Philosophy

The Reasons of Atheists and Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s Existence Scale: Development and Initial Validation

David F. Bradley, Julie J. Exline, Alex Uzdavines, and Nick Stauner

Case Western Reserve University

Joshua B. Grubbs Bowling Green State University

Research exploring nonbelievers’ reasons for not believing in the existence of god(s) has focused on theory development. Such efforts are valuable, but may not capture the lived experiences of nonbelievers. The current two studies quantitatively examined nonbelievers’ self-reported reasons for nonbelief through developing the Reasons of Atheists and Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s Existence Scale (RANGES). We developed an initial pool of 64 items using prior published research, revised by a panel of experts including researchers and thought leaders in nonbelief communities. Both studies included participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Study 1 & 2 Ns � 520 & 369), all of whom reported not believing in god(s). In Study 1, our exploratory factor analysis suggested nine factors across 35 items. In Study 2, we confirmed the nine-factor structure using 38 items (35 from Study 1 plus three new items for better coverage of factors with few items) with adequate fit. Across both studies, the RANGES subscales showed good reliability, convergent validity (e.g., positive correlations with previous lists of reasons for religious doubt), predictive validity (e.g., positive and negative feelings toward God and religion), and discriminant validity (e.g., subscales were not unexpectedly associated with other measures). Our 1-year follow-up with a subset of Study 2 participants (N � 132) found different levels of stability among the RANGES subscales. This measure can promote further understanding the motivations, identities, and experi- ences of nonbelievers across cultures.

Keywords: atheism, agnosticism, nonbelief, religion, personality

Belief in god is declining in America (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009), with everything from individualism (e.g., Twenge, Ex- line, Grubbs, Sastry, & Campbell, 2015) to apostasy (e.g., Streib & Klein, 2013) being credited for rises in nonbelief. Prior theorizing focused through psychoanalytic (e.g., Vitz, 1999) and evolutionary (e.g., Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013) lenses developed a framework for why some people may not believe in a god or gods. However, empirical studies building on these frameworks remain sparse. The present work seeks to answer this question by developing a nuanced measure of reasons atheists and agnostics give for nonbelief in a god or gods.

Nonbelief, Atheism, and Agnosticism

The term atheism usually refers to the belief that no god(s) exist, or that there is insufficient evidence to justify belief in god(s) (Nielsen, 2013). Agnosticism generally refers to the belief that it is not possible at this time to say whether or not a god or gods exist, either because an individual currently lacks evidence regarding the existence of such beings or because it is fundamentally impossible to have said evidence (Le Poidevin, 2010). It is possible to inte- grate agnosticism with a religious or spiritual identity or set of beliefs, though holding agnostic beliefs about the existence of god(s) still precludes active belief in the existence of god(s). In this sense, atheism and agnosticism are not identical, but are both forms of nonbelief in the existence of a god or gods.

Not all people whose views suggest atheism or agnosticism self- identify with the label atheist or agnostic. One study using a U.S. sample found that 2% are atheists and 10% are agnostics based on their stance on the existence of God, but less than 1% labeled themselves atheists or agnostics (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009). Another study, using several indirect techniques, estimated that 28% of people do not believe in the existence of God, though far fewer would admit nonbelief directly (Gervais & Najle, 2017). Regardless of the exact prevalence of nonbelief in the population, it is clear that holding nonbeliefs does not directly align with self-labeling as a nonbeliever. Since our study focuses primarily on beliefs, we defined our nonbe- liever sample based on beliefs rather than self-labels.

David F. Bradley, Julie J. Exline, Alex Uzdavines, and Nick Stauner, Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University; Joshua B. Grubbs, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State Uni- versity.

