Latin History III

4

CUBA SINCE rg1g

llulgencio Batista had been the dominant 6gure in Cuban national affairs lilr a quaner of a century. He had ruled Cuba, directly or indirectly, since thc military coup of 4 September 1933, except for an interlude of Aut6ntico rule from 1944 to t952. He had seemed confident and powerful until the last weeks of his last presidency. But suddenly Batista was gone. On New Year's Eve 1958 he quit, taking with him much of the top echelon of his government. A new leader, young and bearded, who for two yeurs had led a guerrilla war in eastern Cuba, gradually spreading the inlluence of his forces to the western provinces, slowly assuming the lcrrdership of the urban and the rural resistance to the Batista regime, mnrched into Havana. Audacious and effective in his military campaign nncl political skills, persuasive and commanding in his public speech, lliclel Castro had become the leader of the future. Power had passed, Iomewhat unexpectedly, to a new generation of Cubans.

ln January 1959 the old regime collapsed in Cuba and a revolution rnrne to power. The old rules of the game no longer applied and the armed

lirrces that had shaped the life of independent Cuba for so long had ctumbled. The rebel army became the defender of the new revolutionary ttntc, sweeping aside the parties that had structured political life in previ- ruus decades. Only the Communist party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP), wlrich had been banned by Batista in the r95os but reappeared in I959, wus left intact. The fall of the old regime required that new norms, rules n[rl institutions be devised to replace those that had collapsed or been ovcrthrown. The history of Cuba during the next thirty years addressed llre nceds of revolutionary creativity, the persistent commitment to create rrrtlcr out of revolution, the need ro uphold a revolutionary faith in the irnplementation of that new order.

9J

96 Cuba: A short bistorY

THE CONSOLIDATION OF REVOLUTIONARY PO\f ER (t959-62)

cuba has always been buffeted by the winds of internarional affairs. Geo-

graphically in the heart of the American Mediterranean, it has been cov- eted by the major powers over rhe centuries. \vith the end of four hundred years of spanish colonial rule and the establishment of United States primacy in r8g8, Cuba',s link wirh the United States became the virtually exclusive focus of Cuban internationl relations during the first half of the

rwentieth centurY. In 1919 the U.S. government viewed with concern the affairs of a

country that seemed uncharacreristically our of its control. cuba mat- rered to the United States because of both its strategic location and its economic importance. The united States operated a naval base at GuantSnamo under the rerms of a rgo3 treary rhar recognized nominal cuban sovereignty but guaranreed the United Stares the right to oPerate

the base for as long as \washington wished. Despite subsequent cuban

proresrs, the Unired Srates retained the base. \rhile U.s. military forces had not been stationed in Cuba outside Guantdnamo for several decades and U.s. governmenr officials had played a reduced role in internal cuban politics, in the rgSos the U.S. ambassador remained the country's

second most imporranr polirical figure after the President of the Repub-

lic. In r959 the value of U.S. investments in Cuba - in sugar, mining, utilities, banking and manufacruring - exceeded thar in every other La- tin American counrry excepr venezuela. The united States also took abour two-thirds of cuban exporrs and supplied about three-quarters of

its imporrs. (And foreign trade accounted for about two-rhirds of Cuba's

estimated national income. ) Fidel castro, the z6 ofJuly Movemenr, which he led, and other revolu-

rionary forces thar had participated in rhe revolutionary war, sought to af6rm cuban narionalism. In the symbols used and histories evoked, in the problems diagnosed and solutions proposed, rhere was a strong empha-

sis on enabling cubans to take charge of their history. There was, how- ever, during rhe revolutionary war only a limired criticism of u.S. govern-

ment policies and rhe acriviries of u.S. enterprises in cuba. castro hacl bitterly criticized the modest U.S. military assistance initially extended to

the Batista government under the formal military agreements between the

two counrries, but this aid was evenrually cur. casrro had also spoken of

the expropriation of rhe U.S.-owned public utilities. However, in the later

Cuba since 1959 97

phases of the guerrilla war, for tactical reasons, Castro seemed to back off from any expropriation proposals.

In the early months of the Revolution there were three principal themes in Cuban-U.S. relations. First, there was mistrust and anger over U.S. criticism of events in Cuba. The Cuban government brought to trial many who had served the Batista government and its armed forces; most of these

prisoners were convicted and many were executed. The trials were strongly

criticized, in both Cuba and the United States, for observing few proce- dural safeguards to guarantee the rights of the accused as well as for the severity o[ many sentences. Fidel Castro and other Cuban government leaders were offended by this, and they denounced their critics in the U.S. mass media (especially the wire services) and the U.S. Congress. The onset

of poor relations between Cuba and the United States from January 1919 stemmed from this clash between the values of justice and retribution of revolutionaries and the values of fairness and moderation of a liberal society even toward its enemies.

The second major factor was the Revolution's initial impact on U.S. firms operating in Cuba. The frequency of strikes increased sharply in rg59

^s workers sought gains from management under the more favour-

able political situation. Foreign-owned firms were affected by such srrikes and in some cases the question of their expropriation arose. A strike at the Royal Dutch Shell petroleum refinery, for instance, raised the question of the expropriation of British property, authorized by a law issued by the rcbels in retaliation for British military sales to the Batista government. liidel Castro obtained generous concessions from Shell in exchange for forgoing expropriation 'at this time'.' Comparable pressures from below tflfected the revolution in the countryside. The Agrarian Reform Acr (issued May 1959), moderate in many resPects, was also strongly national- ist. The Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA) was more willing to intervene in labour-management conflicts when farms were foreign- owned, and to suspend the strict application of the law in these cases to cxpropriate foreign-owned land. Such local agrarian conflicts soured U.S.- ( luban relations.

The third feature of this period was changing Cuban attitudes to new private foreign investment and official foreign aid. On r8 February r959 l)rime Minister Fidel Castro publicly welcomed foreign capital and on zo

March r959 acknowledged the ample availability of aid. On z April r959

' Fidel Castro, Dirnrsot para la hrtoria (Havana, r919), l: 1o-2, 75-8r

98 Cnha: A sbort history

the Prime Minister announced that on a forthcoming trip to the United Stares he would be accompanied by the presidenr of rhe Narional Bank and

rhe Ministers of the Tieasury and of the Economy to seek funds for cuba.

This trip to the United States in April 1959 became a deadline for making decisions thar the overworked revolutionaries had hitherto postponed. Did

cuba's new governmenr wanr a close relationship with the United states? \07as rhis revolution committed to a Cuba open and profitable for multina-

tional firms? Could its leaders make a genuine and radical revolution with the support of the United Fruit Company, Coca-Cola, the Chase Manhat- tan Bank or standard oil? vould Fidel castro accept rhe economic ausrer- ity preached by the International Monetary Fund (lMF), embrace U.S. vice-president Richard Nixon, and proclaim U.S.-Cuban friendship ar the

gates of the Guanrdnamo naval base? En route to the United States Castro

told his economic cabinet that they were not to seek foreign aid from officials of the U.S. government, the S7orld Bank or the IMF, with whom they might speak during their visit. The purpose of the trip, therefore, changed from acquiring aid for capitalist development to gaining time for

far-reaching transformations the specific form of which was still uncertain. There is no evidence that the United States, or these international financial

institutions, denied aid to Cuba that its government had requested. In fact, Cuba did not ask them for aid. Had such aid been requested and granred, it would have tied Cuba's future closely ro the world capitalist economy and to the united States because of the condirions ordinarily attached to such aid in the l95os. A small number of revolutionary leaders, therefore, concluded well ahead of the rest of the citizenry that it was impossible to conduct a revolution in Cuba without a major confronta-

tion with the United States. A revolution would require rhe Promised extensive agrarian reforms and probably a new, far-reaching state interven-

tion in the public utilities, mining, the sugar industry and possibly other manufacturing sectors. Given the major U.S. investments in these sectors'

and United States hostility to statism, revolution at home would inevita- bly entail confrontation abroad.

The approval of the Agrarian Reform Act was followed in June Lgtg by

the first maior cabinet crisis, which resulted in the departure of thc moderates. U.S. ambassador Philip Bonsal presented a formal U.S. govern-

menr proresr on r r June complaining of irregulariries and abuses in thc early implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law against U.S' firms. The

head of the Air Force, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, quit at the end of June an<l fled to the united Srates, charging communisr infilrrarion of rhe govcrn-

Caba since 1959 99 ment. President Manuel Urrutia was forced out in Juln leaving no doubt that Prime Minister Casrro was Cuba's uncontested leader. The question of communism was also an issue for Urrutia, who had stoutly defended the government against charges of communism while accusing the Commu- nists of attempting to subvert the Revolution. Urrutia was replaced by Osvaldo Dortic6s (who would serve as president until r976). The question of communism also mattered for the slowly evolving links with the Soviet Union. The first official contacts with the Soviet Union were made in Cairo by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara in June 1959, although at this stage Soviet-Cuban trade was as insignificant as it had been before the Revolu- tion. Relations with Moscow changed qualitatively from October r9t9. And Soviet deputy prime minister Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba in Febru- ary 196o to sign the 6rst important bilateral economic agreement between the two countries and to promote other relations.

