Week 6 discussion - Collection An agency has focused its system development and critical infrastructure data collection efforts on separate engineering management systems for different types of assets and is working on the integration of these systems.
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Chapter 8
Collection
Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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• Diligent and ongoing observation of computing and networking behavior can highlight malicious activity – The processing and analysis required for this must be done
within a program of data collection
• A national collection process that combines local, regional, and aggregated data does not exist in an organized manner
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Introduction
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Fig. 8.1 – Local, regional, and national data collection with aggregation
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• At local and national levels data collection decisions for national infrastructure should be based on the following security goals – Preventing an attack
– Mitigating an attack
– Analyzing an attack
• Data collection must be justified (who is collecting and why)
• The quality of data is more important than the quantity
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Introduction
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Fig. 8.2 – Justification-based decision analysis template for data collection
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• Metadata is perhaps the most useful type of data for collection in national infrastructure – Metadata is information about data, not what the data is
about
• Data collection systems need to keep pace with growth of carrier backbones
• Sampling data takes less time, but unsampled data may be reveal more
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Collecting Network Data
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Fig. 8.3 – Generic data collection schematic
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Fig. 8.4 – Collection detects evidence of vulnerability in advance of notification
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• National initiatives have not traditionally collected data from mainframes, servers, and PCs
• The ultimate goal should be to collect data from all relevant computers, even if that goal is beyond current capacity
• System monitoring may reveal troubling patterns
• Two techniques useful for embedding system management data – Inventory process needed to identify critical systems
– Process of instrumenting or reusing data collection facilities must be identified
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Collecting System Data
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Fig. 8.5 – Collecting data from mainframes, servers, and PCs
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Security Information and Event Management
• Security information and event management (SIEM) is the process of aggregating system data from multiple sources for purpose of protection
• Each SIEM system (in a national system of data collection) would collect, filter, and process data
• Objections to this approach include both the cost of setting up the architecture and the fact that embedded SIEM functionality might introduce problems locally
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Fig. 8.6 – Generic SIEM architecture
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Fig. 8.7 – Generic national SIEM architecture
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• Identifying trends is the most fundamental processing technique for data collected across the infrastructure
• Simplest terms – Some quantities go up (growth)
– Some quantities go down (reduction)
– Some quantities stay the same (leveling)
– Some quantities doing none of the above (unpredictability)
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Large-Scale Trending
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Fig. 8.8 – Growth trend in botnet behavior over 9-month period (2006–
2007)
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• Some basic practical considerations that must be made by security analysts before a trend can be trusted – Underlying collection
– Volunteered data
– Relevant coverage
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Large-Scale Trending
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• Collecting network metadata allows security analysts track a worm’s progress and predict its course
• Consensus holds that worms work too fast for data collection to be an effective defense – There’s actually some evidence that a closer look at the
data might provide early warning of worm threats
• After collecting and analyzing, the next step is acting on the data in a timely manner
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Tracking a Worm
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Fig. 8.9 – Coarse view of UDP traffic spike from SQL/Slammer worm
(Figure courtesy of Dave Gross and Brian Rexroad)
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Fig. 8.10 – Fine view of UDP traffic spike from SQL/Slammer worm (Figure courtesy of Dave Gross and Brian Rexroad)
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• Once the idea for a national data collection program is accepted, the following need to be addressed – Data sources
– Protected transit
– Storage considerations
– Data reduction emphasis
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National Collection Program