Unit V Essay(for Essays Expert Professor)

JACK O. VANCE

The Anatomy of a Corporate Strategy

p- MORE AND MORE companies are coming to real- ize the significance of a suitable corporate strategy to the continued prosperity of their enterprises. The best approaches to the development of a corporate strategy, however, are not clear. In this article I want to say a few words about the meaning of strat- egy, to illustrate two current major forces that un- derscore the necessity for skillfully developed com- pany strategies, and then to examine three key fac- tors of great importance in developing an aggres- sive corporate strategy.

The Nature of Corporate Strategy.—Corporate sti-ategy fundamentally is the deployment of re- sources to achieve an objective. It refers to an im- portant action which can be taken with respect to any aspect of a business. Corporate strategy can be formulated formally in a systematic long-range planning program or intuitively in the brain of a top manager of a business. Regardless of where and how a strategy is developed, it—and the process that created it—is vital to a business organization be-

F A L L / 1970 / V O L . X I I I / N O . 1

cause it determines tlie major dii-ections a company takes and the momentum with which it moves.

As Seymour Tilles notes, ". . . while the notion of a strategy is extremely easy to grasp, working out an agreed-upon statement for a given company can be a fundamental contribution to the organization's future success."^ In addition, in today's intensely dy- namic environment, the internal and extemal forces on profitability accentuate the advantages of strate- gic planning. Therefore, developing and sustaining an ongoing corporate strategy is vital to the long- term viability of the organization.

Ceorge Steiner believes that "Developing a strat- egy is usually a very diflBcult and fateful task. It usually means questioning old methods, exploring unfamiliar environmental waters, facing up to an objective evaluation of strengths and weaknesses, forcing important changes on people in the firm and organizational arrangements, and taking high risks with the firm's capital. This has to be done in a world of rapid change, and it has to be done contin- uously."^

Textbooks suggest that, ideally, every corporate body have a strategy that meets three criteria.

• It recognizes and understands how the forces of the past have affected the organization.

• It is responsive to the current forces of change. • It is capahle of implementing programs hased on

the first two considerations.

By constructively integrating the knowledge gained from past experiences, the organization should be able to determine and formulate a program that projects into the future to embrace products, mar- kets, earnings, debt position, ownership, and rates of growth. Also, a corporate strategy must be dy- namic enough to burst through the limiting bounda- ries imposed by tunnel vision, yet flexible enough to withstand or thwart a possible distraction or con- flict: strikes, accidents, price wars, competitive in- roads, and invasion by raiders.

Robert R. Blake and his associates believe that dynamic corporate strategy "relies on the premise that future possibilities can be defined and made exphcit according to optimal definitions, and by logi- cal analysis of and derivation from the past. It does not reject the past as a basis for thinking about the future, but then, neither does it rely on it entirely. Dynamic planning designs an optimal model, then builds into it specific corporate objectives. This ena- bles the organization to see and examine alternative sets of possibilities which can be used to evaluate its present operations, and to introduce needed changes."^

This would appear to be a fairly simple prescrip- tion for corporate health. However, experience has shown that this kind of strategic planning only oc- curs by a vigorous and organized eflFort, inspired by an innovative board of directors. According to Blake, such planning requires more intellectual competence and skill because it challenges the orga- nization to be more creative, innovative, and re- sourceful while becoming more committed to the chosen strategy.

In the following discussion, let us consider two among a number of current forces having sufficient impact on a company to emphasize the need for skillful strategic analysis: technological obsoles- cence and conglomeration. These are then related to a three-step program for evolving a corporate sti'ategy and developing a management team to im- plement it.

Accelerating Technological Obsolescence.—The accelerated technological obsolescence of entire fields of well-established products and services is proceeding daily, and undoubtedly is having its im- pact on the corporate director s own business. John Kenneth Galbraith underscored this point when he wrote: "The imperativeness of technology and orga- nization . . . are what determine the shape of eco- nomic society."'

Indeed, consider the effect of microelectionics on communication products, containerization on trans- portation systems, and computerized services on office equipment design. Unfortunately, there seems to be a myopic law of nature that impedes organiza- tions from challenging the status quo or from capi- talizing on technological change. The electric razor was not developed by the safety razor companies; certainly it wasn't a silk stocking company that de- veloped nylon nor was it a typewriter company that introduced the electric typewriter; and the airplane was not designed by automobile companies.

