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Week 6 Discussion Forum - Deadly Force

Assigned Reading: Thistlewaite and Wooldredge, Part 1, Chapter 5, Deadly Force: What explains the variation in police shootings across departments? pp. 98-105.

After reading the article answer the following questions in a discussion posting:

1. Do you think the methodology used to complete this study was valid?

2. What limitations do you see, if any, in the way the study was conducted?

3. Do you think that the amount of variation in the number of police shootings revealed in the study is as significant today as it was in 1977? Why or Why not?

Police Use of DeaDly foRce The FBI defines deadly force as “the intentional use of a firearm or other instrument resulting in a high probability of death” (Lathrop 2000). The use of deadly force by police is a rare occur-rence but can have serious implications for the officer, the department, and the community. All police decisions to use force against a citizen are subject to review and can result in disciplinary action against the officer. Departments can be held liable if a police officer fails to follow legal and departmental rules governing the use of force. Police–community relations often suffer as a consequence of the police using force against a member of the community. Police shootings were blamed for many of the urban riots that took place during the 1960s and 1970s. According to data from the National Center for Health Statistics, there were 4,649 civilians killed by police between 1960 and 1974 (Milton et al. 1977). Up until the 1970s, research on police use of deadly force was scarce. The FBI kept data on the number of citizens killed by police but the information was not included in the Uniform Crime Reports and was not publicized. Very little was known about the extent of deadly force, factors that influenced its use, and the consequences for officers and the community. The few studies that did exist were usually limited to a single city and were either conducted by police departments or outside organizations without the cooperation of the department (Milton et al. 1977). DeaDly foRce: What exPlains the vaRiation in Police shootings acRoss DePaRtments? Milton, C., J. Halleck, J. Lardner, and G. Abrecht (1977). Police Use of Deadly Force. Washington, DC: Police Foundation. Background Significant differences in police use of deadly force have been found across cities in the United States, yet there was little interest in trying to explain the variation before the mid-1970s. Laws governing police use of deadly force differed from state to state and even across departments within the same state. Gerald Robin (1963) published one of the first empirical studies of police use of deadly force in 1963. Robin analyzed police killings in Philadelphia from 1950 to 1960. During that time, there were 32 instances of police use of deadly force. All but two incidents were deemed “justifiable.” Robin found that victims were disproportionately young and black, with a majority of the victims suspected of committing an index offense at the time they were shot and three-fourths with prior police contacts. Robin also examined police homicides across other large cities and found considerable variation in the number of citizens killed by police. In Boston, the rate of justifiable homicides was 1.4 per 10,000 officers versus 63 per 10,000 officers in Akron, Ohio. The findings from Robin’s study drew little attention from police administrators and scholars (Fyfe 1988). Interest in the subject increased in 1967 when a report was released by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The report expressed concerns over the fact that officers were using deadly force without administrative guidance (Fyfe 1988). One consistent trend that had emerged from previous research was the wide variation across states and departments in the number of deadly force incidents. In the mid-1970s, the Police Foundation undertook a comprehensive study to explore the differences across jurisdictions and departments in police use of deadly force. the study Catherine Milton, Jeanne Halleck, James Lardner, and Gary Abrecht (1977), researchers from the Police Foundation, wanted to fill the void in the literature by conducting a multi-jurisdiction study that would help explain the differences across cities in the number of police shootings. This information could then be used to assist in the development of policies and procedures for reducing the number of police shootings. In preparation of the study, researchers reviewed prior studies of deadly force and interviewed police administrators in several cities. An advisory board was assembled that consisted of university professors and police administrators. The Board would assist with setting the research agenda and the research design. The first task was to select the police departments that would participate in the study. Researchers contacted 45 departments across the country and interviewed various administrators and supervisors to determine which agencies kept detailed records of their officers’ shootings and would be willing to supply this information. Departments were also asked questions about their deadly force policies, proce-dures, and training. The goal was to select departments from different regions with dissimilari-ties in their crime rates and in their use of deadly force. Researchers were also interested in cities with different deadly force policies and