

INTRODUCTION

Tönnies and His Relation to Sociology

ORIENTATION OF GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT

IN 1887, FERDINAND TÖNNIES, at the early age of thirty-two, produced a small volume which was destined to wield great influence upon sociological thinking. For the next fifteen years this *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, with its unique, difficult,¹ old German diction, was read by only a small circle. Its second edition, however, gained much attention and ran through six more editions, one after another, achieving an international reputation for its author. The volume pointed back into the Middle Ages and ahead into the future in its attempt to answer the questions: What are we? Where are we? Whence did we come? Where are we going?

The romantic characteristics and ominous prophecy of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* might have attracted more attention had it appeared during a previous period, when a strong current of German tradition was being carried through the works of Stein, Mohl, Riehl, Herder, Kant, Möser, Arndt, Fichte, and Schleiermacher. Hans Freyer² has dramatized the role Tönnies played in preserving the German tradition in sociology from the positivism which prevailed in America, France, and England.

Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft appeared as a synthesis of rationalism and romanticism, idealism and materialism, realism and nominalism.³ It is the more remarkable because it did not branch off solely from German philosophical idealism but rather sank its roots into economic and legal history,⁴ deriving what nourishment the mind of its creative author required, especially from Maine, Gierke, Marx, and Hobbes. This, combined with his knowledge of the ethnology, psychology, philosophy, and sociology of the time, led to the great synthesis.

It would be a mistake to assume that the roots of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* had no foundation other than the literature with which the author was familiar. They ran deep into the subsoil of Tönnies' own experience and observation. As a son of a well-to-do peasant family, he saw the influence of rationalism as the old rural culture of his native province, Schleswig-Holstein, had to submit to the inroads of mechanization and commercialization. Furthermore, his oldest

brother was engaged in trading with English merchants so that he had, while very young, firsthand contact with two worlds—the world of the peasant rooted to his soil and the world of the merchant whose soul is in the profits of his trade. After receiving his doctor's degree at the age of twenty-one at Tübingen, he returned to his native province and set himself to the task of writing *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, concerning which he said: "The work occupied my time day and night continuously for the following six or seven years, whether I was at home, at my writing desk, taking a walk, or traveling." Its first draft was presented to the faculty of the University of Kiel in 1881, at which time its author began his long period of lecturing there.

APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

It is altogether fitting that almost half a century after the publication of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, which was the creative effort of a youthful mind, Tönnies' book on "The Spirit of Modern Times," *Geist der Neuzeit*,⁵ was published in 1935, half a year before Tönnies' death. This work and *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* will go down through history together, not as the beginning and end of one man's career, but as guideposts to past, present, and future. Some critics believe they have detected a note of pessimism⁶ in Tönnies' descriptions of the village, town, and estate of the Middle Ages in his works. Following are a few observations from *Geist der Neuzeit*: In the Middle Ages there was unity, now there is atomization: then the hierarchy of authority was solicitous paternalism, now it is compulsory exploitation; then there was relative peace, now wars are wholesale slaughter; then there were sympathetic relationships among kinsfolk and old acquaintances, now there are strangers and aliens everywhere; then society was chiefly made up of home- and land-loving peasants, now the attitude of the businessman prevails; then man's simple needs were met by home production and barter, now we have world trade and capitalistic production; then there was permanency of abode, now great mobility; then there were folk arts, music, and handicrafts, now there is science—and the scientific method applied, as in the case of the cool calculations of the businessman, leads to the point of view which deprives one's fellow men and one's society of their personality, leaving only a framework of dead symbols and generalizations.

Tönnies continually reminded his readers that the process of change through which the individual who was controlled by natural or integral will in his *Gemeinschaft* was "freed" and became the subject of rational will, was "healthy" and "normal." (See note 1 on page 284.) Although critics accused him of recommending *Gemeinschaft* as good

and condemning *Gesellschaft* as bad, he disclaimed any such intention. (See note 2 on page 284.) For him *Gemeinschaft* represented the youth, and *Gesellschaft* the adulthood, of society. Although societies, like individuals, could die from old age, no objective physician or student of medicine could condemn old age.⁷ In his last work Tönnies hinted that the process of change from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* might be reversed by real causes if such existed, but not by speeches and sentimental romanticizing about the past.⁸

Notwithstanding the important role played by the ideological elements encompassed in natural will and rational will, Tönnies, like Marx, was addicted to the economic interpretation of history.⁹ Tönnies believed that with the development of trade, the modern state, science, the natural will and *Gemeinschaft*-like characteristics of social entities, norms, and values gave way to rational will and *Gesellschaft*-like characteristics. Unlike Marx, who believed technical conditions and progress to be the prime mover in change, Tönnies ascribed this role to a large-scale trade involving the desire for the profitable use of money, which led to the development of capitalism. According to Tönnies the introduction of this type of trade into the integrated communities of agrarian and town societies liquidated the old ideologies and brought about the capitalistic age with its rationalistic intellectual attitude. In this interpretation, Tönnies was influenced by 17th- and 18th-century social science of England and France, as well as by Marx.¹⁰

In the small volume on "Progress and Evolution in Society" (*Fortschritt und Soziale Entwicklung*),¹¹ appearing in 1926, which resulted from the compilation of several papers, Tönnies discussed the concept of progress and described in concrete terms the development of a universal culture in the world. *Progress and Evolution in Society* and *The Spirit of Modern Times*, with the more specialized volumes on the folkways and mores¹² and public opinion,¹³ represent penetrating interpretations of reality through the application of the concepts *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and are Tönnies' most important contributions to his applied (*angewandte*) sociology, which is one of the three disciplines of Tönnies' sociology proper (*spezielle Soziologie*).

SPECIAL AND GENERAL SOCIOLOGY

Tönnies' sociology proper includes: (1) Pure or theoretical (*reine, theoretische*) sociology; (2) applied sociology; and (3) empirical (*empirische*) sociology, or sociography.

Sociology proper, social biology, social psychology, and demography constitute general sociology. This latter term was used by Tönnies

to indicate all-inclusiveness as contrasted with the narrower field of sociology proper. Social biology, broadly considered, studies the interactions which result from the living together of plants and animals; however, general sociology concerns itself only with those of its aspects which relate to human living together. Social biology, as a part of general sociology, is social anthropology abstracted from all psychology and as such involves the biological study of race and genetics, as well as other biological considerations, and is studied in connection with ethnography, demography, and other disciplines which may be classified with sociology proper. Social psychology considers the inner psychical or subjective aspects of human living together.