Theodore Levitt writes: "If a company's o\vn re- search does not make [a product] obsolete, another's will. Unless an industry is especially lucky . . . it can easily go down in a sea of red figiu-es—just as the railroads have, as the buggy whip manufacturers have, as the corner chains have, as most of the big movie companies have, and indeed, as many other industries have. The best way for a firm to be lucky is to make its own luck. That requires knowing what makes a business successful."^

Competing With Conglomerates.—Before deter- mining a corporate strategy, the thoughtful director must also consider the ever-increasing horizontal and vertical acquisition routes of merger-minded conglomerates. One needs only to look at the oil companies that have recently acquired coal deposits or low-cost crude streams and moved into petro- chemicals. Retail chains that market insurance and financial services holding companies are currently moving to combine insurance, mutual funds, and banking within the framework of a department store of finance. Outboard motor companies are al- ready selling boats, and medical supply houses are managing hospitals' central supply functions on an annual contract basis. As these organizations build unique competitive strengths, they threaten the sur- vival of single-line marketers or unintegrated raw materials-dependent companies.

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"Fifteen years ago," said Dictaphone then-Presi- dent Lloyd M. Powell, "we had one competitor; 12 years ago there were four; now there are at least SO."*̂ When Mr. Powell made that statement. Dicta- phone was solely manufacturing and selling dictat- ing machines and other sound recording and repro- ducing equipment and accessories. Thus, it was a one-product company competing against some gi- ants in the industry. By June 1969 Dictaphone was literally a new company, involved in manufacturing, selling, and leasing a variety of business machines, providing office supplies and services, and market- ing office furniture. In short, it diversified to become a mini-conglomerate.

As this illustration suggests, competing with the conglomerates challenges every resource of an orga- nization. However, by developing an aggressive corporate strategy a smaller company will be better able to withstand the rigors of such demanding competition.

Developing an Aggressive Corporate Strategy

Preventive measures can help a company avoid being swallowed by conglomerate competition or overtaken by technological obsolescence. But the board of directors and chief executive officer, who have questioned their corporate strategy, need to be aware of three key factors of prime significance in developing an aggressive corporate strategy. They

are : • Position in the profit cycle of its industry • Plans for developing an ambitious, progressive

management team • Effectiveness in supplying social needs

The Company's Position in Its Industry's Profit Cy- cle.—A concern for the inherent profit structure of the business is the point at which any strategic anal- ysis begins. Thus, looking at the company from the perspective of its industry profit cycle in terms of its competitiveness on the money market is the factor to consider. How can this competitiveness be mea- sured? A company should seek to achieve a return on investment that is at least equal to those con- cerns that have recently sold common stock at a price in the upper quartile of the price earnings ra- tios (12 to 18). What this rather elaborate calcula- tion proves is that currently, the after-taxes profits of the organization should be close to 15 percent of its net worth if long-term debt is in the range of 25

to 35 percent of the net worth. A lower debt would mathematically justify a lower profit percentage as a percent of net worth.

If the profit rate passes this first hurdle, there is some assurance it will be able to perpetuate the company in its quest for capital. Too many indus- tries slide past this first strategic danger signal in a wave of high cash fiow from depreciation of deple- tion accounting. Lulled by an abundance of cash, the railroads sought capital by issuing 50-year bonds to finance 20-year locomotives; oil companies found easy financing on their reserves. These and other industries never subjected themselves to the artificial test of the sale of common stock at a com- petitive money market rate. Today, the fundamen- tal economics of many of these basic industries demonstrate the increasing ratio of capital per ex- panding unit of revenue, coupled with a decreasing profit margin on these sales. Now these industries are in the 5 to 11 percent return on net worth range. Their correspondingly low price earnings ratios in- vite economy-seeking mergers or corporate raiders. This is typical of a business in the decline of its in- dustry's life profit cycle.

Tliere would seem to be three alternatives avail- able to a company with this problem. All, in effect, call for eventual diversification into fields of activity characterized by higher profit margins. Such diver- sification would be accomplished through merger, acquisition, or the internal development of research and development resources.

TJie horizontal merger as a technique for building a base for subsequent steps is a first strategic con- sideration. A regional oil company that merges to become national, builds cash resources, and achieves cost reductions would be an example of the horizontal merger technique.

