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Public Relations Review 32 (2006) 160–167

Defining the characteristics of a lingering crisis: Lessons from the National Zoo David S. DeVries, Kathy R. Fitzpatrick ∗

DePaul University, Department of Communication, 2320 North Kenmore Ave., Chicago, IL 60614-3250, USA

Received 19 December 2005; received in revised form 17 February 2006; accepted 22 February 2006

Abstract

This article begins to define the characteristics of a new type of organizational crisis—a “lingering crisis.” A qualitative case study involving the National Zoo indicated that a lingering crisis may involve (1) multiple events occurring over an extended timeframe; (2) intense media scrutiny; (3) escalating involvement of external organizations, including watchdog/regulatory/oversight agencies; (4) incongruent organizational messages and stakeholder perceptions; (5) external/internal charges of organizational deception; (6) insufficient organizational responses to stakeholder concerns; (7) organizational failure to address leadership responsibility for crisis. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Organizational crisis; Intense media scrutiny; Lingering crisis; Crisis management

1. Introduction

On April 10, 2002, The Washington Post (Cohn, 2002) reported that a giraffe had died at the Smithsonian National Zoological Park (“National Zoo” or “Zoo”) in Washington, DC. On its face, the story did not appear to be one of the more important stories of the day; however, in retrospect, this story marked the beginning of an extended, well-documented crisis that lasted more than 2 years and involved the deaths of more than 68 animals housed at the National Zoo.

During the crisis period, the National Zoo was subjected to widespread scrutiny from numerous outside organiza- tions, including the United States Congress, the American Zoo and Aquarium Association, the National Academy of Sciences and national and local media – both print and broadcast, particularly The Washington Post – and vocal former employees.

What set this crisis apart and made it ripe for academic study was that it seemed to defy categorization into any modern crisis category. For example, Lerbinger (1997) offered a list of seven crisis types: natural, technological, confrontation, malevolence, skewed management values, deception and management misconduct. While the National Zoo crisis exhibited characteristics of some of these crises, it was not clear that the Zoo crisis could properly be placed into any one of these existing crisis types. In fact, the defining characteristic of the Zoo crisis seemed to be that it lingered far beyond the timeframe of most crises, causing considerable damage to the institution in the loss of stakeholder support.

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 773 325 7340; fax: +1 773 325 7584. E-mail address: [email protected] (K.R. Fitzpatrick).

0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2006.02.010

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Through a qualitative case study, this research sought to define the characteristics of what appeared to be a new crisis type: a “lingering crisis.” The work expands the existing body of knowledge in crisis management by identifying a new category of crisis that scholars may build upon or refine. The study also may be useful to public relations professionals in helping them recognize the “warnings signs” of a lingering crisis. Scholars (e.g., Coombs, 1998, 2000) have perceived a direct link between an organization’s ability to categorize particular types of crises and the organization’s ability to develop appropriate and effective crisis response strategies.

2. Literature review

An important foundation for classifying crises came from Lerbinger (1997), who laid out seven types of crises: crises from natural causes, technological crises, crises of malevolence, crises of skewed management values, crises of deception, crises of misconduct and confrontation crises. Coombs (1999) also identified five broad categories into which most crises fall, including misdeeds (organizational misdeeds and human breakdowns), accidents (technical breakdowns, challenges, workplace violence and mega-damage), malevolence, natural disaster and rumor. Coombs and Holladay (1996) devised a crisis typology based on attribution theory, which included accidents, transgressions, faux pas and terrorism.

Natural crises, which Lerbinger (1997) called “disasters” (p. 57), occur when organizations suffer damage from earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storms, droughts or other destructive events. In addition to being generally uncontrol- lable, natural crises negatively affect life, property and the overall environment. Coombs (1995) called these types of crises “accidents” (p. 456), noting that accidents or disasters can sometimes be uncontrollable acts of nature.

Lerbinger (1997) asserted that technological crises, which are caused by incorrect human application of science and technology, can occur frequently and typically disrupt an entire system, particularly when technology and human life intersect. Coombs (1995) and Coombs and Holladay (1996) categorized some technological crises as “accidents,” while Mitroff (1988) identified crises of this type as “breaks,” meaning the event happened due to operator error, poor security or product defects. Later, Coombs (1999) re-classified “accidents” as “technical breakdowns” (p. 61) and delineated crises caused by human errors as “human breakdowns” (p. 61). Olaniran and Williams (2001) added another dimension to technological crises, suggesting that because technological crises are inevitable, they be deemed “anticipatory” (p. 489).