PURE OR THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY

Although Tönnies made important contributions in applied and empirical sociology, he is best known for his work in the pure or theoretical field. This latter is made up of a logical system of concepts of ideal types¹⁴ and of social entities (*soziale Wesenheiten*) in a static condition. Such a system is required for the description and understanding of empirical social phenomena, just as in some other fields mathematics is required. By way of analogy, Tönnies described such concepts as nails on which the facts of experience could be hung, or clamps which would clasp bundles of reality, thus serving as efficient tools in the production of knowledge.¹⁵ By use of his system of concepts he was able to demonstrate the possibility of combining formal sociology with historical sociology.¹⁶ Tönnies' system finds its most adequate description in his *Introduction to Sociology*,¹⁷ which appeared four years before his death; and, although it never attained the recognition of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, is more readable and is a great help in the understanding of his sociology.

A. The First Sphere of Tönnies' Pure Sociology—Fundamental Concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*

The keystones of Tönnies' system are the concepts or ideal types, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, which are based primarily upon natural will and rational will. In his sociological system these four concepts hold the center of the stage and all of the other concepts are related to them.¹⁸ Since the fundamental concepts of the system are adequately set forth by Tönnies himself in Part Five, "The Summing Up," on pages 237-59, no extended discussion of this aspect of his system will be required here.

Tönnies assumes that all social relationships are created by human will.¹⁹ As social facts they exist only through the will of the individuals

to associate. This will and the inner relationship of the associated individuals with one another may vary from one situation to another. For instance, a group or a relationship can be willed because those involved wish to attain through it a definite end and are willing to join hands for this purpose, even though indifference or even antipathy may exist on other levels. In this case rational will (*Kürwille*), in which means and ends have been sharply differentiated, as in Max Weber's "*Zweckrationalem*" behavior, prevails. On the other hand, people may associate themselves together, as friends do, because they think the relation valuable as an end in and of itself. In this case natural or integral will predominates. Natural will is the conditioning and originating element in any process of willing which is derived from the temperament, character, and intellectual attitude of the individual, whether it has its origin in liking, inclination, habit, or memory.²⁰ It cannot be inferred, however, that natural will is always irrational. There are degrees of rationality of natural will and of the communities and groups which it forms. Thus, in order of the importance of rationality there are the *Gemeinschaft* groups based on friendship, on neighborliness, and on blood relationships. Groups in which natural will predominates may range from those held together by intellectual ties to those bound by the instinctive liking or sympathy of biologically related individuals.²¹

Thus, the businessman, scientist, person of authority, and the upper classes are relatively more conditioned by rational will²² than the peasant, the artist, and the common people, who are more conditioned by natural will. In general, women and young people are conditioned predominantly by natural will, and men and older people by rational will.²³

In making these distinctions, Tönnies is constantly thinking in terms of means and ends.²⁴ The work of the peasant, hunter, artisan, or artist is a way of life, not merely a means to an end. Even the tools and utensils which such people use as means are less sharply differentiated from the ends than the means used by merchants, business entrepreneurs, and army leaders. The fields, soil, and livestock of the peasant are in and of themselves ends, whereas the means to the profits of the trader are sharply differentiated from the ends.²⁵ The horseman may value his horse because of liking, sympathy, or even love, or he may value it solely as a work animal, as a means to an end. Ordinarily, language, as a means of expressing oneself, is at least partially, an end in itself. For traders and designing, ambitious persons even language becomes a tool used to attain ends—to deceive, to advertise, to exaggerate, to overcome sales resistance. A utensil, tool, or instrument may become so embodied in the activities of a man

that it is almost a part of him, a third hand or, better, an extension of his own hand, through the use of which man's creative abilities are expressed. The introduction of the machine destroyed the previous unity or blending of the three elements—man, instrument, and work.

In all walks of life individuals live in the service of other individuals, and are in a sense tools or machines. When people are used as mere means to ends, even as "inanimate things," such usage is governed by rational will. The slave driver or industrial magnate is governed by rational will in his use of men; the peasant by natural will in the use of his family and servants. The more the actions of man are controlled by love, understanding, custom, religion,²⁶ folkways, and mores, the less people, animals, and things are thought of as mere means to ends and the less important the role of such socially sanctioned means as paper money, tricks of the trade, and the businessman's intellectual attitude. With the coming of the economic man who, characterized by Tönnies as the businessman, uses all means to attain wealth, and of the political man who, like the Machiavellian dictator, uses all available means to increase his power, and of the scientific man who, like the mathematician, uses logical concepts in descriptions which deprive things and man of life, means and ends come to be sharply differentiated and rational will prevails. It was Tönnies' belief that it remained for the scientific man to devise means of freeing the majority from the role of mere machines or puppets; but that the scientist must have different eyes than those of the so-called social engineer who constructs or copies Utopian plans and attempts to fit people into them; he must learn that society is a living, organic thing, unfolding naturally from within like a growing embryo or plant bud; and he must learn that this fact is just as real as the facts which make it possible to build bridges by following mathematical logic and constructed models. For Tönnies, the actions of people who are controlled by natural will resemble the organic functions of growing things. Those who are governed by rational will are more apt to follow models or plans with logical precision.²⁷

Although there are some elements in common between the use of ideal types and the use of a classificatory system such as is employed in biology, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are not to be thought of in this light. They are logical concepts which, like the concept of the electron in physics or the vitamin in dietetics, assist in description of relevant areas of consideration. However, the two logical concepts of Tönnies' system differ from such concepts as are used in natural science in that social life based entirely upon one type to the exclusion of the other would be inconceivable. Tönnies' types are not merely types but ideal types or mental constructs which do not actually exist

empirically in pure form, and no society could exist if one form or type existed to the exclusion of the other. Man's behavior is never motivated solely by rationality and reason. Passions and emotions play a role in all actual human associations.²⁸

Tönnies has been criticized for using the dichotomy *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* on various occasions as antithetical conceptual categories in a static state as well as a means of representing stages in historical development. The categories, however, are ideal types and as such can be used to describe both change and the differences between groups at any one time. Thus, the Middle Ages are characterized as having more *Gemeinschaft*-like relationships than modern times. Also, the family is described as having more of the characteristics of *Gemeinschaft* than a joint-stock company. The essential point to be kept in mind is that neither the family nor the Middle Ages are really *Gemeinschaft*; but any group or definite period in history may be compared with such mental concepts or constructs as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.

In fact, one of Tönnies' great contributions was his characterization of various groups in a given period, or in different periods of history, by the use of these two types. For instance, the families of peasants and city workers may be compared in time and space by the use of these conceptual tools.

