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6 THE ACTORS VIEW

This chapter will present the actors view in detail. Fundamental concepts such as meaning, intentionality, dialogue and dialectics on which the view is based will be provided. The relation of the actors view to its paradigm and some typical results from this view will also be provided.

AN UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

In modern Physics there is, among other things, talk about an uncertainty, which means that physical phenomena in micro-cosmos are not only particles but also waves. This aspect means the particles do not have any definite demarcation. The uncertainty, then, says that it is certainly possible to close the waves in between two obstacles in order to better determine the position of a particle. But the closing in is then decreasing the wavelength, at the same time as the frequency is increasing. The outcome is that what was supposed to provide a more precise measurement in reality is changing the energy of the particle. The actors view might, in parity with this, claim that man too should be seen both as a

particle (being) and a wave (becoming) with indefinite demarcation (freedom). What will then happen if we as creators of knowledge are closing her in – the authentic human being – between some items in a questionnaire in order to quantitatively determine the “position” of isolated characteristics of her? What type of knowledge will be the result of such a closing- in, asks the actors view? Is not the “energy” of this “particle” also changed by the very moment of measuring? Like the uncertainty principle that Heisenberg brought into modern physics (the Heisenberg

uncertainty principle), Arbnor asserts (2004) that it is possible to formulate an uncertainty principle even in the social science area by starting from the ultimate presumptions of the actors view (see Figure 6.1 on next page): From this principle it follows that every kind of statistical measurement as explanation of

human aspects/behaviour in social contexts (micro-cosmoses) leads to a gradual decreased understanding of ourselves as authentic totalities. And the opposite: the better we understand ourselves as authentic totalities, the more uncertain the quantitative aspects become – they can take any expressions, whenever, wherever. Because, as men we are free to act as unique subjects! Unlike phenomena in nature we also have the unique ability to think critically of what we are exposed to as well as uncritically be manipulated by it. We are creatures creating meaning one way or another. If we lose the qualitative feeling of totality and the meaningful context – our ability to create ourselves, as free actors in our own micro-cosmos – then we

Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-30 09:49:11.

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lose some of what is human, according to the presumptions of the philosophy of life according to the actors view.

Figure 6.1 The Arbnor Uncertainty Principle Source: Arbnor, 2004: 362

As creators of knowledge in the actors view we must therefore never stand outside in order to observe others as objects, because in such a case the others and their situation would appear as strange. Appearing as strange is a function of not participating ourselves. And if we do not participate as actors creating knowledge, that which appears as strange also looks like something determined (= conditioned by external factors and not by human free will). Because, if we participate ourselves, we will notice, as creators of knowledge, that things are moving by our own choice and actions and by others. Then, we will not be strangers to the dynamic flows of the present in human micro-cosmoses. (This problem of free will and determinism is one of the most disputed questions in the history of philosophy.) In the “closing in/locking” perspective of statistics/questionnaires most characteristics may,

according to the actors view, appear as determined and even similar on the surface. And according to the uncertainty principle above we will, by this explaining knowledge, understand human situations as free dynamic totalities increasingly poorly! We develop and measure us, so to say, into “unfreedom” in the sign of self-reference. The explanatory knowledge here becomes, according to the actors view, a kind of constructivistic vicious circle of unfreedom. Using the presumptions of the actors view as a basis, researchers, investigators, consultants

and business leaders are instead building their activities on developing and clarifying others as creative subjects (actors) in order to make themselves free. If we, as creators of knowledge, are aiming for human development and freedom, then the purpose of “making ourselves free” also becomes a prerequisite for this ideal. If we are better at realizing our own freedom, we also have better possibilities to realize this life value first in the study area and then also in society at large through that self-reference which always exists between scientific results and the development of society according to the actors view. The actors oriented creator of knowledge is therefore, in all different ways, searching for

the inner quality of those human micro-cosmoses he/she is meeting. And also, at the same time, he/she tries to re-create this quality in him/herself in order to be able to understand and to transfer these experiences through “the emancipatory interactive action” (see Table 3.1).

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SOME DENOTATIONS OF CONCEPTUAL MEANING

The section title mentions denotation of conceptual meaning (vs. providing definitions) because of the ultimate presumptions the actors view is based on, for example, that concepts within social reality are ambiguous and continuously reinterpreted.

Concepts as meaning

As stated earlier, the actors view postulates that reality’s ambiguity and changeability are a result of (among other things) the creator of knowledge’s interaction with, and search for, dialectic connections (knowledge that is dependent on the observer/actors). The actors view claims that the core of knowledge consists of understanding/meaning for the subjects; ambiguity is therefore as desired as it is essential to the creation of knowledge. The actors view talks for that reason about denotations whereas the other two views talk about definitions. A denotation of conceptual meaning refers here to the general understanding, meaning and significance that we, the authors, associate with the concept, while a specific meaning is given by the context in which it appears.

Intentionality

The concept of intentionality is an essential part of the basic assumptions of the actors view. It constitutes the foundation on which actors’ egological spheres (the internal logic of actors that constitute their subjective conceptual meaning) and finite provinces of meaning are postulated (see Chapter 3); that is, it describes how egological spheres and finite provinces of meaning can exist. Intentionality refers to the structure that gives a purpose to experience. Intentionality is not

the same as intentions; it is the dimension behind intentions. It is through intentionality that we bridge the gap between subjects and objects. The concept of intentionality is not used by traditional empirical researchers because it does away with part of their foundation. In strictly empirical thinking, people are seen as “passive” experiencers and interpreters of objects in external reality. That which is contained in intentionality, on the other hand, makes people active creators of the objects in their environment. May (1969) expresses it this way: “What really happens is that objects themselves conform to our ways of understanding. A good example of this is mathematics. These are constructs in our minds; but nature conforms ‘answers,’ to them” (1969: 226). May continues by quoting Russell, “Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover” (1969: 226). The concept of intentionality overturns traditional empirical thought, which states: we are

attracted by surrounding objects through our senses, and our senses make it possible to perceive them (the objects). On the other hand, intentionality asserts that via our purposeful consciousness, we reach out by using our senses and find or mould objects according to our purposes. This ability to create our environment is called intentionality.

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Consider how one and the same house can alter its look depending on the intentionality present. Suppose we work with the following alternative starting points for our intentionality: (a) We are to conclude a “quick deal”, that is, buy and then sell the house for a good profit; (b) we have been invited to spend a weekend with friends in the house. We will certainly experience the house completely differently in the two cases. This means that the house as an object will be molded according to the intentionality we have as a starting point for our sense impressions. The common saying that “seeing is believing” is consequently, according to the actors view, highly relevant to everyone. Intentionality connects us with the environment and makes us act as creative humans instead

of passive receivers (the result of the strict empirical idea). The degree of vitality and engagement among people is to be found in intentionality. It also directs our attention as creators of knowledge toward trying to understand the roots of intentionality in order to make the actors’ egological sphere and finite provinces of meaning intelligible.

Social science knowledge

According to the concept of intentionality, social science knowledge also becomes socially constructed with a self-reference to the society at large. The creator of knowledge should, according to the actors view, therefore consciously use this reference and construction in an open, ethical and emancipating way. This means, among other things, to work for a form of knowledge that emancipates one’s own thought as well as others and one’s own power, urge, passion and commitment as well as others. The conception of knowledge of the actors view is therefore procreative with a clearly expressed ambition to be present and to act – not to stand outside as an observer. The actors view claims that an action-oriented social research is needed which aims at

reaching deepened understanding as well as extended freedom in society, at the same time as research is providing a knowledge which is extending understanding of the complexity of the human society. And what is complex can not, according to the actors view, be divided into simple relations of causes and effects – in the spirit of determinism – because what is humanly complex will then be erased – that which we intended to understand! Complexity has the peculiarity that it can only be clarified through descriptions, which are rich in aspects and which show depth and composition and show the unique human/the actor behind and in this composition. Similarly, as Sartre once formulated his criticism of the labels of generality for human activity, “Franz Kafka is an intellectual-bourgeois, but every intellectual-bourgeois is not a Franz Kafka.” The knowledge interest of the actors view is definitely innovative, oriented towards

understanding, emancipation and action, unlike an explaining, deterministic search for generality of a cause–effect type of knowledge. As creators of knowledge we are always co- actors in a constant flow of the development of reality. And here the issue is, according to the actors view, that we are like “artists” who procreate and shape this interactivity and do not believe that it is possible to stand outside like observers and register something which afterwards is reconstructed in general models – statements which might not make one single

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man feel freer or more alive. What happens, says the actors view, if we more generally were to say yes to actors

oriented premises for what we call social science knowledge? And the actors view answers, according to Arbnor (2006), by providing the ambition criteria for actors oriented social and business knowledge shown in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 Knowledge Ambitions

So, the actors oriented creator of knowledge aims at delivering what is potential in what is factual and, at the same time, aims at describing and shaping this process. It also becomes a means for critically reflecting the self-reference of general social science knowledge. In the process of realizing the knowledge ambitions (Figure 6.2), the creator of knowledge will also discover the existing social science knowledge representation of generality, normality, clichés, uniformity, etc. in individual human beings. The creator of knowledge therefore asks continuously what really should be called social and business knowledge, emphasizing science. To be a creator of knowledge in the sense of the actors view consequently means, as an

actor, to enter a dialogue with that reality which you, in a flow of the present, are at the same time part of creating in order to emotionally, imaginatively and qualitatively look for what is irregular, and clarify this reality using an authentic language (first hand expressions), where participants are made into subjects of an understanding, emancipatory and innovative knowledge interest.

