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CrimeVictimsAnIntroductiontoVictimologybyAndrewKarmenz-lib.org.pdf

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ANDREW KARMEN John Jay College of Criminal Justice City University of New York

crime victims A N I N T R O D U C T I O N T O V I C T I M O L O G Y

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Crime Victims: An Introduction to Victimology, Ninth Edition Andrew Karmen

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Brief Contents

P R E F A C E xvii

Chapter 1 What Is Victimology? 1

Chapter 2 The Rediscovery of Crime Victims 39

Chapter 3 Victimization in the United States: An Overview 66

Chapter 4 A Closer Look at the Victims of Interpersonal Crimes of Violence and Theft 93

Chapter 5 The Ongoing Controversy over Shared Responsibility 134

Chapter 6 Victims and the Police 177

Chapter 7 Victims’ Rights and the Criminal Justice System 205

Chapter 8 Victimized Children 246

Chapter 9 Victims of Violence by Lovers and Family Members 286

Chapter 10 Victims of Rapes and Other Sexual Assaults 325

Chapter 11 Additional Groups of Victims with Special Problems 376

Chapter 12 Repaying Victims 416

Chapter 13 Victims in the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Directions 454

G L O S S A R Y 491

R E F E R E N C E S 502

N A M E I N D E X 563

S U B J E C T I N D E X 574

Contents

P R E F A C E xvii

1 What Is Victimology? 1 Focusing on the Plight of Crime Victims 2 Studying Victimization Scientifically 3 Why Objectivity Is Desirable 5

Sometimes It Is Difficult to Distinguish Victims from Villains 5 Criminals Can Be Victims Too 8 Victims Can Find Themselves at Odds with the “Good Guys” 10

Sources of Bias that Thwart Objectivity 11 Victimology’s Undeserved “Bad Reputation” 14

Why Emphasize Research? 17 Comparing Victimology to Criminology 18

The Many Parallels between Criminology and Victimology 18 Some Differences and Issues about Boundaries 19 Interfacing with Other Disciplines 20 Divisions within the Discipline 23

What Victimologists Do 24 Step 1: Identify, Define, and Describe the Problem 24 Step 2: Measure the True Dimensions of the Problem 24 Step 3: Investigate How Victims Are Handled 27 Step 4: Gather Evidence to Test Hypotheses 27

Why Study Victimology? 32 Recognizing Exemplary Behavior Under Very Difficult Circumstances 33 “Survivorology:” Toward a More Inspiring and Upbeat Trajectory within Victimology 36 Summary 37 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 38 Questions for Discussion and Debate 38

Critical Thinking Questions 38 Suggested Research Projects 38

2 The Rediscovery of Crime Victims 39 The Discovery, Decline, and Rediscovery of Crime Victims 40

Social Movements: Taking Up the Victims’ Cause 41 Elected Officials: Enacting Laws Named after Victims 45 The News Media: Portraying the Victims’ Plight 46 Commercial Interests: Selling Security Products and Services to Victims 48

Victimology Contributes to the Rediscovery Process 49 Rediscovering Additional Groups of Victims 50 The Rediscovery Process in Action, Step by Step 54

Stage 1: Calling Attention to an Overlooked Problem 54 Stage 2: Winning Victories, Implementing Reforms 55 Stage 3: Emergence of an Opposition and Development of Resistance to Further Changes 56 Stage 4: Research and Temporary Resolution of Disputes 57

Summary 64 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 64 Questions for Discussion and Debate 64 Critical Thinking Questions 64 Suggested Research Projects 65

3 Victimization in the United States: An Overview 66 Victimization Across the Nation: The Big Picture 67

Making Sense of Statistics 68 The Two Official Sources of Data 69

Facts and Figures in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) 70 Facts and Figures in the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 73 Comparing the UCR and the NCVS 76 A First Glance at the Big Picture: Estimates of the Number of New Crime Victims Each Year 77 A Second Look at the Big Picture: Watching the FBI’s Crime Clock 77 Delving Deeper into the Big Picture: Examining Victimization Rates 79 Tapping into the UCR and the NCVS to Fill in the Details of the Big Picture 81 Searching for Changes in the Big Picture: Detecting Trends in Interpersonal Violence and Theft 83

Taking a Longer View: Murders in the United States over the Past Century 86

The Rise and Fall of Murder Rates Since 1900 87 Putting Crime into Perspective: The Chances of Dying Violently—or from Other Causes 89 Summary 91

C O N T E N T S v

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 92 Questions for Discussion and Debate 92 Critical Thinking Questions 92 Suggested Research Projects 92

4 A Closer Look at the Victims of Interpersonal Crimes of Violence and Theft 93 Addressing Some Troubling Questions 94

Identifying Differential Risks: Which Groups Suffer More Often Than Others? 95

Focusing on Murders 95 Where It Is Safer or More Dangerous: Making International Comparisons 95 The Geographic Distribution of Violent Deaths in the United States 99 Who Gets Killed by Whom? How, Where, and Why? 100 Who Faces the Gravest Threats of Being Murdered? 102 Changes over Time in Near Death Experiences: Trends in Aggravated Assault Rates 103

Focusing on Robberies 106 Robbers and the People They Prey Upon 107 Robberies: Who, How Often, How, Where, When 107 Changes over Time in Robbery Rates 108 Checking Out Whether More Robberies Are Turning into Murders 108 Differential Risks: Which Groups Get Robbed the Most and the Least Often? 110

Focusing on Burglaries 114 Trends and Patterns in Burglaries 114

Focusing on Motor Vehicle Theft 115 Stealing Cars for Fun and Profit 115 Trends in Motor Vehicle Theft 116 Which Motorists Should Be Most Concerned When Parking? 117

Focusing on Individuals Whose Identities Were Stolen 121 The Nature of the Problem and How Many People Experience Its Aggravations 121 Losses and Suffering 123 Is the Problem Growing or Subsiding? 126 Who Faces the Greatest Risks? 128

Predicting the Chances of Becoming a Victim Someday: Projecting Cumulative Risks 129 Summary 131 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 132 Questions for Discussion and Debate 132 Critical Thinking Questions 132 Suggested Research Projects 132

5 The Ongoing Controversy over Shared Responsibility 134 How Some Victims Contribute to the Crime Problem 135 Repeat and Chronic Victims: Learning from Past Mistakes? 136

vi C O N T E N T S

The Entire Spectrum of Possibilities: Recognizing Complete Innocence and Full Responsibility 137 Who or What Is to Blame for Specific Incidents? 138

What Is Victim Blaming? 138 What Is Victim Defending? 141 What Is System Blaming? 142

Mistakes Individuals Make: Facilitation 143 How Many Burglaries Were Victim-Facilitated? 144 How Many Vehicle Thefts Were Victim-Facilitated? 145 How Many Identity Thefts Were Victim-Facilitated? 148

Victim Precipitation and Provocation 152 How Many Violent Crimes Were Precipitated or Provoked? 155

Transcending Victim Blaming and Victim Defending: System Blaming 157 The Importance of Determining Responsibility in the Criminal Justice Process 160

Applying Deterrence Theory to Victims 161 Theorizing about Risk Factors: Figuring Out Why Certain Groups Suffer More Often Than Others 164 Why Various Groups Experience Differential Risks: Routine Activities and Specific Lifestyles 165 Some Victims Were Criminals: The Equivalent Group Explanation 169 What’s the Difference Between Crime Prevention and Victimization Prevention? 170 Reducing Risks: How Safe Is Safe Enough? 172 Ambivalence About Risk Taking 173

Summary 174 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 175 Questions for Discussion and Debate 175 Critical Thinking Questions 176 Suggested Research Projects 176

6 Victims and the Police 177 Victims Interacting with the Criminal Justice System: Cooperation or Conflict? 178

What Would Be Ideal? 178 What do Victims Want: Punishment? Treatment? Restitution? 179

Make “Them” Suffer 179 Make “Them” Get Treatment 182 Make “Them” Pay for Losses and Expenses 183

Victims and the Police 183 Reporting Incidents 184 Responding Quickly 188 Handling Victims with Care 188 Challenging the Victim’s Version of Events 189 Investigating Complaints and Solving Crimes 193 Arresting Suspects 199

C O N T E N T S vii

Recovering Stolen Property 200 Measuring Progress toward a Victim-Oriented Police Department 201

Summary 203 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 203 Questions for Discussion and Debate 203 Critical Thinking Questions 203 Suggested Research Projects 204

7 Victims’ Rights and the Criminal Justice System 205 The Adult Criminal Justice System Versus the Juvenile Justice System 206 Toward Greater Formal Legal Rights within the Criminal Justice System 207

The Quest for a Constitutional Amendment Guaranteeing Victims’ Rights 210 The Achievements of the Victims’ Rights Movement 211 Rights Gained at the Expense of Offenders 212 Rights Gained at the Expense of the System 212 Rights Gained at the Expense of Offenders, the System, or Both 213

Victims and Prosecutors 216 Assisting Victims and Other Witnesses for the State 217 Protecting Victims Who Serve as Witnesses for the Prosecution 219 Dismissing Charges and Rejecting Cases 222 Negotiating Pleas 223

Victims and Defense Attorneys 225 Postponing Hearings 225 Cross-Examining Witnesses During Trials 226

Victims and Judges 228 Granting Bail 228 Sentencing Offenders 229 Appealing to the Supreme Court 232

Victims and Juries 233 Victims and Corrections Officials 236

Keeping Track of Offenders and Receiving Reimbursement from Them 237 Influencing Parole Board Decisions 237

And Justice for All? 239 Recognizing “Second-Class” Treatment 240

Summary 243 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 244 Questions for Discussion and Debate 244 Critical Thinking Questions 244 Suggested Research Projects 245

8 Victimized Children 246 The Ongoing Debate Between Maximalists and Minimalists 247 Missing Children 248

The Rediscovery of the Plight of Kidnapped Children 248 Fears and Confusion Reigns in the Absence of Data 250 Estimates of the Incidence and Seriousness of the Disappearance Problem 252

viii C O N T E N T S

Hunting for Children Who Have Vanished 255 The Amber Alert System 256 Protecting Children from Kidnappers 258

Physically and Sexually Abused Children 259 The Rediscovery of Child Abuse 259 How Children Suffer 261 Estimates of the Incidence, Prevalence, and Seriousness of Child Abuse 263 Maximalist versus Minimalist Approaches to the Seriousness of the Problem 264 Trends in the Rate of Child Abuse 266 Differential Risks Children Face of Being Maltreated 268 More Controversies Surrounding Childhood Sexual Abuse 269 The Furor over Recalling Repressed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse 269 Strange Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse During Rituals 274

Abused Children and Legal Proceedings 276 Taking into Account the Best Interests of the Child 276 The Credibility of Children as Witnesses 277 Devising Child-Friendly Practices 279

Proactive versus Reactive Strategies 281 Additional Forms of Exploitation and Mistreatment of Young People 282

Sibling Abuse 282 Abuse of Adolescents by Parents 282 Statutory Rape of Minors 283

Summary 283 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 284 Questions for Discussion and Debate 284 Critical Thinking Questions 284 Suggested Research Projects 284

9 Victims of Violence by Lovers and Family Members 286 Violence within Romantic Relationships and Families 287 The Rediscovery of “Wife Beating” 287

Blaming Her for His Violent Outbursts 290 How Victims Suffer 290 Estimates of the Incidence, Prevalence, and Seriousness of Intimate Partner Violence 291 Recognizing Warning Signs 297 Fatal Attractions: Slayings of Intimate Partners 298 Explaining Intimate Partner Violence: Why Doesn’t She Just Leave Him? 300 Enabling Victims Who Feel Trapped to Escape 303 Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System: Violence Is Violence—or Is It? 304

The Rediscovery of Battered Husbands and Boyfriends 310 Victim Provocation and Murder: When Is the Slaying of a Wife Beater Justified? 311

Intimate Partner Homicides and the Criminal Justice System 312 Arguments Stressing That the Brutal Man Did Not Deserve to Die 312 Arguments Emphasizing That the Brutal Man Provoked the Lethal Response 313

C O N T E N T S ix

The Rediscovery of Other Victims of Beatings 316 Dating Violence 316 Abuse of Parents by Adolescents 318 Elder Abuse 318 Battering Within Same-Sex Relationships 321

Preventing Battering 322 Summary 322 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 323 Questions for Discussion and Debate 323 Critical Thinking Questions 323 Suggested Research Projects 324

10 Victims of Rapes and Other Sexual Assaults 325 Sexual Assaults and Rapes: The Social Reaction 326 The Rediscovery of the Plight of Rape Victims 327 The Consequences of Being Sexually Assaulted 328 The Controversy Surrounding Questions of Shared Responsibility 329

“Real Rapes” as Compared to “Acquaintance Rapes” and “Date Rapes” 330 Victim-Blaming Viewpoints 332 Victim-Defending Perspectives 335

Estimates of the Incidence, Prevalence, and Seriousness of Rape 338 Who Faces the Gravest Dangers? Differential Risks of Being Sexually Assaulted and Raped 340 How the Criminal Justice System Handles Rape Victims 341

The Controversy over Unfounded Accusations 345 The Accuser Versus the Accused 349 Unwanted Publicity and Negative Media Portrayals 350 Rape Shield Laws 352 Issues Surrounding Force and Resistance 352 The Need for Corroboration 353 Rape Victims and the Police: Reporting Rates and Solution Rates 354 Rape Victims and Prosecutors 355

Crisis Centers: Providing Emergency Assistance 358 The Rediscovery of More Victims of Rapes and Sexual Assaults 359

Drug-Facilitated Sexual Assaults 359 The Rediscovery of More Rape Victims 361

Sexual Assaults on Campus 362 Sexual Assaults Within the Military 368 Sexual Assaults Between Males 369 Sexual Assaults Behind Bars 370 Sexual Assaults Within Marriages 371

Three Competing Approaches to Reducing the Problem of Forcible Rape 372 Summary 374 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 374 Questions for Discussion and Debate 374

x C O N T E N T S

Critical Thinking Questions 375 Suggested Research Projects 375

11 Additional Groups of Victims with Special Problems 376 Individuals Menaced by Stalkers 377

Stalking: A New Word for an Old Problem 377 The Scope of the Problem 378 Cyberstalking: A New Word for a New Problem 381

Victims of Crimes Committed at School 382 Threats Facing Middle and High School Students 382 Threats Facing College Students 385 The Controversy over Hazing on Campus 389

Casualties of Workplace Violence 390 Casualties While on the Job 391

Targets of Hate Crimes 393 Rediscovering a Very Old Problem 393 How Much Hate? 395 Criminal Justice System Reforms 398

Violence Between Prisoners 399 Law Enforcement Officers Injured and Slain in the Line of Duty 401

Who, Where, What, When, How, and Why? 402 Showing Solidarity 404

Casualties of Politically Inspired Violence and Terrorism 405 Assessing the Threat of Terrorism 406 Assistance and Recovery 411

Summary 414 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 414 Questions for Discussion and Debate 414 Critical Thinking Questions 415 Suggested Research Projects 415

12 Repaying Victims 416 The Costs of Victimizations 417 Gaining Restitution from Offenders 418

Back to Basics 418 The Rise, Fall, and Rediscovery of Restitution 419 Divergent Goals, Clashing Philosophies 421 Opportunities to Make Restitution 423 Obstacles Undermining Restitution 425 Restitution in Action 426

Winning Judgments in Civil Court 428 The Revival of Interest in Civil Lawsuits 428 The Litigation Process 429 Collecting Damages from Third Parties 433

Collecting Insurance Reimbursements 437 Private Crime Insurance 437 Patterns of Loss, Recovery, and Reimbursement 439

C O N T E N T S xi

Federal Crime Insurance 439 Recovering Losses Through Victim Compensation Programs 440

The History of Victim Compensation by Governments 441 The Debate over Compensation in the United States 441 How Programs Operate: Similarities and Differences 444 Monitoring and Evaluating Compensation Programs 446

Confiscating Profits from Notorious Criminals 449 Writing and Rewriting the Law So That Crime Doesn’t Pay 450

Summary 452 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 452 Questions for Discussion and Debate 453 Critical Thinking Questions 453 Suggested Research Projects 453

13 Victims in the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Directions 454 Toward Countering Criminal Violence with Forceful Responses 455

The Legitimate Use of Force in Self-Defense 455 Would Victims Be Better Off if They Were Armed? 456 Purchasing and Using Firearms for Self-Protection: The Maximalist Versus Minimalist Debate 457 Arguments Advanced by Proponents of Arming for Self-Protection 459 Counterarguments Advanced by Critics Opposed to Arming for Self-Protection 461 Gun Laws Directly Affecting Victims 465 Justifiable Homicides Carried Out by Victims and Law Enforcement Officers 468 The Vague Line Between Victims Acting in Self-Defense and Using Excessive Force 469 Victims and Bystanders Sometimes Engage in “Retaliatory Justice” 470 Vigilantism’s Frontier Origins 472 The Appeal of Retaliatory Justice 473

Toward Restorative Justice 477 A Brief History of Restorative Justice 479 The Peacemaking Process: How Reconciliation Programs Work 481 Evaluating Efforts at Reconciliation 484 Pros and Cons from the Victim’s Point of View 485 The Future of Restorative Justice 487

Summary 488 Key Terms Defined in the Glossary 489 Questions for Discussion and Debate 489 Critical Thinking Questions 489 Suggested Research Projects 490

G L O S S A R Y 491

R E F E R E N C E S 502

N A M E I N D E X 563

S U B J E C T I N D E X 574

xii C O N T E N T S

Boxes, Tables, and Figures

BOXES

Box 1.1 What the Police Mean by the Term Victimology 4

Box 1.2 Some Striking Examples of “Victimology Bashing” 15

Box 1.3 The Social Reaction to Victimization: A Look at the Interplay between Victims, Offenders, and Bystanders 21

Box 1.4 A Sampling of the Wide Range of Studies about the Interaction between Offenders and Victims 25

Box 1.5 An Illustration of How to Analyze a Specific Type of Victimization: Road Rage 28

Box 1.6 Questions to Spur the Development of Survivorology 37

Box 2.1 Highlights in the Brief History of Victimology and Victim Assistance 51

Box 2.2 The Process of Rediscovery Goes On and On 52

Box 2.3 An Illustration of the Four Stages in the Rediscovery Process: The Plight of Victims of Human Trafficking 58

Box 3.1 The FBI’s Instructions About How to Classify Certain Complicated Crimes: Guidelines from the Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook 84

Box 4.1 A Statistical Picture of Murders in the United States, 1980–2008 104

Box 4.2 “Your Money or Your Life!” 110

Box 4.3 Carjacked Drivers 113

Box 5.1 Early Expressions of Support for Inquiries into the Victim’s Role 140

Box 5.2 Early Criticisms of the Notion of Shared Responsibility 142

Box 5.3 Advice from Experts About Burglary 146

Box 5.4 Advice to Motorists About Vehicle Theft 148

Box 5.5 The Perils of Identity Theft: What to Do and What Not to Do, According to the Experts 152

Box 5.6 Prof Calls for Crackdown on Crime Victims 162

Box 5.7 Robbery: What the Experts Recommend 165

Box 6.1 Notable Criticisms of How the Criminal Justice System Handles Victims 180

Box 6.2 Which Individuals Who Claim to Be “Victims” of Auto Theft Might Be Suspected of Engaging in Fraud by Law Enforcement and Insurance Investigators? 192

Box 7.1 Inspiring Examples of Victim Activism 208

Box 7.2 Events That Call Attention Not Only to the Plight but also to the Rights of Various Kinds of Victims 210

Box 7.3 Legislation Introduced in Congress Sponsored by the Crime Victims Caucus 216

Box 7.4 Supreme Court Decisions Directly Affecting Victims 234

Box 7.5 Which Victims Get Better Treatment? 241

Box 8.1 Highlights of the Rediscovery of the Missing Children Problem 251

Box 8.2 How Often Are Children Kidnapped, and What Happens to Them? 254

Box 10.1 The Controversy Surrounding Widely Held Rape Myths 337

Box 10.2 The System’s Shortcomings from a Victim’s Point of View 342

Box 10.3 The Problem of Untested Rape Kits 356

Box 10.4 Guidelines for the Proper Handling of Allegations of Sexual Misconduct on Campuses 367

Box 11.1 A Timeline of Some of the Worst Campus Shootings 388

Box 12.1 Challenges Facing Burglary Victims Who Seek Insurance Reimbursement 438

Box 13.1 What Armed Citizens Under Attack Must Consider Before Pulling the Trigger 457

TABLES

Table 2.1 Possible Indicators That a Person Is a Trafficking Victim 63

Table 3.1 Estimated Nationwide Victimization Rates from the UCR and the NCVS, 2013 82

Table 3.2 Comparing the Risks of Death Posed by Crime, Accidents, and Certain Diseases, 2010 and 2012 90

Table 4.1 Murder Rates Across the Globe: Selected Countries, 2012 97

Table 4.2 Murder Rates in Selected Cities Around the World 98

Table 4.3 Yearly Estimates of Murders Committed During Robberies 110

Table 4.4 Robbery Rates for Various Groups, 1993 and 2013 111

Table 4.5 Which Vehicle Owners Suffered the Most Thefts? 118

Table 4.6 Vehicle Theft Rates in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2013 120

Table 4.7 How Victims of Identity Theft Were Harmed, Nationwide, 2006, 2010, 2013 125

Table 4.8 Estimates About the Number of Identity Theft Victims per Year, 2001–2013 127

Table 4.9 States Where Residents Faced the Highest and Lowest Risks of Identity Theft, 2013 128

Table 4.10 Chances of Becoming a Victim over a Lifetime 130

xiv B O X E S , T A B L E S , A N D F I G U R E S

Table 6.1 Trends in Reporting Crimes to the Police, Selected Years, 1973–2013 187

Table 6.2 Trends in Clearance Rates, United States, Selected Years, 1953–2013 195

Table 6.3 Clearance Rates for Homicide Cases (Murder and Manslaughter) in Major U.S. Cities, Selected Years, 2003–2012 197

Table 7.1 Victims’ Rights Gained at the Expense of Suspects, Defendants, and Convicts 213

Table 7.2 Victims’ Rights Gained at the Expense of Criminal Justice Agencies and Officials 214

Table 8.1 Accomplishments of the Amber Alert System, 2005–2011 257

Table 11.1 Victimization Rates per 1,000 Students, 12 to 18 Years Old, at School Compared to Away from School, 1992–2012 383

Table 11.2 Crimes Committed on College Campuses, United States, 2001–2011 387

Table 12.1 Percentages of Convicted Felons Sentenced to Restitution as an Additional Penalty in the 75 Largest Jurisdictions Nationwide, Selected Years, 1996–2006 427

Table 12.2 Percentage of Convicted Felons Placed on Probation Who Have Restitution Obligations in the 75 Largest Jurisdictions Nationwide, Selected Years, 1994–2009 428

Table 13.1 Comparing and Contrasting Retributive and Restorative Justice 480

FIGURES

Figure 3.1 The FBI’s Crime Clock, 2013 78

Figure 3.2 Trends in Violent Victimization Rates, United States, 1973–2013 85

Figure 3.3 Trends in Property Crime Rates, United States, 1973–2013 86

Figure 3.4 An Historical Overview of Homicide Rates, United States, 1900–2013 88

Figure 4.1 Murder Rates In Major Cities, United States, 2013 100

Figure 4.2 Trends in Aggravated Assaults, United States, 1973–2013 106

Figure 4.3 Trends in Robberies, United States, 1973–2013 109

Figure 4.4 Trends in Burglaries, United States, 1973–2013 115

Figure 4.5 Trends in Motor Vehicle Thefts, United States, 1973–2013 117

Figure 8.1 Trends in Child Maltreatment Rates, United States, 1990–2012 267

Figure 9.1 Trends in Murders Due to Intimate Partner Violence, United States, 1977–2013 299

Figure 10.1 Trends in Rape Rates, United States, 1973–2013 339

Figure 11.1 Trends in Murders of Students at Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, United States, School Years 1992 to 2011 384

B O X E S , T A B L E S , A N D F I G U R E S xv

Figure 11.2 Trends in Work-Related Murders, United States, 1992–2013 393

Figure 11.3 Trends in the Murders of Law Enforcement Officers, United States, 1973–2013 402

Figure 11.4 Casualties of Terrorism, United States, 1980–2005 407

Figure 12.1 Opportunities for Offenders to Make Restitution 424

Figure 12.2 Case Attrition, Funneling, or Shrinkage: The Leaky Net 425

Figure 13.1 Trends in Justifiable Homicides, United States, 1988–2013 468

xvi B O X E S , T A B L E S , A N D F I G U R E S

PREFACE

In the early 1980s, I became interested in the victims’ rights movement thatwas campaigning to reform criminal justice policies. I decided to develop an experimental course about crime victims, but I found that no comprehensive and up-to-date textbook existed. After discovering this absence of scholarly books appropriate for classroom use, I accepted the challenge and decided to write one.

When I began working on the first edition during 1983, it was difficult to locate reliable social science data or even well-informed speculation about a number of crucial aspects about people who experienced interpersonal violence and theft. When I prepared the second edition in the late 1980s, I encountered the opposite problem. Instead of a scarcity of material, there was too much. Large amounts of data and lengthy analyses were becoming available, especially about rape, spouse abuse, child abuse, and elder abuse. By the mid-1990s, when I prepared the third edition, this “knowledge explosion” had become even more difficult to manage. Entire issues of scholarly journals had been devoted to, and whole books had been written about, the plight of these victims. When I wrote the fourth edition, the most striking change that I encountered was how the recently developed Internet could provide readily available and contin- uously updated information about a wide variety of victims. As a result, I added an appendix of websites that faculty and students could check out periodically to view the latest statistics and the most recent developments concerning new laws, programs, and services. (Now there are too many to list.) The fifth edition introduced readers to the problems faced by victims of identity theft, cyberstalk- ing, sexual abuse by clergy, drug-facilitated date rape, bias-driven hate crimes, and unfortunately, terrorist attacks. It also contained many more research find- ings as a growing number of studies about violence and theft found their way onto the information highway via government agencies, advocacy groups, and scholarly journals focused on specific types of victims. By the time the sixth edition was published, so many new topics and controversial issues had accumu- lated over the years that I had to break up 7 long chapters into 13 more

manageable ones; this repackaging of themes and issues has worked out very well for courses that run 14 or 15 weeks. The seventh edition featured a closer look at several groups of victims who faced special problems, such as college students, casualties of road rage, and feloniously assaulted police officers. In the eighth edition, this list expanded to include increased coverage of assaulted high school students, persons trafficked into the United States, and prisoners.

Ever since the seventh edition, a table right at the outset in Chapter 1 has assembled victimology-bashing quotes that show how the scientific study of victimization is often confused with the controversial political ideology of victi- mism. This misunderstanding of what victimology actually is all about has led some influential commentators to condemn the entire discipline and brand it with an undeserved bad reputation. Unfortunately this problem continues, and some students might enter the class with a negative impression of victimology.

WHAT’S NEW?

In revising this textbook once again, I have maintained a focus on all the groups of victims that appeared in the previous eight editions. Although nothing important has been cut out, I have changed the order of presentation of a few subjects, and I have paid greater attention to a number of timely issues. In response to feedback from reviewers, this edition has more extensive and more concentrated discussions about the competing theories that explain who gets victimized and why. But it also has an additional number of concise real- life cases culled from high-profile news stories that put a human face on the many empirical generalizations and statistics that are cited in each chapter. These emotionally charged items help to promote students’ engagement with the scholarly material that is the backbone of this textbook. These gripping excerpts spark discussions and debates about what happened to real individuals in actual cases, and in the process concretize abstract principles, hypotheticals, and procedures. (As in all the past editions, I continue to respect the privacy of persons who have been harmed by criminals by withholding their names and locations. However, the references provide that information for those stu- dents who might want to delve into these cases in greater detail.)

The most useful change in each of the 13 chapters is that I have reformulated clear and measurable learning objectives that will be useful for professors under- taking outcomes assessment. The questions at the end of each chapter, which encourage discussion and debate as well as critical thinking, can serve as the cor- responding performance measures. I also provide ideas at the end of each chapter for hands-on research projects. These could form the basis for term papers that can serve as additional indicators of what students gained from taking your class.

In preparing this ninth edition, as always, I have thoroughly updated all the statistical evidence that is needed to back up my analyses and conclusions. For those instructors who relish evidence-based claims and sound policy recommen- dations, plenty of reliable empirical material from official sources of data appears in the many graphs, tables, and boxes.

xviii P R E F A C E

As in the previous eight editions, I have sought out and highlighted the many controversies that involve victims as they interact with offenders, criminal justice officials and agencies, policy makers, the news media, social movements, and businesses selling security products and services. These contested issues are emotionally unsettling, hotly debated, and divisive, but they make a college course more meaningful and relevant to the real world of competing interests and polarized politics. I strive to be fair and balanced by presenting the strongest arguments of both sides in each controversy. I do not endorse some of the points of view that I present or their implications for social policy, of course. But I firmly believe that a textbook ought to call attention, whenever possible, to sharp clashes between well-meaning people with differing evidence-based views and divergent interpretations of the same data. Two examples of contro- versies featured in this ninth edition include whether individuals who sense that they are at risk would fare better if they were armed with concealed handguns for self-protection, as well as the best ways to address alcohol-fueled sexual assaults on campus.

Some highlights of the specific revisions, additions, and improvements I have made in each chapter are described below:

Chapter 1, “What Is Victimology?” has been sharpened to make sure that students find the upcoming course and its reading assignments to be engaging, relevant to their career plans, and meaningful to their personal concerns. This lead-off chapter contains new real-life cases that dramatize the suffering of college students as the targets of ruthless offenders. That is followed by a streamlined discussion stressing the need for objectivity, and then a new section on the necessity of engaging in research. Bystander intervention, which is an insufficiently studied aspect of society’s reaction to victimization, is now covered in greater depth in a box that provides a typology, an example, and an up-to-date review of research findings. Another set of actual cases illustrates how the reactions of victims under attack and their resiliency in its aftermath often can be inspirational and uplifting. That leads to the observation that victimology’ s unavoidable preoccupation with suffering can and should be balanced out by another more positive and upbeat line of inquiry, termed “survivorology.” A sec- tion asking “Why Study Victimology?” was expanded to further motivate students to consider the practical value of the course and the importance of the entire enterprise.

Chapter 2, “The Rediscovery of Crime Victims,” provides a great many new references that will prove useful to students who want to investigate the plights of particular groups that have not yet received sufficient atten- tion and assistance. The coverage of victims of human trafficking, a prob- lem of great concern and outrage to many students, now more clearly illustrates how the rediscovery process goes through four distinct stages.

Chapter 3, “Victimization in the United States: An Overview,” has been reorganized to better explain and illustrate how official statistics can provide preliminary answers to important questions. The graph showing historical

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trends in homicides has been moved to the end of this chapter to round out the idea of the big picture. The extensive FBI Uniform Crime Report data as well as the findings from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) National Crime Victimization Survey in the tables and graphs have been updated and simplified. The discussion of comparative risks (mortality due to ill- nesses and accidents) has been expanded and updated.

Chapter 4, “A Closer Look at the Victims of Interpersonal Violence and Theft,” replaces the more narrowly focused chapter formerly entitled “Violent Crimes: Murders and Robberies.” It starts out with an examina- tion of the latest United Nations statistics comparing murder rates for a great many countries and their leading cities in order to demonstrate the importance of location as a major determinant of risk levels. The chapter now also includes discussions about people who suffered near death experiences and other aggravated assaults, robberies, burglaries, vehicle thefts, and even identity theft. Engaging questions are posed, such as which individuals face the gravest chances of being murdered and which motorists should be most concerned when parking their cars. Throughout the chap- ter, differential risks are the focus of attention: how various demographic groupings experience much higher or much lower rates of victimization.

Chapter 5, “The Ongoing Controversy over Shared Responsibility,” is a sharpened reformulation of the previous edition’s “Victims’ Contribution to the Crime Problem.” But as always, it presents all sides of this contro- versial topic. The debate over individual responsibility (in the form of facilitation, precipitation, and provocation) is characterized as victim blam- ing versus victim defending. The chapter now features enhanced coverage of the theories that account for the differential risks experienced by entire demographic groups. New material highlighted in boxes provides prag- matic advice from experts about how to avoid being burglarized, getting robbed, and being impersonated by an identity thief, and what to do if these unwanted events happen.

Chapter 6, “Victims and the Police,” replaces “Victims and the Criminal Justice System: Cooperation and Conflict; Part 1: The Police.” This streamlined chapter contains updated tables, including the clearance rates for index crimes for the entire nation, and the homicide clearance rates for many big-city police forces (data that still does not appear in other victim- ology, criminology, or criminal justice textbooks, to my knowledge).The controversy surrounding charges that some police departments try to manipulate crime statistics downward by discouraging victims from report- ing incidents is explored in greater depth. Other issues examined in more detail include efforts by victims to recover their stolen property and the filing of dishonest and false complaints.

Chapter 7, retitled as “Victims’ Rights and the Criminal Justice System,” now provides a systematic review of the many recently enacted procedural rights (material that formerly appeared in the final chapter of the book). The enumeration and assessment of these rights is integrated into the

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discussions about interactions with prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, juries, and corrections officials This expanded chapter includes some new Supreme Court decisions impacting victims and a strengthened examina- tion of the need for protection against intimidation and reprisals.

Chapter 8, “Victimized Children,” contains expanded discussions and updated statistics in tables and graphs that reveal the latest trends in child maltreatment cases and fatalities. Differential risks of being abused are explored in greater detail. The latest revelations about sexual abuse as well as cover-ups of systematic molestations are summarized. A summary of a study about the sudden rise and rapid fall of prosecutions and lawsuits based on repressed memories of childhood abuse helps to understand what hap- pened to this formerly burning issue.

Chapter 9, “Victims of Violence by Lovers and Family Members,” benefits from new real-life cases and updated research findings. The many ways that victims suffer now is explored in greater detail. The clash between maxi- malist and minimalist perspectives has been updated and sharpened. Theo- ries that address “why does she stay with an abusive partner?” are presented more effectively. Orders of protection and gun surrender laws are described more clearly.

Chapter 10, “Victims of Rapes and Other Sexual Assaults,” contains new real-life cases and updated statistics in the graph and the table. The discus- sion about sexual assaults on campus now appears here, rather than in Chapter 11, and a great deal of material has been added, including best practices for handling these cases. Coverage about sexual assaults in the military was added. Updated estimates about differential risks and unana- lyzed rape kits enhance the analysis of these issues.

Chapter 11, “Additional Groups of Victims with Special Problems,” has been reorganized and streamlined and benefits from many fresh real-life examples. New material has been added about cyberstalking, line-of-duty deaths of police officers, and murders and woundings attributed to terror- ism. The analysis of offenses against high school and college students, of inmate vs. inmate violence, and of hate crimes has been updated and strengthened.

Chapter 12, “Repaying Victims,” contains some new material about civil lawsuits and state compensation funds, as well as practical advice addressing the challenges of collecting insurance reimbursements in the wake of burglaries.

Chapter 13, “Victims in the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Directions,” now features a greatly expanded and yet carefully balanced presentation of the controversy surrounding arming for self-protection, with a wealth of new material about victims using guns to defend themselves. Approaches to conflict resolution that seek to achieve restorative justice now stand out in sharp contrast to arming for self-protection because the discussion about legal rights and remedies has been moved to Chapter 7.

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Once again, this edition accentuates the positive by repeatedly focusing on the unanticipated but much-welcomed trend that became evident by the late 1990s: an impressive nationwide drop in victimization rates. Across the country, fewer people are being murdered, robbed, raped, assaulted, or suffering losses from burglaries and car thefts than at any time in the past several decades. This improvement in public safety is well documented in the many tables and graphs throughout the text. Of course, no one knows how much longer the ebbing of the crime wave that began in the 1960s and peaked in the early 1990s will last because no consensus exists among criminologists and victimologists about why crime rates rise and fall.

USING THIS TEXTBOOK

This ninth edition is intended to meet several distinct needs. The optimal situa- tion is to use this textbook as the foundation for an undergraduate elective course on victimology that runs for an entire term. In fact, more than enough material is provided to sustain even a graduate-level course. A number of chap- ters can be used to address victim-centered problems, such as violence in Amer- ican society, that arise in either an advanced criminology class or as selected issues in criminal justice course.

Similarly, other chapters might fit neatly into courses that focus on policy analysis or research methods.

For classes that require a term paper or group project, this edition provides loads of up-to-date references, suggestions for short research projects at the end of each chapter, plenty of graphs and statistics, and numerous observations about problems of measurement and interpretation. For example, the extensive com- pilation of the types of victimization that recently have been recognized or are just waiting to be rediscovered (see the list at the end of Chapter 2) can serve as a launching pad for exploratory research and term projects. For courses that incorporate writing requirements via essay exams, each chapter has several ques- tions for discussion and debate plus a few that stimulate critical thinking. An instructor’s manual with short answer questions is also available, as are Microsoft PowerPoint® visual aids.

I maintain a personal Web site (www.crimevictimsupdates.com) geared to this textbook’s chapters that provides links to the very latest newspaper and magazine articles, radio and television interviews, and reports issued by govern- ment agencies and think tanks. The website can be useful for extra credit and make-up assignments and serves as a constant reminder that the subjects exam- ined in the course are closely connected to the real world outside the classroom.

MY GROWING “CREDENTIALS” AS A CRIME VICTIM

Each time I revise this textbook, my credentials (unfortunately) broaden and deepen. Direct experience often is the best teacher and a source of sensitivity and insight about life’s problems and the challenges imposed by misfortunes.

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In the preface of each previous edition, I listed these credentials: I am not only a criminologist and victimologist, I am also a crime victim.

I know from personal encounters what it is like to be a victim of a range of street and white-collar crimes (thankfully, none of them were really serious). In fact, my very first experience was something to laugh at, in retrospect, although it was very aggravating at the time. After I graduated from college, I got my first car: a brand-new 1966 Mustang. I drove it around upstate New York, where I was attending graduate school, for about a week before a thief stole its gleaming wire wheel covers—all four of them in a single night! Amazingly enough, crime was not yet a widespread problem, so my minor misfortune actually appeared in the police blotter of the local newspaper. This incident contributed to my life- long interest in law-breaking, victimization, and the search for justice.

Before the first edition was written:

I was held up twice (in one month!) by pairs of knife-wielding robbers.

I lost a car to thieves. The police discovered it completely stripped, burned, and abandoned.

I experienced a series of thefts of car radios and batteries.

I suffered a break-in that left my apartment in shambles.

By the time the second edition of this textbook came out, my already impressive résumé as a street crime victim had grown considerably:

A thief stole the bicycle that I used to ride to the train station by cutting the fence to which it was chained.

Someone ran off with a fishing rod I had left unattended for a few minutes on a pier while I was buying more bait. (It surely was not pulled over the railing by a big fish).

A teenager singled out my car in a crowded parking lot for some reason and smashed the rear window with a rock. An eyewitness pointed out the young man to the police, and his foster parents volunteered to pay my bills for the damage. (I minimized their expenses by going to a salvage yard to find a low-cost replacement window.)

A thief broke into the trunk of my car and stole my wallet and my wife’s pocketbook while we spent an afternoon at the beach. Our wallets were later recovered from a nearby mailbox, emptied of our cash and credit cards.

One hot summer night, an intruder entered our kitchen through an unlocked screen door. He ran off with a purse while we talked to guests in the living room.

A car I was riding in was sideswiped by a vehicle driven by a fugitive who was being hotly pursued by a patrol car. No one was hurt, and the offender escaped.

A thief smashed the side window of my car, which was parked at a meter a block away from the college where I teach. Sitting in the passenger seat, he

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began to pry out the radio. When the alarm went off, he fled, leaving his screwdriver behind (it is now my favorite tool).

By the third edition, I had a few more misfortunes to add to the list:

My car was broken into two more times, on busy streets, during the day. One time, the alarm sounded and apparently scared off the thief, cutting short his depredations and minimizing my losses to a handful of quarters kept for tolls in an ashtray and some items in the glove compartment.

Shortly before the fourth edition was completed, my family was the victim of a con game that turned out to be a rather common scam:

We picked a moving company out of the Yellow Pages because it advertised low rates and accepted credit cards. I should have been suspicious when they arrived in a rented truck, but I foolishly signed some papers authorizing them to charge me for packing materials. While we loaded computer components, valuables, and pets into our cars and shuttled them to our new house, they quickly used an enormous amount of shrink-wrap and cardboard boxes on our old furniture, cheap picture frames, and clothing. When their rented van arrived at our new home 10 miles away, they presented me with a bill that was inflated by about $1,000 worth of unnecessary packaging. They demanded immediate payment in cash before they would unload our stuff that Saturday night, or else they would drive away with all our possessions and charge us for unloading and storage. I called the police, but they insisted it was a business dispute and said that they could not intervene. I had no choice but to visit several ATMs, to take out loans from all our credit cards, and hand over the cash. On Monday, I contacted some colleagues at John Jay College of Criminal Justice who have close connections with law enforcement agencies. They made inquiries and warned me that this com- pany was known to have mob ties. Because these gangsters literally knew where we lived, I regret to admit that a fear of reprisals intimidated me from pursuing my claims about fraud in civil court or through state regulatory agencies or consumer affairs bureaus. Years later, I read in the newspaper that some victims received protection as witnesses for the prosecution and that this moving scam crew eventually was put out of business and incarcerated.

By the time I completed the fifth edition, my credentials had “improved”:

Like many other New Yorkers, I knew some victims of terrorism who barely escaped death by evacuating the World Trade Center before the Twin Towers collapsed.

My daughter’s backpack was stolen by a thief who pried open the trunk of our automobile after watching her park the car and walk away.

More importantly, I received just a taste of what it is like to be a victim of identity theft. The fraud detection unit of a credit card company called one morning and asked if anyone in my family had recently charged exactly $400 at a department store and $200 at a computer software store about

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40 miles away. When I answered no, and wondered aloud how such round number amounts could be charged for merchandise that is taxed, they simply said, “Don’t worry, just fill out an affidavit.” When the paperwork finally arrived weeks later, I did what they asked and never heard anything about these peculiar financial transactions again.

By the time the sixth edition came out, I had received plenty of fraudulent e-mails (called “phishing”—see the discussion of identity theft in Chapters 4 and 5) warning me to immediately update my account at some bank or credit card company or eBay before it was frozen. Besides these pathetic attempts to con me, very little else happened, which probably reflected the nationwide drop in crime that has lowered virtually everyone’s risks of being victimized (see Chapter 3).

However, while preparing the seventh edition, my family was victimized twice—in other countries! My daughter’s car was broken into near a museum in Montreal, Canada, and her husband’s digital camera was stolen (and we paid a hefty bill for a new door lock and rear window for the damaged vehicle). In London’s theater district, a pickpocket deftly removed my wife’s wallet from her backpack (see Chapter 1). Fortunately, although she lost some cash and her driver’s license, whoever ended up with her credit cards was not able to purchase anything or steal her identity. Meanwhile, back home, I suspected that someone entered our car one night while it was parked unlocked in our driveway because the glove compartment was open the next morning. As far as I could tell, nothing was taken. Sure enough, the next night the thief returned and stole the remote for our garage door opener from the car’s sun visor while we were eating dinner. Fortunately, just an hour later I discovered that the remote was missing due to my habitual carelessness about not locking my car’s doors (see Chapter 5), so I disconnected the garage door opener. I did not report these two minor matters to the police. The incidents in Montreal and London were reported to the authorities, but they never contacted us, so pre- sumably the car thief and the pickpocket were never caught and our stolen property was not recovered (see Chapter 6).

One other incident is worth recounting because it is humorous: I keep my canoe chained to a rack at the town beach during warm weather. I came down one hot summer day to do some paddling and fishing and discovered that someone had stolen the chain and the padlock—but left the canoe behind, undamaged. Go figure!

After finishing the eighth edition, I had only one additional trivial incident to report. Someone stole a small anchor from my motorboat while it was moored in a nearby bay. I reported this petty larceny to the harbor patrol.

Now that this ninth edition is complete, I have just one more minor incident to share. Someone used my credit card to purchase stuff I would never buy and enroll in various costly Web-based services of no interest to me. The credit card security department flagged these peculiar transactions and notified me. I did not have to pay for the expensive goods and services this identity thief charged in my name.

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Obviously, victimization is rarely a laughing matter and nothing to scoff at. Others have suffered far more severely than I have. People endure devastat- ing losses and try to cope with traumatic ordeals. But these many brushes with an odd assortment of offenders over the last four decades have sensitized me to the kinds of expenses, emotional stresses, and physical injuries that taken together constitute the “victim’s plight.” I suspect that many victimologists and victim advocates have been drawn to this humanistic discipline because their own painful experiences inspired them to try to alleviate the suffering of others.

ANCILLARIES

To further enhance the teaching of victimology courses, the following supple- ments are available to qualified adopters. Please consult your local sales repre- sentative for details.

Online Instructor’s Manual

The instructor’s manual contains a variety of resources to aid instructors in pre- paring and presenting text material in a manner that meets their personal pre- ferences and course needs. It presents chapter-by-chapter suggestions and resources to enhance and facilitate learning.

Online Test Bank

The Test Bank contains multiple choice and essay questions to challenge your students and assess their learning.

Online PowerPoints®

These vibrant, Microsoft PowerPoint® lecture slides for each chapter assist you with your lecture, by providing concept coverage using images, figures, and tables directly from the textbook!

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the following people who helped me prepare this ninth edition of my textbook:

At Cengage Learning: Carolyn Henderson Meier, Senior Product Manager for Criminal Justice; Julia Catalano, Product Assistant for Criminal Justice; Kara Kindstrom, Marketing Manager for Criminal Justice; at S4Carlisle Publishing Services: Michael B. Kopf, Development Production Editor; and at Lumina Datamatics: Kailash Rawat.

xxvi PREFA CE

I would like to express my appreciation to these reviewers of all the previ- ous editions:

Kelly Asmussen, Peru State College Frankie Bailey, State University of New York, Albany Kevin M. Beaver, Florida State University Susan Beecher, Aims Community College Bonnie Black, Mesa Community College Ashley Blackburn, University of North Texas Pam Nielson Boline, Dakota Wesleyan University John Bolinger, MacMurray College Willie D. Cain, Campbell University Faith Coburn, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Ellen G. Cohn, Florida International University Andria L. Cooper, Fort Hays State University Susan Craig, University of Central Florida Greg Dawson, College of Central Florida Elizabeth DeValve, Fayetteville State University Rhonda Dobbs, The University of Texas at Arlington William Doerner, Florida State University, Tallahassee John Dussich, California State University, Fresno Deborah Eckberg, Metropolitan State University Martha Earwood, University of Alabama at Birmingham Gerald P. Fisher, Georgia College and State University Linda Fleischer, The Community College of Baltimore County

Gilbert Geis, University of California at Irvine Alan Harland, Temple University Sidney Harring, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Matasha Harris, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Carrie Harter, Sam Houston State University Debra Heath-Thornton, Messiah College Scott Hedlund, Pierce College Elizabeth Hegeman, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Michael Herbert, Bemidji State University Stacey Hervey, Metro State College Eric W. Hickey, California State University, Fresno Lin Huff-Corzine, Kansas State University Amanda M. Humphrey, Mount Mercy University David Johnson, University of Baltimore Dan Jones, Governors State University Lynn Jones, Northern Arizona University Janice Joseph, Richard Stockton College of New Jersey Betsy Kreisel, University of Central Missouri Fred Kramer, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Janet Lauritsen, University of Missouri–St. Louis Daniel P. LeClair, Boston University Joseph Linskey, Centenary College Cheng-Hsien Lin, Lamar University Karol Lucken, University of Central Florida

PREFACE xxvii

Donal MacNamara, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Liz Marciniak, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg Michael G. Maxfield, Rutgers University Thomas McDonald, North Dakota State University Jackye McClure, San Jose State University Markita McCrimmon, Central Carolina Community College Melissa Owens McKenna, Hiwassee College Stephen J. Morewitz, San Jose State University Christine Mouton, University of Central Florida George Muedeking, California State University, Stanislaus Ann Weaver Nichols, Arizona State University Sharon Ostrow, Temple University Leanne Owen, Holy Family University Elicka S. L. Peterson, Florida State University Amy Pinero, Baton Rouge Community College Elizabeth Quinn, Fayetteville State University

Roy Roberg, San Jose State University Kevin Roberts, Grace College Lorie Rubenser, Sul Ross State University Edward Sagarin, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Ken Salmon, Arizona State University Stanley Saxton, University of Dayton Brent Smith, University of Alabama, Birmingham David Sternberg, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Mark Stevens, North Carolina Wesleyan College James Stewart, Northeastern Junior College Thomas Underwood, Washburn University Joseph Victor, Mercy College Karen Weiss, West Virginia University Tamara Tucker Wilkins, Minnesota State University, Mankato Janet K. Wilson, University of Central Arkansas Thomas G. Ziesemer, College of Central Florida

Finally, I want to thank all those professors who provided valuable feedback through a survey about the eighth edition which helped me to prepare this ninth edition:

Andrew Karmen, February 2015

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1 What Is Victimology?

CHAPTER OUTLINE Focusing on the Plight of Crime Victims

Studying Victimization Scientifically

Why Objectivity Is Desirable

Sometimes It Is Difficult to Distinguish Victims from Villains

Criminals Can Be Victims Too Victims Can Find Themselves at Odds with the

“Good Guys” Sources of Bias that Thwart Objectivity

Victimology’s Undeserved “Bad Reputation” Why Emphasize Research?

Comparing Victimology to Criminology

The Many Parallels between Criminology and Victimology

Some Differences and Issues about Boundaries Interfacing with Other Disciplines Divisions within the Discipline

What Victimologists Do

Step 1: Identify, Define, and Describe the Problem Step 2: Measure the True Dimensions of the Problem Step 3: Investigate How Victims Are Handled Step 4: Gather Evidence to Test Hypotheses

Why Study Victimology?

Recognizing Exemplary Behavior Under Very Difficult Circumstances

“Survivorology:” Toward a More Inspiring and Upbeat Trajectory within Victimology

Summary

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary

Questions for Discussion and Debate

Critical Thinking Questions

Suggested Research Projects

LEARNING OBJECTIVES To practice looking at victims and victimization

through a scientific lens.

To appreciate why objectivity is worth striving for when examining the victims’ plight.

To discover why some people have a negative impression about what they brand as victimology.

To be able to recognize how victimology is similar to as well as different from criminology.

To become familiar with the steps to follow when conducting a victim-centered analysis.

FOCUSING ON THE PLIGHT OF CRIME VICTIMS

The concept of a victim can be traced back to ancient societies. It was connected to the notion of sacrifice. In the original connotation of the term, a victim was a person or an animal put to death during a religious ceremony in order to appease some supernatural power or deity. Over the centuries, the word has picked up additional meanings. Now it commonly refers to individuals who suffer injuries, losses, or hardships for any reason. People can become victims of accidents, natural disasters, diseases, or social problems such as warfare, discrimination, political witch hunts, and other injustices. Crime victims are harmed by illegal acts.

Victimization is an asymmetrical interpersonal relationship that is abusive, painful, destructive, par- asitical, and unfair. While a crime is in progress, offenders temporarily force their victims to play roles (almost as if following a script) that mimic the dynamics between predator and prey, winner and loser, victor and vanquished, and even master and slave. Many types of victimization have been out- lawed over the centuries—specific oppressive and exploitative acts, like raping, robbing, and swindling. But not all types of hurtful relationships and deceitful practices are forbidden by law. It is permissible to overcharge a customer for an item that can be pur- chased for less elsewhere, or to underpay a worker who could receive higher wages for the same tasks at another place of employment, or impose exorbitant interest rates and hidden fees on borrowers who use credit cards and take out mortgages, or to deny food and shelter to the hungry and the homeless who cannot pay the required amount.

Victimology is the scientific study of the physical, emotional, and financial harm people endure because of illegal activities. Victimologists first and foremost investigate the victims’ plight: the impact of the injuries and losses inflicted by offenders on the people they target. In addition, they carry out research into the public’s political, social, and economic reactions to the suffering of victims. They also study how victims are handled

by officials and agencies within the criminal justice system, especially interactions with police officers, detectives, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, probation officers, and members of parole boards.

Victimologists want to know whether and to what degree crime victims experience physical wounds, economic hardships, or emotional turmoil. One aim, of course, is to devise ways to help them recover. In the aftermath of the incident, are they sad- dened, depressed, frightened, terrorized, traumatized, infuriated, or embittered? Also, victimologists want to find out how effectively the injured parties are being assisted, supported, served, accommodated, rehabili- tated, and educated to avoid further trouble. Victimol- ogists are equally curious to determine the extent to which their suffering is being totally ignored, largely neglected, belittled, manipulated, and commercially or politically exploited. Some individuals who sustain terrible injuries and devastating losses might be memorialized, honored, and even idolized, while others might be mocked, discredited, defamed, deme- aned, socially stigmatized, and even condemned for bringing about their own misfortunes. Why is this so?

Victimologists also want to examine why some injured parties find their ordeals life transforming. Some become deeply alienated and withdraw from social relationships. They may become burdened by bouts of depression, sleep disorders, panic attacks, and stress-related illnesses. Their healing process may require overcoming feelings of helplessness, frustration, and self-blame. Others might react to their fear and fury by seeking out fellow sufferers, building alliances, and discovering ways to exercise their “agency”—to assess their options and make wise decisions, take advantage of opportunities, regain control of their lives, rebuild their self- confidence, and restore a sense of trust and security. Why do people experience such a wide range of responses, and do personality or social factors pri- marily determine how a person initially reacts and then recovers?

Direct or primary victims experience the criminal act and its consequences firsthand. Indirect or secondary victims (such as family members and loved ones) are not immediately involved or physically

2 C H A P T E R 1

injured in confrontations. But they might be burdened, even devastated, as the following examples illustrate.

A teenager who shot and killed a high school athlete is about to be sentenced to prison. The distraught father of the murdered boy tells the judge, “We always hope our little guy will come through the door, and it will never be. We don’t have lives. We stay in every day. We can’t function.” (MacGowan, 2007)

As an argument with a stranger escalates and he pulls out a gun, a wife is wounded when she puts out her hand to try to shield her husband from the bullet that causes his death. She tells an interviewer, “I was just so excited and looking forward to spending the day with the love of my life.… And just to think that in the blink of an eye, my whole world just got shattered into a million pieces. And now I’m left trying to pick them all up and putting them back together.” (Gutman, 2014)

First responders and rescue workers who race to crime scenes (such as police officers, forensic evi- dence technicians, paramedics, and firefighters) are exposed to emergencies and trauma on such a rou- tine basis that they also can be considered secondary or indirect victims who periodically might need emotional support themselves to prevent burnout (see Regehr and Bober, 2005; and Abel, 2013).

Note that victimologists are social scientists and researchers, as opposed to practitioners who directly assist injured parties to recover from their ordeals or who advocate on their behalf. Doctors, nurses, psy- chiatrists, psychologists, therapists, counselors, social workers, caseworkers, lawyers, clergy, and dedi- cated volunteers provide hands-on services, emo- tional support, and practical advice to their clients (see Williams, 2002). Victimologists step back and evaluate the effectiveness of these well-intentioned efforts by members of the healing and helping pro- fessions. Conversely, people who minister to those in distress can gain valuable insights and useful sug- gestions from the findings of studies carried out by victimologists.

The term victimology can mean different things to different people, and detectives can consider themselves “victimologists” too. In police work, the term victimology is applied to a type of back- ground investigation. To homicide detectives, vic- timology is the process of reconstructing events and learning as much as possible about a person who was murdered in order to help figure out who the killer is (see Box 1.1).

STUDYING VICTIMIZATION SCIENTIFICALLY

The suffering of victims and of the people who are very close to them always has been a popular theme for artists and writers to interpret and for political and religious leaders to address. But this long and rich tradition embodies what might be categorized as the subjective approach to the plight of vic- tims, since issues are approached from the stand- point of morality, ethics, philosophy, personalized reactions, and intense emotions. Victimologists examine these same topics and incidents from a fresh, new angle: through a social science lens. Objectivity is the hallmark of any social scientific endeavor. Scientific objectivity requires that the observer try to be fair, open-minded, evenhanded, dispassionate, neutral, and unbiased. Objectivity means not taking sides, not showing favoritism, not allowing personal prejudices to sidetrack analy- ses, not permitting emotion to cloud reasoning, and not letting the dominant views of the times dictate conclusions and recommendations.

Prescriptions to remain disinterested and unin- volved are easier to abide by when the incidents under scrutiny happened long ago and far away. It is much harder to maintain social distance when investigating the plight of real people right here and right now. These scientific tenets are extremely difficult to live up to when the subject matter—the depredations inflicted by lawbreakers—connects to widely held beliefs about good and evil, right and wrong, and justice and unfairness. Most offen- ders show such callous disregard and depraved

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 3

indifference toward the human beings they have cold-bloodedly targeted as depersonalized objects that it is difficult to avoid being caught up and swept away by strong emotional currents. Consider how natural it is to identify with those on the receiving end of violent attacks, to feel empathy and sympathy toward them, and to bristle with hostility toward the aggressors, as in the following real-life cases (all involving college students):

A 22-year-old student government president is car- jacked and kidnapped by two armed young men, 21 and 17 years old, and forced to withdraw money from an ATM. Next, they drive their hostage to a remote location in the woods, molest her, and then decide to kill her since she could identify them. She pleads for her life and urges them to pray with her. Instead, one shoots her four times. But she still can move and talk, so he blasts her with a shotgun to finish her off. The two assailants are caught and convicted of murder. (Velliquette, 2011)

A 22-year-old college student who aspires to become a police officer works in a bakery. But he is gunned down in his home by a gang of young men who barge in and mistake him for his look-alike younger brother, who had gotten them in trouble with the authorities. “He was one of the best boys you will ever find,” his mother laments. (Bultman and Jaccarino, 2010)

A sophomore attends a campus party and leaves alone around midnight. About 2 am, footage from a sur- veillance camera shows her walking in a downtown pedestrian mall followed by a man. After that she disappears, and her family, friends and volunteers undertake the largest hunt for a missing person in the state’s history. Over a month later, her remains are discovered on an abandoned property about 8 miles away from the mall, and the police arrest the man in the video, who is linked by forensic evidence to other attacks. Students at her university organize a memorial during homecoming weekend, and her parents thank the police and the volunteers who searched for her, but

B O X 1.1 What the Police Mean by the Term Victimology

When homicide squad detectives say they are engaged in vic- timology, they mean piecing together clues and leads from the dead person’s life in order to help discover the killer’s identity. Police investigators want to find out as much as possible about the deceased from interviews with the next of kin and eyewit- nesses, e-mail messages, diaries, banking deposits and with- drawals, computer files, and records of telephone calls. Detectives look into the victim’s associates (by compiling lists of contacts, including friends, family members, acquaintances, rivals, and enemies), social background (lifestyle, occupation, education, marital status, secret lovers), criminal history (any prior record of arrests, convictions, and incarcerations plus any cases in which the departed served as a complainant, plaintiff, or witness against others), financial situation (sources of income, debts owed, investments, and who is next in line to inherit any property), and health issues (drinking habits, substance abuse, and other problems). Autopsy findings shed light on the final meal, the presence of any traces of recent drinking and drug taking, the cause of death, and the approx- imate time interval when the fatal confrontation took place.

For example, if a drug dealer is found shot to death in an alley, detectives would construct a timeline of his last known

whereabouts and activities. What were his known hangouts (bars, clubs, parks, etc.)? Investigators would seek clues to determine whether he was killed by someone above him in the hierarchy of drug trafficking or someone below who worked for him or bought controlled substances from him. Was he recently embroiled in any disputes or court cases, and did he secretly serve as a confidential informant? Who had a motive and an opportunity to slay him? (NYPD homicide detectives, 2008). When police discovered the scattered remains of a number of young women in a stretch of deserted sand dunes near a pop- ular beach, their victimological inquiries soon established a common thread: that they all had been prostitutes apparently slain by a serial killer (Swartz, 2013).

