Review 4

214 J •

A .

H o B

s o N / The E

conom ic Taproot of Im

perialism

goods at a price w hich covers the true cost of pro-

duction. T he first result of the successful form

ation of a trust or com

bine is to close dow n the w

orse equipped or w

orse placed m ills, and supply the en-

tire m arket from

the better equipped

and better placed ones. T

his course m ay or m

ay not be at- tended by a rise of price and som

e restriction of con- sum

ption: in som e cases trusts take m

ost of their profits by raising prices, in other cases by reducing the costs of production through em

ploying only the best m

ills and stopping the w aste of com

petition. For the present argum

ent it m atters not w

hich course is taken; the point is that this concentration of industry in "trusts;' "com

bines;' etc. at once lim its

the quantity of capital w hich can be effectively em

- ployed and increases the share of profits out of w

hich fresh savings and fresh capital w

ill spring. It is quite evident that a trust w

hich is m otivated by cut-throat

com petition, due to an excess of capital, cannot nor-

m ally find inside the "trusted" industry em

ploym ent

for that portion of the profits w hich the trust-m

akers desire to save and to invest. N

ew inventions and other

econom ies of production or distribution w

ithin the trade m

ay absorb som e of the new

capital, but there are rigid lim

its to this absorption. T he trustm

aker in oil or sugar m

ust find other investm ents for his sav-

ings: ifhe is early in the application of the com bina-

tion principles to his trade, he w ill naturally apply his

surplus capital to establish sim ilar com

binations in other industries, econom

ising capital still further, and rendering it ever harder for ordinary saving m

en to find investm

ents for their savings. Indeed, the conditions alike of cut-throat com

- petition and of com

bination attest the congestion of capital in the m

anufacturing industries w hich have

entered the m achine econom

y. W e are not here con-

cerned w ith any theoretic question as to the possi-

bility of producing by m odern

m achine m

ethods m

ore goods than can find a m arket. It is sufficient

to point out that the m

anufacturing pow

er of a country like the U

nited States w ould grow

so fast as to exceed the dem

ands of the hom e m

arket. N o one

acquainted w ith trade w

ill deny a fact w hich all

A m

erican econom ists assert, that this is the condi-

tion w hich the U

nited States reached at the end of the century, so far, as the m

ore developed industries are concerned. H

er m anufactures

w ere saturated

w ith capital and could absorb no m

ore. O ne after

another . they sought

refuge from

the w

aste of

com petition in "com

bines" w hich secure a m

easure of profitable peace by restricting the quantity

of

operative capital. Industrial and financial princes in oil, steel, sugar, railroads, banking, etc. w

ere faced w

ith the dilem m

a of either spending m ore than they

knew how

to spend; or forcing m arkets outside the

hom e area. T

w o econom

ic courses w ere open to

them , both leading tow

ards an abandonm ent of the

political isolation of the past and the adoption of im

perialist m ethods in the future. Instead of shut-

ting dow n inferior m

ills and rigidly restricting out- put to correspond w

ith profitable sales in the hom e

m arkets, they m

ight em ploy their full productive

pow er, applying their savings to increase their busi-

ness capital, and, w hile still regulating output and

prices for the hom e m

arket, m ay "hustle" for foreign

m arkets, dum

ping dow

n their

surplus goods at

prices w hich w

ould not be possible save for the profs itable nature of their hom

e m arket. So likew

ise they m

ight em ploy their savings in seeking investm

ents · outside their country, first repaying the capital bor- row

ed from G

reat B ritain and other countries for ·

the early developm ent of their railroads, m

ines and m

anufactures, and afterw ards becom

ing them selves

a creditor class to foreign countries. It w

as this sudden dem and for foreign m

arkets for m

anufactures and for investm

ent w hich w

as avow

edly responsible for the adoption of Im perial-

ism as a political policy and practice by the R

epub- lican

party to

w hich

the great

industrial and

financial chiefs belonged, and w hich belonged to

them . T

he adventurous enthusiasm

of President

T heodore R

oosevelt and his_ "m anifest destiny" and

"m ission of civilization" party m

ust not deceive us. It w

as M essrs. R

ockefeller, Pierpont M

organ, and their associates w

ho needed Im perialism

and w ho

fastened it upon the shoulders of the great R epub-

lic of the W est. T

hey needed Im perialism

because they desired to use the public resources of their country

to find profitable em

ploym ent

for their capital w

hich otherw ise w

ould be superfluous .... It is this econom

ic condition of affairs that

form s the taproot of Im

perialism . If the consum

ing public in this country raised its standard of con- sum

ption to keep pace w ith every rise of productive

pow ers, there could be no' excess of goods or capital

clam orous to use Im

perialism in order to find m

ar- kets: foreign trade w

ould indeed exist, but there

. w ould be no difficulty in exchanging a sm

all surplus of our m

anufactures for the food and raw m

aterial w

e annually absorbed, and all the savings that w e

m ade could find em

ploym ent, if w

e chose, in hom e

industries ....

R O

B E

R T

w

cox/ G

" • LI

. ram

sc1,r egem ony, and International R

elations 215

G ram

sci, Hegem ony,

and International Relations R

O B

E R

T W

. C

O X

C ox exam

ines the im plications of A

ntonio G ram

sci's conce t of h .

. storico) to G

ram sci is decisive com

posed as t't . ·•b

h " p

egem ony for IR

. The historic bloc (blocco .

' ts

0, ot

structures and superst t

" h

b' .

the sub;ective, respectively. Thus, C ox tells us w

e find in the "

. .

ures -t eo Jectiveand

ships of the political, ethical, and ideological spheres of t. -~Zoe.te ;uxtaposttton and reciprocal relation-

the instrum ent of hegem

ony. Hegem ony at the Internati:::~tl: w

it t e econom

ic sphere." _The bloc bec~m es

the w orld econom

y exhibiting a dom inant m

od .

vel extends beyond states. It ts an order within com

plex social relations connecting classes am e of roductton that_penetratesall countries. It also consists of

m utually reinforcingso~ial political and eco on~ ttifferentcountries. W

orld hegem ony, therefore, consists of

' ,

nom tc s ructures O

ne exp~ i

d h

. m

onyare international organizations Pros ect :

ess on an m

ec am sm

of w orld hege-

to be at the national, not the internatf anal feve{ for the creation of counter-hegem onic blocks are m

ost likely

Som e tim

e ago I began reading G ram

sci's P rison

f!~tebooks.In these fragm ents, w

ritten in a fascist pnson ~etw

een 1929 and 1935, the form er leader of

the Italian C om

m unist

Party w as concerned w

ith the problem

of understanding capitalist societies in . the

1?20s and. 1930s, and particularly

w ith

the m

eanm g of fascism

and the possibilities of build1· ,. •

C

ng an a 1~ernative 1orm

of state and society based on the w

orking class. W hat he had to say centered upon

!he state, upon the relationship of civil society to the_ state, ~nd upon

the relationship of politics,

ethics, a?d ~deology to production. N ot surprisingly,

G ram

s_c1 did ~ot have very m uch to say directly

about m ternat10nal relations. N

evertheless I found !hat G

ram sci's thinking w

as helpful in understand- m

g_ the m eaning of international organization w

ith w

hich I w as then principally concerned. Particularly

useful w as his concept of hegem

ony, but valuable . _also~ere several concepts w

hich he had w orked out

for him self or developed from

others. T his essay sets

forth m y understanding of w

hat G ram

sci m eant by

hegem o~y and these related concepts, and suggests

how _ I thm

k they m ay be adapted, retaining his es-

s~ntial m eaning, to the understanding of problem

s ~f _w

orld order. It does not purport to be a critical

stµdy of G ram

sci's political theory but m

erely a

derivation ~om it of som

e ideas useful for a revision of current m

ternational relations theory.1 ...

