Coordination among different and multiple public policies is a valued political aim. Furthermore, IGR and IGM involve state and local (peripheral) entities in the policy process. The type of "politics" present in these arenas might be termed the politics of implementation, the politics of coordination, and the politics of central and peripheral participation.

Several factors should be kept in mind when reflecting on the terms and relationships summarized in Table 1. First, the elaboration of features identified with each of the three con-

cepts is a matter of analytic emphasis rather than behavioral exclusiveness. The patterns present under FED, for example, are matters of degree and gradations rather than neat or sharp separations from IGR and IGM. Furthermore, the use(s) to which the schematics of Table 1 may be put are chiefly for heuristic purposes.


The contrasts and emphases suggested above are aimed at promoting a basic understanding of the different types of phenomena occurring in the U.S. political system. The concepts, categories, and comparisons are not advanced as elements of an explanatory or predictive model. Neither is the framework intended to be normative. Nothing is implied about the desirable or undesirable qualities of FED, IGR, or IGM.

These observations lead directly to another important contextual factor. The framework in Table 1 is exploratory and experimental. It is presented here to test its capability to facilitate understanding and interpretation of the broad-ranging and changing relationships in America's political-administrative system(s) over the past half century and more.

Actor Roles It is both feasible and desirable to pursue these modest heuristic efforts one step further. Table 1 identifies a sixth feature for comparing FED, IGR, and IGM at the level of system characteristics—the role(s) of lead(ing) actors. Figure 1 uses and extends this system feature by focusing on the varied roles played by major types of actors. Three types of actors are identified by the column headings: popularly elected officials, appointed generalist administrators, and program (functional) managers (policy professionals).

These categories of actors have been identified and analyzed in interjurisdictional literature over the past three or more decades, with Beer offering the sharpest delineation between "topocrats" and "technocrats." Popularly elected officials are distinguished or separated from appointed generalists such as city/county managers, central staff, and nonprogram personnel. Both empirical and impressionistic observations suggest that different interjurisdictional role patterns operate between officials in these two categories. Elected local officials, for example, tend to be the lead persons in making contacts with elected officials in other jurisdic-

Figure 1
*Federalism (FED), Intergovernmental Relations (IGR),
 and Intergovernmental Management (IGM): Concepts, Actors, and Roles*



tions while appointed generalists tend to contact most often their counterparts in other entities.⁵⁶ Similarly, the programmatic professionals or functional managers tend to establish strongest interjurisdictional linkages with like-minded program people in other entities, namely, other policy professionals.⁵⁷

The three categories of officials are cross-classified in relation to several process components associated with FED, IGR, and IGM. Under each concept in Figure 1 are explicit or

implicit subordinate elements based in part on the elaboration of system features discussed in conjunction with Table 1. Thus, politics, purposes, and power are subsidiary components of FED; policy, perspectives, and priorities are components of IGR; programs, projects, and procedures are aspects of IGM.

The cells of the matrix in Figure 1 are occupied by symbols of varying size. The broad symbols in the upper left, for example, indicate the large and prominent roles played by elected

officials in the components under FED. Likewise, the lower right sector of Figure 1 displays large indicators which signify the major and central role played by policy professionals (program managers) in implementation processes. The middle cells of Figure 1 highlight the prominence of generalist administrators in the arenas of IGR activities that involve policy, perspectives, and priorities.

The diagonal cells from upper left to lower right *might* be interpreted in a normative or prescriptive sense to be a balanced, appropriate, or "proper" role for each set of actors. Such an interpretation carries the scheme beyond its initial and intended aim. Furthermore, the presence of role extensions, breadth, or spillovers is expected and is indicated by the use of lesser-graded indicators in other cells of each vertical column. That is, elected officials are not restricted in their activities and involvement to the elements listed under FED; they also participate, in a progressively lesser manner and degree, in the elements noted under IGR and IGM. Policy professionals' roles and efforts similarly extend into the activities indicated under IGR and FED.

An added contextual comment serves to conclude this discussion of actor roles and relationships. This formulation has clear and acknowledged links to recent efforts by Svvara and others to reconceptualize and operationalize the link(s) between politics, policy, and administration.⁵⁸ Svvara, of course, focuses specifically on city managers (generalist administrators) and their relationships with city councils (elected politicians). He posits a continuum of role differentiations among actors in four activity arenas—mission, policy, administration, and management. The underlying conceptual parallels between that framework and the one elaborated above should be evident. The chief contrast, of course, is the more diverse, extended, complex, and uncertain environment of inter-jurisdictional relationships.

Concluding Observations

All nations of any significant size and consequence confront one of the fundamental problems of governance. How should the competing claims of central and peripheral author-

ity be resolved? The issue is more ancient than the kingly controversies among the 12 tribes of Israel. It is also as current as the latest round of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on state power(s) over abortion, flag burning, and school prayers.