particularly those that had recently changed their poli-cies. Listed below are the seven departments selected for the study. Each of these departments agreed to fully cooperate with researchers. The number of police shootings during the 2-year study period (1973–1974) is listed in conjunction with the department characteristics of interest to the researchers. BiRmingham, alaBama (41 shootings) The department operated without a written deadly force policy. Officers were guided by Alabama case law that involved a 50-year-old court decision authorizing police to use deadly force in apprehending an escaping suspect accused of illegally distilling whisky. This was the smallest city examined with a population of roughly 300,000. DetRoit, michigan (179 shootings) This was the largest city selected with a population of approximately 1.4 million. The city had a high occurrence of gun-related crimes and police shootings. Under a new mayor, the department had recently eliminated a program that involved the use of plainclothes and decoy officers. inDianaPolis, inDiana (36 shootings) This department seemed to operate under a less strict deadly force policy. The police chief had recently created a deadly force review board. kansas city, missoURi (26 shootings) The department had just put into place a new deadly force policy, giving researchers the opportunity to examine its effectiveness. oaklanD, califoRnia (17 shootings) The city had a high crime rate and was known for racial tension, yet had a small number of police shootings. The department had in place a conflict management program. PoRtlanD, oRegon (9 shootings) State law restricted police officers in their use of deadly force, and the department had a low number of shootings.

Washington, D.c. (70 shootings) The department had adopted a strict firearms policy and was one of the first to establish a review board. However, the city had experienced a high rate of shootings in the preceding few years. The data for the study came from police department records, interviews, and observations over a 2-year period beginning in 1973. Administrators granted access to files, answered ques-tions, and allowed researchers to observe their officers at work. Researchers only examined police shootings that resulted in the death or injury of a civilian. findings The goal of the Police Foundation was to conduct a descriptive study of police use of deadly force because of the limited amount of research on the topic. Using archival data from seven police departments across the United States, researchers provided an analysis of the variation in police shootings across departments giving special attention to differences in departmental policies and procedures. One of the major advantages of examining preexisting data collected for some other purpose is nonreactive measurement. Researchers do not have to be concerned that their observations might influence study participants. During the study period, there were 378 police shootings and information was gathered on 320 incidents. Detroit had such a large number of shootings that researchers gathered data only for an 18-month period instead of 2 years. Most of the police shootings were nonfatal (79 percent). According to data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics, in 1973 there were 376 civilians killed by police officers in the United States (Milton et al. 1977). Fourteen percent of those deaths occurred in the study cit-ies, yet the combined population of these cities represented only 1.9 percent of the US population. victim chaRacteRistics Demographic information was available for most of the shooting victims. A majority were male (only six victims were identified as female) and more than one-third were between the ages of 19 and 24. The youngest victim was 14 and the oldest was 73. A disproportionate number of victims were black (79 percent), however, this percent was con-sistent with black arrest rates. The demographic findings were consistent with prior studies of police deadly force. Over half of the suspects were also armed (57 percent). All but 10 of the vic-tims were involved in a criminal offense or were acting suspicious when the shooting occurred. Almost one-third of the incidents involved police responding to some type of disturbance call (i.e., domestic disturbance or assaults). One of the victims was attempting suicide when shot by the police. Four of the victims were bystanders and five were other police officers. The data did not permit a clear determination of whether the victims were “confronting” the officer(s), “resisting,” or “fleeing.” officeR chaRacteRistics This information was more difficult to obtain. Demographic information on the officers involved in the shootings was not readily available from all depart-ments. Researchers were able to access information on the officers’ status at the time of the shoot-ings. Officers were off-duty in 17 percent of the shootings while 21 percent involved plainclothes officers. Researchers speculated that these officers were not easily identified and were more likely to become involved in situations where a crime was in progress. Officers did not initiate most of the off-duty shootings but more commonly came upon a crime scene and stopped to help. Ninety-two percent of these shootings were considered justified and resulted in no disciplinary action taken against the officer (although this percent excluded the city of Detroit because no data on officer disposition was available).

