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Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul David Apolloni

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 34, Number 1, January 1996, pp. 5-32 (Article)

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Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul

D A V I D A P O L L O N I

VROM P h a e d o 78b to 8od, Socrates a t t e m p t s to a n s w e r S i m m i a s ' f e a r that, e v e n

if t h e soul has existed e t e r n a l l y b e f o r e birth, it m i g h t be d i s p e r s e d a n d this

w o u l d be the e n d o f its existence (77b5). His a n s w e r is an a r g u m e n t which

a t t e m p t s to s h o w t h a t t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t e because it is similar to t h e F o r m s

a n d dissimilar to physical objects. T o date, this a r g u m e n t - - t h e so-called A f t i n -

ity A r g u m e n t - - h a s n o t r e c e i v e d m u c h s y m p a t h y f r o m Plato's c o m m e n t a t o r s ,

w h o universally c o n s i d e r it the weakest o f Plato's a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e i m m o r t a l -

ity o f t h e s o u l ?

T h e lack o f s y m p a t h y a n d e n t h u s i a s m f o r this a r g u m e n t is n o t difficult to

u n d e r s t a n d . J u s t c o n s i d e r t h e following o u t l i n e o f the a r g u m e n t . T h e soul is

invisible, t h e r e f o r e t h e soul is m o r e similar to the Invisible, i.e., t h e F o r m s ,

which a r e always t h e same, t h a n a r e bodies, which a r e visible a n d which a r e

c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g , a n d which a r e m o r e similar to t h e Visible t h a n is t h e soul

( 7 9 a - b ) . F u r t h e r , t h e soul is m o r e like the Always t h e S a m e in that w h e n it

uses t h e b o d y to see o r h e a r o r perceive, it is " d r a g g e d " by the b o d y into t h e

N e v e r t h e Same, a n d the soul " w a n d e r s a n d is c o n f u s e d a n d whirls as if

i n t o x i c a t e d " i n s o f a r as t h e soul has c o m e in c o n t a c t with such t h i n g s ( 7 9 c 5 - 8 ) .

W h e r e a s w h e n t h e soul c o n s i d e r s by itself, it goes to the r e a l m o f the F o r m s ,

a n d ceases its w a n d e r i n g . T h e r e f o r e t h e soul is m o r e like the Always t h e S a m e

t h a n t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e (79d). Finally, w h e n t h e soul is in the b o d y , t h e soul

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the First Annual Conference of the Minne- sota Society of Ancient Philosophy, held at the College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, Minnesota, May 7, 1994. Thanks are due to Martha Beck-Phillips, John Pepple, and an anonymous referee of the J l t P for their valuable suggestions and criticisms.

' See Kenneth Dorter, "'Plato's Image of Immortality," The Philosophical Quarterly 6/lo 5 (Octo- ber, 1976): ~95-3o4 . Dorter's interpretation is probably the most sympathetic that I have seen, and yet he thinks that the argument is "set forth rather casually, is frequently weakened by qualifications and hesitancy, and is based merely upon analogy" ('~95)-

[5]

6 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 34:1 J A N U A R Y 1996

r u l e s t h e b o d y a n d t h e r e f o r e is m o r e like t h e D i v i n e t h a n is t h e b o d y , w h i c h is

m o r e like t h e M o r t a l .

S o i n t e r p r e t e d , t h e m a i n t h r u s t o f this c h a i n o f a r g u m e n t s is c l e a r l y v e r y

w e a k . T h a t t h e s o u l is m o r e s i m i l a r t o t h e F o r m s t h a n it is t o b o d i e s d o e s n o t

e s t a b l i s h h o w it is s i m i l a r . 2 A n d s o it falls s h o r t o f s h o w i n g t h a t it is s i m i l a r i n

t h a t b o t h t h e s o u l a n d t h e F o r m s a r e i n d e s t r u c t i b l e o r i n d i s s o l u b l e .

N o r d o e s t h e s i t u a t i o n i m p r o v e w h e n w e c o n s i d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l a r g u -

m e n t s i n t h e c h a i n . F o r e v e n i f t h e s o u l is invisible, this in n o w a y e s t a b l i s h e s

t h a t it is u n c h a n g i n g , like o t h e r t h i n g s w h i c h a r e invisible. N o r d o e s it f o l l o w

t h a t t h e s o u l is s i m i l a r in a n y i n t e r e s t i n g w a y t o w h a t is a l w a y s t h e s a m e j u s t

b e c a u s e it s t o p s c h a n g i n g w h e n it c o n t e m p l a t e s " t h e p u r e , t h a t w h i c h a l w a y s is

b o t h i m m o r t a l a n d t h e s a m e . " N o r d o e s t h e s u p p o s e d f a c t t h a t t h e s o u l r u l e s

t h e b o d y m a k e it s i m i l a r t o t h e D i v i n e t o s u c h a n e x t e n t t h a t it w o u l d f o l l o w

t h a t t h e s o u l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e as t h e D i v i n e is t h o u g h t t o be.

F i n a l l y , S o c r a t e s ' c o n c l u s i o n f r o m all o f this at 8 o b 8 - ~ o is t h o u g h t t o b e

d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y w e a k , b u t u n d e r s t a n d a b l y so: " i f t h e s e t h i n g s a r e so, is it n o t

f i t t i n g f o r t h e b o d y t o q u i c k l y c o m e a p a r t , b u t t h e s o u l t o b e c o m p l e t e l y

i n d i s s o l u b l e , o r s o m e t h i n g c l o s e t o it [r ~ m g ~t TO6TOU]?" I f t h e c o n c l u s i o n

l e a v e s o p e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s o u l is nearly i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , t h e n it is d e -

s t r u c t i b l e a f t e r all, in w h i c h c a s e t h e a r g u m e n t falls s h o r t o f e s t a b l i s h i n g w h a t

it w a s s u p p o s e d to.

T h u s t h e a r g u m e n t a p p e a r s t o h a v e f a u l t s so g l a r i n g t h a t it is h a r d t o t h i n k

t h a t P l a t o t o o k it s e r i o u s l y , a n d a t least o n e r e c e n t c o m m e n t a t o r g o e s so f a r as

t o s u g g e s t t h a t S o c r a t e s i n a d v e r t e n t l y r e p u d i a t e s it in t h e f a c e o f o b j e c t i o n s

t h a t his c o m p a n i o n s raise.3 B u t i f t h e a r g u m e n t is so b a d , w e a r e l e f t w i t h a

s i g n i f i c a n t p u z z l e as t o w h y P l a t o w o u l d t a k e it s e r i o u s l y e n o u g h t o w r i t e it,

a n d t o w r i t e it a t t h e c e n t e r o f o n e o f his g r e a t e s t d i a l o g u e s , w h e r e it w o u l d

h a v e a s p e c i a l p l a c e o f h o n o r . 4

I n w h a t f o l l o w s , t h e n , [ w o u l d like t o a r g u e t h a t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t is

m o r e t h a n a r h e t o r i c a l f l o u r i s h , a n e m o t i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f b e l i e f s d e e p l y felt, o r

' David Gallop, Plato: Phaedo (Oxford, 1975), 14o: "But if 'being more similar' means 'having more features in common', the fact that the soul shares with the Forms a given feature that the body lacks would not show that it is 'more similar' to them than is the body. Even if this were shown, it would not follow that the soul has all features in common with the Forms that the body lacks."

For example, David White, Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's "Phaedo" (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1989) , 133.

4 Kenneth Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo": An Interpretation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 7 ~. Dorter (76) thinks that the argument has value as an articulation of deep feelings that there is something noble and eternal about us. Thus he thinks that the Affinity Argument, like the Argument from Design for God's existence, is logically defective but very persuasive, and that this accounts for Plato's inclusion of it in the dialogue.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 7

a weak analogy which Plato put forward only to discard, that it is a deductive a r g u m e n t whose conclusion follows from its p r e m i s s e s - - p r e m i s s e s whose truth Plato w o u l d have t h o u g h t he had established. As such, it is an a r g u m e n t o f equal or greater philosophical merit than either the A r g u m e n t from Recollection ( 7 3 - 7 6 ) or the Final A r g u m e n t from Opposites ( l o ~ - i o 6 ) . 5 Indeed, the first and third portions o f it anticipate s o m e m o d e r n arguments for dualism. 6

1 . T H E A R G U M E N T ' S C O N T E X T W I T H I N T H E D I A L O G U E

A persistent and crucial t h e m e t h r o u g h o u t the Phaedo states that the philoso- pher m u s t detach from the senses and from desires for physical objects t h r o u g h rigorous training. We find expression o f this idea n o t only j u s t after the Affinity A r g u m e n t ( 8 o e - 8 ld), but also both earlier, at 6 6 - 6 7 e , and later, at 1 1 4 d - e . In the latter passage, Plato clearly distinguishes this idea from all o f the mythic o n e s elaborated immediately preceding. But even if it were mythic, this w o u l d not c o u n t as evidence that Plato himself did not believe it. For Plato conceives o f the relationship between a r g u m e n t and myth as o n e o f loose evidential s u p p o r t o f the former for the latter (114d).7 But the onlyjustifica-

5 In s u p p o r t o f this statement I can only invite my readers to compare the Affinity A r g u m e n t as 1 shall reconstruct it with these o t h e r two a r g u m e n t s in the Phaedo. I believe that such a comparison will show that all three approach the definition o f a great philosophical a r g u m e n t as one which moves f r o m premisses which everyone considers obvious to conclusions nobody can believe. This does not mean that I am trying to establish the Affinity A r g u m e n t as sound (or unsound). It, like any o t h e r a r g u m e n t by an ancient philosopher, makes assumptions that are, in the end, questionable or would require f u r t h e r revision and assessment i f a c o n t e m p o r a r y philoso- p h e r were to try to d e f e n d them. For example, the a r g u m e n t assumes Plato's T h e o r y o f F o r m s - - that the world o f the senses is largely composed o f c o m p r e s e n t opposites but the Forms are not, that like is attracted to like so that the immaterial soul, when separated f r o m the body, goes to a world o f similar objects, whereas if the soul is too attached to the body, it remains in the world o f physical objects. C o m p a r e these assumptions with those o f the A r g u m e n t from Recollection--that sensible equals somehow "fall short" o f true Equality (Phaedo 7 4 d - e ) , that a priori knowledge is "forgotten" (76d); or those o f the Final A r g u m e n t - - t h a t the soul cannot be destroyed because it has life a n d life cannot receive death (1 o6c-e). For critical assessment o f both o f these arguments, and f u r t h e r references, see Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, i 19ff. a n d 192ff., respectively. See also G.E.M. Anscombe, " U n d e r s t a n d i n g Proofs," in h e r From Parmenides to Wittgenaein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Voi. i (Minneapolis, t981 ), 34-43; Gregory Vlastos, "Anamnesis in the Meno," Dialogue 4 0965): 146-67.

s See below, n. 48 a n d my Epilogue for this and o t h e r reasons for a wide interest for the a r g u m e n t .

7 Following his final mythic description o f the afterlife, Socrates says here, "Complete affirma- tion that these things are as I have described is not p r o p e r for a reasonable person; nonetheless, that these things are so or something like them [xotct~t' ~trtct] concerning the soul and its habita- tion, it seems fitting to me and a p p r o p r i a t e to risk thinking, since it is manifest [qbcts o~oct] that t h e soul is immortal. For the risk is a reasonable one [xcO.6g], and it is necessary f o r me to chant to myself such things as these, for which reason I have embellished my account [xct~, ttO3.at itllxt3vt0 t6v p.~0ov]." T h e s e words make clear that Socrates takes himself to have established that the soul is immortal, a n d because he has established this, the mythic account o f the h e r e a f t e r he

8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 4 : 1 JANUARY I 9 9 6

t i o n we f i n d in t h e d i a l o g u e is in t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t itself, specifically in

t h e p o r t i o n s s h o w i n g t h a t t h e soul is t h e s a m e a n d (as we shall see) d i v i n e .

W i t h o u t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t , o n e o f S o c r a t e s ' m o s t i m p o r t a n t d o c t r i n e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e d i a l o g u e is g i v e n n o s u p p o r t p r e c i s e l y w h e r e we w o u l d e x p e c t

t o f i n d it. A n d o n e w o u l d e x p e c t S o c r a t e s to h a v e d r o p p e d this d o c t r i n e i f t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t w e r e d e f e a t e d . B u t h e d o e s n o t d o this.

A n d w h a t a b o u t t h e o b j e c t i o n s o f S i m m i a s a n d C e b e s ? B o t h o f t h e s e fail, so t h e y c a n n o t i m p l y t h a t S o c r a t e s g a v e u p t h e Affinity A r g u m e n t . I n d e e d ,

Cebes" o b j e c t i o n m i s s e s t h e p o i n t . F o r i f i n d e e d t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t e , it is n o t

a n a l o g o u s to t h e tailor, w h o / s , a f t e r all, c o m p o s i t e . S o c r a t e s ' final r e m a r k s a t

9 5 b - c c o n c e r n i n g C e b e s ' o b j e c t i o n 8 s h o w t h a t at m o s t it h a s a p o i n t a g a i n s t t h e

A r g u m e n t f r o m R e c o l l e c t i o n , a n d w o r k s a g a i n s t t h e final t h i r d o f t h e a r g u - m e n t w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e d i v i n i t y ( a n d " s t r e n g t h " ) o f soul. O r r a t h e r , it w o r k s

a g a i n s t a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this p o r t i o n o f t h e a r g u m e n t . F o r S o c r a t e s h a s n o t a r g u e d t h a t t h e soul is i m m o r t a l j u s t b e c a u s e it is d i v i n e - - h e h a s a r g u e d

t h a t it is i m m o r t a l b e c a u s e it is invisible a n d u n c h a n g i n g , as well as d i v i n e .