G ram

sci and H egem

ony G

ram sci's c?ncepts w

ere all derived from history-

b?th from ~1s ow

n reflections upon those periods of history w

hich he thought helped to throw

an ex- planatory

light upon the present,

and from

his person.al experience of political and social struggle. T

hese m cluded the w

orkers' councils m ovem

ent of the _early 1920s, his participation in the T

hird Inter- ?at1onal, and his opposition to fascism

. G ram

sci's ideas have alw

ays to be related to his ow n historical

context. M oreove_r, pe :vas constantly adjusting his

concepts to specific historical circum stances. T

he c~ncepts cannot usefully be considered in abstrac- tion from

their applications, for w hen they are so

abstracted diffe~ent usages of the sam

e concept appear to ~ontam

c~~tradictions or am

biguities.2 A

concept, m G

ram sci s thought, is loose and elastic

and at~ains preci~ion only w hen brought into con-

tact ~1th a particular situation w

hich it helps to explam

, a contact w hich also develops the m

eaning o~ th~ ~oncept. T

his is the strength of G ram

sci's h1stonc1sm

and therein lies its explanatory pow er.

' ·R

obertW C

"G

· H

· ·

ox, ram

sci, egem

ony, and International R elation " ·

R b

to W orld O

rder (C am

bridge U K

· C am

bridge U .

. p

s m

o ert W . C

ox and T im

othy J.Sinclair,A pproaches

. . '

· m

vers1ty ress, 1996), 124-41. R eprinted by perm

ission.

' ii

R o B

E R

T W .

co X

/ G

ram sci, H

egem ony, and International

R elations

R O

B E

R T

W .

C O

X

/ G

ram sci, H

egem ony, and International

R elations

216 217

other classes from those in w

hich it had n~t. I? north- the leadership and supportive basis for an alterna-

T he term

"historicism " is how

ever, frequently m is-

particularly apposite

to the

period of the

N ew

ern E

urope, in the countries w he~e capitalism

had tive to fascism

. W here M

achiavelli looked to the in- understood

and criticized by tho~e _w

ho seek a E

conom ic Policy before coercion began to be ap-

first becom e established, bourgeois hegem

o~y w as

dividual prince, G

ram sci looked to the m

odern m

ore abstract system atic, um

versalistic, and non- plied on a larger scale against the rural population.)

m ost com

plete. It necessarily involved co~cessions ~o prince: the revolutionary party engaged in a contin-

historical form ofknow

ledge.3 .

In w estern E

urope, by contrast, civil society, subordinate

classes in return for acqm

escence m

uing and developing dialogue w ith its ow

n base of G

ram sci geared his thought consisten~ly to_ the

under bourgeois hegem ony, w

as m uch m

ore fully bourgeois leadership, con~essions w

hich co~ld lead support.

G ram

sci took over from M

achiavelli the practical purpose of political actio~. In h~,s priso~

developed and took

m anifold

form s. A

w ar

of ultim

ately to form s of social dem

ocracy w hich pre-

im age of pow

er as a centaur: half m an, half beast, a

w ritings, he alw

ays referred to M anosm

as the p~i- m

ovem ent m

ight conceivably, in conditions of ex- serve capitalism

w hile m

aking it m ore acceptable t_o

necessary com bination of consent and coercion. 8 T

o losophy of praxis:'4 Partly at least, one m

~y surm ise,

ceptional upheaval,

enable a revolutionary van-

w orkers and the petty bourgeoisie. B

e~~use t~eir the extent that the consensual aspect of pow

er is in it m

ust have been to underline the practica~ revolu- guard to seize control of the state apparatus; but

hegem ony w

as firm ly entrenched in clV

ll society, the forefront, hegem

ony prevails. C oercion is alw

ays tionary purpose of ph~lo_sophy: Partly too,_ it w

ould because of the resiliency of civil society such an

the bourgeoisie often did not need to run the sta~e latent but is only applied in m

arginal, deviant cases. have been to indicate his m

tention to c~ntri~ute to a exploit w

ould in the long run be doom ed to failure.

them selves. L

anded aristocrats in E ngland, Junkers m

H

egem ony is enough to ensure conform

ity of be- lively developing current of thought: given im

pet~s G

ram sci described the state in w

estern E urope (by

Prussia, or a renegade preten~er to the m antle of

havior in m ost people m

ost of the tim e. T

he M achi-

by M arx but not forever circum

scribed by M arx s

w hich w

e should read state in the lim

ited sense N

apoleon I in France, could do it for ~hem so long as

avellian connection frees the concept of pow er (and

k N o thing could be further from

his m ind than

of adm inistrative, governm

ental, and coercive ap- w

or . ·

f h

these rulers recognized the hegem om

c s~~ucture_sof of hegem

ony as one form of pow

er) from a tie to

M arxism

w hich consists in an exegesis o

t e

paratus and not the enlarged concept of the state civil society as the basic lim

its of their political act~on. historically specific social classes and gives it a w

ider :acred texts for the purpose of refining a tim

eless set m

entioned above) .as "an outer ditch, behind w hich

T his. perception of hegem

ony led G ram

sci. to applicability to relations of dom

inance and subordi- there stands a pow

erful system of fortresses and

of categories and concepts. enlarge his definition of the st~te. W

hen the adm m

- nation, including, as w

ill be suggested below , rela-

earthw orks:'

istrative, executive, and coercive apparatus of gov- tions of w

orld order. It does not, how ever, sever

O rigins of the C

oncepts of H egem

ony ernm

ent w as in effect constrained by the hege_m

ony pow

er relations from their social basis (i.e., in the

In R ussia, the State w

as everything, civil society of the leading class of a w

hole social f~r.m at10n, it

case of w orld-order relations by m

aking them into

w as prim

ordial and gelatinous; in the W

est, T

here are tw o m

ain strands leading to the G ram

s- becam

e m eaningless to lim

it the defim tion of the

relations am

ong states narrow

ly conceived), but there w

as a proper relation betw een State and

cian idea of hegem ony. T

he first ran fro~ the debates state to those elem

ents of governm ent. T

o be m ean-

directs attention tow ards deepening an aw

areness of civil society, and w

hen the State trem bled a

w ithin the T

hird International concernm g the _strat-

. ful the notion of the state w

ould also have to this social basis.

