Sociology Homework assignment (due on today 7/22 11:59p.m.)

4 Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race

and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics [1989]

Kimberle Crenshaw

One of the very few Black women’s studies books is entitled All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave.’ I have chosen this title as a point of departure in my efforts to develop a Black feminist criticism because it sets forth a problematic consequence of the tendency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis.3

• I want to examine how this tendency is perpetuated by a single-axis framework that is dominant in antidiscrimination law and that is also reflected in feminist theory and antiracist politics.

I will center Black women in this analysis In order to contrast the multi dimenslonality of Black women’s experience with the single-axis analysis that distorts these experiences. Not only will this juxtaposition reveal how Black women are theoretically erased, it will also illustrate how this framework imports its own theoretical limitations that undermine efforts to broaden feminist and antiracist analyses. With Black women as the starting point, it becomes more apparent how dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis. I want to suggest further that this single-axis framework erases Black women In the conceptualization, identification and remediation of race and sex dis crimination by limiting inquiry to the experiences of otherwise-privileged members of the group. In other words, in race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged Blacks, In sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race- and class-privileged women.

This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes those who are muLtiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest further that this focus on otherwise-privileged group members creates a distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in

57

58 Kimberle Crenshaw

experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much more complex phenomenon.

After examining the doctrinal manifestations of this single-axis framework,

I will discuss how it contributes to the marginalization of Black women in feminist theory and in antiracist politics. I argue that Black women are sometimes

excluded from feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse because both are

predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not accurately reflect

the interaction of race and gender. These problems of exclusion cannot be

solved simply by including Black women within an already established analytical

structure. Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of

racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account

cannot sufficiently address the particular manner In which Black women are

subordinated. Thus, for feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse to embrace

the experiences and concerns of Black women, the entire framework that has

been used as a basis for translating “women’s experience” or “the Black

experience” into concrete policy demands must be rethought and recast.

As examples of theoretical and political developments that miss the mark

with respect to Black women because of their failure to consider intersectionality,

I will briefly discuss the feminist critique of rape and separate spheres ideology,

and the public policy debates concerning female-headed households within the

Black community.

I. The Antidiscrimination Framework

A. The Experience of Intersectionality and the Doctrinal Response

One way to approach the problem of intersectionality is to examine how

courts frame and interpret the stories of Black women plaintiffs. While I cannot

claim to know the circumstances underlying the cases that I will discuss, I

nevertheless believe that the way courts interpret claims made by Black women

is Itself part of Black women’s experience and, consequently, a cursory re view

of cases involving Black female plaintiffs is quite revealing. To illustrate the

difficulties inherent in judicial treatment of intersectionality, I will cons ider

three Title VU4 cases: DeGraffenreid v General Motors,5 Moore v H ughes

Helicoprers6 and Payne v Travenoi7

I. DeGraffenreid v General Motors

In DeGraffenreid, five Black women brought suit against General Motors,

alleging that the employer’s seniority system perpetuated the effects of past

discrimination against Black women. Evidence adduced at trial revealed that

General Motors simply did not hire Black women prior to 1964 and that all

of the Black women hired after 1970 lost their jobs in a seniority-based layoff

during a subsequent recession. The district court granted summary Judgment

for the defendant, rejecting the plaintiffs’ attempt to bring a suit not on behalf

Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex 59

of Blacks or women, but specifically on behalf of Black women. The court stated:

iPilaintiffs have failed to cite any decisions which have stated that slack women are a special class to be protected from discrimination. The Courts own research has failed to disclose such a decision. The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have been discriminated against. However they should not be allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new super-remedy’ which would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes intended. Thus, this lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.8

Although General Motors did not hire Black women prior to 1964, the court noted that “General Motors has hired. . female employees for a number of years prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of j9fi49 Because General Motors did hire women—albeit white women—during the period that no Black women were hired, there was, in the court’s view, no sex discrimination that the seniority system could conceivably have perpetuated.

After refusing to consider the plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim, the Court dismissed the race discrimination complaint and recommended its consolidation with another case alleging race discrimination against the same employer.’0The plaintiffs responded that such consolidation would defeat the purpose of their suit since theirs was not purely a race claim, but an action brought specifically on behalf of Black women alleging race and sex discrimination. The court, however, reasoned;

The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that rhe goal of the statute was to create a new classification of ‘black women’ who would have greater standing than, for example, a black male. The prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora’s box.

Thus, the court apparently concluded that Congress either did not contemplate that Black women could be discriminated against as “Black women” or did not intend to protect them when such discrimination occurred.° The court’s refusal in DeGraffenreid to acknowledge that Black women encounter combined race and sex discrimination implies that the boundaries of sex and race discrimination doctrine are defined respectively by white women’s and Black men’s experiences. Under this view, Black women are protected only to the extent that their experiences coincide with those of either of the two groups.’5 Where their experiences are distinct, Black women can expect little protection as long as approaches, such as that in DeGraffenreid, which completely obscure problems of intersectionallty prevail.

2. Moore v Hughes Helicopters, Inc. Moore ti Hughes Helicopters, Inc.’4 presents a different way in which courts

fall to understand or recognize Black women’s claims. MooTe Is typical of a

60 Kimberte Crenshaw

number of cases in which courts refused to certify Black females as class represenratives in race and sex discrimination actions.15 In Moore, the plaintiff alleged that the employer, Hughes Helicopter, practiced race and sex discrirn ination in promotions to upper-level craft positions and to supervisory jobs. Moore introduced statistical evidence establishing a significant disparity between men and women, and somewhat less of a disparity between Black and white men in supervisory jobs.’6

Affirming the district court’s refusal to certify Moore as the class representative in the sex discrimination complaint on behalf of all women at Hughes, the Ninth Circuit noted approvingly:

Moore had never claimed before the EEOC that she was discriminated against as a female, but only as a Black female. . (Tlhis raised serious doubts as to Moore’s ability to adequately represent white female employees.’7

The curious logic in Moore reveals not only the narrow scope ofantidiscrimination doctrine and its failure to embrace intersectionality, but also the centrality of white female experiences in the conceptualization of gender discrimination. One inference that could be drawn from the court’s statement that Moore’s

complaint did not entail a claim of discrimination “against females” is that

discrimination against Black females is something less than discrimination against females. More than likely, however, the court meant to imply that Moore did

not claim that all females were discriminated against but only Black females. But even thus recast, the court’s rationale is problematic for Black women.

The court rejected Moore’s bid to represent all females apparently because her attempt to specify her race was seen as being at odds with the standard allegation that the employer simply discriminated “against females.”

The court failed to see that the absence of a racial referent does not necessarily

mean that the claim being made Is a more inclusive one. A white woman

claiming discrimination against females may be in no better position to represent

all women than a Black woman who claims discrimination as a Black female

and wants to represent all females. The court’s preferred articulation of “against

females” is not necessarily more inclusive—it just appears to be so because the

racial contours of the claim are not specified. The court’s preference for “against females” rather than “against Black

females” reveals the implicit grounding of white female experiences in the doctrinal conceptualization of sex discrimination. For white women, claiming

sex discrimination is simply a statement that but for gender, they would not

have been disadvantaged. For them there is no need to specify discrimination

as white females because their race does not contribute to the disadvantage for

which they seek redress. The view of discrimination that is derived from this

grounding takes race privilege as a given. Discrimination against a white female is thus the standard sex discrimination

claim; claims that diverge from this standard appear to present some sort of

hybrid claim. More significantly, because Black females’ claims are seen as hybrid,

they sometimes cannot represent those who may have “pure” claims of sex

discrimination. The effect of this approach is that even though a challenged

Demarginalizing the intersection of Race and Sex 61

policy or practice may clearly discriminate against all females, the fact that it has particularly harsh consequences for Black females places Black female plaintiffs at odds with white females.