I n r e s p o n s e to P h a e d o ' s r e c o u n t i n g t h e discussion, E c h e c r a t e s m e n t i o n s

o n l y S i m m i a s ' o b j e c t i o n as t h e o n e c o n v i n c i n g to h i m (88d). So t h e t e x t a g a i n m a k e s c l e a r C e b e s ' lack o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a s t u t e n e s s . O f c o u r s e , S o c r a t e s d o e s

n o t explicitly say this. R a t h e r , p r e s u m a b l y , h e is v e r y g e n t l y a n d i n d i r e c t l y p o i n t -

i n g it o u t w i t h o u t e m b a r r a s s i n g his f r i e n d , w h o is t o o o b t u s e to notice. H e h a s a g e n t l e r w a y o f t r y i n g to c o n v i n c e C e b e s . T h u s C e b e s ' o b j e c t i o n is m e r e l y a d r a -

m a t i c i n t r o i t to a n e w , i n d e p e n d e n t a r g u m e n t f o r i m m o r t a l i t y (9 6 - 1 o 6 ) . S i m m i a s ' o b j e c t i o n is m u c h m o r e o n t h e m a r k , f o r it q u e s t i o n s a c r u c i a l

i n f e r e n c e m a d e in t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t , i.e., t h a t w h a t is invisible is i n d e -

s t r u c t i b l e . F o r t h e a t t u n e m e n t o f t h e s t r i n g s o f a l y r e is invisible, b u t is d e -

s t r o y e d w h e n t h e s t r i n g s a r e s n a p p e d . So i f t h e soul is a n a t t u n e m e n t o f o p p o s i t e s in t h e b o d y , it c a n n o t s u r v i v e t h e d e a t h o f t h e b o d y e i t h e r .

has just elaborated o r something like it is reasonable to believe. Cf. Veda Cobb-Stevens, "Mythos and Logos in Plato's Phaedo," in A.-T. Tymieniecka, ed., The Philosophical Reflection of Man in Literature (Dordrecht, 1982 ), 4o4, who points out that in the Phaedo, we are not completely separable from the body in this life; so we must address death in perceptual, mythical terms. But the soul must maintain primacy over the body, so the myth is structured by the conclusions of reasoned argument. "The basic structure of the philosophical insight gained by logos must guide and order the content of the myth. In this way, the myth can speak directly to the fear which has its origin in the body, hut speak with the 'hidden meaning' and calming effect of its logical structure. Thus the myth, instead of inducing the soul to regress to the level of the body, speaks to the body in a language structured by the insights of the soul." See also Ludwig Edeistein, "The Function of Myth in Plato's Philosophy,"Journal of the History of Ideas lo (1949): 463 - 8 l, esp. 466.

s,,To show that the soul is strong and godlike, and even that it existed before we were born-- all this, you may say, may very well indicate not that the soul is immortal, but merely that it is long- lived, and preexisted somewhere for a prodigious period of time, enjoying a great measure of knowledge and activity."

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 9

As f o r this o b j e c t i o n , t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to believe t h a t Plato t h i n k s h e has failed to r e f u t e it, w h a t e v e r o n e thinks o f t h e r e f u t a t i o n itself.9 A n d to E c h e c r a t e s ' q u e s t i o n as to w h e t h e r Socrates r e s c u e d his a r g u m e n t , P h a e d o in his r o l e as m o d e r a t o r in t h e d i a l o g u e r e s p o n d s a f f i r m a t i v e l y ( 8 8 e - 8 9 a ) . In- d e e d , S o c r a t e s has a l r e a d y a n t i c i p a t e d this o b j e c t i o n because, as we shall see, his r e s p o n s e to t h e o b j e c t i o n is a m e r e e x p a n s i o n o f t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e a r g u - m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e divinity o f t h e soul.

So i f Plato d i d n o t t a k e t h e a r g u m e n t seriously, w h y t h e n d o S o c r a t e s ' i n t e r l o c u t o r s fail to r e f u t e it? I believe, t h e n , t h a t the a b o v e c o n t e x t u a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t Plato r e j e c t e d t h e a r g u m e n t all fail. It r e m a i n s f o r us to c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r it is a bad a r g u m e n t .

2 . T I I E B A S l C S T R U C T U R E O F T H E A R G U M E N T

A n y a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e a r g u m e n t m u s t solve t h e following puzzle. At 7 9 b - c , S o c r a t e s asserts t h a t t h e b o d y is more s i m i l a r a n d more a k i n to the Visible. W h y d o e s h e settle f o r this, w h e n h e can assert s o m e t h i n g s t r o n g e r - - t h a t t h e b o d y i n d e e d / s visible? F u r t h e r , h e asserts t h a t t h e soul is invisible ( o v x 6Qctx6v) a n d h e n c e u n s e e n (&tiS~g). T h e n h e s t r a n g e l y i n f e r s f r o m this what a p p e a r s to be a f a r w e a k e r c o n c l u s i o n - - t h a t t h e soul is m o r e similar t h a n is t h e b o d y to the U n s e e n , a n d t h e b o d y is m o r e similar t h a n is t h e soul to t h e Visible (79 b 1 6 - 1 7 ) . W h y d o e s h e n o t i n f e r instead t h a t t h e b o d y b e l o n g s to t h e Visible a n d t h e soul to t h e Invisible?

F u r t h e r , S o c r a t e s m a k e s similar m o v e s in t h e l a t e r stages o f t h e a r g u m e n t : at 7 9 d o - e i , S o c r a t e s i n f e r s t h a t the soul is m o r e similar a n d m o r e a k i n to t h e Always t h e S a m e w h e n h e has established t h a t t h e soul is in fact u n c h a n g i n g ; a n d at 8 o a 6 - 8 , h e i n f e r s t h a t soul is m e r e l y like t h e Divine, w h e n h e has e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t its n a t u r e is to r u l e r a t h e r t h a n to be r u l e d . In t h e s e last two stages, t h e n , h e o d d l y r e p l a c e s a m o r e specific c o n c l u s i o n with a v a g u e r , if n o t w e a k e r , o n e . W h y ?

D o r t e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n is a p p a r e n t l y t h a t this shows S o c r a t e s ' " h e s i t a n c y '''~ a n d t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is n o t m e a n t to be a r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n . ~ H o w e v e r , t h a t Plato i n t e n d s us to see t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is n o t a r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n c a n n o t e x p l a i n w h y S o c r a t e s d e d u c e s that t h e soul is m o r e like t h e Invisible f r o m t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e soul is invisible. Such a d e d u c t i o n is r i g o r o u s ; lack o f r i g o r is n o t t h e p r o b l e m . I f S o c r a t e s is b e i n g hesitant, we n e e d to k n o w w h y if this is g o i n g to s e r v e as a n e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m is, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e d e d u c t i o n

9 My own assessment of the point of the Socrates' argument from the "strength" of the soul is outlined below, pp. 27-29. For a critique of Socrates' counterarguments against the harmony theory, see David Bostock, Plato's "Phaedo'" (Oxford, 1986 ), 1~5-34.

,o Dorter, "Plato's Image of Immortality," 295. " Dorter, Plato's "'Phaedo": An Interpretation, 76.

1 0 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6

j u s t s e e m s o d d . A n d o d d n e s s i n d i c a t e s t h a t w e a r e n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e

a r g u m e n t - - n o t t h a t w e s h o u l d t a k e it as a w e a k a r g u m e n t f r o m a n a l o g y .

S o w e m u s t t r y t o f i n d a n o t h e r a n s w e r . I t was a c o s m i c p r i n c i p l e w i d e l y

a c c e p t e d b y t h e G r e e k s t h a t like g r a v i t a t e s t o like. S o c r a t e s utilizes s u c h a

p r i n c i p l e a t 8 1 a , t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e i m p u r e s o u l r e m a i n s o n t h e e a r t h a n d w h y

t h e p u r i f i e d s o u l g o e s t o h e a v e n . T h i s c o u l d easily b e a t l e a s t p a r t o f t h e r e a s o n

S o c r a t e s p u t s s o m u c h e m p h a s i s u p o n t h e s i m i l i t u d e o f t h e s o u l t o t h e I n v i s i -

ble, A l w a y s t h e S a m e , a n d D i v i n e . W i t h i n t h e a r g u m e n t i t s e l f h e s e e m s t o b e

m a k i n g a s i m i l a r p o i n t a t 8 o c - d - - w h e n t h e s o u l t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e o b j e c t s o f

t h e senses, it is d r a g g e d b y t h e b o d y i n t o t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e a n d like t h e m " w a n d e r s a n d is c o n f u s e d a n d w h i r l s as i f i n t o x i c a t e d " ;

a n d w h e n it c o n t e m p l a t e s all b y itself, it g o e s (in t h o u g h t ? ) t o t h e p u r e , a l w a y s

b e i n g , etc., a n d b e c a u s e it is a k i n t o this w o r l d a n d a l w a y s c o m e s t o b e w i t h it, it

s t o p s its w a n d e r i n g a n d r e m a i n s t h e s a m e .

B u t i f S o c r a t e s h a s s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d s t o say t h a t t h e s o u l b e l o n g s t o t h e

I n v i s i b l e b e c a u s e it is invisible, o r t h a t it b e l o n g s t o t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e

b e c a u s e it i n s o m e w a y d o e s n o t c h a n g e , w h y d o e s h e n o t say this? S o I w o u l d

like t o s u g g e s t a n o t h e r a n s w e r as well.

V e r y r o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , t h e a r g u m e n t , as I will i n t e r p r e t it, r u n s as follows.

T h e r e a r e t w o a n d o n l y t w o k i n d s o f b e i n g - - ( a ) t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e S a m e a n d

t h e M o r t a l , a n d (b) t h e I n v i s i b l e , t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e , a n d t h e D i v i n e . T h e s o u l

will b e l o n g t o w h i c h e v e r k i n d it m o s t c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e s b y s h a r i n g a t t r i b u t e s

definitive o f t h a t k i n d . S i n c e t h e s o u l m o s t c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e s (b), it m u s t b e l o n g t o (b). B u t t h e n it will a l s o h a v e a n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f ( b ) - - i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y .

T h e a r g u m e n t , so u n d e r s t o o d , is b a s e d u p o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e

j u s t t h e s e t w o k i n d s w i t h j u s t t h e s e d e f i n i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( 7 9 a 6 - 7 ) . S o c r a t e s

d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e a n d t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e a t 78c.

T h e f o r m e r a r e likely t o b e c o m p o s i t e a n d a r e o b s e r v a b l e t h r o u g h t h e

s e n s e s / ' a n d t h e l a t t e r i n c o m p o s i t e a n d c a n o n l y b e g r a s p e d t h r o u g h r e a s o n

'" Presumably, Socrates means to exclude from the Invisible objects of all and any of the senses (cf. 79c2-3). He merely chooses the term "Visible" because he is taking vision as a represen- tative of all the senses. The Visible consists, then, not only of visible objects but sensible objects, and the Invisible consists not just of objects which cannot be seen, but which cannot be objects o f the other senses as well.

One wonders whether objects too small to sense are "invisible" in Plato's sense. (See Bostock, P/ato's "Phaed0," 118--19.) Presumably, Plato would not have thought of Democritus' atoms as invisible and unchanging as the Forms are. Accordingly, I suggest that they would be "visible" in the sense that one could see what turn out to be great numbers of them together and that they could be seen individually if human sight were extended to see smaller objects than it in fact does. That is to say, the Visible includes any objects it would be logically possible to perceive through the senses. On the other hand, what is "invisible" is something whose nature is such that it is logically impossible that it could be seen or sensed at all.

Of course Simmias later brings up attunemem as an example of something which would violate

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 11

(79a). T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e f o r m e r c l a s s - - b o d i e s - - c o n s t i t u t e t h e Visible; a n d t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e l a t t e r - - S o c r a t e s ' o n l y e x a m p l e s are F o r m s - - c o n s t i t u t e t h e Invisible. Since t h e m e m b e r s o f the f o r m e r class are bodies, visibility, c h a n g e , a n d m o r t a l i t y a r e a t t r i b u t e s essential to a n d definitive o f t h a t class. A n d invisi- bility, i m m u t a b i l i t y , a n d divinity m u s t t h e n be a t t r i b u t e s essential to a n d defini- tive o f t h e latter class as well.

T h u s s o m e o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s d e f i n i n g t h e Invisible are "always t h e s a m e " a n d " d i v i n e , " so t h a t l a t e r in t h e a r g u m e n t these b e c o m e a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e s f o r t h e Invisible. A n d similarly f o r t h e Visible at 7 9 d 9 - e l : "~.6 ~t~[ r ~:XovtL" a n d " ~ la/I [r ~:;(o~L]" are clearly a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e s f o r t h e Invisible a n d t h e Visible, since Socrates r e f e r s to each as a " k i n d [e[6et] o f those talked a b o u t p r e v i o u s l y a n d those talked a b o u t n o w " a n d the o n l y k i n d s he has p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d a r e t h e two e[Svl T6~v 6~c0v at 7 9 a 6 - 7 , which a r e t h e Invisible a n d t h e Visible. P r e s u m a b l y " t h e Divine" a n d " t h e M o r t a l " at 8 o a 3 - 8 a r e to be u n d e r s t o o d in the same way.

As it t u r n s o u t , Socrates t h i n k s t h a t the soul is capable o f s h a r i n g c h a r a c t e r - istics o f b o t h kinds, b u t at d i f f e r e n t times a n d u n d e r d i f f e r e n t conditions.'3 So e v e n t h o u g h Socrates wishes to d e f e n d the idea t h a t t h e soul is invisible, always t h e same, a n d d i v i n e - - a t t r i b u t e s antithetical to those o f physical o b j e c t s - - h e t h i n k s t h a t t h e soul can take o n s o m e o f t h e n a t u r e o f physical bodies i f it is in c o m m u n i o n with t h e m to too g r e a t a d e g r e e ( 8 o c - d ; cf. 67a5).

H o w t h e n d o e s o n e establish t h e k i n d to which t h e soul really d o e s belong? Clearly o n e m u s t p r o c e e d by s h o w i n g t h a t t h e soul h a s ' a t t r i b u t e s which d e f i n e o n e o f t h e k i n d s a n d which are antithetical to the o t h e r kind, t a k i n g c a r e to a r g u e t h a t t h e soul in its o w n n a t u r e is invisible while u n d e r s o m e c o n d i t i o n s u n n a t u r a l to it it can take o n physical p r o p e r t i e s . Each defining a t t r i b u t e t h a t we can d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e soul shares with o n e k i n d s u p p o r t s t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e soul has all t h e o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s associated with t h a t kind. I t is n a t u r a l , t h e n , to p u t t h e m a t t e r in t e r m s o f similarity--the soul belongs to w h i c h e v e r k i n d it is m o s t similar to in t h e sense o f h a v i n g f e a t u r e s which are definitive o f t h a t kind.~4

t h e p r o p o s e d k i n d - d i s t i n c t i o n , s i n c e h e s u p p o s e s it to b e b o t h invisible a n d d e s t r u c t i b l e . S o c r a t e s d o e s n o t explicitly a n s w e r this o b j e c t i o n , b u t t h a t fact d o e s n o t necessarily m e a n t h a t h e t h o u g h t it r e f u t e d his d i s t i n c t i o n . W h e t h e r a n a t t u n e m e n t is visible o r not, it certainly is sensible. A h a r p h a s a t t u n e m e n t i f o n e h e a r s it p l a y e d in t u n e .

,s Phaedo 8 ~d: t h o s e souls w h o h a v e c o m m u n e d t o o closely with t h e Visible s h a r e in t h e Visible a n d t h u s c a n b e s e e n as a p p a r i t i o n s w a n d e r i n g a r o u n d m o n u m e n t s a n d graves. S o c r a t e s is clear, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e ( s e p a r a t e d ) soul is invisible w h e n it is p u r i f i e d o f c o m m u n i o n with t h e o b j e c t s o f t h e s e n s e s .