B. Second Sphere—The Theory of Relationships or Social Entities²⁹

The concepts *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are used to differentiate social entities (*soziale Wesenheiten*). These are classified as (1) social relationships (*Verhältnisse*),³⁰ (2) collectives (*Samtschaften*), and (3) social organizations or corporations (*Körperschaften*). Social relationships result from psychical relationships which are willed. Such relationships are conditioned by the wills of others not directly involved, inasmuch as society has established or institutionalized rights and duties of individuals. Between individuals in social relations with each other, there always exists a consciousness of something toward which the participants have rights and duties. Thus, I might think, "I must do this because you are my brother," or "I cannot do that because we are both friends of A." A people, a racial or a language group, a class or an estate is a collective which lacks the means of giving expression to the collective wills of the individuals composing it through a representative person or body. Social organizations or corporate bodies that do have this means of expression may be thought of as persons. Their members are conscious of the ability of their respective groups to make decisions and act in accordance. The most important social organizations are states.³¹ The concepts, social rela-

tionships, collectives, and social organizations, and their relations to various types of authority in *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, are described in the first section of the translation.⁸²

C. The Third Sphere—Social Norms³³

Without regularity in the behavior of individuals there could be no group life. Tönnies described three types of norms: (1) order, (2) law, and (3) morality, which make for regularity in social relationships in collectives and social organizations. The norms classified under the category "order" are of the most universal nature. Just as the biologists might think of vegetative life as more universal and more fundamental than animal life, the norms of order may be conceived as more universal than law. Tönnies goes further with this analogy, indicating that the differentiation made between human life and other forms is comparable to the differentiation between the norms classified under the category morality and those classified under the categories law and order.⁸⁴ However, the categories, as Tönnies admits, are not mutually exclusive, and it is not always possible to classify norms under one of the three categories—order, law, or morality—any more than it is possible to classify all living beings as plant, animal, or human.

The social will which is characteristic of morality and law reacts more strongly and more perceptibly upon the thinking individual than does the social will governing the norms classified under order.⁸⁵ Among the norms classified under the category order are the succession of, times of, and behavior at, meals. The more complicated and difficult social life becomes, the more such order must be regulated by rationality and policed direction, as in traffic on a city street. When group life has the characteristics of *Gemeinschaft*, the norms of order are based upon concord (*Eintracht*); when the life is essentially that of the *Gesellschaft*, they are based upon convention.⁸⁶

Since one of Tönnies' original interests was the philosophy of law, he gives considerable attention to the various norms related to law.⁸⁷ He defines as norms of law those norms which are interpreted and enforced by judicial decision. Law is created either by custom or by legislation. For Tönnies, custom, which is rooted in common habits, is the will of social entities. His conception thus differs from custom as generally conceived in that it is not necessarily the common origin of all norms out of which the laws and morality of higher cultures evolve. In fact, in exceptional cases custom can result from law.⁸⁸

His distinction between rational law, as characterized by Hobbes, and "original natural law," which is composed of norms valid under all conditions of human society, is essential for his distinction between

Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. Since customary law may be codified and become embodied in legislation, the distinction between written and unwritten law is not the essential difference between the law characterizing Gemeinschaft as contrasted with Gesellschaft. The more complex and rationalistic society becomes the more the forms of law become divorced from customs, folkways, and mores of the people, and the more important legislative law becomes.³⁹

Tönnies assumed man to be, in part at least, a social animal by nature.⁴⁰ This led him to conceive a system of law which stood in direct contrast to the individualistic rational law. This contrasting system was based upon common altruism, mutual sympathy, and understanding, mutual recognition of rights and duties—all conditions essential for community solidarity and integration. In such a society there would be no disparity between law and morality, since common property in land and means of production would prevail as it prevails in many agrarian societies.

Under morality are grouped such norms as are interpreted by or relevant to an imaginary judge, who may be God; their range is wide, varying from rules for decent conduct to what is formally polite. Human conscience, reason, and ideals furnish their general basis. In Gemeinschaft these norms are sanctioned by religion through its beliefs, faith, and creeds. In Gesellschaft the norms of morality are sanctioned by public opinion which arises from common interests. In both instances the influence extends to both social and political life.

D. The Fourth Sphere—Social Values⁴¹

Tönnies divides social values into three groups: economic, political, and intellectual or spiritual values. The real nature of all social values is determined by social and individual will. If a cultural item, such as a piece of art, is produced and used as a mere means to an end, the rational will conditioning such production and use is by no means the same as the natural will which leads to production for the pure joy of creation itself. Land may in one society be a mere good offered for sale with no more ceremony or ado than the exchanging of one denomination of money for another. In another society, however, the land may be the common property of a group, and may represent spiritual values so closely bound up with the integrity and sanctity of group mores that it cannot be transferred.

All social values and ideals have their points of reference in social relationships, collectives, and social organizations. The greater the understanding, harmony, and friendship existing between individuals, the greater the probability that their values will be common and the more the possessions of each will merge into those of the other. The

development of the modern spirit of trade and capitalism tends to liquidate original familylike communism based upon liking, habit, and memory.⁴² The scientific, individualistic, and rationalistic intellectual attitude has driven the supernatural sanction of social values into the background.

E. Fifth and Last Sphere—Systems of Human Endeavor

(*Bezugsgebilde*)

The least-developed phase of Tönnies' theory is his systems of human endeavor grouped under the same three categories used for social values—the economic, political, and intellectual or spiritual. In fact, these systems can be considered as social values, each form having its counterpart in *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Among the economic systems are home industry, city economy, agriculture, national economy, and world economy. Under political systems are listed systems of law, protection, and constitutions. Under the intellectual or spiritual category are listed systems of religion, art, philosophy, science, and education.

Empirical Sociology, or Sociography

Heberle⁴³ has summarized the important empirical works of Tönnies. The wide range of topics includes the following: the surveys of the socio-economic situation of longshoremen and seamen in Hamburg and other ports, undertaken by Tönnies upon request after a large strike in Hamburg; a study on suicide in Schleswig-Holstein; a study of the relationship between certain moral phenomena and socio-economic conditions in Schleswig-Holstein; a monograph on criminality in Schleswig-Holstein, based upon material collected in the chief prisons of the province; and a study on cyclical changes in marriage rates and in the proportion of male to female births in relation to certain economic data, published during the first year of World War I. This latter was one of the first German contributions to the empirical study of business cycles, and in it Tönnies invented a method of correlation of his own.

PERSONAL BELIEFS AND PHILOSOPHY

For Tönnies the end and meaning of any social order was peaceful relationships among men. So firm was this belief that he excluded negative or antagonistic behavior from his pure sociology.⁴⁴ Maladjustments could best be righted peacefully without resort to revolution and the recasting of the institutions and norms of society.⁴⁵ Sociology

should point the way to the establishment of peaceful human relationships among groups, classes, and nations. However, Tönnies believed that the common people would seek and find the highways and byways which they would follow.⁴⁶ This great faith in and sympathy for the common people is in part explained by the remarkable facility with which he made their acquaintance and gained their confidence. He knew their lots and what they were thinking about. He knew that they were as a group generally more realistic, social-minded, and kind-hearted than were the more wealthy and educated classes, who, in order to gain or retain status, relied upon rational action regardless of the fairness or humaneness of such action. This in part explains why Tönnies sided with the laborers in labor disputes. He believed that in siding with the common man he was taking the position which from the long-time point of view was the best for the nation.