city chaRacteRistics Cities with larger populations generally had more shootings than smaller populations, but population size alone could not explain differences in shootings because cities of comparable size had significantly different numbers of shootings. Size of the police force within a city was not related to the number of shootings. Fluctuations in crime rates also failed to correspond with changes in the use of deadly force, although researchers noted the difficulty with establishing trends over a limited (2-year) time period. DePaRtmental RegUlations At the time of the study, many police departments had implemented (or were in the process of implementing) policies and procedures that restricted the use of deadly force, some even beyond what the law specified. One reason why some departments avoided the more restrictive policies was the threat of civil liability. The department could be held liable if a court found that an officer acted outside of the policy. The more narrow the policy, the easier it was to establish that the officer was at fault. The regulations in place within each of the seven study departments varied significantly, and most lacked a single comprehensive policy on the use of force. Instead, policies and procedures were spread across multiple documents that lacked organization. Birmingham had no formal policy beyond the 1915 court decision while police officers in Indianapolis operated under state law only. Oakland’s department regulations prohibited police from shooting at burglars and auto thieves, but the rule did not mention any other non-violent felons. Every department authorized the use of deadly force in self-defense situations or in defense of third parties, but there were language differences. For example, in Oakland, officers could only use deadly force “when all other available means have failed.” In Detroit, there had to be a threat of “serious bodily harm or death.” Each department permitted officers to shoot fleeing felons but differed with regard to which felons could be shot. All of the departments had more restrictive policies in place for juvenile suspects, and it appeared that this particular policy had achieved its desired effect. After the Kansas City Police Department imple-mented their regulation, the number of juveniles shot by police significantly decreased. None of the departments required officers to first fire a warning shot. In fact, all of the departments pro-hibited it based on the risk of harm to innocent bystanders. Two departments—Indianapolis and Washington, D.C.—actually required officers to carry their firearms when off-duty. In Detroit and Indianapolis, officers were allowed to carry a second gun. DePaRtmental RevieWs All decisions to use deadly force were subject to review, but the nature and extent of the reviews differed across departments. Every department required its offi-cers to immediately report a shooting or firearm discharge. These reports were submitted to dis-patch in some departments versus to the watch commander in others. Departments also differed in how police shootings were investigated. Some departments used a chain of command system where a preliminary investigation was made by a supervisor who submitted a report that was reviewed by everyone up through the administrative hierarchy. Other departments allowed the internal affairs unit to conduct the investigation or convened an investigative committee to review the shootings. Beginning in 1970, a handful of departments established police firearms review boards. The concept quickly spread. Composition of these boards varied by department but usu-ally consisted of police administrators, investigators, patrol officers, and members of the com-munity. Detroit, Oakland, Washington, D.C., Portland, and Indianapolis all had review boards in place at the time of the study. When the use of deadly force was found to be “unjustified,” the most common sanction received by an officer was a verbal or written reprimand. Seldom were officers suspended or ordered to surrender their days off. It was even more unusual for an officer to be criminally prosecuted RecommenDations The variation in police use of deadly force and the limited number of departments studied prevented researchers from deriving any definitive explanations for differ-ences in the use of deadly force. The researchers did, however, suggest several factors that were worth pursuing in subsequent research. State statutes, department policies, training, and review procedures appeared to be related to differences in shooting rates across cities. Based on their findings, researchers made several recommendations for departments interested in reducing the number of police shootings and for those considering changes to their deadly force regulations. Policies that were clearly written and provided specific guidelines for when officers were autho-rized to shoot were preferable to vague policies that required officers to make too many assess-ments of the situation before deciding if deadly force was appropriate. Researchers advocated policies that limited the use of deadly force by police to the following two situations: To defend himself or herself, or another person, from what the officer reasonably perceives as an