14 C o n s i d e r h o w o n e a r g u e s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t a g i v e n s h a d e o f grayish g r e e n is g r a y i s h green ( a n d n o t g r e e n i s h gray). O n e a r g u e s in t e r m s o f similarities h e r e , so t h a t w h i c h e v e r p u r e c o l o r t h e s h a d e r e s e m b l e s t h e m o s t is t h e o n e we say it is. B u t n o t j u s t a n y similarity is r e l e v a n t . F o r

12 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : ~ J A N U A R Y ~ 9 9 6

S i m i l a r i t y to a k i n d b y s h a r i n g o n e o f its d e f i n i n g a t t r i b u t e s is t h u s e v i d e n c e

t h a t s o m e t h i n g b e l o n g s to t h a t kind. A n d this, I t a k e it, is w h a t S o c r a t e s is

i m p l y i n g w i t h his c o u p l i n g o f t h e w o r d s 6 ~ o l 6 x ~ ) o v a n d ovyye'v~oxe~ov a t

7 9 b 4 - 6 a n d d 9 - e l : i f t h e soul is m o r e s i m i l a r to t h e I n v i s i b l e by b e i n g invisi- ble, it follows t h a t i f t h e r e a r e j u s t t h e s e t w o k i n d s o f b e i n g , t h e soul is m o r e

k i n d r e d w i t h t h e Visible, i.e., it b e l o n g s m o r e to t h e k i n d t h e Visible.

B u t i f t h e r e a r e o n l y two k i n d s o f b e i n g , as S o c r a t e s says, t h e n i f t h e s o u l is

invisible it w o u l d follow i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t it s h o u l d b e l o n g to t h e I n v i s i b l e a n d

h a v e all o f t h e o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e I n v i s i b l e as well. A n d t h e s a m e c a n

b e said i f t h e soul is u n c h a n g i n g a n d d i v i n e - - i t s h o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y follow t h a t

t h e s o u l b e l o n g s to t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e a n d t h e Divine. A c c o r d i n g l y , we

w o u l d h a v e t h r e e a r g u m e n t s e a c h i n d e p e n d e n t l y s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n , i n s t e a d o f o n e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t m a d e u p o f t h r e e s m a l l e r a r g u m e n t s s u p -

p o r t i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o g e t h e r .

B u t this is n o t t h e w a y t h e a r g u m e n t r u n s . S o c r a t e s c o n c l u d e s o n l y t h a t t h e

soul is m o r e like t h e I n v i s i b l e t h a n t h e Visible at 7 9 c 1 6 - 1 7 ; a n d a t 7 9 e ~ - 5 t h e soul is still said to b e o n l y " m o r e s i m i l a r in e v e r y way" to t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e

t h a n t o t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e , o r " m o s t s i m i l a r " to t h e D i v i n e a n d A l w a y s t h e

S a m e , etc., at 8 o b . T h e s e n s e we g e t f r o m t h e use o f t h e s e i n c r e a s i n g l y

s t r o n g e r a d j e c t i v e s is t h a t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t is a n a r g u m e n t w h o s e p a r t s c u m u l a t i v e l y s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n .

So we n e e d to r e f i n e o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e a r g u m e n t s o m e w h a t . S o c r a -

tes d i v i d e s u p all o f b e i n g i n t o t w o kinds, to b e s u r e . B u t t h e soul, as we n o t e d , is a p u z z l i n g e n t i t y . I t is invisible, a n d y e t S o c r a t e s t h i n k s t h a t at t i m e s it c a n b e

p h y s i c a l a n d visible. Is it s u b j e c t to c h a n g e a n d c a n it b e r u l e d b y s o m e t h i n g else? I f so, it w o u l d s e e m to b e l o n g to a t h i r d k i n d o f its o w n , a n d n o t to o n e o f

t h e o t h e r two. So S o c r a t e s m u s t first s h o w t h a t it d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o a k i n d o f

its o w n , t h a t i n d e e d it is in i t s e l f invisible, u n c h a n g i n g , a n d d i v i n e . All t h a t

follows f r o m t h e first a r g u m e n t f r o m t h e s o u l ' s s u p p o s e d invisibility is t h a t t h e

soul is v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h e Invisible. F o r to say t h a t it b e l o n g s t o t h e I n v i s i b l e is

to say s o m e t h i n g m u c h s t r o n g e r t h a n t h a t it is i n v i s i b l e - - i t is to say t h a t it is invisible a n d u n c h a n g i n g a n d d i v i n e . I t is m o r e likely t h a t it b e l o n g s to t h e

I n v i s i b l e ( a n d t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e a n d t h e Divine) i f it c a n b e s h o w n t h a t it

example, the object to which the greenish grey shade belongs might resemble in shape and size gray objects more than green ones, but this would not count as evidence that it is gray rather than green. The shade has to be more similar to green in one essential aspect--i.e., with respect to color--than it is to gray. These similarities in color are the only ones that count, so ifa given shade is more similar in color to green than it is to gray (and one does not have reason to think of this shade is a third color distinct from both green and gray) it must be a kind of green, despite whatever other similarities or dissimilarities there might be. And the more color similarities one finds between this shade and green, the less the likelihood that it is either gray or a third color.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 13

d o e s n o t c h a n g e s o m e h o w . By t h e e n d o f t h e t h i r d a r g u m e n t , S o crat es t h i n k s h e has s h o w n t h a t t h e soul has all t h r e e o f t h e i m p o r t a n t d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s - tics o f t h e k i n d w h o s e m e m b e r s a r e i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . By this time, h e has elimi- n a t e d t h e possibility t h a t t h e soul d o e s n o t b e l o n g to a t h i r d kind,~5 so h e has a r i g h t to c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e soul b e l o n g s to t h e Invisible, Always t h e S a m e , a n d Divine, a n d h e n c e is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . ~6

T h i s leads us to ask a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n . Did Plato i n t e n d us to t ak e t h e r e to b e o n l y two k i n d s o f b e i n g ? T h a t h e d i d in fact m a k e su ch a p a r t i t i o n l a t e r o n is e v i d e n t f r o m his division b e t w e e n b e i n g a n d b e c o m i n g o c c u r r i n g in his l a t e r w r i t i n g s ~ 7 - - a division w h i c h is a r e s t a t e m e n t o f this o n e . B u t , o f c o u r s e , in t h e Phaedo itself (~ o 2 f f . ) , h e i n t r o d u c e s a n e n t i t y wh i ch seems to b e l o n g to n e i t h e r o f t h e a b o v e k i n d s o f b e i n g - - t h e i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r . T h u s S o c r a t e s ' l a r g e - ness a n d smallness a r e said to c h a n g e in t h e sense o f c o m i n g to b e a n d p a s s i n g away, a n d c l e a r l y t h e y a r e sensible. B u t since t h e y also n e v e r a d m i t o p p o s i t e s to t h e m s e l v e s ( ~ o 2 e - ~ o 3 c ) '8 t h e r e is s o m e r e a s o n to believe t h e y b e l o n g to a t h i r d k i n d .

H o w e v e r , i f Plato d o e s t h i n k o f i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r s as a t h i r d k i n d , this n e e d n o t u n d e r m i n e t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t , n o r n e e d we i n f e r t h a t Plato t h o u g h t it did. F o r e v e n if i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r s d o c o n s t i t u t e a t h i r d k in d , Plato m a k e s it q u i t e clear, as we shall also see, t h a t t h e soul c o u l d n o t b e l o n g to such a k i n d b e c a u s e i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r s a r e d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e i r subjects f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , a n d t h e soul's "divinity " ru l es this o u t , ' 9 as d o e s S o c r a t e s '

r e s p o n s e to t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e soul is a h a r m o n y (93ff.). So w h e t h e r o r n o t Plato has a t h r e e f o l d o r t w o f o l d o n t o l o g y , t h e r e a r e o n l y

two k i n d s which h e c o n s i d e r s r e l e v a n t to t h e n a t u r e o f s o u l - - o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e Same, a n d Mortal , a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , t h e Invisible, Always t h e S a m e , a n d Divine. It follows t h e n f r o m t h e g r e a t e r similarity o f t h e soul to t h e l a t t e r k i n d t h a t it b e l o n g s to t h a t kind, since t h e similarity is in t e r m s o f p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h a r e essential to t h a t k i n d a n d n o t t h e o t h e r .

,51 w o u l d s u g g e s t a s i m i l a r e x p l a n a t i o n f o r w h y t h e h u m a n b o d y is m e r e l y said to b e m o r e similar to t h e Visible w h e n it is in fact visible at 79 b, etc. l f t h e soul, w h i c h is invisible, c a n b e visible a n d h e n c e s o m e t h i n g a p p a r e n t l y physical w h i c h r e s e m b l e s t h e b o d y , this m e a n s t h a t t h e h u m a n b o d y is also a p u z z l i n g e n t i t y w h i c h m i g h t b e l o n g to a k i n d o f its o w n o r to t h e s a m e t h i r d k i n d as t h e soul. O n l y w h e n h e h a s s h o w n t h a t t h e b o d y is visible a n d n e v e r t h e s a m e a n d m o r t a l in t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g r u l e d c a n S o c r a t e s c o n c l u d e t h a t it is dissoluble because it is m o s t similar ( a n d h e n c e b e l o n g s to) t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e S a m e , a n d Mortal.

,61 shall a r g u e l a t e r o n t h a t h e d i d in fact c o n c l u d e this, t h a t " W h a t e v e r k i n d a n e n t i t y m o s t r e s e m b l e s is o n e to w h i c h it b e l o n g s " is a p r i n c i p l e m o r e o r less implicitly u s e d in his a r g u m e n t . See below, p p . 1 5 - 1 6 .

17 E.g., Republic 518c, 52 t d ; Timaeus 27dff., Philebus 54ff. ' s O n t h e s e n s e in w h i c h this c o u l d b e said to i n d i c a t e u n c h a n g e a b i l i t y , s e e below, p p . 1 6 - 1 9 . ,gSee below, p p . ~ 7 - ~ 9 .

1 4 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : 1 JANUARY ~ 9 9 6

B u t d o e s S o c r a t e s a c t u a l l y c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s o u l d o e s b e l o n g t o t h e I n v i s i -

b l e , A l w a y s t h e S a m e , a n d D i v i n e , a n d t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e s o u l is i n d i s s o l u b l e ?

T h e f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n a t 8 o b 8 - 1 o - - t h a t t h e s o u l is c o m p l e t e l y i n d i s s o l u b l e o r

s o m e t h i n g n e a r t o t h i s - - h a s b e e n t a k e n b y c o m m e n t a t o r s t o m e a n t h a t P l a t o is

u n s u r e o f h i s c o n c l u s i o n o r t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t

e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e s o u l . ' ~

N o t e t h a t e v e n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , a s q u a l i f i e d a s it is, d o e s n o t f o l l o w i f t h e

a r g u m e n t is a m e r e a n a l o g y . I n a n y c a s e , S o c r a t e s ' c o m p a n i o n s ' r e a c t i o n t o t h e

a r g u m e n t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e y t a k e t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s e r i o u s l y , a n d t h e y t a k e it t o

c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s o u l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . F o r t h i s is t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h e y a t t a c k

( 8 6 a , 8 7 a ) , n o t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e s o u l is almost i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . A n d t o b e s u r e , a c l o s e l o o k a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t S o c r a t e s d o e s n o t s a y t h i s ;

w h a t h e s a y s is t h a t t h e s o u l is completely o r absolutely (~6 ~ a O ( x z m v ) i n d i s s o l u b l e

o r s o m e t h i n g n e a r t o t h i s . " " S o m e t h i n g n e a r t o t h i s " m e a n s "nearly a b s o l u t e l y

i n d i s s o l u b l e , " w h i c h i n t u r n i m p l i e s t h a t s o m e p a r t o f t h e s o u l is i n d i s s o l u b l e

a n d s o m e p a r t is n o t . "

" N e a r l y c o m p l e t e l y i n d i s s o l u b l e " i n w h a t w a y ? P l a t o is n o t a s e x p l i c i t a s o n e

w o u l d l i k e h e r e . B u t it is e v i d e n t t h a t P l a t o t h i n k s o f t h e s o u l a s c o m p o s e d o f

" p a r t s " - - t h e i n t e l l e c t , w h i c h P l a t o s o m e t i m e s c a l l s " t h e s o u l " a n d t h i n k s is

i n c o m p o s i t e , a n d s o m e t h i n g e l s e . ' 3 I f s o u l w e r e n o t c o m p o s e d o f p a r t s , t h e n

t h e w h o l e o f t h e s o u l w o u l d h a v e t o b e t h e i n t e l l e c t . B u t t h i s c a n n o t b e so, f o r

t h e n s o m e o f S o c r a t e s ' s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s o u l w o u l d m e a n t h a t the intellect b e c o m e s v i s i b l e a n d b o d y l i k e w h e n it c o m m u n e s t o o c l o s e l y w i t h b o d -

i e s . T h e n t h e i n t e l l e c t w o u l d b e c o m e c o m p o s e d o f p h y s i c a l p a r t s a n d c o u l d b e

d e s t r u c t i b l e . T h i s c a n n o t b e S o c r a t e s ' m e a n i n g s i n c e i f t r u e it w o u l d r e n d e r

u n s o u n d a l l p r o o f s f o r t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e s o u l .

I n a n y c a s e , w h a t P l a t o s o m e t i m e s m e a n s b y " t h e s o u l " h a s t o b e m o r e t h a n

�9 o E.g., Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo" 75, White, Myth and Metaphysics; cf. Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 14o. �9 ~ Dorter in "Plato's Image of Immortality," 298, fails to note this point. He writes: " . . . and,

finally, it is concluded that the soul is indissoluble or close to it (8oh8)." Cf. Hugh Tredennick's translation in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton University Press, 197 l), 63: "Very well, then, in that case is it not natural for the body to disintegrate rapidly, but for the soul to be quite or very nearly indissoluble?"

" O f course this could also mean that the soul is completely indissoluble except under some conditions, hut I do not see what this could refer to other than that some essential part of the soul is indissoluble and some part is not.

"sContra W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV (Cambridge University Press, 1975), 346-47 and Terence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford, 1989), 235, n. 27. Guthrie writes: � 9 in the Phaedo the psyche is simple and elemental, synonymous with intelligence; and emotions

and desires (66c), as well as sense-perception, are assigned to the body. This is well brought out at 94b, where the resistance of a thirsty man to the impulse to drink is given as an instance of soul opposing body, whereas at Rep. 439 c it exemplifies one element of the soul opposing another." Both Guthrie and Irwin assume that what is part of the soul cannot be physical and vice-versa.