As previously stated, Tönnies had, during his own lifetime, experienced the disintegrating influence of commercialization and industrialization in his rural homeland. Moreover, he had witnessed the incorporation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein into Prussia, thus changing a political community into a mere administrative district. These experiences, as well as his studies, gave him his sympathy for the common man and that type of state control which would protect him. He hoped that co-operative and trade-union movements of the people themselves might solve many of the maladjustments brought on by the development of rationalism and individualism.⁴⁷

The Application of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* As Related to Other Typologies*

THE TYPOLOGICAL TRADITION

Tönnies' use of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* resembles in certain respects conceptual forms that are a part of an old tradition of typing social entities antithetically. As Sorokin has pointed out, the tradition may be traced back to the philosophical speculation of the Classical Greeks and to the epoch of Confucius. Notwithstanding the age of the tradition, it still has a marked vitality, and appears to be one of the fundamental approaches to sociological phenomena. Examples of this tradition are such familiar conceptualizations as Maine's status society and contract society; Spencer's militant and industrial forms; Ratzenhofer's conquest state and culture state; Wundt's natural and cultural polarity; Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity; Cooley's primary and secondary (implicit) groups; MacIver's communal and associational relations; Zimmerman's localistic and cosmopolitan communities; Odum's folk-state pair; Redfield's folk-urban continuum; Sorokin's familistic vs. contractual relations; Becker's sacred and secular societies; as well as such nonpersonalized but common dichotomies as primitive-civilized; literate-nonliterate; and rural vs. urban.

Obviously these varied polarizations are not interchangeable and do not abstract the "same things" out of the social world, but they do have something in common. Not only do they frequently represent similar "content," but, perhaps more important, they exemplify in common the view that it is necessary to distinguish fundamentally different types of social organization in order to establish a range within which transitional or intermediate forms can be comprehended. The polar extremes in point are clearly ideal or constructed types despite the fact that some of the aforementioned theorists tended to treat their types as ontological entities rather than as conceptual devices. The polar-type formulations, implicitly at first, but in recent years with increasing explicitness, have firmly established the point that the *continuum* is a vital notion in the comparative analysis of social phenomena. The types establish the "outer limits" or standards by means of which the processes of change or intermediate structural forms can be comprehended from the perspective of the continuum. It is in this

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sense that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and related typologies remain as an important part of current sociological endeavor. A brief examination of the applicability of some of the type constructs would therefore seem to be pertinent.

1. Durkheim: Mechanical and Organic Solidarity

Describing not merely the range of human existence, but what to him appeared as an irreversible historical trend, Durkheim in his study of the division of labor polarized society into two types.⁴⁸ The first type is the *mechanically solidary society*, wherein beliefs and conduct are alike. People are homogeneous mentally and morally, hence communities are uniform and nonatomized. It is in this type of society that a totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all men exists, and which Durkheim called the *conscience collective*. This conscience is characterized by the attributes of *exteriority* and *constraint*. Exteriority refers to the fact that the conscience as totality is never a product of the members of society at any one point in time; constraint has reference to the significant point that the membership of a mechanically solidary society cannot morally refute its collective conscience. Offense against the collective conscience is moral offense and is punishable by repressive law.

Durkheim's second polar type, defining the direction of historical development, is the *organically solidary society*, wherein society is held together by the interdependence of its parts. The division of labor is a result of the struggle for existence, and the specialization of labor stimulated individualism and differentiation. People in the society are heterogeneous; their mental and moral similarities have disappeared. Volume and material and moral density of people are the necessary conditions for the division, as they make it possible for more individuals to make sufficient contact to be able to act and react upon one another. This in turn makes possible the contact and interconnection of formerly separate collectivities and breaks down the insulation between them, with resultant diversification. The primary consequence of this whole process is the weakening of the *conscience collective*. Crime ceases to be an offense against common moral sentiments and becomes an offense against personal "rights." Spontaneous relations between individuals are replaced by contractual associations. Offensive acts then lose their sacrilegious character and "repressive" law is replaced by "restitutive" law.

Durkheim's investigation of suicide⁴⁹ brought about a fundamental change in his conception of the *conscience collective* as put forth in *The Division of Labor in Society*. The emphasis on the strong predominance of the *conscience* in the mechanically solidary society and

the weakening of the *conscience* in the organically solidary society was supplanted by a recognition of the existence of the *conscience collective* in the differentiated, heterogeneous, organically solidary society as the basis of either egoistic or altruistic order. A more specific definition of its absence was arrived at—the anomic society, wherein the collective beliefs and sentiments no longer effectively regulate social action and society persists only on the basis of a shifting and precarious consensus. The change from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity does not result in an automatic loss of *conscience collective*, but an alteration in its forms. The “noncontractual basis of contract” is a moral, and hence collective foundation for individualistic and secular association. Durkheim’s recognition of this, based upon the research use of his types, has given an undeniable impetus to the specialized sociological study of law, religion, and knowledge due to the now obvious relation of these phenomena to social structure.

2. Cooley: The Primary Group

Cooley, an American contemporary of Durkheim’s, maintained that neither the individual nor the group has primacy in social action. Contrary to Durkheim, who gave the group primacy over its individual members, and contrary to Spencer, who asserted that the individual is basic and the group only the sum total of its members, Cooley perceived the importance of interactive process of mutual influence between group and individual. For him the most important groups in the formation of individual human nature and the development of norms and ends are what he called *primary groups*.⁵⁰

Type examples of the primary group are the family, or household group, the old-fashioned neighborhood, and the spontaneous play-group of children. In such groups all children everywhere participate, and the intimate association there realized works upon them everywhere in much the same way. It tends to develop sympathetic insight into the moods and states of mind of other people and this in turn underlies the development of both the flexible type of behavior and the common attitudes and sentiments which we have mentioned. . . .

The chief characteristics of a primary group are:

- 1) Face-to-face association.
- 2) The unspecialized character of that association.
- 3) Relative permanence.
- 4) The small number of persons involved.
- 5) The relative intimacy among the participants.