Dialogue

The word dialogue is from dia (through) and logos (words), and is characterized by the interplay between “talking” and “listening” that takes place on equal terms for the participants. The word is the “instrument” of the dialogue, and it consists of two mutually dependent elements: reflection and action. If a word loses its element of action, reflection is affected. Words drained of action become elements of an empty language game – babbling – from both a

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scientific and an everyday point of departure. If, on the other hand, a word loses its reflective element, it becomes an empty activity, action for action’s sake; scientific as well as everyday activism. Words that have lost their intentionality – one or both of their elements – bring out what is not genuine (not dependent on individuals) in existence, in thoughts, or in both. The methodological purposes of the dialogue are twofold. Firstly, to clarify differences

(thesis–antithesis) in which the participants can reflect their original opinions. Secondly, to go beyond (synthesis) the original opinions with which you enter the dialogue as a participant. The interplay of questions and answers in the clarifying phase of the dialogue is close to

what we might call an “honest question”. To ask an honest question, you have to know that you don’t know. And when you know that you don’t know, you don’t use a direct method, because that implies that you only want to know something more thoroughly in the way you already know it (compare understanding an actor’s actions based on his/her finite province of meaning and not your own). Dialogue leads to a more intensive interaction than, for instance, questionnaires with their prepared questions. In a dialogue the creator of knowledge can not stand outside as an observer. The dialogue is based on nearness, authencity and willingness to emancipate and go beyond (create syntheses). In the continuous first hand expressions of the dialogue the subjectivity of man is refined. Dialogue could be called the basis of dialectics (see below).

A asserts a1 (thesis) B asserts b1 (antithesis) A asserts a2 (synthesis), which encompasses or is based on both a1 and b1, and which contains something over and above the pure combination of a1 and b1: A adds new information and/or gives a2 a specific structure. (Out of the clarified differences something new and qualitatively different is developed. In the ideal case the dialogue continues until a common understanding/action develops – a kind of meta-synthesis.)

The dialogue is a necessity in the social world of reflection and action between people. To interview someone in depth or to plant one’s own ideas with somebody else has nothing to do with the dialogue. Carrying out a dialogue is the basis of the act of creating knowledge and the participation of the creator of knowledge in the world. The dialogue as a method in the actors view therefore necessitates humility, undivided attention and a genuine curiosity on the part of the creator of knowledge, as well as a belief in fellow humans as actors who have their own free will and right to create social reality. Asking honest questions and being genuinely related to the words makes it natural for

actors creators of knowledge to use an interactive development of understanding as a prerequisite and to carry on emancipatory interactive action as part of the result.

Dialectics

The word dialectics comes from dia (through) and lektos (conversation). It was stated in antiquity that the best method for reaching “the truth” was to converse/argue (shed light on) an

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issue from a number of different angles (perspectives) so that various opinions could contradict each other. Dialectics is basically the study of the inherent contradictions in phenomena. By contradiction, we mean that everything contains its own negation; that is, what is general can only be revealed if what is specific exists: the finite only in relation to the infinite, what is quantitative in relation to what is qualitative (see “the Arbnor Uncertainty Principle”, Figure 6.1). In the previous illustration in which A and B made statements in a dialogue, we can reflect

on how contradictions appear in the dialogical situation itself. The concepts that might perhaps be used by A in the first statement a1 (the thesis) are given as something immediate. This immediate (the first) is later shown as the second in relation to itself; that is, as something mediated or referring to something else. This something else is the statement of the dialogical partner B (b1). That could therefore be called the negation of the first (antithesis). The immediate (a1 – the thesis) has been subordinated to the second (b1 – the antithesis), but the second is not an empty negation. The second is what is mediated and contained in the denotation of the first. The first is therefore preserved in the second even though it has been subordinated to b1 through the fact that it has been given another shape in relation to the negation (the antithesis). The second is simultaneously the mediated and the mediator. The second denotation

mediates something that is related to itself, that is, b1 to b1; it therefore contains its own second in itself. In this way the second denotation – as a contradiction – leads to its own dialectic. The negation that the second in itself will give rise to invalidates the contradiction (two minuses equal a plus, a double negative is a positive) and thereby restores the first immediateness. This immediateness is, in fact, part of the process of the third in relation to the first immediateness (the thesis) and the second mediated (the antithesis). The third is the unity (the synthesis–a2) between what is immediate and what is mediated. This is the trinity of dialectics (thesis–antithesis–synthesis). This is the basic idea of what we call dialectic relations, connections and/or

circumstances. Everything in our social lives originates in these starting points, according to the actors

view. This leads to social phenomena becoming ambiguous. What my actions are and what they become is partly fixed by others’ significant ambiguous denotations of these actions. Acknowledging that every social phenomenon in and of itself carries contradictory

tendencies and has an inherent capacity to accumulate quantitatively to new qualitative states will clarify why everything that exists (in the social world) is in the process of continuous development or intrinsic movement. It is because of this, according to the actors view, that we are able to understand the contradictions and breaks in continuity in our social lives. At the same time we can also understand the knowledge ambition of the actors view to emancipate what is potential (the antithesis) in what is factual (the thesis) and develop and create something new (synthesis). The meaning of dialectics can be summarized in three paragraphs:

The unity and struggle of contradictions. Contradictions condition each other and bring meaningfulness to the poles. Day conditions night and night, day. The day does not take the

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X. night and vice versa. The phenomena are each other’s prerequisites and create in their struggle a movement (e.g. learning – unlearning, quantity – quality, reflection – action, and other polarizing concepts).

The transition of the quantitative accumulation into a new quality. Quantitative change can quickly change into completely new qualitative configurations. Cold water can quickly turn into ice. A seed in the ground can suddenly start to grow after lying dormant for several years. A work team can quickly change qualitatively if some members leave and/or others are added.

Everything undergoes development and becomes its own contradiction. The seed in the ground becomes a plant – the negation (antithesis) of the first – that becomes a seed-case – the negation of the negations (the synthesis). This contradiction, once again, becomes its own negation, which may be the same as at the beginning but at a higher level – plants and more seeds. The synthesis looks like the thesis but at a higher qualitative level. For example, the need for the increase in knowledge within an area leads to specialists who carry their own contradictions around – a need for overview, more complete orientation, and so on.

The meaning of dialectics is also contained in the dialectical methodology of the actors view (refer back to Figure 3.15 at the end of Chapter 3). The simple circumstance of a theoretical person entering practice starts a unity and a struggle of contradictions (X). The accumulation of everyday language – the development of language by the creator of knowledge, leads to a new quality (Y) – descriptive and ideal-typical languages, that will negate what is immediately given – the descriptions in everyday language. The original interactive development of understanding leads to its own contradiction (Z) – the act, the emancipatory interactive action. Recall under “Dialogue”, above, that the genuineness of a word (its intentionality) is related to reflection and action as contradictory partners indispensable to each other.

Actor

To talk about actors is important in the actors view, because it indicates an interest in people as intentional, that is, as active, reflective and creative individuals. In a dialogue, interest is directed at understanding and postulating people as free, active, reflective and creative, not as conditioned by external factors by which they might be explained as components with systemic characteristics. It is therefore natural to talk about actions instead of behaviours. Action gives a person the role of an active creator of understanding, whereas behaviour gives a person a passive role as a receiver of stimuli and a generator of responses. To the creator of knowledge, the actor is an “object” to be studied as a free human being

who in the ideal case thinks freely and acts responsibly. This actor is often placed in a context that is more or less organized and that is also an object to be studied by the researcher/consultant/investigator. This context consists of other actors – other people with their own finite provinces of meaning.

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Observer

Observers in the sense of the actors view start from the fact that they must engage themselves humanly in the situation of the actors being studied in order to understand social action, but must periodically increase their dissociative distance in order to broaden the perspective of the data being collected. This method of working should not be confused with what is called participative observation, which can in principle be conducted without any engagement at all. The combination of engagement (interactive development of understanding) and dissociation (reflection), furthermore, minimizes the risk that observers will “drown” in the organizations they study. The observer’s course of action must be flexible and interactively oriented. Stringent and

well-regulated study plans will therefore hinder more than they will help. When the observer has reached a suitable combination of engagement and dissociation, a more coherent total understanding can be developed. Recall that observers can have more than one interest and knowledge ambition, and that

these can be incorporated in the descriptions the observers later provide. An individual observer might be interested in creating understanding, new thinking, emancipation, or some combination of these. This can be accomplished in many different ways, depending on the organization and the actors that creators of knowledge, as observers, work with. It is also important, because observers do work with creating understanding, new thinking and/or emancipation in the organization, for them to detach themselves more and more from any engagement in the organization.

Observer–Actor

An observer of social action will of necessity, according to the actors view, also retain the role of an actor. This means that at the same time that an observer (the creator of knowledge) observes other actors, these actors will observe the actions of the observer – who becomes an actor to them. In these constant role shifts, where the observer becomes an actor and the actor an observer, the observer’s knowledge and theories as well as the actor’s understanding of his/her own situation will be improved. Observers of social action can never stand outside of what they are studying. According to

the actors view, it is a dialectic necessity that observers appear as actors at the same time that they influence and are influenced by what they are studying. To believe as a creator of knowledge that it is possible to stand outside and observe others creates a kind of estrangement, which is deceiving the creator of knowledge into seeing what is happening as something determined (by different causing factors and not by human free will). A researcher/consultant/investigator as an observer might therefore be called an observactor.

Diagnosis

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Development of understanding

The word diagnosis is from dia (through) and gnosis (deeper insight). To diagnose is a way to understand and interpret actors and situations through deeper insight, so that “tools/processes” can be developed that can increase self-understanding among actors and help them in their future actions. In the actors view, the most important aspect of the diagnosis is to see actors as human

beings with intentional characteristics, rather than as artificial beings arranged in some a priori descriptive scheme. As creators of knowledge we are human beings as well and therefore constructed basically the same way as our studied actors. This gives a unique potential possibility for understanding others (and really, understanding would not be possible without it). The possibility is, however, potential because training and reflection are necessary to be able to understand others through oneself: the risk is great that only such experiences of others that suit the finite province of meaning held by the creator of knowledge will be observed and noted. In the same way, there is a risk that the experiences of the actors will be interpreted from the finite province of meaning held by the creator of knowledge, instead of from those held by the actors themselves. It is therefore important for the actors oriented creator of knowledge to search for the inner quality in those human micro-cosmoses he/she meets and at the same time re-create this quality within him/herself in order to be able to understand and bring the experiences on. We describe the purpose of diagnosis in social science (i.e. business) as a three-step

process for an interactive development of understanding: preunderstanding, understanding and postunderstanding.