Another crisis category, according to Lerbinger (1997), is confrontation crises, in which organizations are goaded into altercations by disgruntled people in order to win acceptance of their demands and/or expectations. This definition compares closely with what Coombs (1995) and Coombs and Holladay (1996) called a faux pas. They noted that unintentional actions by organizations sometimes anger external stakeholders who then attempt to mold incidents into crises. Coombs (1995), who asserted that the legitimacy of organizations often is challenged in faux pas crises, later reclassified these crises as “challenges” (Coombs, 1999, p. 61), observing that stakeholders sometimes oppose organizations they believe to be operating inappropriately.

Crises of malevolence, Lerbinger (1997) noted, occur when foes or misanthropes use criminal or other extreme means to express hostility toward companies, organizations or countries. Frequently, these expressions disrupt or even destroy their targets, using criminal methods like product tampering or terrorism. Rumors, disinformation campaigns and espionage also fall into this category.

In acts of terrorism, another crisis of malevolence, the goal of the perpetrators is much more pointed: to intimidate targets with a threat of additional, future acts. Coombs (1995) and Coombs and Holladay (1996) identified the same phenomena, classifying such acts as terrorism crises. Workplace violence, as identified by Coombs (1999), also could fall into the terrorism category.

Extortion, a separate crisis of malevolence identified by Lerbinger (1997), occurs when money or other demands are made of people or organizations. Crises of malevolence also include informational attacks: corporate espionage, rumors and disinformation, which deal with the improper delivery of information—sometimes knowingly false. Espionage routes proprietary information into the hands of competitors. Rumors or disinformation – identified by Mitroff (1988) as “external information attacks” (p. 16) – seek to discredit the reputations of people or organizations through deliberately planted falsehoods. Coombs (1999) resisted grouping crises of malevolence into a single category, placing such acts into the separate categories of malevolence and rumors.

Lerbinger (1997) identified three crises of management failure, calling the first skewed management values. Crises of this type can be caused by both management action and inaction and are mostly financial in nature: management favors

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short-term economic gain at the expense of stakeholders’ social values. Coombs (1995) and Coombs and Holladay (1996) classified crises of this category as “transgressions.” Coombs (1995) explained transgressions as “. . . intentional actions taken by an organization that knowingly place publics at risk or harm” (p. 457).

Crises of deception, also related to management failure, involve the deliberate practice of deceiving stakeholders or concealing unfavorable information (Lerbinger, 1997). Here, Lerbinger observed that organizations fail to acknowledge stakeholder rights to know matters of interest and instead focus on potential financial losses a crisis could cause.

Crises of management misconduct were defined by Lerbinger (1997) as those incidents in which company officials display questionable values, deliberate amorality and/or outright illegality, such as bribery, swindles or kickbacks. Such crises often injure entire organizations despite the fact the scandal might involve only one person or a small group of executives. Coombs (1999) and Coombs and Holladay (2002) expanded this category to include “organizational misdeeds” that could cause injury and sometimes involve legal or regulatory violations.

3. Purpose and methodology

The purpose of this study was to begin to define the characteristics of a lingering crisis. Using a qualitative case study method, the research was designed to answer the question: What made the National Zoo crisis linger?

The research involved the development of an event timeline that outlined significant crisis-related events and a two-tiered inductive analysis of published materials related to the crisis. The crisis period began with the first media report on April 10, 2002, of an animal death, and ended with the announcement on March 18, 2004, that the National Zoo had been re-accredited by the American Zoo and Aquarium Association.

The contents of three sets of publicly available data were analyzed through open and axial coding (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In open coding, the full texts were examined for emerging themes and concepts, which were then categorized. Axial coding was used to identify tentative relationships among and within categories.

National Zoo materials, obtained via the Zoo’s website, provided an unfiltered view of the Zoo’s crisis communication with its stakeholders. These materials included 41 pieces of communication (e.g., press releases, letters and background material) published during the crisis period and released to the public. News coverage of the crisis by The Washington Post included 75 news stories and editorials obtained via the newspaper’s website. The Washington Post reports were chosen because of the paper’s local and national prominence; in addition to being the Zoo’s “hometown paper,” The Washington Post provided a national perspective on the event.

Congressional reports from two governmental authorities with oversight responsibilities for the National Zoo – Congress, which provides about 75% of the Zoo’s annual budget and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which audits animal care and management practices and reports its findings to Congress – also were reviewed. The government documents, obtained via the agencies’ websites, included the transcript of a hearing before the Committee on House Administration and, from the NAS, a news release, report and a transcript of comments delivered at a news conference.