Moore illustrates one of the limitations of antidiscrimination laws remedial scope and normative vision. The refusal to allow a multiply-disadvantaged class to represent others who may be singularly-disadvantaged defeats efforts to restructure the distribution of opportunity and limits remedial relief to minor adjustments within an established hierarchy. Consequently, “bottom-up ap proaches, those which combine all discriminatees in order to challenge an entire employment system, are foreclosed by the limited view of the wrong and the narrow scope of the available remedy. If such “bottom-up” intersectional representation were routinely permitted, employees might accept the possibility that there is more to gain by collectively challenging the hierarchy rather than by each discriminatee individually seeking to protect her source of privilege within the hierarchy. But as long as antidiscrimination doctrine proceeds from the premise that employment systems need only minor adjustments, opportunities for advancement by disadvantaged employees will be limited. Relatively privileged employees probably are better off guarding their advantage while jockeying against others to gain more. As a result, Black women—the class of employees which, because of its intersectionality, is best able to challenge all forms of discrimination—are essentially Isolated and often required to fend for themseLves.

In Moore, the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s bid to represent all Blacks and females left Moore with the task of supporting her race and sex discrimination claims with statistical evidence of discrimination against Black females alone. Because she was unable to represent white women or Black men, she could not use overall statistics on sex disparity at Hughes, nor could she use statistics on race. Proving her claim using statistics on Black women alone was no small task, due to the fact that she was bringing the suit under a disparate impact theory of discrimination.’9

The court further limited the relevant statistical pool to include only Black women who It determined were qualified to fill the openings in upper-level labor jobs and in supervisory positions.’° According to the court, Moore had not demonstrated that there were any qualified Black women within her bargaining unit or the general labor pool for either category of jobs.SL Finally, the court stated that even if it accepted Moore’s contention that the percentage of Black females in supervisory positions should equal the percentage of Black females in the employee pool, it still would not find discriminatory impacr.ZZ Because the promotion of only two Black women Into supervisory positions would have achieved the expected mean distribution of Black women within that job category, the court was “unwilling to agree that a prima facie case of disparate impact ha[dj been proven.”23

The court8 rulings on Moore’s sex and race claim left her with such a small statistical sample that even if she had proved that there were qualified Black women, she could not have shown discrimination under a disparate impact theory. Moore illustrates yet another way that antidiscrimination doctrine essentially erases Black women’s distinct experiences and, as a result, deems their discrimination complaints groundless.

62 Kirnberle Crrnshaw

3. PaynevTrovenol Black female plaintiffs have also encountered difficulty in their efforts to

win certification as class representatives in some race discrimination actions.

This problem typically arises in cases where statistics suggest significant disparities

between Black and white workers and further disparities between Black men

and Black women. Courts in some cases24 have denied certification based on

logic that mirrors the rationale in Moore: The sex disparities between Black

men and Black women created such conflicting interests that Black women

could not possibly represent Black men adequately. In one such case, Payne v

TravenoI,2 two Black female plaintiffs alleging race discrimination brought a

class action Suit on behalf of all Black employees at a pharmaceutical plant.26

The court refused, however, to allow the plaintiffs to represent Black males

and granted the defendant’s request to narrow the class to Black women only.

Ultimately, the district court found that there had been extensive raci al

discrimination at the plant and awarded back pay and constructive seniorit y

to the class of Black female employees. But, despite its finding of general rac e

discrimination, the court refused to extend the remedy to Black men for fear

that their conflicting interests would not be adequately addressed7 the Fifth

Circuit affirmed,25 Notably, the plaintiffs in Travenol fared better than the similarly-situate

d

plaintiff in Moore: They were not denied use of meaningful statistics sho wing

an overall pattern of race discrimination simply because there wer e no men

in their class. The plaintiffs’ bid to represent all Black employe es, however,

like Moore’s attempt to represent all women employees, failed as a conse quence

of the court’s narrow view of class interest. Even though Travenol was a partial victory for Black women, the cas

e

specifically illustrates how antidiscrimination doctrine generally creates a d ilemma

for Black women. It forces them to choose between specifically artic ulating the

intersectional aspects of their subordination, thereby risking thei r ability to

represent Black men, or ignoring intersectionality in order to state a claim that

would not lead to the exclusion of Black men. When one considers th e political

consequences of this dilemma, there is little wonder that many peop le within

the Black cormounity view the specific articulation of Black wome n’s interests

as dangerously divisive. In sum, several courts have proved unable to deal with inte

rsectionality,

although for contrasting reasons. In DeGraffenreid, the court refused to recognize

the possibility of compound discrimination against Black wom en and analyzed

their claim using the employment of white women as the hist orical base. As

a consequence, the employment experiences of white wome n obscured the

distinct discrimination that Black women experienced.

Conversely, in Moore, the court held that a Black woman co uld not use

statistics reflecting the overall sex disparity in supervisory and uppe r-level labor

jobs because she had not claimed discrimination as a woman, but “only” as a

Black woman. The court would not entertain the notion that discrimination

experienced by Black women is indeed sex discrimination—pro vable through

disparate impact statistics on women.

Demarginalfting the Inrersecrion of Race and Sex 63

Finally, courts, such as the one in Travenol, have held that Black women cannot represent an entire class of Blacks due to presumed class conflicts in cases where sex additionally disadvantaged Black women. As a result, in the few cases where Black women are allowed to use overall statistics indicating racially disparate treatment Black men may not be able to share in the remedy.

Perhaps it appears to some that I have offered inconsistent criticisms of how Black women are treated in antidiscrirnination law: I seem to be saying that in one case, Black women’s claims were rejected and their experiences obscured because the court refused to acknowledge that the employment experience of Black women can be distinct from that of white women, while in other cases, the interests of Black women are harmed because Black women’s claims were viewed as so distinct from the claims of either white women or Black men that the court denied to Black females representation of the larger class, It seems that I have to say that Black women are the same and harmed by being treated differently, or that they are different and harmed by being treated the same. But I cannot say both.

This apparent contradiction is but another manifestation of the conceptual limitations of the single-Issue analyses that intersectionality challenges. The point is that Black women can experience discrimination In any number of ways and that the contradiction arises from our assumptions that their claims of exclusion must be unidirectional. Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow In another. If an accident happens In an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is In the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination.

Judicial decisions which premise intersectional relief on a showing that Black women are specifically recognized as a class are analogous to a doctor’s decision at the scene of an accident to treat an accident victim only if the injury is recognized by medical insurance. Similarly, providing legal relief only when Black women show that their claims are based on race or on sex is analogous to calling an ambulance for the victim only after the driver responsible for the injuries is Identified. But it is not always easy to reconstruct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating efforts to determine which driver caused the harm. In these cases the tendency seems to be that no driver is held responsible, no treatment is administered, and the involved parties simply get back in their cars and zoom away.

To bring this back to a non-metaphorical level, I am suggesting that Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white women’s expe riences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes,

64 Kirnberle Crenshaw

they experience discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and

sex

discrimination, but as Black women .

Black women’s experiences are m uch broader than the general categori

es

that discrimination discourse provi des. Yet the continued insistence that Bl

ack

women’s demands and needs be filtered through categorical analyses th

at

completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom

be addressed.

B. The Significance of Doctr inal

Treatment of lntersectionality

DeGraffenreid, Moore and Travenol a re doctrinal manifestations of a commo

n

political and theoretical approach to discrimination which operates to margin

alize

Black women. Unable to grasp the importance of Black women’s intersecti

onal

experiences, not only courts, but fe minist and civil rights thinkers as well

have

treated Black women in ways that deny both the unique compoundedne

ss of

their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the larger c

lasses of

women and Blacks. Black women are regarded either as too much like

women

or Blacks and the compounded na ture of their experience is absorbed

into the

collective experiences of either g roup or as too different, in which c

ase Black

women’s Blackness or femaleness sometimes has placed their needs a

nd per

spectives at the margin of the fe minist and Black liberationist agen

das.