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the John Templeton Founda- tion (Grant 36094 and 59916) in funding this project. Portions of this article appear in a published M.A. thesis written by the David F. Bradley.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David F. Bradley, Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106-7123. E-mail: [email protected]

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Psychology of Religion and Spirituality © 2018 American Psychological Association 2018, Vol. 10, No. 3, 263–275 1941-1022/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000199

263

Reasons for Nonbelief in the Existence of God(s)

Norenzayan and Gervais (2013), using a genetic and cultural evolution framework, conceptualized four potential origins of non- belief, each related to the failure or relatively less activation of an evolved mechanism that would typically foster belief in a god or gods. However, because many of the evolutionary and cultural factors identified often occur below the level of conscious aware- ness, it is unclear whether nonbelievers would identify them as reasons for their nonbelief.

Studies of deconversion narratives, or the process of disaffilia- tion and exit from a particular religious affiliation, point to several common themes that may also serve as potential reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s). It is important to note that deconversion is distinct from the development and maintenance of nonbelief in the existence of god(s), as individuals can deconvert to other religious traditions or leave organized religion while maintaining theistic beliefs. Additionally, individuals who never believed in the existence of god(s) cannot be said to be deconverts at all. Nonetheless, examining the deconversion literature may point to reasons for nonbelief relevant to at least some nonbeliev- ers. A recent mixed-methods examination of deconversion, build- ing on previous conceptual work, identified five characteristics associated with deconversion: loss of religious experiences, intel- lectual doubts, moral criticism of religion, experiences of emo- tional suffering, and disaffiliation from religious communities (Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009).

Recent studies (Bradley, Exline, & Uzdavines, 2017; Exline, Bradley, Uzdavines, Grubbs, & Stauner, 2017) focusing on non- believers’ explicitly stated reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s) grouped these nonbeliefs into six broad categories: intel- lectual, emotional, socialization, bad experiences with religion, experiential, and intuitive. In these studies, participants rated the importance of these categories of reasons in contributing to their nonbelief. Intellectual reasons were by far the most endorsed, but all categories of reasons received some endorsement. We expand on these categories and provide a review of prior work pertinent to them below.

Intellectual. A belief is a stance on the truth or falsehood of an idea. One generally accepted way to determine an idea’s verity or falsity is to apply intellectual reasoning to the idea. Indeed, the phrasing of the question – reasons for nonbelief—may suggest a preference for rational argumentation based on logic, philosophy, or science rather than other potential reasons for nonbelief. This is especially true if the person receiving the explanation is an out- group member (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002), as researchers might be perceived to be. In the case of nonbelief in a god or gods specifically, arguments based on evidence or rationality are part of nonbeliever culture, with many tomes devoted to scientific or philosophical arguments against the existence of a god or gods (e.g., Dawkins, 1986; Dennett, 2006; Martin, 1990; Smith, 1979; Stenger, 2007, 2009).

Relational. Nonbelief in the existence of god(s) may reflect attitudes about the character or actions of particular (or hypothet- ical) gods. People often see gods as relational figures with whom one can have human-like relationships (e.g., Beck & McDonald, 2004; Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2013). In their study of reasons for belief in God Exline and colleagues (2017) found that relational reasons, such as experiences of trust, security, or love focused on

God, were among the most highly endorsed reasons for belief. Bradley and colleagues (2017) found that some atheists endorsed relational reasons for nonbelief as well, including experiences of disappointment, anger, or mistrust focused on a God once believed to exist, or conceiving of God as cruel or punishing. Since many nonbelievers at one time believed in the existence of a god or gods (Kosmin, Keysar, Cragun, & Navarro-Rivera, 2009), it is reason- able to assume that relational reasons for nonbelief may remain relevant for some nonbelievers.