U.S.-Cuban relations continued to deteriorate during the second half of 1959. Disputes over Communist influence in the government became frequent and intense. rJfashington's view of the Cuban government soured as Castro sharpened the vituperative tone of his remarks about the United States. In early March r95o a Belgian ship La Coabre, loaded with arms and ammunition for the Cuban government, exploded in Havana harbor. Prime Minister Castro accused the U.S. government of sabotage. Publicly, the U.S. government protested. Privately, on 17 March 196o, President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to organize the training of Cuban exiles for a future invasion of Cuba.

The pace of deterioration in U.S.-Cuban relations quickened in the spring and summer of ry6o. In late June the Cuban government requested rhe foreign-owned petroleum refineries to process crude oil it had pur- chased from rhe Soviet Union. lVhen the companies refused they were cxpropriated. At the same time, a newly amended sugar act was making its way through the U.S. Congress. A clause in the bill aurhorized the President to cut off the Cuban sugar quota; the bill was approved by f .July. On j July, the Cuban Council of Ministers authorized the expropria- tion of all U.S. property in Cuba. On 6 July, President Eisenhower can- cclled Cuba's sugar quota. On r 5 July the newly established Bank for l,oreign Trade became Cuba's sole foreign-trade agency. O.t 7 August the cxpropriation of all large U.S.-owned industrial and agrarian enterprises was carried out, and on I7 September all U.S. banks were confiscated. On r9 October the U.S. government prohibited exports to Cuba except for non-subsidized foodstuffs and medicines. On z4 October, Cuba expropri-

IOO

ated all U.S.-owned wholesale and retail trade enterprises and the remain-

ing smaller U.S.-owned indusrrial and agrarian enterprises. The Unite<l

States withdrew Ambassador Philip Bonsal on z9 October' U'S'-Cuban

diplomatic relations were finally and formally broken in the waning dayl

of the Eisenhower administration in January r96r ' In conrrast, Cuban-sovier relations improved markedly during tlrir

period. on g July r96o, Prime Minisrer Nikita Khrushchev declared thnt

Soviet missiles were prepared ro defend cuba'in a figurative sense'. Thc

first formal military agreement between the two countries was signctl

within weeks as the soviet Union pledged to 'use all means at its disposrrl

ro prevent an armed United States intervention against Cuba'.'This in'

creasing military collaboration between Cuba and the Soviet Union predi<'t"

ably heightened U.S. government hostility towards Havana'

The swift and dramatic changes in U.s.-Cuban relacions were parallclerl

by rhe reorganization of Cuba's internal political and economic affairs, otre

.onr.qrr.rr.. of which was a massive emigration to the United Statcs,

vashingron favoured this emigration through special programs with tlte

aim of Jiscrediting the Cuban government' From r96o to 196z net otlt'

migration from Cuba amounted to about 2oo'ooo people, or an unPrcc(-

derrted ^ver^ge

of well over 6o,ooo per year' Most emigrants came frolrl

the economic and social elite, the adult males typically being professi<llr

als, managers and execurives, although they also included many whitc

collar workers. on the other hand, skilled, semi-skilled and unskillcrl workers were under-represented relative to their share of the work lorte,

and rural cuba was virtually absent from this emigration. This uppct

middle- and middle-class urban emigration was also disproportionately

white. Henceforth, a part of the history of the Cuban people would unfirltl

in rhe United states. The first wave of emigrants, in part becausc tlrcy

could transfer their skills to new workplaces, would experience relarivt'

economic and social success over rhe next thirty years. Politically, tlrey

would consrirure a srrong anri-communist force often sharply at odds witlr

prevailing political opinion among other Spanish-speaking communittt'r

in the United States. Inlater96oandear|y196lthewould-beCuban-Americanswercslill

just Cubans, exiled from their homeland and planning to return' As tlrr'

United States and cuban governments came to blows during thc sctottrl

half of r96o, $Tashingron became more interested in assisting thc cxilcs trr

Cuba since r959

ovcrrhrow the castro government. The exiles, however, were deeply di-

vrtlcd. Those who were once close ro rhe Batista government were repelled

lry those who had worked with Fidel castro during the rebellion or in the

r,,rrly months of his governmenr, although they had broken with castro

,,u", the question of communism and other issues; this antipathy was fully

rr,t i1>rocared. Did cuba need a restorarion or a non-communist transforma-

rron/ There were many shades of opinion within each side of this funda-

nrcntal cleavage, personaliry conflicts further complicating relationships' 'l'lrc u.s. governmenr required a unified Cuban exile leadership if the |llOrts to overrhrow the Castro government with a minimum of U.s. iltlcrvention were to succeed.

()n zz March 196r several key exile leaders agreed to form the cuban

l(t'vr>lutionary Council presided over byJos6 Mir6 Cardona, who had been

rlrt, lirst prime minister of rhe Cuban revolutionary Sovefnment in January

,rrrtl liebruary rg;g. Prominenr members of the council included Antonio f "lirny') Varona, former prime minister (and oPPonent of Batista), as well

,rr liidel Castro's former Minister of Public 'ilforks, Manuel Ray. Manuel

Arrirne, a former lieutenant of the rebel army, was to be the political chief

rrl rltc invasion force andJos6 P6rez San Romdn the military commander.

lllron rhe overrhrow of the revolutionary regime the council would be-

, onrc rhe provisional governmenr of cuba under the presidency of Mir6

| ,rrtl0na. The exiles' Brigade z5o6 completed its training in Nicaragua ,rn,l (]uatemala.

'l'hc administration of John F. Kennedy inherited the plan for this

rrrv.rsion when it came ro office on 20 January r96r. Those who pressed for

,rrr rrrvasion used the analogy of covert U.S. support for the overthrow of

|,ilirtcmalan presidentJacobo Arbenz rn rg54: effective, at low cost to the

llrrrrc<l stares and with no direct involvement of u.S. troops. supporters ,,1 rlrc invasion argued that it had to proceed soon before Castro's govefn- rrrr,rrt rcceived enough weapons from the Soviet Union to defeat the chal-

l,.rr1ic. ()n 3 April the U.S. governmenr published a'white paper' accusing

r ,rrr r0 and his close supporrers of betraying what had been an authentic

rr,volrrrion. In the U.S. governmenr's view, cuba needed a non-communist

tr,ur\lolfitation. President Kennedy agreed to let the ClA-trained invasion

l'rr r' 11o f<rrward, provided that U.S. forces were not used' ()rr rhc morning of r5 April planes piloted by Cuban exiles bombed

,,,.vr.tirl airfields in Cuba, crearing much panic but little damage. The

1,illrr <. rcslxrnded by imprisoning tens of thousands of suspected dissidents.

t lrr Monclay morning, l7 April 196r, Btigade z5o6 landed at Gir6n

Cuba; A short history

2 Rnolatt,in, u r JrrlY r9(ro, r

t02 Crrba: A short bittorl'

beach on rhe Bay of Pigs in sourh-central Cuba. The Cuban governmotr mobilized both its regular armed forces and rhe militia. Led personally by Fidel Castro, they defeared rhe invasion force within forty-eighr hours anrl captured r,r8o prisoners. The prisoners were held for rrial and inrerrogir. tion by Castro and others on Cuban national television; they were evenru. ally ransomed for shipments of medical and ocher supplies from rhe Unitc<l States late in r962. As recriminations began within rhe Kennedy adminis- tration and exile groups in the afrermarh of rhe invasion's failure, Casrro triumphantly announced that Cuba's was a consolidated socialist revoltr. tion able to defeat its enemies within Cuba as well as rhe superpower ro irs norrh.

If the making of a radical revolution in Cuba required a break with rhc United States, the defence of a radical revolution in the face of U.S. arrack demanded support from the Sovier Union. On z December 196r, Fidcl Castro proclaimed that he was a Marxisr-Leninist and rhat he would be so until death. In July r96z Rafl Castro, the armed forces minister, rravellctl to Moscow to secure additional Soviet military backing. On rhe Sovicr side, the possibility of starioning strategic missiles in Cuba seemed ro bc ir political and military coup. A Soviet straregic base in Cuba would parallcl U.S. bases ringing the USSR, and the reacrion time and accuracy of a Soviet nuclear attack on rhe United Stares would be improved. The '6gura-

tive'missiles ofJuly r96o became the real missiles of October r962. Tlrc USSR eventually installed forty-two medium-range ballisric missiles in Cuba, and as U.S. incelligence sources gathered information on rhis Presi- dent Kennedy was persuaded that the Soviet Union and Cuba sought l major change in the politico-military balance wirh the Uniced Srates. Orr zz October, Kennedy demanded rhe withdrawal o[Soviet 'offensive mis- siles' from Cuba and imposed a naval'quaranrine' on rhe island to prevenr the additional shipment of Soviet weaponry. Kennedy also demanded tlrt' withdrawal of Soviet L-.zll bombcrs and a commirment not to stutiorr Sovier strategic weapons in Cuba in the future.