‘While it could be argued that th is failure represents an absence of

political

will to include Black women, I b elieve that it reflects an uncritical and

disturbing

acceptance of dominant ways of t hinking about discrimination. Cons

ider first

the definition of discrimination t hat seems to be operative in antidisc

rimination

law: Discrimination which is wr ongful proceeds from the identifi

cation of a

specific class or category; either a discriminator intentionally identifi

es this

category, or a process is adopted which somehow disadvantages all m

embers

of this category.29 According to the dominant view, a discriminator

treats all

people within a race or sex catego ry similarly. Any significant exper

iential or

statistical variation within this grou p suggests either that the group

is not being

discriminated against or that conf licting interests exist which defeat a

ny attempts

to bring a common claim .sa Consequently, one generally cann

ot combine these

categories. Race and sex, moreover , become significant only when t

hey operate

to explicitly disadvantage the vi ctims; because the privilegjng of

whiteness or

maleness is implicit, it is general ly not perceived at all.

Underlying this conception of discr imination is a view that the wrong

which

antidiscrimination Law addresses is the use of race or gender factors to

interfere

with decisions that would otherw ise be fair or neutral. This pr

ocess-based

definition is not grounded in a bott om-up commitment to improve the su

bstantive

conditions for those who are victi mized by the interplay of numerou

s factors.

Instead, the dominant message o f antidiscrimination law is that it

will regulate

only the limited extent to which race or sex interferes with the

process of

determining outcomes. This narro w objective is facilitated by the

top-down

strategy of using a singular “but for” analysis to ascertain the effec

ts of race

or sex. Because the scope of antidi scrimination law is so limited, sex

and race

Demargrnalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex 65

discrimination have come to be defined in terms of the experiences of those who are privileged but far their racial or sexual characteristics. Put differently, the paradigm of sex discrimination tends to be based on the experiences of white women; the model of race discrimination tends to be based on the xperiences of the most privileged Blacks. Notions of what constitutes race and sex discrimination are, as a result, narrowly tailored to embrace only a small set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against Black women.

To the extent that this general description is accurate, the following analogy can be useful in describing how Black women are marginalized in the interface between antidiscrirnination law and race and gender hierarchies: Imagine a basement which contains all people who are disadvantaged on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or physical ability. These people are stacked—feet standing on shoulders—with those on the bottom being disad vantaged by the full array of factors up to the very top, where the heads of all those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up against the ceiling. Their ceiling is actually the floor above which only those who are not disadvantaged in any way reside. In efforts to correct some aspects of domination, those above the ceiling admit from the basement only those who can say that “but for’ the ceiling, they too would be in the upper room. A hatch is developed through which those placed Immediately below can crawl. Yet this hatch is generally available only to those who—due to the singularity of their burden and their otherwise privileged position relative to those below—are In the position to crawl through. Those who are multiply-burdened are generally left below unless they can somehow pull themselves into the groups that are permitted to squeeze through the hatch.

As this analogy translates for Black women, the problem is that they can receive protection only to the extent that their experiences are recognizably similar to those whose experiences tend to be reflected in antidiscrimination doctrine. If Black women cannot conclusively say that “but for” their race or “but for” their gender they would be treated differently, they are not invited to climb through the hatch but told to wait in the unprotected margin until they can be absorbed into the broader, protected categories of race and sex.

Despite the narrow scope of this dominant conception of discrimination and its tendency to marginali.ze those whose experiences cannot be described within its tightly-drawn parameters, this approach has been regarded as the appropriate framework for addressing a range of problems. In much of feminist theory and, to some extent, in antiracist politics, this framework is reflected in the belief that sexism or racism can be meaningfully discussed without paying attention to the lives of those other than the race-, gender- or class- privileged. As a result, both feminist theory and antiracist politics have been organized, in part, around the equation of racism with what happens to the Black middle-class or to Black men, and the equation of sexism with what happens to white women.

Looking at historical and contemporary issues in both the feminist and the civil rights communities, one can find ample evidence of how both communities’

66 Kiniberle Crenshaw

acceptance of the dominant framework of discrimination has hindered the development of an adequate theory and praxis to address problems of inter sectionaliry. This adoption of a single-issue framework for discrimination not only rnarginalizes Black women within the very movements that claim them as part of their constituency but it also makes the Illusive goal of ending racism and patriarchy even more difficult to attain.

II. Feminism and Black Women: “Ain’t We Women?”

Oddly, despite the relative inability of feminist politics and theory to address Black women substantively, feminist theory and tradition borrow considerably from Black women’s history. For example, “Ain’t I a Woman” has come to represent a standard refrain in feminist discourse.3 Yet the lesson of this powerful oratory is not fully appreciated because the context of the delivery

is seldom examined, I would like to tell part of the story because it establishes some themes that have characterized feminist treatment of race and illustrates the importance of including Black women’s experiences as a rich source for the critique of patriarchy.

In 1851, Sojourner Truth declared “Ain’t I a Woman?” and challenged the

sexist imagery used by male critics to justify the disenfranchisement of women.32 The scene was a Women’s Rights Conference in Akron, Ohio; white male

hecklers, invoking stereotypical Images of “womanhood,” argued that women

were too frail and delicate to take on the responsibilities of political activity.

When Sojourner Truth rose to speak, many white women urged that she be

silenced, fearing that she would divert attention from women’s suffrage to

emancipation. Truth, once permitted to speak, recounted the horrors of slavery,

and its particular impact on Black women:

Look at my arms! I have ploughed and planted and gathered into barns, and no man could head me—and ain’t I a woman? I would work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a woman? I have born thirteen children, and seen most of ‘em sold into slavery, and when I cried Out with my mother’s grief: none but Jesus heard me—and ain’t I a woman?33

By using her own life to reveal the contradiction between the ideological

myths of womanhood and the reality of Black women’s experience, Truth’s

oratory provided a powerful rebuttal to the claim that women were categorically

weaker than men. Yet Truth’s personal challenge to the coherence of the cult

of true womanhood was useful only to the extent that white women were

willing to reject the racist attempts to rationalize the contradiction—that because

Black women were something less than real women, their experiences had no

bearing on true womanhood. Thus, this 19th-century Black feminIst challenged

not only patriarchy, but she also challenged white feminists wishing to embrace

Black women’s history to relinquish their vestedness in whiteness. Contemporary white feminists inherit not the legacy of Truth’s challenge to

patriarchy but, instead, Truth’s challenge to their forbearers. Even today, the

Demarginalizing the InteTsectioii of Race and Sex 67

difficulty that white women have traditionally experienced in sacrificing racial

privilege to strengthen feminism renders them susceptible to Truth’s critical

question. When feminist theory and politics that claim to reflect women’s

experience and women’s aspirations do not include or speak to Black women,

Black women must ask: “Ain’t We Women?” If this is so, how can the claims

that “women are,” “women believe” and “women need” be made when such

claims are inapplicable or unresponsive to the needs, interests and experiences

0f Black women? The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it evolves

from a white racial context that Is seldom acknowledged. Not only are w omen

of color In fact overlooked, but their exclusion is reinforced when white women

speak for and as women. The authoritative universal voice—usually white male

subjectivity masquerading as non-racial, non-gendered objectivity3is mereLy

transferred to those who, but for gender, share many of the same cultural,

economic and social characteristics. ‘When feminist theory attempts to describe

women’s experiences through analyzing patriarchy, sexuality, or separate spheres

ideology, it often overlooks the role of race. Feminists thus Ignore how their

own race functions to mitigate some aspects of sexism and, moreover, how it

often privileges them over and contributes to the domination of other women.

Consequently, feminist theory remains white, and its potential to broaden and

deepen its analysis by addressing non’privileged women remains unrealized,

An example of how some feminist theories are narrowly constructed around

white women’s experiences is found in the separate spheres literature. The

critique of how separate spheres ideology shapes and limits women’s roles in

the home and in public life is a central theme in feminist legal thought.