sturdy structure of civil society w

as at once egy of the B

olshevik R evolution and the creatl?~ of

m g

' l' ·

1 t

revealed. 10 include the underpinnings of the po itic~ struc ure

a Soviet socialist state, the second from the w

ritm gs

in civil society. G ram

sci thought of thes_e m concrete of M

achiavelli. In tracing the first strand, so~,e

W ar of M

ovem ent and W

ar of P osition

A ccordingly, G

ram sci argued that the w

ar of m ove-

historical term s: the church, the educational system

, com

m entators

have sought to contrast ?r~m

sci s m

ent could not be effective against the hegem onic

the press, all the institutions w hich ~elped to create

In thinking through the first strand of his concept of thought w

ith L enin's by aligning G

ram sci w

~th t_he state-societies of w

estern E urope. T

he alternative in people certain m

odes of behavi?r an~ expec-

hegem ony, G

ram sci reflected upon the experiences

idea of a hegem ony of the proletariat and L

enm w

ith strategy is the w

ar of position w hich slow

ly builds tations consistent w

ith the hegem om

c social orde~. of the B

olshevik R evolution and sought to deter-

a dictatorship of the proletariat. O ther com

m ent~-

up the strength of the social foundations of a new

For exam ple, G

ram sci argued

that the

M asom

c m

ine w hat lessons m

ight be draw n from

it for the tors have underlined their basic agreem

ent.s_W hat is

state. In w estern E

urope, the struggle had to be w on

lodges in Italy w ere a bond am

ongst the g~vernm ent

task of revolution in w estern E

urope. 9 H e cam

e to im

portant is that L enin referred to the_ Rus~ian pro-

in civil society before an assault on the state could officials w

ho entered into the state m achm

ery after the conclusion that the circum

stances in w estern

letariat as both a dom inant

and a dir~ctm ? cl~ss,

achieve success. Prem ature attack on the state by a

the unification of Italy, and therefore m ust be con-

E urope differed greatly from

those in R ussia. T

o dom

inance im plying dictatorship and dir~ction im

- w

ar of m ovem

ent w ould only reveal the w

eakness of sidered as part of the state for the purpose of assess-

illustrate the differences in circum stances, and the

plying leadership w ith the consent of allied classes

the opposition and lead to a reim position of bour-

ing its broader political structure. T he hegem

o~y of consequent differences in strategies required, he had

( notably the peasantry). G ram

sci, ~n effect, took o~er geois dom

inance as the institutions of civil society a dom

inant class thus bridged

the con~entlo~al recourse to the m

ilitary analogy of w ars of m

ove- reasserted controf.

an idea that w as current in the _circles of the T

hird categories of state and civil society, categories w

hich m

ent and w ars of position. T

he basic difference be- International: the w

orkers exercised hegem ony over

T he strategic im

plications of this analysis are the

allied classes and

dictatorship over

enem y

retained a certain analytical usefulness ?utceased to tw

een R ussia and w

estern E urope w

as in the relative clear but fraught w

ith difficulties. T o build up the

correspond to separable entities in reality. ,

strengths of state and civil society. In R ussia, the

classes. Y et this idea w

as applied by the T hird Inter-

basis of an alternative state and society upon the A

s noted above, the second strand leadm g to

adm inistrative and coercive apparatus· of the state

national only to the w orking class _and expre~sed the

leadership of the w orking class m

eans creating alter- the G

ram scian idea of hegem

ony cam e all the w

ay w

as form idable but proved to be vulnerable, w

hile role of _the w

orking class in leadm g an alliance of

native institutions and alternative intellectual re-

from M

achiavelli and helps to broaden even further civil society w

as undeveloped. A relatively sm

all W

orkers peasants, and perhaps som e other groups

sources w ithin existing society and building bridges

> •

h 6

the potential scope of application _of t~e conce~t. w

orking class led by a disciplined vanguard w as able

potentially supportive of revo~uti~na~y_c ange._ betw

een w orkers and other subordinate classes. It

G ram

sci had pondered w hat M

achiavelli had w rit-

to overw helm

the state in a w ar of m

ovem ent and

G ram

sci's originality lies m his givm

g a tw ist to

m eans actively building a counterhegem

ony w ithin

ten especially in The P

rince, concerning the prob- m

et no effective resistance from the rest of civil

this first strand: he began to apply it to the bour- an established hegem

ony w hile resisting the pres-

le~ of founding a new

state. M achiavelli, in the

society. T he vanguard party could set about found-

geoisie, to the apparatus or m e~hanism

~ of h~ge- sures and tem

ptations to relapse into pursuit of in- fifteenth century, w

as concerned w ~th fin~ing the

ing a new state through

a com bination

of apply- of the dom

inant class.7 This m ade it possible

crem ental

gains for subaltern groups w

ithin the

m ony

. .

.. leadership

and the supporting s?C

ial basis fo\ a ing

coercion against

recalcitrant elem

ents and

. for him to distinguish cases m

w hich the bour?em

sie fram

ew ork

of bourgeois hegem

ony. T his is the

united Italy; G ram

sci, in the tw entieth century, w

ith building consent am

ong others. (T ~is analysis w

as had attained a hegem

onic position ofleadership over line

betw een

w ar

of position

as a

long-range

·I ·« I

218 R

o B E

R T w

. C o X

/ G ram

sci, H egem

ony, and International R elations

revolutionary strategy and social dem

ocracy as a policy of m

aking gains w ithin the established order.

P assive Revolution

N ot all w

estern E uropean societies w

ere bourgeois hegem

onies. G

ram sci distinguished

betw een

tw o

kinds of societies. O ne kind had undergone a thor-

ough social revolution and w orked out fully its con-

sequences in new m

odes of production and social

relations. E ngland and France w

ere cases that had gone further than m

ost others in this respect. T he

other kind w ere societies w

hich had so to speak im

ported or had thrust upon them aspects of a new

order created abroad, w

ithout the old order having been displaced. T

hese last w ere caught up in a dialec-

tic of revolution-restoration w

hich tended to be- com

e blocked as neither the new forces nor the old

could trium ph. In these societies, the new

industrial bourgeoisie failed to achieve hegem

ony. T he result-

ing stalem ate w

ith the traditionally dom inant social

classes created the conditions that G ram

sci called "passive revolution;'

the introduction of changes

w hich

did not

involve any arousal

of popular

forces. 11 O

ne typical accom panim

ent to passive revolu- tion in G

ram sci's analysis is caesarism

: a strong m an

intervenes to resolve the stalem ate betw

een equal and

opposed social forces. G

ram sci allow

ed that there w

ere both progressive and reactionary form s of

caesarism : progressive w

hen strong

rule presides over a m

ore orderly developm ent of a new

state, re- actionary w

hen it stabilizes existing pow er. N

apoleon I w

as a case of progressive caesarism , but N

apoleon III, the exem

plar of reactionary caesarism , w

as m ore

representative of the kind likely to arise in the course , of passive revolution. G

ram sci's analysis here is vir-

tually identical w ith that of M

arx in The E ighteenth

B rum

aire of Louis Bonaparte: the French bourgeoisie, unable to rule directly through their ow

n political parties, w

ere content to develop capitalism under a

political regim e w

hich had its social basis in the peas- antry, an inarticulate and unorganized class w

hose virtual representative B

onaparte could claim to be.

In late nineteenth-century Italy, the northern

industrial bourgeoisie, the class w ith the m

ost to gain from

the unification of Italy, w

as unable to dom

inate the peninsula. T he basis for the new

state becam

e an alliance betw een

the industrial bour-

geoisie of the north and the landow

ners of the

south-an alliance w

hich also provided benefits for petty-bourgeois clients (especially from

the south) w

ho staffed the new state bureaucracy and political

parties and becam e the interm

ediaries betw een the

various population groups and the state. T he lack of

any sustained and w

idespread popular participa-

tion in the

unification m

ovem ent

explained the "passive revolution" character of its outcom

e. In the afterm

ath of W orld W

ar I, w orker and peasant occu-

pations of

factories and

land dem

onstrated a

strength w hich w

as considerable enough to threaten yet

insufficient to

dislodge the

existing state. 12

T here took place then w

hat G ram

sci called a "dis- placem

ent of the basis of the state" tow

ards the petty bourgeoisie, the only class of nationw

ide ex- tent, w

hich becam e the anchor

of fascist pow er:

Fascism continued the passive revolution, sustain-

ing the position of the old ow ner classes yet unable

to attract the support of w

orker or peasant subal- tern groups.