Another example of the horizontal merger process is National Can Company of Chicago. In the mid- 1950s, management realized that there was no place in the U.S. economy for a small can maker. Al- though National Can was the third largest manufac- turer of metal containers, it had less than 4 percent of the market; its six plants could supply only pack-

Jack O. Vance is a Director in McKinsey and Company, Inc., management consultants with offices in the United States and overseas. He has been with the company for nineteen years.

FALL / 1970 / VOL. XIII / NO. 1

ers who were located in the plant areas, thus mak- ing it, in eflFect, a regional company. In addition, forces in the industry were such that a small can company was faced with demanding seasonal sales problems. Therefore, President Robert S. Solinsky and his management team embarked on an ambi- tious, aggressive expansion program and acquired can companies in different areas. Profitability de- clined, but sales volume rose from $41 million in 1954 to $147 milhon in 1964.̂ Obviously these ac- quisitions have not solved the basic profit-cycle di- lemma, but they have built financial strength for fu- ture moves. And it is important to manufacturing that through increased size alone these companies have become more elusive for the conglomerate that might have been eyeing their reserves and cash flow.

Acquisition as a technique for buying time in moving toward diversification is a second typical strategic consideration, as this example illusti-ates:

"Late in 1965 Leonard F. McCollum, chairman of Houston's Continental Oil Company, made a deal with Chairman Ceorge Love of Consolidation Coal Company to buy Consol. The purchase made the United States' ninth largest oil company the biggest coal company as well. But size and power were not the main rationale of the deal. For McCollum was thinking in energy terms, as opposed to petroleum terms. With this broader, more visionary sense of mission, he saw the advantages of vastly expanding Continental's energy base."*

However, problems of a low stock earnings multi- ple that force the use of convertible preferred can be encountered when a company uses acquisition to buy time in moving toward diversification. The size of the acquisition necessary to counterbalance the company's low performance can create the need for large amounts of such preferred stock. These con- vertible issues all have an eventual day of reckoning when conversion may produce dilution. There is, of course, already pressure to show earnings on the ba- sis of total conversion.

The possible financial difficulty of following this second alternative has led many companies in tradi- tional low profit-cycle industries to relinquish the idea of becoming corporate parents. Rather, they have sought instant diversification through a so- called reverse merger or sell out.

Deployment of resources for research and devel- opment aimed at diversification is yet a third con- sideration. Ceneral Electric is a case in point. Dur- ing the past few years a surge of activity has plunged various U.S. companies into the costly at- omic power industry in search of the breeder reac- tor, which creates more fuel than it bums. The breeders promise to deliver vast quantities of en- ergy at such low cost that they will have a cascad- ing effect on all industry, on man's efforts to gather food and build shelter, and on the fabric of society itself. To this purpose, Ceneral Electric has already invested more than $200 million in researching and developing the light-water reactor in which the coolant itself is turned into steam. If the Ceneral Electric project is eventually supported by the Atomic Energy Commission (of the six competitors in this field the AEC will support only three), the CE diversification may pay exciting dividends. It has been predicted that by 2001 nuclear power stations should be generating half of the electric energy in the United States, and the total market for nuclear reactors alone should run around $4 billion annu- ally. When atomic power becomes a reality, it will probably open an exciting industry for those who have pioneered it.®

Deployment of resources aimed at diversification is probably only feasible as a primary solution where the company's problem is still relatively mild. Du Pont illustrated this point.

"For years Du Pont has been a financial paragon. Spending lavishly on research, it developed patent- protected 'proprietary' products that enabled it for a long time to earn, after taxes, an average of no less than 10 percent on its gross operating invest- ment, or the undepreciated cost of plant and equip- ment plus current assets—all without incurring long- term debt in the United States. But . . . this return on investment has fallen and is now little better than that of more pedestrian chemical companies."^"

Therefore, even more than usual, Du Pont is now staking its future on research aimed at new product development and diversification to provide the foundations for tomorrow's corporate growth.

The application of technology is usually affected in connection witli the previously discussed acquisi- tion process. Often the transfer of technology and research efforts produce the synergy that builds an outstandingly cohesive corporate strategy.