Feminists have attempted to expose and dismantle separate spheres ideology

by identifying and criticizing the stereotypes that traditionally have justified

the disparate societal roles assigned to men and women. Yet this attempt to debunk ideological justifications for women’s subordination offers little insight

into the domination of Black women. Because the experiential base upon which

many feminist insights are grounded is white, theoretical statements drawn from them are overgeneralized at best, and often wrong) Statements such as “men and women are taught to see men as independent, capable, powerful;

men and women are taught to see women as dependent, limited in abilities, and passive,”39 are common within this literature. But this “observation” overlooks the anomalies created by crosscurrents of racism and sexism. Black men and women live in a society that creates sex-based norms and expectations which racism operates simultaneously to deny; Black men are not viewed as powerful, nor are Black women seen as passive. An effort to develop an ideological explanation of gender domination in the Black community should proceed from an understanding of how crosscutting forces establish gender norms and how the conditions of Black subordination wholly frustrate access to these norms. Given this understanding, perhaps we can begin to see why Black women have been dogged by the stereotype of the pathological matriarch40 or why there have been those in the Black liberation movement who aspire to create institutions and to build traditions that are intentionally patriarchal.4t

68 Kimberle Crenshaw

Because ideological and descriptive definitions of patriarchy are usually premised upon white female experiences, feminists and others informed by feminist literature may make the mistake of assuming that since the role of Black women in the family and in other Black institutions does not always resemble the familiar mariifc5tations of patriarchy in the white community, Black women are somehow exempt from patriarchal norms. For example, Black women have traditionally worked outside the home in numbers far exceeding the labor participation rate of white women.1 An analysis of patriarchy that highlights the history of white women’s exclusion from the workplace might permit the inference that Black women have not been burdened by this particular gender-based expectation. Yet the very fact that Black women must work conflicts with norms that women should not, often creating personal, emotional and relationship problems in Black women’s lives. Thus, Black women are burdened not only because they often have to take on responsibilities that are not traditionally feminine but, moreover, their assumption of these roles is sometimes interpreted within the Black community as either Black women’s failure to live up to such norms or as another manifestation of racism’s scourge upon the Black community.43 This is one of the many aspects of intersectionality that cannot be understood through an analysis of patriarchy rooted in white experience.

Another example of how theory emanating from a white context obscures the multidimensioriality of Black women’s lives is found in feminist discourse on rape. A central political issue on the feminist agenda has been the pervasive problem of rape. Part of the intellectual and political effort to mobilize around this issue has involved the development of a historical critique of the role that law has played in establishing the bounds of normative sexuality and in regulating female sexual behavior.44 Early carnal knowledge statutes and rape laws are understood within this discourse to illustrate that the objective of rape statutes traditionally has not been to protect women from coercive intimacy but to protect and maintain a property-like interest in female chastity.45 Although feminists quite rightly criticize these objectives, to characterize rape law as reflecting male control over female sexuality is ftr Black women an oversimpliled account and an ultimately inadequate account.

Rape statutes generally do not reflect mali control over female sexuality, but white male regulation of white female sexuality.4 Historically, there has been absolutely no institutional effort to regulate Black female chastity.47 Courts in some states had gone so far as to instruct juries that, unlike white women, Black women were not presumed .to be chaste.48 Also, while It was true that the attempt to regulate the sexuality of white women placed unchaste women outside the law’s protection, racism restored a fallen white woman’s chastity where the alleged assailant was a Black man.49 No such restoration was available to Black women.

The singular focus on rape as a manifestation of male power over female sexuality tends to eclipse the use of rape as a weapon of racial terror.5° When Black women were raped by white males, they were being raped not as women generally, but as Black women specifically: Their femaleness made them sexually

f3e,narginahzing the Intersection of Race and Sex 69

vulnerable to racist domination, while their Blackness effectively denied them any protection.5’This white male power was reinforced by a judicial system in which the successful conviction of a white man for raping a Black woman was virtually unthinkable.

In sum, sexist expectations of chastity and racist assumptions of sexual promiscuity combined to create a distinct set of issues confronting Black women.53 These issues have seldom been explored in feminist literature nor are they prominent in antiracist politics. The lynching of Black males, the institutional practice that was legitimized by the regulation of white women’s sexuality, has historically and contemporaneously occupied the Black agenda on sexuality and violence. Consequently, Black women are caught between a Black community that, perhaps understandably, views with suspicion attempts to litigate questions of sexual violence, and a feminist community that reinforces those suspicions by focusing on white female sexuality.54 The suspicion is compounded by the historical fact that the protection of white female sexuality was often the pretext for terrorizing the Black community. Even today some fear that antirape agendas may undermine antiracist objectives. This is the paradigmatic political and theoretical dilemma created by the intersection of race and gender: Black women are caught between ideological and political currents that combine first to create and then to bury Black women’s experiences.

HI. When and Where I Enter: Integrating an Analysis of Sexism into Black Liberation Politics

Anna Julia Cooper, a 19th-century Black feminist, coined a phrase that has been useful in evaluating the need to incorporate an explicit analysis of patriarchy in any effort to address racial domination.55 Cooper often criticized Black leaders and spokespersons for claiming to speak for the race, but failing to speak for Black women. Referring to one of Martin Delaney’s public claims that where he was allowed to enter, the race entered with him, Cooper countered: “Only the Black Woman can say, when and where I enter . . . then and there the whole Negro race enters with me.”56

Cooper’s words bring to mind a personal experience involving two Black men with whom I had formed a study group during our first year of law school. One of our group members, a graduate from Harvard College, often told us stories about a prestigious and exclusive men’s club that boasted memberships of several past United States presidents and other influential white males. He was one of its very few Black members. To celebrate completing our first-year exams, our friend invited us to join him at the club for drinks. Anxious to see this fabled place, we approached the large door and grasped the brass door ring to announce our arrival. But our grand entrance was cut short when our friend sheepishly slipped from behind the door and whispered that he had forgotten a very important detail. My companion and I bristled, our training as Black people having taught us to expect yet another barrier to our inclusion; even an informal one-Black-person quota at the establishment was not unimaginable. The tension broke, however, when we learned that we

70 Kintherje Censhaw

would not be excluded because of o ur race, but that I would have to go

around

to the back door because I wa s a female. I entertained the idea of

making a

scene to dramatize the fact that m y humiliation as a female was no l

ess painful

and my exclusion no more excus able than had we all been sent t

o the back

door because we were Black. But, sensing no general assent to this pro

position,

and also being of the mind that due to our race a scene would In

some way

jeopardize all of us, I failed to st and my ground. After all, the Cl

ub was about

to entertain its first Black guest s—even though one would have to e

nter through

the back door,51 Perhaps this story is not the bes

t example of the Black communi ty’s failure

to address problems related to Black women’s Intersectionalit

y seriously. The

story would be more apt if Bla ck women, and only Black wo

men, had to go

around to the back door of the club and if the restriction came

from within,

and not from the outside of th e Black community. Still this s

tory does reflect

a markedly decreased politica l and emotional vigilance towa

rd barriers to Black

women’s enjoyment of privileg es that have been won on the b

asis of race but

continue to be denied on the basis of sex.

The story also illustrates the a mbivalence among Black wome

n about the

degree of political and social ca pit4l that ought to be expended

toward challenging

gender barriers, particularly w hen the challenges might con

flict with the

antiracism agenda. While there are a number of reasons—inc

luding antifeminist

ones—why gender has not fig ured directly in analyses of th

e subordination of

Black Americans, a central r eason is that race Is still see

n by many as the

primary oppositional force in Bla ck lives. If one accepts that th

e social experience

of race creates both a primary group identity as well as a sha

red sense of being

under collective assault, some of the reasons that Black femi

nist theory and

politics have not figured prom inently in the Black politica

l agenda may be

better understood.6 The point is not that Afric

an Americans are simply inv olved in a more

important struggle. Although some efforts to oppose Black

feminism are based

on this assumption, a fuller app reciation of the problems of the

Black community

will reveal that gender subordin ation does contribute significantl

y to the destitute

conditions of so many African A mericans and that it must there

fore be addressed.