The world held its breath. Not since the dropping of nuclear bombs orr Hiroshima and Nagasaki had nuclear warfare seemed so imminent. Poisctl on the edge of war, the two superpowers jockeyed over their military relationship. The crisis ended when, without prior consulration witlr Cuba, the Soviet Union backed down, pulling out all irs straregic forces irr exchange for the pledge rhar the United States would not invade Cul>a. The United States made rhat pledge conditional on UN verification of thc Soviet withdrawal of straregic weapons, but a furious Fidel Casrro refirserl

Culta since rcy59 to3

ro allow on-site inspection. In fact, although a formal U.S. pledge to ,lcsist from invading cuba would nor be made, an 'understanding' came to

liovern U.S.-Soviet relations over cuba. The Sovier union was not to ,lcPloy strategic weapons in Cuba nor to use ir as a base of operations for

rrtrclear weapons. The United States, in turn, would not seek to overthrow (.rrstro's governmenr. Thus rhe Cuban missile crisis was a maior victory for

rlrc U.s. governmenr, since ir publicly humiliated the soviet government rrvcr rhe central quesrion of rhe day, and yer it also sealed the end of u.S. rrrfluence in Cuba. Both Fidel Castro and his exile opponents lost the total

\uPporr of their superpower allies, but rhe former would evenrually recog-

rrizc the he had gained much more because his rule was saved by rhe wisdom of Soviet actions.

As peace returned to the Cuban countryside at the beginning of r959, the (.(.onomy began ro recover. The revolurionary government sought to stimu-

lltc economic growth and, at the same time, to pursue its redistributive

lioals by altering the structure of demand. The real wages of non- .rlgricultural workers rose sharply, and urban rents for lower-rent dwellings

wcre slashed by as much as 5o per cent. Early in 1959, the government rr.ized all property that had belonged to former president Batista and to his

, lose associates. For the first time in Cuban history the state acquired a rrrajor role owning and directly operating productive acrivities. Unlike nrosr orher maior Latin American countries, Cuba had not developed an (.ntrepfeneurial srate sector of rhe economy before rg;g; consequently, rhcrc was very little experience about how ir might be operated. These

1'roblems were ro be compounded after r96o when many managers were

,lisrnissed, emigrated or were arrested. 'fhe experiment with a mixed economy was brief because, as we have

sccn, rhe Cuban government socialized most of the means of production

,luring its confrontation with the United States. That confrontation need rrot have affected Cuban-owned business, but on r3 October 196o,382 Irxally owned firms, including all rhe sugar mills, banks, large industries, ,rrr<l the largesr wholesale and retail enterprises, were socialized. Three

,lrrys lacer the Urban Reform Act socialized all commercially owned real t,srrrre. The rg5g Agrarian Reform Acr had destroyed cuban-owned as rvcll as foreign-owned latifundia alrhough it still permitted small- and rrrt.rlium-sized private farms. Because many Cuban entrePreneurs had close

, orrrrccri<lns with the United States and were Presumed to oppose the Ir.volr,rtionary governmcnt, the Survival of revolutiOnary rule seemed to

r04 Cuba; A short history

require that management and ownership pass ro loyal revolutiona.cs, however technically incomperenr rhey mighr be. These acrions also rt, flected a self-conscious decision to socialize the economy even rhough tlrc Revolution's socialisr characrer would not be proclaimed officially unril April r96r. Such decisions were justified on rhe grounds of narion'l security and also because direcr ownership and control over the means ol producrion were deemed necessary for economic planning. Economic ccn- tralization was viewed as a rarional step ro generate economic growth. TIrc revolutionary leaders were nor compelled ro socialize the economy: rhcy acted autonomously and, in their view, prudently to implement an idco- logical vision of rhe society rhey wished to build. power had to be concen- trated in the hands of rhe few to achieve rhe aspirations of rhe many: that was ar the heart of rhe evolving ideology.

The turning-poinr in inrernal cuban polirics occurred in ocrober ancl November 1959, monrhs before the break with rhe United Stares, or rhc first treaties wirh rhe Soviet Union. on r5 october, Ra6l casrro, Fidel's younger brorher, became defence minisrer (a rirle changed later ro Minis- ter of the Armed Forces), a post he held thereafrer. Raril casrro had had a distinguished milirary career. He was primarily responsible for the organi- zation and development of the Cuban armed forces and their evenrual victories ar the Bay of Pigs and in overseas wars, rhe milirary being the one undoubtedly effecrive organization created in rhe firsr chirty years of revo- lutionary rule. He also assumed the post of second-in-command to his older brorher in all affairs of srare, civilian as well as military, playing an important role in the reviralizarion of both party and governmenr in the I97os. Raril was Fidel's formally designared successor in case of dearh, with the power to enforce rhe succession.

On r8 October r959, Rolando Cubelas - rhe'unity'candidare with Communist supporr - defeated Pedro Boitel, rhe candidate of rhe z6 o[ July Movement ar the university, in the elecrions for the presidency of the Federaci6n Estudiantil Universiraria (FEU) afrer inrervention by Fidel castro, and aligned rhe FEU with rhe shift roward Marxism-Leninism. (ln ry66, Cubelas would be arrested for plorting ro assassinare Fidel castro, for which ir seems he had the supporr of the U.S. cenrral Inrelli- gence Agency.)

On r9 Ocrober, Huber Matos, military commander of Camagiicy prov- ince and one ofthe leading figures ofthe revolutionary war, resigned along with fourteen oflicers over rhe rising influence of communism in rhc

rcgime. \When Matos was arrested the entire z6 of July Movement execu-

rivecommitteeinCamag[eyprovinceresignedanditsleaderwasde- rained. Matos spent t*o decades in prison; his courageous resistance in jail

irnd his unwillingness to collaborate or to bend to the will of his captors

l>ccame a symbol of strength to the opposition'

In November the Coniederaci6n de Trabaiadores Cubanos (CTC) held

its tenth congress to select a new leadership' The z6 of July Movement's

slatehadaclearmajority.Thegovernmentpressedfor.unity'withthe (.ommunists, but the congress delegates refused and when Fidel Castro

addressed the congress his words were interrupted by the chanting of .twenty-six,twenty-six'.Heattackedthosewhowouldusethatlabel.to

stab the revolution in rhe heart'.1 He argued that the revolution's defence

rcquired avoiding partisan quarrels; he asked for and received authority

fromthecongresstoformalabourleadership.Hepickedthe.unity'slate, including the communists.

Ar the end of November most of the remaining moderates or liberals in

the Council of Ministers, including Minister of Public \yorks Manuel Ray

and National Bank president Felipe Pazos were forced out of of6ce' Of the

twenty-one ministers appointed in January r959' twelve had resigned or

had been ousted by the l.,a of rn. year' Four more would go out in r 96o as

the revolution moved toward a Marxist-Leninist political system' The

climination of many non-communists and anti-communists from the

original coalition, along with the regime's clash with business' were the

internal ingredients of rhe transformation of the revolution's politics' A

ncw leadership consoliclared centralized and authoritarian rule' But

among those in the new government coalition' only the old communists

Irad the political and administrative experience to make the new system

work. As inrernal and international conflicts deepened during r96o and r96r

the government developed its organizational apParatus' Having obtained

control over the FEU and the CTC, the leadership established a militia with

tens of thousands of members to build suPport and to intimidate internal

cnemies. The Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC) was also founded in

August r96o and the Comic6s de Defensa de la Revoluci6n (CDR)' which

cventually encompassed millions of members, were established in Septem-

l>cr 196o. Committees were set up on every city block' in each large

building, factory or work cencre (eventually, CDRs would be dismantled in

Cuba since t959 ro5

I ll I

I

I ;

I

\ Rnolufir. rr November r959, '1

r06 Cuba: A short bistory

work centres so as nor to duplicare rhe work of the labour unions) in or<k.r r' identify enemies of rhe Revolution for the stare's inrernal securiry a[)l)irrrr tus. Gossip became an arm of state power. The Asociaci6n de Juvcrrrrr,l Revolucionaria (AJR) was launched in ocrober r96o, merging thc y'rrrlr wings of rhe old communist Parry, the Revolutionary Directorate, antl rlu, z6 of July Movemenr. A few years larer the AJR became the Unit'rrr rlr, J6venes comunistas (uJC), the youth affiriarc of the communist parry The Asociaci6n Nacional de Agricultores pequedos (ANAP) was fou..[,,1 in May 196t; it excluded rhe medium-sized farm owners (whose pror)c.y would be expropriated in r963) and sought to cur across rhe divisions trr'r existed between producers of various commodities.

A new communist parry was founded in the summer t96r. Callecl rrrr, Organizaciones Revolucionarias Inregradas (ORI), ir was creared thr<luglr the merger of rhree pre-exisring organizations: the z6 of July Movemcrrr , the Revolurionary Directorate, and rhe old communisr parry, rhe psl), The first two of these had by this stage become phanrom organizario.s: the Revolutionary Direcrorate had been deprived of much indepenclcrrr power after January r959, while rhe battles for control over the .rniu"rsiry students' federation and the labour unions had crippled the z6 of July Movemenr's capaciry for independent political activiry. pSp membcrs broughr several advantages to the oRI. They were bridge-builders bc- tween the resr of the leadership and the soviet union. They had sonrc theoretical knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, in conrrast ro the rest ol oRI, and they had long experience of party politics as well as the organiza- tion of mass movemenrs. The PSp had run rhe CTC during irs firsr decaclc and party milirants were rhe only oRI members with prior governmcnr experience, having served in congress in pre-revolurionary years and con- tributed ministers (including carlos Rafael Rodriguez) ro Batista's war cabiner in rhe early r94os. As a resulr, they initially dominated rhe oRI.