Such groups are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of

the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.⁵¹

Cooley's combination of organic theory and psychological orientation which led him to the invention of the concept, "looking-glass" self, and to say that "self and society are twin born,"⁵² resulted in the conceptualization of the primary group, apparently independently of the other theorists we discuss. He did not use the term "secondary group," permitting the implicit type under which groups with characteristics opposite to the primary groups to go unnamed. Since the time of Cooley the primary group, in one form or another, has been a focal point of attention in American sociology. From the mid-thirties on a tremendous amount of research pertaining to this form of social structure has been conducted.⁵³

3. Redfield: The Folk-Urban Continuum

The folk-urban typology of Redfield has been the best-known and most controversial typological formulation in cultural anthropology for the past twenty-five years.⁵⁴ It has often been criticized, particularly by idiographically minded field workers, but it nevertheless has been the stimulant for a great amount of research.⁵⁵

Redfield has formulated an ideal-type version of folk society by linking together a set of attributes. In the absence of explicit delineation the "urban" type is simply composed of the opposite attributes, and hence becomes the polar antithesis.

To Redfield, the folk society is a small collectivity containing no more people within it than can know each other well. It is an isolated, nonliterate, homogeneous grouping with a strong sense of solidarity. Technology is simple, and, aside from the division of function between the sexes, there is little other division of labor; hence the group is economically independent of other groups. The ways in which problems are met by the society are conventionalized by long intercommunication within the group, and these ways have become interrelated with one another to constitute a coherent and self-consistent system: a culture. Behavior is spontaneous, traditional, personal, and there is no motivation toward reflection, criticism, or experimentation. Kinship, its relations and institutions, is central to all experience, and the

family is the unit of action. The value of traditional acts and objects is not to be questioned; hence they are sacred. The sacredness of objects is apparent in the ways in which objects are hedged in with restraints and taboos that keep them from being commonplace. All activities, even those of economic production, are ends in themselves. The more remote ends of living are taken as given; hence the folk society exists not so much on the basis of exchange of useful functions as in common understandings as to what is to be done.

Redfield contends that understanding of society in general and of our own modern urbanized society in particular can be gained through consideration of the societies least like our own—folk societies. His scheme defines an ideal type, the *folk society*, which is the polar opposite of urban society. The type is a construct, and no known society precisely corresponds to it. It is "created only because through it we may hope to understand reality. Its function is to suggest aspects of real societies which deserve study, and especially to suggest hypotheses as to what, under certain defined conditions, may be generally true about society."⁵⁶ The fact that the typology has served this function to a significant degree is evidenced by the gratifying amount of research done in terms of it since the initial tentative type formulation in 1930 in the study of Tepoztlan.⁵⁷

Redfield explicitly indicates his indebtedness to Maine, Durkheim, and Tönnies and points out that his folk-society type results from a restatement of the conceptions of these three men in the light coming from consideration of real primitive societies.⁵⁸ It is less generalized and abstract than any of the sets of concepts formulated by Maine, Durkheim, and Tönnies, but it contains essentially the same attributes. As a consequence, Redfield has succeeded in transferring the central considerations of these concepts to a cross-cultural basis and facilitated the comparative study of societies.

4. Becker: Sacred and Secular Societies

The sacred-secular antithesis has been utilized by many people, but it finds its most elaborate construction in the work of Howard Becker.⁵⁹ Becker makes it very explicit that sacred and secular societies are constructed types. He has meticulously and skillfully preserved their conceptual character and in so doing has contributed significantly to the methodology of typing.

The *sacred society* is isolated vicinally, socially, and mentally. This isolation leads to fixation of habit and neophobia, relations of avoidance, and traditional in-group-out-group attitudes. The concrete is emphasized at the expense of abstraction; social contacts are primary; and tradition and ritual play a large part in the life of the individual.

There is the dominance of sacredness even in the economic sphere which works toward the maintenance of self-sufficiency, and against any development of the pecuniary attitude. The division of labor is simple. Kinship ties are strong and are manifest in "great family" relationships. All forms of activity are under sacred sanctions, and hence violent social control is at a minimum. The forces of gossip and tradition are powerful tools of control. Nonrational behavior is predominant, with an important element of supernaturalism present. Rationalism, particularly in the form of science, is largely absent. The value system is impermeable.

The *secular society* lies at the opposite pole of the continuum and is vicinally, socially, and mentally accessible. Habit fixation is rendered difficult by the accessibility of the social structure. There is an absence of social barriers. Social circulation is unimpeded. Ends are evaluated in terms of "happiness," and means according to the norm of efficiency. Tradition and ritual are minimal. Rationality is dominant, and science is pervasive and powerful. The kinship group is manifest in the conjugal family form. Innovation is frequent; change is sought after and idealized as progress. Informal sanctions are weak, and formal law prevails. Offense against the law invokes little social disapproval. Legal contracts are the rule. Individuation is prominent in society, and the value system is permeable.

These two constructed types cannot be found except in empirical approximations to the major subtypes derived by Becker. The *folk sacred* society is best exemplified by the old-fashioned and primitive groups in the world. The *prescribed-sacred* finds its closest approximation in the Geneva theocracy of Calvin, the Jesuit state of Paraguay, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia. The *principled-secular* is an equilibrating society wherein the extreme aspects of the sacred are lost, and yet a principle derived from the sacred value system puts a check on rampant change and reduces the potential of mental accessibility. The *normless-secular* society refers to a society wherein there is confusion, ambivalence, and disagreement with regard to the norms, with resultant social disorganization. Instances are most frequently found in centers of culture contact wherein the devices of communication generate social accessibility.

The primary value of the Becker polarity lies in its use in getting at the sacred or secular aspects of a group relationship conceived of as *system*, and in exposing the process of secularization or sacrilization that might be taking place. In contrast to the preceding typologies there is no notion of irreversible process in the sacred-secular schema. Although the main historical trend has been toward secularization it is equally permissible to speak of specific cases of sacrilization, as for

instance in the Nazi movement.⁶⁰ Also in contrast to earlier typologists, Becker has recognized the fundamental limitations of the general types: that is, that their construction on a very general level makes them "sponge" types, and hence precludes their use for many specific research purposes. As a consequence, Becker has derived a large number of subtypes incorporating particular combinations of attributes for which empirical approximations can readily be found in quite specific research contexts.⁶¹ Due to the fact that the subtypes are derivations, theoretic articulation is retained, and hence the comparative study of concrete groupings is facilitated. The sacred-secular polarity has been constructed along comprehensive lines, and yet remains versatile and flexible.

5. Sorokin: Familistic, Contractual and Compulsory Relations

As Sorokin states in the foreword to the English edition of *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*, these types are reiterated up to and presumably in his own thinking. Sorokin's *familistic* and *contractual* relationships correspond respectively to *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and have been used as pairs to accompany these concepts, i.e., *familistic Gemeinschaft* and *contractual Gesellschaft*.⁶² Sorokin has himself stated that his third type, *compulsory* relations, represents conceptualization on a different level. Either *familistic* relationships or *contractual* voluntary relationships may be more or less the opposite to compulsory relations. We shall here treat only the *familistic* and *contractual* relationships. For Sorokin, *familistic* relationships are permeated by mutual love, sacrifice, and devotion. They are most frequently found among members of a devoted family and among real friends. Familistic relations represent a fusion of the ego into "we." Both joys and sorrows are shared in common, and those involved need one another, seek one another, sacrifice for one another, and love one another. Norms of such relations require that the participation be all-embracing, all-forgiving, all-bestowing and unlimited.