Preunderstanding

Diagnostic preunderstanding is supposed to bridge the differences that exist between the finite province of meaning held by the creator of knowledge and the finite provinces of meaning held by the (other) actors. Preunderstanding can then function as a linguistic bridge, a dialogue, between the intentionality of the creator of knowledge and that of the actors. A genuine relation to the words and honest questions are the starting points for this interactive development of understanding (see “Dialogue” above where one of the two methodological purposes of the dialogue is described as to clarify differences). Diagnostic preunderstanding is not to be confused with the general preunderstanding brought

up in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.4, summarizing the actors view, at the end of Chapter 3). General preunderstanding is related to the collected experiences that creators of knowledge bring to every new study situation, whereas diagnostic preunderstanding is always developed in a specific study situation and becomes associated with that situation. In order to develop diagnostic preunderstanding, a historical study of the actors of interest

(and their organization) is necessary. It is only against the background of such a study that it becomes possible to understand the finite provinces of meaning that guide the actors’ actions. This preunderstanding or language commonality is the eventual basis of the continuing dialogue and development of understanding in the next two stages, understanding and

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postunderstanding.

Understanding

The development of understanding itself comes about by using the relations and the dialogue that the creator of knowledge established during the preunderstanding stage. It is worth remembering that the ultimate purpose of this situation and the ongoing dialogue is to improve the ability of the actors to be free to solve their own problems. For this reason it is essential to see the development of the diagnosis as a development of an understanding that is shared by the creator of knowledge and the actors. This is supposed to take place through the earlier described “observer–actor” relation in which mutual development and an increase in knowledge takes place. This second stage (diagnostic understanding) consists of a reflection process in which the

researcher/consultant/investigator, in both dialogue and action with the actors, tries to find essential patterns in the information that are based on the actors’ everyday language. During this dialogical reflection process, the creator of knowledge as well as the actors grow in capacity. At the same time, the creator of knowledge gradually develops descriptive and ideal- typified languages (see “Dialectics”, above).

Postunderstanding

Diagnostic postunderstanding is the third stage in the development of understanding. Here a process is initiated whereby the languages developed are related to what is factual and actual, as well as to existing theory. In this stage, the languages being developed become an integral part of the knowledge creator’s “tools”, which means that these languages will provide the bases for the continuing emancipatory interactive action, an interactive action that creates a solid understanding among actors of what is old – and what is new.

Language development

To develop descriptive and ideal-typified languages, in other words to develop “language”, might seem somewhat obscure. How do you develop a new language – like the creation of Esperanto or what? Language development in the sense of the actors view has nothing to do with this kind of language. When we talk about language development in the way the actors view does, we have in mind all the instruments that creators of knowledge can use, antithetical to the everyday language, to express their experiences and understanding. Actors creators of knowledge are intent on communicating through actively forming what

they experience as subconsciously and unconsciously significant in their relation to the actors’ life-worlds. The word communicate is from the Latin communis (common), and is the road to common experiences and insights. To form, in this context, means to “vivify” something, where the observer becomes an important part in creating meaning around what is vivified. The processes, the means (the instruments) that actors creators of knowledge develop

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and use understandingly, emancipatorily and creatively in order to express themselves are what we call languages. Recall that we earlier divided these into descriptive and ideal-typified languages (a further development of this dichotomy is illustrated later in the chapter). We can, in this respect, compare creators of knowledge who use the actors view to artists,

poets, composers and the like, as far as “the passion” for communicating new dimensions of experience is concerned. May (1969) explains what we mean: It is the artists who teach us to see, who break ground in the enlargement of our consciousness; they point the way toward the new dimensions of experience which we have, in a given period, been missing. This is why looking at a work of art gives us a sudden experience of self-recognition. Giotto, precursor to that remarkable birth of awareness known as the Renaissance, saw nature in a new perspective and for the first time painted rocks and trees in three-dimensional space. … The new view of space by Giotto was basic for the new geographical explorations of oceans and continents by Magellan and Columbus which changed man’s relation to his world, and for the explorations in astronomy by Galileo and Copernicus, which changed man’s relation to the heavens. These new discoveries in space resulted in radical upheaval of man’s image of himself. … The psychological upheaval and spiritual loneliness in this period was expressed by the poet John Donne. (1969: 320–1)

Actors researchers/consultants/investigators normally do not communicate their insights in the form of drawings, films, or paintings. But to indicate the road to new dimensions of experience, they must be able to use all possible linguistic features. Actors creators of knowledge must therefore not be ignorant of such methods as slide shows, light and sound shows, or multimedia combinations of these means of expression in order to create an antithesis to everyday language. The actors view agrees entirely with the philosopher von Wright (1986) who, in Vetenskapen och Förnuftet [Science and Reason], asserts: “The understanding of reality in earlier scientific categories has reached its limits. In order to go beyond the limit, these categories must be transformed or replaced by new ones” (1986: 46; our translation). It is through a conscious and re-creative development of language that we, according to the actors view, give ourselves the chance to emancipate “the potential in what is factual”. Then we can go beyond old categories of created knowledge and make more cost- effective and attractive ways of life and work for ourselves. Business revival, according to the actors view, necessitates this language development, too. When constructing language expressions and phrases, which are condensed through the use

of various artistic means of expression, creators of knowledge can use new well-connotated word combinations, analogous concepts, contradictory terms, new concepts and terms, metaphors, analogies, simplifications, newly constructed words, and illustrations and drawings to advantage. When researchers/consultants/investigators, using the instruments just described within the

framework of various models of the actors view (i.e. using scientific language; we remind the reader that it is not necessary to be a scientist to use a “scientific” language), develop a coherent formative pattern in relation to some area under study, we talk about language

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development – a discourse.

Action

Intentionality makes us acting subjects. The word is the instrument of the dialogue and consists of both reflection and action! Action is, in reflection, its own contradiction and vice versa – the contradictions condition each other and give each other a meaning. An actor is an active, reflective and creative human being. We have come to understand that these are some of the implications of using action as a concept and a practice in the process of creating knowledge within the framework of the actors view. The opinion that I as a creator of knowledge have of others must, according to the actors

view, be one to which I myself am willing to conform. It therefore becomes natural for actors creators of knowledge to engage in active emancipatory action as an important part of the process of creating knowledge. At the same time that this role of action is criticized by the two other views, the actors view asks whether creators of knowledge who are analytical and systems-oriented might not like to have their own knowledge-creating activities explained/understood as they explain and understand the activities and development of others; that is, as an expression of various external factors – causes or producers – that determine what they do or that arrange them as components of a system. An actors creator of knowledge who does not take the role of action seriously is as

defective, in the actors view, as analytical and systems-oriented creators of knowledge who do not accept that what they posit for others and their environment applies to themselves as well. It is often language that limits the actions of creators of knowledge when in the field. What at

any moment is the given language (whether everyday or scientific) limits the potential that creators of knowledge have for structuring their experiences out of the interactive development of understanding. Creators of knowledge who do not progress in language development and action can speak and write about only the characteristics and relations for which there are words in the given language. If a transformation of what is given does not take place, the work of these creators of knowledge leads only to a confirmation of what is already known, because every existing life-world also constitutes a knowledge-world in which language is an important part of the structure of reflection, action and legitimacy. Co-reflecting and co-creating with the actors in the field become important prerequisites for

a transformation of what exists in the everyday world as well as in the scientific (research/consulting/investigation) world. Through action, meaning can be wrung from reflection, and through reflection, action can be scrutinized. As much as action designates reflection, reflection designates action – the unity and struggle of contradictions. This distinguishing mark of actors is a guarantee that the creator of knowledge has a genuine relationship to words (see “Dialogue”, above). Business as research/consulting/investigation and research/consulting/investigation as

business could be the motto for the business researcher/consultant/investigator who wants to be involved with creating knowledge through emancipatory interactive action within the framework of the actors view. This includes the creative act and the direct act as important

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elements. The creative act encompasses the “artistic” development of language (see above). The concrete participation of creators of knowledge in practice – such as creating businesses, starting ventures, transforming organizations – constitutes the direct act. The reason the actors view talks about these acts as “emancipatory interactive action” is related to what we have described as the solid connections between language and existence – in both directions. If the knowledge ambitions of the actors view (see Figure 6.2) and the potential in what is factual are to be made visible, intelligible and believable, emancipatory interactive action in the form of creative and direct acts out in the field is necessary. In the actors view, it is important to convey the message actively to the actors out in the field

that the alternative to the laws of causality does not have to be vagueness and make believe. The alternative is meaningfulness and freedom in reflection and action.

REALITY: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

Transformation

The central assumption of the actors view is the existence of a social reality. This means that reality is not independent of us, but consists of an interaction between our own experiences and the collected structure of experiences that we have over time created together with others. The process by which we create our own experiences is called subjectification. This process is prescribed by the concept of intentionality and by the Arbnor Uncertainty Principle (see Figure 6.1) and constitutes the basic idea that humans are a subjective reality. When through our common language we make these subjective experiences externally

available, we talk about externalization. With externalization we create the surrounding reality and can therefore say that society is a human result. The process by which an externalized human act might attain the characteristic of objectivity

is called objectification. Through objectification, externalization loses its subjectively significant structure and becomes a typification, that is, it is given a virtually objective significance structure. Typification is related to our way of attaching various labels and typical designations to – having different understandings of – the people and things around us. Examples of such typifications could be, commuter, entrepreneur, chief, Englishman, snob or scorcher. We expect, and then take for granted, that what is typified behaves according to the understanding mediated by the typification. The typification is not completely objectified until it has gone through a process of institutionalization and legitimization. The process of objectification, in turn, constitutes the basis for the assumption that society is an objective reality. The fourth and last of these processes in social reality is called internalization. This stands

for taking over the world in which others already live, and so it constitutes the dialectic process through which we become members of society. We are not born as members but become such via internalization with its primary and secondary socialization phases. This is the basis of the fourth assumption, that humans are a societal result.

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We have now described four different transforming elements in the total dialectic process that molds our reality. It is important to remember that they work simultaneously at all levels of the social order. In order to understand organizations/companies, it is essential that these transforming elements – processes – are considered with a perspective of totality in their simultaneity (see Figure 6.3). It is not possible to understand any of these processes in isolation. They must be understood

in relation to each other, to their constant movement – dialectics. They constitute transforming elements in the unity and struggle of contradictions at the same time as they are each other’s prerequisites for the transition of the quantitative accumulations to a new quality, in which they again develop and become each other’s contradictions (see “Dialectics” above).