The organization of party cells, selection of p,rrty members, and all promotions and dismissals had to be cleared through rhe of6ce of thc powerful organizarion Secretary, vereran psp leader Anibal Escalanrc. Party cells asserred their authoriry over administrarors, and a preliminary system of polirical commissars was introduced in the armed forces. Mem- bership in the party, moreover, emphasized recruiting those who lracl belonged to rhe older political organizations; recruirmenr of genuine ncw- comers was nor encouraged. Escalanre gave preference ro his old pSp comrades, who knew best how ro organize a party and were personally loyal to him. This proved unacceptable for old z6 of Jury members a.rl

Cuba since t959 r07

,',,1tccially to the military commanders of the guerrilla war' In March r,l(rz, Fidel Castro denounced Escalante for 'sectarianism', removed him lrorn the iob as organization secretary, and exiled him ro Czechoslovakia- A rnassive rescructuring of the ORI followed; about half the ORI members wt'rc expelled, many of them from the PSP faction. New efforts were made

r,, rccruit members not only from the pre-existing organizations but also Irom among those who had been too young for political activity before r,,l59. The scope of party authoricy in the armed forces was drastically lrrnited; henceforth, military commanders would have supreme military .rrrcl political authority within the armed forces. ln ry63 the ORI's name rv;rs changed to the Partido Unido de la Revoluci6n Socialista (PURS).

ln 1962, revolutionary power had become consolidated, although the l.rrclers would not realize this for some years. The threat from the United Srirrcs began to recede as a consequence of the settlement of the missile , risis. Fidel Castro had established his mastery of Cuban politics and his

1'rc-eminence over all rivals. The organization of revolutionary rule be- yond his charisma was under way, even though it would become effective only in the r97os. Opponents of the regime took up in arms in every l,r<)vince in the 6rst half of the r96os, being especially strong in the lrscambray mountain region of Las villas province. Thousands of cubans ,licd in this renewed civil war (r96o-6), the rebels including the peas- ,rntry of southern Matanzas province as well as those whose social and t'conomic interests were more obviously at stake. They were, however, tlroroughly defeated by t966. (\With many like-minded Cubans emigrat- rng, the regime, in effect, exporced the opposition.) The main task had l>ccome the management of the economy, the rapid decline of which rrnperilled rhe accomplishment of other governmenr goals.

ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE

l;ollowing the establishment of a command economy under conditions of

polirical crisis, early economic policy in revolutionary Cuba sought devel- ol)ment through rapid industrialization. Cuba's overwhelming depen- .lcnce on the sugar industry was seen as a sign of under-development. As (.hc Gucvara, Minister of Industries and architect of the strategy, put it, 'thcre can be no vanguard country that has not develoPed its industry. lnclustry is the future'.4

\ )lrrt ,ut,lntnrtria ro (t964): r4

l'! r08 Cuba: A shnrt bistory

Central state ministries were established and a development plan was formulated with help from many sources but especially from rhe Sovict Union and East European countries. Cuba was utterly unprepared, how ever, for a centrally planned economy. It lacked technical personnel (nrtw in the United States orprison) as much as statiscics. The plan for r96z antl the plan for 196z-1 were both fancasies. Data did not exist to formulatc them and knowledge of economic management was primitive. The plarrs called for the achievement of spectacular growth targets. Instead, tltc Cuban economy collapsed in t962. The government froze prices anrl imposed rationing for most consumer producrs. The ration card, a fixturc in Cuban life ever since, combines two importanc aspects of the goverrr' ment's economic performance: relative failure to generate economit growth coupled with relative success in protecting the needs ofthe poorcst Cubans and reducing inequalities in access to basic goods and serviccs. Redistribution policies sought not only to enhance the purchasing powcr of the poor but also ro curtail that of the rich. rJTage scales set maximum as well as minimum salaries. In a suprising move the government changctl the currency overnight; those who did not have their funds in state banks could noc exchange old for new pesos. Their savings were worthless.

The Cuban economy fell further in ry63. Sugar production was dowrr by over a third of its r96r level as a result of the government's drastit policies to diversify away from the crop. Production elsewhere in agricul- ture and industry also suffered. Imports of machinery and equipment for accelerated industrialization, coupled with the decline of revenues frotrt sugar exports, created a balance-of-payments crisis. In June r963, Primc Minister Castro announced a new strategy which once again emphasizcrl sugar production and slowed down the efforts toward industrializaciott. The strategy of sugar-led development was reaffirmed in I964 when rlre Soviet Union and Cuba signed their first long-term agreement that guaran- teed better, stable bilateral sugar prices and, eventually, Soviet subsidics above world market prices for Cuban sugar.

The government's strategy called for increasing sugar production until ro million tons of raw sugar would be produced in r97o. This policy was opposed by a number of technicians and administrators in the sugar indrrs- rry, but they were overruled. The r97o sugar production target becamc rt point of pride, a demonstration that Cubans could take charge of thcir history against all odds. Just as the impossible dream had been achieved in the late r9los when Batista was overthrown, so would another be achicvctl at the end of the r96os as committed revolutionaries demonstratccl that

rhey could raise the level of sugar producrion from 3.8 million tons ln r96,, rc ro million tons in r97o. The doubters would be Proven wrong

;rgain.

The new strategy was complicated, however, by a top-level debate on

tlrc nature of socialist economic organization. One side, led by Minister of

lndustries che Guevara, argued that rhe part of the economy owned by the

srare was a single unit. Money, prices and credit should operate only in ,lcaling with cuban consumefs or foreign countries. The market law of srrpply and demand could and ought ro be eliminated to move rapidly roward communism. central planning was the key. All enterprises would lrc branches of central minisrries. All financing would occur through the r cnrral budget by means of non-repayable interesr-free grancs. All enter-

Prise deficits would be covered by the srace. Buying and selling among srare enterprises would be simple accounting transactions. Money would

bc a unit of accounting bur would nor be used co assess profitability. Material incentives (wage differenrials, bonuses, overtime payments) to

lirbour would be phased our. The central government would allocate r(,sources by planning physical ourpur and would set all prices needed for

;r( countinS. The other side argued thar the part of rhe cuban economy owned by the

srare was not a single economic unit but a variety of enterprises indepen-

,lcntly owned and operated by the state. Transfers from one enterprise to

rruorher did involve buying and selling, with profound implications for rhc allocation of resources. Money and credits were needed to maintain t.l1'ccrive controls over production and ro evaluate economic performance.

linterDrises had to meet their own production costs and noc simply be lr:riled our for their deficits by the central bank; they had to generate their

11wn funds for further investment, maintenance and innovation. Material

ur(cnrives to labour were essential to maintain productivity and quality ,urd to reduce costs. If the 6rst model required extraordinary centraliza- non, the second required more economic autonomy for each firm'

'I'he debate was evenrually resolved when Che Guevara left the Ministry

,,1 lndustries in ry65 (to be engaged in revolutionary campaigns in Africa ,rn<l in South America until his death in late r96z) and rhe ministry was ,lrvided into its former sub-components. Some of Guevara's political allies

rrr orher ministries lost their jobs. However, Guevara's policies were gener-

,rlly adopred, and their implementarion was carried out to extremes. Much

0l thc calamity in economic performance in the lare r96os is due to (irrcvara's flawed vision as well as to the administrative chaos unleashed by

Cuba since t<159 r09

Ctrba: A short histrtry

Fidel castro and his associates, as castro himself would recognizc rrr ,r dramatic speech on z6July r97o when the Cuban economy lay in ruirrr

The radical model required the fuller cenrralization of the econorny. Ar

early as 1963 a second Agrarian Reform law was issued to expropriarc tlrr'

middle-sized farms of the rural bourgeoisie that had remained after tlrc implementationof the t959 law. Bytheendof r963, thestateownccl 7r' per cenr of all land, and only small farms remained in the privare secrol The climax of collectivization came with the 'revolutionary offensivc' ol the spring r968 when consumer service shops, restauranrs and bars, rcpirir

ourfirs, handicraft shops, streer food outlets and even street vendors passt',1

to state ownership and management. ExcePt in a limited way in a small part of the agriculrural secror, no economically productive activity coultl

take place in the late I96os wirhout going through a government agency.

Ir was the time of the state as hot-dog vendor, ice-cream parlour, barlrt'r' and radio repairman. Although an illegal black market developed, firr

vegetables as well as for plumbing services, the governmenr had put tlu'

economy in a strait jacket. Paradoxically, as the economy became thoroughly cenrralized, tlrc

means for central planning and conrrol were abandoned. In the late rg6os there were neirher real year-to-year narional plans nor any medium-tern.r

planning. From late t966 onwards only sectoral planning occurred, but on a limited basis and with lirtle effort to reconcile the often conflicting claims on rhe same resources from unconnected enrerprises and projects. A

cenrral budget was also abandoned, nor ro reappear unril a decade later.