Clearly, whereas victimologists want to uncover trends, patterns, and regularities that hold true for many injured par- ties in general, police investigators seek to establish in great detail everything that can be unearthed about the life and death of a particular person. “Forensic victimology” in this very pragmatic and immediate sense is undertaken to increase the odds of solving a case, apprehending a suspect, and testifying in court on behalf of a person who is no longer able to pursue justice on his or her own (see Petherick and Turvey, 2008).

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add, “We are devastated by the loss of our beautiful daughter.” (Martinez, 2014)

A classroom door swings open, and a mentally deranged undergraduate barges in and shoots the professor who is lecturing by the blackboard. Then, starting with those in the front rows, the silent and expressionless gunman methodically starts firing away at the horrified students, who hit the floor and turn over desks to shield themselves. “There were a couple of screams, but for the most part it was eerily silent, other than the gunfire,” a student reports. As the mass murderer wanders off, another student recalls, “I told people that were still up and conscious, ‘Just be quiet because we don’t want him to think there are people in here because he’ll come back in.’” Indeed, he tries to return to resume the slaughter, but a wounded classmate keeps the door wedged shut. Still determined to reenter into the classroom, the deeply disturbed young man fires repeatedly at the door. When he eventually stalks off, frantic students call 911 on their cell phones and holler for help out the windows. The attacker is later found dead from a self- inflicted gunshot wound to the head, in another classroom, alongside the bodies of some other under- grads he murdered. (Hernandez, 2007)

Doesn’t basic human decency demand that observers identify with the wounded, fallen, down- trodden, and underdogs and condemn vicious predatory behavior? Why would anyone even con- sider striving for objectivity to be an indispensable prerequisite of each and every scientific analysis?

WHY OBJECTIVITY IS DESIRABLE

At first glance, the importance of reserving judg- ments, refraining from jumping to conclusions, and resisting the urge to side with those who are in pain might not be self-evident. An angry, gut reaction might be to ask, “What kind of person would try to remain detached and dispassionate in the midst of such intense suffering? What is wrong with championing the interests of people whose

lives have been upended by unjust and illegal actions? Why is neutrality a worthwhile starting point in any analysis?”

The simple and direct answer to the question “Why shouldn’t victimologists be openly, unabash- edly, and consistently pro-victim?” is that, unlike the situations described in the examples above, on many occasions this formula offers no real guidance. So when is a person worthy of sympathy and support? Most people would consider an individual to be an innocent victim only when the following conditions apply (what sociologists would call the ideal type or positive stereotype): The person who suffered harm was weaker in comparison to the apparent aggressor and was acting virtuously (or at least was engaged in conventional activities and was not looking for trou- ble or breaking any laws), the wrongdoer was a com- plete stranger whose predatory behavior obviously was illegal and unprovoked, and the one who resorted to force was not a member of a governmen- tal agency authorized to use coercion (such as police officers or prison guards). Using the language of soci- ology, the status of being a legitimate or bona fide victim worthy of support is socially constructed and conferred (see Christie, 1986; and Dignan, 2005).

Sometimes It Is Difficult to Distinguish Victims from Villains

But real-life confrontations do not consistently gen- erate simple clear-cut cases that neatly fall into the dichotomies of good and evil, innocence and guilt. Not all victims were weak, defenseless, unsuspect- ing “lambs” who, through tragic or ironic circum- stances or just plain bad luck, were pounced upon by cunning, vicious “wolves.” In some instances, observers may have reasonable doubts and honest disagreements over which party in a conflict should be labeled the victim and which should be stigma- tized as the villain. These complicated situations dramatize the need for impartiality when untan- gling convoluted relationships in order to make a rational argument and a sound legal determination that one person should be arrested, prosecuted, and punished, and the other defended, supported, and assisted. Unlike the black-and-white examples

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 5

presented above, many messy incidents reported in the news and processed by the courts embody shades of gray. Clashes frequently take place between two people who, to varying degrees, are simultaneously both victims, or both wrongdoers. Consider the following two accounts of iconic, highly publicized incidents from past decades that illustrate just how difficult it can be to try to estab- lish exactly who seriously misbehaved and who acted appropriately:

A wealthy couple are at home in their mansion watch- ing television and eating ice cream when someone shoots the man point-blank in the back of the head and then blasts his wife with a shotgun a number of times in the face. The police search for the killers for six months before the couple’s two sons, 21 and 18, concede that they did it. In a nationally televised trial for first-degree murder and facing possible execution, the sons give emotionally compelling (but uncorroborated) testimony describing how their father sexually molested and mentally abused them when they were little boys. The brothers contend they acted in self-defense, believing that their parents were about to murder them to keep the alleged incestuous acts a family secret. The prosecution argues that these boys killed their parents in order to get their hands on their $14 million inheritance (they had quickly spent $700,000 on luxury cars, condos, and fashionable clothing before they were arrested). The jurors become deadlocked over whether to find them guilty of murder or only of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter, and the judge declares a mistrial. In the second trial, the prosecution ridicules their “abuse excuse” defense. The jury convicts them of premedi- tated murder and sentences them to life in prison without parole. Soon afterwards, each brother gets married (the older one divorces and has a second wed- ding behind bars) even though the prison system does not permit conjugal visits for lifers. (Berns, 1994; Mydans, 1994; Associated Press, 1996a; and Hubbard, 2012)

An ex-Marine who works as a bouncer in a bar wakes up in his bed and discovers to his horror that his wife has sliced off his penis with a kitchen knife.

Arrested for “malicious wounding,” she tells the police that she mutilated him because earlier that evening in a drunken stupor he forced himself upon her. He is put on trial for marital sexual abuse but is acquitted by a jury that does not believe her testimony about a history of beatings, involuntary rough sex, and other humiliations. When she is indicted on felony charges (ironically, by the same prosecutor) for the bloody bedroom assault, many people rally to her side. To her supporters, she has undercut the debili- tating stereotype of female passivity; she literally disarmed him with a single stroke and threw the symbol of male sexual dominance out the window. To her detractors, she is a master of manipulation, publicly playing the role of a sobbing battered wife deserving of sympathy to divert attention from her act of rage against a sleeping husband who had lost his sexual interest in her. Facing up to 20 years in prison, she declines to plead guilty to a lesser charge and demands her day in court. The jury accepts her defense—that she was traumatized, deeply depressed, beset by flashbacks, and susceptible to “irresistible impulses” because of years of cruelty and abuse—and finds her not guilty by reason of tem- porary insanity. After 45 days under observation in a mental hospital, she is released. Soon afterwards, the couple divorces, and then they each take financial advantage of all the international media coverage, sensationalism, titillation, voyeurism, and sexual politics surrounding their deeply troubled relationship. Over the years, he is arrested seven times, gets mar- ried three more times, stars in porn movies, and brags that about 70 women have been sexually attracted to him because of his ordeal and re-attachment surgery. She is arrested for punching her mother but then sets up a charitable organization that attempts to prevent domestic violence. (Margolick, 1994; Sachs, 1994; and Moye, 2013)

In both of the classic cases that were resolved by the criminal justice system years ago in ways that caused quite an uproar and still provoke many heated discussions, the persons officially designated as the victims by the police and prosecutors—the dead parents, the slashed husband—arguably could be considered by certain standards as wrongdoers

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who “got what was coming to them.” Indeed, they were viewed just that way by substantial segments of the public and by some jurors. The defendants who got in trouble with the law—the shotgun- toting brothers, the knife-wielding wife—insisted that they should not be portrayed as criminals. On the contrary, they contended that they actually were the genuine victims who should not be pun- ished: sons sexually molested by their father, a bat- tered woman who was subjected to marital rape.

Now consider three confusing and controver- sial cases that made headlines and provoked heated public debates in recent years:

A 17-year-old boy wearing a hooded sweatshirt on a rainy night is on the phone with his girlfriend as he walks home from a store after buying a can of soda and some candy. A member of a neighborhood watch group on patrol in a gated community of townhouses that has recently suffered a rash of break-ins drives by, spots him, and calls the police, voicing his suspicions that, “He is up to no good…”. The 911 dispatcher tells the 28-year-old man, who had taken some criminal justice courses at a community college, not to follow and confront the youth. But he does, and after he gets out of his SUV, they exchange words and become embroiled in a fistfight. Neighbors hear someone screaming and pleading for help, and call 911. When officers arrive, they find the man bloodied and the teenager dead from a bullet to his heart. The man claims that he was the actual victim and that he had a right to fire his licensed handgun in self- defense. When the news spreads that the local police department has decided not to arrest the armed crime watch volunteer, demonstrations erupt across the coun- try, demanding his arrest as an overzealous police wan- nabe who acted as a vigilante. Protesters also condemn provisions of the state’s “stand your ground” law for causing needless bloodshed and denounce the shooter for engaging in racial profiling because he trailed after what he deemed to be a “suspicious outsider.” The local police chief steps down, the county prosecutor and the Justice Department re-open the investigation, and President Obama identifies with the unarmed youth who was tragically and needlessly killed, telling journalists that, “If I had a son, he’d look like {the victim}.” A jury of six women acquits the defendant of charges of second

degree murder, and even of the lesser charge of man- slaughter. The jurors reject the prosecution’s version of the events: that the man had deliberately pursued the hoodie-clad black teenager and instigated the fight that led to the fatal shooting. The jury accepts the injured man’s contention that the teenager knocked him to the ground, punched him and repeatedly slammed his head against the sidewalk; and that he was justified in firing to protect himself because he feared grave bodily harm or death. The testimony and evidence at the trial does not clearly resolve key questions about what really happened that rainy night: who initiated the confrontation and started the fight by throwing the first punch, who screamed for help, and at what point was the handgun drawn? Angry protesters insisting that the dead teen was the genuine victim chant, “No justice, no peace.” After the controversial “not guilty” verdict, the man is featured in the news several times for brushes with the law involving violent outbursts. (Alvarez and Buckley, 2013; and Jauregui, 2014)

At around 4:30 am, a 55-year-old white man hears loud pounding and shouting at his front door and then at his side door. He grabs a shotgun and fires a blast through his locked screen door into the face of a teenage black girl standing on his front porch, killing her instantly. He is arrested and put on trial. Although he initially told the police that his weapon discharged accidentally, he tells the jury that he thought his home was about to be invaded by several intruders and, fearing for his life, vowed that “I wasn’t going to cower in my house, I didn’t want to be a victim.” The pros- ecution contends that he went to the door armed because he wanted to confront and frighten vandals who had defaced his vehicle with paintballs a few weeks earlier. The jury rejects his claim of firing in self-defense, and finds the man guilty of second degree murder and manslaughter. The young woman he killed turned out to be 19, unarmed, and intoxicated. Apparently she was making a commotion because she was seeking help after being involved in a car crash nearby several hours earlier. (Anderson, 2014; and Abby-Lambertz, 2014)

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 7

A 29-year-old mother of 3 enters her home to gather her belongings so she can escape from her abusive estranged husband, whose periodic beatings have inflicted injuries that have sent her to a hospital. But he returns home unexpectedly, accompanied by two of her stepsons. The 10-year-old and 13-year-old watch in horror as he beats and strangles her. She runs into the garage to get into her car but finds herself trapped, so she grabs her licensed handgun and returns to their house. When he curses and charges towards her, she fires what she contends are three warning shots into the kitchen ceiling to ward him off. But he calls the police, and her shots are viewed as angry attempts to hurt or kill him and his sons. She rejects a plea offer and is put on trial, and after the jury deliberates for a mere 12 minutes, she is convicted of three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which could keep her in prison for 20 years. A grassroots move- ment of supporters fights for her release and for the charges to be dropped, viewing her as a battered woman who used a weapon to defend herself from imminent bodily injury. When her conviction is overturned because of faulty jury instructions, the prosecution vows to retry her and to seek consecutive sentences that would keep her behind bars for 60 years. (Shepeard, 2014)

In all three of these recent high-profile cases presented above, one other question arose: whether the race of the participants, and especially whether negative racial stereotypes, colors the thinking of various groups about which person should be des- ignated as the genuine victim (see Ghandnoosh, 2014). Also, in all three of these cases, individuals perceiving themselves to be facing a threat of immi- nent bodily harm reached for their gun, triggering a debate between advocates of armed self-defense and supporters of gun control legislation (the arguments of both sides of this controversy appear in Chapter 13). Sharply different points of view were aired in dinner table discussions, news media columnists’ interpretations, courtroom proceedings, and even political rallies about the role of race in decision making and about the use of deadly weapons for self-protection These are the kind of issues that vic- timologists need to study scientifically.

Whenever different interpretations of the facts lead to sharply divergent conclusions about who is actually the guilty party and who really is the injured party, knee-jerk pro-victim impulses provide no use- ful guidance for action. The confusion inherent in the unrealistically simplistic labels of 100 percent cul- pable criminal and 100 percent innocent victim underscores the need for objectivity when trying to figure out who is primarily responsible for whatever lawbreaking took place. Clearly, the dynamics between victims and victimizers need to be sorted out in an evenhanded and open-minded manner, not only by victimologists but also by journalists, police officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries.

In rare instances, even the authorities can’t make up their minds, as this unresolved incident demonstrates:

A pizza parlor chef and a mob henchman become embroiled in a knife fight that spills out on to a city street. They stab and slash each other and wind up in different hospitals. The police arrest both of the injured parties on charges of attempted murder as well as other offenses. However, each of the combatants refuses to testify in front of a grand jury against his adversary, fearing self-incrimination if he has to explain his motives and actions. The district attor- ney’s office declines to grant immunity from prose- cution to either of the two parties because detectives cannot figure out who was the attacker and who fought back in self-defense. As a result, neither is indicted, and a judge dismisses all the charges pend- ing from the melee. Both wounded men, and the lawyers representing them, walk out of court pleased with the outcome—that no one will get in trouble for an assault with a deadly weapon. (Robbins, 2011)

Criminals Can Be Victims Too

To further complicate matters, impartiality is called for when the injured party clearly turns out to be an undeniable lawbreaker. To put it bluntly, predators prey upon each other as well as upon innocent members of the general public. Some assaults and slayings surely can be characterized as

8 C H A P T E R 1

“criminal-on-criminal.” Researchers (see Singer, 1981; and Fattah, 1990) noted long ago that people who routinely engage in illegal activities are more likely to get hurt than their law-abiding counterparts. When an organized crime syndicate “puts out a contract” on a rival faction’s chieftain, the gangster who gets “whacked” in a “mob rub- out” is not an upstanding citizen struck down by an act of randomly directed violence. Similarly, when a turf battle erupts between drug dealers and one vanquishes the other, it must be remembered that the loser aspired to be the victor. When youth gangs feud with each other by carrying out “drive- by” shootings, the young members who get gunned down are casualties of their own brand of retali- atory “street justice.” Hustlers, con men, high- stakes gamblers, pimps, prostitutes, fences, swindlers, smugglers, traffickers, and others living life in the fast lane of the underworld often get hurt because they enter into showdowns with volatile persons known to be armed and dangerous. What could it possibly mean to be pro-victim in these rather com- mon cases in which lawbreakers harm other wrong- doers? The designations “victim” and “offender” are not always at opposite poles but sometimes can be pictured as overlapping categories somewhere near the middle of a continuum bounded by complete innocence and full legal responsibility.

Of course, it is possible for people engaged in illicit activities to be genuine victims qualifying for protection and redress through the courts. For exam- ple, prostitutes who trade sexual favors for money are frequently beaten by sadistic johns, robbed of their earnings by exploitative pimps (see Boyer and James, 1983; and Brents and Hausbeck, 2005), and occa- sionally targeted by serial killers. The harms they suf- fer are more serious than the “offenses” they commit (see Coston, 2004). Similarly, drug addicts who get beaten and robbed merit assistance. Next, consider the possibility of the intergenerational transmission of misusing force—a cycle of violence over time that transforms a victim into a victimizer (see Fagan, Piper, and Cheng, 1987). For example, a child sub- jected to periodic beatings might grow up to parent his sons in the same excessively punitive way he was

raised. A study that tracked the fortunes of boys and girls known to have been physically and sexually abused over a follow-up period of several decades concluded that being harmed at an early age substan- tially increased the odds of future delinquency and violent criminality (Widom and Maxfield, 2001). Another longitudinal study of molested males esti- mated that although most did not become pedo- philes, more than 10 percent grew up to become sexual aggressors and exploiters (Skuse et al., 2003). Similarly, the results of a survey of convicts revealed that they were much more likely to have been abused physically or sexually as children than their law- abiding counterparts (Harlow, 1999).

Even more confusing are the situations of cer- tain groups of people who continuously switch roles as they lead their messy and deeply troubled daily lives. For instance, desperate heroin addicts are repeatedly subjected to consumer fraud (dealers constantly cheat them by selling heavily adulterated packets of this forbidden powder). Nevertheless, after being swindled over and over again by their suppliers, they routinely go out and steal other peo- ple’s property to raise the cash that pays for their habits (see Kelly, 1983). Similarly, teenage girls who engage in prostitution are arrested by the police and sent to juvenile court as delinquents, in accordance with the law. But reformers picture them as sexu- ally abused by their pimps and by johns who actu- ally commit statutory rape upon these underage sex workers. Are they victims who need help rather than offenders who deserve punishment (see Kristof, 2011)? To further complicate matters, offenders can morph into victims right under the noses of the authorities. For example, when delin- quents are thrown in with older and tougher inmates in adult jails, these teenagers face grave risks of being physically and sexually assaulted (“New study,” 2008). In penal institutions, convicts become victims entitled to press charges and to pro- tection when they are assaulted, gang raped, or robbed by other more vicious inmates (who seek to stifle any complaining and reporting as “snitching”). About half of all inmates in state pris- ons told interviewers that they had been shot at in

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 9

their past lives on the street, and more than a fifth had been wounded by gunfire (Harlow, 2001).

Violence begets violence, to the extent that those who suffer today may be inclined to inflict pain on others tomorrow, For example, a group of picked-upon students might band together to ambush their bullying tormentors; or a battered wife might launch a vengeful surprise attack against her brutal husband.

Victims Can Find Themselves at Odds with the “Good Guys”

Striving for objectivity is important for yet an- other reason. Crime victims can and do become embroiled in conflicts with persons and groups besides the perpetrators who have directly inflicted physical wounds and economic losses. Injured par- ties might nurse grievances against journalists reporting about their cases; police officers and detectives investigating their complaints; prosecu- tors ostensibly representing them in court; defense attorneys working on behalf of the accused; juries and judges deciding how to resolve their cases; pro- bation, parole, and corrections officers supervising convicts who harmed them; lawyers handling their lawsuits in civil court; governmental agencies and legislative bodies shaping their legal rights; social movements either speaking on their behalf or opposing their wishes; and businesses viewing them as eager customers for security products and services. Impartiality helps social scientists to under- stand why friction can develop in these situations and how to find solutions if these relationships become antagonistic.

First consider the situation in which some vic- tims are pitted against others. This can arise in the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme collapse, when it comes to parceling out whatever funds remain to the many investors who were defrauded. Those investors who bought in and cashed out earlier made money at the expense of those who jumped in right before the pyramid scheme was uncovered (see Henriques, 2010). Which victims are truly the “good guys,” and which are more deserving of inaccurate depictions than others? Objectivity

is needed to resolve this victim versus victim infighting.

Next, consider how victims of highly publicized crimes could be outraged by the way the news media portrays them. Rather than side with the injured parties or with the journalists covering their cases, shouldn’t a victimologist adopt the stance of a detached and disinterested observer who investigates these charges of insensitivity and inaccuracy perhaps by carrying out a fine-grained content analysis of press coverage in those high-profile cases?

Third, consider those situations where well- intentioned officials and groups put forward compet- ing criminal justice policies, both of which claim to be pro-victim. For instance, prosecutors’ offices have adopted one or the other of two alternative ways of responding to violence between intimate partners. One policy enables a battered woman to remain in control of “her” case and ultimately decide if she wants to press charges against her husband or lover whom she had arrested for assaulting her. Advocates of letting her choose whether to prosecute or not emphasize that this approach empowers her to weigh her alternatives and take her personal safety into account. The other policy mandates that the prosecution of the arrestee should go forward on the basis of the available evidence (police officer tes- timony, photos of bruises, eyewitness accounts, hos- pital records, and 911 recordings), even if the injured party wants to drop the charges (either because she fears reprisals or seeks rapprochement). Supporters of this policy believe that when batterers know they will be held responsible and punished, domestic violence will subside as a societal problem. In other words, her ability to determine what she wants to do about her individual situation must be sacrificed for the “greater good,” which is to use cases like hers to gen- erally deter would-be batterers from assaulting their partners. Only an impartial analysis of scientifically gathered evidence can determine which of these two ostensibly pro-victim approaches best serves the long-term interests of most domestic violence victims (see O’Sullivan, Davis, Farole, and Rempel, 2007; and Nichols, 2014).

The Pentagon has tried for several decades to reduce the number of sexual assaults inflicted by

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members of the marines, army, navy, air force, and even the coast guard upon their comrades in arms in service academies, barracks, military bases, and even foreign battlefields. After the U.S. Senate debated alternative ways to bring the problem under control, two competing bills, both claiming to be pro-victim, came up for a vote. Supporters of one proposal argued that soldiers, sailors, and mar- ines who are sexually assaulted fear that if they dare to file a complaint, their superiors may not act in their behalf. So they urged legislation that would have stripped commanding officers of their ability to decide which cases reported to them should lead to a court martial and would have empowered mil- itary prosecutors to make that decision about press- ing charges or not. But the majority voted against this proposal, and instead the Senate passed the Vic- tims Protection Act of 2014 that provides complai- nants with special counsels to advise them about the pros and cons of pursuing their cases in the military as opposed to the civilian criminal justice system (Jordan, 2014). Which of these two competing approaches would have been better for victims of sexual assaults? Will the new reform bring about substantial improvements? Objectivity, not parti- sanship, is needed to answer these questions.

The above examples underscore how impor- tant it is for researchers to remain neutral at the outset of a study. Now consider the dilemmas many everyday people face because of their com- peting loyalties: their desire to back crime victims in their struggle for justice versus remaining true to their other commitments. The following examples illustrate how objectivity and impartiality are sorely needed whenever pro-victim impulses must be bal- anced against other priorities and allegiances—for instance, enthusiastic support for the police or for the pro-life movement.

The mission of police departments is to protect and serve the public, and most people respect and admire the courage of officers who risk their lives to rescue hostages taken by kidnappers. But who would a person who is pro-victim as well as pro-police side with when these well-intentioned officers accidentally kill by “friendly fire” a captive they are seeking to free from the clutches of a captor? Would they agree

with the distraught relatives who launch civil lawsuits for damages that criticize the department for inade- quate training and an overreliance on military-style SWAT tactics rather than hostage negotiation techni- ques, or would they stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the police fraternal organizations that predictably insist that the courageous officer did nothing wrong? Clearly, objectivity is called for when examining the effectiveness of existing law enforcement strategies and departmental policies in these tragedies that peri- odically seize the attention of the news media and the public (for example, see Dewan, 2005; Rubin, 2008; Murphy, 2014; and Haake, 2014).

People who are pro-choice would agree that a girl or woman who has been compelled to submit to incestuous relations or a forced penetration that results in a pregnancy should not have to bear the rapist’s child. But those who want to minimize the suffering of these females and yet are also passionately pro-life might find themselves torn between their conflicting loyalties. This dilemma is fought out in public whenever candidates running for office declare their support for strict antiabortion bills that would permit no exceptions, not even for terminating preg- nancies resulting from incest or rape (see Redden, 2013). Evaluating the impact of these controversial policies and proposals about terminating desperately unwanted pregnancies requires an open-minded and even-handed approach to the arguments advanced by both sides about how many pregnancies each year arise from incest or rape, and what are the conse- quences for the mother who is compelled to bear the rapist’s child and for that baby as it grows up. In many states, the man, unless he is convicted of rape, can sue for visitation and custody rights, like any other estranged father (see Chapter 10).

SOURCES OF BIAS THAT THWART OBJECTIVITY

To sum up the arguments presented in earlier sec- tions, when choosing projects to research and when gathering and interpreting data, victimologists must put aside their personal political orientations toward

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 11

criminal justice policies (such as conservatism or liberalism); their allegiances to causes (such as pre- serving civil liberties or advancing women’s rights or outlawing abortion); and any positive or negative feelings toward entire groups (such as being pro- police or hostile to gun owners). Advocacy, whether for or against some policy or practice, should be kept separate from assessing the facts or drawing conclusions based on the available data. Scientific skepticism in the face of claims (“Prove it! Where is the evidence?”)—not self-interest or preconceived notions—must prevail when evaluat- ing whether victims’ rights legislation, prevention strategies, antitheft hardware, and recovery pro- grams genuinely work or are ineffective or even counterproductive in reaching their stated goals. Expert opinion, in reports, in court testimony, or in the classroom, must be based on facts, not faith. Research, policy analyses, and program evaluations must tell the whole truth, no matter who is disap- pointed or insulted.

Three types of biases undermine the ability of any social scientists (not just victimologists) to achieve objectivity and draw conclusions based on solid evidence (see Myrdal, 1944). The first may arise from personal experiences, taking the form of individual preferences and prejudices. For example, victimologists who have been personally harmed in some way (beaten by a lover, robbed, or raped, for example) might become so sensitized to the plight of their fellow victims that they can see issues only from that point of view. Conversely, those who have never been through such an ordeal might be unable to truly grasp what the injured parties must endure. In either case, the victimologist may develop a bias, whether it be oversensitivity and overidentification or insensitivity and lack of identification.

A second type of bias derives from the legacy of the discipline itself. The language, concepts, theories, and research priorities can reflect the collective preferences and priorities of its founders and their followers. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that the pioneers in this field of study introduced a victim-blaming orientation into the new discipline, but over the decades the tide has decisively turned. Today, the vast majority

of victimologists make no secret of their opposite commitments: not to find fault with those who are suffering but rather to devise more effective means of aid, support, and recovery.

Although subtle, a third type of bias can be traced back to the mood of the times. Victimolo- gists, like all other members of a society, are influ- enced by their social environment. The events that shape public opinion during different periods of time can also affect scientific thought. During the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, many people demanded that the government devise ways to help victims get back on their feet financially, medically, and emotionally. This insistence about expanding the social safety net to cushion the blows inflicted not only by corporations laying off workers and hospitals and doctors charging exorbitant fees for medical treatments but also by criminals reflected the spirit of egalitarianism and mutual aid of this stage in American history. The belief that society—through the instrument of the government—could and should do more to help out inspired a great deal of research and policy advocacy. But these ambitious goals have been voiced less often ever since the 1980s, when the themes of “strive for self-reliance,” “reduce social spending by government,” and “cut taxes” gained popularity. This emphasis on individuals taking responsibility for their own well-being as opposed to holding the socioeconomic system accountable for its shortcomings and failings (especially chroni- cally high rates of unemployment and a growing gap between the super rich and the desperately poor) has become the dominant ideology since the financial meltdown of 2008 and the onset of the “Great Recession.” Consequently, research projects and proposals about government-funded victim assistance programs have shifted their focus to matters such as only providing seed money for demonstration projects, imposing “sunset provi- sions” (to phase out efforts that don’t rapidly produce results), stressing cost effectiveness, and exploring the feasibility of self-help, privately financed, or faith-based charitable alternatives.

Clearly, inquiries into how victims suffer at the hands of criminals as well as other groups such as

12 C H A P T E R 1

journalists and criminal justice officials is unavoid- ably a value-laden pursuit that arouses intense pas- sions and sharply dissenting views. As a result, some have argued that objectivity is an impossible and unrealistic goal that should be abandoned in favor of a forthright affirmation of values and allegiances. They say that victimologists (and other social scien- tists) should acknowledge their biases at the outset to alert their audiences to the slant that their analy- ses and policy recommendations will take. Others argue that objectivity is worth striving for because subjectivity thwarts attempts to accurately describe, understand, and explain what is happening, why it came about, and how conditions can be improved.

For the purposes of a textbook, the best course of action is to present all sides of controversial issues. Nevertheless, space limitations impose hard choices. This book focuses almost entirely on victims of inter- personal violence and theft (street crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, kidnapping, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). There are many other categories of lawbreaking: crimes in the suites involving a betrayal of trust and an abuse of power by high government officials against their rivals or to the detriment of the general public, and by corporate executives who can illegally inflict massive losses and injuries upon their company’s workers, custo- mers, stock owners, or competitors. White-collar crimes such as embezzlement by employees against their employers or fraud by citizens against govern- ment programs also impose much greater financial costs than street crimes. Organized rackets run by mobsters (drug smuggling, gun trafficking, counter- feiting of documents and currency, gambling, extor- tion) generate millions of dollars, undermine everyday life, and stimulate official corruption (bribes to look the other way). Crimes without complainants—victimless activities to some, vice to others—are controversial because the social reaction and criminal justice response might be worse than the original deviant behavior involving transactions between consenting adults (such as prostitution, ille- gal wagering, and street-level drug selling and buy- ing). Clearly these other categories of crimes are as serious and merit attention from scholars, law enforcement agencies, and concerned citizens.

But they are not the types of lawless deeds that come to mind when people talk about “the crime problem” or express fears about being harmed. Street crime scares the public, preoccupies the media, keeps police departments busy, and captures the notice of politicians. These conventional, ordinary, depress- ingly familiar, and all-too-common predatory acts have tangible, visible, and readily identifiable victims who are directly affected and immediately aware of their injuries and losses.

In contrast, in the other categories of crime, especially white-collar crime and crime in the suites, the deleterious consequences are experienced by abstractions (such as “a competitive economy” or “national security”), impersonal entities (such as the U.S. Treasury or multinational corporations), or vaguely defined collectivities (such as voters, tax- payers, investors, shareholders, or consumers). It is difficult to grasp precisely who has suffered in these cases, and it is nearly impossible to describe or mea- sure the background characteristics or reactions of the injured parties. It is extremely tough to establish in court specifically who the flesh-and-blood vic- tims are in cases of drug smuggling, money laun- dering, insurance scams, false advertising, bribe taking, software piracy, counterfeiting of trade- marked goods, dumping of toxic wastes, insider trading, electoral fraud, illegal campaign contribu- tions, and income tax evasion. But individuals hurt by assailants, robbers, and rapists can be easily iden- tified, observed, contacted, interviewed, studied, counseled, assisted legally, and treated medically. As a result, a wealth of statistical data has accumu- lated about their wounds, losses, and emotional reactions. For these reasons, victims of interpersonal violence and theft will be the primary focus of attention and concern throughout this text, even though many of the illegal activities cited above inflict much more severe social and economic dam- age (see Naim, 2005). But note that this decision immediately introduces a bias into this introduction to the field of victimology, one that reflects the experiences of authors of articles and textbooks, the collective priorities of the discipline’s founders and most prolific researchers, and the mood of the times!

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 13

Victimology’s Undeserved “Bad Reputation”

Not very long after the term entered mainstream culture, victimology (undeservedly!) became a “dirty word.” Some prominent and insightful people who ought to know better misuse “victimology” as an epithet spit out through clenched teeth. This dis- turbing trend emerged during the 1990s and unfor- tunately is becoming even more entrenched and pronounced during the twenty-first century. For example, in an article condemning a speech deliv- ered by President Obama, an editor of a political journal used the term victimology in a negative way four times (such as “Obama has now put the presi- dential imprimatur on the crudest kind of racial victimology.…”) (MacDonald, 2013). Similarly, a former speechwriter for President Bush wrote an editorial headlined, “The Victimology of Hillary Clinton” (Frum, 2014). And a nationally syndicated radio talk show host, responding to a caller who characterized “victimology” as a mindset about feeling guilty for being privileged, responded, “But this whole notion of victimology, I totally get it” (Limbaugh, 2014)—but does he really? Some dramatic illustrations of how victimology has been bad-mouthed in the media as muddled thinking or even denounced as a contemptible point of view over the years appear in Box 1.2.

What were these commentators thinking when they issued these sweeping denunciations of what they branded as “victimology”? Why is this rela- tively new academic discipline being singled out for such harsh criticisms?

Evidently, those who condemn what they label “victimology” are railing at something other than scientific research focused on people harmed by criminals. The mistake these commentators are making is parallel to the improper usage of the phrase “sociological forces” rather than “social forces,” and “psychological problems” instead of “mental problems.” Victimology is just one of many “-ologies” (including such narrowly focused fields of study as volcanology, penology, or suici- dology, or such broad disciplines as sociology and psychology). The suffix -ology merely means “the study of.” If the phrase “the objective study of

crime victims” is substituted for “victimology” in the excerpts quoted above, the sentences make no sense. Victimology, sociology, and psychology are disciplines that adopt a certain approach to their subject matter or a method of analysis that main- tains a particular focus, but they do not impose a partisan point of view or yield a set of predictably biased conclusions.

It appears that what these strident denunciations are deriding is a victimization-centered orientation that can be categorized as the ideology of victimism (see Sykes, 1992). An ideology (such as conservatism or liberalism) is a coherent, inte- grated set of beliefs that shapes interpretations and leads to political action. Victimism is the outlook of people who share a sense of common victimhood. Individuals who accept this outlook believe that they gain insight from an understanding of history: of how their fellow group members (such as women, homosexuals, or racial and religious minorities) have been seriously “wronged” by some rival group (to put it mildly; viciously slaughtered would be a better way to phrase it in many historical cases!) or held back and kept down by unfair social, economic, or political institutions built upon oppressive and exploitative roles and relationships.

For example, in a well-known speech in 1964 (right before Congress passed civil rights legislation officially dismantling segregation), Malcolm X, the fiery spokesman for the black nationalist move- ment, adopted a victimist outlook when he pro- claimed (see Breitman, 1966) “I’m one of the 22 million black people who are the victims of Americanism … victims of democracy, nothing but disguised hypocrisy … I’m speaking as a victim of this American dream system. And I see America through the eyes of the victim. I don’t see any American dream; I see an American nightmare.” A victimist review of the history of African Americans up to the present would stress how the evils of slavery were “perfectly legal”; how Jim Crow segregation and institutionalized racism in housing, employment, education, and public accommodations until the 1950s were permitted by a Supreme Court decision; how lynch mobs rarely got into trouble for their extrajudicial

14 C H A P T E R 1

B O X 1.2 Some Striking Examples of “Victimology Bashing”

The context and then the statement denouncing “victimology”

Concerning male/female relations:

During a nationally televised interview, a critic of con- temporary feminism (Paglia, 1993) declared, “I hate victimology. I despise a victim-centered view of the uni- verse. Do not teach young women that their heritage is nothing but victimization.”

A collection of letters written to the editors of the New York Times (1996, p. E8) was published under the headline “What women want is a lot less victimology.”

A reviewer (Harrop, 2003) of a book about the difficul- ties facing boys wrote, “The art of victimology requires three easy steps: (1) Identify a group suffering real or perceived injustices. (2) Exaggerate the problem. (3) Blame the problem on a group you don’t like. Conserva- tives have long condemned the “victimology industry” as a racket, especially when practiced by women and minorities. As it happens, conservatives also play the game, and very well indeed…. The latest victimized group seems to be American boys.”

A political analyst subtitled her provocative article about an alleged “Campus Rape Myth” as “The reality: bogus statistics, feminist victimology, and university approved sex toys” (MacDonald, 2008a).

Concerning heterosexual/homosexual relations:

In a newspaper opinion piece about the controversy surrounding homosexuals serving in the military, the author (Sullivan, 1993, p. A21) observed, “The effect that ending the ban could have on the gay community is to embolden the forces of responsibility and integration and weaken the impulses of victimology and despair.… A defeat would send a signal to a gay community at a crossroads between hopeful integration and a new relapse into the victimology of the ghetto.”

Concerning race and ethnic relations:

An author of a book about race relations called a well- known reverend and civil rights activist a “professional victimologist” (see Dreher, 2001).

A former governor of Colorado (Lamm, 2004) warned that a plot to “destroy America” through immigration and multiculturalism would include the following strat- egy: “establish the cult of victimology … start a griev- ance industry blaming all minority failure on the majority population.”

A newspaper columnist and political activist (Kuhner, 2011) lamented: “Victimology and racial set-asides dominate large swathes of American life, from university admissions and government bureaucracies to big busi- ness and construction.”

Concerning international relations:

A former Soviet intelligence officer (Pacepa, 2005) denounced the United Nations as a breeding ground for “a virulent strain of hatred for America, grown from the bacteria of Communism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, jin- goism, and victimology.”

A prominent commentator (Brooks, 2006a) wrote about the public’s perception of the Middle East: “What these Americans see is fanatical violence, a rampant culture of victimology and grievance, a tendency by many Arabs to blame anyone but themselves for the problems they create.”

A reviewer (Anderson, 2008) of a book about the war on terrorism wrote: “The Left’s victimology now sickens [the author].”

The secretary of defense in both the Bush and Obama administrations (Gates, 2009) told members of the armed forces: “I think most of our families don’t regard themselves as victims and don’t appreciate sometimes the victimology piece. They are very proud of the service of their soldiers overseas.…”

Concerning “culture wars”:

In his syndicated column, a leading conservative parti- san (Buckley, 1994, p. 30a) condemned the thinking of the 1960s Woodstock generation: “The countercultural music is the perfect accompaniment for the culture of sexual self-indulgence, of exhibitionism, of crime and illegitimacy, and ethnic rancor and victimology.”

Concerning courtroom strategies:

A news magazine columnist (Leo, 2002) took a swipe at certain lawsuits: “Yes, everybody is a victim now, but some breakthroughs in victimology are more noteworthy than others. The year’s best example was the trio of supersize teens who sued McDonald’s, claiming the burger chain made them fat by enticing them to eat its meals nearly every day for five years.”

In a critique of several jury verdicts that found defen- dants “not guilty,” a news magazine commentator (Leo, 1994) complained, “We are deep into the era of the abuse excuse. The doctrine of victimology—claiming

(Continued)

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 15

murders; how Klan terror often went unpunished; and how injustices within the criminal justice pro- cess such as police brutality and racial profiling con- tinue right up to the present.

Similarly, a leading figure in the women’s liberation movement of the late 1960s analyzed “sexual politics” in a victimist way (Millet, 1970): “Oppressed groups have been denied education, economic independence, the power of office, representation, an image of dignity and self- respect, equality of status, and recognition as human beings. Throughout history women have been consistently denied all of these, and their denial today, while attenuated and partial, is never- theless consistent.” A victimist perspective about the history of female oppression would point out how in the past girls and young women who testi- fied that they had been raped felt as if they were put on trial; how battered women’s pleas for help were ignored by the men at the helm of the criminal justice system; and how females were barred from serving on juries and were strongly discouraged from pursuing various careers, such as becoming a police officer, lawyer, or judge.

Staunch critics of current conditions often connect the dots by tracing the roots of today’s

social problems back through centuries of system- atic subjugation. Activists believe that the unfair practices of the past persist right up to the present. But the commentators cited in Box 1.2 claim that adopting this kind of victimist orientation leads to an unhealthy preoccupation of dwelling on past wrongs that impedes efforts to make prog- ress today.

This debate over who or what is to blame for persisting injustices surrounding sex, class, and race is part of an ongoing political battle for the hearts and minds of the American people—a continuing ideological struggle that is often categorized as “identity politics,” which is part of the “culture wars.” Unfortunately, victimology has become confused with victimism and as a result has been caught up in the cross fire between partisans of the Right and Left. But victimology, as an “-ology” and not an “-ism,” is an objective, neu- tral, open-minded, and evenhanded scientific endeavor that does not take sides, play favorites, or speak with just one voice in these political debates. So there is no reason to condemn the whole scholarly enterprise of victimology and dis- miss it as flawed, distorted, or slanted, as the com- mentators quoted in Box 1.2 did. To put it bluntly,

victim status means you are not responsible for your actions—is beginning to warp the legal system.…. The irony of this seems to escape victimologists. A move- ment that began with the slogan, ‘Don’t blame the victim’ now strives to blame murder victims for their own deaths.”

Concerning academia and life on college campuses:

A columnist (Seebach, 1999, p. 2B) berated liberal pro- fessors for producing college grads whom employers would reject because the students were “experts only in victimology or oppression studies.”

A political analyst (MacDonald, 2007) interpreted the selection of a new university president as evidence that “Harvard will now be the leader in politically correct victimology.”

Arguing that resentment against highly educated can- didates might be going too far during the 2008 presi- dential campaign, a political analyst (MacDonald, 2008c) agreed with her allies: “I am as depressed as anyone by the university’s descent into ignorant narcis- sism and victimology over the last 30 years.”

Concerning everyday life:

A Pulitzer Prize–winning conservative commentator (Will, 1998, p. 42) titled his syndicated column opposing the Clinton administration’s antismoking campaign as “President feeds the culture of victimology.”

One journalist (Parker, 1999, p. B10) even insisted that “Americans are fed up with twentieth-century victimology.”

B O X 1.2 (Continued)

16 C H A P T E R 1

victimology has received a bum rap by those who mockingly equate it with victimism. Read on and this confusion will be dispelled. Victimology will take shape as a challenging, meaningful, balanced, enlightening, socially constructive, and relevant field of study that focuses on a very old problem from a fresh, new angle.

WHY EMPHASIZE RESEARCH?

As a branch of social science that closely focuses on how people behave and react, victimology must be research oriented. Yet, a criticism that often is voiced is, “Why spend all that time and money trying to establish what everyone already knows? The answer is that research is always necessary because “common sense” or “conventional wisdom” is sometimes mis- taken, and what people think they already know is incorrect.

For example, consider what happened in this real-life incident:

A 43-year-old grad student enters a classroom in which about 20 students had assembled a few minutes before class. Armed with a military semiau- tomatic rifle loaded with a 30-round clip, he points the weapon at his classmates and pulls the trigger, but the rifle jams. He tries again, but again the gun does not fire. The students realize they are under attack and drop to the floor, overturn their desks, and try to hide behind them. One courageous student shoves his desk at the gunman, enabling the others to bolt out into the hallway and then out of the building. The gunman flees too but is captured within an hour back at his home. (Asmussen and Creswell, 1995)

Everyone knows what happened in the imme- diate aftermath, since—unfortunately—violence on college campuses has erupted many times in recent decades. Students in nearby classrooms heard a commotion and set up makeshift barricades while the 20 distraught students raced away in a panic from the scene of the potential slaughter and imme- diately sought out counselors provided by the administration, right? Wrong! Only a few were openly emotional and cried. Most were in a state

of denial and milled around the entrance to the building kidding each other about their near- death experience, dismissing it as though it was trivial. No one called the campus mental health center right away. Most sought out the company of friends or hung out in nearby bars, according to two researchers who interviewed some of the students who thought they were about to die that fateful day (Asmussen and Creswell, 1995).

Next consider what is “known” about robbers: They single out targets that they consider weak and vulnerable, who are easy prey and are unlikely to put up much of a struggle to escape or to try to overpower and capture them. Therefore, it seems predictable that elderly ladies would be robbed much more often than young men, right? Wrong. Data derived from a national survey of the public carried out by a government agency, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, each year reveals that robbers go after teenage boys and young men much more often than older women.

As a final example, most people are familiar with the military’s problem of sexual assaults within the ranks (mentioned above). Few would be surprised that servicemen, especially those of higher ranks, exploit their power over the women in uniform to coerce them to submit to sexual acts against their will. But it may be quite a shock to most observers to discover that a little more than half of all reports gathered by researchers of “unwanted sexual con- tacts” imposed by men were directed at other men. Men therefore made up the majority of the targets of sexual assaults, although women suffered dispropor- tionately high rates (females make up only 15 per- cent of all members of the armed forces but almost 50 percent of all victims). Clearly, the findings of the Pentagon’s survey indicate that the problem of sex- ual violence goes far beyond the confines of male– female relations among enlistees serving in the army, navy, air force, and marines (see Dao, 2013).

Research is always needed because unexpected findings often are uncovered. Victimologists rely upon the same methods used by all social scientists: case studies, surveys and polls based on question- naires and interviews, carefully designed social experiments, content analyses of various forms of

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 17

communication (like movies and song lyrics), sec- ondary analyses of documents and files, records of focus group interactions, and up close and personal ethnographic inquiries based upon systematic field observations.

COMPARING VICTIMOLOGY TO CRIMINOLOGY

Victimology is an interdisciplinary field that benefits from the contributions of sociologists, psycholo- gists, social workers, political scientists, doctors, nurses, criminal justice officials, lawyers, spiritual leaders, and other professionals, volunteers, advo- cates, and activists. But academically and organiza- tionally, victimology is best conceived of as an area of specialization within criminology, on par with other fields of intensive study, such as delinquency, drug abuse, and penology. All these subdisciplines merit elective courses and textbooks of their own in colleges and graduate programs. In other words, criminology is the older parent discipline and vic- timology is the recent offshoot.

Criminology can be defined as encompassing the scientific study of illegal activities, offenders, their victims, criminal law and the justice system, and societal reactions to the crime problem.

The Many Parallels between Criminology and Victimology

Even though it is a rapidly evolving subdiscipline, victimology parallels its parent, criminology, in many ways. Criminologists ask why certain indivi- duals become involved in lawbreaking while others do not. Their studies concentrate on the offenders’- backgrounds and motives in order to uncover the root causes of their misbehavior. Victimologists ask why some individuals, households, and entities (such as banks) are targeted while others are not. Research projects aim to discover the sources of vulnerability to criminal attack and the reasons why some victims might act carelessly, behave recklessly, or even instigate others to attack them.

Criminologists recognize that most people occa- sionally break certain laws (especially during adoles- cence) but are otherwise law-abiding; only some who engage in delinquent acts graduate to become hardcore offenders and career criminals. Victimolo- gists realize that anyone can suffer the misfortune of being at the wrong place at the wrong time but wonder why certain individuals are preyed upon over and over again.

Although the law holds offenders personally accountable for their illegal conduct, criminologists explore how social, economic, and political condi- tions “breed” or foster or generate criminal activity. Similarly, although certain victims might be accused of sharing some degree of responsibility with their offenders for the outbreak of specific incidents, vic- timologists examine personality traits, agents of socialization, and cultural imperatives that compel some people to take chances and put their lives in danger (like teenagers), while others seem to accept their fate. Just as aggressive criminal behavior can be learned, victims may have been taught to lead high- risk lifestyles or alternatively, even to play and accept their subordinate roles.

Both criminologists and victimologists place a great emphasis on following the proper ways of gathering and interpreting data as evidence. Crim- inologists and victimologists calculate statistics, compute rates, compile profiles, draw graphs, and search for patterns and trends. Criminologists col- lect and analyze information about individuals engaging in illegal behaviors, especially their typical ages and social backgrounds (such as educational attainments and income levels). Victimologists look over statistics about the sex, ages, and social backgrounds of the people who are harmed by unlawful activities.

Criminologists apply their findings to devise local, regional, and national crime-prevention strat- egies. Victimologists scrutinize the patterns and trends they detect to learn from other people’s mis- fortunes and mistakes. They then develop person- alized victimization-prevention strategies and risk reduction tactics.

Both criminologists and victimologists study how the criminal justice system actually works, in

18 C H A P T E R 1

contrast to the way the system is supposed to oper- ate according to agency regulations, official roles, federal and state legislation, court decisions, and politicians’ promises. Criminological research reveals how suspects, defendants, and convicts are really handled, while victim-centered studies exam- ine the way injured parties are actually treated by police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Criminologists assess the needs of offenders for counseling, psychotherapy, additional educa- tion, job training, and drug treatment. In addition, criminologists evaluate the effectiveness of various rehabilitation programs offered behind bars or avail- able to probationers or parolees that are intended to reduce recidivism rates. Similarly, victimologists want to diagnose the emotional problems that beset people after they have been harmed by offen- ders, and to test out the usefulness of programs designed to facilitate their recovery (see Lurigio, 1990; and Roberts, 1990). Criminologists try to calculate the social and economic costs that criminal activity imposes on a community or on society as a whole. Victimologists estimate the losses and expenses that individuals and businesses incur due to acts of violence, theft, or fraud.

Some Differences and Issues about Boundaries

Criminology and victimology differ in several important ways. For starters, criminology is several hundred years old, whereas victimology did not emerge until the second half of the twentieth century.

Criminologists agree among themselves that they should limit their studies to illegal activities and should exclude forms of social deviance that do not violate any criminal law. For instance, the unwanted attention and advances that constitute sexual harassment at a workplace are no longer con- sidered to be a private matter or a personal problem but are a type of discrimination that can lead to a lawsuit—but not an arrest. Similarly, certain aspects of bullying are clearly against the law (physical attacks), while other expressions (mocking, teasing, taunting) are upsetting and ought to be discouraged

but are not illegal acts. Both criminologists and vic- timologists would study bullying in those instances where the intentional acts of aggression rise to the level of criminal behavior and result in vandalism or theft, or, worse yet, erupt into violence (such as the object of scorn suffering a severe beating; or conversely, when the pushed-around individual switches roles by bringing a deadly weapon to school to fight back against his tormentors) (see DeGette, Jenson, and Colomy, 2000; Unnever and Cornell, 2003; and Lipkins, 2008).

However, victimologists, unlike criminologists, cannot reach a consensus about the appropriate outer limits of their field. Some victimologists argue that their scientific studies should not be restricted to criminal victimization. They believe that additional sources of harm, anguish, and loss are worthy of systematic analysis: vicious political repression (brutality, torture, execution) carried out by despotic regimes that violate basic human rights; manmade slaughters (such as wars and geno- cide); natural disasters (such as floods and earth- quakes); and maybe even sheer accidents (like meltdowns of nuclear power plants). There are vic- tims of cancer, famines, ethnic cleansing, and tor- ture who suffer in similar ways to people injured in crimes. The common thread would be to under- stand the nature of tribulations and travails, and the consistent goal would be to develop effective strat- egies for short-run relief as well as long-term solu- tions to alleviate emotional and physical pain stemming from all kinds of calamities.

However, the majority of victimologists believe that their studies should remain focused on criminal victimization so that there are precise, readily identi- fiable limits and clear directions for further research and theorizing. Actually, criminal victimization may not be more serious (financially), more injurious (medically), or more traumatic and longer lasting (emotionally) than other types of harm. But it is necessary to rein in the boundaries of the field in order to make it manageable for the practical purposes of holding conferences, publishing journals, writing textbooks, and teaching college courses. (For the pros and cons of these alternative visions of what the scope of victimology ought to be, see

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 19

Schafer, 1968; Viano, 1976, 1983, and 1990a; Galaway and Hudson, 1981; Flynn, 1982; Scherer, 1982; Schneider, 1982; Friedrichs, 1983; Elias, 1986; Fattah, 1991; and Dussich, 2009b.)

The dividing line between victimology and mainstream criminology is not always clear-cut. Invariably, the two fields overlap. Historically, much of criminology can be characterized as offen- derology because of its preoccupation with the reasons why criminals behave as they do, a focus on the wrongdoers’ personal motives and the underlying root causes of their antisocial behavior, and whether punishment or treatment will make them stop. Lawbreakers always have been under a spotlight while the people they harmed remained shadowy figures on the fringes. But now victimol- ogy enriches criminology by yielding a more bal- anced and comprehensive approach that sheds light on both parties and their interactions.

Another way to differentiate the priorities of criminology versus victimology is to examine the social reaction to crime as opposed to the social reaction to victimization.

Once again, it is difficult to try to draw a sharp line between what issues criminologists should explore in contrast to what parallel or comparable topics victimologists should scrutinize. Yet such an exercise might be worthwhile because it helps clar- ify how the two fields have different focuses and also points to areas where research about victims and victimization remains sparse.

Since the offender is of primary interest to criminologists, analyzing the social reaction to law- breaking might include issues like the public’s willingness to pay for increased criminal justice expenses (hiring more police officers, supplying them with more powerful weaponry, and building more prisons in contrast to investing in job training, drug treatment, and inmate reentry programs) and the degree of voter support for tough new laws or for stiffening existing penalties (such as “three strikes” legislation or expanded use of electronic monitoring) or for police crackdowns (zero toler- ance campaigns). The focus remains on the wrong- doers and how to best handle them, whether through punishment or rehabilitation. Long-term

crime prevention strategies that criminologists propose and debate include efforts to eradicate the social roots of street crime, such as poverty, unemployment, failing schools, and dysfunctional families.

For victimology, the emphasis shifts to the public’s reaction to the plight of injured parties. Consequently, researching the social reaction to victimization translates to examining the degree of voter support for victims’ rights initiatives and the willingness of taxpayers to earmark revenue for government-run assistance programs and compen- sation funds. Also of great interest are the many self- help and direct aid projects set up by former vic- tims, such as child search organizations, shelters for battered women, crisis centers for rape victims, and similar advocacy organizations. Another dimension of the social reaction is the many steps fearful indi- viduals might undertake to reduce their own risks of becoming targets. These victimization prevention efforts on a personal level (in contrast to crime prevention efforts on a community or societal level) include taking self-defense classes and buying guns for self-protection, purchasing antitheft devices (such as burglar and car alarms), and buying insurance policies for reimbursement of crime-inflicted losses (life, health, home, and car insurance as well as for identity theft and fraud protection).

One of the most intriguing aspects of the social reaction to lawbreaking behavior is how often and in what manner eyewitnesses respond while a crime is in progress. Criminology and victimology overlap whenever researchers focus upon the interaction between offenders, their intended victims, and onlookers, an emerging area of study that could be referred to as bystanderology, to coin a term (see Box 1.3).

Interfacing with Other Disciplines

A number of academic orientations enrich victim- ology. Researchers who pursue a mental health/ forensic psychology orientation might explore how victims react to their misfortunes. They ask why some injured parties experience

20 C H A P T E R 1

B O X 1.3 The Social Reaction to Victimization: A Look at the Interplay between Victims, Offenders, and Bystanders

Bystanderology

If a third party is present when an offender confronts his intended victim, this presence of an audience introduces a situational variable or contextual factor that can become the focus of what can be called “bystanderology.”

One or more onlookers were watching in about 70 per- cent of all fights, around 50 percent of all robberies, and almost 30 percent of all rapes and other sexual assaults, according to an analysis of government surveys of victims’ experiences during the 1990s (Planty, 2002).

Individuals who witness a crime in progress as it unfolds right before their eyes may react in essentially two ways. First of all, there is nonintervention: Bystanders may avert their gaze, steer clear of trouble, mind their own business, and not get involved in the dispute. Or they may simply watch, become confused and immobilized, and consequently not do anything to help out. In extreme cases, they may run away, as when shots are fired. Alternatively, onlookers could become engaged and intervene to some degree while a crime is in progress or in its immediate aftermath (see Shotland and Goodstein, 1984; and Takooshian, 2014).

The following example, which took place on a busy big city street, illustrates this spectrum of possibilities, as an onlooker who intervened in behalf of a victim becomes mor- tally wounded himself and then fails to receive any aid from other spectators:

A man angrily confronts a woman and threatens vio- lence. A homeless immigrant who sometimes works as a day laborer comes to her aid and is stabbed. A nearby surveillance camera records how he collapses and lies face down in the gutter for over an hour. Passersby show some curiosity but hurry along. One man lifts the wounded Good Samaritan’s body, sees a pool of blood, and then walks away. Another snaps a photo and then departs. By the time the police are summoned and help arrives, he is dead. (Sulzberger and Meenan, 2010)

Police officers are third parties who have a duty to intervene and can be counted upon to enter the fray in behalf of an innocent person under attack. Bystanders and onlookers have no such duty and may or may not take action as a robber, rapist, or assailant confronts a victim. A typology of possible responses by bystanders could include the fol- lowing categories, ranked in terms of the desirability/unde- sirability of the outcome (making the situation better or worse for the person under attack):

a) Effectively intervene to rescue the victim from harm and also apprehend the apparent offender by making a citizen’s arrest until the police arrive.

b) Minister to the victim after the attack is over by pro- viding physical and emotional first aid until first responders like police officers, emergency medical technicians, and ambulance crews arrive.

c) Scream for help and summon the authorities by calling 911; or at least take pictures that can later be used as evidence.

d) In the aftermath of an attack, come forward and serve as a witness for the prosecution.

e) Do nothing, take no action, look the other way, or melt away due to apathy or indifference; but also some non- interveners may be immobilized by fear.

f) Become a victim; the Good Samaritan who steps in can get injured or killed by the offender.

g) Accidentally injure or kill the victim while carrying out a rescue mission (this disaster can happen when a SWAT team tries to overpower a hostage-taker but the captive is killed during the raid).

h) Intervene in behalf of the wrong party by erroneously sizing up the situation, resulting in the injury or death of the genuine victim. This can happen when uniformed officers mistake an undercover officer for an “armed perpetrator” who is training a gun on a suspect, and they shoot the officer in disguise thinking they are rescuing a victim (a tragic mistake referred to by the military term “friendly fire”)

i) Intentionally join in on the side of the wrongdoer, undermining the victim’s ability to effectively resist and inflicting additional losses and injuries, which may even be fatal (these bystanders who knowingly make things worse have been called “Bad Samaritans”). Bystanders who rally to the side of lawbreakers while a crime is in progress can get swept up into a type of crowd psychology that leads to the looting of stores, mob attacks, lynchings, race riots, and gang rapes.

The social reaction of the bystander(s) may decisively shape the outcome of an attempted crime. The presence of onlookers might cause the would-be offender to back down or cut short his attempt to inflict harm. On the other hand, the existence of an audience might cause both parties to escalate their conflict in order to save face and protect their reputations on the street. This might encourage the aggres- sor to deliver additional wounds in order to demonstrate his prowess, as in clashes between gang members.

When surveyed about whether the presence of a third party helped or worsened the situation, half of all victims reported “neither helped not hurt.” But when bystanders actively interceded, victims judged the impact of their

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W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 21

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (occa- sionally feeling very frightened long after a danger- ous “fight or flight” situation has passed) while others who suffer through comparable calamities do not. Professionals engaged in therapeutic rela- tionships with patients who endured vicious vio- lence need to discover which crisis intervention techniques work best (see Roberts and Roberts, 2005). Researchers who take an historical perspec- tive trace developments from the past to better understand the present, while those who adopt an economic perspective try to measure individual and collective costs, losses, and expenses that result from criminal activities. The anthropological orientation compares victimization in other societies far away and long ago in order to transcend the limitations of analyses rooted in the here and now. Victimologists

who adopt a sociological perspective develop pro- files (statistical portraits) of the characteristics of people who are harmed, analyze the interactions within the victim–offender relationship, examine the way other people and social institutions (such as the public welfare and health care systems) deal with injured parties, and seek to evaluate the effec- tiveness of new policies and programs. Scholars who apply a legalistic/criminal justice orientation (that focuses on department regulations, Supreme Court decisions, and legislation) explore how vic- tims are supposed to be handled by the police, pro- secutors, defense attorneys, judges, probation officers, and parole boards, and they scrutinize the provisions of recently enacted laws designed to empower victims as the adversary system resolves their cases.

actions as “helpful” more often than as “harmful.” Passersby play a constructive role if they prevent further injuries and recover stolen property, and their intervention is counter- productive if they further enrage the attacker (Hart and Miethe, 2008).

A phenomenon known as the “bystander effect” has been studied extensively by social psychologists, often by simulating emergencies in an experimental setting. Their findings reveal that as the number of bystanders increases, the likelihood that any particular individual will intervene decreases. Also, as the number of onlookers increases, the time that elapses until someone takes action increases. Bystanders are more inclined to get involved if they are directly beseeched for assistance. When bystanders are slow or reluctant to make a move, it may be due to audience inhibition (each person is afraid of being publicly embar- rassed if the effort fails) or because of the diffusion of responsibility (each onlooker assumes someone else will take charge of the situation and take the first step) (see Scroggins, 2009).

Passersby might have a moral duty to be “their brother’s keepers.” But in most states (except in Vermont since 1967, and later Minnesota and Wisconsin), they bear no legal obli- gation to undertake any risks (unless they are police officers, firefighters, and doctors, even when they are off-duty). Civil statutes shielding Good Samaritans from out-of-pocket expenses and lawsuit liability are meant to encourage

individuals to get involved. Criminal laws prevent people from harming one another, but they do not compel indivi- duals to help one another, even if one knows that another person is in imminent danger or has sustained a serious physical injury (Silver, 2012).