8 California Management Remew

Developing an Ambitious, Aggressive Management Team.—"In 1959, during one of the frequent reorga- nizations at Chrysler Corp., aimed at halting the company's slide, a management consultant con- cluded: 'The only thing wrong with Chrysler is peo- ple. The corporation needs some good top execu- tives.' "̂ ^ And Ralph J. Cordiner, former president of Ceneral Electric Company, declared, "Not custom- ers, not products, not money but managers may be the limit on Ceneral Electric's growth."^"

Is it any wonder, therefore, that the third element in the successful company strategy is a plan for de- veloping a superior management team that has the vision and courage constantly to question, refine, and realign the direction of the company? Such a group is not produced by skillful recruiting, fol- lowed by the traditional employee relations pro- gram. Building a management team is a skill beyond any usually displayed by a typical corporate person- nel department. It begins by infusing into the mem- bers of the team the belief that they can achieve their own goals best by directing their energies to- ward the success of the organization; it continues by compensating them, if possible, for the travel and family tensions inherent in widespread dynamic operations. Thus, to develop an exceptional man- agement team, a corporation combines the entrepre- neurial satisfactions of wealth with the psychologi- cal consideration of individual needs. However, such a program will not evolve by chance; it must be carefully nurtured. Such a program will be con- stantly modified and adapted by tlie expanding scope of the executive structure, yet will adhere to the following principles:

1 / Executives should not be allowed to devote their careers to specialization.

2 / Executives should be provided incentives for cur- rent gain plus estate building.

3 / Executives should be challenged to live under and perpetuate high standards of performance.

4 / Executives should be committed to organizational approach for continuous change.

Let us examine how to build this type of team in your organization.

Prohibiting Career Specialization.—The objective of a nonspeciahzed orientation is a top management team in which no member is wedded to any one particular corporate activity, such as finance, mar- keting, research and development, or production.

Each man should be capable of contributing signifi- cantly to all facets of corporate work. However, de- fining what is meant by an expansive, multidisci- plined approach is still not achieving it.

One method for achieving such an approach is to rotate selected management responsibilities at least every three years. Thus, executives will be forced to come to grips with new concepts. They will develop an understanding not only of the separate disci- plines within the organization, but of the various business areas in which the corporation is involved. At Ceneral Electric, for example, familiarity with perhaps some 60-odd industries might be essential. At another large enterprise, the management group's expertise might span a range of industries including aerospace, automobiles, agriculture, and textile machinery. Tlie aim is to stimulate creativity in the job rather than solidify routine.

Providing Strong Incentives.—An accepted meth- od for motivating high-caliber management is to provide strong incentives. The opportunity to achieve personal wealth and owTiership in the com- pany can be created through stock options and spe- cial tax shelters for estate building. If the executives possess the basic learning capacity and creativity, this opportunity can be expected to bear the fruit of high productivity while developing and expanding executive potential.

Setting High Performance Standards.—Executive motivation may be responsive to both the incentive of wealth and the acceptance of an "up or out" pol- icy for the good of the enterprise. Following this policy for all positions above a given level will as- sure that stagnant people with stagnant ideas are short lived. Talent, not seniority, then becomes the only acceptable criterion for advancement.

Organizing for Continuous Change.—The organi- zational approach that complements the continu- ously changing business environment can be de- fined as a series of profit centers spawning addi- tional profit centers. At the top is the small, aggres- sive, uncompromising corporate holding staff. This structLu-e emphasizes profit responsibility as far down in the organization as possible by sectioning off independent profit centers and assigning respon- sibility for these segments.

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Effectiveness in Supplying Social Needs.—The second key to designing a corporate strategy moves outside the financial field. Because of the various forces operating in the environment, it is essential to adopt a long-term social role as part of the corpo- rate strategy. Therefore, in addition to considering technological obsolescence, the viable coi'porate strategy must also be guided by the changing needs of people because it is a force that promises to be the key to commercialization of the future. The fol- lowing examples illustrate this.