Figure 6.3 Simultaneous Processes

For ease of description, we will describe each of the elements – the processes – separately. The reader is therefore asked to keep the dialectic idea in mind and to relate the following presentation to Figure 6.3.

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Subjectification

We experience our fellow human beings in a direct way when we share a community in time and space. When we share this community with another, we reach a contemporaneousness in our consciousness. We perceive each other’s bodies as an unspecified field of sensations by which this consciousness manifests itself in us. In these dialogical, everyday meetings with others we continuously externalize ourselves and consequently lay the foundation for social dialectics. This dialectic relationship also lays the foundation for various finite provinces of meaning that are developed by society’s actors. How externalization and development of these finite provinces of meaning take place is to a large extent related to what we call the subjectification of a person or an actor (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4 The Subjectification of a Person or Actor

This subjectification is attributed to how individual actors develop themselves as subjects on the social stage. An individual actor’s interpretations are attributed to his/her subjectification process. How each actor makes this interpretation is related to the finite province of meaning by which he/she is oriented and the egological sphere and interpretation he/she uses. That this finite province of meaning and egological sphere are possible at all is based on the assumption of intentionality, which describes the principles of human consciousness as such. If these principles are related to an actor’s total situation and factual way of interpretation, we can infer the actor’s egological sphere and finite province of meaning, that is, we can develop an understanding of the subjectification process. The knowledge ambition of the actors view (see Figure 6.2) to act reinforcing the subject

for what is unique relates directly to this process of subjectification. It is the belief of the view that unique individuals in a dialogue support a creative development of the society, which in turn relates to the innovative knowledge interest of the view.

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Externalization

Externalization stands for the assumption that we take part in creating our surrounding reality (society is a human result). When we communicate our subjectification to others through our common language, that is, make something externally available, we enable them to react to our previous subjective experiences and thoughts. We externalize ourselves continuously in various actions that we communicate to fellow humans in everyday relations. These other human beings then function as reflections of our externalizations. By means of this communication we may possibly transform the original content of a thought and formulate a new or refined thought. This mutual relation with others is dialectic and leads to the continuous reinterpretation and change of meanings. A creator of knowledge should therefore, according to the actors view, interest him/herself

in a language development (see above, p. 141–2) which is extending our externalization possibilities to express, vivify and clarify what is pregnant, sublime, subtle, creative, difficult to express etc. This is also about the special knowledge ambitions of the view (see Figure 6.2).

Objectification

Our externalized subjective thoughts and intentions constitute moments (stages) or parts of complicated dialectic processes. After several reflections (reinterpretations), and changes in the original subjective thoughts, these thoughts may finally approximate the character of being objective. The environment, then, has generally started to accept the externalization as meaningful. This process of acceptance is what we call objectification. What was earlier externalized has now become part of our objective reality. We can divide objectification into two phases: institutionalization and legitimization.

When, between different actors, there is a common typification of some habitual act, we can say that an institution has emerged. (By “institution” here can be meant everything that we go on, from the established descriptive language of the society and its applied social science research, to different public authorities.) All human actions are in one way or another subject to routinization. These habitual acts are incorporated into our experience as knowledge routines, and because they are characteristically taken for granted we call this type of knowledge cookbook knowledge. The origin of all institutionalization, in other words, is in the typification of one’s own and

others’ conduct. We typify not only the actors but also their actions. This makes it possible for us to handle others’ (as well as our own) performances safely as generally accepted and objective acts. In this way we assign to ourselves and to others certain typified roles that are attributed to typified action patterns. If these partially objectified, finite provinces of meaning become too much a part of our interpretation of ourselves, there may be negative consequences for our self-experience. An objectified finite province of meaning can completely paralyse our subjectification, leading us to develop normal pathological acts – that is, acts that are so normal in our society that they are active obstacles to a renewal that might be necessary and

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desirable. It is in situations like this that creators of knowledge work with an emancipatory knowledge interest; that is, they work to emancipate the actor from this paralysing basis of interpretation and action. Because this situation is more or less valid for all of us, we have a tendency to express our purposes and action patterns from a basis of objective meaning structures. We unconsciously hide our subjective meaning, a fact that in the actors view is worthy of thought for all researchers/consultants/investigators engaged in interviews of any kind. For the next generation of individuals, those who will take over the institutions, some kind

of social control is necessary because at different ages these individuals “are forced” to become members of a number of different institutions and cannot return to conditions as they were before. The second important phase in the process of objectification, therefore, is legitimization. This works as a kind of second degree of objectification in which we weave legitimization into the institutions themselves in order to explain and to justify them. We can divide the legitimization process into three stages: linguistic legitimization,

proverbial legitimization and theoretical legitimization. Linguistic legitimization is already built into our everyday language, because it comes from

and is developed in the objectified reality (see “Action”, above). Most words in our language already contain “objective” information. For example, a child learns that another child can be called a cousin. This word (cousin) conveys certain information about how the child might act in relation to the other child and, therefore, legitimizes this specific “cousin” action. Or a new employee finds out that the boss is the founder of the company as well, or he meets other so- called pre-scientific or subject-specific concepts which exist with inbuilt “directions of use” for thinking beforehand. Proverbial legitimization can be attributed to our use of proverbs to legitimize some of our

actions. If a child or anyone else asks why you act as you do, you might answer: “Many a little makes a mickle.” Any other explanation becomes unnecessary. In fact, such a question asked at the workplace may well be justified, but because the typification on which the institution is based has the characteristic of taking things for granted, nobody reflects on why they act as they do and instead uses the proverbial legitimization built into the typification as an answer to the question. By taking too much for granted, according to the actors view, we become “slaves” to institutions we ourselves have created. Theoretical legitimization is more sophisticated and is used at a higher level than those

mentioned above. This can be related to all kinds of quasi-scientific explanations given to legitimize an institution. According to the actors view these processes are operating together and in parallel with that

form of knowledge creating activities that are going on within a large number of social institutions with different legitimizing dignity. Knowledge creating activity does not then stand outside this social dialectics and the view speaks therefore about the self-reference of knowledge creation. We can therefore, according to the actors view, develop knowledge about ourselves which is reducing us – making us unfree in the sign of this self-reference (see Figure 6.1 and for a reminder of the meaning of “self-reference”, see the Glossary). We can alternatively work with emancipating acts within the knowledge ambitions of the view (see Figure 6.2). This is a choice that the knowledge creator makes in what we call the scientific

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ideal in a paradigm.

Internalization

Internalization stands for the element with which we accept a world in which others already live. In other words, we become members of the society. The internalization process can be seen in the phases of primary and secondary socialization (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Primary socialization, which takes place in childhood, is the most important phase for a

person’s development. Most of the “objective” world that is accepted by a child is imparted by others. Therefore, knowledge being transferred becomes emotionally conditioned and identification becomes a necessary prerequisite. Children, for instance, identify themselves with a role or an attitude. This identification is a continuous dialectical process between the experience of others and the identification of oneself. It is in primary socialization that the first understanding of reality is founded. Language becomes the most important internalizing factor of primary socialization. Yet socialization is a continuous process that does not end with the primary phase but continues throughout a person’s entire life as secondary socialization. Secondary socialization mainly encompasses the internalization of specific institutional

sub-areas. The content of this internalization depends on the complexity and the work specialization in the area in question. In this phase, the learning of role-specific knowledge and the professional language associated with the area are often necessary. The learning situations of the two socializing phases are different to the extent that the degree of anonymity is considerably higher in the secondary phase. For this reason there is not the same demand for identification as in the primary socialization.

Social dialectics

A continuous synthesizing process

Just as we have described how reality is socially constructed in a society, we can describe various organizations in the society. This means that we can talk about the social reality of a company and can follow its construction using the four elements. It is only a question of levels in the social order – while keeping in mind that a company is only a small piece of the total social dialectics. In order to understand what this social dialectics means, we have to realize that each

individual actor simultaneously represents both subjectified reality and objectified reality. We have to understand how we can see the general in what is personal and the personal in what is general. These contradictions are inseparable and, in fact, produce the transformation in the thesis–antithesis relationship, which becomes a continuous synthesizing process, namely, the development and self-movement of social reality (see Figure 6.3 above and Figure 6.5 overleaf). In the development process just described, society’s actors construct their finite provinces

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of meaning, which then reflect simultaneously both what is subjective (personal) and what is objective (common). The common set that emerges when all the finite provinces of meaning are aggregated in a society, a company or any organization constitutes the objectified reality for that organization. This is the reality in which we live our daily lives as members of society. It is always there before us; its total existence is very rarely or never in doubt, only minor aspects of it are questioned. This objectified reality is what we call everyday reality (see Figure 6.6).

Everyday reality

Husserl (1931) described everyday reality as the reality in which we find ourselves at every moment of our lives (the Lebenswelt), where we accept it exactly the way it presents itself to us in our everyday experiences. This reality is extended in an indefinite way in both time and space. Its existence is never in doubt; this applies to both its physical and its sociocultural aspects. Doubts, of course, do arise and things often prove to be different from our previous experiences. Yet these doubts, questions and corrections concern mainly details within this reality and never reality as such and in its entirety. So when we face problems that are not routinized we try to relate them to our “cookbook” knowledge: we try to find some kind of everyday life explanation rather than worry “unnecessarily”. Sometimes we don’t find such an explanation and so have to turn to our own, very subjective, reality. The subjectivity we experience as a result can hardly be communicated to others in a meaningful way because our common language is based on everyday reality; trying to externalize this very subjective experience will necessarily distort it.

Figure 6.5 Social Construction of Reality

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Figure 6.6 Social Dialectics and Everyday Reality

It is therefore important for a researcher/consultant/investigator to consider language barriers when subjectification processes are to be made intelligible. In the section titled “Language Development” (above), we stated that the creator of

knowledge should not be unfamiliar with various instruments for communicating and for manifesting the antithesis of everyday language. We want to stress the importance of this once more.