Police departments and community organizations sometimes help set up civilian anticrime patrols and neigh- borhood watch committees. On college campuses, rape pre- vention campaigns include efforts to train potential bystanders (especially male athletes and sorority sisters) to step in to creatively outmaneuver aggressive classmates from crossing the line separating drunken partying from carrying out sexual assaults. Ever since the late 1980s, role playing exercises and poster campaigns have urged students, espe- cially incoming freshmen, to “Do something” with slogans like “Don’t be a passive bystander,” “Don’t just stand there,” and “If she can’t stop him, you can” (Winerip, 2014). Inter- vention by onlookers (playing the role of “capable guar- dians”) is counted upon by some victimization prevention strategies (such as alerting the authorities if an alarm goes off). Honoring those who didn’t stand idly by and placed themselves at risk as “heroes” demonstrates the public’s appreciation for coming to the assistance of victims when a crime is in progress (also see Hart and Miethe, 2008; Lateano, Ituarte, and Davies, 2008; Reynald, 2010; Gidcyz et al., 2011; Moynihan, 2011; and Banyard, Arnold, Eckstein, and Stapleton, 2011).

B O X 1.3 (Continued)

22 C H A P T E R 1

Divisions within the Discipline

Victimology does not have the distinct schools of thought that divide criminologists into opposing camps, probably because this new subdiscipline lacks its own well-developed theories of human behavior. However, in both criminology and vic- timology, political ideologies—conservative, liberal, and radical left/critical/conflict—can play a signifi- cant role in influencing the choice of research topics and in shaping policy recommendations.

The conservative tendency within victimology focuses primarily upon street crimes. A basic tenet of conservative thought is that everyone—both vic- tims and offenders—must be held strictly account- able for their decisions and actions. This translates into an emphasis on self-reliance rather than gov- ernmental assistance. Individuals should strive to take personal responsibility for preventing, avoid- ing, resisting, and recovering from criminal acts and for defending themselves, their families, and their homes from outside attack. In accordance with the crime control model of criminal justice, the primary purpose of the legal system is to protect the innocent from those who want to harm them. As a result, lawbreakers must be punished in proportion to the suffering they inflicted on their victims (the philosophy of retribution, or just deserts). Making criminals pay also is supposed to accomplish the goals of general deterrence (to make a negative example of them, to serve as a warning to other would-be offenders that they should think twice and decide not to break the law), as well as specific deterrence (to teach them a lesson so they won’t repeat this forbidden conduct in the future). Incapacitating predators behind bars keeps them away from the targets they would like to prey upon.

The liberal tendency sees the scope of the field as stretching beyond street crime to include crimi- nal harm inflicted on persons by reckless corporate executives and corrupt officials. A basic theme within liberal thought is to endorse societal inter- vention through the instrument of government to try to ensure fair treatment and to alleviate needless suffering. This position leads to efforts to extend the

“safety net” mechanisms of the welfare state to cushion shocks and losses due to all kinds of mis- fortunes, including crime. To “make the victim whole again,” aid must be available from such pro- grams as state compensation funds, subsidized crime insurance plans, rape crisis centers, and shelters for battered women. Some liberals are enthusiastic about restorative justice experiments that, instead of punishing offenders by imprisoning them, attempt to make wrongdoers pay restitution to their victims so that reconciliation between the two estranged parties might become possible.

The radical left/critical/conflict tendency seeks to demonstrate that the problem of victimization arises from the exploitative and oppressive relations that are pervasive throughout the social system. Therefore, the scope of the field should not be lim- ited simply to the casualties of criminal activity in the streets. Inquiries must be extended to cover the harm inflicted by industrial polluters, owners and managers of hazardous workplaces, fraudulent advertisers, predatory lenders (for example, of mort- gages with deceptive provisions for repayment of the loan), brutally violent law enforcement agen- cies, and discriminatory institutions. Victims might not be particular individuals but whole groups of people, such as factory workers, minority groups, customers, or neighborhood residents. From the radical/critical/conflict perspective, victimology can be faulted for preferring to study the more obvious, less controversial kinds of harmful beha- viors, mostly acts of personal violence and crude theft by desperate individuals, instead of the more fundamental injustices that mar everyday life: the inequitable distribution of wealth and power that results in poverty, malnutrition, homelessness, fam- ily dysfunction, chronic structural unemployment, substance abuse, and misplaced aggression toward potential allies who are in similar circumstances. The legal system and the criminal justice apparatus are considered part of the problem by criminolo- gists as well as victimologists working within this tradition because these institutions that supposedly promote fairness actually primarily safeguard the interests of influential groups and privileged classes (see Birkbeck, 1983; Friedrichs, 1983; Viano, 1983;

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 23

Elias, 1986, 1993; Fattah, 1986, 1990, 1992a, 1992b; Miers, 1989; Reiman, 1990; Walklate, 1991; and Mawby and Walklate, 1993).

WHAT VICTIMOLOGISTS DO

The current parameters of the field are evident in the kinds of questions victimologists try to answer. In general, these questions transcend the basics about “who, how, where, and when,” and tackle the questions of “why?” and “what can be done?”- Victimologists explore not only the interactions between victims and offenders, but also victims and the criminal justice system as well as victims and the larger society.

A selection of some intriguing and imaginative studies that illustrate the kinds of issues concerning offender–victim relationships addressed by research- ers over the decades appears in Box 1.4.

Victimologists, like all researchers, must adopt a critical spirit and a skeptical stance to see where the trail of evidence leads. In the search for truth, myths must be exposed, unfounded charges dismissed, and commonsense notions put to the test. The follow- ing guidelines outline the step-by-step reasoning process that can be followed when carrying out research (see Parsonage, 1979; Birkbeck, 1983; and Burt, 1983).

Step 1: Identify, Define, and Describe the Problem

The most basic task for victimologists is to deter- mine all the different ways that a violation of the law can inflict immediate and long-term harm: the extent of any physical injuries, emotional damage, and economic costs, plus any social consequences (such as loss of status). For example, as they grow up, severely abused children might suffer from post- traumatic stress disorder, dysfunctional interpersonal relationships, personality problems, and self- destructive impulses (see Briere, 1992).

Sometimes a group is difficult to study because there isn’t an adequate expression that describes its common misfortune or captures the nature of its

plight. Now that terms like date rape, stalking, cyberstalking, carjacking, battering, elder abuse, identity theft, and bias crime have entered everyday speech, government agencies and researchers are exploring in what manner and how frequently peo- ple are harmed by these offenses. On occasion, vic- timologists help break the silence about situations that long have been considered taboo topics by studying activities such as sibling abuse, incestuous sexual impositions in stepfamilies, and marital rape (see Hines and Malley-Morrison, 2005).

Victimologists analyze how the status of being a “legitimate victim” is socially defined. They explore why only some people who suffer physical, emo- tional, or economic harm are designated and treated as full-fledged, bona fide, and officially recognized victims and as such, are eligible for aid and encour- aged to exercise rights within the criminal justice process. But why are other injured parties left to fend for themselves? One key question is, “Is the social standing of each of the two parties taken into account when government officials and mem- bers of the general public evaluate whether one person should get into legal trouble for what hap- pened and the other should be granted assistance?”

Clearly, the status of being an officially recog- nized victim of a crime is socially constructed. The determination of who is included and who is excluded from this privileged category is carried out by actors within the criminal justice process (police officers and detectives, prosecutors, judges, even juries) and is heavily influenced by legislators (who formulate criminal laws) and the media that shapes public opinion about specific incidents.

Step 2: Measure the True Dimensions of the Problem

Because policy makers and the general public want to know how serious various kinds of illegal activities are, victimologists must devise ways to keep track of the frequency and consequences of prohibited acts. The accuracy of statistics kept by government bureaus and private agencies must be critically examined to ferret out any biases that might inflate or deflate these estimates to the advantage of those who, for

24 C H A P T E R 1

B O X 1.4 A Sampling of the Wide Range of Studies about the Interaction between Offenders and Victims

Identifying the Cues that Trigger a Mugger into Action

Pedestrians, through their body language, may signal to prowling robbers that they are “easy marks.” Men and women walking down a city street were secretly videotaped for sev- eral seconds, about the time it takes a criminally inclined person to size up a potential victim. The tapes were then shown to a panel of “experts”—prisoners convicted of assaulting strangers—who sorted out those who looked as if they would be easy to corner from those who might give them a hard time. Individuals who received high muggability ratings tended to move along awkwardly, unaware that their nonverbal communication might cause them trouble (Grayson and Stein, 1981).

Explaining Public Indifference toward Victims of Fraud and Con Games

People who have lost money to swindlers often are pictured as undeserving of sympathy in the media, and they may encounter callousness, suspicion, or contempt when they turn to the police or consumer affairs bureaus for help. This second-class treatment seems to be due to negative stereo- types and ambivalent attitudes that are widely held by the public as well as criminal justice officials. A number of aphorisms place blame on the “suckers” themselves—“fraud only befalls those of questionable character,” “an honest man can’t be cheated,” and “people must have larceny in their hearts to fall for a con game.”

For example, white-collar crime investigators picture even sophisticated investors who lose their money to scam- mers in Ponzi schemes as being so blinded by their greed for suspiciously high returns that they ignore the red flags that should have alerted them to the likelihood that they were being drawn into a too-good-to-be-true business arrange- ment (Goldstein, 2011).

Con artists count on exploiting the anticipated behavior of their “marks.” Their targets may get so preoccupied with some “convincer” (such as a large sum of money awaiting them) that they are too distracted to realize what is really going on. Marks could be socially compliant to someone impersonating an authority figure (for example, they reveal their password in response to an e-mail allegedly from a bank’s security officer and subsequently are taken in by a “phishing” scheme). They may let their guard down and assume there is safety in numbers if it seems that lots of other people are willing to take a chance on some risky ven- ture. They may be willing to do something illegal (such as to buy stolen goods) and end up too compromised to go to the police. They could be so trusting and naïve that they fall for

tear-jerking emotional appeals for financial help. And under pressure to “act now or it will be too late,” they could make impulsive decisions they later regret. In well-planned con games pulled off by professionals, nothing is what it seems to be (Stajano and Wilson, 2011).

The stereotype of defrauded parties is that they disre- garded the basic rules of sensible conduct regarding financial matters. They don’t read contracts before signing and don’t demand that guarantees be put in writing before making purchases. Their apparent foolishness, carelessness, or com- plicity undermines their appeals for redress and makes others reluctant to activate the machinery of the criminal justice system and regulatory agencies on their behalf. Their claims to be treated as authentic victims worthy of support may be rejected if they are scorned as money-hungry “dupes” who were merely outsmarted (Walsh and Schram, 1980; Moore and Mills, 1990; and Shichor, Sechrest, and Doocy, 2000).

Using a broad definition of fraudulent schemes (including various rip-offs such as dishonest home, auto, and appliance repairs and inspections; useless warranties; fake subscription, insurance, credit, and investment scams; phony charities, contests, and prizes; and expensive 900-number telephone ploys), a nationwide survey found victimization to be widespread. More than half the respondents had been caught up in some scam or an attempt at deception at least once in their lives, costing an average loss of more than $200. Contrary to the prevailing negative stereotype, the elderly were not any more trusting and compliant; in fact, they were deceived less often than younger people (Titus, Heinzelmann, and Boyle, 1995).

Examining How Pickpockets View their Targets

According to a sample of 20 “class cannons” (professional pickpockets) working the streets of Miami, Florida, their preferred marks (victims) are tourists who are relaxed, off guard, loaded with money, and lacking in clout with criminal justice officials. Some pickpockets choose “paps” (elderly men) because their reaction time is slower, but others favor “bates” (middle-aged men) because they tend to carry fatter wallets. A “moll buzzer” or “hanger binger” (sneak thief who preys on women) is looked down on in the underworld fra- ternity as a bottom feeder who acts without skill or courage. Interaction with victims is kept to a minimum. Although pickpockets may “trace a mark” (follow a potential target) for some time, they need just a few seconds to “beat him of his poke” (steal his wallet). This is done quietly and deftly, without a commotion or any jostling. They rarely “make a score” (steal a lot in a single incident). The class cannon

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W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 25

some self-serving reason, wish to either exaggerate or downplay the real extent of the problem.

In order to make measurements, victimologists have to operationalize their concepts by develop- ing working definitions that specify essential char- acteristics and also mark boundaries, clarifying which cases should be included and which should be excluded. For example, when trying to deter- mine how many students have experienced school violence, should youngsters who were threatened

with a beating be counted, even if they were not actually physically attacked?

Once victimologists measure the frequency of some unwanted event per year, they can begin to search for changes over time to see if a particular type of criminal activity is marring the lives of a greater number or fewer people as time passes. To grasp the importance of making accurate measure- ments, consider the problem of child abuse. Suppose that statistics gathered by child protection agencies

“passes” (hands over) “the loot” (wallet, wad of bills) to a member of his “mob” (an accomplice) and swiftly leaves the scene of the crime. Only about one time in a hundred do they get caught by the mark. And on those rare occasions when the theft is detected, they can usually persuade their victims not to call the police. They give back what they took (maybe more than they stole) and point out that pressing charges can ruin a vacation because of the need to surrender the wallet as evidence, plus waste precious time in court appear- ances. Cannons show no hatred or contempt for their marks. In general, they rationalize their crimes as impersonal acts directed at targets who can easily afford the losses or who would otherwise be fleeced by businesses or allow their money to be taken from them in other legally permissible ways (Inciardi, 1976).

Exploring the Bonds between Captives and their Captors

Hostages (of terrorists, skyjackers, kidnappers, bank robbers, rebelling prisoners, and gunmen) are used by their captors to exert leverage on a third party—perhaps a family, the police, or a government agency. These captives could react in an unanticipated way to being trapped and held against their will. Instead of showing anger and seeking revenge, these pawns in a larger drama may emerge from a siege with posi- tive feelings for, and attachments to, their keepers. Their outrage is likely to be directed at the authorities who rescued them for acting with apparent indifference to their well- being during the protracted negotiations. This surprising emotional realignment has been termed the Stockholm syndrome because it was first noted after a 1973 bank holdup in Sweden. Several psychological explanations for this “pathological transference” are plausible. The hostages could be identifying with the aggressor, and they might have

become sympathetic to acts of defiance aimed at the power structure. As survivors, they might harbor intense feelings of gratitude toward their keepers for sparing their lives. As helpless dependents, they might cling to the powerful figures who controlled their every action because of a primitive emotional response called “traumatical infantilism.” After the ordeal, terrorized hostages need to be welcomed back and reassured that they did nothing wrong during—and right after—their captivity. People in occupations that place them at high risk of being taken prisoner—ranging from conve- nience store clerks and bank tellers to airline personnel and diplomats—need to be trained about how to act, what to say, and what not to do if they are held and used as a bargaining chip during a stand-off. Law enforcement agencies need to set up and train hostage negotiation units as an alternative to solely relying on heavily armed SWAT teams whose military-style assaults endanger the lives of the captives they are trying to save. Crisis negotiators no longer consider the bonding that may occur between captives and captors to be detrimental. The development of the Stockholm syndrome actually can increase the hostages’ chances of surviving the ordeal. However, it could also mean that law enforcement cannot count on the victims’ cooperation in working for their own release and for later prosecuting their violent and dan- gerous kidnappers in court. In terms of frequency of occur- rence, it is likely that this type of coping mechanism by captives has been overemphasized and inaccurately assumed in cases that were diagnosed by commentators in the media. Identifying with the aggressor and seeing rescuers as adver- saries rarely takes place, according to an analysis of the narratives contained in the FBI’s Hostage/Barricade Database System (see Ochberg, 1978; Fattah, 1979; Symonds, 1980a; Turner, 1990; Louden, 1998; Fuselier, 1999; and De Fabrique, Romano, Vecchi, and Van Hasselt, 2007).

B O X 1.4 (Continued)

26 C H A P T E R 1

indicate a huge increase in the number of reported instances of suspected abuse. How can this upsurge be explained? One possibility is to interpret this spike as evidence that parents are neglecting, beating, and molesting their children these days like never before. But another explanation could be that new compul- sory reporting requirements recently imposed on physicians, school nurses, and teachers are bringing many more cases to the attention of the authorities. Thus, a sharp rise in reports might not reflect a genu- ine crime wave directed at children by their caretakers but merely a surge in official reports because of improvements in detecting and keeping records of maltreatment. Victimologists can make a real contri- bution toward resolving this controversy by devising ways to estimate the actual dimensions of the child abuse problem with greater precision. Other pressing questions that can be answered by careful measure- ments and accurate statistics include the following: Are huge numbers of children being snatched up by kidnappers demanding ransoms? Or are abductions by strangers rare? Are husbands assaulted by their wives about as often as wives are battered by their husbands? Or is female aggression of minor concern when compared to male violence? Is forced sex a common outcome at the end of an evening, or is date rape less of a danger than some people believe (see Loseke, Gelles, and Cavanaugh, 2005)?

Once injured parties have been identified, and their ranks measured, researchers can carry out a needs assessment through interviews or via a sur- vey to discover what kinds of suffering they are experiencing and what sorts of assistance and sup- port they require to resolve their problems and return to the lives they were leading before the crime occurred. Such studies might reveal their unmet material and emotional needs, and weak- nesses in existing programs and policies.

Step 3: Investigate How Victims Are Handled

Researchers scrutinize how victims actually are treated by the criminal justice and social service

systems that are ostensibly designed to help them. Their studies can pinpoint the sources of tension, conflict, mistreatment, and dissatisfaction that alienate victims from the agencies that are supposed to serve them. Program evaluations determine whether stated goals are being met. For instance, many victimologists have studied how well or how poorly the police, prosecutors, judges, and family therapists are responding to the plight of abused children, sexually assaulted persons, and also battered women (see Hilton, 1993; Roberts, 2002; Hines and Malley-Morrison, 2005; Roberts and Roberts, 2005; and Barnett, Miller-Perrin, and Perrin, 2005).

Step 4: Gather Evidence to Test Hypotheses

Victimologists investigate all kinds of hypotheses: suspicions, hunches, impressions, accusations, assertions, and predictions. Like all social scientists, when presented with claims about what is true and what is false, their proper response is not to accept or reject the assertion but to declare: “Prove it! Show me! Where is the evidence?”

Testing hypotheses yields interesting findings, especially discoveries that cast doubt on common- sense notions (challenging what everyone “knows” to be true) and widely held beliefs. A major goal is try to sort out myths from realities.

For example, will the “dos and don’ts” tips offered on websites for women who are being stalked by ex-lovers actually work to reduce the risks of violent outbursts; or are these bits of advice largely ineffective; or could following these instruc- tions actually be counterproductive, escalating ten- sions and heightening dangers?

In order to illustrate each of the four steps that victimologists might follow when researching a particular type of suffering, a systematic analysis of the problem of “road rage” is presented in Box 1.5.

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 27

B O X 1.5 An Illustration of How to Analyze a Specific Type of Victimization: Road Rage

Step 1: Identify, Define, and Describe the Problem:

The analysis begins with a brief history that recounts when the problem was recognized and the way in which the victims’ plight was originally portrayed.

For decades, concern about the risks surrounding auto- mobile travel centered on accidents caused by hazardous road conditions, speeding, and drunk driving. Although flare-ups between motorists with short fuses must have been taking place since the onset of the automobile age well over 100 years ago, they remained under the radar until the news media began to report on a spate of “freeway shootings” (in California in 1977, in Houston in 1982, in Los Angeles in 1987, and in Detroit in 1989). Newspaper headlines originally dubbed the frightening situations as “road assaults,” “free- way free-for-alls,” “highway violence,” “highway hostility,” “motorist mayhem,” and even merely “unfriendly driving.” Yet concerns about becoming a casualty of one of these confrontations on wheels did not mount until a media account coined the phrase “road rage” in 1988; the catchy alliteration was meant to capture the essence of an armed attack in which a Florida driver shot a passenger in a car that had cut him off (see Best, 1991; and Roberts and Indermaur, 2005). During the 1990s, the sudden emergence and rapid diffusion (across the country and around the globe) of sub- stantial media attention to this “new crime” demonstrated how large audiences of frazzled commuters and anxious tra- velers considered this amorphous yet omnipresent threat to be of great relevance. Colorful accounts—about 10,000 stor- ies between 1990 and 1996, and nearly 4,000 in 1997 alone— described a “spreading epidemic” of “ugly acts of freeway fury” in which cursing, seething, and stressed-out motorists were “driven to destruction,” because it was “high noon on the country’s streets and highways.” Roads were pictured as “resembling something out of the Wild West,” “highways to homicide,” “shooting galleries,” “war zones,” and even “ter- ror zones.” Journalists, reflecting the popular movies of their day, originally branded offenders as “road warriors” and “Rambos,” who rejected the prevailing outlook of “have a nice day” in favor of a “make my day” chip-on-the-shoulder approach to dealing with strangers. Drivers lost their tempers and took their frustrations out on each other in numerous ways, ranging from fistfights to intentional collisions to gunfire (see Best, 1991; Mizell, 1997; Fumento, 1998; and Roberts and Indermaur, 2005).

Today, cases like this one are widely recognized to be examples of “road rage:”

A man in a SUV with his wife and two-year-old daughter is driving down a big city highway known for its traffic jams when he suddenly finds himself surrounded by a swarm of men on motorcycles. He panics and bumps one of the motorcyclists; another dismounts and he accidently runs over him. Fearing for his safety and the well-being of his family, he races down an exit ramp with the motor- cycle riders in hot pursuit. They catch up with him on a busy street, smash his vehicle’s windows, and drag him from his SUV. A video of the beatdown goes viral, drawing a great deal of international attention, as viewers ask, “Where were the police—what took them so long to break up this attack on this besieged motorist?” (It turns out that one of the “bikers” actually was an undercover officer infiltrating the gang, but he is indicted for assault, along with 10 others.) (Long and Peltz, 2013)

Step 2: Measure the True Dimensions of the Problem

The analysis proceeds by estimating the frequency of occur- rence of this sort of incident and examining the victim– offender interaction in order to draw evidence-based portraits of the typical aggressors and their usual targets, and of the amount of harm done.

Unfortunately, chilling accounts often were laced with hyperbole and sensationalism. Consequently, heated discus- sions erupted about whether fears were out of proportion to actual threats. Investigations that attempted to estimate the actual toll that road rage imposed on motorists adopted definitions that were way too broad: media coverage, and even some of the earliest research undertakings, character- ized road rage as synonymous with extremely aggressive driving habits that embodied hostility toward other motor- ists. Part of the continuum included noncriminal acts, such as screaming curses out the window, making threatening or obscene gestures, flashing headlights on and off, honking horns repeatedly, weaving in and out of traffic, cutting others off, tailgating in a way that resembles stalking, and getting out of the vehicle to argue face-to-face. From the targeted motorist’s point of view, as well as from a police and traffic safety perspective, this inclusive definition that ran- ged from trivial to life-threatening actions seemed to make sense, in terms of recognizing all the different dimensions of an infuriating and ominous encounter. But from the stand- point of both criminology and victimology, the definition should be much more restrictive and exclude insults and

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implied threats as well as bad driving maneuvers that at most result in summonses for moving violations in traffic court. A more limited and precise definition of road rage would count only those interpersonal conflicts that are matters for the criminal justice system to resolve: outbreaks of violence in which either one of the drivers—or one of the passengers—intentionally or recklessly injures or kills another driver, passenger, cyclist, or even a pedestrian, or damages a vehicle on purpose; or uses the vehicle to make a serious attempt to do harm to another party embroiled in the fracas (see Smart and Mann, 2002). A driver who is threat- ened can be considered a victim of harassment, and if a gun is pointed, the crime becomes “menacing.” If a shot is fired, an assault with a deadly weapon has taken place. One difficult methodological decision confronting researchers is whether to include or exclude incidents in which the two warring parties were not complete strangers. For example, some car chases are really extensions of ongoing quarrels that fall under the category of “domestic violence” (Mizell, 1997). Upon investigation, other clashes could turn out to be drive- by shootings involving members of warring street gangs or competing drug-dealing crews. But putting these exceptional cases aside, road rage generally constitutes a type of physical attack perpetrated by a stranger in a vehicle who approaches a victim just by chance in an anonymous public space—a street or highway (Roberts and Indermaur, 2005).

Criminologists zero in on the perpetrators’ possible mental problems, anger and aggression, drug and alcohol use, and risk-taking propensities while victimologists focus on the characteristics of the injured parties and how they respond to the incidents. Both sets of researchers seek to discover how often punishable acts of road rage break out. Not all cases are considered newsworthy by editors and journalists, so schol- arly studies must be based on access to “official sources of data”: the arrest records of police departments and the tran- scripts of court proceedings, perhaps supplemented by the files of insurance companies. However, descriptions of the events leading up to the confrontation may be fragmentary or incomplete, or the versions of who did what to whom could be completely one-sided. Furthermore, just as with media coverage, official statistics present an underestimate. Some criminal acts that could lead to arrest and prosecution go unreported because the authorities were not notified by either party or by eyewitnesses. On the other hand, accounts from unofficial sources could yield overestimates because the working definition of road rage used by the general public and the media has expanded far beyond the original narrower

notion of violence on wheels. Other unofficial sources of data, including the findings of surveys, that ask motorists if they were ever subjected to or eyewitnesses to road rage may be cluttered with huge numbers of judgmental interpreta- tions about incidents that would not wind up in the criminal justice system. For example, using a broad definition, an annual survey estimated that the most afflicted cities in 2009 were New York, Dallas/Fort Worth, Detroit, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and Atlanta; far fewer incidents reportedly took place in Portland, Cleveland, Sacramento, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh (AP, 2009).

Several websites that welcome postings by motorists infuriated by encounters with inconsiderate, rude, careless, or just plain inept drivers also use a definition that is too vague and inclusive. Overly broad definitions tend to gener- ate exaggerated estimates. The prevalence rate of ever experiencing, perpetrating, or witnessing road rage can approach 100 percent if the database includes motorists’ complaints about drivers who suddenly cut in front of them, honked incessantly, braked hard without warning, swerved dangerously, hurled insults, or even forced them on to the shoulder. These experiences might be unnerving and insult- ing, and some might be violations of traffic ordinances, but as merely subjective and undocumented accusations, they don’t rise to the level of criminal matters, so the aggrieved parties are not genuine “victims” of physical violence or deliberate property destruction.

The task for scholarly researchers is to sort through this collection of media and police reports about aggres- sive and reckless driving and focus on the incidents of intentional collisions, assaults, shootings, and even murders. For example, a comprehensive review of over 10,000 records of events that took place from 1990 through 1996 yielded an estimate of over 200 deaths and about 12,600 injuries directly attributable to road rage, or about 1,500 casualties a year resulting from collisions arising from dangerously aggressive driving (see Mizell, 1997; and Garase, 2006). On the other hand, as real as the threat may be, criminal acts of road rage seems to be a relatively infrequent event, statistically speaking, at least according to self-report surveys of drivers (Roberts and Indermaur, 2005). Pedestrians and cyclists felt the most vulnerable; believed that they were specifically targeted; suffered more physically and mentally; and were more likely to alter their behavior after the incidents, according to a survey of a small sample of self-identified victims (Cavacuiti et al., 2013).

(Continued)

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 29

B O X 1.5 (Continued)

Road rage needs to be operationalized (precisely defined so that it can be measured) in a restrictive manner to include only incidents in which one driver knowingly injures or kills another motorist, passenger, or pedestrian or uses a vehicle as a weapon to attack someone or something. Then criminologists could focus their attention on the defendants who get arrested and prosecuted for their angry outbursts, by asking questions like: Do people who pick fights when driving also start altercations in everyday life? Do they drive as they live? Do these hyperaggressive drivers differ demographically and socially from average motorists? Psychologically oriented criminologists could ask whether these belligerent drivers are burdened with pent up anger, poor impulse control, short fuses, and hair triggers that reflect deep-seated personality problems (and maybe even mental disorders) that make them a danger to themselves and anyone who strays into their path. These emotional disturbances might include an obses- sion with minimizing travel time to the point of always being in a great rush; a need to try to come in first in a highly competitive environment; a tendency to perceive the driving mistakes of others as personal attacks on themselves or their vehicles; and even a sense that they need to punish others to teach others a lesson to improve their driving skills (see Ayar, 2006).

But these issues about the presumed shortcomings of offenders are not the immediate focus of victim-centered investigations, which seek to expand and balance out the inquiry into the hostile encounter by paying close attention to the injured party and to the behaviors of both individuals during their confrontation. The victim–offender interaction must be carefully reconstructed. Two strikingly different possibilities arise. The first scenario is that road rage casual- ties were innocent travelers who were cruising along and just minding their own business when they were randomly tar- geted by belligerent drivers. This image of a routine activity being interrupted “out of the blue” by senseless violence is especially chilling because automobile travel unavoidably brings strangers from very different social backgrounds into close proximity as they attempt to share the road with one another. Road rage is a serious problem that must be addressed immediately if ordinary motorists can become embroiled in a feud without warning; if some hothead’s wrath can be vented on anyone who is unlucky enough to gets in his way; and if any motorist—just like getting into a collision—can find himself under attack at anytime.

But the alternative scenario paints an entirely different picture: that the injured party was a violence-prone individ- ual himself. He was spoiling for a fight and was easily inflamed and incited into action. These mutual combatants overreacted to each other’s overtures. The initial event was misperceived as embodying a hostile intent, and this pre- sumed threat was countered with an inappropriately bellicose response, thereby escalating the incident to the point of bloodshed or a crash. The misbehavior of the victim can be as important a catalyst in this interaction as the aggressive actions of the assailant. In essence, offenders and victims “find each other” as they interact within a vast pool of fellow drivers. The question arises, in what proportion of cases are the injured parties not totally innocent victims? How often do those who get wounded or killed share some degree of responsibility with the complete strangers who attacked them? Presumably, the violations of traffic laws would not have spiraled into a criminal matter were it not for the vic- tim’s inadvertent triggering of the aggressive driver’s violent response; or worse yet, the victim’s furious overreaction to the offender’s bad driving led to the next round of escalating hostilities. Researchers who examine the victim–offender interaction can provide estimates of the percent of cases in which victims are totally innocent of any incitement to vio- lence, and the remaining percent in which those who wind up hurt are partially at fault for triggering the aggressive driver’s illegal response.

Media accounts portray road rage victims as tending to be young males in their twenties and thirties (Asbridge, Smart, and Mann, 2003). Some researchers who have studied both parties suggest that they have uncovered situations that illustrate the principle of homogamy: that both offen- ders and victims share a great deal in common, socially and demographically (according to surveys about aggressive driving that asked about lesser skirmishes in addition to violent episodes). The picture they have painted from their data is that the two persons caught up in the confrontation tend to closely resemble each other. Both usually are males; often in their twenties and thirties; generally of lower socioeconomic status; frequently with drug and drinking problems; perhaps exhibiting a “macho” personality; some- times driving around in a high-performance vehicle or sports car with tinted windows; and most disturbingly, all too often going around armed with guns (see Asbridge et al., 2003, 2006; Roberts and Indermaur, 2008; Hemenway, Vriniotis, and Miller, 2006; and Fierro, Morales, and Alvarez, 2011).

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These angry young men, who have poor impulse control and a propensity to get into fights while trying to share the road, seem to be one and the same as those who spend a lot of time away from home and get into brawls on street corners and in bars. Additional studies that derive profiles of both parties from police files and court proceedings could settle this question about the possibility of homogamy. The research hypotheses would be that both the offenders and their victims would tend to be low-income, young, urban males, rather than females, older persons, suburbanites or rural residents, and more affluent people (Asbridge et al., 2003). Furthermore, those whose routine activities involve a great deal of driving may have more opportunities to become embroiled in confrontations (Asbridge and Butters, 2013).

Step 3: Investigate How Victims Are Faring

Zero in on the criminal justice system’s response. Motor vehicle collisions are a major cause of injury,

disability, and death, especially of young people. On a soci- etal level, vehicle crashes are a major source of shattered lives, emotional damage (including phobias, and in extreme cases, post-traumatic stress disorder), truncated opportu- nities, missed work, and other losses and expenses. Since some unknown proportion of highway carnage is attributable to road rage, this societal problem may impose serious unrecognized consequences for public safety and social well- being. How are the police, courts, and insurance companies addressing these issues of?

Criminologists and criminal justice officials debate whether offenders might need to be punished (through stiff fines and time behind bars) to teach them a lesson not to drive recklessly again (specific deterrence), and to hold them up as negative role models to serve as a warning to other would-be road warriors (general deterrence). Incapacitation (through license suspensions and incarceration) will serve to protect other motorists by removing them from the driver’s seat. Treatment (such as anger management, time manage- ment, and stress management) might be called for if that is the source of their dangerously aggressive behavior behind the wheel. But what could and should be done for the objects of their wrath? If the homogamy thesis is correct, then vic- tims might be negatively stereotyped as potential perpetra- tors themselves. The authorities might automatically handle the “ostensible targets” of road rage differently than other innocent victims of physical violence because these

individuals might bear some responsibility for the breaking of laws this time—and the next time, they could be the offenders.

Victim-centered questions that researchers need to address include these: What happens in police stations, courtrooms, and in insurance offices when the authorities believe that both parties are partially to blame? Are charges against the defendant reduced or dismissed if it appears that the injured party contributed in some way to the escalation of the confrontation? Do insurance companies reduce the amounts of reimbursement for damages or medical treatment, or deny the applications entirely, in cases of mutual combat? In contrast, in cases where the injured parties are blameless, are the sentences harsher on those convicted of highway mayhem than of comparable street brawls? Do innocent tar- gets of road rage get the same assistance and exercise the same rights as innocent victims of violent street crimes? How these victims’ cases actually are handled ought to be a prime concern of victimologists.

Step 4: Gather Evidence to Test Hypotheses

See if this criminal activity is linked to other social problems and whether effective responses have been devised and implemented.

Now that the term road rage is firmly entrenched in the vocabulary of law, criminal justice, and journalism, discus- sions of the problem generate many interesting hypotheses. For example, a number of possible societal causes have been suggested. Can increases or decreases in road rage be corre- lated with other indicators of changes in the pace of life and the level of tension, frustration, alienation, and cutthroat competition in an area at a given time and place? Does the problem have deeper societal roots than just the chance encounter of two foul-tempered/short-fused individuals? To what extent is road rage the outgrowth of underlying social problems, such as alcohol consumption and drug abuse; overall levels of aggression, rage, and untreated mental ill- ness; as well as increases in commuting time, road traffic, construction delays, and rush-hour congestion (see Smart and Mann, 2002; and Asbridge et al., 2003).

Another interesting hypothesis that needs investigation is: Does the yearly incidence of highway violence closely track the level of violence on the streets—in other words, if public safety improves and the streets become more peaceful, does the occurrence of road rage also decline?

(Continued)

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 31

WHY STUDY VICTIMOLOGY?

One last parallel between criminology and victimol- ogy merits highlighting. Criminology and victimol- ogy are not well-paying fields ripe with lucrative opportunities for employment and advancement. Studying the modus operandi of criminals and the mistakes made by the individuals they injured cer- tainly doesn’t make a person invincible to physical attacks, thefts, or swindles, although this heightened awareness might reduce the risks a student of human behavior and criminal conduct faces. Yet for several good reasons a growing number of people are invest- ing time, energy, and money to study victimology in training academies and college courses.

First of all, those who study the plight of victims benefit intellectually, as do all social scientists, by gaining insights into everyday life, solving puzzling and troubling issues, better appreciating life’s subtle- ties, seeing phenomena more clearly, and under- standing complex situations more profoundly. Second, intellectually curious individuals can profit from pursuits that expand their horizons, trans- cend the limits of their own experiences in the familiar routines of everyday life, free them from irrational fears and unfounded concerns, and enable them to overcome gut reactions of fatalism, cynicism, emotionalism, and deep-seated prejudices. Third, the findings generated from theorizing and applied research have practical applications that

The next set of hypotheses to be tested is whether the measures to curb road rage are working effectively. Legisla- tures in a number of states passed tough new laws against recklessly aggressive driving, hoping to deter or weed out the problem drivers who are at high risk of causing road rage incidents. Police departments and state highway patrol agencies devised new ways of monitoring and videotaping traffic flow and accidents, and launched crackdowns to vig- orously enforce traffic laws. Criminologists need to evaluate whether these crime control strategies are bringing roadway violence under control.

At the same time, the National Safety Council, the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, insurance companies, and government agencies such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration developed awareness and education campaigns, warning the public about how quickly minor traffic confrontations could escalate into dangerous show- downs. Is there much that fearful motorists can do to mini- mize their chances of becoming the target of another driver’s wrath, or at least to halt the up-and-back interplay before it spirals out of control? As soon as the problem was recog- nized, articles in the popular press and road safety educa- tional materials alerted motorists about “How to avoid getting shot at” and “How to handle on-the-road hostility” plus other practical suggestions for those on the receiving end of aggressive driving (see Best, 1991; and Mizell, 1997). In 2007, the governor of Michigan, and in 2009, the governor of Alabama, responding to an educational campaign against “emotional driving” sponsored by a self-help group founded by a parent of a woman killed in an incident, proclaimed the

middle of July as “Road Rage Awareness Week” (Targeted News Services, 2009). Are the pragmatic tips disseminated in driver education campaigns really effective as a way of pre- venting victimization? If road rage incidents decline after practical advice is widely disseminated, then these victim- oriented countermeasures might deserve some credit for helping concerned motorists stay out of trouble. Comparisons of changes in the levels of reported road rage crimes in sim- ilar jurisdictions that did and did not implement these strat- egies should shed light on this matter.

Finally, what have been the long-term trends over the decades? Is road rage (as distinct from changes in media coverage) genuinely increasing or decreasing as the years roll by? In 1997, the House Subcommittee on Surface Transpor- tation held hearings about a reported epidemic of “auto anarchy” that was “transforming the nation’s roadways into crime scenes.” In the midst of all this publicity, however, skeptics pointed out that statistics showed that the numbers of accidents, highway deaths, and crash-related injuries actually were trending downward, especially when the increases in the number of drivers, registered vehicles, and the total miles traveled were taken into account. Perhaps the entire road rage problem had been blown way out of propor- tion right at the outset by journalists trying to attract large audiences, politicians seeking campaign donations and votes, therapists looking to profit from heightened fears of a newly recognized emotional “disorder,” and lobbyists representing publicity-hungry agencies and organizations (see Drivers.com staff, 1997; Fumento, 1998; Rathbone and Huckabee, 1999; Hennessy and Wiesenthal, 2002; and “Rising Rage,” 2005).

B O X 1.5 (Continued)

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simultaneously ease the distress of others and foster a sense of purpose, self-worth, accomplishment, and satisfaction that comes from combating social injustices.

Those who study how individuals shape and in return are influenced by the realities around them are developing their “sociological imagination” (Mills, 1959)—a recognition of how their particular personal troubles usually are outgrowths of and can be traced back to larger social problems (like pov- erty, unemployment, dysfunctional families, and failing schools). Specifically, by exercising their “criminological imagination” (see Young, 2011), those who focus on lawbreaking can raise their consciousness about the connections between indi- vidual difficulties, historic injustices, prevailing social institutions and ideologies, contemporary cul- ture, and the shortcomings of academic research and theorizing in order to recognize the sharp con- trast between what is and what could be.

Besides paying these dividends, it’s possible to profit in other ways by studying various aspects of victimization.

Scrutinizing victim–offender interactions can shed light on how miscommunication, misunder- standings, desires, obsessions, demands, stereotypes, reckless behavior, and provocative acts can trigger harsh reactions that can lead to needless conflict and avoidable tragedies.

Analyzing the way that certain victims are crit- icized and blamed for their own downfall raises vital questions about the degree to which individuals are able to determine their own fate as opposed to the extent to which larger social forces and pressures shape a person’s behavior and social circumstances.

Exploring how some victims are assisted by social programs while others are left to fend for themselves raises profound issues about the proper role of government and its collectively funded and organized safety net meant to cushion the fall of individuals reeling from the impact of serious losses and major expenses.

Examining how some individuals and groups stress self-reliance and taking responsibility for one’s well-being, especially in terms of arming in self-defense against troublemakers, while others

emphasize relying on police protection and collec- tive undertakings meant to eradicate the social roots of crime, helps to clarify the differing assumptions and values that underlie political conflicts between those believing in right wing as opposed to left wing ideologies.

Delving into the dark side of family life—child abuse, spouse abuse, and elder abuse—sheds light on the all-too-common dysfunctional relationships that undermine the notion of being “safe at home” as a sanctuary from the cruelties of the outside world, and suggests ways to prevent or correct these difficult situations.

Investigating how the police and courts handle the casualties of interpersonal violence uncovers the criminal justice system’s priorities, and the extent to which agencies that are supposed to deliver “blind justice” and treat persons equally actually take into account the victim’s social class, race, sex, and age. It also reveals how injured parties define the elusive ideal of “justice” in terms of varying beliefs about vengeance, penitence, forgiveness, and reconciliation.

Examining the way victims were treated in the past and how they are responded to in other socie- ties reveals what has been, what might be, what should be avoided, and what ought to be emulated and adopted.

RECOGNIZING EXEMPLARY BEHAVIOR UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES

Criminologists generally study people who are labeled as “predators” and “convicts” because of the most antisocial and harmful acts they are known to have committed. Those who are sympa- thetic to offenders as troubled souls argue that people should not be judged solely by the worst things they have done. Victimologists generally study individuals at the most vulnerable and miserable points in their lives. But examining the range in reactions of persons under attack sometimes provides an oppor- tunity to see people at their very best, not just at

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 33

their low points. Consider how these individuals who were targeted by offenders responded in ways that are worthy of respect, even admiration:

A mother visiting a friend’s house logs in to her sophisticated home-surveillance system to see if a snowstorm has started yet, and using her infrared camera trained on her backyard is startled to spot an intruder climbing into her house. As he begins to ransack her home, she watches in real time video, and then hurriedly calls 911. When the burglar spies the flashlight beams of the responding officers, he panics and bolts outside. She directs the police to his hiding spot, and after a brief chase, he is captured. (Yan, 2014)

A 15-year-old girl opens the door to what appears to be a deliveryman in uniform. She recognizes him as her former uncle who is furiously looking for his ex- wife, and tries to slam the door shut, but he kicks it in. He pulls out a gun and ties her up, along with her four sisters and brothers. When her parents return home, the man ties them up too and orders all seven members of the family to lie face-down on the floor and to tell him where he can find his ex-wife. When his former in-laws and their children insist they don’t know where she is, he methodically shoots each one in the head. The girl is wounded but plays dead until he runs out. Then she quickly calls 911, tells the police that her parents and siblings have been murdered, and warns them that the killer is on his way to his ex-wife’s parents’ home. He is intercepted and apprehended before he can shoot anyone else. (Fredericks, 2014)

A 27-year-old woman who stands four feet, five inches and weighs 90 pounds is behind the counter of her family’s suburban convenience store when a six- foot-tall man wearing a mask pulls a gun and brandishes it in her face. The angry gunman screams, “Hurry up! Give me the money!,” but she stalls and makes believe she can’t open the cash register. When the robber turns to see if anyone is looking, she grabs a three-foot ax hidden behind the counter and starts

swinging it wildly, yelling, “Get out of here!” He flees empty-handed. She confides to detectives and a reporter that “I was scared, I was shaking. I didn’t want to hit him, I just wanted him to get out.” (Crowley, 2007)

A 31-year-old social worker is about to go to dinner after a long day on a cold night when he is suddenly confronted by a teenager wielding a knife. He hands over his wallet to the young robber and then offers him his coat too, surmising, “If you are willing to risk your freedom for a few dollars, then I guess you must really need the money.” Then he takes the emotionally confused adolescent to a restaurant. When it is time to pay for the meal, the teenager gives back his wallet, and even hands over his knife. The social worker sums up their encounter to an interviewer: “If you treat people right, you can only hope that they treat you right. That’s as simple as it gets in this complicated world.” (NPR, 2008)

A “gentleman” holds a lobby door open for a 101- year-old woman who is on her way to church. But then he hits her so hard that blood spurts out her mouth and nose. A surveillance camera in the hall- way shows the robber striking her over and over until she finally relinquishes her grip on her handbag con- taining $23. Her face bleeds for two weeks and her right arm never heals properly. But nearly a year later, she hobbles into a courtroom to identify the 45- year-old defendant as the man who mugged her. Her testimony at this special evidentiary hearing is pre- served on videotape just in case she is unable to appear as a witness for the prosecution at the trial. (Farmer, 2008)

A 35-year-old woman is beaten, robbed, and repeatedly raped for two hours in a dingy garage. In court, the courageous single mother testifies that while the gunman kept sexually assaulting her, “I had to keep myself from going crazy. I just hummed to myself.” Realizing that the humming also calmed the rapist, she begins to give him a massage and to talk

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soothingly to him. As they converse, the 45-year-old assailant apologizes, and then discloses his name and even his date of birth, which later enables detectives to track him down. (Shifrel, 2007a)

A 45-year-old teacher is kidnapped in a shopping mall parking lot by a gun-toting teenage carjacker. She secretly turns on a micro-cassette recorder to gather evidence just in case she can’t convince the youth to let her go. During her final 46 minutes, she persuades the carjacker to discuss his childhood and his experiences in the military, descriptions which later provide detectives with valuable clues. She also reads passages to him from a psychology textbook; urges him to live a meaningful life and to find God; promises to help him land a job; and sobs as she describes how she treasures being a mother to her young son. But it is all to no avail. He doesn’t shoot her, but smothers her with her own coat, which con- tains the tape recorder in a pocket that leads to his capture. (Jones, 2007)

Victimology is not the cold or dismal discipline it might appear to be at first glance. Victimologists are not morbidly curious about or preoccupied with misfortune, loss, tragedy, pain, grief, death, and mourning. Of course, because of its inherently negative subject matter, the discipline is problem- oriented by nature. However, victimologists also take part in furthering positive developments and constructive activities when they seek to discover effective ways of coping with hardships, transcend- ing adversity, reimbursing financial losses, speeding up the healing process, promoting reconciliation between parties enmeshed in conflicts, and restor- ing harmony to a strife-torn community.

What insights that could advance an under- standing of resilience in the struggle to fully recover from a shattering, life-threatening experience might be gleaned from these cases?

A mentally deranged 60-year-old woman shoots a member of a sheriff’s department SWAT team in the neck. Formerly known as “the most in shape” dep- uty by his fellow officers, he wakes up as a quadri- plegic, confined to a wheel chair. But with great

determination he remains focused on his goal of returning to work at a desk job in the narcotics squad, observing “Your future is kind of bleak when you’ve got tubes coming out of you and everyone is saying you’ll never walk again.… But if you stay mad about it all the time, you’re not doing anything good for yourself.” Supported by his family and colleagues, he optimistically reports signs of progress. “There have been a lot of little instances, like being able to pick up a … potato chip and eat it with my hands.” (Young, 2008)

As part of a gang initiation ritual, a thirteen-year-old boy is given a gun and told to use it. He confronts a young mother, yells, “Give it up!” and shoots her in a panic when she screams. The bullet rips through her jaw and teeth, requiring her to undergo ten years of agonizing reconstruction surgery. When he is caught, he is prosecuted as an adult and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. And yet, when he telephones her from prison after several years, she accepts the collect charges, even though she still is in terrible pain and can’t eat. He apologizes for his “mistake” and for decades afterwards, they write letters to each other. She becomes friends with her assailant’s mother and brother, and despite con- cerns by her husband and friends, urges the judge (unsuccessfully) to release him from prison (Kristof, 2014).

A member of congress is shaking hands with consti- tuents at a supermarket, when a deranged college student emerges from the crowd and opens fire. Six people are killed, and thirteen are wounded, includ- ing the congresswoman, who is shot in the forehead. Doctors estimate she has a one in ten chance to live, but she pulls through. At her lowest ebb, she is not even able to smile, and experts doubt that she will ever speak or walk again. But with the help of her astronaut husband, her family, and dedicated mem- bers of the hospital staff, she summons up astonishing tenacity and one breath and one hard fought word at a time, recovers from her catastrophic head wound better than expected. When asked in a television

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 35

interview if she was ever angry about what happened to her, she replies haltingly, “No. No. No. Life. Life.” A few years later, she tells a crowd “I am working hard, lots of therapy: speech therapy, phys- ical therapy, and yoga too.” She insists, “My spirit is strong as ever”… and “I am still fighting to make the world a better place and you can too.” (Curry, 2011; Freking, 2011; and Walshe, 2014)

Evidently, studying how injured parties respond to their plight can yield some unanticipated benefits. Victimologists can gain a more complete understanding and appreciation of the full range of possible reactions to attacks. Some individuals cope with their misfortunes in ways that are clever, bold, even courageous, and demonstrate a determination to behave with dignity and to pursue an unwaver- ing commitment to justice. These persons can serve as positive role models for other wounded people who are seeking to recover from setbacks and over- come hardships.

“SURVIVOROLOGY:” TOWARD A MORE INSPIRING AND UPBEAT TRAJECTORY WITHIN VICTIMOLOGY

Some people who have been seriously harmed by criminals prefer to be called survivors rather than victims because of the term’s positive connotations— that they are rebounding are exercising “agency” to take charge of their lives and demonstrating their resiliency to adversity. They see the term “victim” as carrying a lot of unwanted baggage, such as being “bested,” “vanquished,” and a “loser.” Already, the expressions “survivors of incest, rape, intimate partner violence, and child abuse” are widely used (but not of robberies or shootings—at least not yet).

Similarly, some people initially attracted to the discipline of victimology may begin to fear that it is mired in negativity and preoccupied with pain, loss, sorrow, hostility, and recriminations. Learning bitter lessons from mistakes and feeling empathy toward those who are suffering may not be sufficient incen- tives to study victimology. What advocates, members of the helping professions, and injured parties

themselves need to find out more about is how cer- tain seriously wounded persons are able to go beyond “just coping.” As it is put glibly in everyday language, some seem able to “get over it,” “get past it,” “put it behind them,” and “get on with their lives.” How do they do it? What is the secret of their success? What personality traits, coping skills, inner resources, and belief systems enable individuals who have endured shattering experiences to emerge from a period of bereavement, depression, and anger, reconsider their priorities, and return to their previous lives or perhaps reorient themselves to new lifestyles (see Ai and Park, 2005; and Underwood, 2009).

This potentially upbeat tendency within vic- timology could be termed survivorology. Just as gravely ill persons, refugees from war-torn coun- tries, captives who were cruelly tortured, or severely wounded soldiers can demonstrate great resolve to make the most out of their remaining time on earth and make impressive strides to piece back together their disrupted lives, so too might individuals who sustained vicious attacks want to make the transition from victim to survivor. Researchers—and the general public—can find the outlooks and actions of certain exemplary indi- viduals who have suffered through shocking ordeals to be admirable, uplifting, and even inspiring. Within victimology, survivorology could focus on these success stories, in which individuals whose lives looked so bleak in the immediate aftermath of a terrible crime made great progress, surmounted obstacles, overcame severe limitations, and trans- formed a crisis into an opportunity.

The overarching theme of survivorology could be to “discover the common threads that underlie the secrets of their success” and determine how they did it: Was their recovery and new trajectory built upon faith and spirituality, inner strengths and outstanding character traits, the crucial support provided by others (family members, close friends, volunteers and men- tors, or perhaps fellow sufferers in self-help groups), government-funded social programs, immersion in activism, or some other source of courage and perseverance? And what special opportunities would other individuals in similar dire straits need to make a successful reentry back into society? To spur the

36 C H A P T E R 1

development of survivorology as an area of concentra- tion within victimology that accentuates the positive, two key concepts need to be operationalized: resiliency (roughly speaking, the ability to rebound after a serious setback) and recovery (basically, regaining control over one’s life, recuperating, restoring, returning to the con- dition the person was in before the crime took place). Once these two concepts of resiliency and recovery are

operationalized as variables whose magnitude can be estimated numerically and not designated simply as a dichotomous all or nothing situation, then different degrees of resilience and rates of recovery need to be investigated for various groups of victims.

The more survivorology is developed, the less victimology will be preoccupied solely with suffer- ing, loss, and negativity (see Box 1.6).

SUMMARY

Victimization is an asymmetrical relationship that is abusive, parasitical, destructive, unfair, and illegal. Offenders harm their victims physically, financially, and emotionally. Until recently, the plight of crime victims was largely overlooked, even by most crim- inologists. When some researchers began to study victims, their initial interest betrayed an antivictim bias: They sought evidence that the victims’ behav- ior before and during the incidents contributed to their own downfall. Since the 1960s, the majority of the social scientists attracted to this new discipline have labored to find ways to ease the suffering of victims and to prevent future incidents. But a com- mitment to strive for objectivity rather than to be

reflexively pro-victim is the best stance to adopt when carrying out research or evaluating the effec- tiveness of policies.

Victimology is best viewed as an area of spe- cialization within criminology. Both criminologists and victimologists seek to be impartial in their roles as social scientists when investigating lawbreaking, its social consequences, and the official responses by the justice system. But much of criminology in the past can be characterized as “offenderology,” so the new focus on those who are on the receiving end of interpersonal violence and theft provides some balance and rounds out any analysis of problems arising from lawbreaking behavior.

B O X 1.6 Questions to Spur the Development of Survivorology

How can the concept of “survivor” be operationalized so that it is not too restrictive and yet not too inclusive?

What is resilience, and how can it be measured as a matter of degree?

What is recovery, and how can it be measured as a matter of degree?

Which groups of victims (such as those who have endured repeated beatings, childhood sexual abuse, rapes, shootings, or the loss of a loved one who died violently) have the most success—and the most difficulty—recovering from their ordeals?

Which groups of victims show the most resilience in terms of characteristics such as age, sex, race and ethnicity, education, income, and occupation?

What forms of social support (such as strong family ties, close bonds with friends, financial reimbursement, gov- ernment programs, individual and group counseling, and camaraderie from a self-help group) improve the prospects for as well as the rate of recovery?

What aspects of an individual’s character and which personality traits foster resiliency and recovery?

What can crime victims learn about resiliency and recovery from the travails of individuals who endured devastating losses due to political oppression, natural disasters, life-threatening illnesses, and other near- death experiences—and vice-versa.

W H A T I S V I C T I M O L O G Y ? 37

Victimologists carry out studies that seek to identify, define, and describe all the ways that illegal activities harm targeted individuals; to measure the seriousness of the problem; to discover how victims’

cases are actually handled by the legal system; and to test research hypotheses (for example, about bystanders or survivors) to see if they are supported by the available evidence.

KEY TERMS DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY

bystanderology, 20

criminology, 18

direct or primary victims, 2

ideal type, 5

ideology, 14

indirect or secondary victims, 2

just deserts, 23

muggability ratings, 25

needs assessment, 27

objectivity, 3

offenderology, 20

operationalize, 26

operationalized, 30

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 22

prevalence rate, 29

principle of homogamy, 30

socially constructed, 24

Stockholm syndrome, 26

subjective approach, 3

survivorology, 36

survivors, 36

victim, 2

victimism, 14

victimization, 2

victimology, 2

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

1. Why should victimologists strive for objectivity rather than automatically adopt a pro-victim bias?

2. Give several examples of the kinds of research questions that victimologists find interesting and the kinds of studies they carry out.

3. In what ways are victimology and criminology similar, and in what ways do they differ?

4. Should bystanders be required to notify the police about serious crimes that they directly witness?

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. How should the police and the public react when hardcore criminals, such as mobsters, drug dealers, and street gang members fight among themselves and become casualties of violence?

2. Generate a list of questions about stabbings that would be of great interest to a victimologist working within (a) an anthropological frame- work, (b) a historical approach, and (c) an economic perspective.

SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROJECTS

1. Perform a keyword search of a comprehensive database of magazines and newspaper articles and blog postings to discover whether the term victimology is still being misused and confused with the ideology of victimism.

2. Use a comprehensive database of magazines and newspaper articles to determine whether any cases currently in the news illustrate the difficulty of identifying which party clearly is the criminal and which is the victim.

38 C H A P T E R 1

2 The Rediscovery of Crime Victims

CHAPTER OUTLINE The Discovery, Decline, and Rediscovery of Crime

Victims

Social Movements: Taking Up the Victims’ Cause

Elected Officials: Enacting Laws Named after Victims The News Media: Portraying the Victims’ Plight Commercial Interests: Selling Security Products and

Services to Victims Victimology Contributes to the Rediscovery Process

Rediscovering Additional Groups of Victims

The Rediscovery Process in Action, Step by Step

Stage 1: Calling Attention to an Overlooked Problem Stage 2: Winning Victories, Implementing Reforms Stage 3: Emergence of an Opposition and Development

of Resistance to Further Changes Stage 4: Research and Temporary Resolution of

Disputes

Summary

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary

Questions for Discussion and Debate

Critical Thinking Questions

Suggested Research Projects

LEARNING OBJECTIVES To trace how changes in the criminal justice system

over the centuries have impacted the role of victims in the legal process.

To find out how and why the plight of victims has been rediscovered in recent decades by various social movements and groups.

To become familiar with the stages of the rediscovery process.

To apply the concept of rediscovery to specific groups of victims mentioned in the news.

THE DISCOVERY, DECLINE, AND REDISCOVERY OF CRIME VICTIMS

Each law that prohibits a certain act as being harm- ful defines the wrongdoer as a criminal subject to punishment and at the same time specifies that the injured party is a victim deserving some sort of redress. The laws forbidding what are now called street crimes—murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and theft—can be traced back several thousand years. Hence, victims of interpersonal vio- lence and theft were “discovered” ages ago, in the sense that they were formally identified and offi- cially recognized.

Scholars of the history of the legal system report that in past centuries victims played a leading role in the resolution of criminal matters. To dis- courage retaliation by victims and their families— acts that could lead to endless feuding if offenders and their kin counterattacked—societies in simpler times established direct repayment schemes. Legal codes around the world enabled injured parties to receive money or valuables from wrongdoers to compensate for the pain, suffering, and losses they endured.

This process of victim-oriented justice pre- vailed mostly in small villages engaged in farming, where social relations were based on personal obli- gations, clear-cut family ties, strong religious beliefs, and sacred traditions. But the injured party’s role diminished as industrialization and urbanization brought about business relations that were volun- tary, secular, impersonal, rationalized, and contrac- tual. Over the centuries, victims lost control over the process of determining the fate of the offenders who hurt them. Instead, the local governmental structure dominated judicial proceedings and extracted fines from convicts, physically punished them, or even executed them. The seriousness of the wounds and losses inflicted upon victims were of importance only for determining the charges and penalties wrongdoers faced upon conviction. Restoring injured parties to the condition they were in before the crimes occurred was no longer the main concern. In fact, the recovery of damages

became a separate matter that was handled in another arena (civil court) according to a different set of rules (tort law) after criminal proceedings were concluded (Schafer, 1968).

Historically, in the United States and in other parts of the world, the situations of victims followed the same evolutionary path from being at the center of the legal process to being relegated to the side- lines. When the 13 American colonies were settled initially by immigrants from Great Britain in the 1600s, the earliest penal codes were based on reli- gious values as well as English common law. During the colonial era, police forces and public prosecutors had not yet been established. Victims were the key decision makers within the rudimen- tary criminal justice system and were its direct ben- eficiaries. They conducted their own investigations, paid for warrants to have sheriffs make arrests, and hired private attorneys to indict and prosecute their alleged attackers. Convicts were forced to repay those they harmed up to three times the value of the goods they had damaged or stolen (Schafer, 1968).

But after the American Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, crimes were reconceptualized as hostile acts directed against the authority of the government, which was defined as the representative of the peo- ple. Addressing the suffering imposed upon indivi- duals was deemed to be less important than dealing with the symbolic threat to the social order posed by lawbreakers. Public prosecutors, acting on behalf of the state and in the name of the entire society, took over the powers and responsibilities formerly exercised by victims. Federal, state, and county (district) attorneys were granted the discre- tion to decide whether to press charges against defendants and what sanctions to ask judges to impose upon convicts.

The goals of deterring crime through punish- ment, protecting society by incapacitating danger- ous people in prisons or through executions, and rehabilitating transgressors through treatment came to overshadow victims’ demands to be restored to financial, emotional, and physical health.

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Over the last two centuries, the government increasingly has assumed the obligation of providing jail detainees and prison inmates with food, cloth- ing, housing, supervision, medical care, recreational opportunities, schooling, job training, psychological counseling, and legal representation—while leaving victims to fend for themselves. As they lost control over “their” cases, their role dwindled to just two contributions: filing a complaint with the police that initiated an investigation and, if necessary, tes- tifying for the prosecution as another piece of evi- dence in the state’s presentation of damning facts against the accused.