immediate threat of death or serious injury, when there is no apparent alternative. (Milton et al. 1977, p. 131) and To apprehend an armed and dangerous subject, when alternative means of apprehension would involve a substantial risk of death or serious injury, and when the safety of innocent bystanders will not be additionally jeopardized by the officer’s actions. (Milton et al. 1977, p. 131) Researchers recommended against any policy that required officers to make distinctions based on the seriousness of the crime committed or a suspect’s age. Not all felony suspects posed a threat to an officer’s safety, and age became relevant only if it was related to the suspect’s ability to inflict harm upon the officer. Other recommendations included prohibiting officers from fir-ing upon moving vehicles (shots were rarely accurate and posed a risk to innocent bystanders) and firing warning shots (because of the risk to other officers and innocent bystanders). Officers should also be restricted in their ability to “draw and display” a firearm. Given the significant percentage of shootings by off-duty police officers, departments should implement guidelines specifying the circumstances in which off-duty officers were permitted to involve themselves in a situation (such as only in serious crimes). It was important for departments to include representatives from all ranks in the discussion of changes to these policies. Rules that further restrict the ability to use deadly force were likely to be perceived as a threat to the officers’ safety. Involving as many officers as possible in the dis-cussions could help alleviate these concerns. All regulations, rules, and procedures needed to be compiled into a single policy document that was periodically reviewed and revised as needed. In addition to the recommendations for policy changes, researchers also suggested ways to increase officers’ compliance with the regulations, such as improved training, increased accountability, and meaningful review procedures. limitations The Police Foundation report was the first large-scale study of police use of deadly force. Researchers analyzed data from seven police departments across the United States in an effort to provide information on the characteristics and extent of police shootings. Special attention was given to departmental policies and review procedures. The data for the study came primar-ily from police department records. Research using available data is often more cost-effective and less time-consuming than collecting original data, and the data can be ideal for examin-ing differences in a phenomenon under study (in this case researchers wanted to examine dif-ferences in deadly force policies). A major disadvantage to the use of existing data, however, is that the data may be insufficient for achieving the research objectives. The findings from the Police Foundation study of deadly force were derived from data supplied by police departments that were not randomly selected. A convenience sample of departments was examined based on the departments’ availability of data and willingness to cooperate with the study. In addition, the seven study departments also composed a purposive sample because they were deliberately selected to represent a variety of departments varying in size and geographic area. Therefore, the extent that findings would generalize to other departments was questionable. Because of the lim-ited availability of information on police officer characteristics, researchers were unable to deter-mine how much of the differences across departments were due to compositional differences in the officers themselves. Furthermore, the data did not allow researchers to determine the context in which deadly force was used (e.g., were victims fleeing or resisting an arrest?). Another criticism of the Police Foundation study focused on the fact that police depart-ments provided the data. Data on the number of police shootings were considered suspect when obtained from department records, particularly when the data were used to make compari-sons across departments. Many small police departments did not keep accurate records of their police shootings, and departments differed in how they defined and classified police shootings (Sherman and Langworthy 1979). In the Police Foundation study, researchers examined only police shootings that resulted in a civilian death or injury and did not examine the number of discharges where no civilians were shot. According to William Waegel (1984), prior research on police use of deadly force should have included discharges in their analyses because the circum-stances that lead up to discharge incidents may be the same as for police shootings. significance and subsequent Research In addition to providing a detailed description of the use of deadly force across departments in multiple cities, researchers from the Police Foundation also set forth a research agenda to guide future studies. High priority was given to establishing uniform data collection procedures for keeping track of all police shootings. Minnesota had already implemented a mandatory report-ing system for all police agencies within the state (Sherman and Langworthy 1979). Research on police shootings should also include