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BRIEF REPORT

Social Anxiety Disorder and Memory for Positive Feedback

Brianne L. Glazier and Lynn E. Alden University of British Columbia

Clinical theorists postulate that individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) display memory biases such that recall of social events becomes more negative with time; however, alternative memory models have also been proposed. Research has focused predominantly on selective recall of negative information with inconsistent findings. The goal of the current study was to examine potential biases in recall of positive social feedback. Individuals with SAD (n � 59) and nonanxious community controls (n � 63) engaged in an unexpected public speaking task and received standardized positive or neutral feedback on their speech. Participants were asked to recall the feedback after 5 minutes and after 1 week. Results indicated that at delayed recall, individuals with SAD recalled positive feedback as less positive than it had been. The findings support cognitive models of SAD and extend the model to positive social information. Research is needed to understand the mechanisms that underlie fading positivity.

General Scientific Summary Individuals with social anxiety disorder display a pattern of eroding positivity in their recall of positive social feedback.

Keywords: memory bias, public speaking, social anxiety disorder

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000407.supp

Clinical theorists propose that individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) focus on negative information during social events and repeatedly retrieve and ponder this information after the event. This selective retrieval process is hypothesized to progressively alter memories such that recollections of events become more negative over time (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). An alternative model is suggested by memory studies that find individuals without SAD often display a positivity bias, re- calling events as more positive than they were (e.g., Levine, Schmidt, Kang, & Tinti, 2012; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011; Wilson & Ross, 2003). This bias is hypothesized to arise from an adaptive self-protective drive to maintain self-esteem

(Wilson & Ross, 2003). People prone to negative affect, such as those with social anxiety, are postulated to lack this self-protective tendency (e.g., Koban et al., 2017). The difference between these two models has implications for SAD interventions, namely whether to modify postevent retrieval, thereby offsetting negative biases, or to address ways to capitalize on positive outcomes to build social self-esteem.

The method used to evaluate the two models is the same, namely assessing change in memory between immediate and delayed recall. Further, both models assume that selective recall is more likely to occur if the stimuli involve threat and self-referent (vs. other-referent) encoding (Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Mansell & Clark, 1999). In the domain of social anxiety, two types of studies have been conducted to examine memory bias. The first assesses change in participants’ self-judgments of social performance over time. This approach has produced inconsistent results, with some studies finding evidence for negative change in self-rated perfor- mance (Cody & Teachman, 2011; Dannahy & Stopa, 2007) and others not (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Brozovich & Heimberg, 2011).

The second approach is to provide specific feedback following a social task and assess change in feedback memory between immediate and delayed recall. One advantage of this approach is that the feedback is, to a certain extent, objective and standardized. It also allows comparison of memory change for positive as well as negative feedback, thereby building on the mounting evidence that individuals with SAD respond to positive events in non-

This article was published Online First January 31, 2019. Brianne L. Glazier and Lynn E. Alden, Department of Psychology,

University of British Columbia. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities

Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Grant 435-2012-0350. The funding source was not involved in the conduct of the research or preparation of the article. The study was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics board under the title “Self and Social Perception – Part 2” (H15-00243). The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Brianne L. Glazier, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T1Z4, Canada. E-mail: briglazier@ psych.ubc.ca

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mailto:[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000407

normative ways (e.g., Alden, Taylor, Mellings, & Laposa, 2008; Reichenberger, Wiggert, Wilhelm, Weeks, & Blechert, 2015). To date, three feedback studies have been conducted. Edwards, Rapee, and Franklin (2003) compared high and low socially anx- ious students on free recall of feedback words after a filler task and one week later. They detected no change in recall of either positive or negative feedback items. Cody and Teachman (Cody & Teach- man, 2010) provided feedback as 5-point scales reflecting both positive and negative aspects of speech performance. Consistent with Edwards et al. (2003), they did not detect a change in memory for negative feedback. However, low anxious controls displayed a positivity bias in recall of both positive and negative feedback at immediate and at delayed recall, whereas the high socially anxious group did not. To minimize affect spillover between information types, Glazier and Alden (2017) provided positive and neutral feedback to separate groups. Participants completed recall mea- sures after a 5-min delay and again one week later. Results revealed that social anxiety predicted a reduction in the recalled positivity (i.e., valence) of the positive feedback over time, whereas no such bias emerged with recall of neutral feedback. Such findings are generally consistent with clinical models of SAD. Consistent with basic memory research regarding recall versus recognition methods, no bias emerged in recognition of feedback content, that is, whether the item had been previously presented (e.g., Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008).