The *contractual* relationship is limited and specified, covering only one narrow sector of the lives of the parties involved. Typical contractual relationships are those of employer and employee, buyer and seller, plumber and householder. The rights and duties of each party are specified by contract. The unity of such groups is rooted in the sober calculation of advantage. It is self-centered and utilitarian. Typically one member of the relationship tries to get as much from the other as possible with the smallest possible contribution. They may remain strangers to each other, one party little interested in the well-being, activities, and philosophy of the other. There is no fusion to

produce a homogeneous "we." Such relations are usually of limited duration, voluntary, and stand in contrast to those which are compulsory.⁶³ Relationships may develop from familistic to contractual or vice versa.⁶⁴

6. Weber: Types of Action Orientation

Although not following properly in the tradition of dichotomously typing society, the types of action constructed by Weber are directly relevant to the Tönnies' formulation, the Parsons' formulation which is to follow, and the present context in general. All the relationships discussed here, indeed all relations, are based upon a continuity of social action.⁶⁵ Weber starts by typing the action context, and then constructs his varied relationship types on the basis of the underlying typical lines of action. Action is typed:

. . . in terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends (*zweckrational*), that is, through expectations as to the behavior of some objects in the external situation and of other human individuals, making use of these expectations as "condition" or "means" for the successful attainment of the actor's own rationally chosen ends; (2) in terms of rational orientation to an absolute value (*wertrational*); involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success; (3) in terms of affectual orientation (*affektuell*), especially emotional, determined by the specific affects and states of feeling of the actor; (4) as traditionally oriented (*traditional*) through the habituation of long practice.⁶⁶

It may be seen that *zweckrational* is essentially expedient rationality and denotes a system of action involving an actor's motives, conditions, means, and ends wherein the actor weighs the possible alternative ends and means available to him in terms of his purposes and selects the course of action most expedient to him. A system of discrete ends exists for the actor, and an orientation toward them involves such considerations as "efficiency," "counting the cost," "undesirable consequences," "amount of return," and "figuring the results" which condition the otherwise unrestrained adaptation of means to the achievement of ends. This form of rationality plays a dominant role in Weber's over-all sociological analysis.

Wertrational orientation is differentiated from expedient rationality by Weber through the inclusion of an "absolute value" which eliminates the possibility of the actor's selection from alternative ends, and ultimately, therefore, bars the possible selection of certain means. This

is a sanctioned form of rationality wherein the actual adaptation of means toward the achievement of the absolute, or ultimate end (value), may comply with the criteria of expedience but cannot in itself be *zweckrational* in view of the lack of a discrete system of ends and the possibility of weighing them in terms of available means and prevailing conditions. The sole important consideration of the actor is the realization of the value.

Affectual action is actually treated by Weber as a form of nonrationality (possibly even irrationality) wherein means and ends become fused, and therefore unsusceptible of delineation in behavior. This form of action is dominated by emotional states of feeling of the actor and involves an impulsive or uncontrolled reaction to some exceptional stimulus. It occurs as a release from tension, and therefore the later phases of an affectual act may become increasingly "rational."

Traditional action is also treated by Weber as a deviation from rational orientation in that the means involved become ends in themselves or hold the same rank as ends. This type of action is an almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide behavior in repeatedly followed and prevailing courses. Typically this means a conformity with the accepted and prevalent ways of behavior, with little evaluation or consideration of their expedience.

These four ideal-typical modes of social action were formulated by Weber for purposes of comparison with actual occurrences of behavior. Such behavior of course shades across the types in various degrees of approximation. It is important to note, however, that in Weber's actual analysis of empirical occurrences there is a marked tendency on his part to utilize the *zweckrationale* orientation as the basis for "understanding" and "interpreting" behavior, thereby reducing the other forms to the status of residual categories. In effect, this produces an implicit rational-nonrational dichotomy underlying the action types, which in turn results in the conceptualization of relationships in these terms. Weber's *Vergemeinschaftung* and *Vergesellschaftung* are directly modeled upon Tönnies' formulations, although Weber does introduce a third category of *kampf* (conflict) that is not provided for in Tönnies' system. *Zweckrational* may be compared with Tönnies' *Kürwille* and the resulting *Gesellschaft*, whereas *wertrational*, *affectual*, and *traditional* behavior may be identified with Tönnies' *Wesenswille* and the resulting *Gemeinschaft*. It is easy to see then how Weber reached his conclusion that the main trend of history was that of increased rationalization. This compares directly with Tönnies' conclusions regarding the trend toward *Gesellschaft*, and also with the related conclusion of Sorokin, Becker, Durkheim, and Redfield.

7. Parsons: The Pattern Variables of Action Orientation

The pattern variables of action orientation (or of value orientation or role definition, as they are variously called) constitute the most persistent link between personal, cultural, and social systems in Parsons' theory of social action.⁶⁷ As a consequence they are of central importance in articulating the scheme. It is apparent that the pattern variables were born as a negative reaction to what Parsons conceived of as the inadequacies of Weber's types of action and Tönnies' polar types. Parsons ends his classic discussion of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* with the following comment:

. . . this discussion of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* should not be taken to mean that these concepts are unreservedly acceptable as the basis for a general classification of social relationships or, indeed, that it is possible to start from *any* dichotomy of only two types. The basic types cannot be reduced to two, or even to the three that Weber used. To attempt to develop such a scheme of classification would be definitely outside the scope of the present study. Such an attempt would, however, have to make a critical examination of the schemes of Tönnies, Weber and some others one of its main tasks.

However, the aspects of Tönnies' classification with which this discussion has been concerned do involve distinctions of basic importance for any such scheme and would hence have to be built into the wider scheme, which would probably involve considerable alteration in their form of statement.⁶⁸

At base the attitude of Parsons indicated a recognition of the fact that general "sponge" types had inherent limitations with respect to the handling of many specific problems. Weber manifested some recognition of this; Becker has been acutely aware of it; and the present writers among others in recent years have been directly concerned with the problem. Whereas Becker approached the problem by deriving a series of subtypes for empirical purposes, Parsons, in line with his propensity for systematic theory, chose the approach of deriving the components of action orientation directly from the structure of social action.