analyses of harmless discharges (situations where the police fired their weapon but hit no target), characteristics of officers involved in shootings, and char-acteristics of the shooting incidents (location, time of day, precipitating factors, etc.). Researchers also suggested that future inquiries should consider the role of opportunity in police shootings (e.g., did more police-citizen contacts increase the number of police shootings?). Finally, longitu-dinal research was needed to determine the impact of legislative and department policy changes in multiple jurisdictions. Police administrators and scholars took note of the recommendations and numerous studies were subsequently conducted on police use of deadly force. The only two community characteristics examined by Police Foundation researchers were community size and crime rates, and neither one was related to the number of police shootings. Other studies have produced correlations between community characteristics and the number of police shootings. Richard Kania and Wade Mackey (1977) examined all police shootings that resulted in deaths in the United States from 1961 to 1970 and found that levels of public vio-lence and homicide produced the strongest relationships with police shootings. Communities with higher levels of violence were more likely to experience a greater number of police shoot-ings. Several other studies have produced similar findings (Fyfe 1980a, Alpert 1989, Jacobs and O’Brien 1998). For example, Kenneth Matulia (1985) examined police shootings across 57 large US cities and found that a city’s robbery rate and number of police officers killed in the line of duty were related to the number of police shootings. Researchers from the Police Foundation discovered that a significant number of police shootings were at the hands of off-duty police officers. Officers were encouraged and sometimes required to arm themselves at all times. Arming off-duty officers would keep them safe and pos-sibly deter potential criminals. Fyfe (1980b) examined this practice among New York police offi-cers who were required to carry guns at all times. Three-fourths of the 681 shootings by off-duty officers were justified (i.e., in defense of self or others), but 12.6 percent were accidental. Four out of every 10 shootings resulted in disciplinary action or criminal prosecution. It may not be in the best interest of a department to require officers to carry guns at all times. Milton et al.’ s (1977) study also revealed that a disproportionate number of police shooting victims were black. Several other studies reported similar findings in cities across the United States (Meyer 1980, Fyfe 1988, Blumberg 1981, Geller and Karales 1981, and Binder, Scharf, and Galvin 1982). Initial explanations for the racial disparity were divided. Some scholars attributed these differences to the higher number of police contacts among minorities while others believed that officers were more likely to shoot black suspects relative to white suspects. Subsequent research uncovered a decline in this racial disparity as a result of stricter deadly force policies (Sparger and Giacopassi 1992). Fyfe (1981) also discovered that, in New York City, black police officers were twice as likely as white officers to use deadly force. The difference was attributed to the environment in which black officers worked (areas with high amounts of violence) and to differences in an officer’s rank and assignment. An officer’s age and experience were unrelated to the use of deadly force, however. According to the Police Foundation report, much of the variation in police use of deadly force was attributed to departmental policies and state statutes. In 1979, Fyfe published his study of the impact of changes in deadly force policies within the New York City Police Department. Fyfe, a former lieutenant with the department, had just completed his doctorate in criminal jus-tice. In 1972, the department had implemented a new regulation that restricted the use of deadly force beyond the state statute. The regulation stipulated that officers must rely on a minimum amount of force necessary to achieve a desired result. Officers were prohibited from firing warn-ing shots, firing upon moving vehicles (unless occupants were firing at the officers), and dis-charging their weapon in such a manner that would endanger the lives of innocent bystanders. The regulation also created a Firearms Discharge Review Board to “investigate and adjudicate all officer firearms discharges” (p. 311). Fyfe analyzed over 3,800 firearm discharge reports between 1971 and 1975 and found a significant reduction in the occurrence of police shootings after the new regulation was implemented. Most noteworthy was the reduction in instances where police shot “fleeing felons.” The analysis also showed a decline in warning shots fired by officers. The importance of departmental policies in controlling police use of deadly force has been well docu-mented in the literature (Meyer 1980, Scharf and Binder 1983). The Police Foundation study focused attention on the wide variation of deadly force laws across states. Differences were especially pronounced in the rules for apprehending “fleeing felons.” Some states allowed officers to shoot