Early and current socialization. Popular beliefs often seem more credible than unpopular or rare beliefs. In their study of atheists and believers, Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) found that atheists, compared to believers, experienced less emphasis on religion during their upbringing. Another survey showed that 27% of religious “nones” (individuals who reported having no religious affiliation) had at least one nonreligious parent, a figure much higher than the general population (Kosmin et al., 2009). These findings cannot clarify whether nonbelievers’ caregivers actively pushed them toward nonbelief in the exis- tence of god(s) or simply did not push toward religious belief. However, data from surveys of professional scientists suggest that some professions contain concentrations of people with negative views of religious beliefs (Ecklund & Park, 2009), which may result in active socialization pressure toward non- belief. While the presence of socialization pressure may be a reason for nonbelief, such pressure often affects beliefs sub- consciously (Asch, 1956; Bond & Smith, 1996) and may be rarely explicitly endorsed as a reason for nonbelief.

Antireligion. Positive experiences with religious people and institutions may lend more credence to the existence of a god or gods, and negative experiences may lead to nonbelief in the existence of god(s). Victims of clergy sex abuse, for example, report lower levels of belief in God (Rossetti, 1995). The effect of perceived victimization at the hands of religion may extend to the societal level as well. Some nonbelievers spend considerable time and energy combating what they perceive to be the negative influence of religious teachings on society (e.g., Christina, 2012; Hitchens, 2007).

Intuitive. People can make decisions, including evaluations of truth claims, based on preconscious factors that cannot be easily articulated. These preconscious factors are sometimes called intu- ition (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007). People may make objectively rational decisions before they are able to explain their decisions in rational terms (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). However, these intuitive processes do not always lead to objec- tively rational decisions or judgments. Regardless of their veracity, intuitions can be powerful and hard to override with deliberate cognitive processes (for a review, see Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, people often superimpose rational explanations for conclusions reached via intuition rather than give up their intuitions (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).

Emotional. Positive and negative emotions can influence con- scious thoughts (Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2000). Arguments using the peripheral pathway aim to change emotional-attitudinal positions on a given topic. Peripheral arguments can, at times, be more effective than arguments using the central pathway, which use high-quality facts or rational arguments to alter beliefs (Hov- land, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). For this reason, it is important to consider the possibility that nonbelief in

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264 BRADLEY, EXLINE, UZDAVINES, STAUNER, AND GRUBBS

a god or gods could reflect general positive affect about nonbelief or negative affect about belief (separate from feelings about god(s) as relational figures).

Agnostic. Agnostic nonbelief involves abstaining from both belief and active disbelief in the existence of a god or gods. Agnostic nonbelief may be seen as a sort of epistemic humility concerning the existence of a proposed god or set of gods. Alter- natively, agnostic nonbelief can be a statement about the strength of arguments for and against the existence of a god or gods, namely that neither is persuasive at this moment, and as a result belief is not warranted.

Existential. According to Yalom (1980), humans have four basic concerns that arise as a matter of human existence: to find meaning, to feel connected to others and the universe, to face the specter of an unavoidable death, and to face one’s essential re- sponsibility for one’s actions. Belief in the existence of a god or gods may be appealing in part because it addresses these concerns. Those who have other ways of resolving these concerns, find religious approaches to these concerns inadequate, choose to not resolve these existential concerns, or do not feel the weight of these concerns may be less likely to believe.

The Present Studies

As described above, individuals may endorse many reasons for nonbelief in god(s) (Exline et al., 2017). Developing a measure that asks nonbelievers to respond to a range of differ- ent reasons for nonbelief may allow for the assessment of nuanced reasons for nonbelief previously available only through in-depth qualitative interviews (see Streib et al., 2009). This measure may help describe intragroup variation among nonbelievers and clarify the previously identified reasons for nonbelief. In doing so, the measure may help further the public understanding of nonbelievers and their reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s). This measure may also inform theories as to what causes individuals to become nonbelievers and, more broadly, what prevents individuals from simply adopting the dominant beliefs in their culture (i.e., in this U.S. sample, theistic and especially Christian beliefs). Additionally, this measure may serve as one way of measuring and understanding cross-cultural differences in how nonbelievers conceptualize belief, nonbelief, and the role of religion and religious people in their society.