A part from

caesarism , the second m

ajor feature of

passive revolution

in Italy

G ram

sci called

trasform ism

o.It w as exem

plified in Italian politics by G

iovanni G iolitti, w

ho sought to bring about the w

idest possible

coalition of

interests and

w ho

dom inated the political scene in the years preceding

fascism . For exam

ple, he aim ed to bring northern

industrial w orkers into a com

m on front w

ith indus- trialists through a protectionist policy. Trasform

ism o

w orked

to co-opt

potential leaders of subaltern

social groups. B y extension trasform

ism ocan serve

as a strategy of assim ilating and dom

esticating po- tentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them

to the policies of the dom

inant coalition and can thereby obstruct

the form

ation of class-based organized

opposition to established social and political pow er.

Fascism continued trasform

ism o.Gram

sci interprets the

fascist state corporatism

as an

unsuccessful attem

pt to introduce som

e of the m ore advanced

industrial practices of A m

erican capitalism under

the aegis of the old Italian m anagem

ent. T

he concept of passive revolution is a counter- part to the concept of hegem

ony in that it describes the condition

of a non.hegem onic society,-one in

w hich no dom

inant class has been able to establish a hegem

ony in G ram

sci's sense of the term . T

oday this notion of passive revolution, together w

ith its com

ponents, caesarism and trasform

ism o,is partic-

ularly apposite

to industrializing

T hird

W orld

countries.

R O

B E

R T

W .

C O

X /

G

· H

ram sc,, egem

ony, and International R elations

219 H

istoric Bloc (B locco Storico)

~ram ~ci attributed the source of his notion of the

h1stonc bloc ( blocco storico) to G eorges Sorel, though

Sorel never used the term or any other in precisely

the sense G ram

sci gave to it 13 Sorel di'd ho .

. ·

, w

ever, in- terpret revo~ut10nary action in term

s of social m yths

through w ?1ch people engaged in action perceived a

' confrontation ?ftotalities-in w

hich they saw a new

order challengm

g an established order. In the course of a cataclysm

ic event, the old order w ould be over-

thr~w n as a w

~o~e and the new be freed to unfold.14

~ile G

ra~sc1 did not share the subjectivism of this

v1s10n, he did _share the view that state and society

to~eth~r co~stituted a solid structure and that revo- lution im

plied the developm ent w

ithin it of another structure strong enough to replace the first E

h .

, M

h h

. c om

g arx,

e t ought this could com e about only w

hen the ~rst had exhausted its full potential. W

hether dom

m a?t

or em ergent, such a structure

is w hat

G ram

SC I called an historic bloc.

F~r Sorel,. social m yth,

a pow erful

form

of collect1~e subjectivity, w

ould obstruct

reform ist

tendencies. T hese m

ight otherw ise attract w

orkers aw

ay f~om revolutionary

syndicalism into incre-

~entahst trade unionism

or reform

ist party poli- tics. T

he m yth_ was a w

eapon in struggle as w ell.as a

!ool for analysis. For G ram

sci, the historic bloc sim -

: Iiarly had a revolutionary orientation

through its

stress on the unity and coherence of sociopolitical order~. It w

as an intellectual defense against co- optat1on by trasform

ism o.

T he hi~to~ic bloc is a dialectical concept in the

se~se that its. m teracting

elem ents create a larger

um ty. _G

ram sc1 expressed these interacting elem

ents s?m

et1m es as the subjective and the objective, som

e- tim

es as superstructure and structure.

Structures and superstructures form an "h' t

. bl

,, T h

. 1s one

oc. . at is to say the com

plex contradictory ?nd discordant ensem

bleof the superstructures

eco~om ism

'.' or a narrow ly econom

ic interpretation of history), ideas and m

aterial conditions are alw ays

bound together, m utually influencing one another

and not reducible one to the other. Ideas have to b; under~too_d in relation to m

aterial circum stances.

~atenal c1rcum

stances include both the social rela- , tions and the physical m

eans of production. Super- structures

of ideology and political organization

s~ape the developm ent of both aspects of produc-

tion and are shaped by them .

:'11h~storic bloc cannot exist w ithout a hege-

m on~c social cl~ss. W

here the hegem onic class is the

dom m

ant class m a country or social form

ation the s~ate (in ?ram

sci's enlarged concept) m aintains c~he-

s~on and identity w ithin the bloc through the propaga-

tion of a ~om m

on culture. A new

bloc is form ed w

hen a subordinate class (e.g., the w

orkers) establishes its hegem

ony over other subordinate groups (e.g., sm all

f~m ers, m

arginals). T his process requires intensive

dialogue betw een leaders and follow

ers w ithin the

w ould-?e hegem

onic class. G ram

sci m ay have con-

curred m th_e Leninist idea of a vanguard party w

hich takes upon itself the responsibility for leading an im

- m

ature w orking class, but only as an aspect of a w

ar of m

ov~m e~t. B

ecause a w ar-of-position strategy w

as reqm

red m the w

estern countries, as he saw it, the role

o~ the partJ:' s~ould be to lead, intensify, and develop d1alo~e w

1thm the w

orking class and betw een the

w orking class and other subordinate classes w

hich could be brought into alliance w

ith it. T he"

lin " .

. m

ass e

as ? m

o billzat10n. techniq~e once developecl by the

C ~m

~se <?am m

um st Party is consistent w

ith G ram

sci's thm

king 1n this respect. .

I~tellectuals play a key role in the building of an h1~tonc bloc. Intellectuals are not a distinct and rel~ ativel~ classless SO

fial stratum . G

ram sci saw

them as

orgam cally co~nected w

ith a social class. T hey per-

form the_ funct10n of developing and sustaining the

m e~tal _im

age~, technologies, and

organizations

is ~e reflection of the ensem

bleof the social relat10ns of production. is

T he ju~t~position and reciprocal relationships

of .· the_ ~ohti~al, ethical, and

ideological spheres of

~cti".1ty w ith

the econom

ic sphere

avoid reduc- •

om sm

._It avoids ~educing everything

either to

t econom .~cs (~con?m

1sm ) or to ideas (idealism

). In y G

ram SC

Is h1stoncal m

aterialism

(w hich

he '· · careful t

d · ·

. w

as f

O 1stm

gm sh from

w hat he called "historical

,..,

w h1c~ b1~d together the m

em bers of a class and of

?n histonc bloc into a com m

on identity. B ourgeois

m tellect~~ls did this for a w

hole society in w hich the

bourge01s1e w as hegem

onic. T he organic intellectu-

?ls of the w ?rking class w

ould perform a sim

ilar role m

the creat10n of a_ne:W

historic bloc under w orking-

class hegem ony w

1thm that society. T

o do. this they w

oul~ ha_ve to evolve a clearly distinctive culture, ?rgam

z?t1on, and technique, and do so in constant m

teraction w

ith the

m em

bers of

the em

ergent block. E

veryone, for G ram

sci, is in som e part an

220 Ro B

E R

T w . co X

/ G ram

sci, H egem

ony, and International R elations

• Ro B

E R

T W . co X

/ G ram

sci, H egem

ony, and International R elations

221 intellectual,

although only

so~e perform

ful~-

. the social function

of an m tellectual. In this

tim e

. "

11 f task, the party w

as, in his conception, a co ec ive

intellectual:' h

In the m ovem

ent tow

ards hegem ony and t e

creation of an historic bloc, G ram

sci di~tinguished ~ee levels of consciousness: the econom

1co-corpo~ative, w

hich is aw are of the specific interests of a particu!ar

group; the solidarity or class conscio~sness, w htch

extends to a w hole social class but rem

a~ns at purely

econom ic level; and the hegem

onic, w hich b~m

gs the interests of the leading class into harm

ony w ith those

of subordinate classes and incorporate~ these_ other interests into

an ideology expressed m um

versa~ term

s.16 The m ovem

ent tow ards hegem

ony, G ram

sc1 says is a "passage from

the structure to the sphere of the 'com

plex superstructures:' by w

hich he m eans

passing from the specific interests of a gro~p or ~lass

to the building of institutions and elabor~t10~ of ~de- 1

. If they reflect a hegem

ony, these m st1tutions

o og1es. .

h ill

and ideologies w ill be universal in form

, I.e., t not appear as those of a particular class, and w

ill g1~e som

e satisfaction to the subordinat~ gr?ups w hile

not underm ining

the leadership or vital m terests of

the hegem onic class.