Moreover, the foregoing critiq ue of the single-issue frame

work renders prob

lematic the claim that the stru ggle against racism is disting

uishable from, much

less prioritized over, the stru ggle against sexism. Yet It is a

lso true that the

politics of racial otherness that Black women experience alon

g with Black men

prevent Black feminist conscio usness from patterning the deve

lopment of white

feminism. For white women, the creation of a conseiousn

ess that was distinct

from and In opposition to th at of white men figured prom

inently in the

development of white feminist politics. Black women, like Blac

k men, live in

a community that has been d efined and subordinated by c

olor and culrure.6

Although patriarchy clearly op erates within the Black comm

unity, presenting

yet another source of dominat ion to which Black women are

vulnerable, the

racial context in which Black w omen find themselves makes the

creation of a

political consciousness that Is oppositional to Black men diffic

ult.

Demai-ginalizing the Intersecion of Race and Sex 71

Yet while it Is true that the distinct experience of racial otherness militates

against the development of an oppositional feminist consciousness, the assertion

0f racial community sometimes supports defensive priorities that marginalize

Black women. Black women’s particular interests are thus relegated to the

periphery in public policy discussions about the presumed needs of the Black

community. The controversy over the movie The Color Purple is illustrative

The animating fear behind much of the publicized protest was that by portraying

domestic abuse in a Black family, the movie confirmed the negative stereotypes

of Black men.2 The debate over the propriety of presenting such an image

on the screen overshadowed the issue of sexism and patriarchy in the Black

community. Even though it was sometimes acknowledged that the Black

community was not immune from domestic violence and other manifestations

of gender subordination, some nevertheless felt that in the absence of positive

Black male images in the media, portraying such images merely reinforced racial

stereotypes.63 The struggle against racism seemed to compel the subordination

of certain aspects of the Black female experience in order to ensure the security

of the larger Black community. The nature of this debate should sound familiar to anyone who recalls

Daniel Moynihan’s diagnosis of the ills of Black America. Moynihan’s report

depicted a deteriorating Black family, foretold the destruction of the Black male

householder and lamented the creation of the Black matriarch. His conclusions

prompted a massive critique from liberal sociologists65 and from civil rights

leaders. Surprisingly, while many critics characterized the report as racist for

its blind use of whIte cuLtural norms as the standard for evaluating Black

families, few pointed out the sexism apparent in Moynihan’s labeling Black

women as pathological for their “failure” to live up to a white female standard

of motherhood.67 The latest versions of a Moynihanesque analysis can be found in the Moyers

televised special, The Vanishing Black Family,65 and, to a lesser extent, in William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged.69 In The VanLshing Black Family, Moyers presented the problem of female-headed households as a problem of irresponsible sexuality, induced in part by government policies that encouraged family breakdown.7°The theme of the report was that the welfare state reinforced the deterioration of the Black family by rendering the Black male’s role obsolete. As the argument goes, because Black men know that someone will take care of their families, they are free to make babies and leave them. A corollary to the Moyers view is that welfare is also dysfunctional because it allows poor women to leave men upon whom they would otherwise be dependent.

Most commentators criticizing the program failed to pose challenges that might have revealed the patriarchal assumptions underlying much of the Moyers report. They instead focused on the dimension of the problem that was clearly recognizable as racist.7’ White feminists were equally culpable. There was little, if any, published response to the Moyers report from the white feminist community. Perhaps feminists were under the mistaken assumption that since the report focused on the Black community, the problems highlighted were racial, not gender based. Whatever the reason, the result was that the ensuing

72 Kimberle Crenshaw

debates over the future direction of welfare and family policy proceeded without

significant feminist input. The absence of a strong feminist critique of the Moynihan/lvloyers model not only impeded the interests of Black women, but it also compromised the interests of growing numbers of white women heads

of household who find It difficult to make ends meet.7Z

William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged modified much of the

moralistic tone of this debate by reframing the issue in terms of a lack of

marriageable Black men.13 According to Wilson, the decline in Black marriages

is not attributable to poor motivation, bad work habits or irresponsibility but

instead Is caused by structural economics which have forced Black unskilled

labor out of the work force. Wilson’s approach represents a significant move

away from that of MoynihanfMoyers in that he rejects their attempt to center

the analysis on the morals of the Black community. Yet, he too considers the

proliferation of female-headed households as dysfunctional per se and fails to

explain fully why such households are so much in peril. Because he incorporates

no analysis of the way the structure of the economy and the workforce

subordinates the interests of women, especially childbearing Black women,

Wilson’s suggested reform begins with finding ways to put Black men back in

the family.74 In Wilson’s view, we must change the economic structure with

an eye toward providing more Black jobs for Black men. Because he offers no

critique of sexism, Wilson fails to consider economic or social reorganization

that directLy empowers and supports these single Black mothers.75

My criticism is not that providing Black men with jobs is undesirable; Indeed,

this is necessary not only for the Black men themselves, but for an entire

community, depressed and subject to a host of sociological and economic Ill s

that accompany massive rates of unemployment. But as long as we assume that

the massive social reorganization Wilson calls for is possible, why not think

about it in ways that maximize the choices of Black women?16 A more com plete

theoretical and political agenda for the Black underclass must take into ac count

the specific and particular concerns of Black women their families occupy the

bottom rung of the economic ladder, and it is only through placing them at

the center of the analysis that their needs and the needs of their familie s will

be directly addressed.77

IV. Expanding Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics by Embracing the Intersection

If any real efforts are to. be made to free Black people of the constraints

and conditions that characterize racial subordination, then theories and strat egies

purporting to reflect the Black community’s needs must include an analysi s of

sexism and patriarchy. Similarly, feminism must include an analysis of race if

it hopes to express the aspirations of non-white women. Neither Black liberati onist

politics nor feminist theory can ignore the intersectional experiences of those

whom the movements claim as their respective constituents. In order to in clude

Black women, both movements must distance themselves from earlier approa ches

in which experiences are relevant only when they are related to certain clearly

Demo rginalizirlg the intersection of Race and Sex 73

identifiable causes (for example, the oppression of Blacks is significant when based on race, of women when based on gender>. The praxis of both should be centered on the life chances and life situations of people who should be cared about without regard to the source of their difficulties.

I have stated earlier that the failure to embrace the complexities of com poundedness Is not simply a matter of political will, but is also due to the influence of a way of thinking about discrimination which structures politcs so that struggles are categorized as singular issues. Moreover, this structure Imports a descriptive and normative view of society that reinforces the status quo.

It Is somewhat Ironic that those concerned with alleviating the ills of racism and sexism should adopt such a top-down approach to discrimination, if their efforts Instead began with addressing the needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged and with restructuring and remaking the world where necessary then others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit. In addition, it seems that placing those who currently are marginalized in the center is the most effective way to resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences and undermine potential collective action.

It is not necessary to believe that a political consensus to focus on the lives of the most disadvantaged will happen tomorrow in order to recenter discrirn ination discourse at the intersection. It Is enough, for now, that such an effort would encourage us to look beneath the prevailing conceptions of discrimination and to challenge the complacency that accompanies belief in the effectiveness of this framework. By so doing, we may develop language which is critical of the dominant view and which provides some basis for unifying activity. The goal of this activity should be to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups for whom It can be said: “When they enter, we all enter.”

Notes

1. GlorIa T. Hull, et al, eds (The Feminist Press, 1982). 3. The most common linguistic manifestation of this analytical dilemma is represented

In the conventional usage of the term “Blacks and women.” Although it may be true that some people mean to include Black women In either “Blacks” or ‘women” the context in which the term is used actually suggests that often Black women are nor considered. See, for example, Elizabeth Spelman, The Inessential Woman 114—15 (Beacon Press, 1988) (discussIng an article on Blacks and women In the military where “the racial identity of those identi6ed as ‘women’ does not become explicit until reference is made to Black women, at which point it also becomes clear that the category of women excludes Black women”). It seems that if Black women were explicitly included, the preferred term would be either “Blacks and white women” or “Black men and all women.”