Our aim for the present project was to develop and psycho- metrically evaluate the Reasons of Atheists/Agnostics for Non- belief in God’s Existence Scale (RANGES). We developed items based on prior literature, previous unpublished research by the authors, and feedback from academic and nonacademic experts in atheism. In Study 1, we used exploratory factor analysis to examine factor structure and inform item reduction efforts. In Study 2, we used confirmatory factor analysis with new data to fit a model informed by the EFA results from Study 1.

Both studies included tests of reliability and validity. We antic- ipated low cross-factor loadings (i.e., cross-loadings �.30) and strong internal reliability (i.e., � � .70) for all final subscales. We also examined stability over one year in a subset of Study 2 participants. Both studies included several tests of convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity.

Study 1: Measure Development and Initial Evaluation

Method

Participants and procedure. We recruited 520 U.S. adults (267 female, 238 male, 15 transgender or “other”; Mage � 32.39, SDage � 11.71) to provide survey responses through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system and paid them $2.00 after sur- vey completion. MTurk allows researchers to quickly and inex- pensively collect high-quality data with more demographic diver- sity than other Internet sampling methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). MTurk samples provide results that are psycho- metrically similar to samples recruited in other ways (e.g., Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).

Measures. Measures are listed below in the order in which they appeared in the survey. Table 1 reports demographics. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics.

Belief in God’s existence. As in a prior study (Exline, Park, Smyth, & Carey, 2011, Study 5), participants completed a forced- choice item adapted from the General Social Survey: 1) I know that no god or gods exist, and I have no doubts about it. 2) While it is possible that a god or gods exist, I do not believe in the existence of a god or gods. 3) I do not know whether there is a god or gods, and I do not believe there is any way to find out. 4) I do not know whether there is a god or gods, but it may be possible to find out. 5) I find myself believing in a god or gods at some of the time, but not at others. 6) While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in a god or gods. 7) I know that a god or gods really exist, and I have no doubts about it.

Options 1 and 2 suggest atheist beliefs, and 3 and 4 suggest agnostic beliefs. Participants who chose options 5, 6, or 7 were excluded from the rest of the survey and analyses.

Religious/nonreligious identity. Participants responded to, “How would you describe your present religious/spiritual tradition, if any?” via a text box.

Desire for a god or gods to exist. Participants used a slider bar to respond to, “Regardless of how much you actually believe in the existence of a god or gods: How much do you WANT a god or gods to exist?” The slider ranged from 0 (I do not want a god or gods to exist) to 100 (I want a god or gods to exist).

Reasons of Atheists/Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s Exis- tence Scale (RANGES). Participants responded to 64 items after receiving the following prompt:

People can have many reasons for not believing in the existence of a god or gods. Below is a list of potential reasons. Some of the reasons listed below use the word “God.” Please interpret “God” to stand for whatever image or idea you primarily associate with that term, such as a specific god you used to believe exists or a specific god that other people believe exists.

On a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (extremely important), how important is each of the following items in explaining why you currently do not believe in the existence of God?

Past beliefs about and attitudes toward God. Participants were asked whether they believed in a god or gods in the past. Those participants who indicated past belief were asked how long they had not believed in god(s). As in previous studies (Bradley et al., 2017; Exline et al., 2011), we also asked participants, “Looking back over your entire life, how often

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265RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

have you had positive feelings toward God?” They responded on a scale from 0 (never) to 10 (always). They then completed similar items focused on religion and God, including past anger toward God, past feelings that God is angry at you, past positive and negative feelings toward religion, and past negative expe- riences with religious people.

Religious and spiritual struggles. Participants completed the 26-item Religious and Spiritual Struggles Scale (RSS; Exline, Pargament, Grubbs, & Yali, 2014). They rated the extent to which they had experienced each type of struggle over the past few months, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). The RSS includes six subscales: Divine, Demonic, Interpersonal, Moral, Ultimate Meaning, and Doubt. We scored participants’ responses by averaging across the individual item responses within each subscale.