PLATO'S AFFINITY ARGUMENT 15

j u s t t h e intellect, since t h e soul is c a p a b l e o f b el i ev in g t h e a b s u r d m e s s a g e s o f t h e senses ( 8 3 d 5 - 6 ) a n d it c a n be filled with d e s i r e s a n d p l e a s u r e s o f t h e b o d y , all w h e n t h e intellect is p r e s u m a b l y d o r m a n t . T h e view t h a t in t h e Phaedo p l e a s u r e s a n d d e s i r e s f o r e a r t h l y t h i n g s a r e in t h e b o d y - - n o t in t h e s o u l - - i s clearly false, b e c a u s e as 8 3 d 7 m a k e s clear, w h e n t h e soul believes to b e t r u e w h a t t h e b o d y (i.e., senses) says, it is b e c a u s e the soul a g r e e s (61~o6o~e~v) with t h e b o d y a n d delights ('~o~ a6"co~ Xa~Oetv) in t h e s a m e t h in g s t h a t it is f o r c e d to b e c o m e o f a similar h a b i t a n d b r e d t o g e t h e r (606~Qo~t6g ~e xaL 6~t6~Oo(t~og). So t h e soul is t h e seat o f s o m e p l e a s u r e s , a f t e r all, a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e it be- c o m e s "filled w i t h " t h e b o d y ( 8 o d l o ) - - i . e . , this p a r t o f t h e soul r e m a i n s t h e soul, a n d y e t b e c o m e s physical.24

I n this way, S o c r a t e s c a n say t h a t w h e n t h e soul (i.e., intellect) s e p a r a t e s a n d p u r i f i e s itself f r o m the body t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y , h e c a n m e a n in p a r t t h e physical p a r t o f t h e soul w h i c h has b e e n filled with p l e a s u r e s a n d d e s i r e s o f t h e b o d y . Since n o t h i n g is left o f t h e soul b u t w h a t is essential to i t - - t h e i n t e l l e c t - - S o c r a t e s c a n r e f e r to this simply as " t h e soul" at this p o in t . I f so, t h e r e is a c l e a r s e n s e in w h i c h t h e soul is o n l y nearly completely indissoluble, f o r it c a n lose t h e p a r t o f itself w h i c h a t t a c h e s itself to a n d b e c o m e s p a r t o f t h e physical w o r l d .

B u t this follows o n l y if P l a t o is i m p l y i n g t h a t i f t h e soul is m o s t similar to t h e Invisible, N e v e r C h a n g i n g , etc., it m u s t also b e l o n g to this kind. I f so, t h e a r g u m e n t c a n n o t b e m e r e l y o n e f r o m a n a l o g y . It m u s t d e p e n d i n s t e a d u p o n t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e soul b e l o n g s to w h i c h e v e r o f t h e two k in d s o f b e i n g it m o s t closely r e s e m b l e s in t e r m s o f d e f i n i t i v e a t t r i b u t e s .

3" THE SOUL IS MORE SIMILAR TO THE ALWAYS THE SAME THAN TO

THE NOT EVER THE SAME

(a) A W r o n g I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f "Always t h e s a m e " a n d " N e v e r t h e s a m e " T h e p h r a s e s "always t h e s a m e " a n d " n e v e r t h e s a m e " raise p r o b l e m s f o r

S o c r a t e s ' a r g u m e n t . As a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e s f o r t h e Invisible a n d t h e Visible, t h e y o b s c u r e t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e s e two kin d s a r e g e n e r a l l y m e a n t to b e e x c l u - sive. F o r w h a t d o we d o with a n o t h e r possible a l t e r n a t i v e - - t h a t which is s o m e - times t h e s a m e a n d s o m e t i m e s n o t t h e same? S e c o n d l y , h o w c a n t h e soul b e always t h e s a m e a n d y e t "be d r a g g e d by t h e b o d y i n t o t h o s e th i n g s w h i c h a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e " a n d " w a n d e r " a n d "whirl as if i n t o x i c a t e d " ( 7 9 c 6 - 8 ) ? H o w can it p u t aside t h e b o d y a n d c o n t e m p l a t e by itself so as to e n t e r i n to t h e r e a l m o f t h e F o r m s ( 7 9 d l - u ) ? H o w c a n it " s t o p f r o m its w a n d e r i n g " a n d r e m a i n t h e s a m e w h e n it c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e F o r m s i f it is u n c h a n g i n g ( 7 9 d 4 - 5 ) ?

I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e r e a r e a n y satisfactory a n s w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s o n

�9 4 6 7 a 5 ; 8 lc4-d 4 makes the point three times. And at 83d4ff. he compares each pleasure and pain to a rivet which attaches the soul to the body and makes it bodylike.

1 6 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 5 4 : ~ J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6

this u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f " c h a n g e " a n d " t h e s a m e . " F o r e v e n i f S o c r a t e s is t h i n k -

i n g t h a t o n l y t h e intellect n e v e r c h a n g e s , this is c l e a r l y n o t t r u e , since it f o r g e t s

a n d r e m e m b e r s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e F o r m s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n it, a n d it m o v e s

f r o m o n e life in o n e b o d y to a n o t h e r life in a n o t h e r . B u t t h e c o n c l u s i v e

a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t this k i n d o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f " c h a n g e " a n d " t h e s a m e " is

t e x t u a l . A t 7 8 d - e , S o c r a t e s tells us w h a t h e m e a n s b y " t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e . "

Socrates: And what o f the many beautiful things, such as m e n or horses or cloaks, or other such things, or equal things, or any things homonymous with them? Are they the same, or is it completely the opposite, so that they are never the same as themselves or as one a n o t h e r - - i n a word, never the same? Cebes: T h e s e things are so, again: they are never the same.

N o w to b e s u r e , b e a u t i f u l m e n a n d h o r s e s a n d cloaks c a n b e c o m e u g l y a n d

c a n c h a n g e in o t h e r ways as well. B u t this d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e y c h a n g e in

e v e r y w a y so as n e v e r to b e t h e s a m e e i t h e r as t h e m s e l v e s o r as o n e a n o t h e r . F o r S o c r a t e s m a k e s it c l e a r l a t e r t h a t s o m e t h i n g c a n a n d d o e s r e m a i n t h e

s a m e t h r o u g h this s o r t o f c h a n g e w h e n h e says t h a t he, S o c r a t e s , c a n t a k e o n

s h o r t n e s s a n d still r e m a i n t h e s a m e ( 1 o 2 e 4 - 5 ) . A n d w h a t a r e we to m a k e o f t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e s e a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e as o n e a n o t h e r ? T h i s c a n n o t m e a n

t h a t , e.g., b e a u t i f u l m e n c a n n o t all b e b e a u t i f u l at t h e s a m e t i m e , so t h a t w h e n o n e m a n b e c o m e s b e a u t i f u l , a n o t h e r w h o was b e a u t i f u l m u s t n o w b e c o m e ugly.

So S o c r a t e s m u s t h a v e m e a n t b y txtxct[~.~l a t 7 8 d 4 a n d 6s at d 7 s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n change in o u r s e n s e o f q u a l i t a t i v e a l t e r a t i o n o r local m o t i o n .

(b) W h a t P l a t o m u s t m e a n b y " a l w a y s t h e s a m e " a n d " n e v e r t h e s a m e "

I n s t e a d , in s a y i n g t h a t s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e , S o c r a t e s

m u s t b e m a k i n g t h e f a m i l i a r p o i n t h e m a k e s e l s e w h e r e , e.g., at Phaedo 74 a n d Symposium ~ lo, t h a t sensibles w h i c h a r e b e a u t i f u l a r e also u g l y a n d w h i c h a r e e q u a l a r e also u n e q u a l . I n this way, a b e a u t i f u l m a n is n o t t h e s a m e as h i m s e l f

qua b e a u t i f u l , b e c a u s e h e is also u g l y in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h s o m e t h i n g else. T h a t

is, t h e r e is o p p o s i t i o n in h i m b e t w e e n t h e s e two o p p o s i t e s . N o r is h e t h e s a m e

as o t h e r b e a u t i f u l m e n qua b e a u t i f u l , in t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e y also c o n t a i n ugli- n e s s . ~ A c c o r d i n g l y , w h a t is always t h e s a m e is n e v e r F a n d n o t - F .

C i t i n g this p a s s a g e a n d o t h e r s , T e r e n c e I r w i n h a s a c c o r d i n g l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d

f o r us t w o s e n s e s o f " c h a n g e " in G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y : self-change ( s - c h a n g e ) - - l o c a l m o v e m e n t a n d / o r q u a l i t a t i v e a l t e r a t i o n ; a n d aspect-change ( a - c h a n g e ) - - m e r e

,5 Irwin's understanding of this passage is similar to mine. See T. H. Irwin, "Plato's Heracleiteanism," The Philosophical Quarterly 27/1o6 (January, 1977): 3-13.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T ~7

c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e p r o p e r t i e s . ' 6 A l t h o u g h I r w i n f i n d s n o e v i d e n c e t h a t

P l a t o c o u l d clearly d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n s - c h a n g e a n d a - c h a n g e , h e a l s o s e e s n o r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t P l a t o c o n f l a t e d t h e m e i t h e r . S o f a r , t h e n , I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t

P l a t o c a n n o t h a v e i n m i n d s - c h a n g e w h e n h e s p e a k s o f " a l w a y s t h e s a m e " a n d

" n e v e r t h e s a m e . " I f s o , e v e n i f P l a t o h a d n o precise w a y o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g s- c h a n g e a n d a - c h a n g e , i t s e e m s o b v i o u s t h a t h e m u s t h a v e m e a n t t o e x c l u d e a l l a -

c h a n g e f r o m t h e F o r m s , a n d w h e n h e s p o k e h e r e o f t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e

a l w a y s c h a n g i n g , h e m u s t h a v e h a d i n m i n d t h i n g s w h i c h e x h i b i t a - c h a n g e .

I n c o n t r a s t , t h e n , w i t h s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s w e s h o u l d s a y t h a t t h e F o r m s

h a v e a - s a m e n e s s - - t h e y d o n o t a d m i t t h e i r o p p o s i t e s . T h a t is t o s a y , t h e F is

n e v e r n o t - F ( a n d is n e v e r the N o t - F ) . 2 7 W h y s h o u l d c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s , w h e t h e r i n p a r t i c u l a r s , s e n s i b l e

p r o p e r t i e s , o r t y p e s o f p a r t i c u l a r s , b e t e r m e d " c h a n g e " a t a l l ? O n e c a n r e a s o n -

a b l y s a y t h a t S i m m i a s " b e c o m e s " l a r g e w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h S o c r a t e s , a n d t h a t

h e " b e c o m e s " s m a l l w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h P h a e d o , e v e n t h o u g h h e w a s l a r g e r

t h a n t h e o n e a n d s m a l l e r t h a n t h e o t h e r a l l a l o n g . F u r t h e r , a s s u m i n g t h e

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a s e n s i b l e p r o p e r t y l i k e a c e r t a i n c o l o r w i t h b e a u t y , o b j e c t s

w h i c h h a v e t h i s p r o p e r t y w i l l " b e c o m e " b e a u t i f u l o n s o m e c o m p a r i s o n s o r i n

�9 6 Irwin, "Plato's Heracleiteanism," 3 - l 3. Irwin defines "s-changes" as "x s-changes iff at time t I x is F and at time t, x is not-F, and x itself is not in the same condition at t 2 as it was at t, (e.g., at t, it is hot and at t, it has become not-hot, by becoming colder than it was" (4)- He defines "a- changes" as "x a-changes iff x is F in one aspect, not-F in another, and x is in the same condition when it is F and when it is not-F (e.g., x is big in comparison with y, small in comparison with z)" (4). Irwin later extends the definition o f a-change to include compresence o f opposites within different tokens o f the same type (8-9).

�9 T Just what is it that is said to he in flux at 7 8 d - e ? Irwin argues that one o f the many beautifuls will not be a particular man, but a class o f beautiful things (lo), since Plato does not think that every particular (e.g., every particular which has justice o r piety) suffers compresence o f opposites (9). Thus his "sticks and stones" arguments o f Phaedo 74 can only be extended from "equal" to the o t h e r predicates Socrates mentions at 7 5 d - e on the assumption that he is thinking o f types. Consider then the fact that the quality o f being dark-complexioned is sometimes itself beautiful, sometimes not. Thus the class o f dark-complexioned men, under that description, contains both beauty and ugliness (and thus are never the same in relation to themselves). Con- sider also the relationship between this class and another class--the class o f pale-complexioned men. Because in some cases, some members o f the former class are more beautiful than the latter, and in others, more ugly than the latter, the class o f dark-complexioned men is both beautiful and ugly in relation to the class o f pale-complexioned men (and these classes are never the same in relation to each other).

However, this cannot be the whole story. Many particulars do suffer compresence of oppo- sites. This is certainly clear from Plato's own examples o f particular equal sticks and stones at 74 c (which he alludes to again at 78el) and o f particular fingers at Republic 523--25 . Irwin acknowl- edges this in his discussion o f Phaedo i o2 ( ! 1 ), where Simmias is large in relation to Socrates, small in relation to Simmias, and yet is said to become both large and small, i.e., large in one compari- son. small in another. So a-change must occur not just for types o f particulars and their sensible properties, but also in many cases for those particulars as well.

I 8 J O U R N A L O F T H E H 1 S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : 1 JANUARY ~996

s o m e c o n t e x t s , u g l y in o t h e r s . A n d s o t o o f o r t y p e s o f b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t s . 2s

" C h a n g e " i n t h e s e n s e o f a - c h a n g e t h u s is a n e p i s t e m i c t e r m a p p l i e d t o o b j e c t s

a n d k i n d s o f o b j e c t s w h i c h p r o d u c e t h e f o l l o w i n g k i n d o f s - c h a n g e in t h e s o u l :

b e l i e f a t t, t h a t a is ( t h e t y p e o f t h i n g w h i c h is) F, b e l i e f a t t~ t h a t a is ( t h e t y p e o f

t h i n g w h i c h ) is n o t - F .

T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a - c h a n g e a n d s - c h a n g e ( a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g

s e n s e s o f " s a m e n e s s " ) h e l p s u s t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o

k i n d s o f b e i n g . S o m e t h i n g t h a t h a s a - c h a n g e is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is F b u t w h i c h

is a l s o liable t o b e ( o r t o b e t h e s o r t o f t h i n g w h i c h is) n o t - F . T h e s e n s e i n w h i c h

i t / s F d o e s n o t l o g i c a l l y e x c l u d e its a l s o b e i n g n o t - F . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e

F o r m t h e F, w h i c h h a s a - s a m e n e s s , / s F ( o r / s F - n e s s ) i n a s t r o n g e r s e n s e - - o n e

w h i c h e x c l u d e s its b e i n g n o t - F ( o r n o t - F - n e s s ) . I n a d d i t i o n , F o r m s s e e m t o

e x c l u d e o t h e r p a i r s o f c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s as well. T h u s t h e B e a u t i f u l , p r e -

s u m a b l y , w o u l d n o t b e b o t h e q u a l a n d u n e q u a l a t t h e s a m e t i m e . F u r t h e r ,

b e i n g s w h i c h s u f f e r a - c h a n g e h a v e a s o r t o f b e i n g w h i c h m a k e s t h e m a p p e a r t o

c o n f l a t e t h e o p p o s i t e s t h e y h a v e , w h e r e a s b e i n g s w h i c h h a v e a - s a m e n e s s h a v e

a s o r t o f b e i n g w h i c h d o e s n o t d o t h i s . ' 9 T h e o n e k i n d o f b e i n g is t h e k i n d t h a t

s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s h a v e ; t h e l a t t e r k i n d o f b e i n g is t h e s o r t t h a t n o n s e n s i b l e

o b j e c t s , s u c h a s F o r m s , h a v e . S o u n d e r s t o o d , t h e r e is n o a l t e r n a t i v e b e y o n d

w h a t is a l w a y s t h e s a m e a n d w h a t is n e v e r t h e s a m e .