Constitutionally, the issue is commonly framed in legal terms: Which jurisdiction has the authority to do what, with what degree of discretion or autonomy? Administratively, the "basic theoretical question" has been posed by Fesler as "How to relate area and function?"⁵⁹ Like the blending of politics and administration, the two questions overlap and are intertwined. The linkage between constitutional arrangements grounded in politics and organizational implementation matters centered around administration is a theme that permeates this article.

The historical origins and emergence of the concepts of FED, IGR, and IGM have been reviewed and sketched briefly. The evolution in usage of the terms reflects the changing patterns of influence and role relationships among and within U.S. political jurisdictions. Power and influence have become notably fragmented and dispersed among actors within a given political jurisdiction. Likewise, authority relationships assume varying shapes among and between political entities—national, state, and local governments.

Increased actor- and entity-based involvement has produced a plethora of participants in the public sector decision-making processes. The resulting complexity has made the tasks of public administration and management at once more demanding and also more difficult. Speaking about "the increasing complexity of the 'implementation structures' within which [public] managers must manage," Peters notes the "increasing degree of fusion between the public and private sectors," as well as "the degree of complexity that exists within the public sector itself."⁶⁰ The contrasting aspects of FED, IGR, and IGM typify this public sector complexity and, especially in the case of IGM, the escalated involvement of the private sector.

Greater involvement by the independent and the private sectors is probably not surprising given the scarcity and austerity problems confronting the public sector. The finite charac-

ter of time, money, and other resources makes scarcity an inherent problem of political and organizational choice. But the fiscal austerity which has prevailed during the past decade has accentuated the importance of connections to other jurisdictions. In some instances the connections have increased based on cooperative ventures; in others they have intensified in a competitive mode. In addition, and especially in fiscal terms, there has been a drop in the degree of dependency on aid from external sources, particularly from the national government.

The onset and continuation of fiscal austerity, sometimes described as cutback management or decrementalism, has prompted some observers to conclude that the United States has moved toward de facto, state-oriented, or "fend-for-yourself" federalism.⁶¹ The phrases refer to the relative decline in federal aid coming to state and local governments. The terms also include the rapid as well as the gradual shifts that have occurred in state-local assumption(s) of responsibilities for various functions during the past decade.

Counterpoised to these devolution tendencies are movements toward greater regulation.⁶² The specifics and the details of centralization through regulation cannot be provided. But the trend in this direction was expressed succinctly by Elazar. He noted that "the American federal system may be passing into a new phase" in which "federal grants no longer set the tone in intergovernmental relations"; instead it is one where "the move seems to be in the direction of new relationships in the field of government regulation."⁶³

Most of this regulation emanates from congressionally enacted and court-approved statutes, with national administrative agencies intimately and crucially involved in regulatory implementation. Within these agencies the role of program (policy) professionals has long been recognized as significant. At the same time there has been a serious question or doubt as to the disposition of the policy professionals to balance program goals with historic FED values. Ostensibly, that balance will now be struck more deliberately.

The formal foundations have been laid for the involvement of program or policy profes-

sionals in the process of shaping the future of FED, IGR, and IGM. Executive Order 12612, titled simply "Federalism," was issued on 26 October 1987.⁶⁴ This order mandated the creation of a "Federalism Assessment" process within each national executive branch department and agency. This review process requires that in the formulation and implementation of agency policies through regulations, the agency administrators and program managers take into account "fundamental federalism principles" and "federalism policymaking criteria."

The details of the order and the process it creates are beyond the scope and purpose here. It is also too early to judge the impact and consequence(s) of the order. One agency, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, indicated that out of 400 legislative proposals emerging annually from its policy formulation processes, about half contained federalism assessment statements.⁶⁵

An important point should not be missed, however. Policy professionals deeply involved in specific program functions are increasingly being asked and/or required to factor their preferences and choices into a broader set of FED, IGR, and IGM value concerns. Those management-based (IGM) preferences and choices are expected to influence significantly the complex configuration of FED and IGR in the 1990s and well past the year 2000.

Notes

1. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Shaping of Intergovernmental Relations in the Twentieth Century," *The Annals*, vol. 359 (May 1965), pp. 10-22; David B. Walker, *Toward a Functioning Federalism* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1981); Deil S. Wright, "Intergovernmental Relations: An Analytic Overview," *The Annals*, vol. 416 (November 1974), pp. 1-16.
2. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: New American Library, 1961). See also Martha Derthick, "American Federalism: Madison's Middle Ground in the 1980s," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (January/February 1987), pp. 66-74.

3. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 2 (June 1887), pp. 197–222; reprinted in Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, eds., *Classics of Public Administration* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987), pp. 10–25. Subsequent citations are from the reprinted source.
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5. Wilson, "The Study of Administration," p. 18.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
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10. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
12. Chester A. Newland, *Public Administration and Community: Realism in the Practice of Ideals* (McLean, VA: Public Administration Service, 1984), 45 pp.
13. Cheryl Miller Colbert, "An Empirical Analysis of Politics-in-Administration: State Agency and State Agency Head Participation in the Policy Process" (PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1983), 270 pp. Colbert locates seven instances where the politics-in-administration continuum appears. See also, James H. Svara, "Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council Manager Cities," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 45 (January/February 1985), pp. 221–232.
14. Four representative statements on the aridity and demise of the politics-administration dichotomy are: Paul H. Appleby, *Policy and Administration* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1949), 173 pp.; Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 9 (Autumn 1949), pp. 257–264; Wallace Sayre, "Trends in a Decade of Administrative Values," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 11 (Winter 1951), pp. 1–9; Wallace Sayre, "The Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 18 (Spring 1958), pp. 102–105.
15. Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 128.
16. Durham, "Politics and Administration in Intergovernmental Relations," p. 6.
17. David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., *Federalism Mature and Emergent* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 115–136.
18. Morton Grodzins, "American Political Parties and the American System," *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 13 (December 1960), pp. 974–998.
19. William Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), 169 pp.
20. William Buchanan, "Politics and Federalism: Party or Anti-Party?" *The Annals*, vol. 359 (May 1965), pp. 107–115.
21. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Transformation in American Politics: Implications for Federalism* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 382 pp. For highlights of the report, see U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "New Relationships in a Changing System of Federalism and American Politics," *National Civic Review*, vol. 75 (November/December 1986), pp. 336–345.

22. Samuel H. Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 72 (March 1978), pp. 9-21.
23. Ibid., p. 18.
24. Terry Sanford, *Storm Over the States* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 80.
25. Edward W. Weidner, "Decision-Making in a Federal System," in Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., *Federalism Mature and Emergent* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 363-383; Edward W. Weidner, *Intergovernmental Relations as Seen by Public Officials* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), 162 pp.
26. Beer, "Federalism," p. 20.
27. Harlan Cleveland, "Theses of a New Reformation: The Social Fallout of Science 300 Years After Newton," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 48 (May/June 1988), pp. 681-686. See also, Harlan Cleveland, *The Future Executive* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 140 pp.
28. The "policy professionals" category is discussed extensively and perceptively in Paul E. Peterson, Barry G. Rabe, and Kenneth K. Wong, *When Federalism Works* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986), 245 pp.
29. Ross Clayton, Patrick Conklin, and Raymond Shapek, eds., "Policy Management Assistance—A Developing Dialogue," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 35 (December 1975, special issue), pp. 693-818; see especially, Ann C. Macaluso, "Background and History of the Study Committee on Policy Management Assistance," pp. 695-700.
30. Wilson, "The Study of Administration."
31. One noteworthy source for an assessment of the Reagan presidency is John L. Palmer ed., *Perspectives on the Reagan Years* (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1986), 215 pp. Others include John L. Palmer and Elizabeth V. Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Experiment: An Examination of Economic and Social Policies under the Reagan Administration* (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1982), 530 pp.; John William Ellwood, ed., *Reductions in U.S. Domestic Spending: How They Affect State and Local Governments* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982), 337 pp.; Richard P. Nathan and Fred C. Doolittle, *The Consequences of Cuts: The Effects of the Reagan Domestic Program on State and Local Governments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Urban and Regional Research Center, 1983), 221 pp.; Lester M. Salamon and Michael S. Lund, eds., *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America* (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1984) 500 pp.; John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The New Direction in American Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985), 409 pp.
32. Richard S. Williamson, "The 1982 New Federalism Negotiations," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 13 (Spring 1983), pp. 11-32; Timothy J. Conlan, "Federalism and Competing Values in the Reagan Administration," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 16 (Winter 1987), pp. 29-48; and Stephen B. Farber, "The 1982 New Federalism Negotiations: A View from the States," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 13 (Spring 1983), pp. 33-38.
33. Charles H. Levine, "Human Resource Erosion and the Uncertain Future of the U.S. Civil Service: From Policy Gridlock to Structural Fragmentation," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, vol. 1 (April 1988), pp. 115-134; Barbara Ferman, "Slouching Toward Anarchy: The Policy-making/Implementation Gap Revisited," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, vol. 2 (April 1989), pp. 198-212. For opposite (left and right) political stances on the rigidities and inertia in U.S. governmental system(s), see Robert Lekachman, *Visions and Nightmares: America After Reagan* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 316 pp.; and Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 323 pp.
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- Schechter, "On the Compatibility of Federalism and Intergovernmental Management," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 11 (Spring 1981), pp. 127-141; Deil S. Wright, "Managing the Intergovernmental Scene: The Changing Dramas of Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management," in William B. Eddy, ed., *Handbook of Organizational Management* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), pp. 417-454; Robert Agranoff and Valerie A. Lindsay, "Intergovernmental Management: Perspectives from Human Services Problem Solving at the Local Level," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 43 (May/June 1983), pp. 227-237; Stephen R. Rosenthal, "New Directions for Evaluating Intergovernmental Programs," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 44 (November/December 1984), pp. 491-503; Robert Agranoff, *Intergovernmental Management; Human Services Problem Solving in Six Metropolitan Areas* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 199 pp.; Robert Agranoff, "Managing Intergovernmental Processes," in James L. Perry, ed., *Handbook of Public Administration* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), pp. 131-147.
35. Agranoff, *Intergovernmental Management*, p. 1.
 36. *Ibid.*
 37. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 38. Elazar, "Is Federalism Compatible with Prefectorial Administration?"; Schechter, "On the Compatibility of Federalism and Intergovernmental Management."
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-128.
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
 42. Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 260.
 43. James D. Carroll, "The New Juridical Federalism and the Alienation of Public Policy and Administration," *American Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 16 (Spring 1982), pp. 89-106. See also Michael D. Reagan, *Regulation: The Politics of Policy* (Boston: Little Brown 1987), 241 pp.; U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Regulatory Federalism; Policy, Process, Impact, and Reform* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 326 pp.; Christopher K. Leman and Robert H. Nelson, "The Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs," *Environmental Law*, vol. 12 (Spring 1982), pp. 981-1029; and Margaret Wrightson, "From Cooperative to Regulatory Federalism," *SIAM Intergovernmental News*, vol. 9 (Spring 1986), pp. 1, 5. In her concluding sentence Wrightson makes a telling point about present and future regulatory relationships: "Taken together and projected into the future these trends suggest that the residue of the grand (Reagan) experiment could be a federalism that looks decidedly more regulatory than cooperative" (p. 5).
 44. Deil S. Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, 3d ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988), 511 pp.
 45. James H. Svara, "Dichotomy and Duality."
 46. Hugh Heclo's phrase for the use of intermediaries is "government by remote control." See Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 92. An alternate term is "third-party government." See Lester Salamon, "The Rise of Third-Party Government," *Washington Post*, 29 June 1980, p. C7, where it is noted that "the heart of this change is a shift from direct to indirect or 'third party' government, from an arrangement in which the federal government ran its own programs to one in which it relies primarily on others—states, cities, special districts, banks, non-profit corporations, hospitals, manufacturers, and others—to carry out its purposes instead." A more extensive development of this thesis is found in Lester M. Salamon, "Rethinking Public Management: Third-Party Government and the Changing Forms of Government Action," *Public Policy*, vol. 29 (Summer 1981), pp. 255-275. A similar but more long-term historical analysis is Frederick C. Mosher, "The Changing