When plea negotiation (a settlement worked out by the prosecutor and the defense attorney) replaced a trial as the most common means of resolving criminal cases, victims lost their last opportunity to actively participate in the process by presenting their firsthand experiences on the witness stand to a jury. Victims rarely were included and consulted when the police and prosecution team decided upon their strategies and goals. To add insult to injury, often they were not even informed of the outcomes of “their” cases. Thor- oughly marginalized, victims frequently sensed that they had been taken advantage of twice: first by the offender and then by a system that ostensibly was set up to help them but in reality seemed more intent on satisfying the needs of its core agen- cies and key officials (see Schafer, 1968; McDonald, 1977; and Davis, Kunreuther, and Connick, 1984).

After centuries of neglect, those on the receiv- ing end of violence and theft were given renewed attention and, in effect, were rediscovered during the late 1950s and early 1960s. A small number of self-help advocates, social scientists, crusading journalists, enlightened criminal justice officials, and responsive lawmakers helped channel the public’s attention to a festering problem: the total disregard of the needs and wants of victims. Through publications, meetings, rallies, and petition drives, these activists promoted their mes- sage: that victims were forgotten figures in the criminal justice process whose best interests were systematically overlooked but merited attention. Discussion and debate emerged during the late

1960s and has intensified throughout the following decades over why this injustice existed and what could be done about it. Various groups with their own distinct agendas formed coalitions and mobilized to campaign for reforms. As a result, new laws favorable to victims are being passed, and criminal justice policies are being overhauled.

A number of distinct groups and constituen- cies are responsible for this ongoing process of rediscovery. They include a wide variety of social movements; elected officials; commercial interests; the news media; and scholars, researchers, and advocates.

Social Movements: Taking Up the Victims’ Cause

Aside from suffering harm at the hands of criminals, victims as a group may have very little else in com- mon. They differ in terms of age, sex, race/ethnic- ity, religion, social class, political orientation, and many other important characteristics. Therefore, it has been difficult to organize them into self-help groups and to harness their energies into a political force for change. Despite these obstacles, a crime victims’ movement emerged during the 1970s. It has developed into a broad alliance of activists, support groups, and advocacy organizations that lobbies for increased rights and expanded services, demonstrates at trials, maintains a variety of web- sites, educates the public, trains criminal justice professionals and caregivers, sets up research insti- tutes and information clearinghouses, designs and evaluates experimental policies, and holds confer- ences to share experiences and develop innovative programs.

The guiding principle holding this diverse coa- lition together is the belief that victims who other- wise would feel powerless and enraged can attain a sense of empowerment and regain control over their lives through practical assistance, mutual sup- port, and involvement in the criminal justice pro- cess (see Friedman, 1985; Smith, 1985; Smith, Sloan, and Ward, 1990; and Weed, 1995).

The victims’ movement has greatly benefited from the work of advocates, who, by definition,

T H E R E D I S C O V E R Y O F C R I M E V I C T I M S 41

speak in behalf of someone else, especially in legal matters. Originally, advocates were referred to as “ombudsmen.” Rape crisis centers and shelters for battered women were the first to empower their clients in the early 1970s by furnishing them with the services of dedicated and knowledgeable people to consult with who understood how the criminal justice process worked and how to make the system more responsive to their clients’ needs. These pio- neers in advocacy usually were former victims who knew firsthand what the injured parties were going through. A Florida police department and a Chicago legal services organization were the first components of the justice system to routinely pro- vide advocates in the mid-1970s. Shortly afterward, prosecutors’ victim–witness assistance programs (VWAPs) and family courts (responsible for assign- ing guardians ad litem to represent the best interests of abused children) followed suit. In addition to survivors and volunteers, professionals in the help- ing fields (such as social workers, nurses, psycholo- gists, psychiatrists, counselors, and lawyers) began to offer their specialized skills. Agencies provided short-term training in crisis intervention techniques and practical assistance with financial claims, court proceedings, and referrals to medical, mental health, and legal services. Courses and career preparation became available on college campuses. Two forms of advocacy developed: Case advocacy involves a one-on-one relationship with a client who needs specific assistance and focused guidance for a short period of time. System advocacy involves repre- senting an entire group as part of an organized lob- bying campaign to bring about procedural reforms that will ease their plight (Dussich, 2009a).

Major Sources of Inspiration, Guidance, and Support Several older and broader social move- ments have greatly influenced the growth and orienta- tion of the victims’ movement. The most important contributions have been made by the law-and-order movement, the women’s movement, and the civil rights movement.

The law-and-order movement of the 1960s raised concerns about the plight of victims of street crimes of violence and theft. Alarmed by surging

crime rates, conservatives adopted the “crime con- trol” perspective and campaigned for hard-line, get- tough policies. They insisted that the criminal jus- tice system was society’s first line of defense against internal enemies who threatened chaos and destruc- tion. The “thin blue line” of law enforcement needed to be strengthened. A willingness to tolerate too much misbehavior was viewed as the problem, and a crackdown on social and political deviants who disobeyed society’s rules and disrupted the lives of conventional people was offered as the solution. To win over people who might have been reluctant to grant more power to gov- ernment agencies—police, prosecutors, and prison authorities—they argued that the average American should be more worried about becoming a victim than about being falsely accused, mistakenly con- victed, and unjustly punished (Hook, 1972). Con- servative crime control advocates pictured the scales of justice as being unfairly tilted in favor of the “bad guys” at the expense of the “good guys”—the innocent, law-abiding citizens and their allies on the police force and in the prosecutor’s office. In a smooth-running justice system that they envi- sioned, punishment would be swift and sure. Attor- neys for defendants would no longer be able to take advantage of practices that were dismissed as “loop- holes” and “technicalities” that undermined the government’s efforts to arrest, detain, convict, imprison, deter, incapacitate, and impose retribu- tion on wrongdoers.

“Permissiveness” (unwarranted leniency) and any “coddling of criminals” would end: More offenders would be locked up for longer periods of time, and fewer would be granted bail, proba- tion, or parole. Liberals and civil libertarians who opposed these policies as being too repressive and overly punitive were branded as “pro-criminal” and “antivictim” (see Miller, 1973; and Carrington, 1975).

In contrast, liberal activists in the women’s movement have focused their energies since the late 1960s on aiding one group of victims in partic- ular: females who were harmed by males and then failed to receive the support they deserved from the male-dominated criminal justice system. Feminists

42 C H A P T E R 2

launched both an antirape and an antibattering movement. The antirape movement set up the first rape crisis centers in Berkeley, California, and Washington, D.C., in 1972. These centers were not just places of aid and comfort in a time of pain and confusion. They also were rallying sites for outreach efforts to those who were suffering in isolation, meeting places for consciousness-raising groups exploring the patriarchal cultural traditions that encouraged males to subjugate females, and hubs for political organizing to change laws and policies (see Rose, 1977; Largen, 1981; and Schechter, 1982). Some antirape activists went on to protest the widespread problem of sexual harassment on the street, uniting behind the slogan “Take back the night” (see Lederer, 1980).

Other feminists helped organize battered women’s shelters. They established the first “safe house” in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1974. Campaigns to end battering paralleled activities to combat rape in a number of ways. Both projects were initiated for the most part by former victims who viewed their plight as an outgrowth of larger societal pro- blems and institutional arrangements, rather than as personal troubles stemming from their own indi- vidual shortcomings. Both sought to empower women by confronting established male authority, challenging existing procedures, providing peer support and advocacy, and devising alternative places to turn to in a time of need. The overall analysis that originally guided these pro-victim efforts was that male versus female offenses (such as rape, wife beating, sexual harassment in the streets and at work, and incest at home) pose a threat to all women and slows progress toward equality between the sexes. The gravest dangers are faced by women who are socially disadvantaged because of racial discrimination and economic inse- curity. According to this philosophy, girls and women victimized by boys and men cannot count on the privileged males at the helm of criminal jus- tice agencies to lead the struggle to effectively pro- tect or assist them—instead, women must empower each other (see Brownmiller, 1975).

Similarly, liberal activists in the civil rights movement focused their energies on opposing

entrenched racist beliefs and discriminatory prac- tices that encouraged members of the white major- ity to intimidate, harass, and attack people of color. Over the decades since the 1950s, this movement has brought together organizations representing the interests of a wide range of minority groups, in order to direct attention to the special threats posed by racist violence, from lynch mobs to Ku Klux Klan terrorism in the form of bombings and assassinations.

In recent years, one of the movement’s major concerns has been convincing the government to provide enhanced protection to individuals who are the targets of bias crimes, which are motivated by the perpetrators’ hatred of the “kind of person” the victim represents. Bias crimes can range from harassment and vandalism to arson, beatings, and slayings. Civil rights groups have been instrumental in lobbying state legislatures to impose stiffer penal- ties on attackers whose behavior is fueled by bigotry and in establishing specialized police squads to more effectively deter or solve these inflammatory viola- tions of the law. Otherwise, these divisive crimes could polarize communities along racial and ethnic lines and thereby undermine the ongoing American experiment of fostering multicultural tolerance and the celebration of diversity (see Levin and McDevitt, 2003).

Civil rights organizations also try to mobilize public support to demand evenhandedness in the administration of justice. A double standard, although more subtle today than in the past, may still infect the operations of the criminal justice sys- tem. Crimes by black perpetrators against white victims always have been taken very seriously— thoroughly investigated, quickly solved, vigorously prosecuted, and severely punished. However, crimes by white offenders against black victims, as well as by blacks against other blacks (see Ebony, 1979) have rarely evoked the same governmental response and public outrage. The more frequent imposition of the death penalty on murderers who kill whites, especially blacks who slay whites, is the clearest example of a discriminatory double standard (see Baldus, 2003). Civil rights activists also point out that members of minority groups

T H E R E D I S C O V E R Y O F C R I M E V I C T I M S 43

continue to face graver risks of becoming victims of official misconduct in the form of racial profiling and police brutality—or even worse, the unjustified use of deadly force—as well as false accusations, frame-ups, wrongful convictions, and other miscar- riages of justice.

Additional Contributions by Other Social Movements Social movements that champion the causes of civil liberties, children’s rights, senior citizens’ rights, homosexual rights, and self-help also have made significant contributions to bettering the situation of victims.

The civil liberties movement’s primary focus is to preserve constitutional safeguards and due pro- cess guarantees that protect suspects, arrestees, defendants, and prisoners from abuses of govern- mental power by overzealous criminal justice offi- cials. However, civil liberties organizations have won court victories that have benefited victims of street crime in two ways: by furthering police pro- fessionalism and by extending the doctrine of “equal protection under the law.”

In professionalized police departments, officers must meet higher educational and training require- ments and must abide by more demanding stan- dards. As a result, victims are more likely to receive prompt responses, effective service, and sensitive treatment. If they don’t, channels exist through which they can redress their grievances. Guarantees of equal protection enable minority communities to gain access to the police and pros- ecutorial assistance to which they are entitled and to insist upon their right to improved, more profes- sionally trained law enforcement in contrast to the under-policing they endured until recently. This improves the prospects for careful and respon- sive handling for complainants whose calls for help were given short shrift in the past when offi- cials discriminated against them due to their race, ethnicity, sex, age, social class, disability, or some other disadvantage (Walker, 1982; and Stark and Goldstein, 1985).

Children’s rights groups campaign against sexual abuse, physical abuse, severe corporal punishment, gross neglect, and other forms of

maltreatment of youngsters. Their successes include stricter reporting requirements of cases of suspected abuse; improved procedures for arrest, prosecution, and conviction of offenders; greater sensitivity to the needs of victimized children as complaining witnesses; enhanced protection and prevention services; and more effective parenting instruction programs.

At the other end of the age spectrum, activists in senior citizens’ groups have pressured some police departments to establish special squads to protect older people from younger robbers and swindlers and have brought about greater awareness of the problem of elder abuse—financial, emo- tional, and physical mistreatment by family mem- bers or caretakers (see Smith and Freinkel, 1988).

The gay rights movement originally called attention to the vulnerability of male homosexuals and lesbians to blackmail, exploitation by organized crime syndicates that ran bars and clubs, and police harassment of those who deserved protection (see Maghan and Sagarin, 1983). The movement now focuses on preventing street assaults (“gay-bashing”) against suspected homosexuals and lesbians—hate crimes that are motivated by the offenders’ disdain for the victims’ presumed sexual orientation.

Groups that are part of the self-help move- ment have set up dependable support systems for injured parties by combining the participatory spirit of the grassroots protest movements of the 1960s with the self-improvement ideals of the human potential movement of the 1970s. The ideology of self-help is based upon a fundamental organizing principle: that people who have directly experi- enced the pain and suffering of being harmed and are still struggling to overcome these hardships themselves can foster a sense of solidarity and mutual support that is more comforting and effec- tive than the services offered by impersonal bureau- cracies and emotionally detached professional caregivers (Gartner and Riessman, 1980).

Even the prisoners’ rights movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s may have inspired victim activism. Inmates rebelled at a number of cor- rectional institutions, often in vicious and counter- productive ways. They protested overcrowded

44 C H A P T E R 2

conditions; demanded decent living standards; insisted on greater ways of communicating with the outside world (via uncensored mail, access to the mass media, more family visits, and meetings with lawyers); asked for freedom of religion; called for more opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and job training; and complained about mistreat- ment and brutality by guards (see ACLU, 2008). Many people harmed by these incarcerated offen- ders surely wondered, “if convicts deserve better treatment from the authorities, don’t we, too?”

The task for victimologists is to assess the impact that all these other social movements have had on shaping the course of the victims’ move- ment over the decades, as well as on alleviating the suffering of persons harmed by criminals these days. How effective and influential have the victo- ries of these campaigns really been?

Elected Officials: Enacting Laws Named after Victims

Legislators engaged in the political process of enact- ing new laws have helped to rediscover specific groups and address their plight. Starting in the 1980s, federal, state, and local representatives real- ized that if they proposed a new law and named it after someone who had suffered terribly in a highly publicized crime, their campaign would gain a great deal of favorable media coverage that would help build support for the law’s passage as well as for their own reelection. All suggestions for revisions and additions to the existing body of laws can be controversial and might provoke opposition, but officeholders who dare to argue against proposed legislation that enshrines the name of an innocent person harmed by a vicious predator run the risk of being branded “antivictim.”

Probably the best-known example of a law bearing the name of a crime victim is the Brady Bill, or more formally, the Handgun Violence Preven- tion Act. The title honors James Brady, President Reagan’s press secretary, who was shot in the head in 1981 by an assassin trying to kill the president (the gunfire killed two persons guarding the president). Passed in 1993, it imposed a computer-based FBI

criminal background check on anyone who seeks to buy a firearm from a federally licensed dealer, in a stepped-up attempt to protect the public from individuals deemed to be dangerous (who had been forbidden by federal law from purchasing fire- arms since 1968, as a reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963).

Another bill bearing a victim’s name is the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (originally referred to as the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act). Named to memorialize a 19-year-old freshman who was raped and murdered in her dorm by another student, it was enacted in 1990. This fed- eral law requires all colleges that receive federal aid to maintain and disclose annual reports about a long list of crimes that take place on or near their cam- puses so that prospective students and their parents can assess the relative risks of attending various insti- tutions of higher learning.

The Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act went into effect in 2008. It set up a cold case unit within the U.S. Department of Justice to reopen and investigate bias-motivated murders committed before 1970. Emmett Till, a 14-year-old black teenager, was kidnapped, tortured, shot, and dumped into a river in 1955 by two white racists for flirting with the wife of one of the two men at a grocery store in rural Mississippi (see Anderson, 2011).

The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act was passed by Congress in 2009. Named to commemorate a gay college stu- dent who was beaten to death by bigots, and an African-American man who was dragged to his death behind a pickup truck by white supremacists, the legislation expanded the coverage of the federal government’s hate-crime law, which was originally passed in 1969.

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), was enacted by Con- gress in 2006. Named in the memory of a six- year-old who was abducted from a department store and then viciously murdered, the act strength- ened sex offender registration requirements, stiffened

T H E R E D I S C O V E R Y O F C R I M E V I C T I M S 45

the penalties of existing laws forbidding sexually abusing and exploiting children, and extended federal authority over kidnappings.

Over the decades, many state legislatures have passed statutes named after victims, such as New Jersey’s Megan’s Law. Commemorating a seven- year-old girl slain in 1994 by her next-door neigh- bor, a habitual child molester, each state’s version of Megan’s Law mandates that convicted sex offenders register with their local police department and that community residents be notified of their where- abouts, so that parents—in theory, at least—can take steps to better shield their children from these potentially dangerous strangers.

Since the 1980s, state and county legislatures nationwide have enacted thousands of new laws named after victims (see Editors, New York Post, 2006; and Lovett, 2006). Two very different con- clusions about the rediscovery of the victim’s plight by lawmakers can be drawn. The first is to view certain headline-making tragedies as a “final straw” that focused much-needed attention on a festering problem, mobilized public opinion, and triggered long overdue legislative action by well- meaning elected officials. The other response is to suspect that vote-seeking politicians are exploiting the media attention surrounding highly emotional but very complicated situations for their own per- sonal advantage (to advance their careers). They grab headlines by proposing a change in the existing body of law that will allegedly prevent such an inci- dent from happening again. The strong feelings evoked by a recent tragedy make it difficult for opponents to question the wisdom of implement- ing the “reforms” these ambitious, headline-seeking politicians propose in the name of the victim.

The task for victimologists is to start out as impartial observers and to gather data to see whether the legislation bearing the name of a vic- tim actually offers any tangible assistance to ease the plight of individuals harmed in this particular man- ner. Also, are these measures really effective in pre- venting innocent people from being hurt by these kinds of offenses in the future, or do they just pun- ish offenders more severely on behalf of those they already injured? Some of these recent legal reforms

enacted to ostensibly reduce the occurrence of a certain kind of victimization might turn out to be ill-conceived, seriously flawed, ineffective, or even counterproductive (for example, see Cooper, 2005).

The News Media: Portraying the Victims’ Plight

The news media deserve a great deal of credit for rediscovering victims. In the past, offenders received the lion’s share of coverage in newspapers and maga- zines and on radio and television stations. Stories delved into their backgrounds, their motives, and what should be done with them—usually how severely they should be punished. Scant attention was paid to the flesh-and-blood individuals who suf- fered because of the offender’s illegal activities.

But now those who are on the receiving end of criminal behavior are no longer invisible or forgot- ten people. Details about the injured parties are routinely included to inject some human interest into crime stories. Balanced accounts can vividly describe the victims’ plight: how they were harmed, what losses they incurred, what intense emotions distressed them, what helped or even hindered their recovery, how they were treated by care- givers, and how their cases were handled by the legal system. By remaining faithful to the facts, journalists can enable their audiences to transcend their own limited direct experiences with law- breakers and to see emergencies, tragedies, and tri- umphs through the eyes of the injured parties. Skillful reporting and insightful observations allow the public to better understand and empathize with the actions and reactions of those who suffered harm. In certain highly publicized cases, interviews by journalists have given victims a voice in how their cases ought to be resolved in court, and even how the problem (such as child snatchings by an angry ex-spouse, easy access to firearms, or collisions caused by drunk drivers) should be han- dled by the criminal justice system. Media coverage also has given these individuals with firsthand experiences a public platform to campaign for wider societal reforms (Dignan, 2005).

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However, victims—and if they perish vio- lently, their next of kin—often complain about sensationalism, a kind of coverage that has been branded as “scandal-mongering,” “pandering,” “yellow journalism,” and “tabloidism.” Newspa- pers, magazines, radio stations, and television net- works are prone to engage in sensationalism because they are profit-oriented businesses. Shock- ing stories attract readers, listeners, and viewers. Blaring headlines, gripping accounts, colorful phrases, memorable quotes, and other forms of media hype build the huge audiences that enable media enterprises to charge advertisers high rates. Producers, editors, and reporters who seek to play up the human-interest angle may exploit the plight of persons who have suffered devastating losses and debilitating wounds. Not surprisingly, the “info- tainment” shows have found that crime stories attract a lot more notice if they are spiced up with a heavy dose of sex, gore, and raw emotions. In the quest for higher ratings, market-driven coverage can sink to an “If it bleeds, it leads” rule of thumb. If reporters turn a personal tragedy into a media circus and a public spectacle, their intrusive behavior might be considered an invasion of pri- vacy. Overzealous journalists frequently are criti- cized for showing corpses lying in a pool of blood, maintaining vigils outside a grieving family’s home, or shoving microphones into the faces of bereaved, dazed, or hysterical relatives at funerals. The injured party receives unwanted publicity and experiences a loss of control as others comment upon, draw lessons from, and impose judgments on what he or she allegedly did, or did not do, or should have done.

Incidents receive intensive and sustained cover- age only when some aspect of the victim–offender relationship stands out as an attention-grabber: The act, the perpetrator, or the target must be unusual, unexpected, strange, or perverse. Suffering harm in ways that are typical, commonplace, or predictable is just not newsworthy. Editors and journalists sift through an overwhelming number of real-life trag- edies that come to their attention (largely through contacts within the local police department) and

select the cases that are most likely to seize center stage, go viral, shock people out of their compla- cency, and either stir up deep-seated fears or arouse the public’s empathy and social conscience.

The stories that are featured strike a responsive chord in audiences because the incidents symbolize some significant theme—for example, that anyone can be chosen at random, simply for being at the wrong place at the wrong time; that complete strangers cannot be trusted; and that bystanders might not come to a person’s aid, especially in anonymous, big-city settings (Roberts, 1989). His- torically, heinous crimes that have received the most press coverage have had one or more of these elements in common: Either the injured party or the defendant is a child, woman, or a prominent or wealthy person; intimations of “pro- miscuous” behavior by the victim or defendant help explain the event; some doubts linger about the guilt of the convict; and the circumstances sur- rounding a slaying seemed unusual (Stephens, 1988; and Buckler and Travis, 2005).

Furthermore, media attention may reflect the unconscious biases of talk show hosts, correspon- dents, and editors who work in the newsroom. For example, members of minority communities have charged that national news outlets, especially those on cable TV, focus relentless attention on the disappearance of attractive white people, particu- larly young women and children, but overlook equally compelling cases involving individuals who do not share these characteristics (see Lyman, 2005; Memmott, 2005; and Barton, 2011).

Hence, it is predictable that the unsolved Christmas Eve murder of a six-year-old beauty contest winner in her own upscale home, with her parents and brother upstairs, would be the sub- ject of incessant tabloid sensationalism (Johnson, 2008). Similarly, the disappearance of a 24- year-old intern after jogging in a park set off an avalanche of lurid speculation when it was revealed that she was having an affair with a married con- gressman (the case was solved years later when her killer turned out to be a complete stranger who had attacked other women in that same park at about

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the same time) (Tavernise, 2011). If these charges are true, the problem may go deeper and may reflect the shortcomings of market-driven journal- ism. The gatekeepers, under organizational pres- sures to sell their product, sift through a huge pool of items and select stories they perceive will resonate with the general public, at the expense of presenting an accurate sampling of the full range of tragedies taking place locally, nationally, and around the world (see Buckler and Travis, 2005).

And yet, it can be argued that media coverage of crime stories is an absolute necessity in an open society. Reporters and news editors have a consti- tutional right, derived from the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press, to present information about lawbreaking without interference from the government. Illegal activities not only harm partic- ular individuals but also pose a threat to those who may be next. People have a right as well as a need to know about the emergence of dangerous condi- tions and ominous developments, and the media has an obligation to communicate this information accurately.

The problem is that the public’s right to know about crime and the media’s right to report these incidents clash with the victim’s right to privacy. Journalists, editors, and victims’ advocates are addressing questions of fairness and ethics in a wide variety of forums, ranging from blogs and posted comments on the Web and letters to the editor in newspapers, to professional conferences and lawsuits in civil court.

Several remedies have been proposed to curb abusive coverage of a victim’s plight. One approach would be to enact new laws to shield those who suffer from needless public exposure, such as an unnecessary disclosure of names and addresses in dispatches or on websites. An alternative approach would be to rely on the self-restraint of reporters and their editors. The fact that most news accounts of sexual molestations of children and of rapes no longer reveal the names of those who were harmed is an example of this self-policing approach in action. A third remedy would be for the media to adopt a code of professional ethics. Journalists who

abide by the code would “read victims their rights” at the outset of interviews, just as police officers read suspects their Miranda rights when taking them into custody (see Thomason and Babbilli, 1987; and Karmen, 1989).

Victimologists could play an important role in monitoring progress by studying how accurate widely broadcast initial accounts are; how fre- quently and how seriously reporters insult and defame the subjects of their stories; and how suc- cessfully the different reform strategies prevent this kind of exploitation, or at least minimize any abu- sive invasions of privacy (see Duwe, 2000).

Commercial Interests: Selling Security Products and Services to Victims

Just as the rediscovery of victims by elected offi- cials and the news media has benefits as well as drawbacks, so too does the new attention paid to injured parties by businesses. An emerging market of people seeking out protective services and anti- theft devices simultaneously raises the possibility of meeting consumer needs but also of commercially exploiting these eager customers. Profiteers can engage in fear mongering and false advertising in order to cash in on the legitimate concerns and desires of individuals who feel particularly vulner- able and even panicky. In situations where entre- preneurs issue bold claims about some gadget’s effectiveness, objectivity takes the form of scien- tific skepticism. Victimologists must represent the public interest and demand, “Prove those asser- tions about this product or service! Where is the evidence?”

Consider the question of whether expensive automobile security systems actually work as well as their manufacturers’ advertisements say they do. For instance, do car alarms really deliver the layer of protection against break-ins that their purchasers seek and that sales pitches promise? In New York, the City Council passed regulations restricting the installation of new car alarms because the devices were deemed to be largely ineffective as well as a serious source of noise pollution. Rather than

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agreeing with frustrated motorists that the wailing sirens do no good, or trying to defend the alarm indus- try’s reputation and profits, nonpartisan victimologists can independently evaluate the effectiveness of these antitheft devices. Are car alarms really useful in deter- ring break-ins; in minimizing losses of accessories such as car stereos, navigation systems, or air bags; in pre- venting vehicles from being driven away; and in aid- ing the police to catch thieves red-handed?

Similarly, research projects could attempt to determine whether burglar alarms actually deter or cut short intruders’ invasions and are therefore worth the price of installation and monthly moni- toring fees, and whether identity theft insurance protection is a wise investment.

VICTIMOLOGY CONTRIBUTES TO THE REDISCOVERY PROCESS

The emergence and acceptance of victimology as a scholarly endeavor has propelled the rediscovery process onward.

The beginnings of the academic discipline of vic- timology can be traced back to several articles, books, and research projects initiated by criminologists dur- ing the 1940s and 1950s. Until that time, criminol- ogy’s attention was focused entirely on those who violated the law: who they were, why they engaged in illegal activities, how they were handled by the criminal justice system, whether they should be incar- cerated, and how they might be rehabilitated. Even- tually, perhaps through the process of elimination, several criminologists searching for solutions to the crime problem were drawn to—or stumbled upon—the important role played by victims.

These criminologists considered victims to be worthy of serious study primarily because they were the completely overlooked half of the dyad (pair). The first use in English of the term victimology to refer to the scientific study of people harmed by criminals appeared in a book about murderers writ- ten by a psychiatrist (Wertham, 1949). The first scholars to consider themselves victimologists examined the presumed vulnerabilities of certain

kinds of people, such as the very young, the very old, recent immigrants, and the mentally incompe- tent (Von Hentig, 1948); the “kinds of people,” (in terms of factors such as age and sex), whose actions contributed to their own violent deaths (Wolfgang, 1958); and the degree of resistance put up by rape victims (Mendelsohn, 1940).

Beniamin Mendelsohn, a defense attorney in Romania, wrote and spoke during the 1940s and 1950s about how victims were ignored, disre- spected, and abused within the criminal justice pro- cess. He proposed ways to help and protect them by creating victim assistance clinics and special research institutes, and he campaigned for victims’ rights. For his foresight, he might be deemed “the father of victimology” (Dussich, 2009b).

During the 1960s, as the problem of street crime intensified, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice argued that criminologists ought to pay more atten- tion to victims (thereby inspiring some to become victimologists). The Commission’s Task Force on Assessment (1967, p. 80) concluded:

One of the most neglected subjects in the study of crime is its victims: the persons, households, and businesses that bear the brunt of crime in the United States. Both the part the victim can play in the criminal act and the part he could have played in preventing it are often overlooked. If it could be determined with sufficient specificity that people or businesses with certain characteristics are more likely than others to be crime victims, and that crime is more likely to occur in some places rather than in others, efforts to control and prevent crime would be more productive. Then the public could be told where and when the risks of crime are greatest. Measures such as preventive police patrol and installation of burglar alarms and special locks could then be pursued more efficiently and effectively. Individuals could then substitute objective estimation of risk for the general apprehensiveness that today restricts—perhaps unnecessarily and at best haphazardly—their enjoyment of parks and their freedom of movement on the streets after dark.

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In this call for a shift in focus, the Commis- sion’s Task Force stressed the potential practical benefits: More crimes could be prevented and more criminals caught, unrealistic fears could be calmed and unwarranted complacency dispelled, and needless expenditures could be eliminated or reduced. These ambitious goals have not yet been attained. Other goals not cited by the commission that have been added over the years include reducing suffering, making the criminal justice sys- tem more responsive, and restoring victims to the financial condition they were in before the crime occurred.

During the 1960s and 1970s, criminologists, reformers, and political activists argued persuasively that offenders themselves were in some sense “victims” too—of the desperation caused by pov- erty in the midst of plenty, dysfunctional families, failing school systems, rundown housing, job shortages, discrimination, police brutality, and other social problems (for example, see Ryan, 1971). In reaction to this sympathetic characteriza- tion of lawbreakers, many people asked, “But what about the real flesh-and-blood individuals that they preyed upon who were innocent, law-abiding, and vulnerable? What can be done to ease their suffer- ing?” While grappling with that question, reformers came to recognize that persons targeted by crim- inals were being systematically abandoned to their fates and that institutionalized neglect had prevailed for too long. A consensus began to emerge that people harmed by illegal acts deserved better treat- ment. Plans for financial assistance were the focus of early discussions; campaigns for enhanced rights within the legal system soon followed.

By the 1970s, victimology had become a rec- ognized field of study with its own national and international professional organizations, confer- ences, and journals. Courses in victimology sprang up on many campuses, in part because students wanted to discuss their own personal experiences— which must be explored with great sensitivity (see Cares, 2012). By the end of the 1990s, students were taking victimology classes at more than 240 colleges and universities.

The milestones that mark victimology’s rela- tively brief history, plus the major pioneering efforts to provide tangible help to crime victims are pre- sented in Box 2.1.

REDISCOVERING ADDITIONAL GROUPS OF VICTIMS

This process—in which people whose plight was recognized long ago but is neglected for many years until it finally attracts the attention it deserves—goes on and on with no end in sight. Some rediscovered groups that have received a great deal of study and support include abused children, battered women; females who have suf- fered date rapes; kidnapped youngsters; people targeted by bigots; individuals attacked by enraged motorists; pedestrians, passengers, and drivers killed in collisions caused by drunk dri- vers; and prisoners sexually assaulted by fellow inmates or members of the custodial staff. The suffering of other groups unfortunately is also becoming quite well known and increasingly attended to: students shot in high schools and colleges, employees subjected to workplace vio- lence, and police officers assaulted and fired at by felons.

And yet, there are still other groups under the radar or waiting in the wings to be rediscovered by those academics and scholars, practitioners, social movements, elected officials, the news media, and commercial interests who continue to drive the process forward. A steady stream of fresh revelations serves as a reminder that these neglected groups still are “out there” and that they have compelling stor- ies to tell, unmet needs, and legitimate demands for assistance and support. Usually, they continue to escape public notice until some highly unusual or horrific incident reveals how they are being harmed. The types of victims whose plight is now being rediscovered—but who require much more scrutiny and analysis, and creative remedies—are listed in Box 2.2.

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B O X 2.1 Highlights in the Brief History of Victimology and Victim Assistance

Year Event

1924 Edwin Sutherland writes the first criminology textbook that includes a short discussion about victims.

1941 Hans Von Hentig publishes an article focusing on the interaction between victims and criminals.

1947 Beniamin Mendelsohn coins the term victimology in an article written in French.

1957 In Great Britain, Margery Fry proposes legislation that would authorize the government to reimburse victims for their losses.

1958 Marvin Wolfgang studies the circumstances sur- rounding the deaths of murder victims and discovers that some contributed to their own demise.

1964 The U.S. Congress holds hearings on the plight of crime victims but rejects legislative proposals to cover their losses.

1965 California becomes the first U.S. state to set up a spe- cial fund to repay victims for crime-inflicted expenses.

1966 The first nationwide victimization survey to find out about crimes that were not reported to the police is carried out, and its findings are considered so enlight- ening that it becomes an annual undertaking.

1967 A presidential commission recommends that crimin- ologists study victims.

1968 Stephen Schafer writes the first textbook about victims.

Early 1970s

The first sex crime squads and rape crisis centers are established.

1972 The federal government initiates a yearly National Crime Victimization Survey of the general public to uncover firsthand information about street crimes.

1973 The first international conference of victimologists is convened in Jerusalem.

1974 The first shelter for battered women is set up in Minnesota. The first victim advocates in law enforcement are assigned by the police department in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The first lawyers serving as advocates for victims in legal proceedings are made available on the South East Side of Chicago.

Mid- 1970s

Prosecutors initiate victim–witness assistance programs.

1976 The first scholarly journal devoted to victimology begins publication. A National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) is established to bring together service providers working for government agencies and nonprofits. The probation department in Fresno, California, is the first to instruct its officers to interview victims to find out how the crime impacted them physically, emotionally, socially, and financially.

1977 New York State enacts the first “Son of Sam” law to prevent offenders from profiting from telling about their exploits.

1979 The World Society of Victimology is founded.

Year Event

1981 President Reagan proclaims Victims’ Rights Week every April.

1982 Congress passes a Victim and Witness Protection Act that suggests standards for fair treatment of victims within the federal court system.

1983 The President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime recommends changes in the Constitution and in federal and state laws to guarantee victims’ rights.

1984 Congress passes the Victims of Crime Act, which provides federal subsidies to state victim compensa- tion and assistance programs.

1985 The United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution that urges all members to respect and extend the rights of victims of crimes and of abuses of power.

1986 Victims’ rights activists seek the passage of consti- tutional amendments on the federal and state levels guaranteeing victims’ rights.

1987 The U.S. Department of Justice opens a National Victims Resource Center in Rockville, Maryland, to serve as a clearinghouse for information.

1990 Congress passes the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act.

1994 Congress passes the Violence Against Women Act. 2003 The American Society of Victimology is set up to

encourage collaboration between academicians, researchers, and practitioners.

2004 Congress enacts the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which pledges fair treatment and opportunities for input in federal court proceedings.

2005 A bipartisan group of 18 members of Congress forms a Victim’s Rights Caucus.

2007 VictimLaw, a user-friendly website set up by the National Center for Victims of Crime, provides a searchable database about state legislation concern- ing restitution and compensation for financial losses.

2008 The National Museum of Crime & Punishment opens in Washington, D.C., with exhibits that dramatize the plights of victims.

2011 The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) of the federal government’s Department of Justice (DOJ) launches a website, www.crimesolutions.org, that evaluates the effectiveness of programs on behalf of crime victims.

2014 The Bureau of Justice Statistics develops a webpage that presents tables of data about victims in a user- friendly format.

2014 California becomes the first state to pass a “Yes Means Yes” law that requires explicit mutual consent before engaging in sex in college campus settings.

SOURCE: Galaway and Hudson, 1981; Schneider, 1982; Lamborn, 1985; National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA), 1989, 1995; Dussich, 2003; Walker, 2003; Garlock, 2007; Rothstein, 2008; Dussich, 2009a, 2009b; and Chappell, 2014.

B O X 2.2 The Process of Rediscovery Goes On and On

These recently recognized groups of victims face special pro- blems that require imaginative solutions. They eventually will receive the assistance and support they need as the rediscovery process continues to focus attention and resources on their plight:

Individuals who are deaf, blind, mentally retarded, mentally ill, or afflicted by other disabilities that attracted molesters, assailants, robbers, or other crim- inals who preyed upon them more often than other potential targets (Office for Victims of Crime, 2003; Barrow, 2008; and Harrell, 2014), particularly when they were young (Smith and Harrell, 2013; and Tabachnick, 2013).

People whose attackers cannot be arrested and prose- cuted because as members of foreign delegations they have been granted “diplomatic immunity” and are able to escape justice by returning home (Ashman and Trescott, 1987; Sieh, 1990; Lynch, 2003; and Grow, 2011)

Pedestrians and passengers killed by drivers who speed, run red lights, or ignore stop signs and may be guilty of criminally negligent homicide (Goodman, 2013; and Lerner, 2014).

Motorists and pedestrians slammed into during high-speed chases by fugitives seeking to avoid arrest or by squad cars in hot pursuit (Gray, 1993; Crew, Fridell, and Pursell, 1995; and Schultz, Budak, and Alpert, 2010)

Motorists, cyclists, and pedestrians injured or killed by hit-and-run drivers (Bisnar and Chase, 2011).

Native Americans living on the nation’s 310 Indian reservations who suffer much higher victimization rates for murder, rape, and other interpersonal crimes but receive less protection and redress from the criminal justice system than other U.S. citizens (Williams, 2012a, 2012b; and Erdrich, 2013).

Immigrants who feel they cannot come forward and ask the police for help without revealing that they are “illegal aliens” who lack the proper documents and are subject to deportation (Davis and Murray, 1995; Davis, Erez, and Avitabile, 2001; Chan, 2007; and Hoffmaster, Murphy, McFadden, and Griswold, 2010)

Homeless adults robbed, assaulted, and murdered on the streets and in shelters (Fitzpatrick, LaGory, and Ritchey, 1993; and Green, 2008)

Homeless runaway teens who are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and rape (Tyler, Whitbeck, Hoyt, and Cauce, 2005)

Hotel guests who suffer thefts and assaults because of lax security measures (Prestia, 1993; Owsley, 2005; and Ho, Zhao, and Brown, 2009)

Cruise ship passengers who suffer attacks and thefts from fellow voyagers and members of the crew (Anderle, 2013).

Tourists who blunder into dangerous situations avoided by streetwise locals and are easy prey because they let their guard down (Rohter, 1993; Glensor and Peak, 2004; Lee, 2005; and Murphy, 2006)

Delivery truck drivers who are targeted by robbers, hijackers, and highway snipers (Sexton, 1994; and Duret and Patrick, 2004)

Prostitutes soliciting complete strangers on the streets or over the Internet who face risks of being beaten, raped, and murdered that are many times higher than for other women in their age bracket (Boyer and James, 1983; Salfati, James, and Ferguson, 2008; and Mueller, 2014)

Unwanted newborns abandoned or killed by their distraught mothers (Yardley, 1999; and Buckley, 2007)

Suspects brutally beaten by police officers who used more force than the law allows (Amnesty International USA, 1999; and Davey and Einhorn, 2007)

Teachers attacked, injured, and even killed by their students (Fine, 2001; Parker, 2014; and Freie Universi- taet Berlin, 2014)

Underage students who experience statutory rape when they are seduced by their high school teachers (Zernike, 2014).

Youngsters sexually molested or physically abused through prohibited forms of corporal punishment by parents and teachers (Goodnough, 2003; and Larzelere and Baumrind, 2010)

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High school and college students subjected to abusive hazing and bullying by older students that results in injury or death (Salmivalli and Nieminen, 2002; Montague, Zohra, Love, McGee, and Tsamis, 2008; and Zernike and Schweber, 2014)

Terrified residents whose homes were invaded by armed robbers (Hurley, 1995; Copeland and Martin, 2006; and Thompson, 2011)

“Mail-order brides,” lured to the United States by unregulated international matchmaking services on the Internet, who fear deportation if they complain to the authorities about their husbands’ violence (Briscoe, 2005; Morash, Hoan, Yan, and Holtfreter, 2007; and Greenwood, 2008)

Teenage girls and young women kidnapped and held captive as “sex slaves” by vicious rapists (Hoffman, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maslin, 2011; Kaufman, 2012; and Williams, 2013)

Unsuspecting people, usually women, who feel symbol- ically violated sexually after being secretly videotaped during private moments by voyeurs using hidden spy cameras (Lovett, 2003; and Williams, 2005)

Female motorists sexually abused by highway patrol officers (Tyre, 2001)

People deceived by robbers and rapists impersonating uniformed officers as well as plainclothes detectives (Long, 2008; and Van Netta, 2011)

Persons arrested for drug law violations who are pres- sured by detectives to become confidential informants and end up wounded or murdered by dealers (Goodman, 2013)

Good Samaritans who try to break up crimes in progress and rescue the intended victims but wind up injured or killed themselves (Mawby, 1985; Time, Payne, and Gainey, 2010; and Cunningham et al., 2012)

Innocent bystanders wounded or killed by bullets intended for others, often when caught in crossfire between rival street gangs or drug dealers fighting over turf (Sherman, Steele, Laufersweiler, Hoffer, and Julian, 1989; and Williams, 2009)

People being blackmailed who are reluctant to turn to the authorities for help because that would lead to

exposure of their embarrassing secrets (see Katz, Fletcher and Altman, 1993; and Robinson, Cahill, and Bartels, 2010)

Recipients, some of them children, of crank phone calls laced with threats or obscenities, made by individuals who range from “heavy breathers” and bored teenagers to dangerous assailants (Savitz, 1986; Warner, 1988; Leander, Granhag, and Christianson, 2005; and Renshaw, 2008)

Residents injured by fires or burned out of their homes, unaware that they were harmed by acts of arson until fire marshals determine that the suspicious blazes were intentionally set (Sclafani, 2005)

Homeowners who wind up evicted because of swindles like mortgage fraud and foreclosure-rescue fraud (FBI, 2008b)

Consumers who lose money in Internet cyber swindles and “dotcons,” such as online pyramid investment (Ponzi) schemes, bogus auctions, fake escrow accounts, and other computer-based frauds (Lee, 2003b; and Stajano and Wilson, 2011)

“Missing persons” who have vanished and are presumed dead by their frantic relatives, but, since they were adults with a right to privacy, cannot be the objects of intense police manhunts unless there is evidence of foul play (McPhee, 1999; Gardiner, 2008; and NCMA, 2008). Sometimes their remains lie unidentified until “cyber- sleuths” and other amateur detectives poring over online coroners’ files and missing-persons databases are able to match a body to a disappearance and notify the local police department about solving one of their cold cases, thereby helping these deceased individuals get a proper burial, and maybe even securing “justice” for them if their killer is convicted (Halber, 2014; and Latson, 2014)

Unrelated individuals whose lives are snuffed out by vicious and demented serial killers (Holmes and DeBurger, 1988; Hickey, 1991; Egger and Egger, 2002; Pakhomou, 2004; Flegenheimer and Rosenberg, 2011; and AP, 2011c); and especially prostitutes, hitchhikers, and stranded motorists, whose bodies are dumped near highways by violence-prone long-haul truckers (Glover, 2009; and Dalesio, 2011)

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THE REDISCOVERY PROCESS IN ACTION, STEP BY STEP

The rediscovery process is more than just a well- intentioned humanitarian undertaking, media cam- paign, or example of special pleading. It has far- reaching consequences for everyday life, and the stakes are high. Injured people who gain legitimacy as innocent victims and win public backing are in a position to make compelling claims on government resources (asking for compensation payments to cover the expenses they incurred from their physical wounds, for example). People who know from first- hand experience about the suffering caused by illegal acts also can advance persuasive arguments about reforming criminal justice policies concerning arrest, prosecution, trial procedures, appropriate sentences, and custodial control over prisoners. Finally, redis- covered victims can assert that preventing others from suffering the same fate requires a change in prevailing cultural values about tolerating social con- ditions that generate criminal behavior. Victims even can make recommendations that are taken seriously about the ways people should and should not behave (for instance, how husbands should treat their wives, and how closely parents should supervise their chil- dren) and even the proper role of government (such as how readily the state should intervene in “private” matters such as violence between intimates).

The process of rediscovery usually unfolds through a series of steps and stages. The sequential model that is proposed below incorporates observa- tions drawn from several sources. The notion of devel- opmental stages arises from the self-definition of the victimization process (Viano, 1989). The natural his- tory, career, or life-cycle perspective comes from examining models of ongoing social problems (see Fuller and Myers, 1941; Ross and Staines, 1972; and Spector and Kitsuse, 1987). The focus on how con- cerns about being harmed are first raised, framed, and then publicized arises from the constructionist approach (see Best, 1989b). The idea of inevitable clashes of opposing interest groups battling over gov- ernmental resources and influence over legislation comes from sociology’s conflict approach. The realiza- tion that there is an ongoing struggle by victimized

groups for respect and support in the court of public opinion is an application of the concept of stigma con- tests (Schur, 1984).

Stage 1: Calling Attention to an Overlooked Problem

The rediscovery process is set in motion whenever activists begin to raise the public’s consciousness about some type of illegal situation that “everybody knows” happens but few have cared enough to investigate or try to correct. These moral entrepre- neurs, who lead campaigns to change laws and win people over to their point of view, usually have first- hand experience with a specific problem as well as direct, personal knowledge of the pain and suffering that accompany it. Particularly effective self-help and advocacy groups have been set up by parents who endured the ordeal of searching for their missing children, mothers whose children were killed in col- lisions caused by drunk drivers, and the families of offi- cers slain in the line of duty, among others. Additional individuals who deserve credit for arousing an indiffer- ent public include the targets of hate-driven bias crimes, adults haunted by the way they were molested when they were young, women brutally raped by acquaintances they trusted, and wives viciously beaten by their husbands. They called attention to a state of affairs that people took for granted as harmful but shrugged off as “What can anyone do about it?” These activists responded, “Things don’t have to be this way!” Exploitative and hurtful relationships don’t have to be tolerated—they can be prevented, avoided, and outlawed; governmental policies can be altered; and the criminal justice system can be made more accountable and responsive to its “clients.”

As Stage 1 moves along, activists function as the inspiration and nucleus for the formation of self- help groups that provide mutual aid and solace and also undertake campaigns for reform. Members of support networks believe that only people who have suffered through the same ordeal can really understand and appreciate what others just like them are going through (a basic tenet borrowed from therapeutic communities that assist substance abusers to recover from drug addiction).

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Activists also state that victims’ troubles stem from larger social problems that are beyond any individual’s ability to control; consequently, those who suffer should not be blamed for causing their own misfor- tunes. Finally, activists argue that recovery requires empowerment within the criminal justice process so that victims can pursue what they define as their own best interests, whether to see to it that the offender receives the maximum punishment permitted by law, is compelled to undergo treatment, and/or is ordered to pay their bills for crime-related expenses.

To build wider support for their causes, moral entrepreneurs and self-help groups organize them- selves into loosely structured coalitions such as the antirape and antibattering movements. Usually, one or two well-publicized cases are pointed to as sym- bolic of the problem. Soon many other victims come forward to tell about similar personal experiences. Then experts such as social workers, detectives, and lawyers testify about the suffering that these kinds of victims routinely endure and plead that legal reme- dies are urgently needed. Extensive media coverage is a prerequisite for success. The group’s plight becomes known because of investigative reports on television, talk radio discussions, magazine cover stories, news- paper editorials, and the circulation of these accounts on blogs. Meanwhile, press conferences, demonstra- tions, marches, candlelight vigils, petition drives, bal- lot initiatives, lawsuits, and lobbying campaigns keep the issue alive and the pressure on.

Sociologically, what happens during the first stage can be termed the social construction of a social prob- lem, along with claims-making and typification (see Spector and Kitsuse, 1987; and Best, 1989b). A con- sensus emerges that a pattern of behavior is harmful and should be subjected to criminal penalties. This crystal- lization of public opinion is a product of the activities of moral entrepreneurs, support groups, and their allies. Spokespersons engage in a claims-making process by airing grievances, estimating how many people are hurt in this manner, suggesting appropriate remedies to facilitate recovery, and recommending measures that could prevent this kind of physical, emotional, and financial suffering from burdening others. Through the process of typification, advocates point out classic cases and textbook examples that illustrate the menace to society against which they are campaigning.

Stage 2: Winning Victories, Implementing Reforms

The rediscovery process enters its second stage whenever activists and advocacy groups begin to make headway toward their goals.

At first, it might be necessary to set up indepen- dent demonstration projects or pilot programs to prove the need for special services. Then government grants or funding from private foundations can be secured. Next, federal, state, and local agencies or nonprofit organizations can copy successful models or take over some responsibility for providing infor- mation, assistance, and protection. For instance, the battered women’s movement set up shelters, and the antirape movement established crisis centers. Eventu- ally, local governments funded safe houses where women and their young children could seek refuge, and hospitals and universities organized their own 24-hour rape hotlines and crisis-intervention services.

Individuals subjected to bias crimes were redis- covered during the 1990s. During the 1980s, only private organizations monitored incidents of hate- motivated violence and vandalism directed against racial and religious minorities, as well as homosexuals. But in 1990, the government got involved when Congress passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act, which authorized the FBI to undertake the task of collecting reports about bias crimes from local police departments. Achievements that mark this second stage in the rediscovery process include the imposition of harsher penalties and the establishment of specially trained law enforcement units in many jurisdictions to more effectively recognize, investigate, solve, and prosecute bias crimes. Self-help groups offer injured parties tangible forms of support. The best example of a rediscovery campaign that has raised conscious- ness, won victories, and secured reforms is the struggle waged since the early 1980s by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). These anguished parents argued that for too long the “killer drunk” was able to get away with a socially acceptable and judicially excusable form of homicide because more people identified with the intoxicated driver than with the innocent person who died from inju- ries sustained in the collision. Viewing themselves as the relatives of bona fide crime victims, not merely

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persons who perished from accidents, these crusa- ders were able to move the issue from the obituary page to the front page by using a wide range of tac- tics to mobilize public support, including candle- light vigils, pledges of responsible behavior by children and family cooperation by their parents, and demonstrations outside courthouses. Local chapters of their national self-help organizations offered concrete services: Pamphlets were distrib- uted through hospital emergency rooms and funeral parlors, bereavement support groups assisted griev- ing relatives, and volunteers accompanied grieving families to police stations, prosecutors’ offices, trials, and sentencing hearings.

Buoyed by very favorable media coverage, their lobbying campaigns brought about a crackdown on DUI (driving under the influence) and DWI (driving while intoxicated) offenders. Enforcement measures include roadblocks, license suspensions and revoca- tions, more severe criminal charges, and on-the-spot confiscations of vehicles. Their efforts also led to reforms of drinking laws, such as raising the legal drinking age to 21 and lowering the blood alcohol concentration levels that officially define impairment and intoxication (Thompson, 1984). Along with the 55 mph speed limit, mandatory seat belt laws, improved vehicle safety engineering, better roads, and breakthroughs in emergency medical services, the achievements of MADD and its allies have saved countless lives (Ayres, 1994).

Stage 3: Emergence of an Opposition and Development of Resistance to Further Changes

The third stage in the rediscovery process is marked by the emergence of groups that oppose the goals sought by victims of rediscovered crimes. The victims had to overcome public apathy during Stage 1 and bureau- cratic inertia during Stage 2. During Stage 3, they encounter resistance from other quarters. A backlash arises against perceived excesses in their demands. The general argument of opponents is that the pendulum is swinging too far in the other direction; that people are uncritically embracing a point of view that is too extreme, unbalanced, and one-sided; and that special

interests are trying to advance an agenda that does not really benefit the law-abiding majority.

Spokespersons for a group of recently rediscov- ered victims might come under fire for a number of reasons. They might be criticized for overestimating the number of people harmed when the actual threat to the public, according to the opposition, is much smaller. Advocates might be condemned for portraying all those who were hurt as totally innocent of blame—and therefore deserving of unqualified support—when in reality some are partly at fault and shouldn’t get all the assistance that they demand. Activists might be castigated for making unreasonable demands that will cost the government (and taxpayers) too much money. They also might be denounced for insisting upon new policies that would undermine cherished con- stitutional rights, such as the presumption of inno- cence of persons accused of breaking the law. For example, allegations about child abuse or elder abuse can lead to investigations that permanently stigmatize the alleged wrongdoers even if the charges later turn out to be unfounded (see Crystal, 1988).

When the antirape movement claimed to have discovered an outbreak of date rapes against college students, skeptics asked why federally mandated sta- tistics about incidents reported to campus security forces showed no such upsurge. They contended that hard-to-classify liaisons were being redefined as full-fledged sexual assaults, thereby maligning some admittedly sexually aggressive and exploitative col- lege men as hard-core criminals (see Gilbert, 1991; Hellman, 1993; and MacDonald, 2008a). When the battered women’s movement organized a clemency drive to free certain imprisoned wives who had slain their abusive husbands (in self-defense, they contended, but prosecutors and jurors disagreed), critics charged that these abused women would be getting away with revenge killings. When adults who believed that they had endured incest insisted that new memory retrieval techniques were helping them recall repressed recollections of sexual moles- tations by parents, stepparents, and other guardians, some accused family members banded together and insisted they were being unfairly slandered because

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of a therapist-induced false memory syndrome (see Chapters 8, 9, and 10 for an in-depth analysis of these three controversies).

Even the many accomplishments of the entire victims’ movement can be questioned (see Weed, 1995). Under the banner of advancing victims’ rights, pressure groups might advocate policies that undermine whatever progress has been made toward securing humane treatment for offenders and reentry opportunities for ex-prisoners. Victim activism can unnecessarily heighten fear and anxiety levels about the dangers of violence and theft and divert funds toward repressive measures and away from social programs designed to tackle the root causes of street crime.

Groups that focus their energies on the plight of individuals injured by interpersonal violence also can distract attention from other socially harmful activities such as polluting the environment or mar- keting unsafe products, and their reforms can raise expectations about full recovery that just cannot be reasonably met (Fattah, 1986). It is even possible that what was formerly a grassroots movement run by volunteers who solicited donations has metamorphosed into a virtual “victim industry.” It engages in a type of mass production, churning out newly identified groups of victims by dwelling on kinds of suffering that can arise from noncriminal sources such as bullying, emotional abuse, sexual harassment, sexual addiction, eating disorders, and credit card dependency (see Best, 1997).

Stage 4: Research and Temporary Resolution of Disputes

It is during the fourth and last stage of the rediscov- ery process that victimologists can make their most valuable contributions. By getting to the bottom of unsolved mysteries and by intervening in bitter conflicts, researchers can become a source of accu- rate assessments, by helping to evaluate competing claims about whether the problem has or has not been brought under control, and by determining whether treatment and prevention measures are genuinely effective. By maintaining objectivity,

victimologists can serve as arbiters in these heated disputes.

For example, during the 1980s, a series of shocking shootings by disgruntled gun-toting employees led to the rediscovery of victims of workplace violence. In the aftermath of these slaughters, worried employees insisted that employ- ers call in occupational safety specialists to devise protection and prevention programs. Anxious man- agers usually acceded, fearing expensive lawsuits and lowered morale and productivity. But research- ers have determined that these highly publicized multiple murders accounted for just a tiny fraction of a multifaceted but far less newsworthy set of dangers. Most of the cases of workplace violence across the country involve robberies, unarmed assaults, and complaints about stalkers acting in a menacing way. Many incidents that disrupt the smooth functioning of factories and offices are not even criminal matters, such as instances of verbal abuse, bullying, and sexual harassment (Rugala, 2004).

During Stage 4, a standoff, deadlock, or truce might develop between victims’ advocates who want more changes, and their opponents who resist any further reforms. But the fourth phase is not necessarily the final phase. The findings and policy recommendations of neutral parties such as victi- mologists and criminologists do not settle questions once and for all. Concerns about some type of vic- timization can recede from public consciousness for years, only to reappear when social conditions are ripe for a new four-stage cycle of rediscovery of (1) claims making, (2) reform, (3) opposition, and (4) temporary resolution.

A number of types of formerly overlooked vic- tims have reached Stage 4 in the rediscovery pro- cess. Recently collected data can be analyzed to try to put the public’s fears into perspective, to attempt to resolve ongoing controversies, and to assess the impact of countermeasures designed to assist those who are suffering and to prevent others from sharing their same fate (an example that stirs up strong emotions in a great many people, trafficking in human beings, appears in Box 2.3).

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B O X 2.3 An Illustration of the Four Stages in the Rediscovery Process: The Plight of Victims of Human Trafficking

Stage One: Reviving Public Outrage About a Longstanding Problem:

Trafficking in human beings is widely recognized as a lucrative racket and a major aspect of the crime problem in a great many source, transit, and destination countries across the globe. But it is not a new development: Its victims were first discovered over 100 years ago. (The slave trade that brought Africans in chains to the Americas during the age of European colonialism is a different problem that goes back further in history, and its horrors transcend the confines of crime and victimization.)

During the early years of the twentieth century, a world- wide movement against “white slavery” arose. Its stated goal was to stop prostitutes from Europe from being sent to brothels throughout the colonial empires of the Western powers. The sexual enslavement of white females eventually proved to be what social scientists call a moral panic because the problem turned out to be far smaller and less significant than was pop- ularly depicted. And yet, the campaign to stop it led to a series of treaties, including the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1904), the League of Nation’s International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children (1921) and its Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women of Full Age (1933), and the United Nation’s Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949) (Lobasz, 2009).

Compelling girls and women to take part in the sex trade is only part of this problem. The other part is the eco- nomic exploitation of migrant workers who are smuggled across borders to toil in homes, factories, and fields. Starting in the late 1980s, reformers began to call attention to their plight. A number of factors came together to heighten con- cern and provoke outrage: a new focus by human rights groups on the many ways females are exploited around the world; the growing desperation in many societies of single mothers to find ways to support their children (what sociol- ogists call the feminization of poverty); the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, which caused many young women to search for a means of survival abroad; environmental degradation due to the mismanage- ment of natural resources that triggered large-scale migra- tions across national borders of workers seeking opportunities in a rapidly globalizing economy; and the con- solidation of organized crime’s hold over the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and people (Jahic and Finckenauer, 2005; Lobasz, 2009;Chuang, 2010; and Smilowitz, 2014).

When prominent people began to characterize human trafficking as “a form of modern-day slavery” and warn that profiting from the “controlled service” of others was one of the fastest growing criminal industries in the world, a social move- ment developed to oppose it. It brought together international organizations, human rights groups, religious leaders, charitable organizations, political figures, criminal justice officials, social workers, victim advocates, and thousands of well-intentioned grassroots “abolitionists” motivated by stirring phrases like “free the slaves” and “break the chains of bondage.” Two rather unlikely allies joined together to campaign for stronger laws against sex trafficking. The first were certain American feminists who viewed prostitution as an entrenched institution of male dominance and its female providers as subordinates compelled to sell their bodies because of a lack of meaningful economic alternatives. The second political force was a coalition of con- servative evangelical Christians, whose concerns about men who take advantage of “fallen women” stemmed from matters of conscience and strongly held beliefs about purity, innocence, virtue, sin, evil, and immorality. Their religiously motivated crusade centered on preserving traditional marriages and fami- lies rather than on liberating women from subordination to patriarchal control by opening up better opportunities that would enable them to become financially independent (see Chuang, 2010; and Bernstein, 2010).

The rediscovery process moved forward quickly after prominent figures spoke out.

President Clinton (2000) announced “…anti-trafficking provisions represent a major step forward in my Administra- tion’s ongoing effort to eradicate modern-day slavery. In 1998, I issued an Executive Memorandum directing my Administration to combat this insidious human rights abuse through a three-part strategy of prosecuting traffickers, pro- tecting and assisting trafficking victims, and preventing trafficking.… Over the past several years, we have taken every opportunity to shine a bright light on this dark corner of the criminal underworld, in part by continually raising with leaders around the world the need to work together to combat this intolerable and reprehensible practice.…”

President Bush (2003) intoned, “It takes a special kind of depravity to exploit and hurt the most vulnerable members of society. Human traffickers rob children of their innocence, they expose them to the worst of life before they have seen much of life. Traffickers tear families apart. They treat their victims as nothing more than goods and commodities for sale to the highest bidder.… Many victims are beaten. Some are killed. Others die spiritual and emotional deaths, convinced

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after years of abuse that their lives have no worth. This trade in human beings brings suffering to the innocent and shame to our country, and we will lead the fight against it.”