The results of the latter two studies suggest that individuals with SAD may differ from individuals without SAD in their recollec- tions of positive social information. The question remains as to whether they lack the positivity bias found in healthy individuals (e.g., Walker, Yancu, & Skowronski, 2014) or whether they dis- play the negative bias proposed by clinical theorists. The incon- sistent findings of Edwards et al. (Edwards et al., 2003) also point to the need for further examination. In addition, these studies relied on undergraduate samples, and a different pattern of memory bias may emerge in individuals with clinically severe SAD. It is also possible that factors associated with SAD may account for any observed bias rather than social anxiety per se. Comorbid depres- sive symptoms is one such factor. As well, individuals with SAD are known to rate their social performance negatively, to experi- ence greater state anxiety, and to have difficulty recognizing and accepting positive feedback. Assessing the potential contribution of these factors (depression, self-judgments, event-related state anxiety, and positive feedback appraisal) may help to elucidate the nature of memory processes in SAD.

In the current study, individuals with SAD and healthy commu- nity controls were randomly assigned to receive either positive or neutral performance feedback on a speech task via 14 dimensional rating scales allegedly completed by an objective observer. Both recall and recognition of the feedback were assessed after five minutes and after one week. Recognition of feedback content was measured by providing a list of feedback items including the 14 original items and 10 dummy items and asking participants to rate whether the items had been present in the original feedback. Memory for feedback valence was measured by asking partici- pants to recall the valence of the original feedback on the dimen- sional rating scales with memory bias defined as change from Time 1 to Time 2.

We hypothesized that SAD participants would significantly differ from healthy controls in the recalled feedback valence in the

positive relative to the neutral condition. Consistent with clinical models, we predicted that the SAD group would recall positive feedback less positively over time, whereas controls would not. Consistent with clinical models, we anticipated that memory bias would remain when associated depression, state anxiety, self- judgments, and feedback appraisal were statistically controlled. No between-groups differences were expected in recognition of feed- back content (e.g., Edwards et al., 2003; Glazier & Alden, 2017; Green et al., 2008).

Method

Participants

Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and healthy controls (HC) were recruited from the community via electronic and print advertisements. Potential participants completed a tele- phone screening interview to assess research inclusion and exclu- sion criteria. Applicants with histories of psychosis, brain injury, bipolar episodes, substance abuse, or hospitalization or prolonged outpatient treatment for a mood disorder were excluded at this point. Applicants who were deemed eligible were scheduled for a laboratory session in which they were administered the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for Diagnostic and Statistical Man- ual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM–IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994) to confirm diagnostic status. Participants in the SAD group (n � 68) met the following inclusion criteria: (a) a primary DSM–5 diagnosis of SAD (American Psychiatric Asso- ciation, 2013), (b) no current severe major depressive episode, psychosis, brain injury, bipolar episode, or substance abuse, (c) fluency in English. The HC group (n � 71) comprised individuals who met the following inclusion criteria: (a) no current or lifetime psychiatric disorders, and (b) fluency in English.

Measures

Diagnostic and symptom measures. The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM–IV (ADIS-IV; Brown et al., 1994) is a semistructured interview that assesses the anxiety and mood disorders. The ADIS-IV has demonstrated high interrater reliabil- ity and good concurrent validity (Brown et al., 1994). The inter- view was administered by one of four clinical psychology graduate students who had training and experience administering the ADIS-IV and were blind as to self-reported anxiety group. The clinical interviews were recorded and a randomly selected portion (n � 20) were reviewed by a second independent rater blind to the original ratings. Interrater reliability for diagnosis of SAD was good (� � .90, p � .001). The Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998), a 20-item measure, was administered to assess fear of social performance situations (e.g., “I worry about shaking and trembling when I am watched by other people”). The SPS has good convergent validity with measures of social fear and discrim- inates between clinical groups and control samples (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). In the current study, the SPS had good internal consistency (� � .95).