THE RELATION OF THE ACTORS VIEW TO ITS PARADIGM

In general

In Chapter 1, “The Language of Methodology” we described a paradigm as a model or a general mechanism for controlling the creation of knowledge and as consisting of the following parts: a conception of reality; a conception of science; a scientific ideal; and an ethical aesthetical part. In the previous section we presented the most central standpoint in the actors view, that is,

the conception of reality on which the view is based. This description is a thorough presentation of the first part of the paradigm to which the actors view is related. The second part encompasses the conception of science on which the view is based. We have already described this conception as the prerequisites, the development of understanding and the results with which the view works. In the rest of this chapter we will concentrate on this second area, the conception of science held by the actors view. This means that its scientific ideal and ethical aesthetical parts will not be specifically described because they, as mentioned earlier, are more associated with the goals of individual creators of knowledge than with any specific theory. The content of the two latter parts of the paradigm of the actors view, however, is implicitly intimated throughout the whole chapter and more specifically under “Action” (above) and “Some theoretical and action-oriented starting points” (below).

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Prerequisites of the actors view: Metatheories

Of the conditions we brought up in Chapter 3 concerning the methodological views and their prerequisites, explanations/understanding and results, all, except what were referred to as metatheories, are attributed to contributions from previously conducted actors research/consulting/investigations. These contributions from such previous actions cannot be regarded as parts of the paradigm, so they will not be treated here (see Chapter 12). What we earlier described as constitutional factors under the results of the actors view in Chapter 3 can, however, in some situations contribute to a development of the metatheories mentioned and, as such, be incorporated into the paradigm. When we talk about metatheories we refer to the background theories in the conception of

science that are held by creators of knowledge and that, in general terms, guide their practical research/consulting/investigation and are therefore related to the paradigm. These are the guiding theories in the actors view, which means that creators of knowledge use them to develop not only an understanding of their object of study – understanding others – but also for understanding themselves. Because creating knowledge in the actors view is to a large extent aimed at understanding others by understanding oneself, we realize that creators of knowledge who within themselves are not trying to re-create that inner quality they meet in the actors, are not creators of actors knowledge. We can say that a person (an actor) is simultaneously psychological, social, historical and

political. Political in the sense of power-political; that is, various actors (including creators of knowledge) both exert power and are subject to power. In association with each of these basic aspects of human life, we talk about metapsychology, metasociology, metahistory, and metapolitics – different meta-areas that become part of the conception of science in the actors view. Metapsychology points out that human beings are subjective interpreters of their reality in

accordance with being, becoming and freedom (see the beginning of this chapter and Figure 6.1). People cannot be described and explained in terms of their environment alone. The researcher/consultant/investigator must therefore, according to the actors view, try to understand the subjective constitution of knowledge, interpretation and action. This understanding can be developed by trying to get the actors to express problems and opportunities in their own words – first hand expressions. The meaning of formulated problems and opportunities, and the corresponding language, can be seen as the knowledge that opens the creator of knowledge’s understanding of the actions among the actors. It is of great importance in the actors view that an interpretation of an actor corresponds to certain action patterns. The actor, however, does not live in a social vacuum. Interpretations and actions take place

in a social reality with several other actors. We can also talk about the actor’s structural environment, which – as mentioned earlier – is, according to the actors view, dialectic as far as its intrinsic character is concerned. The actor shares a number of things with other actors such as interpretations, actions and language. Many of our actions, however, are controlled or influenced by the objectification that historically emerges around various patterns of interpretation, action and language.

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In these historical processes we also discover how various power-political games have taken place in the interface between externalization and internalization, and have been powerful forces behind many objectifications. In consequence, the historical and political aspects are included as essential metatheories in the conception of science in order to understand the psychological and sociological aspects (see Figure 6.7 and study it in relation to the previous Figures 6.3 and 6.5).

Figure 6.7 Metatheories

Looking at Figure 6.7 we can say that: A. Metapsychological theory, with such advocates as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Fromm, Kelly and Heidegger, offers guiding principles to creators of knowledge for interpreting the subjectification process of individual actors. Yet this is not enough to make intelligible what happens in the illustrated interaction among several actors.

B. Metasociological theory, with such advocates as Schutz, Fromm, Berger & Luckmann, and Mills, offers an understanding of how externalized meanings become objectified and how reality is socially constructed. This makes visible the “game” that is played among actors. Even so, what may seem like inexplicable “game patterns” can appear. These cannot be understood without a full understanding of the power-political elements to which the illustrated group is either subordinated or else dominates.

C. Metapolitical theory, with advocates like Weber, Schutz, Marcuse and Foucault, can bring an understanding of why an actor acts in a way that might contradict his/her personal convictions. Why are, for instance, these specific individuals where they are, and why do

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they act as they do? What brought them there? How and where have they acted before? Or questions such as why certain actions, thoughts and ideas are given a better externalization space than others, and why certain actions, thoughts and ideas are given a more tangible legitimizing and internalizing power than other, similar ones.

D. Metahistorical theory, with advocates like Schutz, Habermas and Foucault, bridges the historical vacuum and thus brings an understanding in terms of historical processes, which clarifies the questions that have just been raised.

These metatheories are among the prerequisites of the actors view as well as part of the interplay when the creator of knowledge tries to reach an understanding and give a meaning to that understanding. They are therefore not arranged in a fixed order of 1 through 4, but are all used simultaneously in the development of understanding. These metatheories were partly explicated in the section titled “Reality: a social

construction” (above, p. 144) when we described how the elements of subjectification, externalization, objectification and internalization socially construct our reality. The rest of the description that can be devoted to them in this book is intertwined in the presentation of the other parts of the conception of science in the actors view, that is, the development of understanding and results. They are not regarded as part of what we refer to as methodology. We believe that our coverage will be sufficient to begin applying the actors view.

Understanding and results

Language

In this book, language is regarded primarily as a social science phenomenon, as a way of externalizing social reality. We experience the world in language. We act in, and reflect on, the world through language. We hold conversations, exchange thoughts, express feelings, create technology and cooperate. Using language we build our companies and organizations. The generally oriented social scientist (as a researcher, as a consultant, or as a general investigator) in the actors view is guided by what language means to people’s way of life as a means of expressing and intermediating knowledge and information in the form of language. It is through language that the knowledge creator attempts to catch what Max Weber called “the subjective logic of actors”. We call this “a person’s egological sphere”. What goes on between people in, say, an organization can therefore be seen as a language

game. The actors view thus postulates that the use of language is controlled by more or less visible rules that give meaning to the symbols and the actions. We can talk of language games as containing ideological, referential and technological rules in which different language games also reflect different life practices (see also, for instance, Arbnor, 1976; Winch, 1958; Wittgenstein, 1953). The various relationships that an organization has with its environment can also be seen as

language games in which the actors of the organization interpret the environment by using the rules of their language games, and in which the environment in turn, using its own rules,

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interprets the organization. In this language game and the interpretive processes that are shaped by it, we can find connections and relations to various patterns of activities, actions and interactions. These connections are based on the assumption that behind every human act there is a more or less conscious process of interpretation. The assumption is related to the conception of social reality, of man, and so on. Language is a means and a medium for describing our interpretations, activities and actions.

People use language to describe and to intermediate reality to themselves and to others. In the same way, creators of knowledge use language in their interactive development of understanding, externalizing descriptions in order to describe and form the reality being studied so they themselves and others can visualize “the egological sphere of actors” and “the finite provinces of meaning” (see Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8 The Actor and the Meaning of Language

While we are making it clear to ourselves that language is of essential importance to the construction of social reality, we must not forget that language can be inadequate for capturing the egological sphere. People have a number of systems and means of expression apart from language – gestures, physical movements, and “internal brain work”, to name a few. Furthermore, linguistic descriptions of reality are ambiguous. People show an amazing flexibility when it comes to attributing varying meanings to words and actions, in spite of the fact that social language games throughout history have attached many stable and objectified meanings to words. In consequence, as an actors creator of knowledge one faces an almost impenetrable surface that can hide the original and most important meaning. At the same time that language is the most important tool for the actor creator of knowledge, it has serious shortcomings that he/she often can do nothing about. Human beings are at the same time, according to the actors view, conscious and unconscious, complex and simple, subjective and objective, ambiguous and unambiguous, dialectic. From the conception of science represented by the actors view, as far as the vision of human

beings and social reality is concerned, it follows that there is no single answer that provides the truth about a problem. Creators of knowledge must admit that reality has such a

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simultaneousness of uniqueness and generality (dialectics) that it cannot be subjected to experiments in a laboratory. Subjective reality concerns subjective meaning and logic, the pattern of which creators of knowledge should try to verify in as many ways as possible, but the procedures of control and validity must not be based on “faulty” conceptions of the nature of reality. Reality, according to the actors view, is a relativity that can only be “dis-closed” by awareness, action and self-reflection. Language – the object of study according to the actors view – is a social invention that is used by and for human beings in this relativity. As such, language is a social and historical construction and should therefore be understood and studied accordingly.

The different levels of language

Hand in hand with the building of societies over time, people have invented various specialized realities to solve various types of problems. This has resulted in a division of work into a number of dissimilar specialist roles. In each of these specialized realities, more or less unique languages are developed. Handling and developing these specialized realities would not be possible within the framework of everyday language. Scientists (researchers/consultants/investigators) have therefore also constructed their own language (see Figure 6.9).

Figure 6.9 Specialized Realities

Within social science research/consulting/investigation, such a development of specialized languages has also taken place. The actors view claims that this language development has to a large extent forgotten the connection to what is most fundamental, that is, to everyday language. Language development so far has been based too heavily on analogies from the worlds of mathematics physics, mechanics and biology. According to the actors view, it is as if one were describing summer by the language usage of winter. For lack of a more suitable term, we use the word “bureaucratic” for the type of scientific language that, according to the actors view, has lost its dialogical connection to the language base of the described phenomena themselves. The starting point for the creator of knowledge should therefore be actors’ everyday

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descriptions, which are then interpreted in a creation-of-knowledge way. This actors-based interpretation is thereby different from a bureaucratic knowledge-based interpretation. This is because other knowledge interests and demands govern the actors researcher/consultant/investigator. From different realities (subjective, specialized and everyday) follow also different forms

of language use in which the meaning of knowledge differs in relation to the various realities. According to the actors view, we must learn to understand how language and the quality of reality stand in a mutual dialectic relationship to each other (reality constitutes language – language constitutes reality). With this in mind, we also realize that we can only understand a reality in and through the language that is related to it. Creators of knowledge must therefore use interpretation, action and reflection to be able to “translate” the language of one reality into the language of another reality (in particular, everyday language into a scientific language). According to the actors view, social phenomena must be understood on their own terms, and

what they mean in the language game and in the reality in which they appear. The knowledge will otherwise become rootless in relation to practical and emotional actions in everyday life. The expression “Theory is one thing and practice is another” is possibly an expression for such a kind of rootlessness.