President Obama advanced similar arguments. He echoed the views of previous chief executives that human trafficking should be called by its real name, “modern slavery” and that the focus of strategies to combat this crime should continue at home, not just abroad. He declared, “The bitter truth is that trafficking also goes on right here. It’s the migrant worker unable to pay off the debt to his trafficker.... The teenage girl— beaten, forced to walk the streets. This should not be happen- ing in the United States of America” (Flock, 2012).

The discovery that sex trafficking wasn’t only a problem in distant lands but that it was cropping up here too added a sense of urgency that spurred people to action. As President Bush (2004) put it, “It is estimated that between 14,500 and 17,500 victims of trafficking cross our borders every year. U.S. law enforcement has documented cases of Latvian girls traf- ficked into sexual slavery in Chicago, or Ukrainian girls traf- ficked in Los Angeles, and Maryland, or Thai, Korean, Malaysian and Vietnamese girls trafficked in Georgia, or Mexican girls trafficked in California, New Jersey and here in Florida. Many of the victims are teenagers, some as young as 12 years old.”

In order to gain the greatest amount of support for the campaign, advocates socially constructed a “perfect victim” who did not voluntarily choose to leave her family and to sell her body. They promoted the image of an innocent young girl who was kidnapped from her remote village and then drugged, beaten, and broken in spirit until she was obedient and submissive; passed around and then sold into slavery; and later transported from her poverty-stricken source country through some transit country until she wound up as a virtual prisoner in a cruelly run brothel in some strange, far-off destination country. This socially constructed perfect victim—young, female, helpless, yearning to be rescued, protected, assisted, and given sanctuary—captured the pub- lic’s imagination. But what about those who did not fit this sympathy-evoking stereotype of the perfect victim? Women who were willing to be smuggled across borders and agreed to be “sex workers” in foreign settings, but did not foresee that they would be intimidated, stripped of their false identity papers, and strictly controlled, do not evoke the same degree of compassion from the public, police officers, prosecutors, judges, and immigration officials. Indifference can easily turn to outright hostility toward these “illegal aliens” who chose and consented to “prostitute themselves.” Somewhere in between are those naïve young women who were procured by

organized crime recruiters via employment scams: false pro- mises of decent-paying legitimate jobs in domestic settings as maids or nannies, or in modeling, or even as dancers in strip clubs. Instead, after overstaying their visa limits or entering the country with counterfeit documents that were later con- fiscated by the trafficker, they wound up as exploited undocumented workers, forced to submit to the demands of pimps, brothel managers, and customers in the commercial sex trade in order to pay off their border-crossing debts and to protect their families abroad from retaliation by the traf- ficker’s syndicate (Rieger, 2007; Lobasz, 2009; and Uy, 2011).

The United Nations declared its first “World Day against Trafficking in Persons” on July 30, 2014. Its Protocol to Pre- vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defined human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduc- tion, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay- ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Banned activities included “the exploitation of the prostitu- tion of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, ser- vitude, or the removal of organs” (Smilowitz, 2014).

In the United States, the definition of sex trafficking has broadened substantially over the years. Physical trans- port across international borders no longer was an essential part of the definition; crossing state boundaries within the United States became a sufficient trigger for federal prosecu- tion (U.S. Department of State, 2007). Later expansions of the definition even dropped the requirement of movement across state lines and simply focused on the use of force, coercion, or fraud to keep someone trapped in a condition of servitude (Farrell, McDevitt, and Fahey, 2010). The work- ing definition of sex trafficking used by local law enforce- ment agencies often boils down to a simple formulation: adult prostitution that involves coercion and any sexual exploitation of children (Gonzalez, 2013).

Because the definition has evolved so dramatically, activists currently work to raise awareness by dispelling the following myths and misconceptions: Trafficking does not necessarily involve smuggling or forced movement, transpor- tation, or border-crossing; physical force, physical abuse, or physical restraint does not have to take place; victims are not only foreign nationals or immigrants but can be males as well as females, adults as well as minors, and even well educated

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B O X 2.3 (Continued)

and affluent persons, not just poorly educated, poverty-stricken people; and the offense of trafficking can occur even if the victim consents and receives payment. However, certain populations remain especially vulnerable: undocumented immigrants; refu- gees and asylum seekers; runaways and homeless youth; mem- bers of groups that have been oppressed, marginalized, and impoverished; and individuals who have been severely abused and traumatized. Trafficked persons were mostly mired in the sex trade (brothels, escort services, massage parlors, street prostitution, and even strip clubs), or they were stuck perform- ing backbreaking labor, like planting and picking crops or land- scaping and construction, or menial jobs, especially in the hotel and hospitality industry; janitorial services; home, health, and elder care; and factories and sweatshops (Polaris Project, 2012). For example, a woman from another country who is hired as a nanny to tend to a child around the clock without any time off, is provided with sparse meals and cramped quarters, and then is threatened with exposure and deportation (because she has overstayed her visa) if she complains about her predicament can be considered trafficked. Similarly, an undocumented day laborer who picks up occasional construction jobs but then is cheated out of his wages and intimidated from protesting because the employer warns him about a call to the immigration authorities is also being coercively exploited (Grant, 2013). As the original definition broadened to encompass so many more people and such a wide variety of situations, the number of persons designated as victims and the number of programs designed to assist them grew dramatically.

A search of journalism databases revealed that media coverage of the problem grew exponentially from a mere handful of articles at the start of the 1990s to about 3,750 in 2008 alone (Farrell et al., 2010).

Stage Two: Passing Legislation and Setting Up Assistance Programs

Raids against transnational trafficking rings, statements by world leaders, international conferences, and articles as well as popular movies depicting sexual slavery heightened pressures to “do something.” In response, the Clinton administration drafted a comprehensive approach that embodied the prosecution of profiteers, protections for trafficked persons, and prevention measures. In 1994, the U.S. Department of State declared traf- ficking across borders to be a severe violation of human rights and began to issue an annual “Trafficking in Persons Report” that monitored what other countries were doing to try to bring the problem under control. The State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons originally focused on the sexual exploitation of women and girls smuggled by inter- national rings feeding the demand for prostitutes but broadened its scope to include forced labor. Foreign nationals who assist investigations and prosecutions are eligible for the designation

“qualified victims,” and they might be granted “continued presence” and immigration relief (from deportation), which can lead to permission to work in legitimate jobs, legal residency, and eventual citizenship. Federally funded services (provided through contracts with NGOs) include medical, dental, and mental health care; sustenance and shelter; help with transla- tion and interpretation; legal assistance; and transportation (Jahic and Finckenauer, 2005; Lobasz, 2009; Chuang, 2010; and U.S. Department of State, 2011). However, to be eligible for these forms of support, plus possibly restitution and a visa, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services must certify that the person meets the hard to prove standards of a “severe traf- ficking victim” (George, 2012).

In 2000, an international agreement went into effect: the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. That same year, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). Both laws defined trafficking as the recruitment and movement of children, women, and men for the purpose of subjecting these victims to involuntary servitude in labor- intensive activities. The TVPA was reauthorized and strengthened in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2013. The 2013 reauthorization strengthened efforts to ban child marriage and to prevent the purchase of products made by labor traf- ficking victims. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 enables government agencies to terminate any con- tracts with organizations and individuals that engage in or support trafficking (Polaris Project, 2014a; 2014b).

An Anti-Trafficking in Persons Division was set up in the Office of Refugee Resettlement that is part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. It funds the National Human Trafficking Resource Center (NHTRC), which staffs a hotline and tipline.

The U.S. Department of Justice runs a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and an Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). The BJA in cooperation with the OVC has funded 42 Anti-Human Trafficking Task Forces across the country, which pair law enforcement agencies with service providers in order to offer effective first responses to exploited persons. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the Department of Home- land Security runs a Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit that seeks to locate individuals brought in from other countries. A Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center is a collaborative effort that involves the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that functions as a repository of infor- mation about these illegal activities (Polaris Project, 2014a).

Besides the Department of Health and Human Services, the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice, at least 15 international organi- zations participate in the global struggle to suppress human

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trafficking, including the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Nations, and the World Bank (Lobasz, 2009).

On the home front, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have passed legislation to combat sex and labor trafficking. However, most states still lack adequate laws to support and assist persons who have escaped, and 12 states had failed by 2014 to make even minimal efforts to pass such legislation, according to a rigorous rating system. The FBI’s efforts to disrupt human trafficking draw upon its Civil Rights Unit (CRU) and the Violent Crimes Against Children Section (VCACS). The CRU investigates forced labor; sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, or coercion; and the sexual exploita- tion of foreign minors, while the VCACS focuses on the com- mercial exploitation of Americans under the age of 18 who have been drawn into the sex trade. The FBI has established close to 70 Child Exploitation Task Forces that operate around the country, in which its agents work in tandem with victim specialists from its Office for Victim Assistance, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies. The Bureau announced in 2014 that a nationwide crackdown on the sex trafficking of underage persons, part of its Innocence Lost initiative, swept up about 280 pimps and similar exploiters and led to the rescuing of nearly 170 minors from their con- trol. Since its creation in 2003, the Innocence Lost sting operations have resulted in the identification and recovery of approximately 3,600 sexually exploited minors (FBI, 2014a).

Activists have identified the immediate needs of per- sons extracted from the clutches of traffickers that ought to be provided by local law enforcement and social welfare agencies: temporary housing, assistance to relocate to another area, transportation on a daily basis, legal advice, and of course physical protection. Ideally, a trained counselor should be assigned to the rescued person’s case within a few hours (Gonzalez, 2013). Advocacy groups are developing and then recommending various “best practices” that fit within a victim-centered approach to prevent the smuggling and sale of human beings across national boundaries, to safeguard these rescued individuals from further harm, and to repatriate them to their country of origin or else reintegrate them into the destination society, at first with legal immigrant status and eventually with citizenship rights.

Stage Three: Challenges Arise and Opposition Emerges

No one approves of or defends involuntary servitude and sexual violence, but the crusade against human trafficking has provoked some opposition among thoughtful people and concerned groups for a number of reasons.

First of all, some activists share the moral outrage of the crusaders but feel that the widespread use of the

shocking phrase modern-day slavery is overly dramatic and an historically inaccurate equation of contemporary forms of servitude with the horrific institutionalized barbarism of the transatlantic slave trade that for several centuries relent- lessly brought fresh supplies of captive Africans to the new world as chattel to be bought, sold, and worked to near death (similarly, the very serious terms lynching, genocide, and holocaust can be inappropriately applied to lesser crimes).

Other critics are dismayed that this reform movement has become drawn into a divisive and intractable debate over the “oldest profession”: whether the sale of sexual favors is inherently coercive, invariably embodies female subordina- tion, and must be driven out of business by punishing prof- iteers, pimps, the women themselves, and their customers. Some argued that becoming a sex worker as an adult can be a voluntary and rational choice, and that these employees or independent contractors deserve economic rights, medical care, and basic legal protections rather than further stigma- tization and permanent criminal records that just drive their forbidden exchanges of erotic acts for money deeper under- ground where they become even more dangerous (see Grant, 2013). In 2003, the Bush administration reaffirmed its oppo- sition to pimping, pandering, and maintaining brothels as inherently harmful and dehumanizing and as furnishing an incentive for the international sex trade in females. This stance prohibited any nongovernmental service organizations that receive federal funding to help victims from supporting any toleration of prostitution as a solution to the trafficking problem. As a result, advocacy groups have become embroiled in a debate over prostitution, instead of focusing their ener- gies on devising improved services for individuals who feel trapped (see DeStefano, 2007; Chuang, 2010; Cavalieri, 2011; and Uy, 2011). Some defense attorneys representing indigents estimate that many, but not all, of their clients arrested on prostitution charges are, in fact, trafficked according to the current broadened definition, and many more have survived an extensive amount of brutality and trauma. But they ask why hyperbolic rhetoric that conflates prostitution with slavery usually leads to crackdowns in which the ostensible victims who are supposed to be rescued by raids instead are prosecuted, resulting in their facing jail time, possible deportation, warrants for failure to appear in court, and rap sheets that undermine their efforts to find jobs and housing in order to leave “the life” (Mugulescu, 2014).

Many concerned activists and advocacy groups feel that the media’s preoccupation with lurid stories about sex traf- ficking causes lawmakers and law enforcement agencies to lose sight of the more pervasive forms of people smuggling for the purposes of taking terrible advantage of them as migrant

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B O X 2.3 (Continued)

laborers as they toil in the fields, factories, and private homes of their exploitive employers (see Chuang, 2010; and Uy, 2011).

Similarly, an emphasis on the criminal justice approach to trafficking as a threat to border security (especially in a post-9/11 world) and as a way of smashing transnational organized syndicates draws substantial amounts of very lim- ited resources toward “crime-fighting” and away from efforts to protect and address the needs of victims (see Lobasz, 2009; Chuang, 2010; and Uy, 2011).

Finally, some skeptics suspect that the true magnitude of the problem has been exaggerated by campaigners who dissemi- nate shocking overestimates in order to arouse an otherwise jaded public (see Grant, 2013). They point out that the actual number of cases, successful prosecutions, and verified victims are tiny fractions of these large, widely circulated figures. For example, between 2000 and early 2007, federal agencies had certified only 1,175 people from 77 countries as victims of human trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2007). During 2009, the State Department issued only about 600 T visas and Continuing Presence orders to cooperating victims (U.S. Department of State, 2011). Yet a CIA report in 2000 estimated that up to 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each year for the sex trade (see Rieger, 2007). Other estimates came in lower; the yearly figure cited above by President Bush was about one-third the size of the CIA estimate but still way beyond the tiny number of rescued persons. On New York’s Long Island, an area reputed to be a hotbed of trafficking, not one arrest was made during 2005, and only one woman was rescued from pros- titution (Mead, 2006). As for the importation of teenage girls from abroad and from other parts of the United States to the streets of New York City for the purposes of prostitution, a fed- erally funded ethnographic study of underage sex workers found very few that could be considered “trafficked.” The estimates derived from the field interviews were surprising: Nearly half were boys; almost half were recruited into the sex trade by friends; only 1 in 10 were involved with pimps; over 9 in 10 were born in the United States; and more than half were native New Yorkers (see Curtis et al., 2008; and Hinman, 2011).

Several explanations attempt to account for this dis- crepancy between rough estimates and actual statistics. One is that the low numbers indicate that the U.S. government has not allocated sufficient resources to thoroughly train law enforcement officers and to fund extensive investigations into this problem and extract people from the clutches of traffickers and exploiters. A variation on this theme is that there is insufficient cooperation and coordination between the agencies tasked by the TVPA enforcement provisions with bringing this problem under control. But others suspect that the low numbers of substantiated cases reveal that political figures and advocacy groups may have greatly overestimated the prevalence of trafficking into (as well as within) the United States (see Farrell et al., 2010).

Stage Four: Research Findings Temporarily Resolve Disputes

The true intensity of the problem remains unknown since trafficking often goes undetected and unreported due to its covert nature, the reluctance of victims who feel vulnerable and fear reprisals to turn to the authorities for help, mis- conceptions about its definition, and a lack of awareness about it in some localities (Polaris Project, 2014b).

The first set of reasonably accurate statistics about the profiles of victims in human trafficking cases was derived from those federal task forces that collected “high-quality” data about their investigations during the period of 2008– 2010. A little over 525 confirmed victims were located in about 390 cases. Most of the investigations concerned sex trafficking rather than labor trafficking. In the sex trafficking cases, the overwhelming proportion of victims were female (94 percent). Also, the vast majority were younger than 25 years old (87 percent) and U.S. citizens (83 percent). As for the victims’ race and ethnicity, more were black (40 percent) and white (26 percent) than Hispanic or Asian. In the labor trafficking cases, most of the victims were over 24 years of age (62 percent), and more were males (32 percent), Hispanics (63 percent), and Asians (17 percent). None were U.S. citizens (Banks and Kyckkelhahn, 2011).

A portrait of the problem was drawn from nearly 1,500 individuals who considered themselves to be caught up in sex and labor trafficking and who directly contacted a hotline for victims during the five-year period from 2007 to 2012. The most common complaints about sex trafficking involved prostitutes controlled by pimps. The majority of these pimps recruited these young women in social settings by feigning romantic interest, by promising them that they would earn enough to enjoy the material comforts they longed for, and by discouraging them from having casual sex “for free.” Then they pressured them to perform sex acts at hotels, motels, truck stops, brothels, and streets for customers solicited through online advertisements. Most of the complaints about labor trafficking came from women from foreign nations stuck doing domestic work in the Northeast as well as in southern Florida and southern California, and from migrant farm workers. Minors were more likely to be exploited sexu- ally than through unpaid labor. Callers reported that they most often became trapped because of lies, false promises, and debts (Polaris Project, 2013).

Victimologists want to discover why many individuals caught up in these oppressive situations do not run to the authorities for help. In other words, what can be done to increase the reporting rate? Exactly how do the traffickers lure or deceive their targets (presumably through false promises of a better life and ploys about legitimate jobs); how do they recruit children (perhaps by capitalizing on their innocence and

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naïveté, sometimes with parental complicity); and how do they dominate and intimidate those who find themselves trapped into involuntary servitude, even when chances to escape their predicament repeatedly arise? Are victims immobilized because their exploiters confiscate all their documents, take advantage of language barriers, threaten reprisals against loved ones at home in the source country, and scare them about deportation if they dare seek help? Perhaps some individuals who enter the country improperly and toil mightily don’t perceive themselves to be trafficking victims—they don’t realize that exploitive relationships that might be acceptable back home may fall under the heading of trafficking here. Whether these explana- tions are sufficient, relevant, and comprehensive needs to be further researched by directly interviewing victims who have been extracted, perhaps unwillingly, from their perilous life- styles (see George, 2003; Landesman, 2004; Bureau of Public Affairs, 2005; Glaberson, 2005; Saunders, 2005; Rieger, 2007; Uy, 2011; and Dank, 2014).

The murder of several border crossers in Arizona by smugglers (called “coyotes”) holding them hostage in frus- trated attempts to extort more money from their families back home indicated the depth of the perils victims face (Fulginiti, 2008). A surge of unaccompanied minors from Central America across the nation’s southern border during 2014 raised the specter of homeless youth ripe for sexual

exploitation (Hulse, 2014). Furthermore, studies based on surveys completed by municipal and county police depart- ments have concluded that most of these law enforcement agencies lacked sufficient policies and adequate training to accurately identify trafficking victims and successfully investigate their cases (Wilson, Walsh, and Kleuber, 2006; Farrell et al., 2010; and George, 2012).

The FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have compiled lists of behaviors and situations to help investigators from the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state and local law enforce- ment and child protection agencies, to better recognize traf- ficking victims if they encounter them in their daily duties. Officers and concerned members of the general public should be on the lookout for the potential signs of being trafficked for the purpose of exploitation in the sex trade or for debt peonage. These clues appear in Table 2.1.

Whether the problem is growing or subsiding and whether specific government assistance and rescue efforts are effective remain subjects of controversy that require addi- tional research. This is why the plight of trafficking victims within the United States can be considered to have arrived at Stage 4 of the rediscovery process.

T A B L E 2.1 Possible Indicators That a Person Is a Trafficking Victim

Does the individual …?

Live on or very close to the work premises

Bunk in a sparse place with many other occupants

Lack personal space and possessions

Frequently move from one work site to another

Appear unfamiliar with how to get around the neighborhood

Seem unable to travel around freely

Admit that he/she cannot socialize with outsiders and attend religious services

Disclose that he/she was recruited for one line of work but then was compelled to perform other tasks

Confide that earnings are garnished and held by someone else

Indicate that identification and travel documents are held by someone else

Appear to have been coached about what to say to immigration and police officers

Seem unable to talk openly and to communicate freely with family and friends

Look injured from beatings or show signs of malnourishment or lack of medical treatment

Defer to someone else who insists on speaking or interpreting for him/her

Claim to be represented by the same attorney that handles the cases of many other

undocumented workers (illegal aliens)

SOURCES: Blue Campaign, 2010; Walker-Rodriguez and Hill, 2011.

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SUMMARY

Laws that recognized that individuals harmed by offen- ders deserved governmental support and economic aid were passed centuries ago, but until the middle of the twentieth century, the plight of crime victims was largely overlooked, even by most criminologists.

Today, the plight of victims is being brought to the public’s attention by journalists covering the crime beat, social movements mobilizing in behalf of certain individuals and groups who embody their causes and agendas, elected officials seeking voters’ support, and commercial interests advertising pro- ducts and services to guard against victimization.

The rediscovery process goes through four stages. After a group’s plight becomes known and reforms are implemented, an opposition frequently arises that resists further changes that might be to the group’s advantage. When conflicts arise, victi- mologists can help resolve them by studying how seriously these newly rediscovered groups actually suffer, if their numbers are really growing or declin- ing, and whether reform measures and efforts designed to assist them are genuinely working as intended.

KEY TERMS DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY

bias crimes, 43

Brady Bill, 45

children’s rights groups, 44

civil court, 40

civil liberties movement, 44

civil rights movement, 42

claims-making, 55

elder abuse, 44

English common law, 40

false memory syndrome, 57

law-and-order movement, 42

Megan’s Law, 46

plea negotiation, 41

public prosecutors, 40

self-help movement, 44

sensationalism, 47

street crimes, 40

tort law, 40

trafficking in human beings, 58

women’s movement, 42

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

1. Identify some of the most important milestones in the history of academic victimology.

2. Highlight some of the first breakthroughs in victim assistance.

3. Summarize what happens at each stage of the rediscovery process.

4. Explain how the campaign to rescue victims of human trafficking has sparked some controversies.

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. Identify a group of victims of some specific illegal activity who still has not been rediscov- ered and was not mentioned in this chapter. Describe the kinds of harm this group might be experiencing.

2. Argue that the rediscovery of victims by the news media, elected officials, and commercial enterprises is a “mixed blessing” by stressing the downside: the potential for exploiting their plight for some ulterior purpose such as per- sonal gain or profiting from their suffering.

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SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROJECTS

1. Find out about some recently proposed or passed laws in your state that have been named in honor of crime victims. In each case, ask whether this legislation offers anything specific—other than ratcheted-up punishment of the offender—to ease the victim’s plight.

2. Choose a group from the list in Box 2.2 whose plight is currently being rediscovered. Pose questions that researchers ought to examine. Find out about the composition of this group,

the nature of its losses, and the efforts now underway to ease its suffering.

3. Choose several groups whose plight is now well known, such as physically abused children, kidnapped children, battered women, abused elders, or carjacked motorists. Find out about how their plight was first rediscovered by looking up the oldest or earliest articles that appear in a comprehensive database of news- paper, magazine, and journal articles.

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3 Victimization in the United States: An Overview

CHAPTER OUTLINE Victimization Across the Nation: The Big Picture

Making Sense of Statistics The Two Official Sources of Data

Facts and Figures in the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR)

Facts and Figures in the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)

Comparing the UCR and the NCVS A First Glance at the Big Picture: Estimates of the

Number of New Crime Victims Each Year A Second Look at the Big Picture: Watching the FBI’s

Crime Clock Delving Deeper into the Big Picture: Examining Vic-

timization Rates Tapping into the UCR and the NCVS to Fill in the

Details of the Big Picture Searching for Changes in the Big Picture: Detecting

Trends in Interpersonal Violence and Theft Taking a Longer View: Murders in the United States

over the Past Century

The Rise and Fall of Murder Rates Since 1900

Putting Crime into Perspective: The Chances of Dying Violently—or from Other Causes

Summary

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary

Questions for Discussion and Debate

Critical Thinking Questions

Suggested Research Projects

LEARNING OBJECTIVES To appreciate how statistics can be used to answer

important questions.

To become aware of the ways statistics can be used to persuade and mislead.

To find out what information about crime victims is collected routinely by the federal government’s Department of Justice.

To become familiar with the ways that victimologists use this data to estimate how many people were harmed by criminal activities and what injuries and losses they suffered.

continued

VICTIMIZATION ACROSS THE NATION: THE BIG PICTURE

Victimologists gather and interpret data to answer crucial questions such as: How many people are harmed by criminals each year? Is victimization becoming more of a problem or is it subsiding as time goes by? And which groups are targeted the most and the least often? Researchers want to find out where and when the majority of incidents occur, whether predators on the prowl intimidate and subjugate their prey with their bare hands or use weapons, and if so, what kinds? It is also impor- tant to determine whether individuals are attacked by complete strangers or people they know, and how these intended targets act when confronted by assailants. What proportion try to escape or fight back, how many are injured, what percentage

need to be hospitalized, and how much money do they typically lose in an incident?

The answers to specific questions like these yield statistical portraits of crime victims, the pat- terns that persist over the years, and the trends that unfold as time passes; when taken together, they constitute what can be termed the big picture —an overview of what is really happening across the entire United States during the twenty-first century. The big picture serves as an antidote to impressions based on direct but limited personal experiences, as well as self-serving reports circulated by organizations with vested interests, misleading media images, crude stereotypes, and widely held myths. But putting together the big picture is not easy. Compiling an accurate portrayal requires care- ful planning, formulation of the right questions, proper data collection techniques, and insightful analyses.

The big picture is constructed by making sys- tematic observations and accurate measurements on the local level. Then, these village, city, and county reports must be aggregated so victimologists and criminologists are able to characterize the situation in an entire state, region of the country, and ulti- mately the nation as a whole. (Sociologists would call this process as going from an up-close and per- sonal micro level up to a more institutional and systemwide macro level of analysis.) An alternative path to follow is to assemble a randomly selected nationwide sample and then ask those people to share their experiences about what offenders did to them during the past year. If the sample is rep- resentative and large enough, then the findings from this survey can be generalized to project esti- mates about what is happening in the country as a whole. Once the big picture is assembled, it becomes possible to make comparisons between the situation in the United States and other post- industrial societies around the world. The similari- ties are increasing and cultural differences are diminishing as globalization is fostering a modern way of life, which involves seeking higher educa- tion, commuting over congested highways to work, shopping in malls, watching cable TV pro- gramming, using the Internet, and calling the police

LEARNING OBJECTIVES continued

To explore the kinds of information about victims that can be found in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s annual Uniform Crime Report.

To learn how the FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting System is extracting more information drawn from police files about victims.

To appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of this source of official statistics.

To discover what data about victims and their plight can be found in the federal government’s alternative source of information, the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey.

To recognize the strengths and weaknesses of this alter- native source of government statistics.

To assemble official statistics to spot trends, and especially whether the problem of criminal victimization has been intensifying or diminishing over recent decades.

To develop a feel for historical trends in the level of violence in the United States.

To be able to weigh the threat of crime against other perils by understanding comparative risks.

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on smartphones for help, that has spread to even the most remote regions of the planet.

Until the 1970s, few efforts were made to rou- tinely monitor and systematically measure various indicators of the plight of the nation’s victims. By the 1980s, a great many social scientists and agencies were conducting the research needed to bring the big picture into focus. Also, all sorts of special- interest groups began keeping count and dissemi- nating their own estimates about the suffering of a wide variety of victims, including youngsters wounded at school, college students hurt or killed on campus, children reported missing by their par- ents, and people singled out by assailants who hate their “kind.”

The statistics presented in this chapter come from official sources and shed light on the big picture concerning “street crimes” involving inter- personal violence and theft.

Making Sense of Statistics

Statistics are meaningful numbers that reveal impor- tant information. Statistics are of crucial importance to social scientists, policy analysts, and decision makers because they replace vague adjectives such as “many,” “most,” and “few” with precise numbers.

Both victimologists and criminologists gather their own data to make their own calculations, or they scrutinize official statistics, which are com- piled and published by government agencies. Why do they pore over these numbers? By collecting, computing, and analyzing statistics, researchers can answer intriguing questions. Accurate and credible statistics about crimes and victims are vital because they can shed light on these important matters:

Statistics can be calculated to estimate victimization rates, which are realistic assessments of threat levels that criminal activ- ities pose to particular individuals and groups. What are the odds various categories of people face of getting robbed or even murdered dur- ing a certain time period? Counts (such as death tolls) answer the question “How many?” Better yet, rates (number of persons who get robbed out of every 100,000 people in a year)

can provide relative estimates about these disturbing questions.

Statistics can expose patterns of criminal activity. Patterns reflect predictable relation- ships or regular occurrences that show up during an analysis of the data year after year. For instance, a search for patterns could answer these questions: Is it true that murders generally occur at a higher rate in urban neighborhoods than in suburban and rural areas? Are robberies committed more often against men than women, or vice versa?

Statistical trends can demonstrate how situa- tions have changed over the years. Is the bur- den of victimization intensifying or subsiding as time goes by? Are the dangers of getting killed by robbers increasing or decreasing?

Statistics can provide estimates of the costs and losses imposed by illegal behavior. Estimates based on accurate records can be important for commercial purposes. For example, insurance companies can determine what premiums to charge their customers this year based on actuarial calculations of the typical financial expenses suffered by policyholders who were hospitalized last year after being wounded by robbers.

Statistics can be used for planning purposes to project a rough or “ballpark figure” of next year’s workload. Law enforcement agencies, service providers, and insurance companies can anticipate the approximate size of their case- loads for the following year if they know how many people were harmed the previous year.

Statistics also can be computed to evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice policies and to assess the impact of prevention strategies. Are battered women likely to lead safer lives after their violent mates are arrested, or will they be in greater danger? Do gun buyback programs actually save lives or is their impact on the local murder rate negligible?

Finally, statistical profiles can be assembled to yield an impression of what is usual or typical

68 C H A P T E R 3

about victims in terms of their characteristics such as sex, age, and race/ethnicity. For example, is the widely held belief accurate that most of the people who die violently are young men from troubled families living in poverty- stricken, big-city neighborhoods? Portraits based on data can also provide a reality check to help ground theories that purport to explain why some groups experience higher rates of predation than others. For example, if it turns out that the frail elderly are robbed far less often than teenagers, then any theory that emphasizes only the physical vulnerability of robbers’ targets will be totally off-base or at best incomplete as an explanation of which groups suffer the most, and why.

However, statistics might not only be used, they can also be abused. Statistics never speak for themselves. Sometimes, statistics can be circulated to mislead or deceive. The same numbers can be interpreted quite differently, depending on what spin commentators give them—what is stressed and what is downplayed. Cynics joke that statistics can be used by a special-interest group just like a lamppost is used by a drunkard—for support rather than for illumination.

Officials, agencies, and organizations with their own particular agendas may selectively release statistics to influence decision makers or shape public opinion. For example, law enforce- ment agencies might circulate alarming figures showing a rise in murders and robberies at budget hearings to support their arguments that they need more money for personnel and equipment to bet- ter protect and serve the community. Or these same agencies might cite data showing a declining number of victimizations in order to take credit for improving public safety. Their argument could be that those in charge are doing their jobs so well, such as hunting down murderers or preventing robberies, that they should be given even more funding next year to further drive down the rate of violent crime. Statistics also might serve as evidence to argue that existing laws and policies are having the intended desirable effects or,

conversely, to persuade people that the old meth- ods are not working and new approaches are necessary.

Interpretations of mathematical findings can be given a spin that may be questionable or debatable—for example, emphasizing that a shelter for battered women is “half empty” rather than “half full,” or stressing how much public safety has improved, as opposed to how much more prog- ress is needed before street crime can be considered under control. As useful and necessary as statistics are, they should always be viewed with a healthy dose of scientific skepticism.

Although some mistakes are honest and unavoidable, it is easy to “lie” with statistics by using impressive and scientific-sounding numbers to manipulate or mislead. Whenever statistics are presented to underscore or clinch some point in an argument, their origin and interpretation must be questioned, and certain methodological issues must be raised. What was the origin of the data, and does this source have a vested interest in shap- ing public opinion? Are different estimates available from other sources? What kinds of biases and inac- curacies could have crept into the collection and analysis of the data? How valid and precise were the measurements? How were key variables operationalized—defined and measured? What was counted and what was excluded, and why?

Victimologists committed to objectivity must point out the shortcomings and limitations of data collection systems run by the government. They try to interpret statistics without injecting any particular spin into their conclusions because (it is hoped) they have no “axe to grind” other than enlightening people about the myths and realities surrounding the crime problem.

THE TWO OFFICIAL SOURCES OF DATA

As early as the 1800s, public officials began keeping records about lawbreaking to gauge the “moral health” of society. Then, as now, high rates of inter- personal violence and theft were taken as signs of social pathology—indications that something was

V I C T I M I Z A T I O N I N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S : A N O V E R V I E W 69

profoundly wrong with the way people generally interacted in everyday life. Annual data sets were compiled to determine whether illegal activities were being brought under control as time passed. Monitoring trends is even more important today because many innovative but intrusive and expensive criminal justice policies intended to curb crime have been implemented.

Two government reports published each year contain statistical data that enable victimologists to keep track of what is happening out on the streets. Both of these official sources of facts and figures are disseminated each year by the U.S. Depart- ment of Justice in Washington, D.C. Each of these government data collection systems has its own strengths and weaknesses in terms of provid- ing the information victimologists and criminolo- gists are seeking to answer their research questions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR): Crime in the United States is a massive compilation of all incidents “known” to local, county, and state police departments across the country. The FBI’s UCR is a virtual “bible” of crime statistics based on victims’ com- plaints and direct observations made by officers. It is older and better known than the other official source, the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS): Criminal Victimization in the United States. The BJS’s NCVS provides projections for various regions and for the entire country based on incidents vol- untarily disclosed to interviewers by a huge national sample drawn from the general public.

Facts and Figures in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR)

The UCR was established in 1927 by a committee set up by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The goal was to develop a uniform set of definitions and reporting formats for gathering crime statistics. Since 1930, the FBI has published crime data in the UCR that was forwarded volun- tarily to Washington by police departments across the United States. In recent years, more than 18,000 village, town, tribal, college, municipal,

county, and state police departments and sheriff’s departments in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and several territories that serve about 97 percent of the more than 300 million inhabit- ants of the United States participate in the data collection process, usually by sending periodic reports to state criminal justice clearinghouses. Several federal law enforcement agencies now contribute data as well (FBI, 2014).

The FBI divides up the crimes it tracks into two listings. Unfortunately, both Part I and Part II of the UCR have been of limited value to those interested in studying the actual flesh-and-blood victims rather than the incidents known to police departments or the characteristics of the persons arrested for allegedly committing them.

Part I of the UCR focuses on eight index crimes, the illegal acts most people readily think about when they hear the term “street crime.” Four index crimes count violent attacks directed “against persons”: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. The other four monitor crimes “against property”: burglary, larceny (thefts of all kinds), motor vehicle theft, and arson. (The category of arson was added in 1979 at the request of Congress when poor neighborhoods in big cities experienced many blazes of suspicious origin. However, incidents of arson are still unreliably measured because intentionally set fires might remain classified by fire marshals as being “of unknown origin.”) These eight crimes (in actual practice, seven) are termed index crimes because the FBI adds all the known incidents of each one of these categories together to compute a “crime index” that can be used for year-to-year and place-to-place comparisons to gauge the seriousness of the problem. (But note that this grand total is unweighted; that means a murder is counted as just one index crime event, the same as an attempted car theft. So the grand total [like “com- paring apples and oranges”] is a huge composite that is difficult to interpret.)

The UCR presents the number of acts of vio- lence and theft known to the authorities for cities, counties, states, regions of the country, and even many college campuses (since the mid-1990s; see

70 C H A P T E R 3

Chapter 11). For each crime, the FBI compiles information about the number of incidents reported to the police, the total estimated losses in billions of dollars due to property crimes, the proportion of cases that were solved, and some characteristics of the suspects arrested (age, sex, race)—but, unfortu- nately for victimologists, nothing about the people who suffered harm and filed the complaints.

In Part II, the UCR only provides counts of the number of people arrested for 21 assorted offenses (but no estimates of the total number of these illegal acts committed nationwide). Some Part II crimes that lead to arrests do cause injuries to individuals, such as “offenses against women and children,” as well as “sex offenses” other than forc- ible rape and prostitution. Others do not have clearly identifiable victims, such as counterfeiting, prostitution, gambling, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, weapons possession, and drug offenses. Still other Part II arrests could have arisen from incidents that directly harm identifiable individuals, including embezzlement, fraud, vandalism, and buying/receiving/possessing stolen property.

The Uniform Crime Reporting Division fur- nishes data in separate annual publications about how many hate crimes were reported to police departments (see Chapter 11). It also issues a yearly analysis of how many law enforcement officers were feloniously assaulted and slain in the line of duty, the weapons used against them, and the assignments they were carrying out when they were injured or killed (also analyzed in Chapter 11).

From a victimologist’s point of view, the UCR’s method of data collection suffers from sev- eral shortcomings that undermine its accuracy and usefulness (see Savitz, 1982; and O’Brien, 1985). First of all, underreporting remains an intractable problem. Because many victims do not inform their local law enforcement agencies about illegal acts committed against them and their possessions (see Chapter 6), the FBI’s compilation of “crimes known to the police” is unavoidably incomplete. The annual figures about the number of reported crimes recorded as committed inevitably are lower than the actual (but unknown) number of crimes that really were carried out. Second, the UCR

focuses on accused offenders (keeping track of the age, sex, and race) but does not provide any infor- mation about the complainants who reported the incidents. Only information about murder victims (their age, sex, and race) is collected routinely (see Chapter 4). Third, the UCR lumps together reports of attempted crimes (usually not as serious for vic- tims) with completed crimes (in which offenders achieved their goals). Fourth, when computing crime rates for cities, counties, and states, the FBI counts incidents directed against all kinds of targets, adding together crimes against impersonal entities (such as businesses and government agencies) on the one hand, and individuals and households on the other. For example, the totals for robberies include bank holdups as well as muggings; statistics about bur- glaries combine attempted break-ins of offices with the ransacking of homes; figures for larcenies include goods shoplifted from department stores in addition to thefts of items swiped from parked cars.

Another shortcoming is that the FBI instructs local police departments to observe the hierarchy rule when reporting incidents: List the event under the heading of the most serious crime that took place. The ranking in the hierarchy from most ter- rible to less serious runs from murder to forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, vehicle theft, and finally larceny. For instance, if an armed intruder breaks into a home and finds a woman alone, rapes her, steals her jewelry, and drives off in her car, the entire incident will be counted for record-keeping purposes only as a forcible rape (the worst crime she endured). The fact that this person suffered other offenses at the hands of the criminal isn’t reflected in the yearly totals of known incidents. If the rapist is caught, he could also be charged with armed robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, possession of a deadly weapon, and possession of stolen property, even though these lesser offenses are not added to the UCR’s compilations.

Phasing in a National Incident-Based Reporting System Fortunately, the UCR is being overhauled and is becoming a much more useful source of information about individuals who are harmed

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by lawbreakers. The FBI is converting its data col- lection format to a National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

Law enforcement officials began to call for a more extensive record-keeping system during the late 1970s. The police force in Austin, Texas, was the first to switch to this comprehensive data collection and reporting system. However, other big-city police departments that deal with a huge volume of crime reports have had trouble meeting NIBRS goals and timetables, so complete imple- mentation has been postponed repeatedly. North Dakota and South Carolina were the first two states to adopt NIBRS formatting in 1991. As of 2008, NIBRS data collection was taking place in 32 states and the District of Columbia, covering 25 percent of the nation’s population, 26 percent of its reported crimes, and 37 percent of its law enforce- ment agencies (IBR Resource Center, 2011). But the switchover seems to be proceeding very slowly. A 2012 NIBRS national report compiled figures submitted by 6,115 law enforcement agencies (only 33 percent of the over 18,000 participating departments) in 32 states that covered about 30 per- cent of the nation’s population and 28 percent of all crimes known to police departments across the country (FBI, 2014b).

One major change is the abandonment of the hierarchy rule of reporting only the worst offense that happened during a sequence of closely related events. Preserving a great many details makes it pos- sible to determine how often one crime evolves into another, such as a carjacking escalating into a kidnap- ping, or a robbery intensifying into a life-threatening shooting. For the incident cited above that was cate- gorized as a forcible rape under the hierarchy rule, this new record-keeping system also would retain information about the initial burglary; the resulting robbery; the vehicle theft; other property stolen from the victim and its value; other injuries sus- tained; the woman’s age, sex, and race; whether there was a previous relationship between her and the intruder; and the date, time, and location of the incident. Until the advent of the NIBRS com- puter database, only in cases of homicide were some of these facts extracted from police files and retained.

Another significant aspect of the overhaul is that the NIBRS provides expanded coverage of additional illegal activities. Instead of just eight closely watched UCR index offenses, FBI compu- ters are now prepared to keep track of 46 Group A offenses derived from 22 categories of crimes. In addition to the four “crimes against persons” and the four “against property” of the UCR’s Part I, the new Group A monitors offenses that formerly had been listed in Part II or just not collected at all. Victim-oriented data are becoming available for simple assault (including intimidation), vandalism (property damage and destruction), blackmail (extortion), fraud (swindles and con games), forcible sex crimes (sodomy, sexual assault with an object, and fondling), nonforcible sex offenses (statutory rape and incest), kidnapping (including parental abductions), and the nonpunishable act of justifiable homicide. The data collected about a victim of a Group A offense include these variables: sex, age, race and ethnicity, area of residence, type of injury, any prior relationship to the offender, and the circumstances surrounding the attack in cases of aggravated assault and murder. If items were stolen, the details preserved about them include the types of possession taken and their value, and in cases of motor vehicle theft, whether the car was recovered. Also, the NIBRS makes a distinction between attempted and successfully completed acts (from the criminal’s point of view) (IBR Resource Center, 2011).

Already, some data mining studies based exclu- sively on the NIBRS archives from selected states and cities address some intriguing issues. For exam- ple, an analysis of roughly 1,200 cases of abductions in the 12 states that had switched over to NIBRS by 1997 shed light on a previously overlooked subcat- egory of “holding of a person against his or her will,” called acquaintance kidnapping. This newly recognized offense includes situations such as when a teenage boy isolates his former girlfriend to punish her for spurning him, to pressure her to return to him, to compel her to submit sexually, or to evade her parents’ efforts to break them up. Also included are incidents in which street gang members spirit off rivals to intimidate them, retaliate against them, or

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even recruit them. In these types of hostage takings, the perpetrators tend to be juveniles just like their teenage targets, the abductions often take place in homes as opposed to public places, and the cap- tives are more likely to be assaulted (Finkelhor and Ormrod, 2000).

Several studies using NIBRS data from certain jurisdictions have revealed important findings about various types of murders. In general, elderly men are murdered at twice the rate as elderly women (Chu and Kraus, 2004). Specifically, older white males are the most frequent victims of “eldercide”; they are killed predominantly by offenders who are below the age of 45 and tend to be complete stran- gers. Female senior citizens are more likely to be slain by assailants who are older than 45 and are often either a spouse or grown child (Krienert and Walsh, 2010). Murders of intimate partners tend to be committed late at night, during weekends, and in the midst of certain holidays more often than at other times (Vazquez, Stohr, and Purkiss, 2005). Also, the higher homicide rate in Southern cities actually may not be due to a presumed subculture of violence or “code of honor” that supposedly compels individuals likely to lose fights and suffer beatings to nevertheless stand up to the aggressors to save face (Chilton, 2004).

Facts and Figures in the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)

Victimologists and criminologists have reservations about the accuracy of the official records kept by police departments that form the basis of the FBI’s UCR as well as its NIBRS. Tallies maintained by local law enforcement agencies surely are incom- plete due to victim nonreporting. Also, on occa- sion, these closely watched statistics may be distorted by police officials as a result of political pressures to either downplay or inflate the total number of incidents in their jurisdiction in order to manipulate public opinion about the seriousness of the local crime problem or the effectiveness of their crime-fighting strategies (for example, see Eterno and Silverman, 2012).

Dissatisfaction with official record-keeping practices has led criminologists to collect their own data. The first method used was the self- report survey. Small samples of people were promised anonymity and confidentiality if they would “confess” on questionnaires about the crimes they had committed. This line of inquiry consis- tently revealed greater volumes of illegal acts than were indicated by official statistics in government reports. Self-report surveys confirmed the hypothe- sis that large numbers of people broke the law (especially during their teens and twenties), but most were never investigated, arrested, or con- victed, especially if they were members of middle- or upper-class families. But self-reports about offending did not shed any light on those who were on the receiving end of these illegal acts.

After establishing the usefulness of self-report surveys about offenses, the next logical step for researchers was to query people from all walks of life about any street crimes that may have been committed against them rather than by them. These self-report studies originally were called “victim surveys.” But that label was somewhat misleading because most respondents answered that they were not victims—they had not been harmed by street crimes during the time period in question.

The first national survey about victimization (based on a random sample of 10,000 households) was carried out in 1966 for the President’s Com- mission on Law Enforcement and the Administra- tion of Justice. It immediately confirmed one suspicion: A sizable percentage of individuals in the sample who told interviewers that they had suf- fered losses and/or sustained injuries acknowledged that they had not reported the incident to the police. This proof of the existence of what was termed the “dark figure” (meaning a murky, mys- terious, imprecise number) of unreported crimes further undercut confidence in the accuracy of the FBI’s UCR statistics for all offenses except murder. Confirming the existence of unreported crime also underscored the importance of continuing this alternative way of measuring victimization rates and trends by directly asking members of the gen- eral public about their recent experiences.

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In 1972, the federal government initiated a yearly survey of businesses as well as residents in 26 large cities, but the project was discontinued in 1976. In 1973, the Census Bureau began interview- ing members of a huge, randomly selected, nation- wide, stratified, multistage sample of households (clustered by geographic counties). Until 1992, the undertaking was known as the National Crime Survey (NCS). After some revisions, it was retitled the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).

The Aspects of Victimization That It Measures NCVS respondents answer questions from a survey that runs more than 20 pages. They are interviewed every six months for three years. The questioning begins with a series of screening items, such as, “During the last six months did any- one break into your home?” If the respondent answers yes, follow-up questions are asked to col- lect details about the incident.

When completed, the survey provides a great deal of data about the number of violent and prop- erty crimes committed against the respondents, the extent of any physical injuries or financial losses they sustained, and the location and time of the incidents. It also keeps track of the age, sex, race/ ethnicity, marital status, income level, and place of residence of the people disclosing their misfortunes to survey interviewers. The survey records the vic- tims’ perceptions about the perpetrators (in terms of whether they seemed to have been drinking and if they appeared to be members of a gang), whether they used weapons, and what self-protective measures—if any—the respondents took before, during, and after the attack. Additional questions probe into any prior relationships between them, as well as the reasons why they did or did not report the crime to the police.

The survey is person-centered. It is geared toward uncovering the suffering of individuals 12 years of age or older and the losses experienced by entire households (but not of workplaces, such as burglaries of offices or robberies of banks). The questionnaire focuses on crimes of violence (forc- ible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) just like the UCR, plus simple assault, but not murder.

It also inquires about two kinds of thefts from indi- viduals (personal larceny with contact like purse snatching and pickpocketing, and without any direct contact), and three types of stealing directed at the common property of households—burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft—again, just like the UCR (except that crimes against collectivities like organizations and commercial enterprises are not included in the NCVS but are counted in the UCR). Identity theft is now examined, but the list of possible offenses is far from exhaustive. For example, respondents are not quizzed about instances of kidnapping, swindling, blackmail, extortion, and property damage due to vandalism or arson.

The benefit of survey research is that it elimi- nates the futility of attempting the impossible: inter- viewing every person (of the nearly 265 million people 12 years old or older residing in the entire United States in 2013) to find out how he or she fared in the past year. The combined experiences of just about 160,000 individuals over the age of 11 living in roughly 90,000 households randomly selected to be in the national sample in 2013 can be projected to derive estimates of the total number of people throughout the country who were robbed, raped, or beaten, and of households that suffered burglaries, larcenies, or car thefts (Truman and Langton, 2014).

Shortcomings of the Data At the survey’s incep- tion, the idea of asking people about their recent misfortunes was hailed as a major breakthrough that would provide more accurate statistics than those found in the UCR. But, for a number of reasons, the technique has not turned out to be the fool- proof method for measuring the “actual” amount of interpersonal violence and theft that some victimol- ogists had hoped it would be. (For more extensive critiques of the methodology, see Levine, 1976; Garofalo, 1981; Skogan, 1981b, 1986; Lehnen and Skogan, 1981; Reiss, 1981, 1986; Schneider, 1981; O’Brien, 1985; Mayhew and Hough, 1988; Fattah, 1991; and Lynch and Addington, 2007).

First, the findings of this survey, like any other, are reliable only to the extent that the national

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sample is truly representative of the population of the whole country. If the sample is biased (in terms of factors connected to victimization, such as age, gender, race, class, and geographical location), then the projections made about the experiences of the roughly 250 million people who actually were not questioned in 2013 will be either too high or too low. Because the NCVS is household based, it might fail to fully capture the experiences of tran- sients (such as homeless persons and inmates) or people who wish to keep a low profile (such as “illegal” immigrants or fugitives).

Second, the credibility of what people tell poll- sters is a constant subject of debate and a matter of continuing concern in this survey. Underreporting remains a problem because communication barriers can inhibit respondents from disclosing details about certain crimes committed against them (inci- dents that they also probably refused to bring to the attention of the police). Any systematic suppression of the facts, such as the unwillingness of wives to reveal that their husbands beat them, of teenage girls to divulge that they suffered date rapes, or of young men to admit that they were robbed while trying to buy illicit drugs or a prostitute’s sexual services, will throw off the survey’s projection of the true state of affairs. Furthermore, crimes com- mitted against children under 12 are not probed (so no information is forthcoming about physical and sexual abuse by caretakers, or molestations or kid- nappings by acquaintances or strangers). Memory decay (forgetting about incidents) also results in information losses, especially about minor offenses that did not involve serious injuries or expenses.

But overreporting can occur as well. Some respondents may exaggerate or deliberately lie for a host of personal motives. Experienced detectives filter out any accounts by complainants that do not sound believable. They deem the charges to be “unfounded” and decide that no further investiga- tion is warranted (see Chapter 6). But there is no such quality control over what people tell NCVS interviewers. The police don’t accept all reports of crimes at face value, but pollsters must. “Stolen” objects actually may have been misplaced, and an accidentally shattered window may be mistaken as

evidence of an attempted break-in. Also, no verifi- cation of assertions takes place. If a person in the sample discusses a crime that was supposedly reported to the local police, there is no attempt to double-check to see if the respondent’s recollec- tions coincide with the information in the depart- ment’s case files. Forward telescoping is the tendency to vividly remember traumatic events and therefore believe that a serious crime occurred more recently than it actually did (within the sur- vey’s reference period of “the previous six months”). It contributes to overreporting because respondents think a crime should be counted, when actually it was committed long before and ought to be excluded.

Because being targeted within the previous six months is a relatively rare event, tens of thousands of people must be polled to find a sufficient number of individuals with incidents worthy of discussion to meet the requirements for statistical soundness. For example, about 1,000 people must be interviewed in order to locate just a handful who were recently robbed. Estimates derived from small subsamples (such as robbery victims who are elderly and female) have large margins of error. The NCVS therefore requires a huge sample and becomes very expensive to carry out.

Even with a relatively large number of partici- pants, the findings of the survey can only describe the situation in the nation as a whole. The serious- ness of the crime problem in a particular city, county, or state cannot be accurately determined because the national sample is not large enough to break down into local subgroups of sufficient size for statistical analysis (with a few exceptions). Fur- thermore, the projected absolute number of inci- dents (offenses committed and victims harmed) and the relative rates (victims per 1,000 people per year) are really estimates at the midpoint of a range (what statisticians call a confidence inter- val). Therefore, NCVS rates always must be regarded as approximate, plus or minus a certain correction factor (margin of error) that depends mostly on the size of the entire sample (all respon- dents) and becomes statistically questionable for a very small specific subsample, such as low-income

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young men, living in cities, who were robbed within the last six months.

The NCVS has improved over the years as better ways have been devised to draw representa- tive samples, to determine which incidents coincide with or don’t fit the FBI’s uniform crime definition, and to jog respondents’ memories (Taylor, 1989). In particular, more explicit questions were added about sexual assaults (involving unwanted or coerced sexual contact) that fell short of the legal definition of forcible rape and about instances of domestic violence (simple assaults) (Hoover, 1994; and Kindermann, Lynch, and Cantor, 1997).

Over its four decades, the survey’s questions have been refocused, clarified, and improved. But the accuracy of the NCVS has suffered because of waves of budget cuts. To save money, the sample size has been trimmed repeatedly. Over the dec- ades, expensive “paper and pencil interviews” (PAPI) carried out at people’s homes have been replaced by follow-up phone calls (computer- assisted telephone interviews [CATI]) and mail-in questionnaires. The response rate for individuals who were invited to participate has held steady at about 88 percent; in other words, 12 percent of the people chosen for the study declined to answer questions in 2010 as well as in 2013 (Truman, 2011; and Truman and Langton, 2014).

Comparing the UCR and the NCVS

For victimologists, the greater variety of statistics published in the NCVS offer many more possibili- ties for analysis and interpretation than the much more limited data in the UCR. But both official sources have their advantages, and the two can be considered to complement each other.

The UCR, not the NCVS, is the source to turn to for information about murder victims because questions about homicide don’t appear on the BJS’s survey. (However, two other valuable, detailed, and accurate databases for studying homi- cide victims are death certificates as well as public health records maintained by local coroners’ and medical examiners’ offices. These files may contain information about the slain person’s sex, age, race/

ethnicity, ancestry, birthplace, occupation, educa- tional attainment, and zip code of last known address [for examples of how this non-UCR data can be analyzed, see Karmen, 2006]).

The UCR is also the publication that presents information about officers slain in the line of duty, college students harmed on campuses, and hate crimes directed against various groups. The UCR is the place to go for geographically based statistics; it provides data about the crimes reported to law enforcement agencies in different towns and cities, entire metropolitan areas, and counties, states, and regions of the country. NCVS figures are calculated for the whole country, four geographic regions, and urban/suburban/rural areas, but are not available for specific cities, counties, or states (because the subsamples would be too small to analyze). The UCR, but not the NCVS, calculates the overall proportion of reported crimes that are solved by police departments. Incidents counted in the UCR can be considered as having passed through two sets of authenticity filters: Victims felt what happened was serious enough to notify the author- ities shortly afterward, and officers who filled out the reports believed that the complainants were telling the truth as supported by some evidence. Although limited information about arrestees is provided in the UCR, this annual report doesn’t provide any descriptions of the persons harmed by those accused rapists, robbers, assailants, burglars, and other thieves (until the NIBRS replaces current record-keeping formats).

NCVS interviewers collect a great deal of information about the respondents who claim they were harmed by street crimes. The NCVS is the source to turn to for a more inclusive account- ing of what happened during a given year because it contains information about incidents that were but also were not reported to the police. The yearly surveys are not affected by any changes in the degree of cooperation—or level of tension—between com- munity residents and their local police, by improve- ments in record-keeping by law enforcement agencies, or by temporary crackdowns in which all incidents are taken more seriously. But the NCVS interviewers must accept at face value the

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accounts respondents describe. Also, the NCVS annual report has nothing to offer about murders, line-of-duty assaults and deaths of police officers, offenses committed against children under 12, robberies and burglaries directed at commercial establishments, and injuries and losses from inten- tionally set fires.

Even when both of these official sources col- lect data about the same crimes, the findings might not be strictly comparable. First of all, the defini- tions of certain offenses (such as rape) can vary, so the numerators may not count the same incidents. The UCR kept track only of rapes of women and girls (sexual assaults against boys and men were considered as “forcible sodomy”) until a gender- neutral definition that explicitly described all forms of intrusive bodily invasions was adopted in 2011. The NCVS counts sexual assaults against males as well as females. Similarly, the definitions of rob- bery and burglary are not the same in the two official record-keeping sources. For example, the UCR includes robberies of commercial establish- ments and burglaries of offices, but the NCVS does not.

In addition, the denominators differ. While the FBI computes incidents of violence “per 100,000 people,” the BJS calculates incidents “per 1,000 people age 12 or older.” For property crimes, the NCVS denominator is “per 1,000 households,” not individuals (the average household has between two and three people living in it).

Therefore, it is difficult to make direct compar- isons between the findings of the UCR and the NCVS. The best way to take full advantage of these two official sources of data from the federal government is to focus on the unique information provided by each data collection system.

Even when the new and improved NIBRS data storage system is taken into account, several important variables are not tracked by any of these government monitoring systems. For exam- ple, information about the victims’ education, occu- pation, ancestry, birthplace, and rap sheet is not collected by the UCR, the NIBRS, or the NCVS. Yet these background variables could be crucial to investigate certain issues (like robbers preying on

recent immigrants or murders of persons known to be involved in the drug scene).

A First Glance at the Big Picture: Estimates of the Number of New Crime Victims Each Year

To start to bring the big picture in focus, a first step would be to look up how many Americans reveal that they were victims of street crimes each year.

The absolute numbers are staggering: Police forces across the nation learned about nearly 1.25 million acts of “violence against persons” during 2013, according to the FBI’s (2014) annual Uniform Crime Reports. In addition, over 9 million thefts were reported to the police (however, some were carried out against stores or offices, not individuals or families). The situation was even worse, accord- ing to the BJS’ National Crime Victimization Survey. It projected that people 12 years old and over suf- fered an estimated 6.1 million acts of violence, and households experienced close to 16.8 million thefts during 2013 (Truman and Langton, 2014).

Some individuals and households are victim- ized more than once in a year, so the number of incidents might be greater than the number of peo- ple. Then again, in some incidents, more than one person might be harmed, so the number of people could be larger than the number of criminal events. Either way, it is obvious that each year, millions of Americans are initiated into a group that they did not want to be part of: They join the ranks of those who know what it is like from firsthand experience to endure crime-inflicted injuries and losses.

A Second Look at the Big Picture: Watching the FBI’s Crime Clock

Consider another set of statistics intended to sum- marize the big picture that are issued yearly by the FBI in its authoritative UCR. This set is called the Crime Clock, and it dramatizes the fact that as time passes—each and every second, minute, hour, and day—the toll keeps mounting, as more and more people join the ranks of crime victims (see Figure 3.1).

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The Crime Clock’s statistics are calculated in a straightforward manner. The total number of inci- dents of each kind of crime that were reported to all the nation’s 18,000 plus police departments is divided into the number of seconds (60 60 24 365 31,536,000) or minutes (60 24 365 525,600) in a year. For instance, about 14,200 people were slain in the United States in 2013. The calculation (525,600/14,200 37) indi- cates that every 37 minutes another American was murdered that year (FBI, 2014).

Just a glance at this chart alerts even the casual reader to its chilling message. The big picture it portrays is that crimes of violence (one every 27 seconds) and theft (one every 4 seconds) are all too common. As the Crime Clock ticks away, a

steady stream of casualties flows into morgues, hospital emergency rooms, and police stations throughout the nation. At practically every moment, someone somewhere in the United States is experiencing what it feels like to be harmed by a criminal. These grim reminders give the impression that becoming a victim someday is virtually inevi- table. It seems to be just a matter of time before one’s “number is called” and disaster strikes. Sooner or later, it will be every American’s “turn”—or so it appears.

Furthermore, it can be argued that these alarm- ing figures revealed by the Crime Clock are actually underestimates of how dangerous the streets of the United States really are, due to a shortcoming in the report’s methodology. The big picture is really

murder

forcible rape

robbery

burglary

larceny-theft

motor vehicle theft

aggravated assault

violent crime

crime index offense

property crime

F I G U R E 3.1 The FBI’s Crime Clock, 2013 SOURCE: FBI, 2014.

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much worse. The FBI’s calculations are based solely upon crimes known to police forces across the country. But, of course, not all illegal acts are brought to the attention of the authorities. The police find out about only a fraction of all the inci- dents of violence and an even smaller proportion of the thefts that occur because many victims do not share their personal troubles with the uniformed officers or detectives of their local police depart- ments. The reporting rate varies from crime to crime, place to place, year to year, and group to group (see Chapter 6 for more details about victim reporting rates). Hence, one way to look at these Crime Clock statistics is to assume that they repre- sent the tip of the iceberg: The actual number of people harmed by offenders in these various ways must be considerably higher.

However, the only disclaimer the FBI offers is this: “The Crime Clock should be viewed with care. The most aggregate representation of UCR data, it conveys the annual reported crime experi- ence by showing a relative frequency of occurrence of the Part I index offenses. It should not be taken to imply a regularity in the commission of crime. The Crime Clock represents the annual ratio of crime to fixed time intervals” (FBI, 2014, p. 44). In other words, the reader is being reminded that in reality, the number of offenses carried out by lawbreakers ebbs and flows, varying with the time of day, day of the week, and season. These Crime Clock numbers represent projections over the course of an entire year and not the actual timing of the attacks. These street crimes do not take place with such rigid regularity or predictability.