Fidel casrro launched an attack on 'bureaucratism' which crippled thc capacity of several central agencies. Financial accounring and auditing were discontinued; statistics were kept only in physical quantities (e.g, pairs of shoes). Ir became impossible to determine the costs of production for most items.

The changes in labour policy were equally dramatic. The phasing our of

material incentives was to be coupled with a renewed emphasis on moral incentives: the revolutionary consciousness of the people would guarantcc

increased productivity and <luality and reductions in cost. tVorkers would

be paid rhe same regardless of variations in efforr or quality. Those wh<l

worked overtime would be expected to do so volunrarily and would not

receive exrra pay. Money was seen as a source of capitalist corruption. This

change in policy occurred in the wake of a maior strucrural change in thc

labour market. Whereas Cuba had suffered a persistently high rate of tlvert

unemployment before the Revolution, this had been reduced quickly in

rlr, t'arly r96os and been transformed into a labour shortage' Many of the

l,rrrrcrlf ,,nemployed had been put to work in state enterprises' Productiv-

rl, l)cr worker plummeted as employment rose and production declined'

lrr.llrciency u.,J rrrrd..-e-ployment were institurionalized in the new eco-

rr)rnic structures. And yei this was also an extraordinary human achieve-

r,rrrrt; it allowed rnn* ubl"-bodied Cubans the dignity of some work and

rlrt cr>mmitment to use their talents in a constructive way'

l:conomic performance was complicated by another change in the struc-

lrrt of the labour market' Because of the highly seasonal nature of the all-

rrlx)rtant sugar industry, pre-revolutioriary employment patterns had suf-

t, rt'tl sharp seasonal o'iiliu'ion'' lVorkers worked very hard when they

,r,t rc cmployed to save for the expected unemployment during the 'dead

.,t'.ts()n,' when the revolutionary government guaranteed employment (or

'.rrllicient unemployme.,, to'np"t'i^tion) throughout the year to all able to

,vork the pre-revolutionary structural incentive to work hard weakened'

l,'us the revolurionary gou"rn..'.rrt succeeded in eliminating a perpetual

',,,trrce of misery - the fear of destitution as a worker stimulus - but this

w,rs not replaced by new effective incentives for high-quality work' As

nrirtcrial incentives were removed on top of these structural changes' the

l,roblem of low and declining worker productivity worsened' as did labour

:'lr,,r,ug.r. No moral exhortations were incentive enough'

Sincemoralincentivesprovedinsufficienttostimulateproductionand

1'roductivity th. goue,nt"tnt engaged in mass mobilization for work in

, h" ,,tgu, Iields and other sectors of the economy' These so-called volun-

t(.crs - who often lacked the right to refuse - were deployed throughout

rhc country rather ineffectively' They were supplemented by a-substantial

lrortion of the personnel of the Cuban armed forces' Having defeated che

rrrccrnal counter-revolution by r966, the armed ftrrces committed thcm-

st'lvcstodirectlyproductiveeconomicactivitiesincludingtheharvesting r,{ sugar cane. Military officers became harvest supervisors as

the desPerate

t'flirrt to produce ro million tons of sugar in r97o combined with the shift

r.wards radical economic policies and reliance on revolutionary conscious-

ncss. A ncw revolutiona'y citi'en was to have emerged to lead Cuba to

. t onomic emanciPation' The economy was recorded as having produced 8' 5

million tons in I97o

(l>y iuggling the artiFcially low l9L9 figt"tt): the highest.in Cuban

lristory but still I5 per cent below target' Between 1968 and I97o the

(.r.rban cconomy *u, budty dislocated as resources were shifted among

s((tors with<>ut rcgard to thc cost of achieving the impossible dream' the

Cuba since t959

Cuba since t959 rr3

IT

l

Cuba: A short history

central government's actions promoting chaos while labour was coercctl (rr work under military discipline without adequate rewards. Productiorr rrr cattle-raising and forestry declined from r968 rc r97o, as did over 6fl 1x,r cent ofall agricultural product lines and over 7r per cent ofall industrirrl product lines; even the fishing sector, the best performer under revoluriorr ary rule, showed more declines than increases.

By r97o Cuba's economic growth performance was dismal. Two sharlt recessions had marked the beginning and end of the decade, the intervcrr ing years showing only a modest recovery. The standard of living wrrr extremely spartan, and discontent surfaced at all levels. To his credit, Prime Minister Castro took personal responsibiliry for the disasrer arrrl changed economic policies in the 6rst half of the r97os.

Relief for the Cuban economy came from an unexpected quarter: tlrc world sugar market. Prices for sugar in the free world market soared frorn an annual average of l. 68 cents of a dollar in r9J o ro 29. 6o cents in r97 4. Givcn that sugar exports had continucd to account for about four-fifths ol all exports, this price bonanza alone accounts for much of Cuba's econornit recovery in the first half of the r97os. The government also moved to reform internal economic organization by adopting and adapting the So- viet economrc model. Central macro-economic planning reappeared in thc early t97os, enabling Cuba to adopt its first 6ve-year plan in r975. Thc first plan (r976-8o) proved too optimistic and many of its targets werc not reached (the growth rate was one-third below plan) since it had been based on the assumption that world sugar prices would remain higher than proved to be the case in the late r97os. Nonetheless, ir was morc realistic than anything rhe government had adopted before. A central budget was again designed and implemented from r977. Financial ac- counting and auditing were reinstituted, and material incentives received renewed emphasis as various reforms in monetary, price and wage policies sought to align supply and demand more accurately. The Soviet Union also channelled considerable resources to bring the Cuban economy afloat again.

One indication of how badly organized the Cuban economy had been in the r96os is that many of the new measures formulated early in the r97os could not be implemented until the late r97os or early r98os. Delays were also caused, however, by some opposition to the liberalization of the Cuban economy. And yet, as the r98os opened, farmers were allowed to sell the surplus to their state quotas in markets where prices were unregu- lated and transactions were between private persons, this also occurred in

lr,rrrclicraft markets and in the after-hours and weekend contracting of ,,r'rvices. At Iong last one could hire a plumber or buy tomatoes without

,lr',rling with a bureaucracy. State enterprises received greater autonomy ro

,r)nrract labour directly rather than depending wholly on the central

l,rlrour agency. A new management system was gradually adopted and

,,,'1,l"mented in the late ,97o' "nd early r98os to provide managers with

,',,,r" ur'l,ut,rmy and authority' It allowed each enterprise to retain some

1,rolits ttt distribute to managers and workers at the end of thc year and to

,,,r1,r,ru. the enrerprise and working conditions' \Wage diff'erentials' over-

rr))c pay and bonuses came to play a major role in labour incentivcs'

llrgher wages were paid for better-quality work' productivity improve-

nr('nts, cost reduction and longer hours' 'fhe economy prospered ul-o't spectacularly during the first half of the

r,;7os, Cuba's growth rate in those years comparing well with that of the

rvorld's leading growth Performers' However' the economy stagnated dur-

rrg rhe r..n.rJhalf of the decude excePt for r978' The third mafor severe

,,.,.ssion under revolutionary rule was under way by mid-r979' encourag-

rng the outburst of emigration in r98o ju-st as the prolonged recession of

rlrc'late r96os increased the emigration of those years'

\reak economic performance at the beginning of the r98os put pres-

srrrc on the country's foreign-debt service Payments' Although Cuba has

rrotbeenamaiorbo.ro*",it'theinternationalcapitalmarkets'itshard- (rrrrency foreign debt in r98z was about $3 billion'

lVhen foreign trade

lrccame more concentrated with the Soviet Union exports generated less

r(,venue for servicing the hard-currency debt. The ensuing negotiations

with European, Arab and Japanese bankers Ied to policies that decreased

(onsumption levels in ti't tu'ly r98os in order ro meet Cuban debt

ol>ligations. {in. -u1n, difference between these two periods of

economic perfor-

nlance was the price of sugar' Although it rose steadily from r97o to

rt;1 4, irfell to an average t'f ubotl' 8 cents per pound during the second

half of the r97os. After-a short-lived rise in late rgtio and early r98t the

worldpriceofsugarfelltothe6-toS-centlevel'Moreover'troubledby irs own weak economic performance, the Soviet Union in r98r cut by

onc-sixth the price it paii for Cuban sugar while continuing to raise the

lrrices it charied fo, its e*ports to Cuba' Cuba's terms of trade with rhe

StlvictljnioninrgSz_whenCubahadtorescheduleitsdebtswith rrrarkct-cconomy lcndcrs - were one-third lower than in rc;1"' The recov- cry of thc price thc Soviets paid for Cuban sugar in subsequent

years

J

rr4 Caba: A short history

prevented a more severe economic crisis, even if the cuban-soviet rcrntt of trade remained well below what they were in the mid- to late l97or, Sugar prices remained closely related to rhe swings in Cutran econonltr performance, underscoring rhe commodity's persistently central r<llt, tn the cconomy.