4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 Usc § 2000e, et seq as amended (1982). 5. 413 F Supp 142 (E D Mo 1976). 6. 708 F2d 475 (9th Cir 1983). 7. 673 F2d 798 (5th Cir 1982). 8. DeGraffenreid, 413 F Supp at 143. 9. Id at 144.

74 Kimberk Crerzshaw

10. Id at 145. In Mosley v General Motors, 497 F Supp 583 (E D Mo 1980), plaintiffs,

alleging broad-based racial discrimination at General Motors’ St. Louis facility, prevailed

In a portion of their Title VII claim. The seniority system challenged in DeGraffsrireid,

however, was not considered in Mosley.

11. Id at 145. 12. Interestingly, no case has been discovered in

which a court denied a white male’s

attempt to bring a reverse discrimination claim on similar grounds—that Is, that sex

and race claims cannot be combined because C ongress did not intend to protect compound

classes. White males in a typical reverse dis crimination case are in no better position

than the frustrated plaintiffs in DeGraffenre id: If they are required to make their claims

separately, white males cannot prove race d iscrimination because white women are not

discriminated against, and they cannot p rove sex discrimination because Black males a

re

not discriminated against. Yet It seems tha t courts do not acknowledge the compound

nature of most reverse discrimination ca ses. That Black women’s claims automatically

raise the question of compound discriminatio n and white males’ “reverse discrimination”

cases do not suggest that the notion of compoundedness is somehow contingent up

on

an implicit norm that Is not neutral but Is white male. Thus, Black women are perceiv

ed

as a compound class because they are two steps removed from a white male norm,

while

white males are apparently not percei ved to be a compound class because they someh

ow

represent the norm. 13. 1 do not mean to imply that all c

ourts that have grappled with this problem

have adopted the DeGraffenreid approa ch. Indeed, other courts have concluded

that

Black women are protected by Title VI I. See, for example, Jefferies v Harris Com

munity

Action Ass’n., 615 FZd 1025 (5th Cir 1980 ). I do mean to suggest that the very fact

that

the Black women’s claims are seen as a berrant suggests that sex discrimination do

ctrine

is centered in the experiences of whi te women. Even those courts that have

held that

Black women are protected seem to ac cept that Black women’s claims raise Issue

s that

the ‘standard” sex discrimination clai ms do not. See Elaine W. Shoben, C

ompound

Discrimirsatiom The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment Disctimination, 55

NYU

1. Rev 793, 803—04 (1980) (criticizing th e Jeeries use of a sex-plus analysis to

create a

subclass of Black women).

14. 708 F2d 475. 15. See also Moore v National Associatio

n of Securities Dealers, 27 EPD (CCF I) ¶

32,238 (D DC 1981); but ace Edmond.s on v Simon, 86 FRD 375 (N D III

1980) (where

the court was unwilling to hold as a ma tter of law that no Black female could r

epresent

without conflict the Interests of both Bla cks and females).

16. 708 F2d at 479. Between January 197 6 and June 1979, the three years in wh

ich

Moore claimed that she was passed ov er the promotion, the percentage of wh

ite males

occupying first-level supervisory positions ranged from 70.3 to 76.8%; Black males

from

8.9 to 10.9%; white women from 1.8 to 3.3°/a; arid Black females from 0 to 2

.2%. The

overall male/female ratio in the top five labor grades ranged from 100/0% in 197

6 to

98/1,S°/a in 1979. The white/Black ratio was 85/3.3% in 1976 and 79.6/8% in 197

9. The

overall ratio of men to women in supervi sory positions was 98.2 to 1.80/s in 197

6 to

93.4 to 6.6°/a in 1979; the Black to whi te ratio during the same time period

was 78.6

to 8.9°/s and 73.6 to 13.1%

For promotions to the top five labor gra des, the percentages were worse. Betwee

n

1976 and 1979, the percentage of wh ite males in these positions ranged fro

m 85.3 to

77.9%; Black males 3.3 to 8%; white fema les from 0 to 1.4%, and Black females

from

0 to 0%. Overall, in 1979, 98.2°/a of th e highest level employees were male; 1.

8% were

female. 17. 708 F2d at 480 (emphasis added).

Demarginalizing the Intersect ion of Race and Sex 75

18. Id at 484-86. 19. Under the disparate Impact theory that prevailed at the time, the plaintiff had

to Introduce statistics suggesting that a policy or procedure disparately affects the members of a protected group. The employer could rebut that evidence by showing that there was a business necessity supporting the rule. The plaintiff then countered the rebuttal by showing that there was a lesa discriminatory alternative. See, for example, Griggs v Duke Powej 401 US 424 (1971); Connecricta v Teal, 457 US 440 (1982).

A central issue in a disparate impact case is whether the impact proved is statistically significant. A related Issue Is how the protected group Is defined. In many cases a Black female plaintiff would prefer to use statLstlcs which include white women and/or Black men to indicate that the policy In question does In fact disparately affect the protected tlass. If as in Moore, the plaintiff may use only statistics involving Black women, there may not be enough Black women employees to create a statistically significant sample.

20. Id at 484, 21. The Court buttressed its finding with respect to the upper.level labor jobs with

statistics for the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area which indicated that there were only 0.2% Black women within comparable job categories. Id at 485 n 9.

22. Id at 486. 23. Id. 24. See Strang v Arkansas Blue Cross 5f Blue Shield, Inc., 87 FRD 496 (5 D Ark

1980); Hammons v Folger Coffee Co., 87 FRD 600 (W D Mo 1980); Edmoridson v Simon, 86 FRD 375 (N D Ill 1980); Vuyanich v Republic National Bank of Dallas, 82 FRD (N D Tex 1979); Colston v Maryland Cup Corp., 26 Fed Rules Serv 940 (D Md 1978).

25. 416 F Supp 248 (N D Miss 1976). 26. The suit commenced on March 2, 1972 with the filing of a complaint by three

employees seeking to represent a class of persons allegedly subjected to racial discrimination at the hands of the defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add an allegation of sex discrimination. Of the original named plaintiffs, one was a Black male and two were Black females. In the course of the three.year period between the filing of the complaint and the trial, the only named male plaintiff received permission of the court to withdraw for religious reasons. Id at 250.

27. As the dissent in Travenol pointed out, there was no reason to exclude Black males from the scope of the remedy after counsel had presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination against Black men. If the rationale for excluding Black males was the potential conflict between Black males and Black females, then Iijn this case, to paraphrase an old adage, the proof of plaintiffs’ ability to represent the interests of Black males was In the representation thereof.” 673 F2d at 837—38.

28. 673 F2d 798 (5th Cit 1982). 29. In much of antidiscrimination doctrine, the presence of intent to discriminate

distinguishes unlawful from lawful discrimination. See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239—45 (1976) (proof of discriminatory purposes required to substantiate Equal Protection violation). Under Title VII, however, the Court has held that statistical data showing a disproportionate impact can suffice to support a finding of discrimination. See Griggs, 401 US at 432. Whether the distinction between the two analyses will survive is an open question. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v Atonio, 109 S Ct 2115, 2122-23 (1989) (plaintiffs must show more than mere disparity to support a prima facie case of disparate Impact). For a discussion of the competing normative visions that underlie the intent and effects analyses, see Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn L Rev 1049 (1978).

30. See, for example. Moore, 708 F2d at 479.

76 K imberle Crenshaw

31. See Phyliss Palmer, The Racial Feminization of Poverty: Women of Color as Portents

of the Future for All Wcnnen, Women’s Studies Quarterly 11:3—4 ( Fall 1983) (posing the

question of why white women in the women’s movement had not create d more effective

and continuous alliances with Black women” when “simultaneou sly ... Black wom

(havel become heroines for the women’s movement, a positi on symbolized by the consistent

use of Sojourner Truth and her famous words, “Alnt I a Woman?”) .