Complexity of approach to religion and spirituality. Participants completed the 8-item Complexity subscale of the Multidimen- sional Quest Orientation Scale (Beck & Jessup, 2004). Participants rated their agreement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (agree strongly). Scores were summed.

Broad reasons for nonbelief. As in previous studies (Brad- ley et al., 2017; Exline et al., 2017), participants read: “People have many reasons for believing that God does not (or might not) exist. Do you see your doubts, or your decision to not believe in God, as being based on these types of reasons?”

Participants responded on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (ex- tremely) to seven potential reasons for nonbelief or doubt in God’s existence: intellectual, positive emotional, negative emo- tional, god relational, socialization, bad experiences with reli- gion, and intuitive. Each reason was presented as a single item, along with examples (e.g., “Intellectual - seeing belief in a god or gods as illogical, not rational; religious teachings or beliefs about gods seem inconsistent or confusing”).

Sources of religious doubt. Participants read: “Please rate the extent to which each issue listed below has caused you to have religious questions or doubts.” They then read 20 potential causes of doubt or questions (from Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997) and indicated the level of doubt or questions caused by each item on a scale from 0 (this issue has not caused any doubts or questions for me) to 6 (this issue has caused extreme doubts or questions for me). Item responses are interpreted independently.

Results

Exploratory factor analysis. We analyzed responses to 64 items comprising the initial version of the RANGES using explor- atory factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and, since factors were expected to correlate, direct oblimin rotation (Costello & Osborne, 2005). We determined factor structure by first conduct-

Table 1 Sample Demographics

Study 1 Study 2

Variable n % n %

Gender Female 267 51.3 148 50.2 Male 238 45.8 147 49.8 Transgender/Other 15 2.9 0 0

Sexual Orientation Heterosexual 412 79.2 249 84.4 Homosexual 25 4.7 11 3.7 Bisexual 51 9.6 24 8.1 Other 32 6.2 11 3.7

Race/Ethnicity African-American/Black 26 4.9 15 5.1 American Indian/Native American/Alaska Native 18 3.4 10 3.4 Asian Indian 12 2.3 0 0 East Asian/Pacific Islander 24 4.5 15 5.1 Middle Eastern 2 .4 2 .7 Latino/Hispanic 39 7.4 16 5.4 White/Caucasian/European American 445 84.1 255 86.4

Marital Status Single, not in a committed relationship 181 34.9 101 34.4 Single, in a committed relationship 109 21.0 60 20.2 Living with partner 79 15.3 61 20.6 Married or civil union 123 23.7 74 25.2 Divorced 14 2.7 22 7.3 Separated 8 1.5 3 1.1 Widowed 1 .2 0 0

Education High school graduate or less 71 13.7 37 12.6 Some college/technical school 180 34.7 99 33.7 Completed two-year/technical degree 57 11.0 15 5.1 Completed four-year degree 120 23.2 103 35.0 Attended/completed graduate/professional school 90 17.4 40 13.6

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266 BRADLEY, EXLINE, UZDAVINES, STAUNER, AND GRUBBS

ing a Very Simple Structure (VSS; Revelle & Rocklin, 1979) analysis to inform our decision regarding the appropriate num- ber of factors, then examining factor loadings and interpretabil- ity of factors. VSS suggested 7 (BIC � �6364), 8 (BIC � �6375), or 9 (BIC � �6368) factors would best fit the data. However, many items showed poor loadings (�.50) and significant cross-loadings (�.30) in 7-, 8-, and 9-factor structures.