The adoption of some economic reforms in the early r97os had quith and positive results, but by the late r97os producrivity improvemcrrtr were more difficult to arrain. Fidel castro rold the rhird party congrcss irr r986 that Cuba still suffered from 'the absence of comprehensive nariornl planning for economic development'. He added thar the new managemcnt system, afrcr a good beginning, had 'no consistent follow-rhrough to improve ir. The initiative was lost and rhe creariviry needed to adapt tlrir system to our own conditions - a sysrem largely taken from otlrct countries - never materialized'. Even'the budget conrinued to be ineffcr tive. Rather than regularing spending, it, in effect, promored it'.t

To address these problems, in April r986 Casrro launched a process rllirt he called'rectificarion'. Cuba was rhe only communist regime in rhe lltc r98os to back off from market mechanisms in order ro improve proclur tion and efliciency. Cascro denounced heads ofsrare enrerprises for having become apprencice capiralists. He lashed our ar rhe lure of 'vile money'. 'lir stamp out the curse of rhe market, in May r986 the governmenr bannctl the farmers'markets that had been legalized in r98o. Other anti-markcr measures were adopred and Castro lashed our againsr the reliance orr bonuses to motivate the workers, calling once again for moral incentives ro build a better society. The fact that the economy fell into a recession irr ry86-7 partly reflected rhe inefficacy of rhese measures ro rid Cuba flronr the vestiges of capitalism. There was, however, another enduring prob- lem. The second half of the r97os was also rhe period of rhe rwo ma.jor African wars and of rhe deployment of large numbers of Cubans overseas, which relied on the mobilization of reservists. A majority of Cuban troops in Ethiopia, about four-fifths of the Cuban troops in Angola and almosr all Cuban personnel in Grenada were reservisrs ar rhe peak of the wars and rhc U.S. invasion. Given the desire to win the wars and to perform well overseas in military roles, some of the best managers, rechnicians anrl workers were taken from the home economy for rhe overseas army, conrrib- uting to a decline in productivity and efficiency in various secrors sincc thc

'Grorno V/eeh\ Reweu. r(r Fcbruary r98(r, specral supplemenr, (r,7

Cuba since t959 I I5

l,rtc r97os. Although the number of Cuban troops in Ethiopia was re-

,lrrrcd sharply by the mid-r9tlos, more than 5o,ooo Cuban troops re-

rrr,rincd in Angola until the war endcd in r9tl8' 'l'he Cuban revolutionary government sought to generate economic

llrowth from the moment it arrived in power but except for the recovery ol the early r97os these policies did not succeed' There was no growth at

,rll cluring- the l96os. The economy's performance after 1975 failed to

,,',,ch m*y planned targets. It generated only modest real economic lirowrh and suffered a maior recession as well as serious international ,k.br problems. The srrucrure of production diversified only a little. Sugar remained king, generating about four-fifths of export revenue'

llowever, the government had also implemented a strategy of import ,,trbstituting industrialization' evolving gradually in the r97os and con-

rrrruing in the rgSos - decades after such straregies appeared in most rrrirjor Larin American counrries. cuba's factories now provided a wider

,,rr,,y of light- and medium-industry products' However' their inef6- , rcncy and the poor quality of their Products remained a problem while

non-sugar agricultural procluction continued to perform poorly with few

(.XccPtions(eggs,citrusfruits).Cubawasunabletodiversifyitsinterna- tional economic relations to any great extent: there was overwhelming

,lr'1>cndence on one product (sugar cane) and one country (the Soviet

tJnion). The tendency in the late r97os and r98os was to retain depen-

,lcnce on both. On the other hand, government economic performance was impressive

with respect to redisrribution. There was a strong and generally successful

tOmmirmenr ro provide full employment for all able-bodied cicizens (de-

spite the reapPearance of overt unemployment in the r97os' reaching 1'4

l)cr cent in r97t2), even at the cost of under-employment and inefficiency' ilqually, access to basic goods at low prices was provided through the

rirrioning sysrem, even ar the cosr of subsidizing consumPtion. The govern-

Ir)cnr's policies in the rg6os dramarically reduced inequalities between social classes and between town and country' The improvement in the rrrral poor's standard of living was outstanding. The trend in the r97os

,trrd early rg8os roward greater use of material incentives led to a new

rrrcquality that stimulated good managerial and worker performance- Nev-

(,rthcless, the leadership retained irs commitment to meet the basic needs

0l its people, and cuba remained a very egalitarian society by Latin Arncrican standards.

I

I

Cuba: A short historl, Cuba since t959

SOCIAL TRENDS

Cuba underwent a demographic transformation after the Revolution camc to power. There was a'baby boom' in the early I96os, the crude birth-ratc increasing by about a third compared to the late rgjos; then the cru<lc birth-rate srayed above 3o births per r,ooo population from 196o to r96t), The principal explanation for the baby boom is probably the improvcrl economic conditions for lower-income Cubans resulting from redistribu- tional policies and improved health facilities in the rural areas. Increasc<l wages, an end to overt unemployment, reduced rents and guaranteed acccss to basic necessities, including education and health care, provided a'floor' for all Cubans. At the same time, the government launched a campaign t<r promote marriages, including the legalization of the many pre-existing consensual unions. Contraceptive supplies, previously available from tl.rc United States, were cut off by the U.S. trade embargo. The emigratiorr broke up families and opened up new opportunities for relationships for those remaining in Cuba. The emigration of doctors and other health-carc personnel reduced opportunities for abortion, as did the more effecrivc enforcement of a pre-revolutionary law restricting abortion.

The initial impact of the baby boom was masked by emigration. Popula- tion growth rates declined in the early r9(ros, but when the firsc wave ol emigration was shut off at the rime of the missile crisis the growth ratc reached the highest level since the rgzos: over 2.6 per cent per year. Thc baby boom also began to have a dramatic impact on the primary school system, which had to expand overnight, and on the delivery of orher social services to the young. The government's ability to delivcr such services is ir striking demonstration of its commitment to support the young even itr years of economic decline.

The baby boom was followed by a baby bust. The crude birrh rate was reduced by half between the end of the I96os anC the end of the r97os, when the population growth rate was one-chird of what it had been in thc mid-l96os. As a resulr of the emigration outburst, there was a net dcclinc in population in r98o, when Cuba's age pyramid showed that the popula- tion aged fifteen to nineteen (the peak of the baby boom) was jo pcr ccnt larger than the population aged twenty to twenty-four (born just bcfbrc rhe Revolution). One consequence of the baby boom was co allow thc government regularly to station J5,ooo young men in its overscas armc<l forces. The population under age five (the 'baby bust') was somcwltirt smaller than the population aged twenty to twcnty-four, ancl it was tltrt'-

rhird smaller than the population aged fifteen to nineteen' The baby bust

lrad as many implications for social services as did the baby boom; one

rnitial effect was cuba's ability ro export primary school teachers ro work

()vcrseas in foreign-aid missions. In the long run, the baby bust might

lravemadeitmorediflicultforCubatostationitsarmiesoverseasinthe I g9os.-

Cuban ferciliry had been declining gradually before the Revolutron' 'l'he high level of social modernization probably contributed to the re-

,,cwed fertility decline, but its magnitude and suddenness in the r97os

tould not be explained with reference to long-term processes alone' The

ncw fertility d..lin. began in the late r96os with the economy's sharp

tlererioration. However, ir continued unabated during both the economic

rccovery of the first half of the r97os and the economic slow-down at the

cnd of the decade. The economy's Poor Performance is a necessary but

rrrsufficient condition for explaining the fertility decline. ln r964, restric-

tions on abortion were eased. Abortion became legal and easy, Cuba's

,rbortion rario (rhe number of abortions Per I'ooo pregnancies) rising

steadily from the r96os so that by the end of the r97os two out of five

l)regnancies were ended by abortion' Only Bulgaria' Japan and the Soviet

UnLn had a higher abortion ratio' Indeed, abortion probably became the

rnainbirth-controlmethod.\{hilethenumberofabortionsdoubledfrom r968 to r978, the number of live births fell by two-fifths' Other means of

contracePtion,however,alsobecamemoreavailablewithinthenational I,calth sisrem and these conrributed ro a fertility decline roo. After the

sharp increases of rhe previous decade the marriage rate stabilized in the

rnid- and late-r97os, but the divorce rate quadrupled from its pre-

rcvolutionary level, about one in three marriages ending in divorce throughout the l97os. It is likely that the greater incidence of divorce helped to reduce the birth rate. The continuing severe housing shortage

^l,odis.o.,,"gedmarriagesbecausecouPlesdidnotwishtolivewiththeir in-laws, or if they did, there was rarely space to house children' The

l)ermanentstationingofsomeSo,oooCubansoverseasinthelater9TOS must also have contributed to reduce fertility'

According to the r98r national census' chere were 9'706'169 Cubans

living in Cuba, one-6ith of whom lived in the city of Havana - a slightly ,-"1L. proportion than in the r97o census' Cuba had become an urban (ountry. \tr7hile the level of urbanization increased slowly between r953

and r97o (from 57 Per cent to 6o per cent), it jumped to 69 per cent in

rgtlr'tlrbangrowthalsotrccurredoutsidethecapital.\J(/hileHavana

I II.I Cuba; A shrtrt history

grew 7.7 per cent from r97o co r98r, Victoria de las Tunas grew lly rll per cent and Holguin and Bayamo by more rhan 40 per cenr. Seven <ltlrr,r ciries grew by more rhan z4 per cenr in rhat period, and the numbcr ol towns with a population of 95,ooo or more doubled in the r97os, lrr short, urbanization occurred mostly ourside the primare ciry (Havana), ,r rare outcome by Latin American standards.