The Crime Clock mode of presentation— which has appeared in the UCR for decades—has inherent shock value because as it ticks away, the future seems so ominous. Members of the public can be frightened into thinking they may be next and that their time is nearly up—if they haven’t already suffered in some manner at least once.

This countdown approach lends itself to media sensationalism, fear-mongering political campaigns, and marketing ploys. Heightened anxieties can be exploited to garner votes and to boost the sales of burglar alarms, automobile antitheft devices, or

crime insurance. For example, according to the Better Business Bureau (2014), a common phone scam begins with a warning based on this type of Crime Clock “data”: “The FBI reports that there is a home break-in in the United States every 15 seconds.…” The robocall then invites the fright- ened recipient to sign up for a “free” security system that, of course, has many hidden costs.

Delving Deeper into the Big Picture: Examining Victimization Rates

Statistics always must be scrutinized carefully, double-checked, and then put into perspective with some context. Victimologists and criminolo- gists look at both raw numbers and rates. Raw numbers reveal the actual numbers of victims. For example, the body count or the death toll is a raw number indicating how many people were dis- patched by murderers. Rates are the appropriate measurements to use when comparing the inci- dence of crime in populations of unequal size, such as the seriousness of the violence problem in different cities or countries, or at different periods of time.

The UCR could offer another disclaimer—but doesn’t—that the Crime Clock’s figures are unnec- essarily alarming because they lack an important measurement of risk—the recognition that there are millions of potential targets throughout the nation. The ticking away of the Crime Clock is an unduly frightening way of depicting the big pic- ture because it uses seconds, minutes, hours, or days as the denominator of the fraction. An alternative formulation could be used in the calculation: one that places the reported number of victimizations in the numerator of the fraction and the (huge) num- ber of people or possessions who are in danger of being singled out by criminals into the denomina- tor. Because there are so many hundreds of millions of residents, homes, and automobiles that could be selected by predators on the prowl, the actual chances of any given individual experiencing an incident during the course of a year may not be so high or so worrisome at all. This denominator provides some context.

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This alternative calculation—using a large denominator, “per 100,000 persons per year”— puts the problem in perspective and can yield a very different impression. In fact, the UCR does present these “crime rates”—which also could be called “victimization rates”—right after the Crime Clock in every yearly report. It seems to make a world of difference in terms of context. The implicit message when rates are calculated is almost the opposite: Don’t worry so much about being targeted. These misfortunes will probably burden someone else.

Indeed, the UCR’s yearly findings seem rel- atively reassuring, suggesting that the odds of being harmed are not at all as ominous as the Crime Clock implies. For example, the Crime Clock warned that a violent crime took place about every 27 seconds during 2013. That understandably sounds frightening because vio- lence is the part of the street crime problem that the public worries about the most. How- ever, when the UCR findings are presented with a huge denominator as a rate (per 100,000 persons per year), the figure seems less worri- some. For every 100,000 Americans, only 368 were subjected to a violent attack during 2013. Another way of expressing that same rate is that 99,632 out of every 100,000 persons made it through the year unscathed. Put still another way, only about 0.4 percent (far less than 1 per- cent) of the public complained to the police that they had been raped, robbed, or assaulted that year (or they were murdered). (Remember, however, that not all acts of violence are reported; some robberies were of stores or banks, or other commercial enterprises or offices; and also, some individuals face much higher or much lower risks of being targeted, as will be explained in Chapter 4.)

As described above, victimization rates also are computed and disseminated by another branch of the U.S. Department of Justice, the BJS. Its estimates about the chances of being harmed come from a different source—not

police files, but a nationwide survey of the pop- ulation: the NCVS. The survey’s findings are presented as rates per 1,000 persons per year for violent crimes, and per 1,000 households per year for property crimes (in contrast to the UCR’s per 100,000 per year; to compare the two sets of statistics, just move the NCVS fig- ure’s decimal point two places to the right to indicate the rate per 100,000). The NCVS’s find- ings indicated that 23.2 out of every 1,000 resi- dents age 12 and over in the United States (or 2,320 per 100,000, or 2.3 percent) were on the receiving end of an act of violence during 2013. (This estimate is substantially greater than the UCR figure because it includes those incidents that were not reported to the police but were disclosed to the interviewers; and it counts a huge number of less serious simple assaults while the UCR only counts more serious aggra- vated assaults—for definitions, see Box 3.1 below.) Furthermore, the NCVS supplies some reassuring details that are not available from the UCR: The rate of injury was about 6 per 1,000 (Truman and Langton, 2014). In other words, the victim was not physically wounded in about three quarters of the confrontations. Accentuating the positive (interpreting these sta- tistics with an “upbeat” spin), despite widespread public concern, for every 1,000 residents of the United States (over the age of 11), 977 were never confronted and 994 were not wounded during 2013.

In sum, the two sources of data—the UCR and the NCVS—published by separate agencies in the federal government strive to be reasonably accurate and trustworthy. What differs is the way the statis- tics are collected and presented. Each format lends itself to a particular interpretation or spin. The UCR’s Crime Clock calculations focus on the number of persons harmed per hour, minute, or even second. But stripped of context, these figures are unduly alarming because they give the impres- sion that being targeted is commonplace. They ignore the fact that the overwhelming majority of

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Americans went about their daily lives throughout the year without interference from criminals. The rates per 100,000 published in the UCR and per 1,000 in the NCVS juxtapose the small numbers who were preyed upon against the huge numbers who got away unscathed in any given year. This mode of presenting the same facts yields a very dif- ferent impression: a rather reassuring message that being targeted is a relatively unusual event.

Tapping into the UCR and the NCVS to Fill in the Details of the Big Picture

The two official sources of government statistics can yield useful information that answers impor- tant questions about everyday life, such as, “How often does interpersonal violence break out?” (Note that when working with statistics and rounding off numbers such as body counts and murder rates, it is easy to forget that each death represents a terrible tragedy for the real people whose lives were prematurely terminated, and a devastating loss for their families.)

The BJS’s definitions that are used by NCVS interviewers appear side by side in Table 3.1 with the FBI’s definitions that are followed by police departments transmitting their figures to the UCR. Also shown are the estimated numbers of incidents and victimization rates for 2013 derived from both data collecting programs.

Glancing at the data from the UCR and the NCVS presented in Table 3.1, the big picture takes shape. Note that the numbers of incidents and the victimization rates from the NCVS are often higher than the UCR figures for each type of offense. The main reason is that the NCVS num- bers include crimes not reported to the police, and therefore not forwarded to FBI headquarters for inclusion in the UCR.

Both sources of data expose a widely believed myth. Contrary to any false impressions gained from news media coverage and television or movie plots, people suffer from violent crimes

much less frequently than from property crimes. Every year, larceny (thefts of all kinds, a broad catch-all category) is the most common crime of all. Burglary is the second most widespread form of victimization, and motor vehicle theft ranks third. According to NCVS findings, thefts of possessions—the stealing of items left unattended outdoors plus property or cash taken by someone invited into the home, such as a cleaning person or guest—touched an estimated 10,050 out of every 100,000 households, or roughly 10 per- cent, in 2013. Fortunately, this kind of victimi- zation turns out to be the least serious; most of these thefts would be classified as petty larcenies because the dollar amount stolen was less than some threshold specified by state laws, such as $1,000). The NCVS finding about how common thefts are each year is confirmed by the UCR. Larcenies of all kinds (including shoplifting from stores in the UCR definition) vastly out- number all other types of crimes reported to police departments.

As for violent crimes, fortunately a similar pat- tern emerges: The most common is the least serious type. Simple assaults (punching, kicking, shoving, and slapping) are far more likely to be inflicted than aggravated assaults, robberies, rapes, or mur- ders. Aggravated assaults, which are intended to seriously wound or kill, ranked second in frequency on the NCVS. According to the UCR, aggravated or “felonious assaults” were the most common type of violent offense reported to the police, but that is because the UCR doesn’t monitor the number of simple assaults committed. Only the number of arrests for simple assaults, not the number of inci- dents, appears in Part II of the UCR; the NIBRS keeps track of statistics for both simple and aggra- vated assaults but a nationwide tally is not yet possible.

Because so many complicated situations can arise, interviewers for the NCVS receive instruc- tions about how to categorize the incidents victims disclose to them. Similarly, the FBI publishes a manual for police departments to follow when

V I C T I M I Z A T I O N I N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S : A N O V E R V I E W 81

T A B L E 3.1 Estimated Nationwide Victimization Rates from the UCR and the NCVS, 2013

Crime Definition Incidents Rate (per 100,000)

FBI’s UCR Definitions

Murder The willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another; includes manslaughter and deaths due to recklessness; excludes deaths due to accidents, suicides, and justifiable homicides.

14,200 4.5

Forcible Rape The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will; includes attempts; excludes other sexual assaults and statutory rape.

80,000 25

Robbery The taking of or attempting to take anything of value from the care, cus- tody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force; includes commercial establishments and carjackings, armed and unarmed.

345,000 109

Aggravated Assault The unlawful attacking of one person by another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury, often by using a deadly weapon; includes attempted murder and severe beatings of family members; excludes simple, unarmed, minor assaults.

724,000 229

Simple Assault No weapon used, minor wounds inflicted Not measured Not computed Burglary The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft;

includes unlawful entry without applying force to residences and commercial and government premises.

1,928,000 610

Larceny-Theft The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the possession of another; includes purse snatching, pocket picking, thefts from vehicles, thefts of parts of vehicles, and sho- plifting; excludes the use of force or fraud to obtain possessions.

6,004,000 1,900

Motor Vehicle Theft The theft or attempted driving away of vehicle; includes automobiles, trucks, buses, motorcycles, snowmobiles, and commercially owned vehicles; excludes farm machinery and boats and planes.

700,000 221

BJS’s NCVS Definitions

Murder Not included in the survey Not measured Not computed Rape/Sexual Assault

Rape is the unlawful penetration of a male or female through the use of force or threats of violence; includes all bodily orifices, the use of objects, and attempts as well as verbal threats. Sexual assaults are unwanted sex- ual contacts, such as grabbing or fondling; includes attempts and may not involve force; excludes molestations of children under 12.

174,000 110

Robbery The taking directly from a person of property or cash by force or threat of force, with or without a weapon; includes attempts; excludes hold-ups of commercial establishments.

369,000 240

Aggravated Assault The attacking of person with a weapon, regardless of whether an injury is sustained; includes attempts as well as physical assaults without a weapon that result in serious injuries; excludes severe physical abuse of children under 12.

633,000 380

Simple Assault The attacking of person without a weapon resulting in minor wounds or no physical injury; includes attempts and intrafamily violence.

2,047,000 1,580

Household Burglary The unlawful entry of residence, garage, or shed, usually but not always, for the purpose of theft; includes attempts; excludes commercial or governmental premises.

2,458,000 2,570 (per 100,000 households)

Theft The theft of property or cash without contact; includes attempts to take possessions and stealing by persons invited inside.

9,071,000 10,050 (per 100,000 households)

Motor Vehicle Theft The driving away or taking without authorization of any household’s motorized vehicle; includes attempts.

556,000 520 (per 100,000 households)

NOTES: All UCR and NCVS figures for incidents were rounded off to the nearest 1,000, except for murder, which is rounded off to the nearest 100. All NCVS rates were multiplied by 100 to make them comparable to UCR rates. The FBI definition of rape is the old narrow one, referred to as the “legacy” definition, not the new expanded one.

SOURCES: FBI’s UCR, 2013; BJS’s NCVS, 2013 (Truman and Langton, 2014).

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they submit records to the UCR about the crimes they are aware of that were committed in their jurisdiction. These guidelines are intended to insure that the annual crime reports are genuinely “uniform”—in the sense that the same definitions and standards are used by each of the roughly 18,000 participating law enforcement agencies. For example, all police and sheriffs’ departments are supposed to exclude from their body count of murders all cases of vehicular homicides caused by drunk and impaired drivers; accidental deaths; justi- fiable homicides carried out by officers of the law or by civilians acting in self-defense; and suicides. But some very complex situations may arise on rare occasions and need to be clarified, so guidelines for scoring them on the UCR are disseminated by the FBI. Some of these instructions appear in Box 3.1 below. (Note that local prosecutors might view these crimes differently.)

Poring over “details” like the precise wording of definitions and arguing over what should and should not be included and counted, or excluded and not monitored, may seem like a rather dry technical exercise and even a “boring” waste of time. However, definitions and the statistics derived from them can really matter. For example, consider the implications of this issue:

Police officials and women’s groups … applauded a recommendation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation subcommittee that the definition of rape used by the agency be revised. The definition, written more than 80 years ago, has been criticized as too narrow, resulting in thousands of rapes being excluded from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report. The subcommittee recommends a broader defini- tion, to include anal and oral rape as well as rapes involving male victims. (Goode, 2011).

What would be the consequence of adopting the more inclusive definition? Initially, forcible rape rates as monitored by this government source would rise, reflecting a more comprehensive and accurate count of the actual amount of sexual violence in the United States. That larger statistic could result in the allocation of additional federal,

state, and local resources to fund efforts to catch and prosecute more rapists, and to provide support and assistance to a greater number of victims (Goode, 2011).

Searching for Changes in the Big Picture: Detecting Trends in Interpersonal Violence and Theft

The data in the annual UCR as well as the NCVS represent the situation in the streets and homes of America after a particular year has drawn to a close. These yearly reports can be likened to a snap- shot at a certain point in time. But what about a movie or video that reveals changes over time? To make the big picture more useful, a crucial question that must be answered is whether street crime is becoming more or less of a problem as the years roll by.

Sharp increases in rates over several consecutive years are commonly known as crime waves. Downward trends indicating reduced levels of criminal activity can take place as well. Ironically, there isn’t a good term to describe a sudden yet sustained improvement in public safety. Perhaps the term crime crash (see Karmen, 2006) captures the essence of such a largely unexpected, year- after-year downturn (just as a quick plunge in the price of shares on the stock market is called a crash, except that a “crime crash” goes on for years before it is noticeable, and then is welcomed).

During the late 1960s, a major crime wave engulfed the country, according to the FBI’s UCR, which was the only annual source of nationwide data during that decade. Since 1973, the findings of the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) NCVS have provided an additional set of figures to monitor the upward and downward drifts in victimization rates. The establishment of a second, independent report- ing system to measure the amount of street crime in contemporary American society initially appeared to be a major breakthrough in terms of bringing the big picture into sharper focus. In theory, the federal gov- ernment’s two monitoring systems should support and confirm each other’s findings, lending greater credence to all official statistics shared with the

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public. But in practice, estimates from the UCR and the NCVS have diverged for particular categories of offenses during certain brief stretches of time, cloud- ing the big picture about national trends (Rand & Rennison, 2002).

The UCR measures the violent crime rate by adding together all the known cases of murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery. The

NCVS doesn’t ask about murder (a relatively small number) but it does inquire about simple assaults (a huge number). The BJS then combines all disclosed cases of simple and aggravated assault, all sexual assaults (of males as well as females), and some rob- beries (only of people, not banks or stores) into its violent crime rate. Other differences in data collec- tion methodology plus divergent definitions that

B O X 3.1 The FBI’s Instructions About How to Classify Certain Complicated Crimes: Guidelines from the Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook

Part A. Does the death of the victim fall into the category of a murder?

What if the victim…:

SITUATION 1) …is confronted by a robber or other assailant and suffers a heart attack and dies?

ANSWER: Do not count this as a murder, but simply as a robbery or as an assault (because it is not a “willful killing”).

SITUATION 2) …is a woman in the ninth month of pregnancy who is stabbed in the stomach; she survives, but the fetus dies?

ANSWER: Do not categorize this as a murder. Score this as an aggravated assault against the woman (because the definition of murder excludes deaths of unborn fetuses).

SITUATION 3) …is a firefighter or a police officer who enters a burning building and dies; later it is determined that the blaze was intentionally set by an arsonist?

ANSWER: Do not count this as a murder because it is under- stood that firefighting and police work is hazard- ous and requires taking grave risks.

SITUATION 4) …is a motorist embroiled in a road rage incident who dies because his adversary intentionally crashes his vehicle into the motorist’s car?

ANSWER: Score this as a murder. If the victim survives, then consider the incident to be an aggravated assault (the vehicle is the deadly weapon), no matter how minor the injury to the person or the damage to the car.

Part B. Is it a rape? What if the victim…

SITUATION 1) …is slipped a date-rape drug in her drink by a man who is after her, but he is unable to lure her away from her friends?

ANSWER: Count this as an attempted forcible rape, since he intended to have intercourse with her against her will (she would be incapable of giving con- sent because of her temporary mental or physical incapacity) but was thwarted by his inability to get her alone.

SITUATION 2) …is married to a man who beats her until she submits to intercourse?

ANSWER: Count this as a forcible rape. Ever since marital rape was recognized as a crime, the law no longer permits a husband to be exempt from arrest for forcing himself on his wife.

Part C. Is the incident an armed robbery? What if the victim…

SITUATION 1) …is a cashier in a store who is ordered to hand over money by a man who claims to have a weapon in his pocket but does not brandish it, so the cashier does not actually see it?

ANSWER: Score this as an armed robbery, since the robber claimed to have a weapon (or perhaps had a fake knife or gun).

SITUATION 2) …returns home and surprises a burglar, who then assaults him with a crowbar, steals valu- ables, and escapes out the door?

ANSWER: Score this as an armed robbery, since the resident was confronted and attacked by the intruder.

SOURCE: Adapted and reworded from Uniform Crime Reporting System Guidelines (FBI, 2009).

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were discussed above may help explain some of the inconsistent results in the years between 1973 and the start of the 1990s, when the two trend lines were not in synch. But one finding clearly emerges: According to both of these monitoring systems, violent crime rates “crashed” during the 1990s and have continued to drift downward, as the graph in Figure 3.2 demonstrates.

A parallel set of problems and findings arise when the changes over time in property crime rates are graphed. The UCR defines property crime to include burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larcenies against persons and households but also against commercial enterprises, government offices, and nonprofit entities. The NCVS counts burglaries, vehicle thefts, and larcenies but only if they are directed against individuals and their households. Once again, despite differing signals during the first 20 years, the takeaway message of

the graph in Figure 3.3 echoes that of Figure 3.2: Property crime rates “crashed” during the 1990s and have fallen farther during the twenty-first century.

In sum, both the FBI’s UCR and the BJS’s NCVS confirm that diminishing numbers of resi- dents of the 50 states are being affected by the social problems of violence and theft. In other words, even though each year millions of new individuals join the ranks of crime victims, the rate of growth has been slowing down for about two decades. This substantial decline in victimization rates since the early 1990s is certainly good news. But how much longer will this crime crash continue? Few social scientists, politicians, or journalists would dare declare that the “war on crime” has been won. And since the experts can’t agree about the reasons why this substantial improvement in public safety took place, if someday there is a return to the

NCVS

UCR

F I G U R E 3.2 Trends in Violent Victimization Rates, United States, 1973–2013 SOURCES: FBI’s UCRs 1973–2013; BJS’s NCVSs 1973–2013.

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“bad old days” of much higher rates of victimiza- tion, the causes of this reversal will be the subject of bitter debate (see Karmen, 2006).

TAKING A LONGER VIEW: MURDERS IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE PAST CENTURY

Another aspect of the big picture involves getting a feel for historical trends. Is the level of criminal violence in the United States today far worse or much better than in the distant past? Is the United States becoming a safer place to live or a more dan- gerous society as the decades pass by? Today’s crime problem needs to be seen in a broader context.

Historians write about the carnage of the past, especially when the first European settlers arrived,

and then during the time period of the Thirteen Colonies, the American Revolution, the centuries of slavery, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the frontier days of the “Wild West.” But accurate records are hard to find before industrialization took place, cities sprang up, and urban police forces began to guard local residents on a daily basis.

Graphs are particularly useful for spotting his- torical trends at a glance. Trends in homicide rates can be traced further back than changes over time for the other interpersonal crimes.

Murder is the most terrible crime of all because it inflicts the ultimate harm, and the damage cannot be undone. The irreparable loss isalso felt by the departed person’s loved ones. But the social reaction to the taking of a person’s life varies dramatically. It is deter- mined by a number of factors: the state’s laws, the offender’s state of mind, the deceased’s possible con- tribution to the escalation of hostilities, the social

NCVSVSV

UCRCRC

F I G U R E 3.3 Trends in Property Crime Rates, United States, 1973–2013 SOURCES: FBI’s UCRs 1973–2013; BJS’s NCVSs 1973–2013.

86 CH APT ER 3

standing of each party, where the crime was commit- ted, how the person was dispatched, and whether the slaying attracted media coverage and public outcry. Some murders make headlines, while others slip by virtually unnoticed except by the next of kin. Some killings lead to the execution of the perpetrator; others ruled to be justifiable homicides result in no penalty and possibly even widespread approval.

Homicide is broadly defined as the killing of one human being by another. Not all homicides are pun- ishable murders. All murders are socially defined: How to handle a specific killing is determined by legislators, police officers, and detectives; prosecutors and defense attorneys; judges and juries; and even the media and the public’s reaction to someone’s demise. Deaths caused by carelessness and accidents are not classified as murders (although if the damage was foreseeable, they might be prosecuted as man- slaughters). Acts involving the legitimate use of deadly force in self-defense whether carried out against felons by police officers or by private citizens under attack (see Chapter 13) are also excluded from the body counts, as are court-sanctioned executions.

The law takes into account whether a killing was carried out intentionally (with “express malice”), in a rational state of mind (“deliberate”), and with advance planning (“premeditation”). These defining charac- teristics of first-degree murders carry the most severe punishments, including (depending on the state) exe- cution or life imprisonment without parole. Killing certain people—police officers, corrections officers, judges, witnesses, and victims during rapes, kidnap- pings, or robberies—may also be capital offenses.

A homicide committed with intent to inflict grievous bodily injury (but no intent to kill) or with extreme recklessness (“depraved heart”) is prosecuted as a second-degree murder. A murder in the second degree is not a capital crime and can- not lead to the death penalty.

A homicide committed in the “sudden heat of passion” as a result of the victim’s provocations is con- sidered a “voluntary” (or first-degree) manslaughter. The classic example is the “husband who comes home to find his wife in bed with another man and kills him.” Offenders convicted of manslaughter are pun- ished less severely than those convicted of murder.

A loss of life due to gross negligence usually is handled as an “involuntary” (second-degree) man- slaughter, or it may not be subjected to criminal prosecution at all. Involuntary manslaughter in most states occurs when a person acts recklessly, or appreciates the risk but does not use reasonable care to perform a legal act, or commits an unlawful act that is not a felony and yet a death results.

Some types of slayings have special names (see Holmes, 1994): infanticide (of a newborn by a par- ent), filicide (of a child by a parent or stepparent), parricide (of a parent by a child), eldercide (of an older person), intimate partner homicide (of a spouse or lover), serial killing (several or more vic- tims dispatched one at a time over an extended period), mass murder (several people slaughtered at the same time and place), felony murder (com- mitted during another serious crime, like robbery, kidnapping, or rape), and contract killing (a profes- sional “hit” for an agreed-upon fee).

The UCR has been monitoring murder (com- bined with manslaughter) rates since the beginning of the 1930s, but in the beginning only big-city police departments forwarded their records to FBI headquarters. Fortunately, another source of data is available that is drawn from death certificates (maintained by coroner’s offices, which are called medical examiners offices in some jurisdictions) that list the cause of death. This database, compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics, can be tapped to reconstruct what happened during the earliest years of the twentieth century up to the present. Graphing this data facilitates the identifica- tion of crime waves and spikes but also sharp drops and deep “crashes” in the homicide rate over the decades. Long-term trends can then be considered in context (against a backdrop of major historical events affecting the nation as a whole).

The Rise and Fall of Murder Rates Since 1900

It is possible to look back over more than a century to note how the homicide rate has surged and ebbed in America during various historical periods.

As the trend line in Figure 3.4 indicates, homi- cide rates appeared to rise at the outset of the 1900s

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as states’ coroners’ offices joined the statistical report- ing system. From 1903 through the period of World War I, which was followed by the prosperous “Roaring Twenties” until the stock market “crash” of 1929, the murder rate soared. It rose even further for a few more years until it peaked in 1933. So during the first 33 years of the twentieth century, the homicide rate skyrocketed from less than 1 American killed out of every 100,000 each year to nearly 10 per 100,000 annually.

The number of violent deaths plummeted after Prohibition—the war on alcohol—ended in 1933, even though the economic hardships of the Great Depression persisted throughout the 1930s. During the years of World War II, when many young men were drafted to fight overseas against formidable enemies trying to conquer the world, only 5 slayings took place for every 100,000 inhabitants. A brief surge in killings broke out as most of the soldiers returned

home from World War II, but then interpersonal violence continued to decline during the 1950s, reaching a low of about 4.5 slayings for every 100,000 people by 1958.

During the turbulent years from the early 1960s to the middle 1970s, the number of deadly confron- tations shot up, doubling the homicide rate. This crime wave reflected the demographic impact of the unusually large baby-boom generation passing through its most crime-prone teenage and young- adult years, as well as the bitter conflicts surrounding the sweeping changes in everyday life brought about by social protest movements that arose during the 1960s and lasted well into the 1970s. The level of lethal violence during the twentieth century reached its all-time high in 1980, when the homicide rate hit 10.2 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. After that peak, murder rates dropped for several years until the second half of the 1980s, when the crack epidemic

YeYeY ar

H o m ic id e s p e r 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 in h a b it a n ts

F I G U R E 3.4 An Historical Overview of Homicide Rates, United States, 1900–2013

88 CH APT ER 3

touched off another escalation of bloodshed. By the start of the 1990s, murder rates once again were close to their highest levels for the century. But as that decade progressed, the fad of smoking crack, selling drugs, and toting guns waned; the economy improved; the proportion of the male population between 18 and 24 years old dwindled; and conse- quently, the murder rate tumbled (see Fox and Zawitz, 2002; and Karmen, 2006). The death toll has continued to drift downward throughout the twenty-first century, even during the hard times of the Great Recession that set in after the subprime mortgage meltdown, stock market crash, and corporate bailouts of 2008, as Figure 3.4 shows.

Returning to the UCR database, the impressive improvement in public safety became strikingly evident in 2013, when the body count declined to about 14,200, about 10,500 fewer victims than in 1991, when the death toll had reached an all-time record of close to 24,700. Taking popula- tion growth into account, the U.S. murder rate in 2013 stood at 4.5 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, an overall “crash” of about 50 percent since 1991 (Cooper and Smith, 2011). The U.S. murder rate hadn’t been as low as 4.5 since 1958.

PUTTING CRIME INTO PERSPECTIVE: THE CHANCES OF DYING VIOLENTLY—OR FROM OTHER CAUSES

One final way to grasp the big picture involves weighing the relative threats posed by different types of misfortunes. The chance of being harmed by a criminal needs to be compared to the odds of being hurt in an accident or of contracting a serious illness. The study of comparative risks rests on estimates of the likelihood of experiencing various negative life events. One purpose of studying comparative risks is to determine what kinds of threats (crimes, accidents, or diseases) merit greater precautionary measures by both individuals and government- sponsored campaigns. (A list of calamities could be expanded to include plagues, fires, and natural

disasters such as floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, and hurricanes.) Once the chances of being stricken by dreaded events are expressed in a standardized way, such as rates per 100,000 people, the dangers can be compared or ranked, as they are in Table 3.2. The data is derived from death certificates filed in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. It is collated by the National Center for Health Statistics into a National Vital Statistics System (Xu et al., 2014).

The nationwide data assembled in the first column of Table 3.2 pertains to people of all ages, both sexes, and varying backgrounds. The statistics in column 2 indicate that overall, about 800 out of every 100,000 Americans died in 2010. That year, the number of deaths from natural causes (diseases) greatly exceeded losses of life from external causes (accidents, suicides, and homicides). In particular, heart disease, cancer, and stroke were by far the leading causes of death in the United States at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. As for other untimely demises, more people died from accidents (including car crashes) than from homicide (murders plus deaths by “legal intervention”—justifiable homicides by police officers as well as executions of death row prisoners). In fact, more people took their own lives through suicides than lost them due to violence unleashed by others (homicide was added to the bottom of the list and did not rank in the top 10 leading causes of death). Tentatively, it can be concluded that most people worry too much about being murdered and ought to focus more of their energies toward their health, eating habits, and lifestyles instead.

However, this inspection of comparative risks surely doesn’t seem right to some readers. For exam- ple, dying from Alzheimer’s disease might be a very real and scary prospect to aging baby boomers, but it is off the radar screen for most millennials. The useful- ness of comparing the mortality rates assembled in the second column of Table 3.2 to each other is limited. The reason is simple: The data in the second column of the table ignores the key factor of age. Column 2’s figures about the causes of death describe the dangers faced by the “average” American, a social construct that each person resembles to some extent. But the actual odds a specific individual faces may differ tremendously from this fictitious composite norm.

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Besides age, the most important determinants of mortality rates are sex, race/ethnicity, social class, and place of residence. To make more mean- ingful comparisons, some of these key variables, especially age, must be controlled, or held constant (see Fingerhut, Ingram, and Feldman, 1992). Death rates for young adults appear in the third column of Table 3.2.

Comparing the rates in column 3 to those in column 2 reveals some sharp differences. For exam- ple, of all Americans between the ages of 20 and 24 (of both sexes and all races), only 87, not 800, out of every 100,000 died in 2010. For people in their early twenties, homicide was a real threat—the third leading cause of death—after accidents (espe- cially involving motor vehicles) and suicides. Few young adults died from heart attacks, cancer, strokes, influenza, or other diseases like HIV/ AIDS (NCHS, 2013). Also, although this is not shown in the table, within every age group, being murdered loomed as a greater danger to boys and men than to girls and women, and to racial minori- ties as compared to members of the white majority. These observations raise an important issue. Besides comparative risks, victimologists have to also study

differential risks. The perils facing different groups (in terms of age, sex, race/ethnicity, social class, and other factors) can vary dramatically. Dif- ferential risks will be scrutinized in the next chapter.

Another problem with risk comparisons is that the ranking represents a snapshot image of a fluid situation. Thus, Table 3.2 captures a moment fro- zen in time—the relative standing of dangers of accidents, diseases, and lethal violence in 2010. But it cannot indicate underlying trends. The chances of something terrible ending a life can change for everyone substantially over the years. That is why yearly data must be assembled into tables and graphs in order to spot trends.

For example, an encouraging downward trend in fatal accidents took place during the 1980s. Deaths due to plane crashes, falls, drownings, fires, and poi- sonings all dropped during that decade, probably as a result of greater safety consciousness, new devices such as smoke detectors and car seats for children, and new policies such as mandatory seat belt laws and tougher penalties for drunk driving. By 1990, the risk of dying in a car crash had fallen to its lowest level since the 1920s, according to a study by the National Safety Council (Hall, 1990). During the

T A B L E 3.2 Comparing the Risks of Death Posed by Crime, Accidents, and Certain Diseases, 2010 and 2012

Cause of Death

Death Rate per 100,000,

All Americans, 2010

Death Rate per 100,000,

20–24 years olds, 2010

Death Rate per 100,000,

All Americans, 2012

All causes 800 87 733 1) Heart problems (cardiovascular disease) 194 3 171 2) Cancers (malignant neoplasms) 186 5 167 3) Lung problems (pulmonary and respiratory

diseases) 45 Fewer than 1 42

4) Strokes (cerebrovascular disease) 42 Fewer than 1 37 5) Accidents (unintentional injuries) 39 36 39 6) Alzheimer’s disease 27 Fewer than 1 24 7) Diabetes 22 Fewer than 1 21 8) Kidney problems (nephritis) 16 Fewer than 1 13 9) Influenza and pneumonia 16 1 14

10) Suicides (intentional self-harm) 12 14 13 Homicides (including legal intervention) (assault) 6 13 5* All other causes 194 12

NOTE: Homicide rate for 2012 is estimated from the FBI’s UCR for 2012.

SOURCE: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Report, 2013; Yu et al., 2014 (column 5)

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1990s, the chances of being murdered diminished impressively, as did the odds of perishing shortly after contracting full-blown HIV/AIDS. As the chances of dying from a particular disease, a terrible accident, or a fatal assault rise or fall over time, list- ings of comparative risks must undergo periodic revision (CDC, 1999).

Column 4 in Table 3.2 shows that mortality rates did change somewhat over a time span of just two years. In general, the trends were in the desirable direction. The death rate for the diseases listed in Table 3.2 all declined, which means the life expec- tancy of the average American increased. The only disappointing trend was a small rise in the suicide rate. Accidental deaths remained at the same level in 2012 as in 2010.

To further complicate the picture, occupation must be taken into account when comparing the risks of becoming a homicide victim to the risk of suffering a fatal injury at work. Risks are closely tied to tasks; some jobs are far more dangerous than others. Focusing on deaths in the workplace, studies conducted by the National Institute for Safety and Health and by the federal government’s Bureau of

Labor Statistics established that fatal accidents take place most often in jobs related to construction, farm- ing and forestry, and transportation. Putting accidents aside, researchers discovered that certain lines of work, such as law enforcement and cab driving, carry much greater risks of being murdered on the job. (See Chapters 4 and 11 for a discussion of homicides at workplaces.)

In sum, individuals face widely varying risks of being murdered, depending on which groups they fall into (who they are, where they live, and what they do on a daily basis).

Now that the big picture has been studied from a number of angles—nationally, historically, and comparatively—it is time to zoom in on specific crimes. The analysis of the big picture has revealed that the most terrible of all violent crimes— homicide—is also the least likely to take place. Data from official sources will help reveal what suffering it inflicts on the population of the United States. In addition to murders, aggravated assaults as well as robberies (two crimes that potentially could escalate into slayings) will be the focus of the next chapter.

SUMMARY

Statistics can convey important information about crimes and their victims, but consumers of numerical data must ascertain exactly what was counted, how accurate the measurements are, and whether vested interests are promoting particular interpretations. The two leading sources of data about crime victims published annually by the U.S. Department of Jus- tice are the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report and the BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey. The UCR draws on police files and is useful to victimologists who want to study murders, but it is of limited value for research into other kinds of victimizations until the National Incident-Based Reporting System is completely phased in and replaces it. The NCVS contains infor- mation about interpersonal violence as well as prop- erty crimes and gathers data directly from members of a large national sample who answer questions about their misfortunes over the past six months.

Victimization rates are expressed per 1,000 in the NCVS or per 100,000 in the UCR in order to facili- tate fair comparisons between groups, cities, or countries of different sizes.

According to both the NCVS and the UCR, the twin problems of interpersonal violence and theft have subsided so substantially since the early 1990s up to the present that these crime rates can be said to have “crashed.” The homicide rate in 2013 was just about the same as in the late 1950s, before “crime in the streets” became a matter of great pub- lic concern.

Comparative risks reveal which kinds of mis- fortunes are more or less likely than others: Homi- cide is not the leading cause of death for any group. Comparative risks show how crime is often not as great a threat to well-being as injuries and deaths from accidents and diseases.

V I C T I M I Z A T I O N I N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S : A N O V E R V I E W 91

KEY TERMS DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY

big picture, 67

comparative risks, 89

coroner’s offices, 87

Crime Clock, 77

crime crash, 83

crime waves, 83

differential risks, 90

forward telescoping, 75

hierarchy rule, 71

index, 70

medical examiners, 87

memory decay, 75

National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 70

official statistics, 68

Part I crimes, 70

Part II crimes, 71

patterns, 68

profiles, 68

range (confidence interval), 75

rates, 79

raw numbers, 79

self-report survey, 73

spin, 69

statistics, 68

trends, 68

Uniform Crime Report (UCR), 70

victimization rates, 68

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

1. Choose some statistics presented in this chapter and interpret them in two ways: First, make them seem as alarming as possible; and second, portray them as reassuringly as possible.

2. What kinds of information about victims of interpersonal violence and theft can be found in the FBI’s annual Uniform Crime Reports?

What are the sources of inaccuracies in these statistics?

3. What kinds of information about victims of interpersonal violence and theft can be found in the BJS’s annual National Crime Victimization Survey? What are the sources of inaccuracies in these statistics?

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. What information about the people who get injured or killed by offenders is not systemati- cally collected by the UCR and the NCVS, or even the NIBRS? Why would this additional information be important? How could it be used and what issues could it shed light on?

2. Make up some hypothetical scenarios in which people with a vested interest in convincing the public that victimization rates are either going up or going down could “shop around” for UCR or NCVS statistics about robberies or burglaries to support their claim.

SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROJECTS

1. Find out the latest rates per 100,000 people for the seven index crimes for your home state by searching the FBI website where the UCR statistics are posted. What crime rates are substantially higher or lower in your state than for the entire United States (as shown in Table 3.1)?

2. Find out the definitions and the precise wording of the questions that are asked in the NCVS by downloading the survey instrument from the BJS website. Discuss how the inquiries about aggravated assault, rape, and other sexual assaults are phrased, and why respondents might be confused or unclear about how to answer these questions.

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4 A Closer Look at the Victims of Interpersonal Crimes of Violence and Theft

CHAPTER OUTLINE Addressing Some Troubling Questions

Identifying Differential Risks: Which Groups Suffer More Often Than Others?

Focusing on Murders

Where It Is Safer or More Dangerous: Making International Comparisons

The Geographic Distribution of Violent Deaths in the United States

Who Gets Killed by Whom? How, Where, and Why? Who Faces the Gravest Threats of Being Murdered? Changes over Time in Near Death Experiences:

Trends in Aggravated Assault Rates Focusing on Robberies

Robbers and the People They Prey Upon Robberies: Who, How Often, How, Where, When Changes over Time in Robbery Rates Checking Out Whether More Robberies Are Turning into

Murders Differential Risks: Which Groups Get Robbed the Most

and the Least Often?

Focusing on Burglaries

Trends and Patterns in Burglaries Focusing on Motor Vehicle Theft

Stealing Cars for Fun and Profit Trends in Motor Vehicle Theft Which Motorists Should Be Most Concerned

When Parking? Focusing on Individuals Whose Identities Were Stolen

The Nature of the Problem and How Many People Experience Its Aggravations

Losses and Suffering Is the Problem Growing or Subsiding? Who Faces the Greatest Risks?

Predicting the Chances of Becoming a Victim Someday: Projecting Cumulative Risks

Summary

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary

Questions for Discussion and Debate

Critical Thinking Questions

Suggested Research Projects

ADDRESSING SOME TROUBLING QUESTIONS

The previous chapter painted the “big picture” about all forms of victimization in the entire country in recent years. This chapter focuses on certain inter- personal crimes of violence and theft in greater depth. People attacked by murderers, other danger- ous assailants, and robbers are examined first. Indivi- duals and households whose homes are burglarized, whose cars are driven off by thieves, and whose identities are stolen by impostors are investigated later in the chapter. (The plight of abused children is examined in Chapter 8; the dilemma faced by intimate partners who are beaten by batterers is explored in Chapter 9; and the suffering imposed by rapists is examined in Chapter 10.)

Victimologists gather and interpret data to answer disturbing questions such as: How many

people are robbed, wounded, and even murdered by criminals each year? How rapidly are the ranks of people who have suffered these misfortunes growing? Researchers want to find out where and when the majority of crimes occur, and, in the age of globalization, where in the world are the streets much more dangerous and where are they dramat- ically safer?

A matter of particular concern is which groups are targeted the most and the least often.

Specifically, which groups are at a higher risk of getting slain, shot, stabbed, or robbed? Data from the UCR and the NCVS will be used to answer a set of unsettling questions:

What are the odds of being attacked during any given year? Incidence rates measure the number of new victims per 1,000 or per 100,000 persons annually and thereby reveal the risks people face.

How many people know what it is like to be confronted by a robber who growls, “Your money or your life!” Prevalence rates esti- mate the proportion of people per 1,000 or per 100,000 who have ever experienced some misfortune.

What are the chances that a person will be harmed by a violence-prone opponent at least once during his or her entire life (not just in a single year) [incidence rate], or during previ- ous years [prevalence rate]? Cumulative risks estimate these lifetime likelihoods by project- ing current situations into the future.

Is violence a growing problem in American society, or is it subsiding? Trend analysis provides the answer by focusing on changes over time.

Does violent crime burden all communities and groups equally, or are some categories of people more likely than others to be held up, physically injured, and killed? Differential risks indicate the odds of an unwanted event taking place for members of one social demographic group as compared to another.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES To understand the meaning of differential risks.

To appreciate the complications of making international comparisons.

To discover which countries and which cities across the globe have the highest and lowest homicide rates.

To use official statistics to spot national trends in murders, aggravated assaults, and robberies in recent decades.

To discover the profile of the typical victim in order to determine which demographic groups face the highest and lowest chances of getting murdered and also of being robbed.

To appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of statistical projections about the risk any given individual faces of being on the receiving end of violence.

To grasp the meaning of cumulative risks.

To become acquainted with the suffering of people whose homes are burglarized.

To become knowledgeable about the situation of people whose cars are stolen.

To become familiar with the aggravation arising from identity theft.

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Identifying Differential Risks: Which Groups Suffer More Often Than Others?

The first step in a victim-centered analysis addresses the issue, “Which groups sustain the greatest casualties? Which groups face lesser threats of harm?

Victimization rates for the entire population indicate how frequently murders, rapes, robberies, and assaults are committed against “average” Americans and how often “typical” households suffer burglaries, motor vehicle thefts, and identity theft. It is reasonable to suspect that the chance of becoming a victim is not uniform for everyone but is more likely for some types and less likely for others.

The discussion about comparative risks at the conclusion of Chapter 3 revealed that different age groupings of people do not all face the same odds of getting killed accidentally—say, from a skiing mishap—or of dying from a particular dis- ease, such as cancer. People with attributes in common such as age or sex may be affected by crime much more or much less often than others. If these suspicions can be documented, then any overall rate that projects a risk for all Americans might mask important variations within sub- groups. In other words, it is necessary to “disag- gregate” or “deconstruct” or break down victimization rates into their component pieces in order to reveal the differential risks faced by particular categories of people.

A pattern within a victimization rate is recog- nizable when one category suffers significantly more than another. The most obvious example is the incidence of rape: Females are much more likely to be sexually violated than are males. Search- ing for patterns means looking for regularities within a seemingly chaotic mass of information and finding predictability in what at first appear to be random events.

The differential risks derived from patterns identified in the data will be investigated in this chapter for the violent crimes of murder and rob- bery and for the property crimes of burglary, motor vehicle theft, and identity theft.

FOCUSING ON MURDERS

Where It Is Safer or More Dangerous: Making International Comparisons

In order to bring the big picture into sharper focus during the era of globalization, it is important to remember that victimization rates vary dramati- cally not only from time to time but also from one place to another. The greatest variations can be found by comparing one society to another. Cross-national comparisons reveal the magnitude of the crime problem in different countries at one point in time.

The main source of data about victimization rates in other countries is a branch of the United Nations—its Office on Drugs and Crime Control– which periodically surveys its members’ law enforcement agencies. Also, the European Union (EU) collects data from the criminal justice systems of its member states and publishes an annual European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics. In the past, the International Police Organization (Interpol) also publicly posted data.

Since 1989, most European countries have participated in an International Crime Victim Sur- vey that generates statistics that are considered more reliable than data from police departments. Police in the various countries use different definitions for common crimes like rape, burglary, and robbery. Also, some police forces are more scrupulous about recording incidents and forwarding their data to headquarters than others. Differences in record-keeping practices can make comparisons dif- ficult too (for example, some countries do not fol- low the “hierarchy rule”), and, of course, the willingness of victims to reveal their troubles to the authorities varies dramatically from place to place (Van Dijk et al. 2007; and Loftus, 2011).

Making international comparisons of victimiza- tion rates continues to be difficult, and hasty con- clusions can be misleading. Some governments do not routinely disclose reliable and up-to-date data about their crime rates, or they publish figures that seem unrealistically low, probably because their regimes fear that high rates will damage their

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nations’ public images and scare off potential tourists and investors.

Researchers who studied cross-national crime data decades ago came to these conclusions: Com- pared to other nations providing trustworthy statis- tics, U.S. victimization rates for violent crimes were very high, for auto theft were fairly high, and for burglary were near the middle of the range (Kalish, 1988). Violence is more of a problem in the United States than in many other highly developed socie- ties, but theft is not (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997).

Narrowing the focus strictly to the number of murders in various societies still requires careful attention to methodological issues. Each country’s definitions of intentional, wrongful, punishable kill- ings reflect laws and local customs that govern the way deaths are classified. For international compar- isons to be valid, definitions of killings that consti- tute murder must be consistent. For example, not all countries consider infanticides as murders. Also, certain countries may count attempted murders as intentional homicides, but in the United States (and most other societies) cases in which wounded people survive are classified as aggravated assaults. Other inconsistencies result if a nation’s body count includes deaths from legal interventions (such as the use of deadly force by police officers and court-ordered executions), totally uninten- tional deaths (like negligent manslaughter and vehicular homicides), and assisted suicides.

The United Nations asks its member states about their crime problems and promotes the use of definitions that are as consistent as possible. These official statistics have been assembled in Table 4.1 in order to present a picture of the varia- tions in murder rates across the globe.

What very important factor do Austria, China, Denmark, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Korea, and Switzerland have in common? They are among the most peaceful societies on the planet, with a murder rate close to just one slaying per 100,000 inhabitants. As for the English-speaking advanced industrial countries, citizens of the United States have a lot more to worry about in terms of

succumbing to lethal interpersonal violence than people who reside in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Most of the countries in the EU have very low murder rates. Some of the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America report that they experience levels of lethal violence that are lower than those in the United States: Morocco, Turkey, Liberia, Egypt, Vietnam, Chile, and Cuba.

Table 4.1 reveals that the people who suffer the greatest casualties tend to live in Central and South America and the offshore island nations in the Caribbean Sea, especially Honduras and Venezuela, but also Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, the U.S. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Brazil, Mexico, and Panama. South Africa, despite the dismantling of apartheid several decades ago, also is still burdened by disturbingly high levels of bloodshed.

Note that some of the killings that boost the body count in strife-torn societies across the globe are not the outgrowth of ordinary street crime but are the result of intense political polarization, expressed as vigilantism (including slayings by death squads), terrorism, and low-intensity guerrilla warfare waged against governments by insurgent groups and drug trafficking cartels. War-torn coun- tries like Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan were excluded from Table 4.1.

Some countries are strikingly different from others in terms of their economies, criminal justice systems, cultural traditions, and age distributions (for example, many developing societies have huge populations of young people and relatively few old people). Therefore, it might make more sense to limit comparisons of murder rates to fairly similar, highly industrialized nations. Because a key determinant of the murder rate in any country is simply the proportion of the population that falls into the highest risk group (young males), one way to deal with variations would be to calculate the homicide rate for every 100,000 teenage boys and young men in each society. Following this pro- cedure and then restricting the comparison only to other highly industrialized societies, the United

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States stood out as having the worst murder rate during the late 1980s (Deane, 1987; Rosenthal, 1990). Another way to take the substantial demo- graphic differences from country to country into account is to calculate the murder rate of a popula- tion and then adjust that number to reflect a stan- dardized age distribution in order to improve comparability over time and between countries.

When 1980s murder rates in different nations were analyzed, higher rates tended to be associated with great economic inequality (huge gaps between the wealthy and the poor), limited government

funding of social programs for the disadvantaged, cultural supports for legitimate violence by govern- ment officials and agencies (frequent executions and few restraints on the use of force by the police), family breakdown (high divorce rates), high rates of female participation in the labor force, and ethnic heterogeneity (see Gartner, 1990).

Clearly, geographic location—in which society a person resides—is a major factor that determines murder risks around the globe. Substantial varia- tions also can be anticipated between different cities in foreign countries. The wide range in murder

T A B L E 4.1 Murder Rates Across the Globe: Selected Countries, 2012

Country Murder Rate per 100,000

Inhabitants Country Murder Rate per 100,000

Inhabitants

Australia 1 Italy 1 Austria 1 Jamaica 39 Bahamas 30 Japan 0.3 Belgium 2 Liberia 3 Belize 45 Mexico 22 Bolivia 12 Morocco 2 Brazil 25 Netherlands 1 Canada 2 New Zealand 1 Chile 3 Nicaragua 11 China 1 Nigeria 20 Colombia 31 Pakistan 8 Costa Rica 9 Panama 17 Cuba 4 Peru 10 Czech Republic 1 Philippines 9 Denmark 1 Puerto Rico (U.S.) 27 Dominican Republic 22 Poland 1 Egypt 3 Russian Federation 9 El Salvador 41 Saudi Arabia 1 Estonia 5 South Africa 31 Finland 2 South Korea 1 France 1 Spain 1 Germany 1 Switzerland 1 Greece 2 Thailand 5 Guatemala 40 Trinidad/Tobago 28 Honduras 90 Turkey 3 Hungary 1 United Kingdom (England and Wales) 1 Ireland 1 Ukraine 4 Israel 2 United States 5 India 4 Venezuela 54 Indonesia 1 Vietnam 3 Iran 4

NOTES: All rates are rounded off to the nearest whole number, except for those less than 1 per 100,000. The latest figures available for a few of the countries are from 2011, not 2013. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory.

SOURCE: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Control, 2014.

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rates in the world’s leading cities is evident in Table 4.2. Note that cities, which have much smaller populations than entire countries, have the poten- tial to show more volatility in homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants from one year to the next. The rampages of a relatively small number of offenders can have a noticeable statistical impact. Ciudad Júarez, Mexico, may be the most dramatic case to illustrate this point. Its body count stood at about 300 homicides in 2007. Then a wave of drug- related violence engulfed the city, and during 2010 about 3,000 murders took place, a shocking tenfold increase (Valencia, 2010).

The cities with the most violent deaths per capita (taking the size of the population into account) are mostly in Central and South America and on certain Caribbean islands: Nassau (Bahamas), Belize City (Belize), Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), San Salvador (El Salvador), Guatemala City (Guatemala), Tegucigalpa (Honduras), Kingston (Jamaica), Panama City (Panama), and Caracas (Venezuela). When these big city rates assembled in Table 4.2 are compared to the entire country’s rates that were presented in Table 4.1, a pattern can be discerned: The leading city often has a higher murder rate than the rest of that country. However, there are some exceptions to this pattern, in which the leading city is safer than the country as a whole, such as Mexico City (Mexico) and Moscow (Russia). Reliable statistics are not available for cer- tain cities known to be burdened by terribly high levels of violence, such as Cape Town as well as Johannesburg, South Africa (Rueda, 2013).

As for the United States, four cities in 2013 had murder rates that were in the same league as some of the roughest cities in the world: Detroit (with 45 per 100,000), New Orleans (with 41), St. Louis (with 38), and Baltimore (with 37). New Yorkers (at 4) were murdered at a rate that was slightly lower than “average Americans” (4.5 per 100,000). But New Yorkers have much more to fear than the inhabitants of large European cities of over several million inhabitants on the list, such as London, Paris, or Rome. Tokyo, the largest city on the list, was the most peaceful place of all. Other huge urban areas with extremely low murder

T A B L E 4.2 Murder Rates in Selected Cities Around the World

Country—City Murder Rate per 100,000

Residents, 2012

Australia—Sydney 1 Austria—Vienna 1 Bahamas—Nassau 44 Belgium—Brussels 3 Belize—Belize City 105 Brazil—Sao Paulo 14 Canada—Toronto 1 China—Hong Kong 0.4 Colombia—Bogota 17 Costa Rica—San Jose 18 Czech Republic—Prague 1 Denmark—Copenhagen 1 Dominican Republic—Santo Domingo 29 El Salvador—San Salvador 53 Estonia—Tallinn 6 Egypt—Cairo 2 Finland—Helsinki 2 France—Paris 2 Germany—Berlin 1 Greece—Athens 2 Guatemala—Guatemala City 117 Honduras—Tegucigalpa 102 Hungary—Budapest 2 Indonesia—Jakarta 0.7 Italy—Rome 1 Jamaica—Kingston 50 Japan—Tokyo 0.2 Kenya—Nairobi 6 Mexico—Mexico City 9 Netherlands—Amsterdam 2 New Zealand—Auckland 0.7 Panama—Panama City 53 Poland—Warsaw 2 Portugal—Lisbon 0.6 Russia—Moscow 4 Spain—Madrid 1 South Korea—Seoul 0.8 Trinidad—Port of Spain 17 United Kingdom—London 1 United States—Detroit 45* United States—New Orleans 41* United States—St. Louis 38* United States—New York 4* Venezuela—Caracas 100**

NOTES: All rates are rounded off to the nearest whole number, except for those less than 1 per 100,000. For some cities, 2011 is the latest year available. *U.S. city rates are for 2013, the latest figures available. **Estimated for 2013 (Cawthorne and Rawlins, 2014).

SOURCE: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Control, 2014.

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rates of less than 1 per 100,000 were Hong Kong, China; Seoul, South Korea; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Auckland, New Zealand.

The above examination of international compar- isons has revealed a crucial risk factor: where a person lives (and by extension, the people one interacts with on a daily basis) has a major impact on the chance of being murdered. People who reside in certain foreign countries and certain cities face much graver dangers of dying violently than inhabitants of other places. So “location” is a substantial determinant of differential risks of becoming a victim of homicide.

Those who lose their lives tend to be perma- nent residents of a city. Tourists, business travelers, conventioneers, and other visitors rarely get caught up in deadly showdowns far from home, according to a detailed analysis of murders in New York City (see Karmen, 2006).

The Geographic Distribution of Violent Deaths in the United States

Now that the murder rates in different countries and their biggest cities have been analyzed, the next logical step is to zoom in on the United States. The interna- tional comparisons in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 highlight the well-known fact that some parts of the world are much more violent—or much more peaceful—than others. But what about the spatial distribution of lethal vio- lence within the United States? Are there striking dif- ferences in the murder rate for different parts of the country, for different cities, and even for various neigh- borhoods within cities?

The answer, as everyone knows, is of course “yes!” A number of geographic factors strongly influence differential risks. As for the four sections of the country, historically the highest homicide rates have been recorded in the South (with 5.3 per 100,000 in 2013); the lowest have been in the Northeast (at 3.5 per 100,000) and the West (at 4.0). The rates in the Midwest generally have fallen in-between (at 4.5). Residents of metropolitan areas (urban centers rather than suburbs) face higher risks of violent death than do inhabitants of rural coun- ties or of small cities beyond the fringe of metro- politan areas.

Geography-based risks can even be further fine-tuned by calculating murder rates for U.S. cities. A closer look at the FBI’s data from munic- ipal police departments confirms that some urban centers were much more dangerous places to dwell in than others. The map in Figure 4.1 shows vertical bars that depict the number of resi- dents who were murdered out of every 100,000 inhabitants of that city (taking size into account is the only sound way to make such comparisons).

The map indicates that among the largest cit- ies, Detroit had the dubious distinction of being the homicide capital of the country in 2013. (When Detroit had to declare fiscal bankruptcy in 2013, it was a more dangerous place, with a murder rate of 45 per 100,000 residents, than it was in 2010, when its murder rate was 34 per 100,000.) The most well-known medium-size city with some of country’s roughest neighbor- hoods is New Orleans (which became even more dangerous after the floods caused by Hurricane Katrina but then improved substantially, as its murder rate tumbled from a sky-high level of 95 per 100,000 residents in 2007 down to still intolerable level of 41 in 2013). In fact, as far as trends go, outbursts of lethal violence diminished in nearly all big U.S. cities from the 1990s up to 2013. Despite the nationwide decline in murder rates, the risks facing residents remain much higher in Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Atlanta, and Miami than in Denver, San Francisco, San Jose, San Antonio, Los Angeles, and New York. The nation’s safest big cities were Seattle and San Diego (see Figure 4.1).

According to researchers, the disparities are not simply a function of size but seem to be deter- mined by conditions such as population density, the local economy (poverty and unemployment rates, wage scales, and the gap between rich and poor), special problems (the easy availability of illegal handguns, the extent of drug trafficking, and the ineffectiveness of police strategies), tradi- tions and customs (including the persistence of a subculture that condones violence), and demo- graphic factors (especially divorce rates and the proportion of the population that is poor, male,

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young, and of a marginalized minority group) (see Tardiff, Gross, and Messner, 1986; Chilton, 1987; Land, McCall, and Cohen, 1990; Messner and Golden, 1992; and Karmen, 2006).

To complicate matters further, murder rates vary dramatically within the confines of a city’s lim- its. Upscale urban neighborhoods are rarely crime scenes while the mean streets on the “wrong side of the tracks” are virtual battlefields between rival street gangs, drug dealing crews, or hostile factions of organized crime. Also, neighborhood homicide rates can flare up or die down substantially over a span of just a few years as local conditions deterio- rate or improve (see Karmen, 2006).

Who Gets Killed by Whom? How, Where, and Why?

Now that some patterns in the level of lethal vio- lence have been spotted, it is time to focus more closely on some common threads that run through thousands of slayings, and what has been pieced together about the relationships between victims

and their killers in recent years. Did the victims know their offenders? How did they perish? What caused the confrontations that led to their untimely deaths? To answer these questions, it is necessary to derive a profile or statistical portrait of the “typical” murder, victim, and killer.

NCVS interviewers ask no questions about murders of household members, and coroners’ records only maintain information about the deceased but not about the killer or the crime, so the UCR is the only source of detailed data that links the individual who perished to the mur- derer. UCR guidelines urge police officials to fill out a Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) about each killing in their jurisdiction. The resulting SHR database provides information about the age, sex, and race of the victim and—if detectives solved the case and made an arrest—the accused person’s age, sex, race, weapon, possible motive, and his or her prior relationship–if any–with the slain person.

The first question that can be answered with the help of data from the SHRs is, “How many murders involved just a single killer and a lone victim.” Nearly

F I G U R E 4.1 Murder Rates In Major Cities, United States, 2013

20 13

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one half of all the homicides in which the police were able to figure out what happened were simply confrontations between two people. The remainder were either unknown or involved more than one attacker and/or more than one person who perished, according to the 2013 UCR.

Another issue that can be readily addressed is “How were the victims killed?” For decades, the majority of killers have dispatched their adversaries with firearms. Sometimes murderers use rifles and shotguns, but usually they prefer handguns (revolvers and pistols account for about two-thirds of all gun deaths). The proportion of victims who expired from bullet wounds rose from 64 percent in 1990 to just about 70 percent in 1993, before subsiding to 65 percent in 1998, lurching back up to 70 percent in 2004, and staying just about at that level (69 per- cent) in 2013. Knives and other sharp instruments ran a distant second as the weapons of choice, accounting for 12 percent of all deaths. The rest were slain by blunt instruments; fists and feet; hands (largely via strangulation and smothering); and by various other ways (explosions, arson, poisons, by being pushed, and other less frequent means).

Another issue that can be addressed with data from the SHRs is, “By whom? Did the victim know the killer?” Recall that this is the kind of issue that intrigued the founders of victimology. They were criminologists who wanted to study the interaction between victims and offenders. They were especially interested in uncovering any prior relationships between the two parties in cases of lethal interpersonal violence. For example, they wondered whether the killer and the mortally wounded person previously had known each other (as intimates, adversaries, or casual acquain- tances). To shed light on this pattern within slayings, victim–offender relationships need to be broadly categorized. Perhaps the two were com- plete strangers brought together by fate. Maybe both were members of the same family (nuclear or extended). The third possibility is that the killer and his target were acquaintances, neighbors, or friends (including girlfriend or boyfriend). Accord- ing to data in the SHRs derived from police inves- tigations from the 1990s up to 2013, in the most

common situation (ranging from 29 percent to 38 percent) the offender was a friend or acquaintance. Killings of one family member by another added up to an additional 12 percent to 14 percent each year. Slayings by strangers accounted for about 12 percent to 16 percent of cases for which the relationship could be surmised by detectives. Unfortunately for researchers, unsolved homicides of “unknown relationship” (at the time the SHRs were submitted) made up the largest category, hov- ering between 35 and 45 percent in recent decades (36 percent in 2013) (FBI, 2014).