Scientific language

It is through the processes of interpretation, action and reflection talked about thus far that scientific language is developed in the actors view. It is important to keep in mind that this development takes place starting with what phenomena mean in the reality in which they appear and in the language with which they are described. This meaning becomes externalized, however, after the process of interpretation, action and reflection into a language other than everyday language. This is because everyday language cannot go beyond its own phenomena. Phenomena in any reality appear when the given language in this reality does not allow a description of them. When we talk about phenomena in everyday reality, we must understand that we are actually referring to experiences that cannot be totally externalized through everyday language. Actors research/consulting/investigation aims at depicting this immanent, not externalizable, understanding. Language development, therefore, means expressing experiences in a language in which they can be externalized (compare to a poet’s language for expressing what is difficult to express). Yet this translation cannot be made unless phenomena have been interpreted in the light of the finite provinces of meaning and that egological sphere that has produced them (see Figure 6.8). To help in their interpretations, creators of knowledge have the four metatheories (see Figure 6.7); the historical one takes on a decisive meaning. The actors view therefore stresses the historical perspective when studying social phenomena. To be able to express an experienced phenomenon (consciously or unconsciously) in our

everyday reality scientifically, the phenomenon must, through action, be “extorted” for significances and interpreted, because the phenomenon has a subjective, social, historical and political connection to its language as well as to its reality. Only after such a process of

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interpretation, action and reflection can the researcher/consultant/investigator externalize the phenomenon by means of language – a scientific language. Remember that the criticism that the actors view directs against the other methodological views has to do with their neglecting this process of interpretation, action and reflection, and instead describing the phenomena of everyday life in terms of what they mean in their scientific language. If phenomena are experienced starting from the scientific pictures of reality, it is not certain in the actors view that they constitute real phenomena in everyday reality. If we were to describe the construction of the scientific language in the actors view in

dialectic terms (see above and compare “Dialectics”) we might say that this language is the second in relation to the first immediate (the first hand expressions by the actors). The first immediate (the thesis – the positive) is the phenomenon as expressed in everyday language, which in a scientific language appears as the second in relation to itself, that is, as the mediated (the antithesis – the negative). The immediate now appears as something mediated in relation to itself. This mediated (the phenomenon in the scientific language) is at the same time the mediating (it is fed back to the actors in everyday reality) and the second (the scientific language) therefore negates itself (- -) and thereby becomes the origin of its own dialectics. The self-negation of the second nullifies the contradiction (- - = +) and restores the immediate, which is then the third in relation to the first immediate, that is, the synthesis is at hand. As actors creators of knowledge, we understand from this: if the first immediate does not

refer to the experienced phenomenon by the actors in everyday reality but to the creator of knowledge’s experience of the phenomenon starting from the reality of the community of knowledge creation, the scientific language will not appear as something second to the actors (they simply feel like strangers in the presence of the scientific language – knowledge has become rootless). This is because the creators of knowledge did not enter into a dialogically honest relation with the actors; nor did they try to interpret the phenomenon starting from its egological sphere. That is, they did not lay a foundation for any mutual dialectics (creator of knowledge actor — scientific language everyday language). The dialectics that now emerges is related only to the reality of the scientific community; that is, the second (the antithesis) appears in dialogue with colleagues in the scientific reality. In other words, there will never be a mutual dialectic relation between the different realities. Because no mutual dialectic relation is developed, there is a great risk that the relation becomes unilaterally dialectic. Creators of knowledge will then, according to the actors view, use their language in a way that implicitly denies other people’s freedom (see Figure 6.1) and thereby they will stretch and mold everyday reality and people in the same way a potter controls a lump of clay (human beings are made into things), because our relation to things are then unilaterally dialectic. We use this to direct the reader’s attention to the most important starting point for the actors

view: namely, that phenomena must be interpreted according to the meaning, significance and purpose they have for the actors. After such a process, phenomena also become phenomena to the creators of knowledge, who then attempt to externalize these interpreted phenomena to the actors by means of a scientific language. This means that the descriptive and ideal-typified languages developed by researchers/consultants/investigators must reflect the richness of variety in social reality, its dialectic nature, its relative and its unique characteristics – in other

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words, be based on the reality they try to describe. The languages can then be developed with various degrees of specificity and detail. In this way we can find various levels of abstraction, not only in everyday language but also within the framework for handling the scientific language. It then follows, according to the actors view, that actors creators of knowledge use their language also to clarify their special responsibility for the self-reference of creating knowledge and such actions in social development.

Diagnosis

In denoting the conceptional meaning of diagnosis, we began with three stages of understanding: preunderstanding, understanding and postunderstanding. We also brought up the objectives of the stages and what they contained in general. We did not, however, illustrate the way of thinking that guides the diagnostic work of the actors creators of knowledge during these stages. During the entire diagnostic process – all three stages of understanding – creators of

knowledge work by placing themselves alternately in two different situations: by personally engaging themselves in, and dissociating themselves from, the actors being studied. While personally engaged, the creators of knowledge have an opportunity to co-act with and interpret the actors in a dialogical relationship (see “Dialogue” above) and thereby attain an immediate understanding. In order to get perspectives on the immediate understanding, the creators of knowledge dissociate themselves from the actors for a while and attempt to disregard factual circumstances. They then use metatheories – referred to earlier – for interpretation. During this dissociation an intermediate understanding is developed. Through this interplay, both actors creators of knowledge and other actors grow in capacity and insight. This means, of course, that the first engagement situation and the immediate understanding associated with it will not be the same as the second one, and the second not the same as the third, and so on. This is also true for the dissociating situations and the intermediate understanding (a dialectical process of development). Below, we describe some of the thinking in a first situation of engagement and dissociation.

Engagement

The actors bring data and information to the creators of knowledge through externalized language descriptions. In principle, the steering that the researchers/consultants/investigators have means only that they want to achieve a dialogical situation, by means of which they hope to capture an actor’s egological sphere. They know that this result is not obtained at once. The process is considerably longer, with learning/unlearning and development of understanding. Creators of knowledge have something in their background that initiates an interest in an organization even before arriving on the grounds. Certain problems, questions, motives and actions work as incentives to this interest. An actors creator of knowledge wants to understand the significances behind problems, opportunities, questions, motives, actions, and more. Based on these conceptions, the creator of knowledge attempts to guide the dialogue. The actors, on

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the other hand, are expected to share their versions and interpretations within these restrictions. In this case, the actors have the leading role, at least quantitatively. The working results of this first phase depend on the spirit and actions that can be created

between a creator of knowledge and the (other) actors. The possibility of sustaining an inter- subjective communication depends on whether the parties see each other as genuine parties to the conversation. This of course requires that both parties are open and honest during the dialogue. In this first phase, an immediate understanding is developed that is, however, created in a dialectic relation that is still weak. Before entering a dissociative situation, creators of knowledge must be reasonably sure of

the actors’ denotation of the conceptual meaning of various questions. Creators of knowledge therefore implement a kind of validity control that has possibilities for a corrected immediate understanding. This takes place in such a way that the actors are allowed to check their own interpretations from the first phase. The feedback may result in new dimensions of the problems, new self-interpretations, new awareness, new repressions, new defence mechanisms and new tendencies to cover up. This can lead to a change of, or supplementation to, the original externalized descriptions. The finite provinces of meaning held by the actors may therefore seem to change in this second phase. The creator of knowledge, however, should not take these new versions for granted. The interpretive creation of knowledge in the dissociative situation, therefore, should encompass versions from both the first and the second phases.

Dissociation

In a dissociative situation, creators of knowledge free themselves from the actors for a short time in order to make a further “validity check” based on other sources. They try during this time to place the whole problem or opportunity complex within brackets in order to separate it from the actual situation. They do this in order to obtain further perspectives on the finite provinces of meaning, to discover the potential in what is factual and thereby obtain an intermediate understanding. The actors’ own interpretations of the egological sphere are related to other sources of interpretation and to metatheories described earlier. The development of understanding and the “validation” thus continue by means of the creator of knowledge’s attempts to interpret the reasonableness of the externalized descriptions. The creator of knowledge therefore supplements the actors’ original descriptions with other sources and his/her own interpretation of reasonableness. The actors’ original descriptions and self-interpretations nevertheless remain important sources of knowledge in the diagnostic process.

The continuation

This alternation eventually continues with a new situation of engagement in which the knowledge from the dissociative stage is fed back to the actors. The objective is to allow the actors to obtain deeper insights into their own interpretations. In return, the

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researcher/consultant/investigator is given the opportunity to obtain a deeper interpretation of the reasonableness of the consistency among manifested actions, alternative actions not taken, and the actors’ denotations of the conceptual meaning of various actions and non-actions. As a result, the creator of knowledge obtains a new immediate understanding and continues his or her work with a new dissociation, and so on. During this continuing dialectic process, a larger and larger co-created awareness of what is factual and what is potential is developed.

A comment

These alternating procedures continue throughout all three of the diagnostic stages described above: preunderstanding, understanding and postunderstanding. The number of alternations necessary within each stage in order to fulfil its purposes and knowledge ambitions (see Figure 6.2) must be decided from case to case.