H egem

onyand International Relations W

e can

now

m ake

the transition

from

w hat

G ram

sci said about hegem

ony and related ~oncepts to the im

plications of these concepts for m

terna- tional relations. First, how

ever, it is useful to l~ok at w

hat little G ram

sci him self had ~o say_ about m

:er- national relations. L

et us begin w ith this passage.

D o international

relations precede

or follow

(logically) fundam ental

social relations? T he~e

can be no doubt that they follow . A

ny orga~IC

innovation in the social structure, ~hrough its

technical-m ilitary expressions, m

o~1fies ?rgan- ically absolute

and relative relat10ns m

the

international field too.17

B y"organic" G

ram sci m

eant that w hich is structural,

long-term ,

or relatively perm a~,ent, as opp?sed

to the short-term

or "conjunctural. H

e w as say~ng that

basic changes in international pow

er relati~ns or w

orld order, w hich are observed as changes m

the m

ilitary-strategic and geopolitical b~lance, ~an be

traced to fundam ental changes in social relations.

G ram

sci did not in any w ay bypass th~ state or

dim inish

its im portance.

T he state rem

a_m ed for

him the basic entity in international

relat10ns and the

place w here: social conflicts take_ place-t?e

place also, therefore, w here hegem

om ~s of soc~al

classes can be built. In these heg~m .om

es of s~e1al classes, the

particular charactensttcs

of nat1~ns

com bine in unique and original w

ays. T he ~orking

class, w hich m

ight be considered

to ~e m ~erna-

tional in an abstract sense, nationalizes itself m the

process of building its hegem ony. T

he em ergence

of new w

orker-led blocs at the national le~el w ould,

in this line of reasoning, precede any bastc restruc- turing

of international

relations. H

ow ever, t?e

state, w hich rem

ains the prim

a~y focu~ of. social t

g le and the basic entity of m ternational

rela- s rug

· ·

1 d ·t

tions, is the enlarged state w hich m

e u es I s ow

n social basi:s. This view

sets aside a narrow _ or sup~r-

ficial view of the

state w hich

reduces it, for m -

stance, to the foreign-policy

bureaucracy or the

state's m ilitary capabilities.

From his Italian perspective, G

ram sci had a keen

sense of w hat w

e w ould now

call depend~ncy. W hat

happened in Italy he knew w

as m ar~edly m

~uenced by external pow

ers. A t the purely fore1gn-pohcy le~el,

great pow ers have relative freedom

to de~e~m

m e

their foreign policies in response to dom estic m

ter- ests; sm

aller pow ers have less ~uto~om

y.1s T he eco-

nom ic life of subordinate nations is pen~trated ~y

and intertw ined w

ith that of pow erful n~t1~ns. T

his is further com

plicated by the e~stence ~1thm cou~-

tries of structurally diverse reg10ns w hich have dis-

tinctive patterns of relationship to external fo~ces.19 . A

t an even deeper level, those states w hich are

pow erful are precisely those w

hich have undergone a profound

social and econom

ic revolution

an~ have m

ost fully w orked out the consequence~ of this

revolution iµ the form of state and of social rela~

tions. T he French R

evolution w as the case G

ram sc1

reflected upon, but w e can think of the ~evelopm

e~t during the C

old W ar of U

.S. and Soviet pow er m

the sam

e w ay. T

hese w ere all nation-based de~elop-

m ents w

hich spilled over national boundaries

to becom

e internationally

expansive phenom

ena. O

ther countries have received the im pact of these

developm ents in a passive w

ay, an instance of w ~at

G ram

sci described at the national level as a passive revolution. T

his effect com es w

hen the im petus ~o

change does not arise out of a "vast local econom ic

developm ent ...

but is instead the reflection of in- ternational developm

ents w hich transm

it their ide- ological currents to the periphery."20

T he group w

hich is the bearer of the new ideas,

in such circum stances, is not an indigenous social

group w hich is actively engaged in building a new

econom

ic base w ith a new

structure of social rela- tions. It is an intellectual stratum

w

hich picks up ideas originating from

a prior foreign econom ic and

social revolution. C onsequently, the thought of this

group takes an idealistic shape ungrounded in a do-

m estic econom

ic developm ent; and its conception

of the state takes the form of"a rational absolute."21

G ram

sci criticized the thought of B enedetto C

roce, the dom

inant figure of the Italian intellectual estab- lishm

ent of his ow n tim

e, for expressing this kind of distortion.

H egem

onyand W orld Order

Is the G ram

scian concept of hegem ony applicable at

the international or w orld level? B

efore attem pting to

suggest how this m

ight be done, it is w ell to rule out

som e usages of the term

w hich are com

m on in inter-

national relations studies. V ery often "hegem

ony" is used to m

ean the dom inance

of one country over others, thereby tying the

usage to a relationship strictly am

ong states. Som etim

es "hegem ony" is used

as a euphem ism

for im perialism

. W hen C

hinese po- litical leaders used to accuse the Soviet U

nion of "hegem

onism ;' they seem

to have had in m ind som

e com

bination of these tw o. T

hese m eanings differ so

m uch from

the G ram

scian sense of the term that it is

better, for purposes of clarity in this chapter, to use the term

"dom inance" to replace them

. In applying the concept of hegem

ony to w orld

order, it becom es im

portant to determ

ine w hen a

period of hegem ony begins and w

hen it ends. A pe-

riod in w hich a w

orld hegem ony has been estab-

lished can be called hegem onic and one in w

hich clom

inance of a nonhegem onic

kind prevails, non- hegem

onic. T o illustrate, let us consider the past

century and a half as falling into four distinguishable periods,roughly. 221845-1875, 1875-1945, 1945-1965, and 1965 to the present.•

T he first period ( 1845-75) w

as hegem onic there

w as a w

orld econom y w

ith B ritain as its center. E

co- nom

ic doctrines consistent w ith B

ritish suprem acy

but universal in form -com

parative advantage, free

trade, and the gold standard-spread gradually out-

w ard from

B ritain. C

oercive . strength . underw rote

this order. B ritain held the balance of pow

er in E urope,

thereby preventing any challenge to hegem ony from

a land-based pow

er. B ritain ruled suprem

e at sea and had the capacity to enforce obedience by peripheral countries to the rules of the m

arket. In the second period (1875-1945), all these fea-

tures w

ere reversed. O

ther countries

challenged B

ritish suprem acy. T

he balance of pow er in E

urope becam

e destabilized, leading to tw o w

orld w ars. Free

trade w

as superseded by protectionism

; the gold

standard w as ultim

ately abandoned; and the w orld

econom y fragm

ented into econom ic blocs. T

his w as

a nonhegem onic period.