Recently, Boise Cascade created a department of ur- ban renewal. This is an outgrowth of President Robert V. Hansberger's membership on the President's Com- mittee on Urban Housing and the company's agreement to serve as a prime consulting contractor for redevelop- ment of sixty blocks of downtown Boise. The new de- velopment will explore the ways to offer development, management, planning, and consulting aid to cities in- volved in renewal.̂ ^

Irvine, California, is a small town in Orange County rushing headlong to become a big city. It was deliber- ately planned to be a city, and this is what sets it apart from other totally planned new towns that have been built from scratch in recent years. Irvine's quality has all along been the main concern of the man who drew up the master plan in 1961, Los Angeles architect-plan- ner, William L. Pereira. He believes that cities should be man's greatest work of art and ideal places for enjoy- ing life. First as planner and more recently as consul- tant with some say as to how the city will evolve, Per- eira has attempted to imbue Irvine with a unique char- acter. Prominent in his plans are the elements that give Southern California its vitality: preoccupation with re- search and higher education, avidity for culture, and a love of outdoor living. Pereira's distinctive contribution was to provide Irvine at birth with a brain and a soul in the form of a new university. Convinced that a great university is an essential resource in a modern city, and vice versa, he served two clients by marrying their inter- ests. He recommended Irvine to the University of Cali- fornia regents, who were seeking a campus site. And he helped persuade the corporation developing the Irvine Ranch to donate the land, one of the requirements of the university. His master plan calls for the campus to grow by extending spokes so that the city and university will remain in intimate contact. One of Pereira's precau- tions is to choose clients who intend to retain ownership of their land and manage its development. Whenever possible, he also likes to stay on as consultant after the planning stage, do enough architecture to set a stan- dard, and review the proposals of other architects. He has such an arrangement at Irvine with both the university and the landowners. He explains: "When we do this we are like a corporation lav^^er who helps to put together a new company, then carries through as counsel."^*

In 1968, Neiman-Marcus President Stanley Marcus announced that henceforth civil rights will be as impor- tant a factor as price, quality, or delivery time in what his six Texas department stores will buy. Specifically, Neiman-Marcus intends to deal as much as possible with firms who hire and train more people from minori- ties. "We would rather do business with a company which is actually and sincerely pursuing a policy of equal opportunity than to continue to do business with one which is not," he said. "The Federal Coverrunent requires that every one of its suppliers of goods and ser- vices certifies that it is an equal opportunity employer. We believe a private company should do no

Thus, in the future, anticipating the changing needs of people will be of paramount importance to business.

Anticipating Changing Needs.—Responding effectively and profitably requires the ability both to identify future social needs and to position the company to reap the benefits. Social needs express themselves through various manifestations—in- creasing age span and leisure time, air and water pollution problems, the socialization of medical care, urban crises.

We cannot accurately foresee how these and other social trends would affect different corpora- tions. However, an understanding of how the com- pany's five-year strategy relates to social trends is unquestionably a factor in designing any well con- ceptualized long-range plans. Developing and using such foresight in planning and in present operations is the impetus behind efforts that many companies are making, as suggested in the following examples:

• Transportation concerns, squeezed by the impact of truck, air, and water transport, prohibited from ac- quiring any one of these competing modes, and locked into an established rate structure, are turning to total systems and logistics support concepts as solutions to the challenges of the next few decades.

• Developing nations represent potential opportuni- ties for manufacturers of standard products. In coun- tries where legal barriers against them are not raised, companies can take the initiative to develop control over an entire process by integrating backwards and forwards, thereby consolidating their position. Licensed monopoly is an established business method in these in- stances.

• Providing special services for the increasing older generation has captured the attention of progressive or- ganizations. One social implication of the extended life span offered by medical advances will be the growing demand for residential environments having leisure ac- tivities and convalescent care.

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• A three-cornered approach to new developments in medicine, computer technology, and medical instru- mentation design anticipates providing large-scale med- ical diagnostic services via production line diagnostic computer centers.

Today, companies concerned with their strategies are grappling with the problems and the potentials of these kinds of anticipated changes. But when we project further into the future, toward the promise and potential that will exist in 1985, 2000, and 2025, are we aware of the possible commercial implica- tions of what we see? How can these examples help to delineate the strategic opportunities in the far fu- ture?

The following listing shows only a few of the changes that might be expected during our life- times. An astute businessman might be able to dis- cern how they relate to his business scene.