Measures of associated factors. The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, 21-item version, Depression subscale (DASS-D; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), a 7-item measure, was administered to determine whether the results were specific to SAD or shared

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229SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER AND MEMORY

with other forms of negative affect (e.g., “I felt down-hearted and blue”). The DASS-D has good convergent and discriminant valid- ity in clinical and community samples (e.g., Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). In the current study, the subscale had good internal consistency (� � .90). The State–Trait Anxiety Inventory – 6 (STAI-6; Marteau & Bekker, 1992), a 6-item mea- sure of state anxiety, was used to assess speech-related state anxiety (e.g., “I feel tense”). The six items demonstrate good concurrent validity with the full STAI for participants with normal and elevated levels of anxiety (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). In the current study, the STAI-6 demonstrated acceptable internal con- sistency (� � .86). The Speech Performance Questionnaire (SPQ; Rapee & Lim, 1992), a 17-item measure, was used to assess participants’ perception of their public speaking performance (e.g., “Fidgeted”). The SPQ has demonstrated good internal consistency in clinical samples (Rapee & Lim, 1992) and demonstrated ac- ceptable internal consistency in this study (� � .92). Participants also completed a five-point scale to assess their appraisal of the feedback (0 � unbelievable, 4 � very believable) to determine whether the SAD and HC groups appraised the feedback similarly.

Feedback and feedback memory measures. Feedback on speech performance was provided via a 14-item bipolar visual analogue rating based on previous research by Edwards et al. (2003). The items assessed concerns shown to be associated with performance anxiety (e.g., “Appeared tense,” “No shaking/tremor”). To enhance feedback credibility, items of condition-incongruent va- lence were included.1 In the positive condition, feedback consisted of 10 items rated on the positive side of the scale, two items rated at the middle of the scale, and two items rated on the negative side of the scale. In the neutral condition, feedback consisted of 10 items rated at the middle of the scale, two items rated on the positive side of the scale, and two items rated on the negative side of the scale. Valence was rated from 0 to 100.

Memory for feedback was assessed after a 5-min delay and after one week. The memory measure included the 14 original feedback items as well as 10 dummy items not presented in the original feedback (see Glazier & Alden, 2017). Participants were asked to mark their recollections of the original feedback on the same bipolar scale or to indicate items that they believed were not included in the original feedback. Four scores were derived from the recall measure at each time point. The main dependent variable was valence recall, the average valence rating for condition- congruent items that a participant correctly recognized as having been presented at both time points. We also assessed content recognition, the total number of the 10 condition-congruent items that were correctly recognized as having been presented at both time points. To examine whether memory bias was related to the incorporation of new information in memory, we assessed false valence recall, the valence marking of any dummy items that a participant falsely recalled as having been presented, and false recognition, the total number of the 10 dummy items that were falsely recalled as having been presented.

Procedure

The study methods were approved by the university’s behav- ioral ethics committee (H15-00243). Following the telephone screening interview, eligible individuals participated in two labo- ratory sessions scheduled one week apart. During the first session,

participants were told they would engage in an impromptu 3-min speech to a webcam on any topic of their choice and that an independent judge was rating their performance skills. Following previous research, free choice of speech topic was used to control for participants’ level of familiarity and knowledge of the topic (Rapee & Lim, 1992). Immediately after the speech, participants completed the STAI-6 and SPQ. Participants were randomly as- signed to receive positive or neutral feedback. Following receipt of feedback, participants briefly waited outside the room to reduce environmental cues. They then returned and completed the Feed- back Memory measure. During the second session, participants again completed the Feedback Memory measure, SPS, DASS-D, and feedback appraisal scale. These measures were administered in the second session to avoid influencing participants’ responses. The experimenter then conducted a funnel debriefing interview to check suspicion of the feedback manipulation using a series of open-ended question to inquire about participants’ hypotheses regarding the study and feedback. Finally, participants engaged in the ADIS-IV clinical interview to confirm diagnostic status. The interview was positioned at the end of the two sessions to avoid priming social fears during the task.

Results

Sample Characteristics

Nine participants attended the first session but did not attend the second session and thus were not included in analyses. After completing the clinical interview, two participants were excluded from the control group because they met criteria for a psychiatric disorder. Three participants were excluded from the SAD group because they did not meet criteria for SAD. Three participants were removed from analyses because of significant amounts of missing data (i.e., three or more missing responses on feedback ratings at either Time 1 or Time 2), resulting in 62 participants in the positive condition (29 SAD, 33 HC) and 60 participants in the neutral condition (30 SAD, 30 HC). Independent samples t tests indicated excluded participants reported greater state anxiety on the STAI-6 than included participants, t(137) � �2.04, p � .04. There were no other significant differences between excluded and included participants on Time 1 measures.