A - c h a n g e is s o m e t h i n g P l a t o t h i n k s is c o n f u s i n g t o t h e soul. I t is n o t t h a t

s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s w h i c h a r e F's a r e b o t h F a n d n o t - F in a c o n t r a d i c t o r y

s e n s e , s i n c e a - c h a n g e d o e s n o t i n v o l v e this, a n d P l a t o k n o w s t h a t s o m e t h i n g

c a n b e F in o n e w a y , n o t - F i n a n o t h e r . S ~ T h e c l e a r e s t p a s s a g e w h i c h i n d i c a t e s

h o w a - c h a n g e is c o n f u s i n g t o t h e s o u l is Republic 5 9 3 - ~ 5 . P e r c e p t i o n c o n - f o u n d s o p p o s i t e s s u c h as h a r d n e s s a n d s o f t n e s s , l a r g e n e s s a n d s m a l l n e s s , t h i c k -

,s See Irwin, "Plato's Heracleiteanism," 5, l o - l i. Cf. Gregory Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato," in his P/aton~ Studies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, 198 ,), 63, where, on the topic of particular F's which are not F's at Republic 479, Vlastos writes: " . their F-nature is adulterated by contrary characters, so that we could only get a confused and uncertain idea of what it is to be F, one that would be subject to constant fluctuations [x,~.Lv6e/'r as we encountered instances of F that turned out to be different in one or more respects from those on which we based our previous conception of it."

,9 See Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality," 58-75, for the classic discussion of these points. However, I cannot agree with his identification of the two kinds of being with logically necessary and logically contingent being. The "is" in "This tree is a plant" seems logically necessary to me (in the sense that it is necessarily true that if this is a tree, it is a plant), but quite clearly a tree is not thereby subject to a-sameness. Nor does the fact that something is necessarily F guarantee that it won't also be not-F: a stick three inches long (qua three inches long) is necessarily larger than one two inches long and necessarily smaller than one which is four inches long.

But perhaps what Vlastos has in mind is a distinction between (a) necessarily unchanging existents and necessary predications of them and (b) changing existents and logically contingent predications of them.

so Republic 436e.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 19

ness and thinness. T h e t h o u g h t o f the soul cannot so conflate these opposites. So the soul must think o f opposites individually and separately,3' i.e., as Forms.

So far, then, Socrates would appear to be speaking as if perception cannot be a source o f knowledge at all. This must be tempered, however, by the fact that he quite clearly calls m e m o r y derived from perception "knowledge" at Phaedo 73c; if so, the soul can derive some knowledge from sense perception.3" This is confirmed by the a r g u m e n t at 74ff. T h e a r g u m e n t does not a t t e m p t to show that a stick is ever not a stick, or a stone not a stone.~3 So presumably perception is capable o f portraying sticks and stones accurately as sticks a n d stones, but it is not capable o f conveying accurately their equality and inequal- ity. Perception all by itself cannot get accurate knowledge o f bodies' opposite propert/es, i.e., when it attempts to do so without the aid o f the intellect, without knowledge o f the Forms. For when the soul relies strictly upon the senses, since the objects o f the senses are both F a n d not-F, the soul cannot know this, because the senses cannot make accurate distinctions between F-ness a n d non- F-ness, F-things and non-F-things.S4

Socrates clearly infers that the soul, insofar as it knows objects which are a- the-same, must itself be a-the-same. How?

(c) Is Socrates Assuming "Like knows like"? David Gallop35 has suggested that in the Affinity A r g u m e n t , Socrates is as-

suming Empedocles' "Like knows like." But "Like knows like" is a vague princi- ple. What does it mean? T h e r e are several sorts o f possibilities, but there are g r o u n d s for rejecting each o f them. (a) In the manner attributed to Empedo- cles,36 if the soul knows x, the soul must be composed o f the same dements that x is composed of. (b) In thespirit o f Empedocles, if the soul knows x, the soul must be

3, I agree with Gall Fine's characterization o f " s e p a r a t i o n " o f the Forms: "A Form F is separate just in case it can exist uninstantiated by F sensible particulars." (See, inter alia, h e r " T h e Object o f T h o u g h t A r g u m e n t : Forms a n d Thoughts," Apeiron [Spring, 1989]: 120, n. ~o.) T h u s to think o f Beauty "separately" is to think o f it as it is all by itself without belonging to a face or a statue or a h u m a n body, or any o t h e r beautiful thing, and to think o f it as free from compresence in the same object or type o f object with its opposite (Symposium 21 la).

3, For a fuller discussion o f this point in the Phaed0 and elsewhere, see Nicholas White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (Indianapolis, 1976), 7 2 - 7 3 .

33 Cf. Plato's explicit statement at Republic 5 z 5 d - e that sight never reports to the soul that a finger is not a finger, as it does that what is small is also large, or that smallness is largeness.

34 On the point that Forms are the basic objects o f knowledge, see Gall Fine, On Ideas (Oxford, t993), 59 a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g note 6x, as well as h e r "Knowledge a n d Belief in Rei0ub//c V," Archly fi~r Geschichte der Philosophic 60 (1978): l ~ 1-39, a n d "Knowledge a n d Belief in Republic V - VII, in S. Evenson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought I: Epistemology (Cambridge, 199o), 8 5 - t 15.

35 Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 14o. Gallop does not develop precisely what this principle is s u p p o s e d to be, however.

3~ Barnes has a r g u e d that even Empedocles did not hold "Like knows like." See his The Presocratic Philosophers, vol. 2 (Roudedge a n d Kegan Paul, 1979), 18o--8L

9 0 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : t J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6

m a d e o f t h e s t u f f ( w h a t e v e r t h a t is) t h a t x is. (c) I f a soul k n o w s x, it m u s t r e s e m -

ble x b y h a v i n g all t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t x has. (d) I f a soul k n o w s x to b e F, t h e n it

m u s t b e F itself; in this w a y it r e s e m b l e s x b y o n l y s h a r i n g t h e p r o p e r t i e s w i t h x t h a t it k n o w s x has. (e) I f a soul k n o w s x, it m u s t h a v e s o m e o f x ' s p r o p e r t i e s itself,

o r h a v e p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h r e s e m b l e a n d r e p r e s e n t s o m e o f x's p r o p e r t i e s . T h e

soul w h i c h k n o w s is like a p a i n t i n g , t h e n , w h i c h m u s t r e s e m b l e t h e o b j e c t it

p o r t r a y s . S o m e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t (e.g., o f a m o u n t a i n ) it s h a r e s - - e . g . ,

c o l o r s a n d s h a p e s . O t h e r p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e m o u n t a i n it c a n o n l y r e p r e s e n t b y

m e a n s o f p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h r e s e m b l e t h e m o u n t a i n ' s in s o m e way ( b e c a u s e a p a i n t i n g is flat a n d c a n o n l y p r o v i d e us with a view f r o m o n e p e r s p e c t i v e ) : t h e

m o u n t a i n ' s size, d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e v i e w e r , its t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y , its s u r f a c e

t e x t u r e . (f) I n t h e m a n n e r o f A r i s t o t l e , i f t h e soul k n o w s x, x ' s f o r m m u s t b e in

t h e soul, so t h a t it w o u l d b e c o r r e c t to say in a s e n s e t h a t x i t s e l f is in t h e soul. T h e soul d o e s n o t b e c o m e a n x in k n o w i n g x b e c a u s e t h e soul is i m m a t e r i a l , w h e r e a s x

is a n x b y h a v i n g its f o r m in its m a t t e r . (g) F o l l o w i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e b y t h e Scholastics ( a n d m o r e r e c e n t l y b y W i l f r e d Sellars) b e t w e e n esse n a t u r a l e a n d esse

intentionale,37 i f t h e soul k n o w s x, t h e soul h a s i n t e n t i o n a l l y all o f x ' s p r o p e r t i e s

w h i c h it k n o w s x to h a v e ; b u t ( a c c o r d i n g to SeUars) t h e basis f o r this is t h a t t h e

s o u l r e a l l y o r n a t u r a l l y h a s at least s o m e o f x ' s p r o p e r t i e s . T h u s , w i t h Sellars, t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s o f x ' s w h i c h t h e soul (Sellars says " m i n d " ) r e a l l y h a s " p i c t u r e "

o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s o f x ' s w h i c h t h e soul d o e s n o t really s h a r e with x.

N o w (a) is c l e a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e , since P l a t o c l e a r l y d o e s n o t wish to t h i n k

o f e i t h e r t h e soul o r t h e F o r m s as b e i n g c o m p o s e d o f e a r t h , fire, w a t e r , a n d

air. (b) m i g h t b e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e , b u t w h y s h o u l d Plato a s s u m e it, u n l e s s (b) is b a s e d u p o n o n e o r m o r e o f ( c ) - ( g ) ? (c) a n d (d) a r e in e v e n w o r s e s h a p e , since

a c c o r d i n g t o (c) ( a n d a c c o r d i n g t o (d)), w h e n t h e s o u l ' s k n o w l e d g e o f x is c o m p l e t e , t h e soul b e c o m e s x in k n o w i n g it. T h u s i f t h e soul k n o w s a n o m e l e t ,

t h e B e a u t i f u l , W i l f r e d Sellars, t h e O s c a r M e y e r W i e n e r S l o g a n , etc., it b e -

c o m e s all o f t h e s e t h i n g s . A n d t h e soul is s u p p o s e d to k n o w t h o r o u g h l y b o t h t h e B e a u t i f u l a n d t h e U g l y a n d all s o r t s o f o t h e r o p p o s i t e F o r m s . H o w c o u l d

P l a t o a v o i d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e soul is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m a n y p a i r s o f F o r m s

o p p o s i t e o n e a n o t h e r ?

s7 The Scholastics made this distinction as one between material and intentional or immaterial possession of attributes. If x possesses all the properties of a horse materially, it is a horse. If x possesses the same properties intentionally, it is a soul knowing the horse (without becoming one itself). In this way, if the soul knows the Forms, it can have all their properties without becoming them. For an account of this in Aquinas, see Herbert McCabe, "The Immortality of the Soul," in A. Kenny, ed. Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Doubleday, 1969), 297-3o6.

For a contemporary defense of a version of "Like knows like" (or "isomorphism of the intellect and the real") and of a distinction between the way an object x is F and the mind which knows that x is F would itself be F, see Wilfred Sellars, "Being and Being Known," ch. ~ in Science, Perception and Reality (Humanities Press, 1963), 41-59.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T "~1

T h i s leaves (e), (f), a n d (g) as c o n t e n d e r s . B u t w h e r e a s s o m e o f t h e s e m a y be m o r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y plausible, t h e t e x t u a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e m is n o n e x i s t e n t . T h e Phaedo c o n t a i n s n o m e n t i o n o r discussion o f a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n esse intentionale a n d esse naturale. O n e seeks in vain f o r m e n t i o n in t h e Phaedo o f a p r o p e r t y in t h e soul r e p r e s e n t i n g a n o t h e r in a n object. A n d t h e r e is a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n as to w h e t h e r (e) m a k e s sense. F o r it c a n n o t e x p l a i n h o w t h e soul c o u l d h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f p r o p e r t i e s which a r e n o t in it. It seems t h a t f o r s o m e p r o p e r t y to r e p r e s e n t a n o t h e r o n e , at t h e v e r y least t h e id ea o f t h e p r o p e r t y r e p r e s e n t e d m u s t exist in t h e soul. A n d t h a t i d ea o f it e i t h e r consists o f t h e p r o p e r t y itself o r s o m e o t h e r p r o p e r t y r e p r e s e n t i n g it. T h e l a t t e r possibility o n l y leads to an infinite r e g r e s s unless we assert t h a t at s o m e p o i n t t h e id ea is t h e v e r y p r o p e r t y it r e p r e s e n t s . B u t t h e n i f to h a v e a n idea o f F-ness is f o r t h e soul to be F, t h e n i f B-ness which is in t h e soul r e p r e s e n t s F-hess to the soul, F- ness m u s t be in t h e soul as well, since t h e id ea o f F-ness m u s t b e p r e s e n t . A n d t h e n t h e r e c a n b e n o s u c h s i t u a t i o n as t h a t o f B-ness, a p r o p e r t y in t h e soul which r e p r e s e n t s F-ness which is n o t in t h e soul. It follows t h a t f o r a n y p r o p - e r t y F, i f t h e soul k n o w s it, t h e soul is still F, a n d (e) collapses i n t o (d).

At Phaedo 73 d, S o c r a t e s d o e s say t h a t w h e n a m a n sees his lo v er's ly re, h e "takes i n t o t h o u g h t t h e f o r m [e~6og] o f t h e b o y w h o s e ly re it is." At first sight, this looks like (f). A c l o s e r look, h o w e v e r , shows t h a t t h e c o n t e x t is r a t h e r casual. S o c r a t e s d o e s n o t s p e n d t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d to e x p l a i n a n y t h i n g like Aristotle's t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e p o i n t is simply t h a t o n e m a y b e re- m i n d e d o f o n e o b j e c t by s e e i n g an object dissimilar to it. T h e w o r d ' f o r m ' , a c c o r d i n g l y , m o s t p r o b a b l y has its o r d i n a r y n o n t e c h n i c a l sen se o f 'b o d ily

f o r m , s h a p e ' . A n d f o r S o c r a t e s to say t h a t t h e l o v e r "takes i n t o t h o u g h t t h e s h a p e o f t h e b o y w h o s e lyre it is" n e e d m e a n n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h a t t h e l o v e r t h i n k s a b o u t t h e b o y w h o s e lyre it is. T h e r e is n o h i n t o f a f o r m / m a t t e r d i s t i n c t i o n , n o r o f t h e p e c u l i a r use Aristotl e p u t s it to.

Sellars's o w n t h e o r y is a s o p h i s t i c a t e d r e a c t i o n to Ari sto t l e a n d t h e Scholas- tics. I f it is a n a c h r o n i s t i c to t r y to r e a d t h e i r positions i n to t h e Phaedo, it m u s t be e v e n m o r e a n a c h r o n i s t i c to t r y to i n t e r p r e t t h e Phaedo in t e r m s o f (g).

I t h u s t h i n k it is a m i s t a k e to say with G a l l o p t h a t S o crates is a s s u m i n g " L i k e k n o w s like" in this a r g u m e n t . I will try to sh o w n e x t t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t w o r k s j u s t fine w i t h o u t s u c h a n a s s u m p t i o n , n o m a t t e r h o w o n e tries to state t h e a s s u m p t i o n precisely.