If detectives could determine the victim– offender relationship in this residual grouping (which presumably contains many difficult-to-solve slayings by complete strangers), the percentages due to family quarrels and conflicts with friends and acquaintances probably would be much smaller. Nevertheless, looking only at solved cases, the old adage remains true: A person is more likely to be killed by someone he or she knows than by a com- plete stranger. In 45 percent of all solved murders in 2013, the killer was an acquaintance or even a former friend. Family members killed each other in 25 percent of all solved cases. Strangers were deemed to be the killers in nearly 20 percent of all solved cases. Because so many slayings remain unsolved, it is difficult to determine if the proportion of murders committed by strangers is rising. It remains an important issue for further research because it is more difficult to anticipate and guard against attacks by unknown assailants (see Riedel, 1987). (SHRs are filled out shortly after killings take place. Police departments usually do not send updated reports to the UCR for “cold cases” that they solve months or years later. Some departments do not submit SHRs to the UCR for each killing, as they are supposed to do in this voluntary reporting system.)

A third question that can be answered is, “Why? What were these sudden violent outbursts all about?” The reasons for the confrontations that claimed lives are called the “circumstances” by police departments and the FBI. The SHRs expose some widely held myths arising from TV shows and movies. Of the 6,681 murders committed during 2013 whose circumstances were known, in only

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13 were the deceased categorized as engaged in prostitution. Gangland killings of mobsters claimed 138 lives (up from 78 in 2007) but amounted to just 2 percent of all murders across the country that year. Drug dealers’ turf battles (386) and drug- fueled brawls (59) added up to another 7 percent. Killings arising from clashes between rival juvenile street gangs (584) accounted for nearly 9 percent of all murders in which the motive was known. Although this nationwide gang death toll dropped from about 670 in 2010 to nearly 585 in 2013, gang membership remained a risky activity in many urban neighborhoods. Robbers stole around 685 lives, about 10 percent of the 2013 body count (FBI, 2014b).

However, the largest category was “other arguments—not specified” (more than 25 percent of all cases solved during 2013). This miscellaneous grouping of heated disputes includes some that were trivial or based on misunderstandings and others that must have seemed to be matters worth killing for and dying over to the participants at the time. If this vague grouping is added to “unknown reasons” surrounding cases the police couldn’t solve then the motives for around half of all the 2013 killings remain a mystery and can’t be meaningfully analyzed. In sum, the avail- able data does not provide definitive answers to the key concern, “what brought about their deadly showdown?”

Who Faces the Gravest Threats of Being Murdered?

The 2013 U.S. murder rate of 4.5 means that out of every collection of 100,000 people, nearly 5 people were killed and 99,995 survived. Who were these unfortunate few that were marked for death? This statistic captures the odds of being slain for fictitious “average” Americans of all backgrounds, which is a useful social construct for certain purposes (for exam- ple, as shown above, to compare the perils faced by U.S. residents to the dangers confronting the average Canadian or Mexican). But this composite statistic conceals as much as it reveals. When the SHRs are used to deconstruct the body count, differential risks

of getting killed become evident. These findings should be especially alarming for those who fall into some or all of the high-risk categories and should be somewhat reassuring for members of other groups. The odds of suddenly expiring vary greatly from place to place: by region of the country, area of residence (urban, suburban, or rural), and specific location (which city) as was shown above. Hence, differential risks already have been uncov- ered in terms of geography: where people reside. It should come as no surprise that three other impor- tant factors are sex, age, and race or ethnicity.

SHR statistics indicate that a person’s sex is a crucial determinant of risks. Men die violently much more frequently than women. Year after year, at least three-quarters of the corpses are of boys and men (almost 78 percent in 2013). This proportion has remained roughly the same since the early 1960s. Expressed as rates, boys and men are killed at least three and during some years four times as often as girls and women. Also, over recent decades, about 9 out of 10 of the known offenders were teenage boys or men (roughly 90 percent of the arrestees were males in 2013). Therefore, most murders can be categorized as male-on-male. When females get killed, the murderers usually turn out to be males (91 percent of all girls and women were slain by boys and men in 2013). On infrequent occasions when females kill, they tend to slay their own small children or the men in their lives rather than other women.

As for the race of those whose lives were snuffed out prematurely, the UCR recognizes only these categories: white, black, and other (Asians) plus undetermined or unknown. (Note that most Hispanics were counted as whites on the SHRs.) During 2013, roughly half (51 percent) of all those who perished were black, a little less than half were white (45 percent), and the small remain- der (3 percent) were of other races (mostly Asians) or of unknown origin (1 percent). Because half of all those who were killed were black, but only about 13 percent of the population identified them- selves as people of African descent according to the U.S. Census Bureau, these UCR calculations con- firm that black communities across the country

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suffer from disproportionately high rates of lethal violence. Whites, who comprise 78 percent of the population but only 45 percent of the departed, experience disproportionately low risks. Put another way, the dangers of getting murdered are dispropor- tionately higher for blacks than for whites or others. As for ethnicity, the SHRs indicated that 18 percent of all those who were murdered were Hispanic, which is in line with the proportion of the population that was classified as Latino or Hispanic (17 percent) by the Census Bureau (see Harrell, 2007).

As for victim–offender relationships, most slayings turn out to be intraracial, not interracial, a longstanding pattern according to decades of record-keeping (see Wood, 1990). Focusing solely upon lone-offender/single-victim killings carried out during 2013, the UCR’s SHRs documented that 90 percent of black victims were slain by black offenders, and 83 percent of white victims were killed by white perpetrators.

Besides sharp differences in risks by sex and race, murder rates also have varied dramatically by age, a pattern that was discerned decades ago (see Akiyama, 1981). Children between 9 and 12 years old are the least likely age group to be slain. The risks of being murdered rise during the teenage years and peak during the early twenties, between ages 20 and 24. After age 25, the body count drops substantially with each passing year, indicating an inverse relationship: As a person grows older, risks decline smoothly. The typical victims were in their late teens, twenties, and thirties when they were killed. Almost two-thirds (62 percent in 2014) of those who died way before their time were between the ages of 17 and 39. An even higher proportion of perpetrators fall into this age range. As a result, most murders can be charac- terized as young adults slaying other relatively young persons.

So far, this listing of differential risks has been based on the 2013 UCR. But what about the recent past? A statistical portrait of all the people who were slain and all the persons arrested for murder and manslaughter between the years 1980 and 2008 appears in Box 4.1. The picture that emerged from this comprehensive analysis of the FBI’s SHRs shows that the differential risks detected in

2013 are consistent with the patterns that prevailed over almost three decades.

From this review of the demographic factors that are correlated with murder rates, a profile can be drawn indicating which groups of people run the greatest risks of suddenly dying from an act of vio- lence. They are Southerners, urban residents, males, teenagers, and young adults between 18 and 24, and African-Americans. Those who fall into the opposite groups face the lowest risks of all: Northeasterners, residents of small towns in rural areas, females, chil- dren and the elderly, whites, and Asians.

One additional factor profoundly influences the dangers of becoming embroiled in lethal showdowns: financial status. Lower income people fall into the high-risk group while affluent persons enjoy life in the low-risk group. But this pattern cannot be unearthed from the SHRs because police files and FBI compilations do not collect information about the social class of the deceased. However, an analysis of New York City murders determined from death certificates that the overwhelming majority of the victims had never been to college and that the zip code of their last known address often indicated they had resided in a low-income neighborhood. Furthermore, of the persons arrested for these homi- cides, about 85 percent qualified as “indigent” in court and were provided with an attorney at no cost by the government. Furthermore, the majority of crime scenes were located in precincts in poverty- stricken neighbors. These findings underscore the connection between violence and economic stand- ing: Being poor is a major risk factor for getting killed as well as for committing murder. Many murders can be characterized as “poor on poor” (Karmen, 2006).

It seems that the attitudes and behaviors of entire groups—such as males, young adults, low- income earners, and city dwellers—determine, to some degree, their fate.

Changes over Time in Near Death Experiences: Trends in Aggravated Assault Rates

Murder and robbery are the two violent crimes that are the main focus of this chapter, but at this point a look at trends in aggravated assaults also would be

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appropriate. Aggravated or felonious assaults are the most frequent category, outnumbering the other serious interpersonal crimes of violence (murder, rape, robbery) monitored by the UCR every year.

By definition, aggravated assaults result in seri- ous wounds or involve attacks (or threats of harm) with a deadly weapon. Therefore, some aggravated assaults are attempted murders in which the injured

B O X 4.1 A Statistical Picture of Murders in the United States, 1980–2008

An analysis of a massive database of hundreds of thousands of SHRs containing details about homicides committed over a span of 28 years established that the perpetrators and their victims were not a representative cross-section of all Americans. On the contrary, murderers and the people they killed were more likely to be male, young, and black, in terms of their demographic characteristics.

By Sex:

Males were disproportionately involved as the accused perpetrators (nearly 90 percent of all arrestees) and as their targets (over 75 percent of the deceased), although males comprise only about 50 percent of the population. Their rate of offending was about 15 for every 100,000 American boys and men, but for females it was less than 2 arrests per 100,000 girls and women per year. The victimization rate for males was close to 12 per 100,000, but for females it was much lower, close to 3 per 100,000 per year. Clearly, the typical murder was male-on-male.

Males mostly killed other males, but also killed females. Females rarely killed, and when they did, they usually killed males.

By Age:

Americans 18–24 years old made up nearly 11 percent of the population but accounted for more than one-third (38 percent) of all the accused killers and about one-quarter (24 percent) of the deceased. Eighteen- to 24-year olds had the highest rates of offending (29 per 100,000 per year) and of dying violently (17 per 100,000) of any age group. Twenty-five- to 34- year-olds suffered the second highest rate of involvement as offenders as well as victims. Nearly two-thirds of all victims and more than three-quarters of all arrestees were under 35 years of age. Therefore, the typical murder involved young adults killing other young adults.

By Race:

Americans of African descent were overrepresented as both victims and offenders. The victimization rate for blacks was 28 per 100,000 per year while for whites it was less than 5 per 100,000. The offending rate for blacks was over 34 per 100,000 while for whites it was less than 5. People identifying themselves as black comprised about 13 percent of the population but made up nearly half (47 percent) of all those who died violently and a little more than half (53 percent) who were arrested for manslaughter and murder. The typical murder was intraracial. Eighty-four percent of whites were slain by whites, and 93 percent of blacks were killed by blacks.

Victim–offender relationships:

Strangers were responsible for about one-fifth (22 percent) of all homicides in which the police could determine the victim– offender relationship.

Of the remaining 78 percent of killings carried out by nonstrangers, the victim was a spouse in 10 percent of the cases, another family member in 12 percent, and a boyfriend or girlfriend in 6 percent. The remaining half (49 percent) involved other types of acquaintances.

Circumstances:

Arguments over all kinds of miscellaneous matters (other than issues surrounding street gangs and drugs, which are separate categories) made up the largest heading each year.

Homicides involving members of juvenile or adult gangs increased from 220 deaths (about 1 percent of all killings) in 1980 to 960 (about 6 percent) in 2008.

The majority of drug-related and gang-related killings took place in large cities.

SOURCE: Cooper and Smith, 2011.

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parties barely survived (a bullet missed its mark, a stabbing was not fatal, and a severe beating almost claimed a life). To put it differently, homicides are aggravated assaults in which victims do not recover from the wounds inflicted by their adversaries. With some bad luck or poor timing or ineffective medical care, an aggravated assault easily could wind up as a murder. Conversely, with good fortune, a tragedy might be averted by ambulance crews, paramedics, and hospital emergency room personnel, and a vicious act of violence that would have added to the body count remains a near death experience and is officially recorded as an aggravated assault.

Whether a victim of an aggravated assault lives or dies depends on several factors, including the weapon used, the severity of the wound, the injured party’s preexisting health condition, and the quality of medi- cal care received. According to a nationwide study that analyzed the caliber of various trauma care systems in selected counties across the country, a continuous drop in the lethality of assaults since 1960 can be primarily attributed to advances in emergency medicine (Harris, Thomas, Fischer, and Hirsch, 2002). The policy impli- cation is that the most important way to drive the murder rate down is to help critically wounded people stay alive by having competent ER doctors, nurses, and EMTs on call, ready to spring into action.

Both the UCR and the NCVS keep records of the annual number of aggravated assaults. Because two sources of official data can be tapped, a graph depicting changes over time in the rates of assaults with a deadly weapon or serious attacks can have two trend lines: one according to the UCR and the other according to the NCVS. The graph shown in Figure 4.2 displays the estimated rates for aggra- vated assaults committed across the United States from 1973 to 2013.

The NCVS trend line shows that close calls and near death experiences of people shot or stabbed declined slightly in frequency from the early 1970s until the early 1990s. Then the NCVS was rede- signed; the rate of aggravated assaults jumped in part because of the new measurement methods. However, by the end of the 1990s and for several years into the new century, a dramatic improvement in the level of serious interpersonal violence became

evident from NCVS estimates. Between 1993 (when the survey was redesigned and the rate hit a peak) and 2009, aggravated assaults disclosed to NCVS inter- viewers plummeted about 60 percent. By 2013, the rate had leveled off a bit above its lowest point in 40 years, at a little less than 4 persons per 1,000, way down from its peak in the early 1990s at 12 per 1,000.

UCR data shows a somewhat different pattern up to the early 1990s. After years of rising numbers of reports about serious attacks, complaints to the police about felonious assaults peaked in 1993 at about 430 per 100,000 people. From that high point, the level of violence subsided substantially during the second half of the 1990s and continued to diminish gradually through the twenty-first cen- tury, which is the same downward drift indicated by the NCVS line on the graph. The UCR rates combining shootings, stabbings, and other felonious assaults in 2013 were way down at about 230 per 100,000. But unlike the NCVS data points, they still had not quite fallen to their lowest levels in 40 years.

But the good news about this very positive trend must be tempered by a recognition that a growing number of totally innocent persons are sustaining aggravated assaults from gun violence that comes out of the blue.

During 2013, President Obama signed into law the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act. It authorized the U.S. Department of Justice to look into attempted mass killings in places of public use in order to provide federal, state, and local law enforce- ment agencies with data that will help them to better understand how to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from these violent outbursts. The FBI began in 2014 to report about the casualties of “active shooter” incidents, in which an offender attempts to kill people in a confined and populated area such as a school, workplace, shopping center, house of worship, transportation hub, or some other gathering place like a movie theater. The monitoring system does not count all mass killings (of three or more persons) or all mass shootings (for example, gang fights and turf battles between rival drug dealing crews are excluded). It focused on 160 active shooter incidents that broke out between

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2000 and 2013. The gunmen collectively inflicted 1,043 casualties on the general public, murdering 486 people and wounding 557. The median number of people slain per incident was 2, with another 2 injured. During the first seven years from 2000 to 2006, an average of around six incidents broke out each year. During the next seven-year interval up to 2013, more than 16 outbreaks took place annually; so the trend, unfortunately, is upward. The gunfire erupted in 40 of the 50 states, and 60 percent of the attacks were over before the local police could arrive to save lives. Most of the shootings lasted five min- utes or less. Even when the police arrived at the scene in time to intervene, the victims still had to make desperate life-and-death decisions. The worst bloodshed took place at an elementary school, a col- lege campus, an army base, and a movie theater. The year with the highest number of casualties (a total of 90 murdered and 118 victims of aggravated assaults) was 2012; during 2000, only seven people were killed or injured in these kinds of armed attacks.

Ten percent of the shooters went after women with whom they had or formerly had a romantic relation- ship. In 12 of these 16 incidents, these women were killed; an additional 42 innocent onlookers were murdered, and another 28 were wounded. In 13 per- cent of all the incidents (21 of 160), the gunfire stopped after unarmed bystanders and victims coura- geously, safely, and successfully restrained the shooter. The FBI concluded that the study supports the impor- tance of training ordinary citizens (including members of the college campus community) as well as law enforcement officers by holding what-to-do-if exer- cises (FBI, 2014c).

FOCUSING ON ROBBERIES

Robbers are usually complete strangers on the prowl for suitable prey. Therefore, they are among the most feared and hated of all street criminals. The offense combines stealing with extortion or outright violence

NCVSVSV UCRCRC

F I G U R E 4.2 Trends in Aggravated Assaults, United States, 1973–2013

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106 CH APT ER 4

(often including the use of weapons), so it carries some of the stiffest prison sentences permissible under law. And yet, throughout history, bandits were considered much more interesting than their victims, and their exploits were often romanticized. The highwaymen of Robin Hood’s band, pirates who plundered ships laden with treasure, frontier out- laws who ambushed stagecoaches and trains, and gangsters who held up banks during the Great Depression—all were the subjects of stories and songs sympathetic to, or at least understanding of, the impulses that drove their dramatic deeds. But the glitter has largely faded and in its place is the image of the mugger or gunman as a vicious thug, a cruel predator, and an exploiter of weakness—one whose random violence casts a shadow over everyday life. This reversal in the imagery of robbers has sparked renewed concern for their victims.

Robbers and the People They Prey Upon

Completed robberies are face-to-face confrontations in which perpetrators take something of value directly from victims against their will, either by force or by threats of violence. Whether the holdup is completed or just attempted, the law considers armed robberies more serious than unarmed ones (strong-arm robberies, muggings, or yokings).

Robberies: Who, How Often, How, Where, When

Because nearly all robbery victims live to tell about their experiences, more details can be gath- ered about them than about people who were murdered. Some limited information about rob- beries that were reported to and solved by local police departments appears annually in the FBI’s UCR.The data indicates the number of incidents and describe the people who were arrested—but not the people who were accosted. The NCVS— not the UCR—is the source to tap to find out “how often, who, how, where, when,” plus information concerning losses, injuries, stolen property recovery rates, and reactions during the confrontations (Harlow, 1987).

Respondents in the sample who confided that they had been robbed within the past six months provided NCVS interviewers with a wealth of data. They described the assailants who robbed them and the weapons used against them, and they disclosed whether the robbers got what they were after, where and when the crimes took place, if they resisted, whether they got hurt, and if so, how seriously. The answers from these unfortunate indivi- duals in the sample were used to derive projections about the experiences of all Americans over the age of 11 who were robbed. To simplify matters, only single-victim/single-offender incidents will be analyzed (Harrell, 2005; 2007).

Nearly 370,000 people were robbed during 2013, according to projections derived from the NCVS sample. That translated to a rate of a little more than 2 per 1,000 persons over the age of 11. In a little more than half of the face-to-face confron- tations, the robbers were unarmed, but in 17 percent they brandished a firearm (almost always a handgun) and in 14 percent they pulled out a knife. Almost 45 percent of the victims (but especially the males) said the offenders were complete strangers, but a surpris- ing proportion, 17 percent (almost exclusively the female victims), characterized the robber as an “intimate” and another 11 percent recognized the offender as a relative. Most of the rest (22 percent) were described as acquaintances, either casual or even well-known. Over 67 percent of the indivi- duals who were robbed that year informed the police about their harrowing experiences, according to the BJS analysis tool customized report (BJS, 2014).

The primary motive behind robbery is theft. But offenders did not always get what they wanted. About one-quarter (27 percent) of robberies ended up as unsuccessful attempts to steal cash and valu- ables. The typical victim lost about $150. Most often, they were relieved of personal effects such as portable electronic or photographic gear, and jewelry, followed by purses and wallets containing credit cards and cash. Most robbery victims never recovered any of these valuables on their own or after an investigation by the police in 2008, the last year that such detailed analyses were available (NCVS, 2011).

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Robbers, armed or not, hurt their victims for a number of reasons. They may do so initially to intimidate the target into submission. They may become violent during the holdup in reaction to resistance, lack of cooperation, or stalling. Offen- ders may relish taking advantage of a helpless per- son or may seize the opportunity to show off to accomplices. Injuring their targets may be a sign of panic, disappointment in the haul, anger, scorn, contempt, sadism, or loss of self-control. Unleash- ing violence may also be instrumental: Wounding individuals can render them incapable of later identifying the robbers, pursuing them, or even calling for help. Explosive outbursts at the end of the transaction may be intended to shock, stun, or preoccupy victims, their associates, and any bystanders so that they will hesitate to sum- mon the police.

Despite all these possible motives for inflict- ing injuries, most robbers didn’t wound their victims. Only a little more than one-third (37 percent) of those who suffered either completed or attempted robberies were wounded. How- ever, some who escaped injuries were grabbed, shoved, and otherwise roughed up. Among the wounded, most victims experienced minor inju- ries, such as cuts, scratches, bruises, and swel- lings. A small proportion suffered serious injuries, such as broken bones, lost teeth, loss of consciousness, or gunshot wounds that required medical care in a hospital emergency room. About 8 percent of robbery victims in 2008 incurred medical expenses, usually from visiting a hospital emergency room (BJS, 2011). Similarly, in 2013 about 40 percent of the people who were accosted told interviewers they were injured in the incident, but most of them (62 percent) did not need any medical treatment for their wounds, according to the customized table generated by the BJS analysis tool.

Changes over Time in Robbery Rates

Robbery is often cited as the offense most people worry about when they express their fears about

street crime. Robbery is a confrontational crime in which force is used, or violence is threatened (…“or else”). Figure 4.3 displays the trends in rob- bery rates according to UCR and NCVS data. The UCR trend line shows that robberies soared after 1977, peaked in 1981, plunged until 1985, and then shot up again to record levels in the early 1990s. After that, reports of muggings and holdups plummeted impressively until 2001. Known cases of robberies largely continued to drift downward during the first decade of the twenty-first century (bottoming out in 2010), and then ending up in 2013 a little above their lowest level in 40 years (FBI, 2014b).

The NCVS trend line tells a very similar, but not identical, story. It indicates that the robbery rate fell between 1974 and 1978, rebounded until 1981 when it hit an all-time high, dropped sharply dur- ing the early 1980s, but then climbed back up from 1985 until 1994. The robbery rate then tumbled an impressive 65 percent between 1993 and 2002 before creeping back up a little. By 2013, disclo- sures to interviewers about robberies had reached their lowest levels since the NCVS surveys began 40 years earlier.

Checking Out Whether More Robberies Are Turning into Murders

One bit of good news about robbery is often over- looked: Most victims are not injured, and of those who are, most don’t need medical attention in an emergency room. And yet, because robbery is such a potentially devastating crime, a troubling question ought to arise: How often do robberies escalate into murders? In other words, what are the chances of being killed by a robber? Robbers may wound their victims (and perhaps inadvertently kill them) to quell resistance or to prevent them from calling for help and reporting the crime or to intimidate them from pressing charges and testify- ing in court.

On occasion, claims are made that robbers these days are more viciously violent than ever before. The impression that robbers kill more readily “these days” than in the past is part of a

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gloomy larger perception that American society is falling apart, that civilization is collapsing, and that predators today are more depraved than ever before. In the aftermath of a particularly gruesome slaying, journalists sometimes play up this theme. But this is nothing new.

For example, during the “good old days” of the 1940s and 1950s, when street crime was not a major issue in electoral campaigns because it wasn’t per- ceived to be a pressing problem, some people feared robbers would kill them even if they surrendered without a fight and cooperated. A reporter at the time (Whitman, 1951, p. 5) wrote: “The hoodlum will bash in your head with a brick for a dollar and ninety-eight cents. The police records of our cities are spotted with cases of ‘murder for peanuts’ in which the victims, both men and women, have been slugged, stabbed, hit with iron pipes, hammers, or axes, and in a few cases kicked to death—the loot being no more than the carfare a woman carried in her purse or the small change in a man’s pocket.”

Several decades later, a newsmagazine’s cover story (Press et al., 1981, p. 48) titled “The Plague of Violent Crime” observed: “Another frightening difference in the crime picture is that life is now pitifully cheap. Law enforcement officials think they have witnessed a shift toward gratuitous slaughter. ‘It used to be Your money or your life,’says a Bronx assistant district attorney.… ‘Now it’s Your money and your life.’”

So a journalist had the impression at the start of the 1950s that robbers were becoming more vicious. The same assertion was made by a journalist at the start of the 1980s. Were these fright- ening media images based on facts? Is it true, as some people fear, that more and more robberies are esca- lating into murders (see Cook, 1985, 1987)? Researchers must undertake a fine grained analysis. Victimologists can combine UCR statistics on mur- ders and NCVS findings about robberies to shed some light on this grisly question (see the data assem- bled in Table 4.3 inside Box 4.2).

NCVSVSV UCRCRC

F I G U R E 4.3 Trends in Robberies, United States, 1973–2013

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A CLOSE R LOOK AT THE VICTIMS OF INTERP ERSONAL C RIME S OF VIOLENCE AND T HEFT 109

Differential Risks: Which Groups Get Robbed the Most and the Least Often?

To discover patterns in robberies, researchers must sort through data collected each year about various groupings of people and households that participated in the NCVS survey. According to the NCVS for 2013, the robbery rate was 2.4 per 1,000. That means just about 2 individuals out of every 1,000 residents over the age of 11 got robbed that year. But, just as with murder rates, sharp differences in robbery risks become evident when the odds facing

the average American are disaggregated or decon- structed. Breaking down the NCVS sample into subcategories, certain demographic groupings were robbed much more often than others. Patterns that prevailed when robbery was a huge problem in 1993 and patterns that still persisted when the robbery rate was dramatically lower in 2013 can be discerned from the data assembled in Table 4.4.

To put the issue bluntly, although everyone might be apprehensive about being robbed at a cer- tain time and place, particular groups of people have a lot more to fear on a regular basis than

B O X 4.2 “Your Money or Your Life!”

Using both the UCR and the NCVS, it is possible to derive rough estimates of how many robbery victims get killed each year, and whether that percentage is growing or shrinking.

The number of robberies committed annually can be estimated from NCVS figures. However, the NCVS excludes robberies of establishments like convenience stores and banks and thereby unavoidably undercounts commercial robberies where some employee or bystander might get slain. UCR figures are always smaller because they represent only the robberies known to the police. The SHRs’ annual number of slayings that were felony murders starting out as robberies is surely an undercount because homicide detectives are unable to determine the motive and solve the crime in around one-third of all cases. Also, in certain murders, the killer might have robbed the deceased person’s corpse as an afterthought, according to a study of robbery-related homi- cides in Baltimore during 1983 (see Loftin, 1986).

Acknowledging these methodological caveats, rough calculations can be performed to derive ballpark estimates of how often targeted individuals—whether they are cooperat- ing or resisting—are murdered by robbers. (See the data assembled in Table 4.3.)

Several tentative conclusions can be reached from this statistical evidence drawn from official sources: The nationwide annual death toll is disturbing but at least it is diminishing. Nearly 2,500 people died at the hands of rob- bers in 1980, and about 685 perished in 2013. But, thank- fully, slayings committed during the course of holdups are rare, considering the huge numbers of confrontations (well over a million in 1980, nearly 370,000 in 2013) in which a life could have been taken along with money or possessions. In 2013, the proportion of robbery victims who were slain— less than two-tenths of 1 percent, was within the same range as during the past 33 years. So predators these days are not more inclined to snuff out the lives of their prey while trying to relieve them of their valuables before making their escape.

And yet, this advice remains sound: When accosted by an armed offender who growls, “Your money or your life!” statistics confirm that the correct response is to hand over the money and hang on to your life, according to a detailed study of more than 100 solved homicides that occurred in Chicago during 1983 (Zimring and Zuehl, 1986).

T A B L E 4.3 Yearly Estimates of Murders Committed During Robberies

1980 1990 2000 2010 2013

Number of persons murdered (from the UCR) 23,040 23,438 15,586 14,748 12,253 Number of persons murdered during a robbery (from the UCR)

2,488 2,156 1,077 780 686

Total number of robbery victims (from the NCVS) 1,179,000 1,150,000 732,000 480,750 369,000 Murdered victims as a percentage of all robbery victims 0.21% 0.19% 0.14% 0.16% 0.19%

SOURCE: FBI’s UCR, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2013; BJS’s NCVS, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2013.

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others. The differential risks vary dramatically by demographic characteristics.

Starting with sex, the first pattern that stands out is that males are singled out more often than females. The rate for males was 11 per 1,000 in

1993, compared to 6 for females. By 2013, boys and men were getting robbed a lot less frequently than in 1993 (down sharply to just 3 per 1,000) but they still tangled more often with robbers than girls and women (down substantially to just 2 per 1,000).

With regard to race and ethnicity, in 1993 blacks and Hispanics were accosted several times as often as whites and others (mostly Americans of Asian ancestry). By 2013, the rates for all four racial and ethnic groups had tumbled and the differences had nearly disappeared, although whites still enjoyed lower risks than blacks, Hispanics, and others.

As for age, the analysis of the survey’s findings for 1993 revealed that younger people (between the ages of 15 and 34) were confronted much more often than older people. Individuals in their late teens faced the gravest risks of all. After those peak years, risks decline steadily with advancing age. In other words, an inverse relationship prevails: As age increases, the dangers of being robbed decrease. In 2013, the differences in victimization rates had narrowed dramatically but the overall pattern persisted: People younger than 35 were targeted more often than those who were older. Contrary to the impression that robbers prefer to prey upon the elderly and frail, the statistics dem- onstrate that senior citizens are singled out the least often of any age group.

Family income also appeared to be negatively correlated with robbery rates. As income increased, the chances of being robbed generally decreased, with just one exception. In 1993, the differences between the lowest and highest income groups were dramatic. Twenty years later, the gap had narrowed considerably, but the pattern persisted: The desperately poor were robbed of their meager possessions much more often than others with higher household incomes. Clearly, robbers are no Robin Hoods.

Robbery is thought to be a big-city problem, and that perception is supported by the data.

In 1993, residents of urban areas were targeted much more often than suburbanites, while inhabi- tants of small towns and rural areas led safer lives. Inhabitants of the largest cities with populations of

T A B L E 4.4 Robbery Rates for Various Groups, 1993 and 2013

Victim Characteristics 1993 Rate 2013 Rate

Overall rate 8 per 1,000 2 per 1,000 Sex

Male 11 3 Female 6 2

Race and Ethnicity White 7 2 Black 21 3 Other 9 4* Hispanic 14 3

Age 15–17 13 3* 18–20 16 3* 21–24 11 4 25–34 11 4 35–49 6 2 50–64 2 2 65 and older 2 0.4*

Family income** Less than $7,500 15 10 $7,500–$14,999 12 8 $15,000–$24,999 10 5 $25,000–$34,999 6 2 $35,000–$49,999 6 3 $50,000–$74,999 7 1 $75,000 or more 5 0.6 Location of the Incident

Urban 15 3 Cities with more than 1 million residents

34** 4

Suburban 7 2 Rural 4 2*

Marital status** Married 3 0.8 Widowed 2 3* Divorced 12 4 Separated 19 9* Never married 17 4

NOTES: Rates are per 1,000 people with these characteristics per year. All rates are rounded off to the nearest whole number, except for those smaller than 1.0. *Estimate is based on very few cases and could be unreliable. **Figure is for 1995, not 1993.

SOURCE: BJS’s Victimization Analysis Tool, 2014.

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over 1,000,000 suffered a shockingly high victimi- zation rate of 33 per 100,000. Two decades later, city people still faced higher risks and country peo- ple still enjoyed lower odds, but the dangers of get- ting robbed in all areas had tumbled, especially in the nation’s largest cities.

In addition to sex, age, race and ethnicity, income, and area of residence, marital status made a big difference: In 1993, individuals who had never been married or who were separated or divorced endured much higher robbery rates than either married or widowed people (who generally were older and tended to be female). By 2013, risks were lower for all groups (except for the widowed, but that statistic was based on very few cases), but the pattern persisted: Those who were not married were more likely to find themselves in trouble. Chances are that most robbers don’t check for wed- ding rings before striking; lifestyle choices may explain the disparate rates. This pattern provides an important clue that will be cited later to explain differential risks.

To sum up the patterns gleaned from Table 4.5, in both the early 1990s and on the safer streets dur- ing 2013, higher robbery risks were faced by men rather than women; minorities than whites; younger people than middle-aged or elderly people; single individuals than married couples; poor people than those who are better off financially; and city residents than those living in suburbs or small towns. Com- bining these factors, the profile of the person facing the gravest dangers of all is an impoverished, young, black or Hispanic man living in an inner-city neigh- borhood. Affluent, elderly white ladies living in rural areas lead the safest lives.

Unfortunately, the NCVS does not calculate a victimization rate for comparison purposes for an individual who falls into all of the high-risk or all of the low-risk subcategories. However, the sur- vey findings cited in Table 4.4 indicated that black teenage boys living in low-income families and residing in the biggest cities (thereby falling into all five of the high-risk categories) must have suf- fered a robbery victimization rate in the “bad old days” of the early 1990s that was off the charts compared with persons from other backgrounds.

However, two decades later, people falling into this highest risk grouping faced dramatically improved odds of avoiding a sharply reduced number of robbers on the prowl.

One additional variable is worthy of consideration—occupation. Robbery rates differ substantially depending on the nature of a person’s work. Statistics from the NCVS indicated that peo- ple holding the following (generally less desirable) jobs were much more likely to be robbed: taxi dri- vers, gardeners, busboys, dishwashers, carnival and amusement park workers, car wash attendants, mes- sengers, newspaper carriers, peddlers, and certain construction workers. However, musicians and composers, painters and sculptors, and photogra- phers also were victimized at above-average rates. Least likely to be accosted were inspectors, line workers, bank tellers, opticians, farmers, profes- sional athletes, elementary school teachers, engi- neers, and psychologists (Block, Felson, and Block, 1985). Another study determined that retail sales workers, especially clerks at convenience stores and liquor stores, were robbed the most, along with cab drivers. College professors faced the lowest risks of being accosted (Warchol, 1998).

Differential risks also show up clearly when a particular kind of robbery—carjacking—is the focus of attention. Some people are more likely than others to have their vehicles taken from them by robbers, as the information assembled from official sources in Box 4.3 indicates.

In general, it appears that the daily activities of individuals as well as the behavior patterns of entire groups—such as poor young men living in cities— determine, to some degree, whether or not robbers will single them out as possible prey.

The takeaway message in the graphs depicted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 confirm that the rates of these three violent crimes have fallen dramatically, even crashed, from their historically high levels that were socially as well as politically intolerable. In general, Americans have been getting along much better with each other since the early 1990s, even during the hard times of the Great Recession that devel- oped during 2008 and persisted for several years. The dramatic downward trends in murders,

112 C H A P T E R 4

aggravated assaults, and robberies (see above) through 2013 indicate that even the nation’s mean- est streets have become substantially safer. But to conclude from these very positive developments that began during the early 1990s that the “worst is over” might be overly optimistic. No criminolo- gist or victimologist knows for sure why crime rates rise and fall, or what the future holds. Predictions about upcoming crime waves or crashes must be based on projected changes in a number of

underlying variables. Developments in some of these root causes are very hard to anticipate. Another crime wave could break out, or the unan- ticipated but much welcomed improvement in America’s crime problem might continue for an additional number of years. But it is safe to con- clude that the ranks of victims were not growing during the twenty-first century as rapidly as they were during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when pessimists made dire predictions that violence

B O X 4.3 Carjacked Drivers

In the movies, as well as in real life, motorists are yanked out of their cars and trucks by highwaymen who hop in behind the wheel and make a quick getaway. In the early 1990s, the catchy term carjacking was coined to describe the robbery of a motor vehicle directly from a driver, as distinct from the theft of a parked car. Once the crime had a name, the news media started to report the most outrageous cases (such as the death of a woman who, while trying to rescue her toddler from the back seat of her commandeered BMW, became entangled in her seat belt and was dragged more than a mile).

Police departments began to keep track of carjacking incidents separately from the general category of “robberies of all types,” and state legislatures began to impose stiffer penalties for the crime. In 1993, Congress passed the Anti-Car Theft Act, which made robberies of motorists carried out with a firearm a federal offense, under the legal rationale that vehicles and guns are involved in interstate commerce (see Gibbs, 1993a). The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act made killings arising from carjackings punishable by death.

Although the probability of being robbed of an auto- mobile, SUV, or truck is low, the potential for disastrous consequences is high. With luck, occupants are forced out of their vehicles and left standing at the roadside, shaken but uninjured. However, this frightening type of confrontational crime can easily escalate from a robbery into an aggravated assault, abduction, rape, and even murder.

Because this combination of circumstances is relatively uncommon, researchers had to merge the findings from a number of years of NCVS surveys to assemble a sufficient number of cases to analyze. During each of the 10 years from 1993 to 2002, the NCVS projected that roughly 38,000 carjackings took place nationwide. That worked out to about 0.17 incidents (some involved more than one person)

per 1,000 people, or 17 per 100,000—making this kind of robbery about three times more common than murder. Almost 25 percent of these motorists were hurt; of these casualties, about 9 percent suffered gunshot or knife wounds, broken bones, or internal injuries.

Each year, up to 15 motorists were killed during car- jackings, according to the FBI’s SHRs. As for trends, this kind of holdup, like other varieties of robberies, tapered off after the mid-1990s (Klaus, 2004).

Many of the differential risks surrounding carjackings paralleled the patterns for other robberies. Male motorists faced greater risks of being accosted than females. Cars driven by people from households with incomes less than $50,000 were seized more frequently than vehicles owned by more affluent families (which probably also means that rob- bers took less expensive cars more often than high-end vehicles). Higher risks were faced by black and Hispanic motorists, drivers between the ages of 25 and 49, people who were not married, and city residents (Klaus, 1999a, 2004).

In the vast majority of the incidents, the driver was alone; in almost half of all confrontations, the robber acted alone. Males committed more than 90 percent of these crimes and were armed in about 75 percent of the incidents (45 percent wielded a gun).

Two-thirds of the drivers put up resistance. About one- quarter used confrontational tactics, such as fighting back against the assailant, trying to capture him, chasing him, or threatening him. About one-third tried nonconfrontational tactics like bolting out of the car and/or screaming for help. Nearly all motorists (98 percent) reported their losses to the police if the robber drove away with their vehicle, but only 58 percent of attempts were brought to the attention of law enforcement agencies. About one-quarter of the owners never recovered their vehicles, but about half suffered some financial losses (Klaus, 1999a, 2004).

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by superpredators soon would be getting out of hand and spiraling out of control.

FOCUSING ON BURGLARIES

Burglaries are the most common of all serious crimes tracked by the FBI. Larcenies, which are thefts of all kinds, are more numerous, but more than half were just petty larcenies resulting in minor losses. Burglaries of residences resulted in substantial losses, averaging over $2,100 in 2013, according to the UCR (FBI, 2014a). Residential burglaries are particularly upsetting because the intruder violates one’s private and personal space, and fears about the threat of a surprise return visit can linger for a long time.

Single-family homes are more attractive to bur- glars than apartments, condominiums, and other multifamily residences because private houses have more access points and are more difficult to secure, and often contain greater rewards. However, pri- vate homeowners can take their own initiatives to protect their possessions and usually have both the incentive and the resources to do so. Intrusions are much more likely to occur during the day and on weekdays when the premises are unoccupied than on weekends and at night. Besides preferring to strike when no one is at home, it appears that bur- glars select targets that are familiar to them and convenient (often close to their own homes), acces- sible, easy to watch, and vulnerable (lacking security devices). Specifically, the most likely targets are located near potential offenders (in high-crime urban neighborhoods or in the vicinity of transit hubs, shopping centers, sports arenas, and places where young men and drug abusers congregate), either near busy thoroughfares or on the quiet outskirts of neighborhoods. Houses vacant for extended periods, homes without barking dogs, and those on corners or bordering on alleys or in secluded locations shrouded by shrubbery, walls, or fences attract prowlers. Ironically, mansions with expensive cars parked outside actually dampen interest because they are more likely to remain occupied or to be protected by sophisticated

security systems. Houses that were struck once are more likely to be struck again because the features that determine their attractiveness are difficult to change, because the burglar returns to remove addi- tional goods left behind during the first invasion, or because the burglar has told others about the vul- nerability of this target. Simple tools like screwdri- vers and crowbars typically are used to pry open locks, windows, and doors (Weisel, 2002).

Trends and Patterns in Burglaries

The changes in the burglary rate over a 30-year span appear in Figure 4.4.

Residents of nearly 2.5 million households told NCVS interviewers in 2013 that someone had tried or had succeeded in entering their home to steal things. This translates to a rate of 26 for every 1,000 households, or more than 2 per- cent. That same year, over 1.9 million burglaries were reported to police departments across the nation, according to the UCR. (Roughly 25 per- cent of those break-ins were of commercial establishments and government agencies, not resi- dences; on the other hand, many completed as well as attempted residential burglaries were not brought to the attention of the police.) Burglars carted off an estimated $4.6 billion in stolen goods, yielding an average loss of over $2,000 per incident in 2013 (FBI, 2014b).

NCVS findings can be used to reveal differen- tial risks. Burglars, just like robbers, are the oppo- site of Robin Hoods. They steal from the poor much more than the rich. The dwellings of the most poverty-stricken families in the NCVS, those with an income of under $7,500, suffered at a much higher rate (55 per 1,000 households, which is over 5 percent) than any other financial bracket on the survey in 2013. As for race and ethnicity, white households experienced nearly 23 intrusions or attempted break-ins per 1,000 while black families suffered about 35, and Hispanic families endured just about the same rate, at 34 per 1,000. Family size seems to count. Households of six or more people were burglar- ized at a rate of 53 per 1,000, while individuals

114 C H A P T E R 4

living alone came home to ransacked dwellings much less often, at 30 per 1,000. As for where the targeted home was located, a surprising change has taken place over the years. Burglary used to be a much bigger problem in large cities. In 1996, the burglary rate for urban dwellers in cities with a population of 1 million or more was a shocking 62 per 1,000 households. By 2013, that figure had drifted downward to just 22 per 1,000. The 2013 burglary rate for suburban families also was 22, while it was substantially higher in rural areas, at 30 per 1,000, according to the BJS’s Victimization Analysis Tool. Hence, burglary had shifted from a big city problem to a headache of country living.

It appears that a family’s financial status, deci- sions about where to live, and everyday behaviors determine, to some degree, whether a burglar invades their personal space.

FOCUSING ON MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT Stealing Cars for Fun and Profit

About 556,000 households suffered a vehicle theft (or an attempted vehicle theft) during 2013, a slight bump up from previous years, according to the NCVS. That volume of incidents translated to a rate of a little more than five vehicle thefts for every 1,000 households. The UCR for 2013 indi- cated that police departments across the country received almost 700,000 complaints about com- pleted or attempted thefts of cars, vans, trucks, buses, motorcycles, and ATVs from households (and also from businesses and agencies, which explains why this figure is larger than the number of vehicle thefts estimated by the NCVS), yielding a rate of a bit over 220 thefts for every 100,000 inhabitants. Therefore, both official sources confirm

NCVSVSV

UCRCRC

F I G U R E 4.4 Trends in Burglaries, United States, 1973–2013 NOTE: UCR figures include commercial and office burglaries. SOURCES: FBI’s UCRs 1973–2013; BJS’s NCVSs 1973–2013.

A CLOSE R LOOK AT THE VICTIMS OF INTERP ERSONAL C RIME S OF VIOLENCE AND T HEFT 115

that vehicle theft takes place much less often than larceny or burglary but is much more common than any of the serious violent crimes in the FBI’s crime index.

Surprisingly, some commentators mistakenly portrayed auto theft as the “happy crime” in which no one loses and everyone gains (see Plate, 1975). Their argument proposes that the thief makes money and that the owner is reimbursed by the insurance company and then enjoys the pleasure of shopping for a new car. Meanwhile, the manufacturer gains a customer who wasn’t due back in the showroom for another couple of years, and the insurance company gets a chance to raise comprehensive fire and theft loss premiums and invest that money in profitable ventures.

But in actuality, most victims of auto theft are quite upset for a number of reasons. Many motor- ists devote a great deal of time, effort, and loving care to keeping their vehicles in good shape. Sec- ond, the shock of discovering that the vehicle van- ished touches off a sense of violation and insecurity that lingers for a long time. Third, not all owners purchase theft coverage, usually because they can- not afford it. Even those who are insured almost always must suffer a hefty deductible out of their own pockets, and they might owe more on the car loan than the vehicle is worth, so the insurance payoff does not cover the outstanding balance they must repay. Personal items left in the vehicle are gone, as are any expensive add-ons. The loss is always unanticipated, necessitating time-wasting emergency measures such as filing a complaint at a police station, taking cabs, renting a car, and canceling important appointments. Many end up buying a more expensive replacement. Finally, motorists who collect insurance reimbursement might find that either their premiums are raised or their policies cannot be renewed.

Collectively, vehicle thefts cost owners nearly $4.1 billion, with losses averaging nearly $6,000 per stolen vehicle in 2013, the UCR reported (FBI, 2014). Insurance coverage for comprehen- sive fire and theft damages and losses cost the average policyholder about $140 per year (III, 2011).

Victims of grand theft auto (also termed grand larceny auto, or GLA) ought to notify the police immediately, since the authorities will assume that the owner was behind the wheel if that stolen vehicle is involved in a crime, such as a hit- and-run, or is used as a getaway car in a bank rob- bery. Also, there is a chance of recovering it if the police locate the vehicle after it is pulled over for a traffic violation, parked, or abandoned. If it is insured for comprehensive fire and theft damage and loss, a case number from a law enforcement agency will be necessary in order to receive reimbursement.

Trends in Motor Vehicle Theft

Changes in motor vehicle theft rates over the past few decades are shown in Figure 4.5. One trend line, based on NCVS findings, portrays yearly rates of thefts of noncommercial vehicles disclosed to survey interviewers, whether successful comple- tions or failed attempts, for every 1,000 house- holds. The other trend line, from the UCR, depicts yearly rates of completed or attempted thefts of all motorized vehicles, per 100,000 peo- ple, reported to police departments across the country. Both of these sets of statistics indicate that rates of auto theft rose during the late 1980s, reached an all-time high at the start of the 1990s, subsided as the twentieth century drew to a close, and then dropped further during the first 13 years of the twenty-first century (tumbling an impres- sive 40 percent just from 2001 to 2010, according to the UCR).

By contrast, however, thefts were climbing after the late 1990s for one type of vehicle: motor- cycles. In 1998, about 27,000 were stolen. That number doubled to more than 55,000 by 2003, then soared to around 71,000 in 2004 before drop- ping back down to 56,000 in 2009 and 46,000 in 2012. As more motorcycles filled the roads and as they became more expensive, their attractiveness to thieves rose. Motorcyclists lavish great attention on their cherished possessions by installing high- performance engines and exhaust systems, chromed parts, and specialized frames. The most often stolen

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brands were Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki, and Kawasaki. Harley-Davidson, despite being the most popular bike, ranked in fifth place, comprising just 8 percent of all missing motorcycles. The high- est theft rates burdened owners in California, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Indiana. The cities where a lot of the stealing took place were New York, Las Vegas, San Diego, Indianapolis, and Miami. Just like riding, stealing shows seasonal variations: More thefts are carried out in the summer than in the winter (Scafidi, 2013).

Which Motorists Should Be Most Concerned When Parking?

A truck is stolen from the parking lot of a hotel. Inside it are three presidential seals, three lecterns, and $200,000 worth of electronic equipment,

including a teleprompter. The truck is recovered a few hours later—it was abandoned in the parking lot of another hotel and looted of a high-end audio system. The Department of Defense investi- gates the theft of the unguarded truck from the lot, which was monitored by closed circuit TV, but is unable to determine if this was just a crime of opportunity or whether the equipment used by President Obama to deliver speeches was specifically targeted. (Geller, 2011).

The theft of a truck from the president’s entou- rage is surely a rare occurrence, but it underscores the fact that determined thieves can steal almost any vehicle.

To begin an investigation into differential risks, it is necessary to ask, “Which cars do thieves find most attractive?” The chances of losing a vehicle

NCVSVSV

UCRCRC

F I G U R E 4.5 Trends in Motor Vehicle Thefts, United States, 1973–2013 NOTE: UCR figures include thefts of taxis, buses, trucks, and other commercial vehicles. SOURCES: FBI’s UCRs 1973–2013; BJS’s NCVSs 1973–2013.

A CLOSE R LOOK AT THE VICTIMS OF INTERP ERSONAL C RIME S OF VIOLENCE AND T HEFT 117

depend upon its make, model, and year. A prime consideration centers on the appeal or black market value of the various cars, SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks to those who make a living by repeatedly fencing stolen parts. Professional thieves prowl the streets looking for specific makes and models on their shopping lists. Which parked cars do they enter and drive away most often?

The answer, in the form of a ranking of vehi- cles, should be fairly straightforward. Consumers need to know this information when shopping for used cars (brand new models do not yet have track records) if they are concerned about the chances of their vehicles spirited away or about the costs of insuring them—premiums to cover comprehensive theft and fire damage (coverage for collisions and personal injuries is more impor- tant and more expensive). In other words, crime- conscious motorists ought to be aware of how desirable or undesirable their prized possessions are to thieves cruising around. But each year, the answer to the question, “Which cars are stolen the most” depends upon which organization is asked and which criteria were used to compile the rank- ing (see Gibson, 2004). Three distinct listings that bear little resemblance to each other appear in Table 4.5.

For vehicles stolen during 2013, the list in the second column in Table 4.5 presents the ranking derived by the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB). The NICB analyzes police car theft reports assembled in the database maintained by the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) each year. During 2013, about half of all stolen vehicles were made by domestic automakers and half were produced by foreign manufacturers. What the rank- ing does not show is that a high proportion of the vehicles stolen during 2013 were very old. For example, most of the nearly 54,000 Honda Accords that were stolen across the nation during 2013 first hit the road during the 1990s; relatively few Accords manufactured after 1997 were taken from their rightful owners (not shown in Table 4.5). This pattern is surprising at first until it is realized that the older cars are stolen to be stripped of their sheet metal parts, which are then used to repair crash- damaged newer cars—unless the manufacturer changes the dimensions of the later models (Scafidi, 2014b).

But what about the theft of brand new cars? If only 2013 makes and models that were stolen somewhere within the United States during 2013 are the focus of attention, then an entirely different list emerges. This ranking appears in the third

T A B L E 4.5 Which Vehicle Owners Suffered the Most Thefts?

Rank All Vehicles Stolen During 2013 Make/Model NICB

Only New 2013 Models Stolen During 2013 NICB

Theft Rate of 2011 Models Stolen During 2011 NHTSA Rate per 1,000

1 Honda/Accord Nissan/Altima Dodge/Charger 5 2 Honda/Civic Ford/Fusion Mitsubishi/Galant 4 3 Chevrolet/Pickup Trucks Ford/Full Size Pickup Cadillac/STS 4 4 Ford/Pickup Trucks Toyota/Corolla Lamborghini/Gallardo 4 5 Toyota/Camry Chevrolet/Impala Hyundai/Accent 4 6 Dodge/Pickup Trucks Hyundai/Elantra Chevrolet/HHR 3 7 Dodge/Caravan Dodge/Charger Chevrolet/Aveo 3 8 Jeep/Cherokee Chevrolet/Malibu Chevrolet/Impala 3 9 Toyota/Corolla Chevrolet/Cruze Nissan/Infinity FX35 3 10 Nissan/Altima Ford/Focus Nissan/GT-R 1 3

NOTES: Column 1: NICB rankings are based on a grand total of the number of thefts of a particular make and model manufactured in previous years that were stolen during 2013, according to the FBI’s NCIC database. Column 2: NICB rankings are based on the number of thefts of a particular make and model manufactured in 2012–2013 that were stolen during 2013, according to the FBI’s NCIC database. Column 3: NHTSA rankings also are drawn from the FBI’s NCIC as well as manufacturers’ production totals. Theft rate is per 1,000 vehicles manufactured and sold to the U.S. public during 2011 and is rounded off to the nearest integer.

SOURCE: First list from NICB (Scafidi, 2014b), second list from NICB (Stewart, 2014), third list from NHTSA (2014).

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column. It also was compiled by the NICB and is derived from the FBI’s NCIC database.

A completely different ranking appears in the fourth column. This list is based on a theft rate for each vehicle that is calculated by taking into account not only the number of cars of a given make and model that are reported stolen to the police (in 2011, the latest year available) but also the number of these cars (not SUVs or trucks) that were produced and sold during 2011. In other words, this third and final ranking uses “number owned by motorists” as its denominator. The resulting rate is the number reported stolen (during 2011) for every 1,000 cars of this type on the road (during 2011). This list from the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) also is calculated from stolen car reports in the FBI’s NCIC database. (No ranking system uses insurance company files about vehicles reported by their owners as stolen.) This ranking appears in the fourth column of Table 4.5.

Obviously, Table 4.5 demonstrates that there are no simple and direct answers to the crucial ques- tions, “Which cars are most attractive to thieves?” and “Which drivers should be most cautious about where they park their cherished possession?” The key risk factors appear to be the make, model, and year of the car; its resale value; the demand for it by chop shops that fence stolen parts; and how easy or difficult it is to break into, start up, and drive away. Insurance records confirm a counterintuitive pat- tern: For several reasons, as cars age, they are more likely to be targeted. If the model lines are not substantially redesigned, then stolen sheet metal crash parts from the older cars can be used by illicit collision body shops to repair damaged newer ones. Also, older cars are less likely to be equipped with the latest state-of-the-art antitheft devices that thieves have not yet learned how to defeat. Another reason is that as cars wear out and depre- ciate, their owners have less incentive to maintain security devices in good working order and to vigi- lantly observe precautions about where they park their less valuable vehicles. Because most cars have a life expectancy of 7–10 years, security experts warn owners never to let their guard down (see

Clark and Harris, 1992; NICB Study, 1993; and Krauss, 1994).

Finally, to make matters more complex, the desirability of particular vehicles on the black market varies around the country. For example, thieves concentrated on Japanese models in Los Angeles, pickup trucks in Dallas, and American sedans in Chicago, reflecting the preferences of consumers in those metropolitan areas (Sparkman, 2003). The insurance industry generates detailed lists annually of the most frequently targeted cars that are tailored for every state and even each large city so that companies can maximize their profits by fine-tuning premiums to reflect payouts to their local customers for theft losses.

Differential risks are determined by a number of factors besides the attractiveness of the target in the stolen car market. Another set of determinants of risk must be the number of professional thieves and chop shops operating in a given area, as well as the effectiveness of the efforts by local police departments to put them out of business.

As for geography, where a vehicle is parked is a key variable. Owners in the South and West suf- fered substantially higher theft rates than in the North and Midwest. Residents of urban areas reported their cars stolen more often than suburba- nites and people living in rural areas. The significance of the geographic factor is illustrated in Table 4.6, which demonstrates how important the location where the car is parked is when it comes to vehicle theft. This listing of vehicle theft rates for many of the nation’s metropolitan areas is based on data from police reports collected by the FBI and analyzed by the NICB (Toups, 2014; and Scafidi, 2014a).

From a motorist’s point of view, this ranking indicates that the meanest streets to park a car are in California’s metropolitan areas. In general, drivers in Western states have the most to worry about in terms of their vehicles vanishing. Those who find parking spaces in downtown areas of a metropolitan area usu- ally have even more to fear than those who park in that city’s nearby suburbs. Some cities that have a reputation for being safe in terms of violence, such as San Jose and San Diego, are not so safe for parked cars; conversely, some places like New Orleans and

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St. Louis that are known to be dangerous in terms of being murdered are not so risky when it comes to leaving vehicles unattended (refer back to Figure 4.1). Drivers who walk away from their cars in the university towns of Madison, Wisconsin; Bingham- ton, New York; and State College, Pennsylvania, can rest assured (statistically speaking) that their vehicles will still be there when they return.

Combining the findings displayed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, it can be concluded that motorists who drive vehicles that are on thieves’ hottest cars list and who park them on the meanest streets of cer- tain hot spot metropolitan areas face unusually high odds of discovering that their prized possession has disappeared.

Besides vehicle attractiveness and geographic location, two other factors surely influence the vulnerability of a parked car: the effectiveness of factory-installed and after-market add-on antitheft devices, and the immediate microenvironment— such as traffic patterns, the presence or absence of pedestrians, and the intensity of lighting at night in the vicinity of the street, driveway, or lot where the vehicle sits unguarded. These two factors are under the control of individuals to some degree, except that many motorists cannot afford secure but expensive parking arrangements and costly antitheft hardware.

Once again, various categories of people face either higher or lower levels of danger from criminals. In terms of differential risks, those who

T A B L E 4.6 Vehicle Theft Rates in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2013

Metropolitan Area Rank

Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000 Residents Metropolitan Area Rank

Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000 Residents

Bakersfield, CA 1 725 Las Vegas, NV 27 395 Fresno, CA 2 710 Omaha, NE 28 390 Modesto, CA 3 680 Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA 29 385 San Francisco/Oakland, CA 4 650 Little Rock, AK 30 385 Stockton, CA 5 635 Houston, TX 35 365 Redding, CA 6 625 Atlanta, GA 48 315 Spokane, WA 7 600 Denver–Mesa, CO 50 310 Vallejo/Fairfield, CA 8 600 New Orleans, LA 51 305 San Jose/Santa Clara, CA 9 570 Cleveland, OH 52 300 Yuba City, CA 10 550 Portland, OR 54 300 Riverside/San Bernardino, CA 11 525 Milwaukee, WI 59 295 Odessa, TX 12 510 Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL 65 280 Seattle/Tacoma, WA 13 500 Tucson, AZ 68 275 Merced, CA 14 495 Honolulu, HI 69 275 Visalia/Porterville, CA 15 490 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 70 270 Salinas, CA 16 490 Chicago, IL, 82 255 Salt Lake City, UT 17 470 St. Louis, MO 93 235 Chico, CA 18 470 Minneapolis, MN–St. Paul, WI 131 185 Yakima, WA 19 465 Philadelphia, PA 138 180 Albuquerque, NM 20 445 Boston–Cambridge, MA 235 125 Grants Pass, OR 21 440 New York City, NY–Newark, NJ 242 120 Oklahoma City, OK 22 440 Pittsburgh, PA 310 80 Detroit/Dearborn, MI 23 430 Madison, WI 320 75 Sacramento, CA 24 410 Binghamton, NY 365 45 Wichita, KS 25 405 State College, PA 379 25 San Diego, CA 26 400

NOTES: The boundaries of metropolitan statistical areas are defined by the U.S. Census and often include nearby counties and suburban towns. Rankings were calculated by the NICB based on UCR rates. Rates are rounded to the nearest 5.

SOURCE: NICB, 2014b.

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faced the greatest odds of losing their cars were apartment dwellers, residents of inner-city neighbor- hoods, African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans, low-income families, and households headed by people under the age of 25. Those whose cars were least likely to be stolen were residents of rural areas, homeowners, and people over age 55, accord- ing to an analysis of a database of more than 12 million attempted and completed vehicle thefts dis- closed to NCVS interviewers between 1973 and 1985 (Harlow, 1988).

Decades later, the pattern was similar. Motorists in big cities with a population of a million or more lost their cars to thieves at a rate of 10 per 1,000 households per year. In rural areas, the theft rate was only 3 per 1,000. White families living in the suburbs experienced a vehicle theft rate of 2, while black families living in cities suffered much more, nearly 9 thefts per 1,000 households. Cars owned by people between 20 and 34 years old disappeared at a rate of 9 per 1,000 households, compared to just 2 for motorists over 65, according to the BJS’s Victimization Analysis Tool of NCVS 2013 data.

It seems that drivers’ decisions about where to reside, spending priorities, and parking habits—in other words, their attitudes and behaviors— determine, to some degree, the fate of their vehicles.

FOCUSING ON INDIVIDUALS WHOSE IDENTITIES WERE STOLEN

The crime of identity theft undermines the basic trust on which our economy depends. When a person takes out an insurance policy, or makes an online purchase or opens a savings account, he or she must have confidence that personal financial information will be protected and treated with care. Identity theft harms not only its direct victims, but also many businesses and customers whose confidence is shaken. Like other forms of stealing, identity theft leaves the victim poor and feeling terribly violated.

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, 2004 (REMARKS WHEN SIGNING THE IDENTITY THEFT PENALTY ENHANCE-

MENT ACT)

The Nature of the Problem and How Many People Experience Its Aggravations

Throughout history, people seeking to evade cap- ture have used disguises, false papers, and aliases to pass themselves off as someone else. Spies, sabo- teurs, infiltrators, terrorists, and fugitives from jus- tice used fictitious histories, documents, and résumés to fool authorities. But now computer databases and high-tech devices provide incen- tives for impersonators for a different reason: monetary gain.