In the third period,

follow ing W

orld W ar II

(1945-65), the U nited States founded a new

hege- m

onic w orld order sim

ilar in basic structure to that dom

inated by B

ritain in m iddle of the nineteenth

century but

w ith

institutions and

doctrines ad-

justed to a m ore com

plex w orld econom

y and to national

societies m ore

sensitive to the political repercussions

of econom ic crises. Som

etim e from

the later 1960s through

the early 1970s it becam e

evident that

this U

S-based w

orld order

w as no

longer w orking

w ell. D

uring the uncertain

tim es

w hich

follow ed,

three possibilities

of structural

transform ation

of w orld order opened up: a recon-

struction of hegem

ony w ith a broadening of polit-

ical m anagem

ent on

the lines envisaged by the

T rilateral C

om m

ission; increased fragm entation

of the

w orld

econom y

around big-pow

er-centered econom

ic spheres; and the possible assertion of a T

hird W

orld-based counterhegem

ony w

ith the

concerted dem

and for

the N

ew

International E

conom ic O

rder•as a forerunner.

• In P roduction, Pow

er, and W orld O

rder, three successive structures

of w orld order are substituted

for the peri- odization given above, based on the dialectical relation of production,

form s of state, and different configurations

of w orld order. T

hese three structures are: ( 1) the liberal international econom

y (1789-1873); (2) the era of rival im

perialism s (1873-1945); and (3) the neoliberal w

orld order

(post-W orld

W ar

II). See

R obert

W .

C ox,

P roduction, Pow

er, and W orld O

rder: Social Forces in the M

aking of H istory (N

ew Y

ork: C olum

bia U niversity Press,

1987), 107-109.

222 . R

o B E

R T w

. co

X

/ G ram

sci, H egem

ony, and International R elations

R O

B E

R T

W .

C O

X /

G ram

sci, H egem

ony, and International R elations

223 O

n the basis of this tentative notation, it w ould

appear that, historically, to becom e hegem

onic, a state w

ould have to found and protect a w orld order w

hich w

as universal in conception, i.e., not an order in w

hich one state directly exploits others but an order w

hich m ost other states ( or at least those w

ithin reach of the hegem

ony) could find com patible w

ith their interests. Such an order w

ould hardly be conceived in inter-state term

s alone, for this w ould likely bring to

the fore oppositions of state interests. It w ould m

ost likely give prom

inence to opportunities for the forces of civil society to operate on the w

orld scale ( or on the scale of the sphere w

ithin w hich hegem

ony prevails). T

he hegem onic concept of w

orld order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-stat.e conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil society, i.e., a m

ode of production of global extent w hich brings

about links am ong social classes of the countries en-

com passed by it. H

istorically, hegem

onies of

this kind

are founded by pow

erful states w hich have undergone a

thorough social and econom ic revolution; T

he rev- olution

not only m odifies the internal

econom ic

and political structures of the state in question but also unleashes energies w

hich expand beyond the state's boundaries. A

w orld hegem

ony is thus in its beginnings an outw

ard expansion of the internal (national) hegem

ony established by a dom inant so-

cial class. T he econom

ic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated w

ith this national hegem

ony becom e patterns for em

ulation abroad. Such an expansive hegem

ony im pinges on the m

ore peripheral countries as a passive revolution. T

hese countries have not undergone the sam

e thorough social revolution, nor have their econom

ies devel- oped in the sam

e w ay, but they try to incorporate

elem ents from

the hegem onic m

odel w ithout dis-

turbing old

pow er

structures. W

hile peripheral

countries m ay adopt som

e econom ic and cultural as-

pects of the hegem onic core, they are less able to

adopt its political m odels. Just as fascism

becam e the

form of passive revolution in the Italy of the interw

ar period, so various form

s of m ilitary-bureaucratic

regim e supervise passive revolution in today's pe-

ripheries. In the w orld-hegem

onic m odel, hegem

ony is m

ore intense and consistent at the core and m ore

laden w ith contradictions at the periphery.

H egem

ony at the international level is thus not m

erdy an order am ong states. It is an order w

ithin a w

orld econom y w

ith a dom inant m

ode of production

w hich penetrates into all countries and links into

other subordinate m odes of production. It is also a

com plex of international social relationships w

hich connect the social classes of the different countries. W

orld hegem ony can be described as a social struc-

ture, an econom ic structure, and a political structure;

and it cannot be sim ply one of these things but m

ust be all three. W

orld hegem ony, furtherm

ore, is ex-

pressed in universal norm s, institutions, and m

ech- anism

s w hich lay dow

n general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules w

hich support the dom

inant m ode of production.

The M echanism

s of H egem

ony: InternationalO

rganizations O

ne m echanism

through w hich the universal norm

s of a w

orld hegem ony are expressed is the interna-

tional organization. Indeed, international organiza- tion functions

as the process through w

hich the institutions of hegem

ony and it~ ideology are devel- oped. A

m ong the features of international organiza-

tion w

hich express its hegem

onic role

are the

follow ing: ( 1) the institutions

em body the rules

w hich facilitate the expansion of hegem

onic w orld

orders; (2) they are them selves the product of the

hegem onic w

orld order; ( 3) they ideologically legit- im

ate the norm s of the w

orld order; ( 4) they co-opt the elites from

peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb counterhegem

onic ideas. International institutions em

body rules w hich

facilitate the expansion of the dom inant econom

ic and social forces but w

hich at the sam e tim

e perm it

adjustm ents to be m

ade by subordinated interests w

ith a m inim

um of pain. T

he rules governing w orld

m onetary and trade relations are particularly signif-

icant. T hey are fram

ed .prim arily to prom

ote eco- nom

ic expansion. A t the sam

e tim e they allow

for exceptions and derogations to take care of problem

situations. T

hey can be revised in the light of changed circum

stances. T he B

retton W oods institutions pro-

vided m ore safeguards for dom

estic social concerns like unem

ploym ent than did the gold standard, on

condition that national policies w ere consistent w

ith the goal of a liberal w

orld econom y. T

he current system

of floating exchange rates also gives scope for national actions w

hile m aintaining the principle of a

prior com m

itm ent to harm

onize national policies in the interests of a liberal w

orld econom y.

. I~t~rnational institutions and rules are ener

ally Initiated by the state w hich establishes theg he

- m

ony. A t the very least they m

ust have that sta;;; supp?rt. T

he dom inant state takes care to secure the

acqm escence_of_.oth.erstates according to a hierarch

of pow ers w

1thm the inter-state structure of he e!

::;;~~:~ second-rank countries are consul;ed

I e1r support is secured. T

he consent of at east som

e of the m ore p

. h Iicited F

I . .

. enp era 1

countries is so- .

orm a

partlc1pat10n m ay be w

eighed 1· c vor ofth

d ·

n 1a- .M

e

om m

ant pow ers as in the International

onetary Fund and W orld B

ank, or it m ay be on a

one-s~ate-o~e-~ote basis as in m ost other m

a'or i - ternational m

stitutions. T here is an i·nc

IJ n

t f · fl

10rm a struc-

uorl~t? iln udence reflecting the different levels of real p

I ica an econom

ic p h' h

for al

d ow

er w

IC

underlies the m

proce ures for decisions.