The experience of women changed considerably under revolutionary rtrk. As we have seen, women were more likely to get married, ger divorct',| and have an abortion. They were much more likely to have chilclrcrr during the l96os than during the r97os. The proportion of women in tlrr. labour force also doubled from the late r95os ro rhe late r97os, when rll,y accounted for 3o per cent of rhe labour force. This resulred, however, frorrr a gradual increase rather than from an abrupr change brought abour by tlu' Revolution. The increased entry of women into the labour force reflecre.l an evolving social modernization alrhough some government policies m:ry have helped it. By contrast, the participation of Cuban women who emi grared to the United Stares increased much more and much more quickly: proportionarely, twice as many Cuban-origin women in the Unired Statt,s rhan in Cuba were employed in the labour force in r97o, when a majoriry of Cuban-American women but only a quarrer of Cuban women werc irr the labour force.

Some Cuban government policies discouraged female incorporarion into the labour force. The governmenr reserved certain categories of jobs frrr men on the grounds that women's health would be impaired were women to be engaged in those occuparions, although no evidence was released to yustify that policy. As the young 'baby boom' workers entered rhe labotrr force rapidly, govcrnment policics sought ro mainrain a consranr sex rari<r in the labour force instead of helping rhe proporrionate incorporarion ol' women.

There was an impressive increase in the numbers of women throughout the educational system. tVomen were represented at levels comparable ro rheir share of the population in formerly predominantly male professional schools at the universiry, such as medicine, the natural sciences and eco- nomics. Although they remained under-represented in engineering ancl agronomy and over-represented in primary and secondary school teaching and in the humanities, a fundamental shift had occurred. The govern- ment, however, imposed quotas to limit the increase in women's enr<ll- ment in certain professional schools such as medicine on thc grounds that

Caba since r959 II9

wornen were more likely to interrupt their careers and rhat women doctors

would be less suitable for service in the armed forces. Women's participation in politics lagged considerably' \7omen ac-

r ounted for only r 3 per cent of the Central Commimees of the Communist

l,,rrty of cuba chosen in rg8o and rg8(t; there were no women in the party St,crctariat and no women in the top government Organ, the Execurive ( .ornmittee of the Council of Ministers. The first woman entered the

l).rrry's Polirical Bureau in r986: Vilma Espin, Rairl castro's wife and l,rcsident of the \7omen's Federation. $7omen were also under-represented

,rr the middle ranks of leadership. surveys suggested rhe persistence of .,t.xual srereorypes in che home (despire governmenr efforts through a li;rrnily Code approved in rhe mid-r97os to equalize status between \l)ouses in the family), the workplace and in politics. \(omen and men r lrrng to traditional female roles.

'l lrcre was little research on race relations after the Revolurion. Because (.rrba's black and mulatto population was disproportionately poor, and

lrccause rhe poor benefited disproportionately from government policies,

lrlacks were likely to have benefited from such policies. Available surveys

srrggesred srronger black than whire supporr for rhe government, until

rgSo blacks were grearly under-represented among cuban exiles. The

r.,)$o emigrarion outburst included urban blacks in numbers comparable ro rheir share of the urban population. The government eliminated the few

rrrcially discriminatory legal bars that existed before the revolution but

rhis had modest impact. The governmenr soughr to include the symbol-

rsrn of Cuba's African heritage at the forefront of the iustifications for (.uba's acrions in African countries. However, rhe gaPs between whites ,rnd blacks may nor have changed as much during the past clecades. For

t.xample, although healrh standards for the enrire population improved,

r lrc relatively higher vulnerability of blacks to diseases (esp:cially parasitic

,liseases that afflict poor populations) continued. The gap in access to lrcalth care between whites and biacks did not change much either' despite

tlrc undoubted gains in this regard for most Cubans. pcrhaps because rhe leaders of the revolurionary movement in the r 95os

wcre disproporrionarely white and because rhey continued to command rltc heighrs of power, blacks were grearly under-represented in the top ()rllans of government and party. The level of black rePresentation changed

lrrtlc from beforc the revolution - when Batista was Cuba's first mulatto lrrcsi<lcnr '.. ro thc rg8(r party congress when Presidenr castro declared it a

"'1

t20 Cuba: A shnrt bistory

matter of party policy to increase the black share of top parry organs; whereas one-third of the rotal populacion was black (r98r census), thc black share of the r986 Central Commitree was just one-fifth. Only in elections to local municipal assemblies were blacks apparenrly represenrccl in numbers comparable to their share of the popularion.

Since the government claimed to have solved racial problems, it becamc subversive to argue char they persisted even if in modified form. Thc government banned associations of black intellectuals and policicians rhar had existed before the Revolucion. A number of those who insisred therc were still serious racial problems in Cuban sociery, or distinctive inrellec- tual issues among Afro-Cubans, became exiles.

Cuba's educational transformation was che revolutionary government's most impressive achievement. The governmenr advanced Cuba's social modernization by the sharp reduction of illiteracy (down to r2.9 per cenr in the t97o census and to 5.6 per cent in 1979), starring with a major campaign in r 96 r which was continued through the extensive adult educa- tion system. The government expropriated all private (including Church- affiliated) schools. After difficulties during the r96os, the government accomplished virtual universal attendance at primary schools. Averagc educational levels in the labour force jumped from bare literacy in the r964 labour census to sixth grade in the r914 labour census and to eighrh grade in the large r979 demographic survey. ln r979, two-frfths of rhc adult population had completed the ninth grade and two-rhirds rhe sixth grade.

The boom in primary education reflecred both government conscious policy and the need to accommodate the baby boom. By the late r97os, primary school enrolments had begun ro decline as a result of the baby bust. From r91 4-, (the peak year in primary school enrolment) to r98o- r, primary school enrolment (including preschool) fell zo per cent. The remarkably adaptive school system increased iunior high school enrolment by tzr per cent and senior high school enrolment by qq per cenr over rhc same period. Between 4oo,ooo and Too,ooo people per year were enrolecl in adult education schools during the r97os.

The primary school system reduced - but did not eliminate - the dif- ferences in access to quality education between urban and rural Cuba. A generous programme of scholarships also helped to reduce class differences in access to education at the post-primary levels. There were a number ol serious problems of quality in Cuban schools during the r9(ros - high

Caba since r g5cy I2T

,lrop-out rates, low levels of teacher training, poor student and poor rcacher performance in the classroom. Although some of these problems

rt,mained, the qualirative improvemenr in the I97os matched the still t,xcellenr quanrirarive performance inherited from the r96os. Many people

,lcserved credit for these accomplishments, including Fidel castro, whose

( oncern with education was a key fearure of the government's commit-

rnenr. However, rhe long-serving vice-president of the council of Minis-

tcrs and Minister of Education, Jos6 Ram6n Fern6ndez, deserved special

rncntion. He skilfully managed the transition from the baby boom to the

lrrrsr, rhe adjustments and expansions of enrolmenr, and the marked im-

l)rovemenrs in the quality of educacion, notwithstanding the problems, rhat, as he recognized, still remained.

Higher educarion had a more rorruous history. Enrolment declined in

rhc r96os, to increase only in rhe next decade. Faculty ranks were deci-

rrrated by politically inspired dismissals and emigration. Most students

wcre enroled only in night school, where the quality of the instruction and

rhc experience ranged from poor ro variable because many teachers were

,rvcrworked, resources were limited and there wefe too many students. 'l'here was a srrong technical bias to higher education that encouraged cnrolmenr in engineering and discouraged it in the humanities. The aca- ,lcmic study of rhe social sciences was neglected, and that which was

rrndertaken avoided contemPorary issues of political signilicance within (.r.rba. Since r 959, however, rhere had been superb historiographical schol-

;rrship whose crowning glory was Manuel Moreno Fraginals's trilogy on

rlrc sugar mill in rhe eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (El ingenio). ()ood historiography stops generally around r935, just before the begin-

rring of rhe subsequently embarrassing alliance between Batista and the (.ommunist Party.

The universities were organized on a broad 'industrial model" to train

lrrofessional personnel in a hierarchical sysrem. They de-cmphasized the

,lcvelopment of the liberal arts or the possibility of active intellectual

t riticism of major political, social, economic or cultural problems. Ir{any

0f'cuba's leading writers of the rg6os and rgTos lived overseas (Guillermo

(.abrcra Infante, Severo sarduy, Reinaldo Arenas, Heberto Padilla, Ed-

rnundo Desnoes, Anronio Benitez Roio, among others) or had died (Aleio

(.rrrpenrier and Jos6 Lezama Lima). Political criteria were among the fac-

rors in making dccisions on student admissions even to non-political profl'ssions such as metlicine and despite the fact that the universities and

thc Acadcmy o[ Sciences emphasized applied technical research. Medical

lii lu

I

r22 Cuba: A short historl,

research, and research on the agriculrure and processing of sugar canc, both with long pre-revolutionary tradirions, were the major areas of scicn- tific achievemenr.