Technological and Social Changes 1970—1975 Electronically implanted organs

Personality and IQ drugs Sea water desalination

1976-1999 Ocean farming Economical regional weather control Genetic control of hereditary defects Manufacturing of synthetic protein

Year 2000 plus Biochemical stimulation of growth of new human organs or limbs

Direct interaction between the human brain and a computer

Education by direct recording of infor- mation on the brain

Year 2025 plus Chemical control of aging (50 years plus)

Specially bred animals for low-grade labor

Communication with extraterrestrial beings

Control of gravity

While these possibilities are seemingly in the Jules Verne category, they reflect the breadth of thinking that the strategic plan of the corporation should represent. A plan for tomorrow that is rooted too deeply in the products and social conditions of today will not be viable in the context of the expo- nential change pattern imposed by our technologi- cal capabilities. For example, when Du Pont started the work on polymer chemistry out of which nylon eventually evolved, the company did not realize that man-made fibers would be the end product. Du Pont acted on the assumption that any gain in man's

ability to manipulate the structure of large, organic molecules—a scientific skill at that time in its in- fancy—would lead to commercially important results of some kind. It was only after six or seven years of research that man-made fibers first appeared as a possible major result area. Therefore, as Peter F. Drucker says, "if the business entrepreneur suc- ceeds, it is not by chance; it is because the small idea his business grew from not only met the needs of the future, but shaped the future as

We have described an approach to preparing a strategy for a diversified, financial performance-ori- ented, aggressive organization employing outstand- ing executive rewards. But what if your corporate strategy is not interested in running on such a fast track? Is there a niche for the more average corpo- rate citizen in this scheme?

Of course there is. We have, though, one caveat. If your stock is publicly traded, the market will eventually make its own assessment of your growth potential. If the figure is too low, your shareholders may be invited to shift their financial interests to a company with a more rewarding growth thrust. Thus, once size has brought public financing, we feel that no corporation can ignore the money mar- ket test of the evident vitality of their strategy.

Defining the degree of emphasis on growth re- quires serious consideration by the board of direc- tors. Today the boards of most major companies have opted for the strongest growth plan they can generate, rather than a limited rate of growth cou- pled with apprehensive looks over the corporate shoulder. This drive for performance results is, in fact, one of the most vital by-products of our com- petitively oriented free enterprise system.

REFERENCES 1. Seymour Tilles, "How to Evaluate Corporate

Strategy," Harvard Business Review (July-August 1963), 112.

2. George A. Steiner, Top Management Planning (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 238-239.

3. Robert R. Blake, Warren E. Avis, Jane S. Mouton, Corporate Darwinism (Texas: Gulf, 1966), p. 69.

4. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Hough ton Mifflin, 1967), p. 7.

5. Theodore Levitt, "Marketing Myopia," Harvard Business Review (July-August 1960), 50.

F A L L / 1970 / V O L . X I I I / N O . 1 11

6. Forbes (May 15, 1965), p. 47. 7. David W. Ewing, The Practice of Planning (New

York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 39. 8. Ibid.,-p. 43. 9. Forbes (February 1, 1969), 30; Fortune (March

1967), 117-123ff. 10. Fortune (November 1967), 139. 11. Business Week (October 6, 1962), 45.

12. Edward C. Bursk and Dan H. Fenn, Jr., Plan- ning the Future Strategy of Your Business (New York: McGraw-HiU, 1956), p. 46.

13. BuMnessWeek (February 24, 1968), 152. 14. Think (January-February 1968), 4-7. 15. Time (January 19, 1968), 83. 16. Peter F. Drucker, "The Big Power of Little

Ideas," Harvard Business Review (May-June 1964), 6.

Those readers who found the above article of interest will undoubtedly be interested in the fol- lowing articles which appeared in earlier issues of the Review:

"A View of Coporate Planning," by Melville C. Branch, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 89.

"Do We Need a New Corporate Response to a Changing Social Environment? Pts. I and II," by

S. Prakash Sethi and Dow Votaw, Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 3 and p. 17.

"How to Assure Poor Long-Range Planning for Your Company," by George A. Steiner, Vol. VII,

No. 4, p. 93.

"Organizational Revitalization," by Warren G. Bennis, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 51.

"Study of a Business Decision," by John E. Fleming, Vol. IX, No. 2, p. 5 1 .

"The Decision-Making Grid: A Model of Decision-Making Styles," by Jay Hall, Vincent O'Leary,

and Martha Williams, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 43.

"The Ethical Dimension in American Management," by Glenn Gilman, Vol. VII, No. 1, p. 45.

To order, use form inside back cover.

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