(d) H o w t h e Soul is Similar to t h e Always t h e S a m e a n d Dissimilar to t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e

I n fact, S o c r a t e s n e v e r says t h a t like kn o ws like. W h a t h e d o e s say is t h a t it is u n l a w f u l f o r a n y b u t t h e p u r e to g r a s p t h e P u r e (67b2). T h e soul c o m e s to b e " d r a g g e d by t h e b o d y i n t o t h o s e thin g s wh i ch a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e " a n d

22 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 34:~ JANUARY ~ 9 9 6

" w a n d e r " a n d "whirl as if i n t o x i c a t e d " w h e n it relies u p o n p e r c e p t i o n to p r o - vide it k n o w l e d g e o f t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e (79c). B u t w h e n it stops its w a n d e r i n g

a n d c o n t e m p l a t e s all by itself, it "stays t h e s a m e " i n s o f a r as it g r a s p s t h e P u r e , Always B e i n g , I m m o r t a l , a n d Always t h e Same3S ( 7 9 c - d ) . T h e c o n t r a s t h e r e is in t h e way t h e soul is said to " g r a s p " its objects. Q u i t e clearly, this g r a s p o f t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e is t h r o u g h p e r c e p t i o n , w h e r e a s t h e g r a s p o f t h e Always t h e S a m e is s u p p o s e d to b e t h o u g h t o r k n o w l e d g e . In s o m e way, k n o w l e d g e o f F o r m s n e v e r i n t r o d u c e s t h e c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s , w h e r e a s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e Always C h a n g i n g does, b u t perception o f t h e Always C h a n g i n g d o e s n o t . B u t h o w ?

A n i m p o r t a n t clue, I t h i n k , is t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m s " p u r e " ( •

"always b e i n g , " a n d " t h e s a m e " at 79d~. T h a t t h e soul "stays the s a m e " i n s o f a r as it g r a s p s t h e P u r e r e m i n d s us t h a t Plato's use o f t h e t e r m " p u r e " (e0.txQtvf~gsg) as

a p p l i e d to t h o u g h t at 6 6 a is a p p a r e n t l y parallel to his a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s a m e t e r m to F o r m s . O p p o s i t e F o r m s a r e " p u r e " in t h a t n e i t h e r s h a r e s in its o p p o - site's c h a r a c t e r . T h i s m i g h t s u g g e s t t h a t t h o u g h t s with c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n t e n t s m i g h t also b e also be c o n s i d e r e d o p p o s i t e s . A t h o u g h t w o u l d b e p u r e , t h e n ,

b e c a u s e it c o u l d n o t h a v e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e t h o u g h t o p p o s i t e it. T h i s c o n n e c t s u p with t h e soul r e m a i n i n g t h e same i n s o f a r as it g r a s p s

Always B e i n g . &e~ 6v at 79d~ is a p p a r e n t l y a s y n o n y m o f xa0ct~x~v. F o r w h e n t h e soul g r a s p s a F o r m , which is j u s t w h a t it is a n d n e v e r its o p p o s i t e , t h e t h o u g h t t h a t g r a s p s it resists c o m p r e s e n c e with t h e t h o u g h t o p p o s i t e to it, t h a t t h e F o r m is o r c a n b e its o p p o s i t e .

B u t t h e l a t e r Republic 524 m a k e s c l e a r w h a t was implicit e a r l i e r : t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g as soft a n d h a r d , t h o u g h possible, involves o p p o s i - tion, so t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f h a r d n e s s is " f o r c e d " to take as its o b j e c t softness also. T h o u g h t , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , has g r e a t e r clarity, a n d t h u s m u s t distin-

g u i s h h a r d n e s s a n d softness as s e p a r a t e a n d distinct (594c5). T h u s a t h o u g h t t h a t s o m e t h i n g is h a r d n e s s c o u l d n o t be a t h o u g h t t h a t s o m e t h i n g is also softness.

I f c e r t a i n acts o f t h o u g h t o r k n o w l e d g e a r e opposites to o n e a n o t h e r , a n d c o u l d c o u n t as a - c h a n g e if t h e y a r e c o m p r e s e n t in t h e s a m e soul, b u t a r e n o t o r n e e d n o t b e c o m p r e s e n t , t h e n t h e soul will be a - t h e - s a m e , j u s t as F o r m s

s8 TotoOz~w in ~iTe ~otoOzo~ ~ 0 o a r t o ~ at 79d6 refers back to txe[va r xaz~ m~T~ at 79d5 which in turn refers back to r6 x a 0 a ~ v re xct~ ~ 6v • tt0~tvarov xct~ r ~Xov at 79d~, so in effect Socrates is claiming that the soul remains the same insofar as it grasps the Pure, Always Being, Immortal, and Always the Same.

~9 eO.txQtv~g at 65e6 is of course a synonym of xct0a~x%, at 65e, as it even more clearly is at 67ba-~, where both terms are applied to the Forms interchangeably. Cf. the use of these terms with r at Symposium 2~le, which makes clear that something is pure if it is free from opposites.

PLATO'S AFFINITY ARGUMENT 2 3

w h i c h resist t h e i r o w n o p p o s i t e s a r e a - t h e - s a m e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f c e r - tain p e r c e p t i o n s a r e o p p o s i t e to o n e a n o t h e r , a n d n e e d to b e c o m p r e s e n t in t h e s a m e subject, p e r c e p t i o n i n t r o d u c e s a - c h a n g e to w h a t e v e r su b ject is d o - ing t h e p e r c e i v i n g .

W h a t sorts o f acts o f t h o u g h t , k n o w l e d g e , o r p e r c e p t i o n , t h o u g h ? F re- q u e n t l y it is t h e case t h a t Plato is p r e o c c u p i e d with a n s w e r s to t h e q u e s t i o n " W h a t is (the) F?" C l e a r l y h e is h e r e , f o r h e has j u s t a r g u e d f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f F o r m s as p r o v i d i n g t h e o n l y a d e q u a t e a n s w e r to this question.4~ A c c o r d i n g l y , I s u g g e s t t h a t Plato is viewing t h i n k i n g - t h a t - s o m e - x - i s - F - n e s s a n d t h i n k i n g - t h a t -

x-is-Not-F-ness as t h e m s e l v e s opposites. A n d p e r c e i v i n g - t h a t - x - i s - F - n e s s is t h e o p p o s i t e to p e r c e i v i n g - t h a t - x - i s - N o t - F - n e s s . N o w it is impossible f o r t h e soul to t h i n k t h a t s o m e x is F-ness a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e t h i n k t h a t x is No t-F -n ess, f o r this a m o u n t s to its t h i n k i n g a n o b v i o u s i m p o s s i b i l i t y - - t h a t F-ness is N o t - F - ness. I f so, t h e soul m u s t be distinct f r o m t h e senses, wh i ch d o t o l e r a t e t h e

c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s , since t h e senses d o p e r c e i v e t h e s a m e x as F-ness a n d N o t - F - n e s s . T h a t is, t h e y d o c o n f l a t e c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s .

T h e p o i n t m a y be m a d e w i t h o u t a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e a r e F o r m s . T a k e a n y p r o p o s i t i o n p a n d its c o n t r a d i c t o r y , not-p. T h e t h o u g h t (belief) thatp is n o t t h e contradictory o f t h e t h o u g h t (belief) that not-p, p a r t l y b e c a u s e it is logically possible f o r s o m e o n e n o t to t h i n k o r believe e i t h e r o n e b y n o t t h i n k i n g o r b e l i e v i n g a b o u t t h e i r subject m a t t e r at all, a n d p a r t l y b e c a u s e p e o p l e can a n d d o h o l d i n c o n s i s t e n t beliefs, s o m e t i m e s e v e n consciously. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e intellect g e n e r a l l y feels c o m p e l l e d to reject t h e t h o u g h t that notop i f it is c e r t a i n o f p, a n d vice-versa, w h e n it is a w a r e o f t h e inconsistency. I f t h e t h o u g h t that p is a n o p p o s i t e o f t h e t h o u g h t that not-p, t h e n t h e intellect's n a t u r e m u s t b e v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f a n y physical b o d y . F o r o p p o s i t e s in physical b o d i e s ( o r in k i n d s o f physical bodies, as t h e case m a y be) b e h a v e d i f f e r e n t l y - - t h e y a r e c o m p r e s e n t unless t h e y a r e o p p o s i t e to t h e p o i n t o f b e i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y .

A n o t h e r way o f p u t t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e is, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e soul ( t h a t is, t h e intellect) is rational; it f u n c t i o n s in a c c o r d a n c e with reason. Physical b o d i e s d o n o t h a v e this c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , n o r c a n they. F o r i f t h e soul w e r e a physical b o d y , t h e o p p o s i t e s in it would b e h a v e t h e way t h e y d o in o t h e r physical b o d i e s - - t h e y w o u l d necessarily be compresent.41 A n d it w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e soul to r e j e c t t h e b e l i e f that not-p if it h e l d that p, o r vice-versa. F o r t h e

4~ Phaedo 74a, where he in effect is asking "What is (the) equal?" 4~ Admittedly, this is necessity in a loose and hypothetical sense. For example, because sticks a

and b are both two inches long, a is equal to b, but this necessarily implies that a is unequal to c,/fc is three inches long. Helen's degree of beauty makes Xanthippe ugly in comparison, but on the other hand it necessarily makes Helen ugly in comparison with Aphrodite, given the degree of beauty Aphrodite enjoys. However, I do not think that this affects the argument.

9 4 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : ~ JANUARY 1 9 9 6

b e l i e f that p a n d t h e b e l i e f that not-p w o u l d b e identical to s o m e o p p o s i t e s in a physical object, t h e b r a i n , a n d t h e s e w o u l d be necessarily c o m p r e s e n t .

So to t h e d e g r e e t h e soul believes t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t messages t h e senses give it, t h e soul will still b e a r a r e s e m b l a n c e to physical bodies, since it will s u f f e r a- c h a n g e as d o they. In e a r l i e r passages in t h e Phaedo, S o crates m a k e s t h e s a m e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n e m o t i o n s a n d d e s i r e s o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d t h o u g h t a n d k n o w l e d g e o n t h e o t h e r . E m o t i o n s a n d desi res c o m e f r o m a n d b e l o n g to t h e b o d y . T h e b o d y fills us with "loves a n d desi res a n d f e a r s a n d all sorts o f fancies a n d n o n s e n s e " ( 6 6 c ~ - 4 ) , which p r e v e n t us f r o m t h o u g h t ( 6 6 c 4 - 5 ) a n d at t ai n - i n g t h e t r u t h ( 6 6 b c - 7 ) . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r is s u p p o s e d to dissociate h i m s e l f f r o m t h e b o d y as m u c h as possible b e c a u s e c o m m u n i n g with it fills us with its n a t u r e (67a5). Plato d o e s n o t m a k e c l e a r wh y h e believes all o f this, b u t p e r - h a p s w h a t h e has in m i n d is t h e idea t h a t e m o t i o n s a n d d esi res a r e similar to p e r c e p t i o n s in t h a t t h e y c o n f l a t e o p p o s i t e s . I f a g o l d o r n a m e n t which is b e a u t i -

f u l in o n e way b u t ugly in a n o t h e r is t h e object o f d e s i r e , o n e in e f f e c t d e s i r e s its b e a u t y and its ugliness, since its ugliness c o m e s r i g h t a l o n g with its b e a u t y . T h e soul w h i c h seeks b e a u t y o r s e c u r i t y o r h a p p i n e s s in t h e s e objects will inevitably be f r u s t r a t e d a n d c o n f u s e d , since t h e y all s u f f e r a - c h a n g e in v a r i o u s ways. A n d as t h e objects o f t h e senses c o n f u s e o p p o s i t e s , so d o t h e s e s a m e objects if t h e y a r e objects o f desire. I n b o t h cases, t h e n , t h e soul takes o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e b o d y . It c a n take o n a - c h a n g e if it takes o n t h e d e s i r e s o f t h e b o d y , which inevitably c o n f l a t e o p p o s i t e s j u s t as its objects a n d t h e p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h o s e objects do.

So, o n t h e o n e h a n d , S o c r a t e s a p p e a r s to imp ly t h a t t h e soul c a n b e subject to a - c h a n g e , a n d can take o n s o m e o f t h e traits o f physical bodies. A n d yet o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , since it really is t h e n a t u r e o f t h e soul to be r a t i o n a l a n d to m a k e logically c o n s i s t e n t j u d g m e n t s , it follows t h a t it is by n a t u r e n o n p h y s i c a l . H o w d o we r e c o n c i l e t h e s e a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y positions?

I a r g u e d a b o v e t h a t Plato m u s t h a v e b e e n t h i n k i n g o f t h e soul as c o m p o s e d o f distinct " p a r t s . " F u r t h e r , t h e fact t h a t t h e soul is r a t i o n a l a n d t h a t it c a n d i s e n t a n g l e itself f r o m i n c o n s i s t e n t beliefs c o n s t i t u t i n g a - c h a n g e m e a n s t h a t t h e r e m u s t be s o m e t h i n g m o r e to it t h a n j u s t t h o s e o p p o s i n g o p i n i o n s a n d beliefs. T h e r e has to be a r a t i o n a l aspect o r " p a r t " o r capacity o f it wh ich in itself d o e s n o t s u f f e r a - c h a n g e o f this s o r t 4 ~ - - t h e "pure r e a s o n " o f 6 6 a w h i c h "seeks to h u n t d o w n e a c h o f t h o s e t h i n g s which are, j u s t by itself a n d p u r e . "

4, Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo," 79, claims that if we take Socrates literally here, there is no solution as to how the soul could be visible and invisible at the same time, and he must be speaking metaphorically here. But this does not follow if part of the soul is visible, i.e., the part having to do with desires for physical objects. Otherwise one would have to argue equally that Aristotle's view of the soul must be taken metaphorically, since presumably the intellect on his view is invisible, whereas the sensible and vegetative souls are visible.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T ~ 5

Reason is "pure," presumably, in that it will not entertain contraries (i.e., c o n t r a r y thoughts o r j u d g m e n t s ) . So even when I entertain inconsistent be- liefs, the " p u r e " aspect o f the soul opposes this if conscious o f it. But this passage also connects reason's purity with dissociation f r o m the senses. This " p u r e reason," u n d o u b t e d l y , is identical to the soul which "all by itself" con- templates the world o f the Forms, stripped o f its worldly attachments by philosophy.

H o w is it that the intellect would not suffer a-change in this way? Plato does not spell this o u t explicitly, b u t let us consider several d i f f e r e n t kinds o f situation which he at least distinguishes: (a) the soul believes the messages the senses give i t - - t h a t physical bodies are true r e a l i t y - - a n d fails to recognize the Forms (cf. 81b); (b) the soul comes to recognize the p h e n o m e n o n o f a-change in physical bodies a n d is c o n f u s e d by the conflicting j u d g m e n t s that the senses give it (79c); (c) the soul comes to recognize the existence o f the Forms a n d distinguishes t h e m f r o m objects o f the senses which participate in them (79d).

Now case (c) is no problem, for here reason makes no contradictory j u d g - ments. But (a) is no p r o b l e m either, since reason has not been a w a k e n e d to make any j u d g m e n t s , including contradictory ones. (b) is the situation in which the soul is j u s t at the point o f being confused by the presence o f o p p o - sites in objects o f the senses. Clearly reason has been awakened at this point; b u t h e r e it calls on the soul to recognize the contradictions in the messages that the senses are giving it. So h e r e the intellect does not s u f f e r a-change either.