4. Crisis event timeline

The timeline showed that the National Zoo crisis apparently began with a story in The Washington Post about the death of “Ryma,” a giraffe, on April 10, 2002 (Cohn, 2002). When a reporter from The Washington Post asked to review the animal’s records, Lucy H. Spelman, the National Zoo director, refused, citing the animal’s “right to privacy” (Grimaldi, 2002). This seemingly evasive answer subjected the Zoo to national ridicule (see, e.g., Grimaldi, 2002) and apparently spurred The Washington Post to conduct several in-depth investigations of subsequent animal deaths. In all, the deaths of 68 animals were eventually revealed.

One of the investigations (Cohn & Grimaldi, 2003b) uncovered six rare animal deaths directly ascribed to Zoo staff errors. Another damaging investigation asserted the National Zoo attempted to deceive reporters at The Washington Post about some of the animals’ medical records, which reportedly had been altered following animal deaths (Barker & Grimaldi, 2003; Grimaldi, Barker, & Cohn, 2003). When confronted with the discrepancies, the Zoo director simply asserted that the staff followed “standard practice” at the National Zoo (p. A01).

A second part of the investigative series (Grimaldi et al., 2003) focused on the death of “Nancy,” an African elephant which, The Washington Post charged, had endured several years of extreme pain due to undiagnosed tuberculosis before she was finally euthanized in 2000. Perhaps the most damaging accusation in the report, however, concerned the National

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Zoo’s alleged attempts to hide Nancy’s tuberculosis (a communicable disease that can affect humans and other animals) once this information was discovered by Zoo staff.

Possible deception also was alleged in stories regarding the questionable circumstances surrounding the deaths of several zebras (Barker & Grimaldi, 2004) and in reports about the Zoo’s failure to inform the public of certain animal deaths (Partlow, 2004).

During the same timeframe, several key employees were dismissed or reassigned; the results of an internal Smith- sonian investigation were revealed, in which director Spelman was blamed for starving several zebras to death; Smithsonian and National Zoo leaders were called to testify before a Congressional panel; the American Zoologi- cal and Aquarium Association (AZA) and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service withheld the National Zoo’s normally routine accreditation; the National Academies of Sciences – appointed by Congress to conduct a year-long investi- gation into animal care and management at the National Zoo – issued an extremely damaging report that criticized the National Zoo on a number of issues, including poor animal care and inadequate internal communication; and the National Zoo director resigned.

The crisis appeared to have ended when the AZA re-accredited the National Zoo for a full-term, 5-year period on March 18, 2004.

5. Open and axial coding

Open coding of the published materials revealed significant similarities in dominant themes for the three groups of data. The emergent categories were collection, referring to the animals in the National Zoo; operations, referring to logistical operations of the National Zoo; infrastructure, referring to physical facilities at the National Zoo; staff, referring to the caretakers, zoologists, veterinary staff and other members of the National staff; external involve- ment/scrutiny, referring to the examination of Zoo operations/staff by external observers, such as the news media and oversight agencies.

Zoo materials also included the category of Zoo, which focused on the mission and goals of the institution. An additional category that emerged from the review of The Washington Post material – but was not evident to any great extent in Zoo or government agency materials – was the category of deception, which referred to reports (as noted above) that Zoo officials acted in a misleading manner.

Despite the categorical similarities in materials from all three groups, axial coding revealed notable disparities in the treatment of information by the three message sources. Materials from the Zoo and The Washington Post were particularly discordant, suggesting that Zoo messages were rejected by The Washington Post. Although the interplay between the government agencies and the Zoo and newspaper, respectively, was less tense, government agency materials reflected considerable concern regarding the underlying problems that led to the Zoo crisis.

In a typical exchange, the National Zoo issued an announcement in which an animal death was reported. In reporting on the death, The Washington Post revealed additional – critical – details about the death that had not been shared in the official Zoo announcement. The government agencies requested explanations for the death and addressed changes needed to prevent future occurrences. The following example illustrates this interplay in the case of the death of two red pandas:

Zoo statement: “Two adult red pandas (also known as lesser pandas) were found dead by a keeper at 8:50 a.m. this morning, January 11, in the animals’ outdoor exhibit at the Smithsonian’s National Zoological Park . . . A preliminary necropsy will be conducted on the animals today” (National Zoo, 2003a).