I Iternational

institutions perform an ideologi-

ca ro e as w ell. T

hey help define I'

. .

for states and I ·f

. ~o icy gm

delm es

. eg1 im

ate certam institutions

and ~ractices at the national level. T

hey reflect .

hons fav

bl h

onenta- .

ora e to t e dom

inant social and

~om 1c f~rces. T

he O

rganization for

E cono:~~

m ~op;ra~10n and D

evelopm ent, in recom

m ending

ol;e ar~sm

: en_dorsed a dom inant

consensus of ~nei

~hm king m

the core countries and strength- fl f

t :~ w

ho w er~ determ

ined to com

bat in- a w

n dis w

ay agam st others

w ho

w ere m

ore concerne

about unem pl

T h

L abor o

· .

oym ent.

e International .

t ~gam

~at1on, by advocating tripartism , legit-

m :i,a es t e social relations evolved in the co

tnes as_ the desirable m odel for em

ulation. re coun- E

hte talent from peripheral

count . .

opted int · t

. nes

1s co- _om

ernat1onal institutions in the f

:asform tsm

o.Individuals from peripheral :~n~;;e:

w i~:~t t~?m

?co~e to international institution; e I ea o w

orking from w

ithin to chan e the system

, are condem ned to w

ork w ithin th

t g

of pa ·

. es ructures

1 ss1ve revo ution. A

t best they w ill h I

t £

elem ents of "m

odernization" to the peri;ler;::t~; th:e

are consistent w ith the interests of estab-

sorbs it pow

ers. H egem

ony is like a pillow : it ab-

. o~s

and sooner

or later

the w

ould-be assailant w

ill find it_ com fortable to rest upon. O

nl w

herle rbepredsentation in international institutions i~

firm y

ase upon an

f ul

. chall

. ar ic

ate social and political bloc e:g~ to hegem

ony-upon a nascent historic

. . n

counterhegem ony-could

partici ation

~?~~areal threat. T he co-optation of outstanding in-

1v1 uals from the peripheries renders this less likely.

Trasform ism

oalso absorbs potent1'all .

he ·

'd Y

counter- gem

om c I eas and m

akes these idea .

. w

'thh ·

· .

· - s consistent

I egem

om c doctrm

e. T he notion of self-

1· £

b · -

· re 1ance

. or exam

p e, 1

egan as a challenge to the w orld

econom y by advocating endogenously determ

ined ,autonom

ous developm ent. T

he term h

b. t

£ d

. as now

- een

ra~~ orm e

to m ean support by the agencies of the

w or

_econom y for

do-it-youtself w

elfare ro-

g~am s m

the peripheral countries. T hese progr~m

s aim

t? enable the rural populations to achieve self-

suffic1~ncy,to stem the rural exodus to the cities

d to ~~h1eve th_e~eby a' greater degree of social' ::d political stab1hty. a~ongst

populations w

hich the w

f rld. e~o~om y Is m

capable of integrating. Self-.

re iance m its transform

ed m eaning becom

es com -

flem entary to and supportive of hegem

onic goals w

r the w orld econom

y. ·

T hus, one tactic for bringing about change in

the structure of w orld order can be ruled

t t I 'll

. .

O U

as a to- a I us1on. T

here is very little likelihood f

f .

. . o

aw aro

m o~em

ent at the m ternational level through w

hich ~ad1cals _w

ould seize control of the superstructure of m

ternat10nal institutions. D aniel Patrick M

'h

no~ithstan~ing, T

hird W orld r;idicals do ::~o:~

trol m tern_at1onal institutions.h E

ven if they did, the cou~d achieve nothing by it. T

hese superstructure~ are m

adequately connected w ith any popular politi-

cal b~se. T hey _are connected w

ith the national hege- ~om

c cl~sses m the core countries and, through the

m term

edia~ of these classes, have a broader base in

th_ehsechountn~s. In the peripheries, they connect only w

it t e passive revolution.

·

The P rospects for C

ounterh~gem ony

W o~ld ?rde~s-t9

rerurn to G ram

s~i's statem ent cited

earlier m this essay-are

grounded . . I

I .

A

· .

. m

soc1a re atw ns

s1gm ficant structural change in w

orld ord .

. cordi

I lik

er 1s, ac- 1

ng_ y, ~' y to b~ traceable to som

e fundam ental.

change m ~octal relations and in the national political

o:ders w ~1ch correspond to national structures of so-

cial relations. In G ram

sci's thinking· th' Id . .

. b

'th ,

1s w ou

com e

a out W I

the em ergence of a new

historic bloc. • b

. M

oynihan w as U

S am bassador to the U

N d

. h

C t

d'' ..

unngte ar er a m

_m 1stration. He m

ade speeches deplorin tha: the U

m ted States :w

as :in opposition'; in the uJ w

h_1chhe represented as being run. by a m ajori

of T

hird W orld countries. See N

ew York Tim

es, Januartyy28 1976.

. .·

,

224 R

O 8 E

R T w

. co x / G

ram sci, H

egem ony, and International R

elations

W e ~ust

shift the problem

of changing w orld

order back from international

institutions to national societies. G

ram sci's analysis ofltaly is even m

ore vali? w

hen applied to the w orld order; only a w

ar of posi- tion can

in the long run, bring about the structural changes: and a w

ar of position involves building up

the sociopolitical base for change thr~ugh the cre-

ation of new

historic blocs. T

he national

context rem

ains the only place w

here an historic bloc can

be founded, although

w orld-econom

y and

w orld-

political conditions m aterially influence the prospects

for such an enterprise. T

he prolonged

crisis in the

w orld

econom y

( the beginning of w

hich can be traced

to the late 1960s and early 1970s) is propitious

for som e deve~-

opm ents

w hich could lead to a counterhegem

?~lC

challenge. In

the core

countries, those_ pohc~es

w hich cut into transfer

paym ents

to depnve social

groups and generate high unem ploym

ent open the

prospects of a broad

alliance of the disadv~ntaged against the sectors of capital and labor w

h~ch find com

m on

ground in international

production a~d

the m

onopoly-liberal w

orld order.

T he

policy basis for this

alliance w ould

m ost

likely be post- K

eynesian and neom ercantilist;

In peripheral coun-

tries som

e states are vulnerable

to revolutionary acti~n

as events from lran to C

entral A m

erica sug- gest. Political preparation

of the population in suf-

ficient depth m ay not, how

ever, be able_ to ~e~p _vace w

ith revolutionary opportunity

and this dim im

s~es the prospect

for a new histori~ bloc. A

n effe_ctive political

organization (G

ram sci's

m odern

pnn~e) w

ould be required in order to rally the new w

orking classes generated

by international productio~

and build

a bridge to peasants

and urban

m argm

als. W

ithout this, w

e can only envisage a process w here

local political elites, even som e w

hich are the prod- uct

of abortive

revolutionary upheavals,

w ould

entrench their

pow er

w ithin

a m onopoly-liberal

w orld

order. A

reconstructed

m onopoly-liberal

hegem ony

w ould

be quite

capable o~ ~ractking

trasform ism

o by adjusting t? m

~ny va~ieties ~f na- tional institutions

and practices, m cludm

g national- ization

of industries. T

he rhetoric

of nationalism

and of socialism

could then

be brought into line

w ith

the restoration

of passive revolution

under new

guise in the periphery. In

short the

task of

changing w

orld order

begins w ith the long, laborious

effort ~o build new

historicblocs w

ithin national boundaries.