The objective of creating knowledge

The knowledge-creating objective of understanding conceptual meaning and egological spheres is related, among other things, to the actors view opinion of the social sciences as a science of conceptually denoted meaning and the idea of how social reality is constructed. In this context, the egological sphere (the logic in constructing subjective conceptual meaning) is sovereign. Human beings do not act without interpreting reality. The actors view postulates that there is a connection between interpretation (the actual denotion of conceptual meaning of action) and action. In the terms of an egological sphere, the actors view creators of knowledge attempt to understand this dialectic relation typical of human beings as sensible social creatures. Individual actors ascribe a significance, a purpose, an understanding, to themselves and

their actions that is noted by the creator of knowledge. Added to this are a number of different interpretations that other actors make of these actions, as well as the designation of meaning, which is viewed as controlling their actions. Researchers/consultants/investigators must therefore give variety-rich descriptions of the content of the egological sphere of the specific actor in order to reflect the potential in what is factual through the ambiguity that is an inherent part of social reality. Creators of knowledge now act at two levels of language. At the “lower” level, they give

extensive and manifold descriptions of the content of various conceptual meanings that are denoted as action by the actor in question. At the scientific level, on the other hand, the point is for researchers/consultants/investigators to denote the egological sphere from an actors and structural, as well as from a dialectic, point of departure.

Actors-based denotation of conceptual meaning

An actors-based denotation of conceptual meaning can encompass both concrete and ideal- typified actors. Creators of knowledge may then, if they wish, verify the actors-based

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denotation of conceptual meaning against the structurally and dialectically based denotations of conceptual meaning. In this way the creators of knowledge may, through their overview, bring understanding to a large number of actors-based denotations of conceptual meaning. The strategic question for such a study of conceptually denoted meaning is: “What does it mean?” If this question is prescribed in the “right” way, it can result in an experience of “damn it!” or of “aha!” or of “what is going on?” – that is, the potential in what is factual is manifested.

Structurally based denotation of conceptual meaning

When creators of knowledge form structurally based denotations of conceptual meaning, they try to clarify how typifications and institutions (see above) emerge (e.g. “business concepts”) as taken-for-granted structures in the dialectic play among the denotations of conceptual meaning by various actors in and through a life practice. Over time, these institutions will acquire a more and more objectified and unambiguous character in a social reality that is otherwise highly multifaceted; they therefore tend, for good or ill, to create a strong prescribing power on patterns of interaction and action, and on the way of thinking within a particular life practice (e.g. a company, a family, a political party). Structurally based denotations of conceptual meaning reflect entire organizations, and they exist as “the organization’s finite province of meaning to itself”, constructed by – yet at the same time independent of – the denotations of conceptual meaning of individual actors. It is these institutionalized, somewhat rigid, provinces the creator of knowledge attempts to form for the purpose of making them understood.

Dialectically based denotation of conceptual meaning

The dialectically based denotation of conceptual meaning refers mainly to a diagnosis of the denotation of conceptual meaning as a process among various groups of actors, institutions, and single actors. With its starting point in the construction of social reality, a dialectic play takes place (see Figure 6.10).

Figure 6.10 Dialectically Based Denotation

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A denotation of conceptual meaning for groups of actors consists of a historical diagnosis. Through such a diagnosis, the researcher/consultant/investigator may find various epochs with different types of patterns that give structural characteristics to the period. The creator of knowledge should ask for the meanings of different periods of history, the implications of different patterns, what was significant in different epochs and how different epochs were understood by different types of actors. A historic diagnosis also involves a study of changes and change potentials. What does the change imply? What are the characteristics of different change potentials? In this dialectic play, many denotations of conceptual meaning will be objectified – acquire stable structural characteristics – but many others will change with time. Forming a dialectically based denotation of conceptual meaning obviously becomes more

extensive than working with the denotations of conceptual meaning for a few specific actors. We are here dealing with larger social groups or with a more complicated actor level than the one involving individual and specific actors. The dialectic, the language and the actors all bring an ambiguous character to social reality. The possibilities for change and stability exist simultaneously as expressions of human unfreedom and/or freedom.

Denotation of conceptual meaning and scientific language

The denotation of conceptual meaning is consequently the basis on which the scientific language of the actors view rests. This language is there to communicate (to form) these denotations of conceptual meaning, which will then appear as the second in relation to the first immediate denotations (so-called first hand expressions) of conceptual meaning given by the actors. The language will then give rise to its own dialectics in the formation dialogue with the actors. Through this dialectic play, a development of understanding is made possible for the creator of knowledge as well as for the (other) actors. This could be called the third stage of diagnosis – the postunderstanding. We have divided the scientific language of the actors view into two levels: descriptive

language and ideal-typified language. We have also explained some of the basic differences between the two levels. We now continue this presentation by describing the connection between the denotations of conceptual meaning described above (actors-, structurally and dialectically based) and the two language levels. Under descriptive language we can find three kinds of models: situational interpretive

models, institutional models and process models (we recommend the reader look at Figure 3.14 again, where the different language levels and models are illustrated). We relate the situational interpretive models to the actors-based denotation of conceptual meaning; the institutional models to the structurally based; and the process models to the dialectically based denotation of conceptual meaning (see Figure 6.11).

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Figure 6.11 Actors View Models and Denotation of Conceptual Meaning

A descriptive language is based on a direct connection with the part of the social reality that it describes. The main purpose of the descriptive language is to communicate understanding and initiate action in relation to this specific part of reality. By giving the actors an opportunity – in the form of a descriptive language – to experience the various denotations of conceptual meaning formed as something mediated, a dialectic process will emerge in which the potential in what is factual can be developed. In order for the interpretations and clarifications presented in the three models of the

descriptive language to convey more universal knowledge, the creator of knowledge must refine the results; “take away” what situationally influences the shape of the descriptive language. This condensation/qualification leads to the second language type in the actors view: ideal-typified language, in which we again find the two kinds of models, typified cases and constitutional ideals. By condensation the different models in the descriptive language, a case description of typified actors who carry typified actors’ conceptions and pursue typified actions under typified circumstances can be developed – namely, models for typified cases. These models have an ideal character because in their condensed form they describe various ideal states that “imaginatively” can reflect human freedom and potential, and thereby engage various actors in procreating dialogues in which the potential will be transformed into the factual, that is, into a new social reality. Typified cases, in spite of being ideal, have a connection to the “living” social reality, although no longer characterized situationally, but essentially. In order not to bring the description too far into the concept of essence, we can, as a

simplification, use the examination of a musical piece as an analogy. In the three models of descriptive language (see Figure 6.11) the “denotation of melody” of the social reality is presented by (starting from) the situational “denotation of tones”. In a model of typified cases, on the other hand, the situational “denotation of tones” is deepened, and the “denotation of melody” as such is studied and described. This “denotation of melody” (essence) we can

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produce only through a process of interpretation, action and reflection. If we go further in the process of condensation/qualification, we can ask ourselves what

constitutes the “denotation of melody” and find that the answer is “the theme”. The second form of ideal-typified language is therefore about constituting ideals: in our musical analogy, the “denotation of theme” (theme in the meaning of motive for creating a melody). In models of typified cases the “denotation of theme” is described by the “denotation of

melody”. In a similar fashion, the “denotation of melody” is described by the “denotation of tones” in the models of the descriptive language. We can thus see how various forms of models (except models of constitutional ideals) describe something by the use of something at different levels (see Figure 6.12 opposite). So, models of constitutional ideals belong to the final “core” in which something cannot be

described by anything else, only by itself. By going beyond the “denotation of melody”, “denotation of beat”, “denotation of tempo”, “denotation of harmony”, and so on, we achieve the “denotation of theme” that constitutes higher levels; that is, we get the constitutional factors of social reality. Similar to models of typified cases, models of constitutional ideals have an ideal character, but by means of the condensing process retain a connection to social reality.

Figure 6.12 Language Development

The condensing referred to can be seen as an understanding of the radical shifts that creators of knowledge make in their interpretive, active and reflective orientation in order to reach the “hidden” subjectivity of the knowledge of social reality; that is, in order to clarify both the historical and future meaningfulness in the potential and (at the same time) in the factual present. Using this kind of language for creating knowledge the actors oriented

researcher/consultant/investigator is developing something unique, but something which also goes beyond what is singular to something as universal as music. Like a composer, to continue the music analogy, he/she wants with his/her language

development to create excitement and a mood by varying “rhythm, tonality and timbre” in the descriptions. The “rhythm” we could call the “pulse” of the activity/text, which is increasing and decreasing in a conscious way, in order to create a tight and varying experience.

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“Tonality” is an implicit keynote, which is there all the time, even if it is not heard – to compare with denotation of theme. To break the keynote – the theme – and do this without “playing out of tune”, is called the composer’s modulation. The actors creator of knowledge is happy to modulate his/her descriptions and actions in order to create moments of surprise or situations that require imagination, interpretation and insight – a way to mark or reflect on the denotation of theme. The “timbre” – the instrument or voice that performs the tone – is created in commonality in the actors view by personalities from different life-worlds – everything from participants in the researched activities in the study area to the readers of the different descriptive languages. The dialectics in social reality then becomes visible in an understanding and action-oriented way. When all the actors involved are given the possibility to feel their own participation in the resulting knowledge creation, they will understand that things are moving through their own choices and actions and by those of others. One does not, then, become alienated facing the inner flow of the dynamism of our socially constructed reality. When you are participating as a knowledge creating actor, everyday life does not appear as something determined (= conditioned by different external factors and not by the free will of man).

SOME THEORETICAL AND ACTION-ORIENTED STARTING POINTS

Social phenomenology and the actors view

The actors view developed in this book is inspired by a social phenomenology tradition with Alfred Schutz as the major representative scholar. Social phenomenology attempts to make clear the variety and the relativity of social reality and how it is maintained by the language used to describe it (see Appendix). In this way, the actors view stipulates that all collected data are “impregnated with theory” from the social sciences, alternatively from less systematic theories like the basic conceptions of everyday life, or from both (we have previously in the book called this phenomenon “the self-reference” of social science). It is therefore in the interest of the actors view to use, among other things, linguistic

innovations, pictures, sound, and more, as working tools/processes in order to puncture taken- for-granted structures in the conception of reality that often stifle development and that are maintained by scientific as well as everyday theories from the language fields. In order to make creators of knowledge aware that data are never theoretically neutral, the actors view prefers to refer to the construction of data instead of the collection of data. If we accept this premise, that data are “impregnated with theory”, it leads us, according to the actors view, to acknowledge that a “fact” is a variable thing, in time as well as in place. This is the background for why the actors view does not accept the idea of an objective, observer- independent reality against which we can test our statements. A creator of knowledge, according to the actors view, cannot be objective in the sense

stipulated by the analytical view (see Chapter 7). Instead of, as the actors view puts it, Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-30 09:49:11.