In starting his analysis with an actor in a situation, Parsons contends that any actor must make five separate choices before the action will have a determinate meaning for him. Meaning does not automatically emerge in a situation, but rather, is based upon the actor's selections from the five sets of alternatives posed for him in any situation. These dichotomies are termed the pattern variables of action orienta-

tion, and the problems of choice between them are termed the dilemmas of action. The pattern variables are listed as follows:

Affectivity	————	Affective neutrality
Particularism	————	Universalism
Ascription	————	Achievement
Diffuseness	————	Specificity
Collectivity-		
Orientation	————	Self-Orientation

Affectivity vs. affective neutrality is the gratification-discipline dilemma and involves the problem of accepting an opportunity for gratification without regard for its consequences, or conversely, evaluating it with regard for its consequences. It is a matter really of whether evaluation will take place or not in a given situation.

Particularism vs. universalism is the dilemma of choice between types of value standards, and involves evaluating an object of action in terms of its relations to the actor and his specific object relationship situation, or in terms of its relations to a generalized frame of reference. This dilemma is one concerning primacy of cathectic or cognitive standards.

Ascription vs. achievement is the dilemma of choice between "modalities" of the social object, and involves the actor's seeing the social object as a composite of ascribed qualities, or conversely, as a composite of performances. This dilemma concerns the conception of objects as "attribute" or "action" complexes.

Diffuseness vs. specificity is the dilemma of the definition of the scope of interest in the object, and involves the concession to a social object of an undefined set of rights to be delimited only by conflicting demands, as over against the concession to a social object of a clearly specified and limited set of rights. This dilemma concerns the scope of significance of the object in action.

Collective-orientation vs. self-orientation is the collective-interest vs. private-interest dilemma and involves the problem of considering an act with respect to its significance for a collectivity or a moral code, or with respect to its personal significance. This dilemma concerns the primacy of moral standards in a procedure of evaluation.⁶⁹

Parsons contends that these pattern-variables are the single most important thread of continuity in the action frame of reference and that they enter in at four different levels. On the concrete level of empirical action they exist as five discrete choices an actor must explicitly or implicitly make before he can act. They enter on the collectivity level as aspects of role definition wherein actions of role-incumbents tend to be specified in terms of one side or another of a

dilemma. The variables also enter on the cultural level as aspects of value-standards; in that value-standards are rules governing action, and insofar as an actor is committed to a standard he will habitually choose the horn of the dilemma specified by adherence to that standard.

In view of their history, derivation, and content, it seems justifiable to conclude that the pattern-variables represent a further and more elaborate specification of the aspects of society dealt with by *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.⁷⁰ In our judgment, then, it is legitimate to speak of them as theoretical components of the more general types. On the basis of our analysis we feel that it is possible to take Parsons' first four variables, add Sorokin's familistic-contractual dichotomy, and Weber's rational-traditional pair and conceive of them as subtypes of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* or Becker's sacred-secular society. In our judgment all the major implications and content of these two typologies are covered, and in addition the advantage of having more specific categories to work with is gained. The fit with the Durkheim, Cooley, and Redfield typologies is not as good because of the differences in construction and levels of abstraction, but nevertheless it seems obvious that there are basic similarities between all the typologies treated here; hence the things that can be empirically said about *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* or sacred and secular at least have implications for the other typologies. We shall attempt an operational demonstration of our type usage.

APPLICATION OF TYPES USED BY PARSONS, SOROKIN, WEBER, AND BECKER IN RELATION TO TÖNNIES' GEMEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT

In a recent article the authors of this "Introduction" attempted to describe what they considered to be essential differences in the systemic attributes of communities of family farms and large estates through a tentative demonstrational analysis of two communities in Costa Rica.⁷¹ Both the concrete and abstract or typological attributes were presented, but we shall here concern ourselves primarily with the application of Tönnies' concepts *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and pertinent concepts as used by other theorists. The two communities to be described are Atirro, a hacienda community with 65 families, and San Juan Sur, a near-by community of family farms including 75 families. Both these communities are located in the Turrialba Canton of Costa Rica 6 miles and 3 miles respectively from the town Turrialba in which 6,500 people live. They are, we believe, typical communities of rural Latin America. If they are typical, the differences

are all the more significant in view of the ideological struggles going on in the world today concerning the relative merits of various forms of land tenure and settlement form. We shall attempt to establish their *type differences* in terms of the theory of social systems.⁷²

A. The Procedure. In an attempt to avoid some of the shortcomings of previous typological descriptions of communities, we have introduced the following innovations: First, what we believe to be the important subtypes of the major general types have been introduced as continua. Second, in the analysis we use subtypes in the form of variable polar components of more general types. These subtypes, although varied and to a certain unavoidable degree overlapping, represent similar levels of abstraction. Third, we have used the concept of the "social system" and consequently are able to treat these subtypes as systemic attributes. This establishes the theoretical possibility of finding similar attributes in apparently different empirical groups. Fourth, we apply the types to only one social system or reference group at a time. We do not attempt to apply the types to many reference groups, such as the family, church groups, occupational groups, political systems, etc., simultaneously. The level of abstraction is thereby held constant. It should also be noted that our types are applied to *social* systems, not cultural systems or personality systems.⁷³ Fifth, we apply the types to specific and comparable *status-roles* in specific social systems. Sixth, to standardize the typing of the relationships, a specific category of action is supplied.

In order to make our hypothetical treatment of these systems pertinent to intercultural accessibility or to resistance to change, we are considering changes which require community action, not "normal" or gradual infiltration of ideas or techniques. On the contrary, we are referring to instigated change involving the articulation of the entire community in a common course of action, such as proposals to introduce organized sanitation to prevent spread of communicable diseases or quarantine regulations of sick persons with such diseases, or to set up community-wide co-operatives, schools, and the like.

B. The Social Relationships to Be Compared. In order to arrange for typing of communal action, we chose a *status-role* in each community which articulated the power structure of the whole social system. The *status-role* of the administrator was chosen as the subject, and the *status-role* of an immediate subordinate, the supervisor, was chosen as object on the large estate, Atirro. The administrator initiates action continuously to the supervisor, who is in daily contact with most families in the hacienda community.

Since the power structure of San Juan Sur is articulated only during fiestas and times of crises and since there are no formally elected

or appointed governmental administrative officials, obviously there are no status-roles exactly comparable to those of the administrator and supervisor at Atirro. The local informal leader of the community, the *gamonal*,⁷⁴ most frequently initiates action in the community as a whole. The following will perhaps best provide an idea of the leadership of the *gamonal* in San Juan Sur:

During a heavy rain in the wet season one of the children of San Juan Sur fell in a bridgeless river when returning from school. She was drowned. The river is now bridged because Sr. Torres rallied all villagers and their families to walk to the trade center town to demand that the *Jefe Politico* make funds available to bridge the river. This leader has led the community members in several such events.⁷⁵

In our typology the *gamonal* is considered as subject, and a fellow community member whom he chose to help him is considered as object.