But what a b o u t a n o t h e r kind o f situation? Reason clearly is operative in people who d o not recognize the Forms. People hold beliefs on the basis o f reason, b u t some o f these beliefs have hidden contradictions which these people d o not see. Plato does not consider this kind o f situation, b u t quite possibly he could d e n y that a part o f the soul which could entertain such beliefs could be immortal. In the end, it is perhaps only the part o f the soul which has knowledge o f the Forms that is free f r o m a-change and hence is eternal. (In the end, then, the kind o f immortality he offers is impersonal at best.)

Why assume that all a-change pertaining to the soul comes in the f o r m o f contradictory beliefs? Why could the soul not suffer a-change by having c o m p r e s e n t nonpsychological opposites? Again Plato does not make this clear, b u t p e r h a p s what he would claim is that since the soul is not an object o f the senses, and no o t h e r opposites could be present in the soul besides psychologi- cal ones a n d physical ones which can be objects o f the senses, the only o p p o - sites which could be present in the soul are psychological ones.

O n e might a r g u e quite plausibly, too, that Plato believed that something suffers the kind o f a-change he is concerned with here if and only if it is sensible. For Plato is c o n c e r n e d with the kind o f a-change which consists o f

2 6 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 4 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 6

c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s in o n e p a r t i c u l a r - - t h e i n d i v i d u a l soul. ( L e t u s call this

" t o k e n - a - c h a n g e . " ) S e n s i b l e o b j e c t s w o u l d h a v e a t least s o m e , i f n o t all o f t h e

f o l l o w i n g : p h y s i c a l size, s h a p e , l o c a t i o n , o r i n t e n s i t y in a t least s o m e s e n s e s a n d

t h e s e f e a t u r e s m a k e e a c h o f t h e m e q u a l a n d u n e q u a l t o o t h e r p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s in v a r i o u s ways. Physical size, a t least, w o u l d m a k e e a c h g r e a t e r in size t h a n

s o m e , l e s s e r in size t h a n o t h e r s . A n d p r e s u m a b l y all c o u l d b e j u d g e d to b e

b e n e f i c i a l a n d n o t b e n e f i c i a l o r b e a u t i f u l a n d n o t b e a u t i f u l in v a r i o u s d e g r e e s .

T h u s w h a t e v e r is s e n s i b l e s u f f e r s f r o m t o k e n - a - c h a n g e .

F u r t h e r , w h a t e v e r s u f f e r s f r o m t o k e n - a - c h a n g e is sensible. W h y ? T h e e x -

h a u s t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is p e r c e i v a b l e t h r o u g h t h e s e n s e s a n d w h a t

c a n b e t h o u g h t p e r h a p s p l a y s a r o l e in Plato's t h i n k i n g here;4S w h a t is p e r c e i v -

a b l e d o e s s e e m to h a v e c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s in it, b u t w h a t is n o t p e r c e i v a b l e

c a n o n l y b e k n o w n t h r o u g h t h o u g h t , a n d w h a t c a n b e k n o w n t h r o u g h t h o u g h t

a l o n e c a n n o t h a v e c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s in it. ( I t is f o r this r e a s o n t h a t it is

u n t h i n k a b l e t h a t t h e F i t s e l f s h o u l d b e not-F.) So i f s o m e t h i n g h a s a - c h a n g e in it, it c a n n o t b e accessible t h r o u g h t h o u g h t a l o n e m t h e o n l y access t o it w o u l d b e t h r o u g h t h e senses.

B u t s o m e t h i n g c a n s u f f e r a - c h a n g e in t h e s e n s e t h a t it b e l o n g s to a t y p e in w h i c h s o m e t o k e n s h a v e o n e o p p o s i t e a n d o t h e r t o k e n s h a v e t h e o t h e r . ( L e t u s call this " t y p e - a - c h a n g e . " ) Since s o m e souls b e l i e v e t h a t t h e B e a u t i f u l is b e a u t y

a n d o t h e r s b e l i e v e ( m i s t a k e n l y , o f c o u r s e ) t h a t c o l o r s a n d s h a p e s a n d t o n e s o f c e r t a i n t h i n g s a r e b e a u t y , all souls, i n c l u d i n g t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s , w o u l d s u f f e r

this s o r t o f a - c h a n g e . E v i d e n t l y , i f P l a t o n o t i c e d a n y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t y p e - a -

c h a n g e a n d t o k e n - a - c h a n g e , this d i d n o t b o t h e r h i m a t all. F o r it s e e m s o d d t h a t

t h e b e l i e f s in s o m e o n e else's soul w o u l d d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s s o u l is s e n s i b l e o r i n s e n s i b l e ( o r p h y s i c a l o r n o n - p h y s i c a l ) to a n y degree.44

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e m a y t h i n k o f e x a m p l e s o f t y p e - a - c h a n g e w h i c h a r e

n o t sensible: a d a p t i n g Republic 3 3 i c - d a n d 5 3 8 d 6 - e 3 s o m e w h a t , a type o f a c t i o n , s u c h as r e t u r n i n g w h a t y o u h a v e b o r r o w e d , m i g h t b e j u s t in s o m e k i n d s

o f i n s t a n c e s , u n j u s t in o t h e r s . T h e s e k i n d s o f i n s t a n c e s o f a c t i o n s a r e n o t s e n s i b l e (only a c t i o n - t o k e n s a r e ) , y e t t h e y m a y s u f f e r t y p e - a - c h a n g e .

So a s t r o n g c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n sensibility a n d t o k e n - a - c h a n g e w o u l d s e e m

43 One sees this dichotomy clearly in the Affinity Argument itself at 8obl ft., where Socrates identifies the Divine and Immortal and the Always the Same, etc., with the Thinkable, and the Human and Mortal and Never the Same with the Unthinkable (i.e., Visible or Sensible). Cf. Phatdo 65d-66a, and 74a-d for this same opposition between perception and thought.

44 That the soul's purity from the bodily nature would be dependent upon the beliefs of other souls is an idea strange to the Phaedo--I can find no evidence of it at all. In fact. Socrates is clear at 79dff. that it is the individual soul, independently of others, which puts aside a-change and remains the same when it contemplates the Forms all by itself. Further, the mythic account of the afterlife from 81ft. flatly contradicts the idea that all souls would have to be philosophical in order for any one of them to be free of the body upon death.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 2 7

to exist, whereas one between sensibility and type-a-change would not. I will accordingly suppose that type-a-change raises no difficulty for Plato's account o f the soul.

I f this is an accurate account o f why Plato apparently saw the connection between sensibility a n d token-a-change, we have an explanation for why the soul would have to be visible if it irrationally attached itself to objects o f the senses a n d why freeing itself from token-a-change (inconsistent beliefs) would make it invisible.

4 " T H E S O U L A N D D I V I N I T Y

In some ways, the last section o f the a r g u m e n t seems to be the weakest part. Why should the fact (if it is a fact) that the soul rules and c o m m a n d s the body entail that the soul is d i f f e r e n t from the body to such a degree as to be "like the divine"? And what bearing does this have on the soul's immortality? One conjures up the familiar image o f one's soul willing to raise one's a r m a n d the arm's obeying. But the soul also is affected by and obeys the body. How can Plato ignore this last bit o f c o m m o n knowledge?

We might start by trying to decide what "divine" means. Hackforth thinks that "divine" is virtually synonymous with "immortal," since it is contrasted with "mortal."45 But if "divine" means "immortal," the objection at 95 c that the soul might not be immortal even t h o u g h it is "strong" and "divine in form" and preexisted birth would not make any selase. So the term "the divine" must mean something o t h e r than this. Just a few lines later, at 8 o b l - 6 , Socrates refers to the divine along with the immortal and thinkable and u n i f o r m and indissoluble a n d always the same, in contrast with the h u m a n and mortal and m u l t i f o r m a n d unthinkable a n d dissolute a n d never the same. T h e contrast here is apparently between the Forms and the physical world. So this passage makes it look as if "the Divine" refers to the Forms, and is roughly equivalent, at least, to the Invisible. This is f u r t h e r corroborated by 81a4-5, where Socra- tes explains how the good soul after death is attracted to its like, the Unseen, which is also the divine and immortal and wise (~06vqaov).

An i m p o r t a n t clue to the meaning Plato attaches to the term appears later at 9 4 d 4 - e 6 . Socrates argues here that the soul is much more o f a divine thing (~ok~ 0etox~Qo~ xtvbg 7tQdtyl~Ctxog) than something in harmony. T h e similarity in language with this a r g u m e n t and the one we are considering now is strik- ing. T h e soul is capable o f " l e a d i n g " (/13,etxovev6voet; cf. 8oa4) the things out o f which the harmony-theorist says it is made; it is also said to lead a n d make itself master (6eo~t6~eLv; cf. 8oa2) o f all habits (~tdwctg "c06~ag ), and to rule (6Q;teLv; cf. 8oa~) all things that are in the human. T h e basic point is that

4s R. Hackforth, Plato's "Phaedo" (Cambridge, 1955), 85.

2 8 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 34: ~ . J A N U A R Y ~996

" w h e n o n e has a fever, t h e soul d r a g s o n e against thirst to n o t d r i n k , a n d w h e n o n e is h u n g r y to n o t eat" ( 9 4 b 7 - 1 o ) ; it opposes the u r g e s o f the b o d y , " h o l d - i n g in c h e c k s o m e with m o r e difficulty a n d with pain, o t h e r s f o r athletic a n d m e d i c i n a l reasons, still o t h e r s m o r e gently, c h o o s i n g s o m e things, chastising o t h e r s , d i s c o u r s i n g as o n e to a n o t h e r with the desires a n d passions a n d fears" ( 9 4 d 2 - 6 ) . T o say, t h e n , t h a t t h e soul is like the divine is to say t h a t it is s t r o n g a n d it p r e e x i s t e d b i r t h (95c5-6).46 T h e idea, t h e n , is t h a t in itself, t h e soul is rational, it is s o m e t h i n g t h a t is t e m p e r a t e , a n d which o v e r r i d e s a n d discon- nects itself f r o m t h e desires o f t h e body.

T h e p r o b l e m o f t h e f r e e d o m o f the will r e m a i n e d to be first f o r m u l a t e d well a f t e r Plato w r o t e this, b u t his w o r d s are strongly r e m i n i s c e n t o f c o n t e m p o - r a r y d e f e n s e s o f t h e f r e e d o m o f the will in the face o f e v i d e n c e t h a t m e n t a l events a r e largely physically caused.47 I f so, we m a y p e r h a p s p u t his p o i n t this way: t h e soul is t h e u l t i m a t e s o u r c e o f free h u m a n action.

T h u s in these cases t h e soul by its n a t u r e rules a n d is n o t r u l e d . I n s o m e way, this is s u p p o s e d to be t h e way in which it parallels the Divine a n d t h e I m m o r t a l , w h e r e a s t h e b o d y is r u l e d , a n d in this way it parallels t h e Mortal. T h e key q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n s t h e m a t t e r in which t h e F o r m s m a y be said to " r u l e " o r " d i r e c t " t h o s e things which p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e m . P e r h a p s Plato is t h i n k i n g t h a t t h e F o r m s d o this in the sense t h a t t h e y d e t e r m i n e t h e n a t u r e o f t h o s e t h i n g s which p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e m , w h e r e a s t h e i r p a r t i c i p a n t s d o n o t d e t e r m i n e the n a t u r e o f t h e F o r m s in a n y way. T h u s t h e F o r m s p r o v i d e t h e u l t i m a t e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r c e r t a i n facts a b o u t t h e being o f t h e i r participants, e.g., t h e i r being e q u a l a n d u n e q u a l , large a n d small, b e a u t i f u l a n d ugly, etc.

I n a sense, it is also possible to t h i n k o f the F o r m s as d o i n g m o r e t h a n j u s t this. Sensible objects c a n n o t be w h a t t h e y are w i t h o u t b e i n g e q u a l a n d u n - equal, large a n d small, thick a n d thin, b e a u t i f u l a n d u g l y in s o m e way a n d in s o m e d e g r e e . H o w c o u l d a stick have a n y o f the o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s which sticks have i f it c o u l d n o t be e q u a l to o t h e r sticks a n d u n e q u a l to still o t h e r s ? H o w c o u l d it be a stick i f it was n o t large in c o m p a r i s o n with s o m e things, small in c o m p a r i s o n with o t h e r s ? I f so, Plato m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t sensible objects like sticks are totally d e p e n d e n t f o r w h a t t h e y are u p o n t h e F o r m s , e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e are n o F o r m s f o r sticks per se.

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , the soul can freely a n d rationally choose to s h a r e in o n e o p p o s i t e w i t h o u t s h a r i n g in t h e o t h e r w h e n t h o s e opposites are c o n t r a d i c - tory beliefs. T h e soul is i n d e p e n d e n t o f the physical a n d so its f r e e bodily

,6,,... tox.tgrv xr toxw fi ~uXfi xctl OEoE~b~ xctl ~ tt~ n ~ t t x r v , ~Qiv ~l~et~ ~v0~bnou~ y~v~o0aL..."; taking both instances of "xa;" to be explicative.

47I have in mind in particular C. A. Campbell's famous article, "Is Freewill a Pseudo- Problem?" Mind LX/~39 (July, 1950: 450-64.

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 9 9

actions are never determined by anything physical. So the point that Plato is underscoring here by referring to his two kinds as "divine" and "mortal" would seem to be that the former has the sort o f being which is independent o f the latter, whereas the latter is dependent upon the former, lfwe accept his account o f the soul as the ultimate cause and explanation o f free human actions (and it is also invisible and unchanging), it should follow that the soul belongs to the kind o f the Divine. For then the soul itself is metaphysically ultimate, like the Forms, in that it has a nature such that at least some o f its activity is not determined or explained by anything else.4S

It should be clear by now that whether Plato considered immanent charac- ters to be a third ontological kind or not, the Affinity Argument is unaffected, since the soul's divinity (i.e., metaphysical uhimacy) means that it cannot be an immanent character. For even if the introduction o f immanent characters later in the dialogue supersedes the twofold distinction at 79 a, we may think o f these two kinds as the only two kinds o f being to which the soul could belong (provided that tl~e soul itself does not belong to another third kind in the sense noted above).