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conducting an artificial struggle by trying to isolate the creator of knowledge in a kind of external relation to what he/she is studying, the actors view makes the creator of knowledge a central figure responsible for how data are constructed and how knowledge is created. In this tradition, the opinion is that it is not possible, and therefore not desirable, to establish a clear boundary between the subjects aiming for knowledge and the “objects” providing it. But don’t misunderstand this, it does not mean that knowledge is subjective in the sense of not being accessible or of not being capable of testing for reasonableness by others. Subjects and objects as understood in the actors view exist in a meaning situation, a

meaning context. We always meet subjects and objects in connection with import and meaning. According to the actors view, objects cannot exist in a social vacuum. Ob-ject means for- somebody in this view. The consequence is that what we call the object of a study will always be woven into a fabric (a net) of relationships of understanding that consists of everything from the creator of knowledge’s own pre-scientific and scientific theories to the actors’ “theories” of meaning. For instance, using a questionnaire to ask people about matters whose personal significance (engagement or, interest in, significance for, in their everyday actions) we cannot possibly know, will, according to the actors view, produce meaningless knowledge for the actors in question and most likely also for the creator of knowledge. Knowledge becomes knowledge of object-like things (an objective, independent, artificial world) that, according to the actors view, triggers a biased and unethical knowledge of other human beings (see Figure 6.1). The only meaning relation the questionnaire has as a technique for asking questions, according to the actors view, is to the creator of knowledge’s own engagement and understanding, not to the individual respondents’ worlds. This is what keeps expressions like “theory is one thing, practice is another” alive, according to the actors view. Social reality consists of people – human beings – and their freedom to interact. The phrases

human being and freedom are important in this context. In fact, this orientation is embedded in the denotation of “the actors view” (see Figure 6.2). By stressing the term actor, an important characteristic of social reality is described. A person is also dependent on other people in social reality. The position of dependence among human beings must consequently require interaction in various forms of externalization, such as when we talk with each other and when we work together. Social interaction is based on people being generously equipped with the ability to interpret their reality. Dialectics is characterized by this interplay of interpretations being based on interactions and interactions based on interpretations. The dialectic is marked by multiplicity, ambiguity and change, among other reasons because people are subjects who come from different environments, have different historical backgrounds, and, furthermore, play different roles in social reality. Social multiplicity can be externalized and described via different human vocabularies. The denotation of conceptual meaning that is expressed by the human use of languages is an important constitutional factor for the way social reality looks. The actors creators of knowledge take great pains to study this social language game. This is because the opinion of the actors view is that the language game in dialectic terms simultaneously shows subjective ambiguity and structural non-ambiguity. We reproduce in a number of theses a basic perspective of social reality based in social

phenomenology and the actors view:

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1. A theoretically articulated agreement between reality and view/approach is needed. 2. Social reality can be seen as a language game in which it is important to understand the

three kinds of denotations of conceptual meaning of various phenomena. 3. The pre-scientific idea stipulating that the more accurately a phenomenon can be

measured the better it can be understood, is of no relevance to the actors view (see the Arbnor Uncertainty Principle, Figure 6.1).

4. Various dialectic processes characterize the construction of social reality. 5. Everyday reality is fundamental to the understanding of social reality. 6. That which is expressed in everyday life as factual has an important significance in terms

of diminishing what is potential. 7. Free human beings are seen as carriers of interpretations, having the ability to create

knowledge and actions in a net of meaning relations. 8. In order for new knowledge to breed insight, development of personality, and direct

action, it must be related to meaning and purpose – i.e. the actors’ own emotional relations (including those of the creator of knowledge).

9. Business is a human science. Human beings construct social business reality. 10. Business is about transforming resources, where the most important ‘capital’ is made up

of the human ability to interpret, create knowledge and act (an engagement in the world) within the framework of structural denotations of conceptual meaning (see Figure 6.2).

From the above it is apparent that the actors view consciously encompasses the philosophical aspects of life as well. Out of the ultimate presumptions on which the actors view is based, what is known as the

network idea as a model for social organizing and change has also emerged. The idea of being able to describe social phenomena simultaneously as structure and process by seeing phenomena in terms of network relations is based on the central idea that it is common value structures that connect people to each other and give them the power to create unexpected changes. In terms of the actors view, this can be described as a meaning context in which the quantitative accumulation is transformed into a new and unexpected quality (see Figure 6.3). The original network idea, according to the actors view, was nevertheless distorted when it entered the world of researchers/consultants/investigators because the analytical and systems views chose to start to “construct” networks for others, thereby losing the very essence of the genuine construction of networks: the spontaneous and free driving force in meaning relations among people. Despite this, the actors view regards the network idea as an interesting descriptive language for making social change understood.

Developing human procreative power

The intent of the actors view is to achieve understanding, insight, emancipation and action for various actors in society (e.g. business leaders, researchers, consultants, investigators). In order to create this, creators of knowledge (being business leaders, researchers, consultants, or investigators) can, within the framework of the models described above under the heading “Denotation of conceptual meaning and scientific language”, use various instruments to

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develop language. These instruments are not only of a purely descriptive nature referring to actors concerned in the study area, but should also be seen as serious instruments of communication that, at the end of a project, can produce understanding in the meaning relations for other actors and other creators of knowledge as well. The written word, emanating from the creative act, is one aspect of the way the actors view

communicates via procreative reports (see Chapter 7 “The procreative report”). Another is the direct act. In both cases the dialogical structure is central. In the same way as we in a dialogue can use the language subconsciously, we may here be

able to use it consciously to create new thoughts, open new perspectives, create involvement, etc. This is all related to those knowledge interests (understanding, emancipating and innovative) and those knowledge ambitions (see Figure 6.2) which engage the actors oriented creator of knowledge to use language in a way where life is enriched. Working with reports that create knowledge, in the actors view, is a means of

communication that should attempt to go beyond the traditional research/consulting/investigative report. Compared with a rational ideal picture in which descriptions are assumed to be expressed objectively and perceived unambiguously, the descriptions here are intended to give possibilities to interpretations and actions as objects for the development of knowledge – that is to release the potential in what is factual. This is a kind of knowledge development where metatheory, empirical reality and ultimate

presumptions are up against each other in a parallel fashion, where creation of knowledge and action are inside and outside of the same helix. The totality is polyphonic if we use our earlier musical analogy, but we don’t find the music by explaining the instruments. We have to understand, according to the actors view, the complex interrelation between actors and their construction of meaning in the social reality as denotation of “tones, melody and theme” (see Figure 6.12). In this area, with reports that create knowledge according to the actors view, we find

ourselves at the beginning of an exciting development. The actors view encourages legitimate experiments. Furthermore, there is a striking similarity between the almost bewildering confusion that is revealed by the actors approach’s view of the knowledge-creating process of description and Bohr’s principle of complementarity in modern physics. Bohr’s principle claims that it is impossible to reduce the nonreducable variation in reality to one single language. And this, according to Bohr, is not a resignation but a development in thinking that Bohr himself, apparently, said made him dizzy. The actors view often borrows complementary ideas from other areas, including artistically

oriented activities, that can lead to a situation in which knowledge recognizes previously unseen connections, or in which out-dated knowledge can be overcome, and so on. By means of a theoretically well-founded actors view, theory will, through its proponents, become the best practice. Theory will not be something that is done before or after practice but will become an integrated part of practical development. In pedagogic contexts, therefore, the actors view recommends the objective (the ob-ject) of

creating knowledge that alternates between theory and practice, rather than the time periods of creating knowledge that are to be sequentially partitioned into practical and theoretical stages, a view that is common in many educative contexts. As the actors view sees it, a partitioning of

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time may lead instead to the possibility that an old-fashioned theory based on meaningless generalizations might survive. And this could, in turn, eventually give nourishment to what is otherwise such a mistaken opinion about the strict difference between theory and practice. Theory and practice, according to the actors view, are two sides of the same progressive coin – our social life.

Reality is, according to the actors view, a human construction in which actors are involved. “Actor” here becomes a central concept when studying the individuals of society. It is a person with the potential freedom to act and to create his/her own life-space. Other concepts like intentionality, dialogue, understanding, denotation of conceptual meaning, action and others, are in this chapter given a dialectic significance. The chapter describes how these and other ultimate presumptions of the actors view together create the frames for a view with an understanding, emancipating and innovating knowledge interest and with knowledge ambitions to reinforce what is unique, look for what is different in what is similar, be meaning-and action-oriented, emancipate the potential in the factual, etc. The chapter also provides the necessary “philosophical” and theoretical background in order to be able to practically apply the actors view in different research/consulting/investigation situations.

POINTS OF REFLECTION

1. The Micro-cosmos of man and the Arbnor Uncertainty Principle are two analogies to natural sciences used in the chapter. Talk to your friends about what in the chapter has been described as being, becoming and freedom. What do these three concepts mean in relation to what is called determinism?

2. Please illustrate what the actors view talks about as intentionality? 3. The actors view has several explicit knowledge ambitions. Which ones? And knowledge interests as .……… Which? What would these ambitions and interests mean to you personally as a creator of knowledge?

4. Why should a dialogue not be mixed up with discussion or debate? Which are the two elements of the dialogue and its two methodological purposes?

5. Construct an example that can vivify the concept of dialectics? 6. Actor is the very central concept of the view. Which important qualities of the view are

indicated with this concept? 7. If you were to develop language in order to describe the actors view to your fellow

students, what metaphors and concepts would you then use in order to come up with a procreative description?

8. Why is the knowledge creating act so important in the actors view? 9. What does reality as a social construction mean? And which are the processes by

which this construction is described? Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-30 09:49:11.

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10. The construction processes are dialectically related to each other. Can you present what is meant by “a dialectic relationship” in this context?

11. Meta-theories are mentioned in the text and they are four in number, but how are they denoted and what do they stand for?

12. What is meant by denotation of conceptual meaning? 13. Which models do you come up with when you describe what is contained in

descriptive language? And how do you make the models comprehensible for those who do not know what descriptive language is all about?

14. Which models are described under ideal-typified language? And what is an ideal type?