N otes

T his text w

as first published in M illennium

: Journal of International Studies; vol. 12, no. 2 (Sum

m er 1983),

162-175. A n earlier version w

as presented to the Panel on H

egem ony and International R

elations, convened by the caucus for a N

ew Political Science at the 1981 ~n~ual

m eeting of the A

m erican Political Science A

ssociation, N

ew Y

ork, Septem ber 1981.

1. For citation

here, I

refer w

here possible

to A

ntonio G ram

sci, Selections from the P

rison N otebooks,

edited and

trans. by Q

uintin H

oare and

G eoffrey

N ow

ell Sm ith

(N ew

Y ork: International

P~~lisher~, 1971), hereafter cited as Selections.The full ~ntical ed~- tion, Q

uaderni del carcere(T urin: E

inaudi, 1975), 1s, cited as Q

uaderni. 2.

T his seem

s to be the problem underlying Perry

A nderson's "T

he A ntinom

ies of A ntonio G

ram sci;' N

ew

Left R eview

, no. 100 (N ovem

?er 1~76:-January ~;77), w

hich purports to find incons1stenc1es m G ram

sc1 s use of concepts.

3. O

n this point see E . P. T

hom pson, "T

he Poverty of T

heory;' in his The P overty of Theory and O

ther E ss~ys

(L ondon: M

erlin Press, 1978), w hich repres~?t~ an his-

toricist position analogous to that of G ram

~c1 s m opp~-

sition to the abstract philosophical M arxis~ of ~om

s A

lthusser. For A lthusser's position see "M

arxism 1s not

H istoricism

;' in L ouis A

lthusser and E tienne B

alibar, R

eading C apita~ trans. by H

en B rew

ster (L ondon: N

ew

L eft B

ooks, 1979). .

. 4.

It is said that this w as to avoid confiscation of his

notes by the prison censor, w ho, if this is true, m

ust have been particularly slow

-w itted.

. , ,

5. C

hristine B uci-G

luckm ann, G

ram sc1et l etat. U

ne theorie materialiste de la philosophie (Paris: Fayard, 1975), places G

ram sci squarely in

the L

eninist tradition. H

ughes Portelli, G ram

sci et le bloc histor(que ~Paris: Fayard, 1972), and M

aria A ntonietta M

acc1occh1, Pou: G

ram sci (Paris: Fayard, 1973), both contrast G

ram sc1

w ith L

enin. B uci-G

luckm ann's w

ork seem s to m

e to be m

ore fully thought through. See also C hantal M

ouffe and A

nne Show stack Sassoon, "G

ram sci in France ~nd

Italy-A

R eview

of the L iterature;' E

conom y and Society,

6 1 (February 1977), 31-68. '6.

T his notion fitted w

ell w ith G

ram sci's assessm

~nt of the situation in Italy in the early 1920s; the w

orking class w

as by itself too w eak to carry the full bur~en of

revolution and could only bring about the foundm g of

a new state by an alliance w

ith the peasant~y and_ som e

petty bourgeois elem ents. In fact, G

ram sc1 considered

the w orkers' council m

ovem ent as a school for leade~-

ship of such a coalition and his efforts p~io_r to h~s im

prisonm ent

w ere directed

tow ards

bm ldm

g this

coalition. 7.

See B uci-G

luckm ann, G

ram sci et l'etat, 63.

I M M

A N

U E

L W A

L L E R

S TE

I N

/ The M odern W

orld S ystem

as a C apitalist W

orld-E conom

y. 225

8. M

achiavelli, The P rince, N

orton C ritical E

dition, edited by R

obert M . A

dam s (N

ew Y

ork: W . W

. N orton,

1977), 49-50; and G ram

sci, Selections,169-170. 9.

T he term

"w estern E

urope" refers here to the B ritain,

France, G erm

any and Italy of the 1920s and 1930s. 10. G

ram sci, Selections,238.

11. G ram

sci borrow ed the term

"passive revolution" from

the

N eapolitan

historian V

incenzo C

uocco (1777-1823), w

ho w as active in the early stages of the

R isorgim

ento. In C uocco's interpretation, N

apoleon's arm

ies had brought a passive revolution to Italy. 12. B

uci-G luckm

ann, G ram

sci el l'etal, 121. 13. G

ram sci, Q

uaderni,vol. IV , 2632.

14. See Sorel's discussion of m yth and the "N

apoleonic battle" in the letter to D

aniel H alevy w

hich introduces .,hisR

eflections on V iolence,trans. by T

. E . H

ulm e (N

ew

Y ork: Peter Sm

ith, 1941). 15. G

ram sci, Selections,366

16. Ibid.,180-195. 17. Ibid.,176. 18. Ibid.,264. 19. Ibid.,182. 20. Ibid.,116. 21. Ibid.,117. 22. T

he dating is tentative and w ould have to be refined

by enquiry into the structural features proper to each pe- riod as w

ell as into factors deem ed to constitute the

breaking points betw een one period and another. T

hese are offered here as m

ere notations for a revision of historical scholarship to raise som

e questions about hegem

ony and its attendant structures and m echanism

s. Im

perialism , w

hich has taken different form s in

these periods, is a closely related question. In the first, pax britannica,although som

e territories w ere directly

adm inistered, control of colonies seem

s · to have been incidental to rather than necessary for econom

ic expan- sion. A

rgentina, a form ally independent country, had

essentially the sam e relationship to the B

ritish econom y

as C anada, a form

er colony. T his, as G

eorge L ichtheim

noted, m

ay be called the phase of "liberal im perialism

." In the second period, the so-called "new

im perialism

" brought m

ore em phasis on direct political controls. It

also saw the grow

th of capital exports and of the finance capital identified by L

enin as the very essence of im peri-

alism . In the third period, w

hich m ight be called that of

the neoliberal or m onopoly-liberal im

perialism , the in-

ternationalizing of production em erged as the preem

i- nent form

,. supported also by new

form s of finance

capital (m

ultinational banks

and consortia).

T here

seem s little point in trying to define som

e unchanging essence of im

perialism , but it w

ould be useful to describe the structural characteristics of the im

perialism s w

hich correspond to successive hegem

onic and nonhegem onic

w orld orders.

The M odern W

orld System as a C

apitalist W

orld-E conom

y IM

M A

N U

E L

W A

LLE R

S TE

IN

P rofessor W

allerstein outlines key concepts and propositions associated with the capitalist w orld-system

. A present-day M

arxist scholar, W allerstein sees capitalism

as best understood as a global, system -w

ide phenom -

enon. W e like this presentation of his w

ork because it is a form al, succinct statem

ent of his theoretical under- standing of capitalist world-econom

y.

T he

w orld

in w hich

w e are now

living,

the m

odern w

orld-system ,

had its origins

in the six-

teenth century.

T his

w orld-system

w

as then

lo- cated in only a part of the globe, prim

arily in parts

of E urope and the A

m ericas. It expanded

over tim e

to cover the w hole globe. It is and has alw

ays been a

w orld-econom

y. It is

and has

alw ays

be.en a

capitalist w orld-econom

y. W

e should

begin by

explaining w

hat these tw o term

s, w orld-econom

y and

capitalism ,

denote. It w

ill then be

easier to appreciate

the historical contours

of the m odern

w orld-system

-its origins,

its geography, its tem

- poral

developm ent,

and its contem

porary struc-

tural crisis. I,,

)m m

anuel W allerstein,W

orld-System sAnalysis:An Introduction (D

urham : D

uke U niversity Press, 2004), 23-41. R

eprinted , . ~y perm

ission.