The Washington Post report: “The National Zoo had a fatal breakdown in communication in the months and weeks leading to the accidental poisonings of two red pandas, with the trouble reaching the point where the Zoo’s safety officer said he authorized burying toxic gas pellets in the animals’ yard without knowing a crucial piece of information: red pandas dig” (Barker, 2003c, p. C01).

Congressional Hearing transcript: “[Congressman John. B. Larson] . . . But the basic question the public has been asking on the deaths of the red pandas is, how could this happen?” (Oversight of the Smithsonian Institution, 2003).

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National Academy of Sciences report: “On January 13, 2003, measures to control rats in the red panda enclosure went awry because the National Zoo’s own written protocols . . . were not followed . . .” (National Academies, 2004).

Comparisons in the external involvement/scrutiny category revealed the most intense level of tension among the three groups. For example, although Zoo officials said they welcomed the appointment of outside experts, such as an independent panel of the National Academy of Sciences and routine inspections by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), they expressed concern that the negative aspects of the Zoo might be over-emphasized and the positives ignored in public reports. In a letter to The Washington Post, Spelman (2003b) noted: “I also want to address some of the items the news media have not reported . . .”

Another letter (Spellman, 2003a) to the newspaper illustrated the Zoo’s defensive posture regarding the involvement of outside experts: “I am writing to correct the false impression, left by your September 25 story, that the National Zoo’s hiring of a public relations firm is the latest Washington scandal. It is no such thing . . .”

In another somewhat ironic instance, the newspaper reported that it had obtained and reviewed a crisis communication plan developed for the National Zoo by a public relations firm: “The 23-page plan warns that continuing inquiries by The Washington Post could emerge as a story of national import, creating a crisis that would imperil the Zoo’s bid for full accreditation and threaten the job of Director Lucy H. Spelman” (Cauvin, 2003, p. B01).

When the National Zoo did not receive its normally routine accreditation from the AZA in March 2003, The Washington Post discussed the implications (Barker & Cohn, 2003): “The action taken by the Zoo association, a trade organization, is a severe blow to the reputation of the National Zoo and its director, Lucy H. Spelman, the Zoo’s former chief veterinarian” (p. B01).

Government agency materials in the external involvement/scrutiny category included primarily Congressional Record testimony. The official record of one hearing also included a letter from PETA that illustrated scrutiny from non-governmental organizations. The letter stated in part: “In recent months, PETA has received an inordinate number of complaints regarding the tragic deaths of animals at the National Zoo. These deaths, in addition to a pattern of poor judgment by Zoo management, lack of federal oversight and public accountability, and substandard conditions, have led PETA to recommend that the National Zoo’s application for AZA re-accreditation be denied at this time” (Oversight of the Smithsonian Institution, 2003).

Finally, axial coding showed that despite the numerous Washington Post messages related to possible deception (e.g., Barker, 2003b; Barker & Grimaldi, 2003, 2004a; Grimaldi et al., 2003; Inside the zoo deaths, 2003; Partlow, 2004), Zoo officials addressed the issue only once. In responding to a lengthy story (Barker & Grimaldi, 2003), reporting that animal records were allegedly altered prior to submission to the newspaper, Spelman (2003a) said: “It was never the intent of anyone at the Zoo to alter clinical records in order to cover up mistakes . . .”

Notably, although references to record-keeping were present in the operations category of government agency materials, such acts were not identified as possible deceptive practices on the part of Zoo officials. For example, in one report, the NAS (National Academies, 2004) observed: “Optimally, records should provide an accurate account of situations and practices directly related to animal management and health. Except in the Department of Pathology, the quality of record keeping has been inconsistent, the records have often been poorly archived, and, in the case of medical records, sometimes altered after initially [sic] entry. This practice of changing records after the fact is unacceptable in the view of the committee.”

6. Discussion and conclusion

These findings indicate that the National Zoo crisis does not fit neatly in any existing crisis category. Arguably, the crisis may have involved some aspects of crises of confrontation—for example, the involvement of PETA and other groups might be construed as confrontational. It also might have involved some elements of employee terrorism, although no evidence regarding intentional acts by employees to harm animals was discovered. More likely, the Zoo crisis could be classified as a crisis of management failure, involving possible skewed management values, deception and misconduct (Lerbinger, 1997). Certainly, the entire organization was injured by the acts of those responsible for the animal deaths and related actions.