Responsibilities and Tactics of the Federal Government," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 40 (November/December 1980), pp. 541-548. The use of and controversy surrounding "third-party" participants have expanded considerably since the terms "privatization" and "contracting-out" gained recent prominence. E. S. Savas, *Privatizing the Public Sector; How to Shrink Government* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1982), 164 pp., and E. S. Savas, *Privatization: The Key to Better Government* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), 308 pp., are two examples of strong advocacy for privatization. Two reflective and more cautionary essays are: Ted Kolderie, "The Two Different Concepts of Privatization," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 46 (July/August 1986), pp. 285-291; and Ronald C. Moe, "Exploring the Limits of Privatization," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (November/December 1987), pp. 453-460. The literature on contracting out is extensive. It has expanded recently as the phrase has become associated with the idea of privatization. See Ruth H. DeHoog, *Contracting Out for Human Services* (Albany: SUNY Albany Press, 1984), 186 pp. An essay that links management and privatization with selected aspects of IGR is James D. Carroll, "Public Administration in the Third Century of the Constitution: Supply-Side Management, Privatization, or Public Investment?" *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (January/February 1987), pp. 106-114. An exemplary case study of privatization, implementation, and intergovernmental problem solving in water pollution control efforts is Gerald W. Johnson and John G. Heilman, "Metapolicy Transition and Policy Implementation: New Federalism and Privatization," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (November/December 1987), pp. 468-478.

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63. Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: The View from the States*, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 252.
64. Executive Order 12612 (26 October 1987); *Federal Register* 52:41685-41688 (30 October 1987). One example of an extensive formal effort to implement this executive order is in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development: see *Federal Register*, 53:31926-31940 (12 August 1988).
65. Personal interviews by the author, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, (Washington: 11 May 1989).