Means and standard deviations of the descriptive and symptom measures are presented in Table 1. The current sample was com- parable with previous studies using SAD samples (Abbott & Rapee, 2004). Independent samples t tests and chi-square tests indicated no significant differences in age or gender between groups or conditions. As is typically found, some SAD participants had secondary diagnoses including generalized anxiety disorder (n � 10), major depressive disorder (n � 7), dysthymia/persistent depressive disorder (n � 3), panic disorder (n � 3), and obsessive– compulsive disorder (n � 1).

To examine associated factors, Group � Condition ANOVAs were conducted. As expected, SAD participants reported greater social performance fear on the SPS than participants in the HC group, F(1, 117) � 144.94, p � .001, � 2 � .55. The Condition

1 These items were treated as filler items and were not included in analyses.

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230 GLAZIER AND ALDEN

effect and Group � Condition interaction were nonsignificant. The SAD group reported greater state anxiety on the STAI-6 than participants in the HC group, F(1, 118) � 46.37, p � .001, � 2 � .28. The Condition effect and Group � Condition interaction were nonsignificant. SAD participants rated their performance more negatively on the SPQ than did HC participants, F(1, 118) � 73.47, p � .001, � 2 � .38. The Condition effect and Group � Condition interaction were nonsignificant.

There was a significant Group � Condition interaction on feedback appraisal, F(1, 116) � 7.67, p � .007, � 2 � .06. Con- sistent with previous research, pairwise comparisons indicated that the HC group appraised positive feedback as more believable than did the SAD group, F(1, 116) � 7.44, p � .007, � 2 � .06, and more believable than the neutral feedback, F(1, 116) � 13.03, p � .001, � 2 � .10.

Memory

For the main analyses, 2 (Group: SAD, HC) � 2 (Condition: positive, neutral) � 2 (Time: T1, T2) ANOVAs with repeated- measures on the Time factor were conducted. As described earlier, the primary dependent measure (valence recall) was the average valence of condition-congruent items that a participant correctly recognized as having been presented at both time points. the analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction on valence recall, F(1, 118) � 10.37, p � .002, � 2 � .08 (see Figure 1). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the SAD group recalled the positive feedback significantly less positively at Time 2, F(1, 118) � 28.49, p � .001, � 2 � .19, and the control group did not. Other pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant. These results indicated that participants with SAD displayed erosion in their memories for positive feedback over time and healthy controls did not.

Table 1 presents the numbers of items correctly recalled. The ANOVA for content recognition revealed a significant Time � Condition interaction, F(1, 118) � 4.923, p � .03, � 2 � .04. Pairwise comparisons indicated that fewer feedback items were recalled at Time 2 than Time 1 in both conditions, F(1, 118) � 16.61 & 53.21, both p � .001, � 2 � .12 and .31 for neutral and

positive, respectively, indicating similar memory decay for the two groups. The effects of Group, Condition, Group � Condition interaction, and the three-way interaction were nonsignificant. We also examined recognition for items that were correctly recognized at both times. A 2 (Group) � 2 (Condition) ANOVA revealed no significant effects. Thus, as expected, there were no group differ- ences in content recognition.

To examine the incorporation of additional information into event memory during the retrieval process, false valence and false recognition were entered as dependent variables in separate anal- yses. There were no significant interaction effects. The results are presented in the supplemental materials, along with the statistics for all nonsignificant results.

To examine specificity of memory bias to SAD, the valence recall analysis was repeated with the DASS-D as a covariate. The three-way interaction and pairwise comparison remained signifi- cant, indicating that the recall findings were not simply a function of depression. Additional analyses were conducted to examine whether anxiety during the speech task (STAI-6), self-perceived performance (SPQ), or feedback appraisal affected recall. These analyses revealed that the three-way interaction and pairwise com- parison remained significant when statistically controlling for per- formance anxiety, self-perceived performance, or feedback ap- praisal.

Discussion

The results revealed that individuals with SAD recalled positive feedback less positively over time, whereas control participants displayed no such change. These findings are consistent with the memory bias proposed by clinical theorists (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and extend this model to recollections of positive social information. To the extent that memory for past events guides anticipation of and responses to current events, an erosion in positivity may operate along with other cognitive pro- cesses (e.g., Koban et al., 2017) to maintain negative expectations for subsequent social events and impede adaptive relational be- havior (Gilboa-Schechtman, Franklin, & Foa, 2000; Papsdorf & Alden, 1998; Wallace & Alden, 1997). The bias may also contrib-

Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Descriptive Statistics, Split by Group and Condition