5" W H A T I S N E V E R C H A N G I N G I S I N C O M P O S I T E

It remains to consider possible grounds for Socrates' asserting that something is incomposite and therefore indestructible. He says at Phaedo 7 8 c 6 - 8 that what is always the same probably49 is incomposite (or alternatively, that those things which are incomposite are probably always the same). Now a-sameness

4s C f . R i c h a r d T a y l o r , Metaphysics, 3 r d e d . ( P r e n t i c e - H a l l , t 9 8 3 ) , 4 1 - 5 o. T h e p o s i t i o n P l a t o is a s s u m i n g a p p e a r s to b e a k i n to t h a t w h i c h T a y l o r h a s r e c e n t l y d e f e n d e d - - t h a t h u m a n s a r e s o m e t i m e s s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g b e i n g s . T h a t is to say, in t h e c a s e o f a n a c t i o n w h i c h is f r e e , it m u s t b e s u c h t h a t it is c a u s e d by t h e a g e n t w h o p e r f o r m s it, b u t s u c h t h a t n o a n t e c e d e n t c o n d i t i o n s w e r e s u f f i c i e n t f o r his p e r f o r m i n g j u s t t h a t a c t i o n . I n t h e c a s e o f a f r e e a n d r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , it m u s t b e s u c h t h a t t h e a g e n t w h o p e r f o r m e d it d i d so f o r s o m e r e a s o n , b u t t h i s r e a s o n c a n n o t h a v e b e e n t h e c a u s e o f it.

T a y l o r d e f e n d s t h i s view by a r g u i n g t h a t it a c c o r d s b e s t w i t h t h e views o r d i n a r y h u m a n s h a v e o f t h e m s e l v e s as f r e e a g e n t s b o u n d by m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n , t t e c o n c l u d e s by n o t i n g t h a t t h e c o n c e p - t i o n o f f r e e a g e n c y i n v o l v e s t w o s t r a n g e m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n s - - t h a t o f a s e l f o r p e r s o n w h o is n o t m e r e l y a collection o f t h i n g s o r e v e n t s , b u t a s u b s t a n c e a n d a s e l f - m o v i n g b e i n g . S e c o n d l y , t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f activity i n v o l v e s a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h a n a g e n t , w h i c h is a s u b s t a n c e a n d n o t a n e v e n t , c a n n e v e r t h e l e s s c a u s e a n e v e n t . A n d t h e a g e n t c a n d o t h i s w i t h o u t b e i n g c a u s e d in a n y way to d o it.

49 I f S o c r a t e s ' c l a i m t h a t it is most likely t h e c a s e t h a t w h a t is i n c o m p o s i t e is always t h e s a m e ( o r vice v e r s a ) is a m e r e a s s e r t i o n o f p r o b a b i l i t y , it will n o t s u p p o r t S o c r a t e s ' c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e s o u l is e i t h e r c o m p l e t e l y i n d e s t r u c t i b l e o r n e a r l y c o m p l e t e l y i n d e s t r u c t i b l e at 8oa. B u t w h a t we h a v e h e r e m i g h t b e a c a s e o f m o d e s t a s s e r t i o n o f a fairly s t r o n g s t a t e m e n t . ( W e f r e q u e n t l y say, f o r e x a m p l e , " I t a p p e a r s t h a t p " o r " I t m o s t likely follows t h a t q" w h e n we in fact m e a n to a s s e r t " p " a n d "q" o r e v e n " n e c e s s a r i l y p" a n d " n e c e s s a r i l y q.") B u t f o r a n a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n t h i s as a n a s s e r t i o n o f m e r e p r o b a b i l i t y , s e e G a l l o p . Plato: Phaedo, 137.

3 0 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 34:1 J A N U A R Y 1996

p r o v i d e s g r o u n d s f o r s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g i n c o m p o s i t e (and h e n c e indestructi- ble) in at least two senses: (a) it does n o t s u f f e r a - c h a n g e , a n d so is n o t com- p o s e d o f c o m p r e s e n t opposites, a n d it c a n n o t be o r b e c o m e o p p o s i t e to itself in a n y way; (b) since it d o e s n o t (or n e e d not) s u f f e r a - c h a n g e , it c a n n o t be a b o d y m a d e u p o f physical parts, since all bodies d o o f necessity s u f f e r a- c h a n g e . T h u s i f t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t e in the sense o f (a), it c o u l d n o t be d e s t r o y e d by b e c o m i n g s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a soul. A n d (b) rules o u t physi- cal d e c o m p o s i t i o n .

W h a t is to p r e v e n t it f r o m .just ceasing to exist, as d o i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r s such as Socrates' l a r g e n e s s relative to P h a e d o w h e n P h a e d o grows? T h e an- swer, o f course, is t h a t t h e soul c a n n o t be a n i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r o r a n y t h i n g like it since it is has its o w n n a t u r e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a n y t h i n g else. ( T h a t was p a r t o f t h e p o i n t o f s h o w i n g t h a t the soul is divine.)

Socrates t h u s is able to c o n c l u d e t h a t the soul is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e a n d h e n c e i m m o r t a l .

6 . E P I L O G U E

I f w h a t I h a v e a r g u e d above is correct, t h e Affinity A r g u m e n t p r o c e e d s as follows. T h e r e a r e at least two kinds o f being: (1) the Visible (in t h e sense o f b e i n g sensible), N e v e r t h e S a m e (in t h e sense o f b e i n g subject to a-change), a n d Mortal (in t h e sense o f b e i n g d e p e n d e n t ) ; a n d (2) t h e Invisible (in t h e sense o f b e i n g imperceptible), Always t h e S a m e (in t h e sense o f n e v e r b e i n g subject to a- c h a n g e ) , a n d Divine (in t h e sense o f b e i n g metaphysically ultimate). Now h u - m a n s c a n n o t perceive t h e soul itself (i.e., t h e intellect) t h r o u g h the senses. T h e soul is capable o f b e i n g subject to o n e o p p o s i t e w i t h o u t b e i n g subject to t h e o t h e r (i.e., it is rational, it is capable o f b e i n g subject to the t h o u g h t t h a t x is F- ness w i t h o u t b e i n g subject to the o p p o s i t e t h o u g h t t h a t x is not-F-ness). T h u s t h e soul is n o t subject to a-change. A n d finally the soul is divine in t h a t it is n o t d e p e n d e n t u p o n a n y t h i n g else f o r at least s o m e o f its actions. T h u s , since t h e soul is invisible, always t h e same a n d divine, it is m o s t similar to (2) in t h e sense t h a t it has t h e d e f i n i n g characteristics o f (2), a n d a c c o r d i n g l y belongs to (2) a n d no o t h e r k i n d ( w h e t h e r a k i n d o f its own o r a k i n d m a d e u p o f i m m a n e n t characters). B u t beings o f k i n d (2) are i n c o m p o s i t e a n d h e n c e indestructible. T h e r e f o r e t h e soul by itself is i n c o m p o s i t e a n d indestructible.

I n s o f a r as t h e soul (i.e., t h e n o n i n t e l l e c t u a l p a r t o f the soul) believes the inconsistencies t h e senses tell it (that s o m e p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f t h i n g is b o t h F- hess a n d not-F-ness) a n d is e m o t i o n a l l y a t t a c h e d to objects in the w o r l d o f t h e senses, it b e c o m e s a t t a c h e d to this world a n d becomes c o m p o s e d o f two " p a r t s " - - o n e o f which is physical. U p o n d e a t h , such a soul will r e m a i n in this world, since like is a t t r a c t e d to like. B u t by practicing p h i l o s o p h y , a soul can s e p a r a t e itself f r o m these worldly a t t a c h m e n t s a n d its material p a r t by h a v i n g

P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 31

c o n s i s t e n t beliefs ( a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f F-ness) a n d c o n t e m p l a t i n g w h a t is real (i.e., real F - n e s s - - t h e F o r m t h e F). A n d since like is a t t r a c t e d to like, at d e a t h s u c h a soul goes to dwell with t h e Invisible, etc. (~6 ~tt6~lg: H a d e s ) .

T h i s a r g u m e n t is t h e first a r g u m e n t f o r i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e soul b a s e d u p o n t h e simplicity o f t h e soul. It is also an i n g e n i o u s a r g u m e n t - - o n e h a v i n g p h ilo - sophical m e r i t c o m p a r a b l e to o r g r e a t e r t h a n Plato's o t h e r i m m o r t a l i t y a r g u - m e n t s (in t h e Phaedo, o r at P h a e d r u s 245 ). T h e a r g u m e n t is i n t e r e s t i n g as a n e a r l y d e f e n s e o f m i n d / b o d y d u a l i s m . Plato's a p p e a l to t h e invisibility o f t h e soul is an a n c e s t o r o f T h o m a s N a g e r s a r g u m e n t t h a t o n e ' s c o n s c i o u s m e n t a l states

a r e o b s e r v a b l e f r o m o n e ' s o w n p o i n t o f view in his f a m o u s article, " W h a t Is It L i k e to Be a Bat?"5o A n d we h a v e s e e n that t h e soul's "d i v in i t y " a n t i c i p a t e s t h e m o d e r n a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e s e l f is s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g a n d t h e r e f o r e i m m a t e r i a l .

O f c o u r s e , t h e a r g u m e n t m a k e s s o m e a s s u m p t i o n s wh i ch a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e t o d a y , s u c h as t h e t r u t h o f t h e T h e o r y o f F o r m s with its t w o - w o r l d o n t o l o g y , a n d t h a t like is a t t r a c t e d to like. It also faces all t h e m o d e r n o b j e c t i o n s to d u a l i s m , a n d as it s t a n d s c o u l d n o t serve as a c o n t e m p o r a r y d e f e n s e o f d u a l - ism. Plato raises n o q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e soul f r o m o n e life to t h e n e x t , a l t h o u g h I s u s p e c t h e w o u l d say t h a t t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e F o r m s , c o n s c i o u s o r u n c o n s c i o u s , is w h a t is p r e s e n t t h r o u g h o u t . B u t i f all souls s h a r e this k n o w l e d g e to s o m e d e g r e e , h o w is t h e soul i n d i v i d u a t e d ? H e n e v e r raises this q u e s t i o n , a n d so n e v e r gives us a n a n s w e r . A n d h e t o o

easily a s s u m e s a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e intellect a n d t h e physical p a r t s o f t h e soul as well as with t h e b o d y itself w i t h o u t telling us w h a t this c o n n e c t i o n is like. U n l i k e D e s c a r t e s , Plato d o e s n o t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e physical b o d y f r o m t h e m i n d by t a k i n g t h e f o r m e r to h a v e spatial e x t e n s i o n as its essen ce a n d t h e l a t t e r to h a v e u n e x t e n d e d c o n s c i o u s t h o u g h t as its essence. T h i s m i g h t b e o n e r e a s o n w h y t h e m o d e r n p r o b l e m o f h o w m i n d - b o d y causal i n t e r a c t i o n takes place n e v e r o c c u r s to him.

B u t it is i n t e r e s t i n g to see h o w Plato's d u a l i s m o t h e r w i s e d i f f e r s f r o m l a t e r versions. Plato d o e s n o t h a v e a c o n c e p t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s m e n t a l states as p r i v a t e a n d physical states as public. ("Invisible" c a n n o t b e t h e s a m e as " p r i v a t e , " o t h e r w i s e t h e F o r m s w o u l d h a v e to be p r i v a t e m e n t a l entities.) It is i n d e e d u n c l e a r to m e w h e t h e r h e has a c o n c e p t o f co n sci o u sn ess, b u t e v e n i f h e has, c o n s c i o u s n e s s d o e s n o t s e e m to be essential to Plato's c o n c e p t o f t h e soul. T h e intellect, w h i c h Plato c o n s i d e r s to b e t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e soul which survives d e a t h - - t h e p a r t t h a t c o n t a i n s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e F o r m s - - i s relatively u n c o n - scious f o r m o s t h u m a n s . I n d e e d , the v e r y asp ect o f m i n d we t e r m "co n scio u s-

s~ Review 83/4 (October, 1974): 435-5 o. Of course, Nagers article was not origi- nally intended as a defense of dualism, but he later came to use the argument contained in it for that purpose. See his The View from Nowhere (Oxford, 1986 ), esp. 13-27, 28-3o.

3 2 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 34: i J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6

ness" c a n be t h e subject o f i r r a t i o n a l beliefs, f o r p e o p l e c a n c o n s c i o u s l y h o l d beliefs to b e t r u e w h i c h t u r n o u t to be i r r a t i o n a l . Plato w o u l d h a v e to c o n s i d e r this physical.

T h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t is historically v al u ab l e in t h a t it shows w h y Plato h o l d s c e r t a i n beliefs w h i c h we w o u l d o t h e r w i s e t h i n k h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n in his r e l i g i o u s beliefs o r in m y t h : it e x p l a i n s his b e l i e f in g h o st s (Phaedo 8 1 c - d ; cf. l o 8 b - d ) , in ascetic practices ( 6 5 c i o f f . , 8 o e - 8 1 c ) , a n d in r e i n c a r n a t i o n as re- w a r d a n d p u n i s h m e n t f o r v i r t u e a n d vice ( 8 1 d - 8 2 c ; cf. 1 1 3 d - 1 4 c ).

T h e bases f o r Plato's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n soul a n d b o d y a r e n o t as p r e c i s e as Descartes's. A c c o r d i n g l y , his d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e soul a n d t h e b o d y is n o t a s h a r p o n e : s o m e aspects o f t h e soul, s u c h as sen satio n a n d t h e e m o t i o n s , a r e i r r e d e e m a b l y bodily; a n d to t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e soul c a n h o l d i r r a t i o n a l beliefs, it c a n b e physical, e v e n a f t e r d e a t h . T h u s h e allows f o r s p e c t e r s o r ghosts.

T h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t is a n i n g e n i o u s a r g u m e n t f o r a s c e t i c i s m - - a posi- t i o n which has a l o n g t r a d i t i o n in t h e West b u t which is n o w c o m m o n l y t h o u g h t to b e u n j u s t i f i a b l e a n d e v e n irratio n al. F o r i f w h a t is physical s u f f e r s a - c h a n g e , c o m p l e t e spiritual f u l f i l l m e n t can o n l y b e a t t a i n e d b y a n intellect f r e e f r o m t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y beliefs which t h e b o d y , with its d e s i r e s a n d t h e five senses, give it.s,

C l e a r l y f o r Plato, t h e state o f t h e b o d y is a f u n c t i o n o f t h e state o f t h e soul which is a t t a c h e d to it. I n d e e d , a b o d y consists larg ely o f c o m p r e s e n t o p p o - sites, a n d so w h a t t h a t b o d y is d e p e n d s u p o n w h a t k i n d s o f c o m p r e s e n t o p p o - site beliefs t h e r e a r e in t h e soul. D i f f e r e n t e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t s a n d t e m p e r a - m e n t s give rise to d i f f e r e n t kinds o f b o d y , so t h a t w h a t k i n d o f p e r s o n o n e is in this life d o e s d e t e r m i n e w h a t b o d y o n e will h a v e in t h e n e x t i n c a r n a t i o n . So t h e a r g u m e n t d o e s p r o v i d e s o m e s u r p r i s i n g s u p p o r t f o r Plato's b e l i e f in re- i n c a r n a t i o n o f souls i n t o t h e b o d i e s o f d i f f e r e n t kinds o f living things.

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5, For a brief account of the nature and history of asceticism, and some arguments for and against ascetic beliefs and practices, see Carl Wellman, "Asceticism," in P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, 1967), 1:171--73. Wellman finds the influence of Plato's asceticism in Plotinus and some of the early Church Fathers, such as St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine, through whom it became a major part of the Christian tradition until the Renaissance.