at any fleeing felon while others limited the use of deadly force to violent or armed fleeing felons. Waegel (1984) examined police shootings in Philadelphia for the period 1970–1978. Pennsylvania adopted a more restrictive statute governing police use of deadly force in 1973 which stipulated that police officers were no longer permitted to shoot unarmed, fleeing felons. Waegel determined that the statutory change had little impact on police use of deadly force because 20 percent of the shootings that occurred in the 5 years after the law went into effect violated the statute. A new deadly force policy was implemented within the Philadelphia Police Department in 1980. Unlike the statute, the departmental policy achieved its goal of reducing the number of police shootings (White 2001). In 1985, the US Supreme Court intervened with its decision in the case of Tennessee v. Garner. The Court declared the use of deadly force to apprehend an unarmed, nonviolent felon a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Police shot Garner, an unarmed 15-year-old boy, after he had committed a residential burglary. The impact of the Court’s decision was significant in that the number of fatal police shootings dropped 16 percent across the country (Tennenbaum 1994). The trend towards declining rates has endured despite increases in both urban populations and police officers. Today, there are approximately 400 justified police homicides each year in the US (Blair et al. 2011). Police officers are currently permitted to use deadly force only when it is “rea-sonable” to do so, and police officer training includes a “use of force continuum” that instructs officers on how to respond using proportional force. Blair et al. (2011) conducted a reaction time experiment in which officers had to make split-second decisions on whether or not to use force against armed suspects. The results of the experiment revealed that even in situations where the officer had his/her gun pointed at a suspect who was armed, but not pointing at the officer, the officer was typically not able to fire before the suspect fired. The results of this experiment illus-trate just how important training is to ensuring the police use the appropriate amount of force. Hoon Lee and Michael Vaughn (2010) found that poor training in the use of deadly force can lead to departments being held liable for their police shootings. Policing scholars agree on the impor-tance of training; however, training in the use of deadly force remains unstandardized across the country. There are differences across states in the quality and quantity of training provided by police academies and in-service training (Morrison and Garner 2011). Police administrators and scholars have learned a great deal about police use of deadly force since the Police Foundation published their findings in 1977. Results from several empirical stud-ies have helped fill the knowledge gaps outlined by Milton and her colleagues. Furthermore, sub-sequent research moved beyond describing variation in police shootings across cities to explaining these differences. This information has led to more restrictive policies, improved police training, and greater availability of alternative nonlethal weapons, all of which have significantly reduced the number of police shootings. References Alpert, G. (1989). “Police Use of Deadly Force: The Miami Experience.” In Critical Issues in Policing, edited by R. Dunham and G. Alpert. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Binder, A., P. Scharf, and R. Galvin (1982). Use of Deadly Force By Police Officers: Final Report. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Bittner, E. (1970). The Functions ofPolice in Modern Society. Washington, DC: National Institute of Mental Health. Blair, J., J. Pollock, D. Montague, T. Nichols, J. Curnutt, and D. Burns (2011). “Reasonableness and Reaction Time.” Police Quarterly 14:323–43. Blumberg, M. (1981). “Race and Police Shootings: An Analysis of Two Cities.” In Contemporary Issues in Law Enforcement, edited by J. Fyfe, 152–66. New York: Sage. Fyfe, J. (1979). “Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination.” Journal of Criminal Justice 7:309–23. Fyfe, J. (1980a). “Geographic Correlates of Police Shooting.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 17:101–13. Fyfe, J. (1980b). “Always Prepared: Police Off-Duty Guns.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 452:72–81. Fyfe, J. (1988). “Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform.” Justice Quarterly 5:165–205. Geller, W., and K. Karales (1981). Split-Second Decisions: Shootings of and by Chicago Police. Chicago: Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group. Jacobs, D., and R. O’Brien (1998). “The Determinants of Deadly Force: A Structural Analysis of Police Violence.” American Journal of Sociology 103:837–62. Kania, R., and W. Mackey (1977). “Police Violence as a Function of Community Characteristics.” Criminology 15:27–48. Lathrop, S. (2000). “Reviewing Use of Force: A Systematic Approach.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 69:16–20. Lee, H., and M. Vaughn (2010). “Organizational Factors that Contribute to Police Deadly Force Liability.” Journal of Criminal Justice 38:193–206.