Yet, while management failure obviously played a role in creating the conditions that led to the first and subsequent animals’ deaths, there was more at play in the National Zoo crisis than one event involving misconduct. The Zoo

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crisis involved multiple crisis events occurring over an extended timeframe and simultaneous scrutiny from numerous influential stakeholders, e.g., news media and government agencies. Charges of deception were involved, as was the rejection of organizational messages by stakeholders, including the news media. Tension among the Zoo and key stakeholders was observed and seemed to escalate over time, possibly influencing not only the duration of the crisis, but also its intensity. Contributing to that tension might have been insufficient responses by Zoo officials to charges of misconduct and deception, as well as perceived – or real – inaction on the part of the institution to fix the problems that led to the crisis.

Collectively, these factors seem to reveal the existence of a new type of crisis – a “lingering crisis” – that begins with an undesirable crisis event (Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002), threatens the organization (Penrose, 2000) and runs the risk of escalating in severity (Fink, 1986). The National Zoo crisis started with a single event – a news report about the death of a giraffe – that although not necessarily unexpected, attracted unwanted attention to the organization and included the risk of future problems.

The existence of multiple crisis events occurring over time, however, suggests a departure from existing crisis literature. Unlike traditional crisis definitions that point to a single event (Belcher, 2004; Heath & Millar, 2004; Lerbinger, 1997; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002), the Zoo crisis involved multiple animal deaths and related actions occurring over an extended timeframe. Although Mitroff (1988) and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) observed that crises can often trigger or affect other crises, such was not the case in the National Zoo crisis: too many unrelated animal deaths were occurring (that is, they were not killed by one malicious employee, for example). The occurrence of multiple events also suggests that a lingering crisis is characterized by an extended timeframe in which events continue to occur weeks, months, even years after the initial event. This characteristic contrasts with other well-studied crises, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, in which Exxon’s reputation was questioned for years, but the actual event that caused such questions occurred in a shorter timeframe.

The findings also indicate that a lingering crisis may be characterized by intense scrutiny from multiple stakeholders, as opposed to a barrage of attacks from a single group. As noted by Fink (1986), a crisis has the potential to escalate in intensity, resulting in higher degrees of outside scrutiny. And because stakeholders may blame organizations for subsequent crisis events, the scrutiny likely escalates the crisis in the form of more unwelcome attention both from within and outside the organization. In the Zoo crisis, it appeared that scrutiny from The Washington Post (see Barker, 2003a; Barker & Cohn, 2003; Cohn, 2003; Cohn & Grimaldi, 2003a; Taylor, 2003) spurred other groups (see, e.g., National Academies, 2004; Oversight of the Smithsonian Institution, 2003) to focus attention on the National Zoo, sparking overlapping reviews. The National Zoo was under attack not only from well-known and well-respected influential groups outside the organization, but also from within its own ranks of current and former employees (Grimaldi & Barker, 2003).

Charges of deception also may play a role in a lingering crisis. But, while Lerbinger (1997) examined crises of deception in isolation, pointing to the discovery of deception as the beginning of some organizational crises, charges of deception alone could not fully account for the Zoo crisis since the charges surfaced well after other crisis-related events had occurred. At the same time, The Washington Post reports concerning deceptive practices clearly seemed to influence the duration of the crisis, perhaps partly due to the failure of Zoo officials to respond promptly and adequately to such charges.

According to this study, an organizational crisis may linger when organizational messages are not validated by stakeholders. For example, The Washington Post reports clearly indicated that the paper was not satisfied with Zoo officials’ responses to the problems associated with the animal deaths. Media reports also indicated some conflict among Zoo employees regarding potential causes of animal deaths. Additionally, oversight agencies questioned Zoo officials’ explanations for the recurring problems at the Zoo. And, Zoo officials did little to address media and other stakeholder concerns, allowing negative perceptions to linger.

Finally, this study suggests that a crisis may linger if leadership changes are not addressed early in the crisis cycle. For example, although the Zoo’s executive director was the subject of considerable criticism throughout the Zoo crisis, her resignation did not occur until late in the second year of the crisis, shortly before the Zoo received re-accreditation. The failure to bring in “new management” may have contributed to stakeholders’ impressions that the Zoo had not taken the steps needed to fix the problems that led to the recurring animal deaths.

These findings offer organizational crisis managers valuable insight into factors that may create a lingering crisis. Familiarity with such “warning signs” will contribute to the development of more effective crisis management plans and more appropriate crisis responses.

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Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank Dr. Donald Martin for his assistance with the research for this project.

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