32 See Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Imp act of Black Women on

Race and Sex in America 54 (William Morrow and Co, mc, 1st ed 1984). 33, Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Women’s Rights Movem

ent in the United

States 91 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), Se e also Bell Hooks, Ain’t

1 a Woman 159-60 (South End Press, 1981). 34. “Objectivity’ is itself an example of the reification of wh

ite male thought.” Hull

et al, eds, But Some of Us Are Brave at XXV (cited in no te 1).

35. For example, many white females were able to gain entry into previously all

white male enclaves not through bringing about a fundament al reordering of male versits

female work, but in large part by shifting their “female” respo nsibilities to poor and

minority women. 36. Feminists often discuss how gender-based stereotypes an

d norms reinforce the

subordination of women by justifying their exclusion from p ublic life and glorifying

their roles within the private sphere. Law has historically played a role in maintaining

this subordination by enforcing the exclusion of women from public life and by limiting

its reach into the private sphere. See, for example, Debo rah L. Rhode, Association and

Assimilation, 81 Nw U L Rev 106 (1986); Frances Olsen, F rom False Paternalism to False

Equality: Judicial Assaults ott Feminisc Community, Illinois 1869— 95, 84 Mich L Rev 1518

(1986); Martha Minow, Foreword: justice Engendered, 101 H arv L Rev 10 (1987); Nadine

Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women’s Subordination and the Role

of Law, in David Kairya, ed, The Politics of Law 117-39 (P antheon Books, 1982).

38. This criticism Is a discrete illustration of a more ge neral claim that feminism has

been premised on white middle-class women’s experience. For example, early feminist

texts such as Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (W. W. Norton, 1963), placed white

middle-class problems at the center of feminism and thu s contributed to its rejection

within the Black community. See Hooks, Ain’t 1 a Wom an at 185-96 (cited in note 33)

(noting that feminism was eschewed by Black women b ecause Its white middle-class

agenda ignored Black women’s concerns).

39. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferen tial Treatment: An Approach

to the Topics, 24 UCLA 1. Rev 581, 588 (1977). 1 chose this phrase not because it is

typical of most feminist statements of separate spheres; in deed, most discussions are not

as simplistic as the bold statement presented here, See, for example, Taub and Schneider,

Perspectives on Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law at 117—39 (cited In note 36).

40. For example, Black families have sometimes been Cast as pathological largely

because Black women’s divergence from the white middl e-class female norm. The most

infamous rendition of this view is found in the Moynih an report which blamed many

of the Black community’s Ills on a supposed patho logical family structure. (See note

64.1 41. See Hooks, Ain’t I a Woman at 94—99 (cited in note 33)

(discussing the elevation

of sexist imagery in the Black liberation movement d uring the 1960a).

42. See generally Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Lab or of Sorrow: Black Women,

Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present (Basic Books, 1985); Angela Davis,

Women, Race and Class (Random House, l8l).

43. As Elizabeth Higglnbotham noted, “women, who often fail to conform to

‘appropriate’ sex roles, have been pictured as, and made to feel, inadequate—even though

DmargiflaliZiflg the Intersection of Race and Sex 77

a women, they possess traits recognized as p ositive when held by men in the wider

society. Such women are stigmatized because their lack o f adherence to expected gender

roles Is seen as a threat to the value system.” Elizabeth Higgi nbotham, Two Represerstattve

Issues in Contemporary Sociological WoTk on Black Women, in Hull, et al eds, But Some

of Us Are Brave at 95 (cIted In note 1)

44. See generally Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will (Simo n and Schuster, 1975);

Susan Eatrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press, 1987).

45. See Brownmiller, Against Our Will at 17; see generally Estrich, R eal Rape.

46. One of the central theoretical dilemmas of feminism that is largel y obscured by

universalizing the white female experience is that experiences that are described as a

manifestation of male control over females can be Instead a manifestation o f dominant

group control over all subordinates. The slgnihcance is that o ther nondoniinant men

rosy not share In, participate in or connect with the behavior, beliefs or actions at issue,

and may be victimized themselves by “male” power. In other contexts, however, “male

authority” might Include nonwhite men, particularly in private sphere contexts. Efforts

to think more clearly about when Black women are dominated as w omen and when

they are dominated as Black women are directly related to the questi on of when power

is male and when It is white male. 47. See Note, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 Harv Women’s L J 103, 117—23 (1983)

(discussing the historical and contemporary evidence suggesting that Black w omen are

generally not thought to be chaste). See also Hooks, Ain’t I a Woman at 54 (cIt ed in

note 33) (stating that stereotypical images of Black womanhood during slav ery were

based on the myth that “all black women were immoral and sexually loose”); Beverly

Smith, Black Women’s Health: Notes far a Course, In Hull et al, eds, But Some o f Us

Are Brave at 110 (cited in note 1) (noting that “. . . white men for centurie s have

justified their sexual abuse of Black women by claiming that we are licentious, alwsys

‘ready’ for any sexual encounter”). 48. The following statement Is probably unusual only in its candor: “What has been

said by aorne of our courts about an unchaste female being a comparatively rare excep tion

is no doubt true where the population Is composed largely of the Caucasian race, but

we would blind ourselves to actual conditions if we adopted this rule where another

race that is largely Immoral constitutes an appreciable part of the population.” Dallas

v State, 76 Ha 358, 79 So 690 (1918), quoted In Note, 6 Harv Women’s L J at 121 (cited in note 47).

Espousing preclsdy this view, one commentator stated in 1902: “1 sometimes hear

of a virtuous Negro woman but the idea Is so absolutely inconceivable to me . . .

cannot imagine such a creature as a virtuous Negro woman.” Id at 82. Such images

persist in popular culture. See Paul Grein, Taking Stock of the Latest Pop Record Surprises,

LA Times § 6 at 1 (July 7, 1988) (recalling the controversy In the late 7Os over a Rolling Stones recording which Included the line “Black girls just wanna get fucked all night’).

49. Because of the way the legal system viewed chastity, Black women could not be

victims of forcible rape. One commentator has noted that “laiccording to governing

(stereotypes), chastity could not be possessed by Black women. Thus, Black women’s

rape charges were automatically discounted, and the Issue of chastity was contested only

In cases where the rape complainant was a white woman.” Note, 6 Harv Women’s L

at 126 (cited in note 47). Black women’s claIms of rape were not taken seriously regardless

of the offender’s race. A judge in 1912 said: “This court will never take the word of a

nigger against the word of a white roan (concerning rape(.” Id at 120. On the other

hand, lynching was considered an effective remedy for a Black man’s rape of a white

woman. Since rape of a white woman by a Black man was “a crime more horrible than

78 Kimberle Crenshaw

death,” the only way to assuage so ciety’s rage and to make the woma

n whole again was

to brutally murder the Black man. Id at 125.

50. See The Rape of Black Women as a Weapon of Terror, in Gerda Las-

ncr, ed, Black

Women in White America 172—93 (P antheon Books, 1972). See also Bro

wnmiiler, Against

Our Will (cited in note 44). Even w here Brownmlller acknowledges th

e use of rape as

racial terrorism, she. resiata making a “special case” for Black women

by offering evidence

that white women were raped by the Klan as well. Id at 139. Wh

ether or not one

considers the racist rape of Black w omen a “special case,” such exper

iences are probably

different. In any case, Brownmiller ’s treatment of the Issue raises

serious questions about

the ability to sustain an analy sis of patriarchy without underst

anding its multiple

Intersections with racism.

51. Lerner, Black Women in Vih ice America at 173.

52. See generally, Note, 6 Harv Women’s L J at 103 (cited in note 47).

53. Paula Giddings notes the c ombined effect of sexual and rac

ial stereotypes: “Black

women were seen having all of th e inferior qualities of white w

omen without any of

their virtues.” Giddings, When an d Where I Enter at 82 (cited In

note 32).