The relatively new, increasingly sophisticated, and surprisingly common white-collar crime of identity theft arises from the illegal appropriation of someone’s personal information—such as the individual’s name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, and mother’s maiden name. Identity fraud is defined as the unauthorized use of another individual’s personal information to try to achieve illicit financial gain. Identity thefts are measured as attempted as well as successful misuses of these personal identifiers to loot an existing account (for example, a bank savings or checking account) or to open a new account (for instance, with a telephone or credit card com- pany), plus impersonations for other fraudulent purposes (such as to collect undeserved govern- ment benefits like someone else’s income tax refund) (Javelin Strategy and Research, 2011; and Langton and Planty, 2011).

Even though identity theft is a relatively new type of offense, it draws upon traditional interper- sonal crimes such as pickpocketing, thievery, rob- bery, and burglary of wallets as well as established white-collar crimes like forgery, counterfeiting, fraud, and impersonation. For example, those who steal cars might be able to parlay a vehicle theft into an identity theft if the driver left a copy of the license or registration in the glove compartment and a laptop, smartphone, briefcase, or wallet in the trunk (ITRC, 2014a). Cutting-edge criminals increasingly commit their offenses online by compromising other people’s existing Internet accounts (such as Amazon, eBay, and PayPal). These high-tech fraudsters also engage in account

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takeovers in which they add new properties to somebody else’s existing utility account (such as for a smartphone) and run up huge unauthorized charges for premium services (Javelin, 2014).

No one is immune from being preyed upon, not even the most wealthy and privileged, as the following example shows.

A purse, containing a checkbook and a Social Security card, is swiped from the wife of the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank while she is sitting in a coffee shop. Months later, a woman is arrested who uses wigs to impersonate her victims when cashing bad checks and draining their accounts. It turns out that she is part of a sophisticated ring that defrauded more than $2 million from hundreds of people who banked at 10 financial institutions. (Lucas and Melago, 2009)

Victims of identity theft were discovered dur- ing the 1990s when nearly all state legislatures criminalized the unlawful possession of personal identification information for the purposes of committing fraud. Hearings held by congressional committees during the 1990s revealed that police departments usually did not view individuals whose identities were appropriated by fraudsters as actual victims, since the immediate monetary losses usually were incurred by credit card compa- nies, not account holders. In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deter- rence Act. The legislation made it a federal crime to knowingly transfer and use any name or num- ber without lawful authority in order to commit or aid and abet any illegal activity. The law not only imposed stiff sentences and fines on those who committed this new federal offense but also stipulated that the impersonated individual was a crime victim deserving of financial protection and entitled to reimbursement via court-ordered resti- tution obligations imposed on convicted thieves. However, a persistent problem is that this crime often goes unreported, uninvestigated, and/or unsolved. In 2000, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) urged police depart- ments that were reluctant to accept complaints to

revise their policies and provide incident reports and other forms of assistance to impersonated individuals (Newman, 2004). A provision of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 enabled customers to get one free credit report each year (from www.annualcreditreport .com) so they can check for any suspicious activity in their accounts at the three major companies. Congress authorized the Department of Home- land Security to get involved when it passed the REAL ID act in 2005 (NCJRS, 2005; Kelleher, 2006; and President’s Task Force, 2007). State laws require companies and agencies to notify their customers and clients so that they can be vigilant whenever the personal information in their records is stolen by hackers.

Reports of ID thefts do not wind up in the tallies of incidents known to the police in any category of Part 1 of the FBI’s UCR. Although the huge grouping entitled “larceny-theft” includes all kinds of acts of stealing, whether petty or grand larcenies, it specifically excludes aspects of identity thefts that appear in Part 2 (but only if there is an arrest), such as embezzle- ments, forgeries, check frauds, and confidence games and other scams (Velasquez, 2013). In other words, because of outdated definitions, acts of stealing carried out by breaking a window or snatching an unguarded purse are counted, while incidents of stealing perpetrated by using a skimmer, a keyboard, or a spyware program are not counted as larceny-thefts.

Several problems continue to undermine the effectiveness of efforts by law enforcement agencies to come to the aid of identity theft victims. First, many officers lack necessary training, and their departments lack the needed resources to provide an adequate response. Second, multijurisdictional complications undercut an agency’s commitment to follow through on a complaint. When a victim in one city reports to a local police department that a thief has stolen personal information and is carry- ing out fraudulent financial transactions in another city, state, or country, which law enforcement agency bears primary responsibility for seeing the investigation through to completion?

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If the authorities seem unsympathetic, betray skepticism, and appear reluctant to officially file their complaints and take action, victims under- standably get upset. They sense that they are being suspected of wrongdoing as they fill out forms that must be notarized, telephone merchants who are demanding payment, fend off collection agencies, and write lengthy explanations to credit rating bureaus. They bear the burden of proof and are held financially responsible unless and until they can establish their innocence and clear their names.

Because law enforcement countermeasures are not yet effective, identity snatchers know that the risks of apprehension, conviction, and punishment are relatively low, while the returns are potentially high. These crimes are difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to investigate, especially when mul- tiple jurisdictions are involved. In fact, offenders exploit these problems by misusing the stolen infor- mation far from the original crime scene, preferably in another county, state, or country (Collins and Hoffman, 2004).

Losses and Suffering

This potentially serious type of larceny can damage a person’s finances, reputation, and credit history, as well as cause great emotional distress that can trig- ger relationship problems. A targeted individual must undertake tasks that are confusing and infuri- ating because the burden of proving innocence falls to the victim.

Identity theft can be viewed as going through a series of stages. People discover they have been preyed upon when they get a call from a credit card fraud division or when a purchase is declined at the point of sale because a card’s limit has been exceeded. Others find out when they are harassed by a bill collector demanding payment on a delin- quent account or when a monthly statement marked “overdue” arrives in the mail. Others notice unauthorized charges on credit card state- ments, peculiar and costly long-distance calls on phone bills, cashed or bounced checks they never wrote, or suspicious withdrawals from their bank accounts. In extreme cases, they discover they

have been targeted when the police take them into custody as a fugitive on an outstanding war- rant, and then it becomes clear that a lawbreaker was released after showing false documents and posting bail. It can take weeks, months, maybe even years before individuals become aware that they have been targeted because the crooks want to get away with the charade for as long as possible. Some don’t discover the extent of the damage until they are denied new credit cards, turned down for student loans, disconnected from utilities, or charged extra high interest rates for mortgages and car loans. Out-of-pocket expenses and time spent on paperwork depend on how long it takes to dis- cover the fraud (Collins and Hoffman, 2004). It takes lower income and less educated people longer to discover the impersonation and consequently they suffer more, in terms of problems with their accounts, harassment by debt collectors, and utility cutoffs (Newman, 2004).

ID theft poses a special problem for military per- sonnel, civilians working for defense contractors, and employees of the criminal justice system who need security clearances. A person who was defrauded might be considered a security risk and could be denied a clearance or might have the privilege of access to classified information revoked if a back- ground check turns up evidence of a maxed out credit card, bounced checks, or an arrest that really was the fault of an impersonator (Velasquez, 2014).

ID scams and swindles exact a serious toll on society as a whole, adding up to billions of dollars in losses annually. New account fraud is more costly but less frequent. Depletion of existing accounts is less common but more expensive to recover from. Businesses sustain most of the financial losses because individuals usually are not held responsible for charges that turn out to be fraudulent. But indi- viduals collectively spend billions in their efforts to repair their credit worthiness. Individuals also suffer indirect costs in the form of businesses’ expenses for fraud prevention and lost revenue that are passed on to them as higher fees; for legal bills to pay for civil litigation initiated by creditors over disputed pur- chases; and for time lost and aggravation they endure while undoing the damage inflicted by the

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impostor (President’s Task Force, 2007, p. 11). Adding business losses to consumer expenses, each incident might cost from $2,800 to $5,100 (Piquero, Cohen, and Piquero, 2011).

Just as the different databases yield inconsistent projections about general prevalence, yearly inci- dence, and twenty-first-century trends, so too are there varying estimates of the actual collective costs of this white-collar crime, and whether overall losses are increasing or decreasing.

Over $13 billion was lost due to identity thefts that took place during 2010, and that figure nearly doubled to $25 billion during 2012, according to the NCVS self-report survey (Harrell and Langton, 2013). However, the impression that losses are being brought under control emerges from the findings of a financial services company’s annual self-report survey that uses a broader definition but a smaller sample. Identity frauds of all kinds cost Americans $48 billion in 2008, rose to $56 billion in 2009, and then plunged to $37 billion in 2010, further tumbled to $21 billion in 2012, and added up to a mere $18 billion in 2013 (Javelin, 2011, 2014).

The next question to be answered is, “In what ways can impersonators hurt their victims?” Unscrupulous impostors can use identifiers to max out existing charge accounts and obtain new credit cards in their target’s name and then run up huge bills that are ignored. ID thieves empty people’s savings accounts and pass bad checks (another type of account takeovers). They secure car loans that will never be repaid based on another person’s credit history and enjoy using gas heat, electricity, cell phones, and landlines while disregarding the costs and consequences of overdue bills. They drive around and get tickets with a license that has their picture but someone else’s name, apply for government benefits and tax refunds they didn’t earn, get hired for jobs by pretending to be an applicant with better credentials, and may even get arrested under an assumed name before jumping bail and disappearing.

One peculiar aspect of identity theft is its para- sitical nature: the offender, unless detected and put out of action, often repeatedly feeds off the same

person in a variety of ways over a prolonged period of time, by maxing out credit cards, emptying bank accounts, and taking out loans that will never be repaid.

Now that the range of possible swindles and scams has been outlined, the question arises, “How did impersonators actually harm their vic- tims?” Table 4.7 shows the relative frequency of each of these forms of fiscal exploitation as the per- centage of all complainants to the FTC’s clearing- house. Credit card fraud was the most common category, afflicting about one-quarter of all victims; loan fraud was the least likely swindle exposed dur- ing 2006. As Table 4.7 reveals, by 2010, credit card fraud, bank account fraud, loan fraud, employment fraud, and cell phone/telephone fraud had dimin- ished, while government benefits fraud (filing a false tax return for a refund) plus assorted other scams had intensified. By 2013, fraud related to govern- ment documents and benefits, especially where thieves collected their victims’ income tax refunds, had grown substantially to become the biggest cat- egory. Other scams, especially credit card fraud, loan fraud, and utilities fraud had declined over the years since 2006, as a comparison of the per- centage of complaints to the FTC in columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 4.7 reveals.

Findings from the NCVS show a slightly dif- ferent ranking. The 2012 NCVS projected that unauthorized use of an existing credit card was the most widespread problem, more common than draining an existing savings or checking account or using personal information to open a new credit card account or to secure a loan (Baum, 2007). In 2010, the most prevalent type of scam continued to be the unauthorized use or attempted use of a credit card, experienced by 3.8 percent of all respondents, which projected to 4.6 million persons across the country. The second most common type of theft was from a bank’s debit, checking, or savings account. Perhaps as many as 1.8 percent of all households, adding up to as many as 2.2 million people experienced this intrusion in 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, there was a decline in the number of households that suffered because some impostor used fraudulent

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documents, such as to obtain undeserved medical treatment charged to someone else’s health insur- ance policy, or to pretend to be the victim when stopped by the police for a traffic violation or a more serious offense (Langton, 2011).

However, estimates and projections about the actual amount of suffering varied dramatically according to different sources. For example, only 1 percent told NCVS interviewers in 2012 that the impersonation caused significant problems at work or school. And merely 4 percent said they experienced significant relationship problems with their families and friends because of the theft. Only 14 percent of those who discovered that their iden- tity had been appropriated by an impostor experi- enced any out-of-pocket expenses. Of these unfortunate persons, about half lost less than $100. As for aggravation, over half of all victims were able

to resolve any problems in just one hour up to one day. However, nearly 30 percent spent a month or more straightening out the mess in which their good names were used for fraudulent purposes. As for their personal reactions, 10 percent told inter- viewers that the theft caused severe emotional dis- tress, and about 25 percent reported moderate levels of distress. When crooks opened brand new accounts and ran up big bills, their victims experi- enced greater financial, credit, and relationship pro- blems and more intense emotional distress. (Harrell and Langton, 2013).

However, according to a different survey, the average fraud loss per incident cost victims about $630 in out-of-pocket expenses in 2010, a substan- tial increase from the 2009 estimate of about $390 per incident. The amount of time it took consu- mers to undo the damage from an identity theft

T A B L E 4.7 How Victims of Identity Theft Were Harmed, Nationwide, 2006, 2010, 2013

Total Number of Complaints 2006

246,000

Total Number of Complaints 2010

251,000

Total Number of Complaints 2013

290,000

Nature of the Crime Percentage of All Complaints

Percentage of All Complaints

Credit Card Fraud Charging items to existing accounts 11 7 6 Opening new accounts in their names 15 9 11

Bank Frauds Draining existing accounts 6 3 2 Receiving electronic fund transfers 8 5 4 Opening new accounts in their names 3 3 2

Utilities Fraud Getting a new cell phone in their names 7 4 4 Getting a new telephone in their names 4 2 1 Getting gas or electric service in their names 6 9 9

Loan Fraud Taking out business/personal/student loans in their names 3 2 2 Taking out auto loans/leases in their names 2 1 1 Taking out mortgages in their names 1 1 1

Employment-Related Fraud Working under their victims’ names 14 11 6

Government Document Frauds Filing false tax returns for refunds in their names and wage fraud 6 16 30 Obtaining driver’s licenses in their names 1 1 1

All Other Purposes and Ways, including attempts 24 29 31

NOTES: Complaints received by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from individuals and participating agencies were rounded off to the nearest 1,000 for the calendar year. Percentages exceed 100 percent due to rounding and because some victims were harmed in more than one way.

SOURCE: Federal Federal Trade Commission Sentinel Network (FTC, 2011, 2014).

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jumped to 33 hours from 21 hours in 2009 (Javelin, 2011).

In sum, reactions can range from a minor annoyance and maybe even mild amusement (in terms of what the thieves purchased using credit cards) to fury about a complicated and costly mess. As a result, a cottage industry has sprung up over the past decade to address the public’s fears and genuine concerns about preventing identity theft and recovering from it. Companies sell protection policies that pledge they will monitor their custo- mers’ financial records for suspicious activities and intercede to repair the damage if successful imper- sonations take place. Whether the fees these com- panies charge and the actual services they deliver are really a wise investment and worth the expenses have not yet been evaluated by victimologists.

The emotional toll of trying to restore their financial reputation can cause some victims to become highly suspicious of other people’s motives and profoundly distrustful of officials and agencies they had counted upon to help them. A wide range of responses are possible, from denial to humiliation to outrage. The level of distress is compounded if the crime is never solved and the real name of the thief never becomes known. Some feel over- whelmed and powerless, as well as ashamed and embarrassed for appearing to be spendthrifts and deadbeats. Others join self-help groups that have websites to share advice and facilitate mutual sup- port with those who know firsthand what it is like to repair a lifetime record of credit worthiness (Busch-White, 2002; and Savage, 2003).

Is the Problem Growing or Subsiding?

How many people know what it is like to be impersonated? How rapidly are their ranks increas- ing? To address these concerns, it is necessary to ask “What are the yearly incidence and longer term prevalence rates?” A wide range of estimates can be found because of variations in the definitions used (what is included and excluded) and the meth- ods of collecting data (complaints filed vs. survey findings and subsequent projections to the entire population). Inconsistencies about definitions of

the crime and its victims persist. Three databases estimate the size of the problem and indicate how its dimensions are changing over time. But the find- ings of these three monitoring efforts do not always match or coincide. The oft-repeated warning that identity theft is America’s fastest growing crime implies a steady upward trend that is difficult to verify. Different impressions can be derived from the data assembled in Table 4.8.

The NCVS is a valuable source of estimates about the prevalence and incidence of identity theft. Questions about identity theft were added to the NCVS in 2004. The percentage of victim- ized households rose between 2005 and 2009 from 5.5 to 7.3 percent but then declined a bit in 2010 to 7 percent. Figures for 2011 are not available, but in 2012 the proportion remained constant at 7 percent of that year’s sample. Therefore, the proportion of the sample that has experienced identity theft had leveled out. In terms of sheer numbers, an esti- mated 16.6 million persons experienced one or more successful deceptions or attempts at imperson- ation in 2012. Over 34 million people over the age of 16 had experienced one or more incidents of attempted or completed identity theft at some point in their lives as of 2012, according to the NCVS (Harrell and Langton, 2013) (see the third column in Table 4.8).

The FTC operates an identity theft data clearinghouse called the Consumer Sentinel Network. It receives information from about 150 law enforcement agencies and collects details from online complaint forms and calls to its hotline (877- IDTHEFT). The FTC bases its estimates about how many people have had their identities stolen on unverified incident reports that have been pour- ing in to this monitoring system since it was set up in 1997 (FTC, 2011). From these complaints, the FTC projected that as many as 8 million Americans suffered from a brush with identify theft during 2008. That figure rose to an estimated 9 million during 2010. As for the actual number of com- plaints, they peaked in 2008 and then declined, but bounced back to an all-time high in 2012 before slipping a bit in 2013 (FTC, 2014) (see the second column in Table 4.8).

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But the number of identity theft victims reached new heights in 2009 before dropping back in 2010. The number of victims then rose substantially for the next three years and in 2013 was not far below its all-time high, according to an annual self-report survey sponsored by a financial services company (Javelin, 2014) (see the last col- umn in Table 4.8).

In sum, as of 2013, the problem of identity theft had stabilized at an intolerably high level that was bothersome to millions of people each year, according to the Justice department’s self- report survey, a private company’s annual survey, and the federal government’s repository for con- sumer complaints. Regardless of which of these three sources of data is cited, two conclusions must be drawn from Table 4.8. First, in terms of trends, the problem of identity theft is no longer steadily getting worse with each passing year. Sec- ond, in terms of relative frequencies, the projected estimates of many millions of individuals and households afflicted by identity theft are much greater each year than the total number suffering from serious property crimes, as recorded by the

UCR as well as the NCVS. The ranks of those who were impersonated by an impostor far out- number the sum total of people whose homes were burglarized and whose motor vehicles were stolen.

As with other categories of interpersonal crime, underreporting undercuts the accuracy of these official and unofficial statistics. Some persons who detect telltale signs of identity theft do not bring their monetary troubles to the attention of law enforcement agencies, and some who do seek assis- tance are rebuffed. In both 2010 and 2013, most persons (a little over 60 percent) who contacted the FTC to file a complaint that their identities were stolen also notified a law enforcement agency about their situation. However, 7 percent said that the police would not take their report (FTC, 2011; 2014). Reporting rates to the police actually might be much lower and declining when measured by a different method. Of all those who told inter- viewers that their identities had been stolen, only about 17 percent filed complaints with their local law enforcement agency in 2007, according to the NCVS (Langton and Planty, 2010). By 2012, the

T A B L E 4.8 Estimates About the Number of Identity Theft Victims per Year, 2001–2013

Source of Estimate and Year

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Complaints and Projections

National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) Households

Javelin Strategy and Research Survey

2001 86,000 not available not available 2002 162,000 not available not available 2003 215,000 15 Million 5% not available not available 2004 247,000 3.6 M 3.1% not available 2005 256,000 8.3 M 3.7% 6.4 M 5.5% not available 2006 246,000 7.9 M 6.7 % 10.6 M 2007 259,000 7.9 M 6.6% 10.2 M 2008 315,000 not available 12.5 M 2009 278,000 8.9 M 7.3% 13.9 M 2010 251,000 9 M 8.6 M 7.0% 10.2 M 2011 279,000 not available 11.6 M 2012 369,000 17 M 7.0% 12.6 M 2013 290,000 not available 13.1 M 6.5%

NOTES: Figures for certain years are not available. For the FTC, figures are for the number of complaints filed with the ID Theft Clearinghouse, rounded to the nearest 1,000. For the NCVS, the number refers to households with victimized persons over the age of 16. The percentage refers to a projection of all U.S. households. For the Javelin survey, the numbers and percentages refer to all adult U.S. residents.

SOURCES: FTC Sentinel annual reports, 2002–2013; BJS NCVS Baum, 2006, 2007; Baum and Langton, 2010; Langton, 2011 Langton and Planty, 2011; Javelin, 2011; 2014).

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reporting rate to the police had slipped to a mere 9 percent (although nearly 90 percent reported the misuse to a credit card company or bank, 9 percent contacted a credit bureau, and 6 percent contacted one of the credit monitoring services [Harrell and Langton, 2013]).

Who Faces the Greatest Risks?

Several obstacles hamper attempts to derive accu- rate estimates of the frequency of these thefts and the profile of those who are targeted most often. First, some people do not yet know that impostors have assumed their identities. Second, some victims are not aware that the FTC has been designated as the national clearinghouse for complaints. Third, certain individuals and businesses are unwilling to report their personal financial problems to law enforcement agencies and government hotlines for an assortment of reasons. For example, businesses might fear that disclosures will harm their reputa- tions, while individuals might decide that the time it will take will not be worth their trouble.

One of the earlier attempts to derive a profile of the average victim determined that the typical

age was 42, the place of residence was a large metropolitan area, and the amount of time it took the person to detect the fraud was 14 months. Seniors were targeted less frequently, and African- Americans tended to suffer more than other groups from check fraud and from theft of utility and telephone services (see Newman, 2004).

But more recent studies cast doubt on the con- tinuing accuracy of this preliminary statistical portrait. The NCVS provides more details about differential risks. As for age, the two intervals that experienced lower rates were those between 18 and 24, and also those over 65. People between the ages of 35 and 49 suffered the most (8 percent per year in 2012). As for race and ethnicity, whites experienced higher rates and blacks and Hispanics lower rates. As for sex, males and females were victimized at roughly the same rate. When it comes to social class, the survey found that families earning $75,000 or more were targeted more often than those in lower income brackets (Harrell and Langton, 2013).

As with other types of crimes, where people live plays a major role in shaping differential risks. Table 4.9 presents a ranking of the five worst states and the five safest states in 2013. Many more reports

T A B L E 4.9 States Where Residents Faced the Highest and Lowest Risks of Identity Theft, 2013

Rank 2013 State Victimization Rate per 100,000

Inhabitants 2010 Victimization Rate per 100,000

Inhabitants 2013

1 Florida 115 193 2 Georgia 97 134 3 California 102 105 4 Michigan 70 97 5 Nevada 96 97 6 Maryland 83 96 7 Arizona 103 91 8 Texas 96 88 9 New York 85 87 10 Illinois Lowest risks 81 86 46 Iowa 38 40 47 Maine 32 39 48 Hawaii 43 38 49 South Dakota 25 33 50 North Dakota 30 32

NOTES: Based on complaints received by the FTC from individuals and participating law enforcement agencies during 2010 and 2013. Many incidents were not reported; complaints were not checked for credibility.

SOURCE: Federal Trade Commission Sentinel Network (FTC, 2011, 2014).

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of being impersonated came from Florida, Georgia, and California (over 100 per 100,000 residents) than from other states. Risks were much lower, about about 40 per 100,00 or even less than that, in Iowa, Maine, Hawaii, and South and North Dakota, according to the Sentinel Network admin- istered by the FTC (2014).

The geographic factor can be fine-tuned further by focusing on specific cities. The 10 metropolitan areas where residents filed the most complaints and therefore presumably faced the greatest dangers of being impersonated were Miami–Fort Lauderdale– West Palm Beach, Florida (with a sky-high rate of more than 340 victims per 100,000 inhabitants); Columbus, Georgia; Naples-Marcos Island, Florida; Jonesboro, Arkansas; Tallahassee, Florida; Cape Coral–Fort Myers, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; Port Saint Lucie, Florida; Beckley, West Virginia; and Tampa–St. Petersburg, Florida. As for entire regions, people living in the South and West needed to be more vigilant than those residing in the Northeast and Midwest, according to the FTC’s (2014) state and city rankings, which are volatile and can vary substantially from year to year.

It appears that spending habits, lifestyle choices, and decisions about where to reside—in other words, attitudes and behaviors—determine, to some degree, whether an individual’s identity will be misappropriated by some thief or hacker.

PREDICTING THE CHANCES OF BECOMING A VICTIM SOMEDAY: PROJECTING CUMULATIVE RISKS

Yearly victimization rates might lull some people into a false sense of security. Annual rates give the impression that crime is a rare event. Only a hand- ful of people out of every thousand fall prey to offenders; most people get through a year unscathed. But fears about victimization do not conform to a January-to-December cycle. People worry that they might be robbed, raped, or mur- dered at some point during their lives. As the years

go by, the small annual rates can add up to a formi- dable level for individuals who fall into several high-risk categories.

Lifetime likelihoods are estimates of the cumulative risks of victimization, viewed over a span of 60 or more years (from age 12 into the 70s, the average life expectancy in the United States today). These projections yield a very different pic- ture of the seriousness of the contemporary crime problem. What appears to be a rare event in any given year looms as a real possibility over the course of an entire lifetime (Koppel, 1987), according to the gloomy projections in Table 4.10.

(Note the difference between lifetime likeli- hoods and prevalence rates. A prevalence rate refers to the proportion of the population that has already experienced victimization. It adds together the cur- rent year’s casualties to those who suffered during previous years. Expressed as a fraction, the numera- tor would be this year’s new cases plus a larger number of old or preexisting cases from previous years; the denominator would be the size of the population. Lifetime likelihoods are estimates about what the grand total might be in the years ahead, calculated by projecting current rates into the future.)

Over a span of about 60 years, nearly every- body will experience at least one theft, and most people may eventually suffer three or more thefts, according to the projections made on the basis of the relatively high rates of reported crimes that pre- vailed during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the chance that a girl or woman will be forcibly raped in a given year is minuscule, it rises to a lifetime threat of 80 per 1,000, or 8 percent (about 1 female in every 12). For black females, the risk is somewhat greater (at 11 percent, or nearly one in nine) over a lifetime. (Note that these projections don’t differentiate between date rape, acquaintance rape, and attacks by strangers— see Chapter 10.) Robbery is a more common crime, so the projection is that about 30 percent of the population will be robbed at least once over a 60-year period. Of this group, 5 percent will be robbed twice, and 1 percent will be robbed three or more times.

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Taking differential risks by sex and race into account, males are more likely to be robbed at least once in their lives (37 percent) than females (22 per- cent), and blacks are more likely to be robbed one or more times than whites (51 percent compared to 27 percent). When it comes to assault, the terms like- lihood and probability take on their everyday meanings as well as their special statistical connotations. Being assaulted at least once in a lifetime is probable for most people—roughly three out of every four per- sons. (However, this alarming prediction includes failed attempts to inflict physical injury, threats of bodily harm that were not carried out, minor scuffles, and intrafamily violence.) Males face a greater likeli- hood of becoming embroiled in a fight someday than females (82 percent compared to 62 percent).

Similarly, the projected cumulative risks are unnerving for property crimes committed against households (not individuals) over a time span of 20 years (not a lifetime of over 60 years starting at age 12). Based on the relatively high rates of bur- glary that prevailed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the prediction was that over 70 percent of all families would experience a burglary or an attempted break-in over the next 20 years, and nearly one quarter would suffer twice, and about one in seven would be targeted three times or more. On the other hand, only a little less than 20 percent would lose a car to thieves over a 20- year span (see the rows in Table 4.10).

However, the mathematical and sociological assumptions underlying these unnerving projections

T A B L E 4.10 Chances of Becoming a Victim over a Lifetime

Type of Victimization and Person’s Race, Sex, and Age

Percentage of Persons Who Will Be Victimized Someday over the Next 60 years

Once or more Once Twice Three times

or more

Rape All females, over a lifetime beginning at age 12 8 8 — — Whites 8* 7 — — Blacks 11 10 1 __

Robbery All persons, over a lifetime beginning at age 12 30* 25 5 1

Males 37 29 7 — Females 22* 19 2 — Whites 27 23 4 4 Blacks 51 35 12 —

Assaults All persons, over a lifetime beginning at age 12 74 35 24 15

Males 82 31 26 25 Females 62 37 18 7 Whites 74* 35 24 16 Blacks 73* 35 25 12

Burglary All households, over a span of 20 years 72 36 23 14 Motor Vehicle Theft All households, over a span of 20 years 19 17 2 __

NOTES: *Figures do not add up to total shown in “once or more column” because of rounding. Estimates include attempts. Projections are based on average victimization rates calculated by the National Crime Survey (earlier name for the NCVS) for the years 1975–1984; for rape, 1973–1982. ___ indicates that the lifetime likelihood is miniscule, less than 0.5 percent. For burglary and motor vehicle theft, the unit of analysis is households, not individuals; and the time span is only 20 years, not 60 years or more.

SOURCE: Adapted from Koppel, 1987.

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are very complex and subject to challenge. The calculations were based on estimates derived by averaging victimization rates for the years 1975 to 1984, and then extrapolating these numbers into the future (Koppel, 1987). If crime rates drop sub- stantially over the next 40 years or so, as they already have during the 1990s and 2000s, these pro- jections will turn out to be overly pessimistic. Con- versely, if the crime problem intensifies during the next few decades of the twenty-first century, the real odds will be much greater than the percentages in Table 4.10.

Lifetime likelihoods of being murdered also have been computed. Unlike the projections above, which are based on NCVS findings, mur- der risk estimates are derived from UCR data. Dif- ferential cumulative risks can be presented as ratios, such as “1 out of every x people will be murdered.” All the remaining individuals (x 1) within this category are expected to die from diseases and other natural causes, accidents, or suicides. A small x indicates a grave danger. Over- all, roughly 1 American out of every 200 will die a violent death (based on the homicide levels of the late 1990s). But the risks vary tremendously, depending on personal attributes, especially sex and race. In general, males are more likely to be slain than females, and blacks are more likely than whites. But when data for both sex and race is included, black females turn out to be in greater

danger of being murdered (1 out of every 171) than white males (1 out of every 241). White females have the least to fear, relatively speaking, of the four groupings (1 will be killed out of every 684). But the prospects facing black males are frightening. If the rates of the late 1990s continue over the decades, 1 out of every 35 black males (about 3 percent) eventually will become a victim of homicide (FBI, 1999). In the early 1980s, the crime problem was more severe so the projected threat was even greater: the prediction was that 1 out of every 21 black males (nearly 5 percent) would die violently (Langan, 1985).

The recognition of differential risks touches off another round of questions for victimologists to grapple with as they analyze UCR and NCVS data. Why does the burden of victimization fall so heavily on some groups of people and not others? Did crime victims do something “wrong” to jeop- ardize their well-being, or were their misfortunes basically due to bad luck or fate? What can each person—who by definition is a potential target— do to minimize risks? Are there policies the govern- ment or society can implement to help all of its members lead safer lives? To what degree is an indi- vidual responsible for his or her own future, and to what extent do forces beyond any individual’s abil- ity to control determine the risks of becoming a crime victim? These controversial issues are care- fully investigated in the next chapter.

SUMMARY

This chapter focused on the people harmed by inter- personal crimes, especially acts of violence by mur- derers, assailants, and robbers; but also by stealing, like burglary, motor vehicle theft, and identity theft.

Various groupings of people face different risks of being harmed by criminals. International comparisons demonstrate that societal conditions and traditions greatly affect a country’s murder rates: The United States stands out as suffering higher rates of violence than similar advanced industrialized societies. Where a person lives and interacts with others is a major determinant of differential risks.

Trends capture changes in victimization rates over time, while patterns indicate connections between the attributes of victims and the frequency with which they are targeted. Data from the UCR and the NCVS indicates that many types of victi- mizations are taking place far less frequently in recent years than during their peak period of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Murders and serious assaults are down sharply since the early 1990s. The gravest risks still are faced by poor young men in urban settings. Robberies take place much less frequently as

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well, but the same categories of people—poor young men in big cities—still are the most likely targets.

The differential risks of experiencing a property crime—burglary, motor vehicle theft, and a stolen identity—vary substantially by location more so than by the characteristics of the persons who are directly affected. Whereas burglaries and vehicle thefts have dropped sharply over the decades, identity theft has mushroomed into a common aggravation—and for

some, a huge source of distress—during the twenty- first century.

Cumulative risks indicate the odds of being vic- timized over the course of a lifetime: suffering an assault someday is a danger most people will endure; and experiencing a burglary over a 20-year span is likely for most households Studying the reasons for differential risks yields theories that explain why cer- tain groups are more vulnerable to attack than others. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

KEY TERMS DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY

carjacking, 113

Consumer Sentinel Network, 126

cumulative risks, 94

differential risks, 94

identity theft, 121

incidence rates, 94

muggings, 107

prevalence rates, 94

profile, 100

statistical portrait, 100

strong-arm robberies, 107

Supplementary Homicide Report, 100

trend analysis, 94

yokings, 107

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

1. Describe some trends in interpersonal crimes of violence and theft that became evident during the 1990s. Which of these trends has continued right up to the present?

2. Discuss the contention that property crime really hasn’t subsided so much—it has just shifted toward identity theft.

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. Try to explain why violent and property crime rates are surprisingly stable and predictable from one year to the next. Speculate as to why last year’s rate for the entire United States was so close to this year’s rate.

2. All the graphs presented in this chapter show that victimization rates have dropped since the

early 1990s. Identify the factors that might explain this much welcomed but largely unexpected improvement in public safety for the following crimes: murder, robbery, burglary, and vehicle theft.

SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROJECTS 1. Make a list of some of the most dangerous

countries and cities in the world, based on their murder rates. Ask some people you know if

they have ever visited these places and whether they were aware of the statistically high rates of violence while they were there.

132 C H A P T E R 4

2. Monitor this year’s murders in your hometown by carefully searching through local newspapers for articles that provide the necessary details. Assemble a database that includes profiles of the victims and the offenders, breakdowns of the victim–offender relationship, weapons used, and circumstances categorizing of the killings. How do these slayings compare statistically to the national averages presented in this chapter?

3. Develop a table that lists the same cities from the map in Figure 4.1. But instead of murder rates, assemble robbery rates from the FBI’s

UCR. Does the ranking of these large U.S. cities by robbery rates come out the same as for murder rates?

4. Find out from insurance companies’ websites the makes, models, and years of vehicles stolen most often in your state and, if possi- ble, in your nearest metropolitan area. See if your vehicle is on the list of those most wanted by thieves.

5. Find out from the FTC website the seriousness of identity theft in your state and in the metropolitan area nearest to where you live.

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5 The Ongoing Controversy over Shared Responsibility

CHAPTER OUTLINE How Some Victims Contribute to the Crime Problem

Repeat and Chronic Victims: Learning from Past Mistakes?

The Entire Spectrum of Possibilities: Recognizing Complete Innocence and Full Responsibility

Who or What Is to Blame for Specific Incidents?

What Is Victim Blaming? What Is Victim Defending? What Is System Blaming?

Mistakes Individuals Make: Facilitation

How Many Burglaries Were Victim-Facilitated? How Many Vehicle Thefts Were Victim-Facilitated? How Many Identity Thefts Were Victim-Facilitated?

Victim Precipitation and Provocation

How Many Violent Crimes Were Precipitated or Provoked?

Transcending Victim Blaming and Victim Defending: System Blaming

The Importance of Determining Responsibility in the Criminal Justice Process

Applying Deterrence Theory to Victims

Theorizing About Risk Factors: Figuring Out Why Certain Groups Suffer More Often Than Others

Why Various Groups Experience Differential Risks: Routine Activities and Specific Lifestyles

Some Victims Were Criminals: The Equivalent Group Explanation

What’s the Difference Between Crime Prevention and Victimization Prevention?

Reducing Risks: How Safe Is Safe Enough? Ambivalence About Risk Taking

Summary

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary

Questions for Discussion and Debate

Critical Thinking Questions

Suggested Research Projects

LEARNING OBJECTIVES To realize why the concept of shared responsibility is

so controversial.

To recognize victim-blaming, victim-defending, and system-blaming arguments.

continued

HOW SOME VICTIMS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CRIME PROBLEM

The first few criminologists drawn to the study of victims were enthusiastic about the concept of shared responsibility as a possible explanation for why a particular person was harmed by a certain offender. By raising questions previous researchers had overlooked about victim proneness, individual vulnerability, and personal accountability for one’s misfortunes, they believed they were developing a more complete explanation about why laws are broken and people get hurt. But they also touched off a controversy within victimology as well as in the arena of public opinion that still rages today.

Consider these situations:

A motorist shows no concern about where he parks his car, even though he knows that it

ranks high on the list of most frequently stolen vehicles. Sure enough, after he leaves it unlocked on a dark quiet street, it is gone when he comes back the next morning.

A college student tosses out bank statements and credit card bills without worrying whether personal information in them will end up in the wrong hands. Her carelessly discarded paperwork enables an identity thief to open up a credit card account and run up a large balance in her name.

A man gets drunk at a bar, even though he is among complete strangers, and recklessly begins to stare at a woman who is sitting next to her formidable-looking boyfriend. They exchange insults, and the jealous boyfriend beats him up.

Until victimology emerged, mainstream crimi- nology had consistently ignored the role that injured parties might play in setting the stage for lawless behavior. Victimologists have pledged to correct this imbalance by objectively examining all kinds of situations to determine whether people who were harmed might have played a part in their own downfall.

Thus, victimologists have gone beyond offender-oriented explanations that attribute law- breaking solely to the exercise of free will by the wrongdoer. Victimologists suggest that certain criminal incidents be viewed as the outgrowths of a process of interaction between two parties. What has emerged is a dynamic model that takes into account initiatives and responses, actions and reac- tions, and each participant’s motives and intentions.

Several expressions coined by the pioneers of victimology capture their enthusiasm for examining interactions: the “duet frame of reference” (Von Hentig, 1941), the “penal couple” (Mendelsohn, 1956), and the “doer–sufferer relationship” (Ellenber- ger, 1955). Reconstructing the situation preceding the incident can provide a more balanced and com- plete picture of what happened, who did what to whom and why, and thereby represents an improvement over earlier one-sided, static, perpetrator-centered accounts (Fattah, 1979).

LEARNING OBJECTIVES continued

To understand the distinctions between victim facilita- tion, precipitation, and provocation.

To be able to apply the concepts of victim facilitation, victim blaming, and victim defending to burglary, automobile theft, and identity theft.

To be able to apply the concepts of victim precipitation, victim provocation, victim blaming, victim defending, and system blaming to murder and robbery.

To realize what is at stake in the debate between victim blamers and victim defenders.

To be able to recognize the institutional roots of crime, which overshadow the victim’s role.

To become familiar with the competing theories that attempt to explain why some groups suffer higher victimization rates than others.

To recognize how the issue of shared responsibility impacts the operations of the criminal justice system.

To debate the appropriate role of risk management and risk reduction strategies in everyday life.

To appreciate the difference between crime prevention and victimization prevention.

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A well-known line of inquiry (albeit a controver- sial one) within criminology centers on the differences, if any, between lawbreakers and law-abiding people. Criminologists ask, “What is ‘wrong’ with them? Are there physical, mental, or cultural differences that dis- tinguish offenders from the rest of us?” In a similar vein, victimologists ask, “What distinguishes victims from nonvictims? Do individuals who get targeted think or act differently from those who don’t?”

Just posing these questions immediately raises the possibility of shared responsibility. Victimologists have borrowed the terminology of the legal system, traditionally used to describe criminal behavior, to describe the motives and actions of the injured parties as well. The words responsibility, culpability, guilt, and blame crop up routinely in discussions based on dynamic, situational accounts of the interactions between two people. In the broadest sense, the con- cept of shared responsibility implies that certain persons—not just their offenders—did something “wrong.” Adopting this framework leads to the prop- osition that some—but certainly not all—of the indi- viduals who were hurt or experienced losses did not do all they could have done to limit their exposure to dangerous people or threatening circumstances, or to abort confrontations that were escalating.

REPEAT AND CHRONIC VICTIMS: LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES?

One day in October, a woman hears someone banging on her front door. She opens it and sees her neighbor, a 21-year-old man, lying on his back. He pleads, “Call 911, I’m dying.” The ambulance rushes the man to a nearby hospital, but he is dead on arrival. Detectives discover that he had been shot at on two different occasions a few days apart back in July, and briefly hospitalized from the second attack. However, the alleged assassin in those two prior armed assaults was still in jail awaiting trial at the time of the third shooting. (Koehler, 2011)

Researchers looking for clear-cut cases of shared responsibility often focus on individuals who have suffered a series of thefts or attacks.

Offenders seem to set their sights on certain indi- viduals and households more than once during a given period of time. “Repeat victims” are bur- dened twice. Suffering three or more times during a relatively short time span qualifies a person for the dubious distinction of being a “chronic victim.” Having been hurt in the past turns out to be the single best predictor of becoming harmed again in that very same way—or by some other perpetrator or from some other type of offense. Furthermore, the greater the number of prior victimizations, the higher the likelihood will be of trouble in the near future. Revictimization often takes place soon after the initial incident, and then the risks begin to decline as time passes. All these incidents are most likely to break out in very localized high-crime areas, dubbed hot spots. Just as a great many crimes can be traced back to just a few perpetrators, a relatively small number of individuals—termed “hot dots”—often sustain a large proportion of these attacks. If the police can recognize these recurring patterns by applying their knowledge about the suspected offenders, the likely scenes of the crimes, and the probable targets, then they can become effective guardians to head off further trouble (Pease and Laycock, 1996).

Such “series incidents” accounted for about 1 percent of all victimizations and 4 percent of all episodes of violence disclosed to NCVS inter- viewers in 2013 (Truman and Langton, 2014).

Just as criminals have careers in which they offend in various ways over the years, those on the receiving end might also be said to endure “vic- tim careers” over the course of their lifetimes. The career consists of the frequency, duration, and seriousness of the hurtful experiences suffered by a person from childhood until death. The total number of incidents, the date of their onset, their timing (bunching up or spreading out), and the nature of the injuries and losses sustained as they grow older might be gained by interviewing people and asking them to try to recall all their misfortunes retrospectively. Another approach would involve periodically reinterviewing them or an entire birth cohort every few years as part of an ongoing

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longitudinal study. The goal would be to empower these individuals to reduce their risks of future tur- moil, to improve social support programs and police interventions intended to help them, and to further the development of victim-centered the- ories that explain the disproportionate burdens cer- tain persons endure (Farrell et al., 2001).

One implication of this focus on revictimiza- tion and victim careers is that particular individuals might be making the same mistakes over and over again. Maybe they periodically permit their judgment to become clouded by drinking too much, by failing to safeguard their personal property, by allowing themselves to become isolated from bystanders who could intervene in their behalf, or by hanging out with persons known to be armed and dangerous. The most well-documented examples include bank branches suffering holdups frequently, residences being bur- glarized a number of times, cars getting broken into on a regular basis, battered wives getting struck repeatedly, and bullied children being picked on by a series of tormentors. Yet their unfortunate track records may not be entirely their fault, according to crime analysts working on behalf of police departments who look for patterns that may indicate where offenders will strike next and precisely whom they might target. These analysts have come up with two primary reasons to account for repeat victimizations: a boost explanation that focuses on the offender’s abilities, and a flag expla- nation that emphasizes target vulnerability (see Weisel, 2005).

Boost explanations of repeat victimizations point out that career criminals gain important information about the people and places they repeatedly attack based on firsthand knowledge from the successful perpetration of their initial illegal act. They use this inside information to plan their next attack against the same target. Examples of boost explanations would be that burglars learn when a particular home is unoccu- pied or how to circumvent a certain warehouse’s alarm system. Car thieves figure out how to open the door of a specific make and model of car with- out a key. Robbers discover where a storekeeper

hides his cash right before closing time. In con- trast, flag explanations of repeat victimizations are victim-centered. They point out that unusually vulnerable or attractive targets might suffer the depredations of a number of different offenders as opposed to the same criminal over and over. For example, apartments with sliding glass doors are easily broken into, convenience stores that are open around the clock are always accessible to desperate shoplifters and robbers, and taxi drivers and pizza deliverers are particularly easy to rob of the cash they are carrying (Weisel, 2005).

THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBILITIES: RECOGNIZING COMPLETE INNOCENCE AND FULL RESPONSIBILITY

A typology is a classification system that aids in the understanding of what a group has in common and how it differs from others. Over the decades, victi- mologists have devised many typologies to try to illustrate the degree of shared responsibility, if any, that injured parties might bear in particular incidents. Some of the categories of people identified in typol- ogies include those who are “ideal” (above criticism), “culturally legitimate and appropriate” (seen as fair game, outcasts), “deserving” (asking for trouble), “consenting” (willing), and “recidivist” (chronic) (see Fattah, 1991; also Mendelsohn, 1956; Fattah, 1967; Lamborn, 1968; Schafer, 1977; Sheley, 1979).

Up to this point, the degree of responsibility a victim might share with an offender has ranged from “some” to a “great deal.” But the spectrum of possibilities extends further in each direction. A typology of shared responsibility must include at least two more categories in order to be exhaus- tive. At one extreme is “no shared responsibility at all” or complete innocence. The other endpoint can be labeled as full responsibility.

Several teenagers have a beef with some boys across the street. They go up to the roof of a nearby building and start shooting at the rival group using an auto- matic pistol. A 34-year-old mother, who is waiting to

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pick up her children from school, hears the sounds of gunfire and tries to shield several nearby youngsters by throwing herself on top of them. She is fatally struck in the chest, and two other bystanders are wounded by the stray bullets. (Baker and Maag, 2011) Completely innocent individuals, such as the

mother killed in the tragedy described above, can- not be faulted for what happened to them. In some cases, they were targeted at random and suffered simply because they were at the wrong place at the wrong time. Others were crime-conscious peo- ple who tried to avoid trouble. They did what they reasonably could to reduce the risks they faced. To avoid violence, they did nothing to attract the attention of predators and nothing to incite other- wise law-abiding people to attack them. Blameless targets of property crimes took proactive steps to safeguard their possessions in anticipation of the possibility of arson, vandalism, burglary, larceny, or vehicle theft. They did all they could to hinder rather than help any would-be thieves hungry for their possessions.

If taking precautions, keeping a low profile, and minding one’s own business qualify as the basis for blamelessness and complete innocence, then at the other extreme, total complicity becomes the defining characteristic for full responsibility. Logically, a victim can bear sole responsibility only when there is no offender at all. Individuals who are totally responsible for what happened are, by definition, really not victims at all. They suffered no harm from lawbreakers and actually are offenders posing as victims for some ulterior motive. Phony complainants usually seek either reimbursement from private insurance policies or government aid for imaginary losses. They file false claims and thereby commit fraud. For instance, someone who falls down a flight of steps might insist he was pushed by a robber. Fake victims may have motives other than financial gain. Some people may pretend to have been harmed in order to cover up what really occurred. For example, a husband who gambled away his paycheck might tell his wife and detectives that he was held up on the way home.

WHO OR WHAT IS TO BLAME FOR SPECIFIC INCIDENTS?

Since the 1970s, the notion of shared responsibility has become a subject of intense and sometimes bit- ter debate. Some criminologists and victimologists have expressed concern over the implications of studies into mutual interactions and reciprocal influences between the two parties. Those who raised doubts and voiced dissent might be seen as loosely constituting a different school of thought. Just as criminology (with a much longer, richer, and stormier history than victimology) has recog- nizable orientations and ideological camps within it (for example, adherents of conflict models vs. socio- biological explanations for violent behavior), so too does victimology have its rifts and factions. To put it bluntly, a victim-blaming tendency clashes repeatedly with a victim-defending tendency over many specific issues.

Arguments that specific victims bear some responsibility along with their offenders for what hap- pened have been characterized as victim blaming. Countering this approach by challenging whether it is accurate and fair to hold the targeted individual accountable for injuries and losses that a wrongdoer inflicted can be termed victim defending.

Two opposing ideologies might imply that there are two distinct camps, victim blamers and victim defenders. However, victimologists cannot simply be classified as victim blamers and victim defenders. The situation is complex, and people may change sides, depending on the crime or the persons involved. In fact, most individuals are inconsistent when they respond to criminal cases. They criticize specific individuals but defend others, or they find fault with certain groups (for example, viciously abusive husbands who eventually are killed by their battered wives) but not other groups (such as inebriated women who are sexually assaulted by their predatory dates).

What Is Victim Blaming?

Victim blaming assumes that the offender and the victim are somehow partners in crime, and that a

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degree of mutuality, symbiosis, or reciprocity may exist between them (see Von Hentig, 1948). To identify such cases, both parties’ possible motives, reputations, actions, and records of past arrests and convictions must be investigated (Schultz, 1968).

The quest for evidence of shared responsibility captivated the first criminologists who became interested in the behavior of victims before, dur- ing, and after the incident. Leading figures encour- aged their colleagues to focus upon the possibility of shared responsibility in their research and theo- rizing. Some of their statements, excerpted from studies that appeared decades ago, are assembled in Box 5.1.

Victimology, despite its aspirations toward objectivity, may harbor an unavoidable tendency toward victim blaming. It is inevitable that a careful reconstruction of the behavior of a victim before, during, and after a crime will unearth rash decisions, foolish mistakes, errors in judgment, and acts of care- lessness that, with 20–20 hindsight, can be pointed to as having brought about the unfortunate outcome. Step-by-step analyses of actions and reactions are sure to reveal evidence of what injured parties did or failed to do that contributed to their suffering.

Victim blaming follows a three-stage thought process (see Ryan, 1971). First, the assumption is made that there is something wrong with these individuals. They are said to differ significantly from the unaffected majority in their attitudes, their behaviors, or both. Second, these presumed differences are thought to be the source of their plight. If they were like everyone else, the reason- ing goes, they would not have been targeted for attack. And third, victims are warned that if they want to avoid trouble in the future, they must change how they think and act. They must aban- don the careless, rash, or provocative patterns of behaviors that brought about their downfall.

Victim blaming is a widely held view for sev- eral reasons. It provides specific and straightfor- ward answers to troubling questions such as, “Why did it happen?” and “Why him and not me?” Victim blaming also has psychological appeal because it draws upon deep philosophical and even theological beliefs. Fervent believers in a just

world outlook—people get what they deserve before their lives end—find victim blaming a com- forting notion. Bad things happen only to evil characters; good souls are rewarded for following the rules. The alternative—imagining a world governed by random events where senseless and brutal acts might afflict anyone at any time, and where wrongdoers get away unpunished—is unnerving. The belief that victims must have done something neglectful, foolish, or provocative that led to their misfortunes dispels feelings of vul- nerability and powerlessness, and gives the blamer peace of mind about the existence of an orderly and just world (Lerner, 1965; Symonds, 1975; Lambert and Raichle, 2000 and Stromwall, Alfredsson, and Landstrom, 2013).

The doctrine of personal accountability that underlies the legal system also encourages victim- blaming explanations. Just as criminals are con- demned and punished for their wrongdoing, so, too, must victims answer for their behavior before, during, and after an incident. They can and should be faulted for errors in judgment that only made things worse. Such assessments of blame are grounded in the belief that individuals exercise a substantial degree of control over events in their everyday lives. They may not be totally in com- mand, but they are not powerless or helpless pawns and should not be resigned to their fate, waiting passively to become a statistic. Just as cau- tious motorists should implement defensive driving techniques to minimize car accidents, crime- conscious individuals are obliged to review their ways of relating to people and how they behave in stressful situations in order to enhance their per- sonal safety. By following the advice of security experts about how to keep out of trouble, cautious and concerned individuals can find personal solu- tions to the social problem of street crime.

Victim blaming also sounds familiar because it is the view of offenders. According to the crimi- nological theory known as “techniques of neu- tralization,” delinquents frequently disparage their intended targets as having negative traits (“He was asking for it,” or “They are a bunch of crooks themselves”). In extreme cases, youthful

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offenders believe the suffering they inflict is retal- iatory justice that merits praise (“We deserve a medal for doing that”). Their consciences would burden them with pangs of guilt if they saw these same incidents in a more conventional way (see Sykes and Matza, 1957; and also Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1967). Those offenders who are devoid of empathy and pity are so desensitized that they do not feel the guilt, shame, remorse, or moral inhibitions that otherwise would constrain their behavior. By derogating and denigrating the victim, juvenile delinquents or adult criminals can

validate their hurtful acts as justifiable. Outbursts of stark cruelty and savagery become possible when the injured party is viewed as worthless, less than human, an appropriate object for venting hostility and aggression, or an outcast deserving mistreatment (Fattah, 1976, 1979).

Defense attorneys may persuasively articulate the victim-blaming views of their clients, espe- cially in high-profile murder cases. A “trash- the-reputation” (demonization of the deceased) approach, coupled with a “sympathy” (for the accused) defense, might succeed in swaying a

B O X 5.1 Early Expressions of Support for Inquiries into the Victim’s Role

A real mutuality frequently can be observed in the connection between the perpetrator and the victim, the killer and the killed, the duper and the duped. The vic- tim in many instances leads the evildoer into tempta- tion. The predator is, by varying means, prevailed upon to advance against the prey. (Von Hentig, 1941, p. 303)

In a sense, the victim shapes and molds the criminal. Although the final outcome may appear to be one-sided, the victim and criminal profoundly work upon each other, right up until the last moment in the drama. Ultimately, the victim can assume the role of determi- nant in the event. (Von Hentig, 1948, p. 384)

Criminologists should give as much attention to “victi- mogenesis” as to “criminogenesis.” Every person should know exactly to what dangers he is exposed because of his occupation, social class, and psychological consti- tution. (Ellenberger, 1955, p. 258)

The distinction between criminal and victim, which used to be considered as clear-cut as black and white, can become vague and blurred in individual cases. The lon- ger and the more deeply the actions of the persons involved are scrutinized, the more difficult it occasion- ally will be to decide who is to blame for the tragic outcome. (Mannheim, 1965, p. 672)

In some cases, the victim initiates the interaction, and sends out signals that the receiver (doer) decodes, triggering or generating criminal behavior in the doer. (Reckless, 1967, p. 142)

Probation and parole officers must understand victim– offender relationships. The personality of the victim, as a cause of the offense, is oftentimes more pertinent than that of the offender. (Schultz, 1968, p. 135)

Responsibility for one’s conduct is a changing concept, and its interpretation is a true mirror of the social, cultural, and political conditions of a given era … Notions of criminal responsibility most often indicate the nature of societal interrelationships and the ideol- ogy of the ruling group in the power structure. Many crimes don’t just happen to be committed—the victim’s negligence, precipitative actions, or provocations can contribute to the genesis of crime.… The victim’s functional responsibility is to do nothing that will pro- voke others to injure him, and to actively seek to prevent criminals from harming him. (Schafer, 1968, pp. 4, 144, 152)

Scholars have begun to see the victim not just as a passive object, as the innocent point of impact of crime on society, but as sometimes playing an active role and possibly contributing to some degree to his own vic- timization. During the last 30 years, there has been considerable debate, speculation, and research into the victim’s role, the criminal–victim relationship, the con- cept of responsibility, and behaviors that could be con- sidered provocative. Thus, the study of crime has taken on a more realistic and more complete outlook. (Viano, 1976, p. 1)

There is much to be learned about victimization patterns and the factors that influence them. Associated with the question of relative risk is the more specific question (of considerable importance) of victim participation, since crime is an interactional process. (Parsonage, 1979, p. 10)

Victimology also postulates that the roles of victim and victimizer are neither fixed nor assigned, but are

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jury and securing an acquittal or in convincing a judge to hand down a lesser sentence. For example, in cases where children slay their parents, the dead fathers and mothers may be pictured as callous abu- sers and perverse molesters, while their offspring are portrayed as defenseless objects of adult cruelty (see Estrich, 1993b; Hoffman, 1994).

What Is Victim Defending?

Victim defending rejects the premise that those who suffer are partly at fault and challenges the

recommendation that people who were targeted must change their ways to avoid future incidents. First of all, victim blaming is criticized for overstat- ing the extent to which careless habits, foolhardy actions, attention-grabbing behavior, and verbal instigation explains the genesis of an illegal act. Motivated offenders would have struck their cho- sen targets even if the victims had not made their tasks easier, called attention to themselves, or aroused angry reactions. Second, victim blaming is condemned for confusing the exception with the rule and overestimating the actual proportion of

mutable and interchangeable, with continuous move- ment between the two roles.... This position, under- standably, will not be welcomed by those who, for a variety of practical or utilitarian reasons, continue to promote the popular stereotypes of victims and victi- mizers, according to which the two populations are as different as black and white, night and day, wolves and lambs. (Fattah, 1991, p. xiv)

Calls for Research into the Victim’s Role in Specific Crimes

Murder: In many crimes, especially criminal homicide, which usually involves intense personal interaction, the victim is often a major contributor to the lawless act.… Except in cases in which the victim is an inno- cent bystander and is killed in lieu of an intended victim, or in cases in which a pure accident is involved, the victim may be one of the major precipitating causes of his own demise. (Wolfgang, 1958, pp. 245, 264)

Rape: The offender should not be viewed as the sole “cause” and reason for the offense, and the “virtuous” rape victim is not always the innocent and passive party. The role played by the victim and its contribution to the perpetration of the offense becomes one of the main interests of the emerging discipline of victimol- ogy. Furthermore, if penal justice is to be fair it must be attentive to these problems of degrees of victim responsibility for her own victimization. (Amir, 1971, pp. 275–76)

Theft: Careless people set up temptation–opportunity situations when they carry their money or leave their valuables in a manner which virtually invites theft by

pickpocketing, burglary, or robbery. Carelessness in handling cash is so persistently a part of everyday living that it must be deemed almost a national habit.... Because victim behavior today is conducive to crimi- nality, it will be necessary to develop mass educational programs aimed at changing that behavior. (Fooner, 1971, pp. 313, 315) Victims cause crime in the sense that they set up the opportunity for the crime to be committed. By changing the behavior of the victim and potential victim, the crime rate can be reduced. Holders of fire insurance policies must meet fire safety standards, so why not require holders of theft insurance to meet security standards? (Jeffrey, 1971, pp. 208–209) Burglary: In the same way that criminologists compare offenders with nonoffenders to understand why a per- son commits a crime, we examined how the burglary victim and nonvictim differ in an attempt to under- stand the extent to which a victim vicariously contri- butes to or precipitates a break-in. (Waller and Okihiro, 1978, p. 5) Auto theft: Unlike most personal property, which is preserved behind fences and walls, cars are constantly moved from one exposed location to another; and since autos contain their own means of locomotion, potential victims are particularly responsible for varying the degree of theft risk by where they park and by the occasions they provide for starting the engine. The role of the victim is especially conse- quential for this crime; many cases of auto theft appear to be essentially a matter of opportunity. They are victim-facilitated. (McCaghy, Giordano, and Henson, 1977, p. 369)

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cases in which blameworthy conduct took place. Shared responsibility is said to be unusual, not com- mon. A few people’s mistakes don’t justify placing most victims’ attitudes and behaviors under a microscope, or under a cloud of suspicion. Third, exhorting people to be more cautious and vigilant is not an adequate solution. This advice is unrealistic because it overlooks the cultural imperatives and social conditions that largely shape the attitudes and behaviors of both parties in a conflict.

Over the past several decades, many victimolo- gists have embraced the tenets of victim defending, and have sharply denounced crude expressions of victim blaming as examples of muddled thinking and confused reasoning about the issue of shared responsibility. Excerpts of the earliest victim defend- ing arguments condemning victim blaming views appear in Box 5.2.

Victim defending is clear about what it opposes, but it is vague about what it supports. Two tendencies within victim defending can be distinguished concern- ing who or what is to be faulted. The first can be called offender blaming. Offender blaming removes the burden of responsibility from the backs of victims and restores it entirely onto the shoulders of lawbreakers,

“where it belongs.” Victim defending coupled with offender blaming leads to traditional criminological thinking, characterized earlier as “offenderology.” The question once again becomes, “What is ‘wrong’ with the offender? How does he differ from the law- abiding majority?” If the answer is that the offender has physical defects or even genetic predispositions to act violently, then the sociobiological theories of crimi- nology become the focus of attention. If the offender is believed to suffer from mental illness, personality disorders, or other emotional problems, then the the- ories of forensic psychology are relevant. If the offender is said to have knowingly and intentionally chosen to prey upon others, then the explanations center on the classical/rational choice/free-will and deterrence theories about pleasure and pain, benefits and costs, and conclude with the necessity of punishing those who decide to steal and rob.

What Is System Blaming?

The second tendency is to link victim defending with system blaming, wherein neither the offender nor the victim is the real culpr