C. The Specific Category of Action. Several social scientists⁷⁶ who are Latin-American specialists were asked to function as "judges" in the typing of the two communities under consideration. Each is intimately acquainted with Atirro and San Juan Sur. The instructions that they followed, as well as one example of the continua offered them, are seen in Figure 1, continua which we believe may be communicated across cultures.

D. Subtypes or Component Continua of the General Types. On hypothetical grounds we have accepted the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* types as the most general forms relevant to our problem. Figure 2 provides the subtypes or component continua which we believe are the chief constituents of these general types. In typing the relationships as presented in Figure 2, an attempt was made to communicate the meaning of the continua through characteristics of their poles.

The judges' reactions are portrayed schematically in Figure 2. Different "profiles" emerged for the two communities. These are marked F and H. The two systems tended to scale out toward opposite poles of the typology, sharp and significant differences being thereby established.⁷⁷

CONCLUSIONS

Insofar as a specific manifestation of the employment of power in San Juan Sur tended toward the affectivity, particularistic, ascription, diffuseness, traditional, and familistic poles, it becomes subject to the hypotheses and statements made about *Gemeinschaft* or sacred com-

FIGURE 1
THE SCHEDULE: AN ILLUSTRATION*

INSTRUCTIONS: Assume that in both the community of family-sized farms (San Juan Sur) and the large estate community (Atirro) two leaders are organizing a reception for the national president who has just informed the leader in the subject role that he will arrive on the next day. The status-roles which structure the interaction which is to be placed on the continua are the following: Hacienda community—Subject is the administrator and object the next subordinate, e.g., the supervisor; community of family-sized farms—Subject is the most powerful informal leader, the

gamonal, and the object whoever helps him most in the execution of the act. In both cases the initiator of the action is the subject, administrator on the hacienda community and *gamonal* in the community of family-sized farms.

Place an H on each continuum below for the above-described action between the specified roles for the event and situation as indicated, for the hacienda community. Place an F on each continuum to indicate how the interaction event and situation for the roles specified would compare in the community of family-sized farms.

NORMS OF ORIENTATION OF THE SUBJECT TO OBJECT

1. AFFECTIVITY

AFFECTIVE NEUTRALITY

5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5


Note: Position No. 5 as the polar type represents action determined completely by emotions—love, hate, fear, and other emotions. Examples of interaction which would fall toward this pole are the following: Mother as subject loving her child, Damon as subject pleading to die for his friend Pythias.

Position No. 5 as a polar type represents action completely devoid of feeling. Examples of hypothetical interaction which would fall close to this pole are the following: A robot commanding another actor; the hired gunman "cold-bloodedly" shooting his victim, a telephone operator giving the object the time of day at the response to a dial signal, etc.

* Other component subtypes were similarly polarized and illustrated. The complete schedule can be seen in Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, *op. cit.* pp. 410-411.

FIGURE 2

PROFILES TYPING THE NORMS OF ORIENTATION OF SUBJECT TO OBJECT
IN AN ACTION CONTEXT



GEMEINSCHAFT

GESELLSCHAFT

F designates the profile of the relationship of informal community leader and an assistant in a community of family-sized farms.
 H designates the profile of the relationship of the manager to an immediate subordinate, the supervisor, in the large-estate community.
 D and C designate the profile of the relationships of president and cabinet subordinate in the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Cuba.
 US designates the profile of the relationship of the president and a cabinet subordinate in the United States.

munities. On somewhat more tenuous grounds, and with the proper interpretive care, it also becomes subject to many of the hypotheses and statements typically related to the primary group, and mechanical and folk societies.

In contrast, Atirro under comparable conditions tended toward the opposite poles of affective neutrality, universalism, achievement, specificity, rationality, and contractual, and hence becomes subject to hypotheses and statements made about *Gesellschaft* or secular communities. Again, with the proper interpretive care and recognition of limitations of transfer, it also becomes subject to treatment in terms of secondary, organic, and urban theory.

It is now a commonplace in the sociology of knowledge that different types of knowledge, as well as the techniques and motivations for extending knowledge are bound up with particular forms of groups. *Gemeinschaft* types of society have a traditionally defined fund of knowledge handed down as conclusive and final; they are not concerned with discovering new ideas or extending their spheres of knowledge. Any effort to test the traditional knowledge, insofar as it implies doubt, is ruled out on moral grounds. In such a group, the prevailing methods are ontological and dogmatic; its mode of thought is that of conceptual realism. In contrast, *Gesellschaft* types of organization institutionalize techniques for the attainment and codification of knowledge. In such a group the methods are primarily epistemological and critical; the mode of thought nominalistic.

If the communities of Atirro and San Juan Sur are actually representative of other large-estate and family-farm communities in Latin America, then we have solid grounds for saying that the large-estate community possesses a different order of accessibility, socially and culturally, than the family-farm community. Moreover, we are justified in saying that the instigation of any change will necessarily have to follow different procedures, adapted to the two distinctly different social structures.

The specific and very limited problem we have dealt with here with respect to these communities is part of a much larger problematic area, that of *social change*. If sociology is to play a key role in contemporary research, then the major inquiries must be made in a world where the patterns of the past are under increased pressure from a dynamic future. The frames of reference utilized in the past to analyze social change appear to be either oversimplified, too much identified with Western ideologies, or overly impressed with an inevitable one-way direction of progress. From out of this heritage it seems possible, however, to salvage a fundamental starting point—the idea of the societal continuum. The dynamics of a societal continuum so for-

mulated as to comprehend the concept of constant polarity and transitional society in which empirical regularities, constant societal denominators, and universal norms can be recognized cannot be sterile. Tönnies' analysis of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and the related work of other theorists attacking similar problems is still relevant, and continues to pose pertinent problems for contemporary sociologists.

At the beginning of a great but deep work perhaps a few suggestions to readers from the translator are in order. As Rudolf Heberle so aptly stated in his Preface, "Certainly, this is an intricate work which makes great demands on the reader." Because of its relative clarity and simplicity, the reader may find the introduction to Tönnies made somewhat easier by turning to the synopsis in Part Five, which we have called "The Summing Up." This section is a translation of a separate article called "*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*," which was printed almost half a century after the first appearance of the original volume and five years before the author's death.

"Notes on Tönnies' Fundamental Concepts," which comprise the last section of this volume, contain various terms as used by Tönnies, systematically classified and related to one another. The reader will find these many concepts and expressions throughout the book. Again as Heberle pointed out, "The meaning of these concepts, and their function in the system are not so easily understood, largely because their author developed them against a background of contemporary thought which has lost a good deal of its relevance to present-day sociology." But *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* is one of "the few classic treatises in sociology—a classic in both form and content." This translation has tried to preserve both.