Variable

Healthy control group Social anxiety disorder group

Neutral condition

Positive condition Total

Neutral condition

Positive condition Total

Age 30.20 (11.02) 31.70 (13.12) 30.98 (12.09) 30.60 (10.40) 28.72 (10.40) 29.68 (10.35) Gender (% female) 60% 67% 63% 70% 66% 68% STAI-6 11.01 (3.47) 10.45 (2.91) 10.72 (3.17) 15.23 (3.88) 15.03 (3.98) 15.14 (3.90) SPQ 46.01 (9.75) 48.22 (9.22) 47.22 (9.45) 29.24 (11.19) 32.91 (11.27) 31.04 (11.29) SPS 8.90 (9.77) 8.33 (6.04) 8.60 (7.97) 36.77 (15.29) 32.14 (14.36) 34.45 (14.89) DASS-D 2.43 (3.53) 1.79 (2.71) 2.10 (3.12) 8.16 (4.89) 6.10 (4.48) 7.13 (4.77) Feedback appraisal 1.93 (1.08) 2.94 (.97) 2.46 (1.13) 2.29 (.85) 2.17 (1.44) 2.23 (1.18) Content recognition

Time 1 7.93 (2.07) 8.76 (1.48) 8.37 (1.82) 8.53 (1.61) 8.38 (1.59) 8.46 (1.59) Time 2 6.97 (2.06) 7.12 (2.23) 7.05 (2.14) 7.40 (2.47) 6.31 (2.66) 6.86 (2.60) Both times 6.47 (2.24) 7.48 (1.89) 7.00 (2.11) 7.10 (2.43) 6.52 (2.37) 6.81 (2.40)

Note. STAI-6 � State-Trait Anxiety Inventory � 6; SPQ � Speech Performance Questionnaire; SPS � Social Phobia Scale; DASS-D � Depression Anxiety Stress Scales—Depression subscale.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000407.supp

ute to the positive affect deficiencies associated with SAD (see Kashdan, 2007) and supports the value of examining responses to positive social events.

Differential recall was not explained by comorbid depressive symptoms, state anxiety, self-perceived performance, or feedback appraisal, which provides support for a specific link between SAD and memory biases. Consistent with the memory literature, the findings also support the suggestion that biases are more likely to emerge using recall and not recognition memory tasks (e.g., Green et al., 2008). The lack of significant group differences in false recognition and false recall indicate that differential recall was not attributable to incorporation of conceptually related information in memory.

A next step in understanding memory bias in SAD is to examine mechanisms that explain memory change. Cognitive models im- plicate postevent processing (PEP; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997); however, studies of PEP have yielded inconsis- tent results (e.g., Cody & Teachman, 2011; Edwards et al., 2003; Morgan & Banerjee, 2008). Other potential mediating factors, such as self-focused attention, also deserve study. Another possibility pertains to feedback-induced affect. It seems possible to appraise feedback as objectively positive, as the SAD group did at Time 1, yet not experience happiness when receiving it (Alden et al., 2008; Weeks, Heimberg, Rodebaugh, & Norton, 2008). Affect was not assessed here to avoid arousing suspicion of the manipulation. The findings indicating that statistically controlling situational anxiety and feedback appraisal did not eliminate recall bias argues against this possibility, but direct assessment of feedback-induced affect might be informative.

The study had several methodological strengths, including the assessment of feedback appraisal, statistically controlling depres-

sion, self-rated performance, and state anxiety, as well as the use of a standardized task and feedback. Nonetheless, some caveats are in order. Although the unexpected speech task is a highly salient social task for individuals with SAD, it still is an artificial labo- ratory task and generalization to participants’ daily social experi- ences remains to be determined. Similarly, social feedback is often ambiguous whereas our feedback manipulation provided objec- tively positive or neutral feedback, which may have acted as valence anchors for participants’ memory. In addition, memory was assessed at only one time point, and does not speak to whether memory change is progressive. Future research should replicate these findings with other social tasks, including nonperformance tasks, more ambiguous feedback (e.g., body language responses from an interaction partner), and at multiple time points. Finally, the results may be culture-specific to North American participants who may expect to receive positive evaluations.

In summary, the current study is the first to address memory for positive feedback in a clinical SAD sample. The results contribute to the growing literature on positive affect deficiencies in SAD and suggest that it may be informative to focus on memory for positive information when treating SAD. Future work should also seek to further elucidate the mechanisms that drive this relationship.

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Received March 29, 2018 Revision received November 23, 2018

Accepted November 30, 2018 �

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