Although Cuba had a high level of lireracy (abour rhree-quarrers of all adults) and relatively high levels of school enrolmenr before the Revolu, tion, these had stagnated in rhe middle third of rhe twenrieth cenrury, The revolutionary governmenr thus took up che rask of educarional mod- ernization where ir had been left in rhe rgzos to institutionalize arr educational revolution that was righrly the pride of its people and goverrr- ment and an outsranding example of susrained commitment to othr,r countries. Cuban schoolreachers ably served rheir counrry's foreign policy and the needs ofordinary students over three continents. The educationnl system, however, was inhospitable to political and intellectual dissenr; ir restricted freedom of expression and repressed many critics. The fruits of education and culture were rhus curtailed. For rhis tragic loss, Cubir served as a negative example of rhe uses of governmenr power ro limir thc full development of human porential.

Government policies and performance in rhe area of health care also regis- tered appreciable success. The governmenr quickly established healrh carc as the right of every citizen, expanding the sysrem of free provision that had existed before rhe Revolution. There were early advances in rhe rural areas, improving the delivery of health care and narrowing rhe gap bc- tween town and country. However, general performance deteriorared dur- ing the r96os compared to rhe quite highly developed pre-revolutionary health system, this rrend largely resulting from rhe worsening health carc in the cities, where mosr people lived. Many doctors and orher health-carc professionals left rhe counrry and because they had been concentrared in Havana the capital suffered disproporrionarely. Existing medical serviccs and facilities were disrupred by polirical and milita"y mobilizarions. Ineffi- cient production of medicines and the disruption of ties wirh the Unirccl States led ro a shortage of medical supplies which had a particular impacr on upper-income urban consumers with access to and resources co buy imported medicines. The emergency health-care training program ro rc- place the departing exiles was uneven in quality, and rhe healrh sysrcm was affected as much as orher areas of srare enrerprise by rhe disorganiza- rion ofrhe r96os.

During the early r96os rhe general as well as the infanr morraliry ratcs worsened. The infant morrality rate (dearhs under a1;e one per r,ooo lrvc

Cuba since r959 r23

lrrrrhs) rose from thirty-five in rtS59 to forty-seven ten years later, the rares lor major diseases also worsening during rhese years. The commitment of

liovernment budgetary resources to urban health care faltered as resources

wcre channelled to the rural areas. Indeed, unril the early I97os the

l,crformance of the health-care sysrem was nor unlike rhat of the Cuban r.(onomy: much better in redisrriburion among social classes and geo-

tiraphic regions than in growth. By the mid r97os, thanks in part to

1'rcceding economic improvemenrs, the sysrem made great advances. The

rrrlhnt mortality rate fell to r8.5 per I,ooo by the time of the r98r ((.nsus, and morbidity rates fell across the spectrum of serious diseases. It rrrusr be remembered, however, that cuba already had a rather mature

lrcirkh-care system on the eve of the Revolution. Thus, six of the top eight

,,rr.rses of death were identical in r958 and in r98r; heart disease, cancers' ,liscases of the central nervous system, influenza and pneumonia, accidents

,rncl early childhood diseases. on the other hand, alrhough acute diaffheic ,liscases, homicides, tuberculosis and nephritis were among the top ten

tluses in r918, rhey had been replaced by suicides, diabetes, congenital nralformations and respiratory diseases by r98r. These changes brought (.uba closer ro rhe rypical health profile for an industrial country in ways

rhat could have been predicted from Cuba's long-term pattern of health-

t are modernization. At rhe srarr of rhe rgSos the governmenr's mosr signi6cant accomplish-

rncnr in health care remained the reduction of inequality in access to lrcalrh care among social classes and regions. Havana's advantage over

(.lsrern cuba narrowed. The set-backs of the rg6os were overcome and lrcalth standards genuinely improved, building on the good but insuffi- ticnr levels of rhe rg;os. Cuba posted ralenred health-care personnel in

rhree-dozen countries the world over. Some of these Programmes sold

thcir medical services to host governments, earning foreign exchange for (.trba's transnational state enterprises. MoSt such progranlmes, however,

wcre free of charge ro the reciPient country.

'l'he revolutionary governmenr's poor performance in housing construction

rcsulted from insufficienr production, inefficiency and disorganization in

rllc construction and construction-materials industries' The government

.licl nor give high priority in the allocation of construction resources to nrcctintra the housing needs of the population- Its principal goals in this

,rrca included the building o[ hospitals, schools and military installations

;rn<l rhc dcpl<-rymcnt of sOme o[ rhe best construction teams overseas'

I

&

Cuba since t959 r25 It

r24 Cuba: A short history

In the late r94os and early r95os, with a population half of that tlrlrr decades later, pre-revolutionary Cuba built almost 2J,ooo housing urrrtr per year. In the early r96os, the rate fell to iust over l7,ooo units lrrt year; very little housing was built in the radical period of the late r96os During the first Five Year Plan(t976-8o), just over t6,ooo housing urrrtr per year were built. The trend in the late I97os was towards a declinc irr the rate of housing construction at the same time as more Constructiott workers were deployed overseas and the Cuban armed forces expandctll

Cuba built almost 2I,ooo housing units in 1973 (the peak year sintc r959) but not even rj,ooo in r98o.

The housing situation was alleviated somewhat by the emigratiorr' From r959 to r915, emigration made available about 9,3oo units on tltc average per year; during those same years, average housing constructitltl was about rr,8oo units. This meant that about one-third of the ncw demand for housing went unsatisfied each year. Considering that much ol

rhe pre-revolutionary housing stock was already in deplorable condition and that there was much evidence that rhousands of housing units col- lapsed out of poor maintenance, Cuba faced a terrible housing problem irr

the r98os. The housing shortage and rhe resultant overcrowding havc been among the major causes for Cuba's high divorce rate and rapidly declining fertility rate.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

The central figure in Cuba's revolutionary politics was Fidcl Castro, his leadership remaining charismatic in the sense that it depended on thc conviction that he did not depend on election by his followers but had been'elected'by a supernatural authority or some'historical force'. Hc also depended on the citizenry's sharing that conviction. Castro's sense of

mission was a persistent theme in his many publi: statements. The con- cluding phrase to the edited version ofhis defence at his trial for attackinll the Moncada barracks on z6 July r913 provided the first major statement of this belief: 'Condemn me; it does not matter to me. History will absolvc ..r.'.u Hirrory-as-god eleccs the revolutionary leader to act with and for his followers. Or, as he put it in perhaps the most diflicult speech of his government career when he reported publicly on the economic collapse of

6 English tcxr in Rolando Bonachea and Nelson P Valdes (eds \' Revolntiotary Str4gle IgtT' I95u 'f he S elqted V'orfu of I' idet Carlra (Cambridgc, Mass., t 97 z), vol. t

rlrt'late I96os:'If we have an atom of value' that atom of value will be

rlrrough our service to an idea, a cause' linked to the PeoPIe'-t The cause'

rl,,'idea, history incarnate, elects the leader to rule' Castro's sway over his

,r,,sociates and many ordinary citizens has been the single most srriking

l,olitical fact of contemPorary Cuban history' (-astro's political style emphasized active engagement as opposed to

rlrcoretical pursuits. It also highlighted the power of self-discipline and

, ,rrrscious action, as opposed to the pre-revolutionary Communists who

rvt'rc waiting for objective conditions to ripen to launch their revolution

,vlrcn Castro's forces swept into power and in contrast to those econo-

rnrsrs who argued thut th. strategy to produce ro million tons of sugar

rn t97o was madness' Subiective will was the fundamental resource for

,,'uulrrtio.ury leaders to overcome obiective obstacles in war' politics or

rtonomics. A vanguard, an elite, must lead rhe people and awaken them

r. their historical responsibilities. Moreover, only the maximum possible

,.llilrt toward the optimal goal was worth pursuing' The apparently

rrrrattainable goal was alone worthy because it was clear that the revolu-

ronary consciousness of women and men provided the essential margin

l,,..rictory. An activist, determined vanguard would reach for the

Itrture - and conquer it. 'fhis approach to politics brought the Cuban Revolution to power

and

lctl the revolutionary gotoat"t"tn' to undertake a number of successful

,rctivities, ranging frori "ictoty in the battlefields of the Horn of Africa to

rhc overcoming of illiceracy. Ii also led to some disasters and rragedies, of

which rhe economic and social experiments of the late r96os provide the

lrcst general example. But many other smaller projects were also disasters'

lcsponding to a whim o, u pu"ing thought of Castro's to which subordi-

rratcs dedicated themselves with ft*ot" and commitment for no sensible

l)rrrpose. This style of leadership bred intolerance toward critics, dissent-

(.rs'oreventhosewhowereIustsomewhatunconventional.Thisstyleof rule reiected out of hand the hypothesis that the great leader's

policies

nright be in error - uncil disaster struck' Revolutionary rule was legitimizecJ not only by charisma but

also by

pcrformance. Cuba, its neJle^ders said from the moment they seized

iru*", in r919, had been delivered from a terroristic' corrupt' abusive and

,llcgitimatepoliticalsystem'FidelCastro'sconsummateoratoricalskills- rultcrnatcly mellow and fierce, iocular or insulting towards his

enemies'

d

' Grunno Weehly Retiru" z August t97o' 6