54. Susan Brownmiller’s treatm ent of the Emmett Till case illu

strates why antirape

politicization makes some African Americans uncomfortable. Despit

e Brownmilter’s quite

laudable efforts to discuss elsewh ere the rape of Black women an

d the racism involved

in much of the hysteria over the Black male threat, her analysis

of the Till case places

the sexuality of white women, ra ther than racial terrorism, at c

enter stage. Brownmiiler

states: “Rarely has one single c ase exposed so clearly as Till’

s the underlying group-

male antagonisms over access to women, for what began in Bry

ant’s store should not

be misconstrued as sri innocen t flirtation. . . . In concrete ter

ms, the accessibility of all

white women was on review.” B rownmiller, Against Our Will a

t 272 (cited In note 44).

Later, Brownmiller argues: “And what of the wolf whistle, Till’s ‘g

esture of adolescent

bravado’? We are tightly aghast t hat a whistle could be cause for

murder but we must

also accept that Emmett Till and J. W. Millam shsred something in comm

on. They both

understood that the whistle was no small tweet of hubba-hubb

a or melodious approval

for a well-turned ankle. Given t he deteriorated situation . . . it

was a deliberate Insult

Just short of physical assault, a la st reminder to Carolyn Bryant

that this black boy, Till,

had a mind to possess her.” Id at 273.

‘While Brownmliler seems to c ategorize the case as one that

evidences a conflict

over possession, it is regarded In African American history as a tr

agic dramatization of

the South’s pathological hatred and fear of African Americans

. Till’s body, mutilated

beyond recognition, was viewe d by thousands so that, in the

words of Till’s mother,

“the world could see what they did to my boy.” Juan Williams,

Standing for Justice, in

Eyes on the Prize 44 (Viking, 1 987). The Till tragedy Is also

regarded as one of the

historical events that bore direc tly on the emergence of the

Civil Rights movement.

“fW)ithout question it moved black America in a way the Su

preme Court ruling on

school desegregation could not match.” Id, As Williams later o

bserved, “the murder of

Emmltt Till had a powerful i mpact on a generation of blacks

. It was this generation,

those who were adolescents wh en Till was killed, that would

soon demand justice and

freedom in a way unknown in America before.” Id at 57. Thus, w

hile Brownmiller looks

at the Till case and sees the v icious struggle over the posses

sion of a white woman,

African Americans see the cas e as a symbol of the Insane degr

ee to which whites were

willing to suppress the Black rac e. While patriarchal attitudes

toward women’s sexuality

played a supporting role, to pla ce white women center stage in th

is tragedy Ia to manifest

such confusion over racism as t o make it difficult to Imagine

that the white antirape

movement could be sensitive to more subtle racial tensions regar

ding Black women’s

participation in it.

Demarginalizitsg the lrstersectssn of Race and Sex 79

55. See Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice from the South (Negro Universities Press, 1969 reprint of the Aldine Printing House, Ohio, 1892).

56. Id at 31. 57. In all fairness, I must acknowledge that my companion accompanied me to the

back door. I remain uncertain, however, as to whether the gesture was an expression of solidarity or an effort to quiet my anger.

58. To this one could easily add class. 60. For a comparative discussion of Third World feminism paralleling this observation,

see Kumarl Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World 1-24 (Zed Books Ltd 1986). Jayawardena states that feminism in the Third World has been “accepted” only within the central struggle against international domination. Women’s social and political status has improved most when advancement Is necessary to the broader struggle against imperialism.

61. For a discussion of how racial ideology creates a polarising dynamic which subordinates Blacks and privileges whites, see Kimberle Crersshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrirnination Law, 101 Harv L Rev 1331, 1371—76 (1988).

62. Jack Matthews, Three Color Purple Actresses Talk About Its Impact, LA Times § 6 at 1 (Jan 31, 1986); Jack Matthews, Some Blacks CTicicai of Spielberg’s Purple, LA Times

§ 6 at 1 (Dec 20, 1985). But see Gene Siskel, Does Purple 1-lace Men?, Chicago Tribune § 13 at 16 (Jan 5, 1986); Clarence Page, Toward a New Black Cinema, Chicago Tribune § 5 at 3 (Jan 12, 1986).

63. A consistent problem with any negative portrayal of African Americana is that they are seldom balanced by positive Images. On the other hand, most critics overlooked the positive transformation of the primary male character in The Color Purple.

64. Daniel P Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Office of Policy Planning and Research, United States Department of Labor, 1965).

65. Sec Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, The Moynthan Report and the Politics of Controversy 427—29 (MIT Press, 1967) (contaIning criticism of the Moynthan Report by, among others, Charles E. Silberman, Christopher Jencks, William Ryan, Laura Carper, Frank Rlessman and Herbert Gans).

66. Id at 395—97 (critics Included Martin Luther King, Jr., Benjamin Payton, James Farmer, Whitney Young, Jr. snd Bayard Ruatin).

67. One of the notable exceptions is Jacquelyne Johnson Jackson, Black Women in a Racist Society, in Racism and Mental Health 185-86 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973).

68. The Vanishing Black Family (PBS Television Broadcast, January 1986). 69. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass

and Public Policy (The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 70. Columnist Mary McGrory, applauding the show, reported that Moyers found

that sex was as common in the Black ghetto as a cup of coffee. McGrory, Moynihan was Right 21 Years Ago, The Washington Post Bi and B4 (Jan 26, 1986). George Will argued that oversexed Black men were more of a menace than Bull Conner, the Birmingham Police Chief who In 1968 achieved international notoriety by turning 6re hoses on protesting school children. George Will, Voting Rights Won’t Fix It, The Washington Post A23 (Jan 23, 1986).

My guess is that the program has influenced the debate about the so-called underclass by providing graphic support to pre-existing tendencies to attribute poverty to individual immorality. During a recent and memorable discussion on the public policy implications of poverty in the Black community, one student remarked that nothing can be done about Black poverty until Black men stop acting like “roving penises,” Black women

80 Kimberle Crenshaw

stop having babies “at the drop of a hat” and they all learn middle-class morality. The student cited the Moyers report as her source.

71. Although the nearly exclusive focus on the racist aspects of the program poses

both theoretical and political problems it was entirely understandable given the racial

nature of the subsequent comments that were sympathetic to the Moyers view. As is

typical in discussions involving race, the dialogue regarding the Moyers program covered

more than just the Issue of Black families; some commentators took the opportunity to

indict not only the Black underclass, but the Black civil rights leadership, the war on

poverty, affirmative action and other race-based remedies. See, for example, Will, Voting

Rights Won’t Fix It at A23 (cited in note 70). 72. Their difficulties can also be linked to the prevalence of an economic system

and family policy that treat the nuclear family as the norm and other family units as

aberrant and unworthy of societal accommodation. 73. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged at 96 (cited In note 69).

74. Id at 154 (suggestions include macroeconomic policies which promote balanced

economic growth, a nationally-oriented labor market strategy, a child support assurance

program, a child care strategy, and a family allowances program which would be both

means tested and race specific). 75. Nor does Wilson include an analysis of the Impact of gender on changes in

family patterns. Consequently, little attention is paid to the conflict that may result

when gender-based expectations are frustrated by economic and demographic factors.

This focus on demographic and structural explanations represent an effort to regain the

high ground from the Moyers/Moynlhan approach which is more psycho-social. Perhaps

because psycho-social explanations have come dangerously close to victim-blaming, their

prevalence is thought to threaten efforts to win policy directives that might effectively

sddreas deteriorating conditions within the working class and poor Black communities.

See Kirnberle Crenshsw, A Comment on Gender, Difference, and Victim Ideology in the

Study of the Black Family, in The Decline of Marriage Among African Amen cans: Causes,

Consequences and Policy Implications (forthcoming 1989). 76. For Instance, Wilson only mentions In passing the need for day care and job

training for single mothers. Wilson at 153 (cited in nOte 69). No mention at all is made

of other practices and policies that are racist and sexist, and that contribute to the poor

conditions under which nearly half of all Black women must live.

77. Pauli Murray observes that the operation of sexism is at least the partial cause

of social problems affecting Black women. See Murray, The Liberation of flack Women,

in Jo Freeman, ed Women: A Feminist Perspective 351—62 (Mayfield Publishing Co, 1975>.