We then removed items that loaded poorly or were redundant with better-loading items and conducted a second VSS using the 35 remaining items. VSS results suggested an 8- (BIC � �1416) or 9-factor (BIC � �1421) solution would be adequate. After examining the results of the 8- and 9-factor structures, we determined the 9-factor structure provided better factor loadings and more interpretable factors. We labeled the nine factors as follows: Intellectual, Relational, Intuitive, Emo- tional, Agnostic, Early Socialization, Current Socialization, Bad Experiences with Religion, and Societal Concerns. This structure differed from our expectations in three ways. First, we had expected the Early Socialization and Current Socialization subscales to form a single factor. Second, we expected the Bad Experiences with Religion and Societal Concerns subscales to

also form a single factor. Third, the expected existentialism factor did not emerge. Table 3 shows eigenvalues, percent of variance explained, and the pattern matrix with items and factor loadings for the final nine-factor solution.

RANGES descriptive statistics. Table 5 reports means, standard deviations, and reliability for the RANGES subscales. We found significant differences in mean scores of the sub- scales using repeated-measures ANOVA, F(8, 4152) � 295.75, p � .001. Holm-corrected tests of main effects showed that intellectual reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s) were the most strongly endorsed, and the least endorsed reasons were emotional, early socialization, and current socialization, all three of which did not significantly differ. Correlations between the subscales appear above the diagonal in Table 6. All sub- scales correlated positively with each other, except the Intel- lectual and Current Socialization subscales, which did not show a statistically significant correlation.

Convergent and discriminant validity. We used multiple regression to predict other measures of nonbelief in the exis- tence of god(s) using the nine RANGES subscales (see Table 7). We expected the RANGES subscales to account for unique

Table 2 Variable Descriptive Statistics

Study 1 Study 2

Variable M SD � M SD �

Reasons for Nonbelief Intellectual 79.46 26.15 — 85.83 24.87 — Emotional (negative) 23.93 29.00 — 21.85 31.34 — Emotional (positive) 24.80 30.08 — 25.00 31.88 — Socialization 26.42 29.58 — 20.46 27.99 — Bad experiences with religion 42.54 36.06 — 42.67 38.56 — Intuitive 53.74 32.69 — 53.55 38.49 — Relational 35.23 34.43 — 36.29 37.54 —

Altemeyer Sources of Doubt The problem of evil 4.36 2.20 — 4.73 2.43 — Negative history of religion 4.93 2.06 — 5.21 2.27 — Hypocrisy of religious people 5.18 2.00 — 5.34 2.19 — The death of a loved one 2.09 1.81 — 2.48 2.16 — Religious teachings about the role of women 4.71 2.24 — 4.91 2.36 — Being religious did not bring peace, joy 4.26 2.30 — 4.03 2.52 — Intolerance by religious people to some groups 5.49 2.03 — 5.33 2.25 — Threats about hell 4.62 2.21 — 4.76 2.44 — Religion prohibits pleasure 4.43 2.20 — 4.61 2.34 — Religious tenets don’t make sense 5.71 1.71 — 5.68 2.04 — Religious faith prevents questioning 5.39 1.97 — 5.31 2.24 — Claims that the Bible is the word of God 5.12 2.05 — 5.37 2.20 —

Lifetime history with religion and spirituality Had positive emotion at a god or gods 3.60 2.68 — 3.13 2.77 — Felt angry at a god or gods 2.95 2.94 — 2.54 3.01 — Had positive feelings at religion 3.51 2.46 — 3.15 2.69 — Had neg. feelings at religion 6.24 2.74 — 6.02 3.13 — Had negative experiences with religious people 4.41 3.33 — 3.85 3.31 — Believed a god or gods felt angry at you 1.54 2.43 — 1.50 2.62 —

Past and current nonbelief Desire for God to exist 34.48 32.70 — 35.47 35.78 — Certainty of nonbelief 57.32 34.77 — 82.21 26.00 — Agnostic beliefs (n, %) 253 48.7% — 28 9.5% — Identification as agnostic (n, %) 233 44.8% — 67 22.7% — Religious quest complexity 30.88 8.17 .66 30.85 9.92 .75

Religious and Spiritual Struggles Divine 1.29 .69 .92 1.12 .49 .92 Interpersonal 1.85 .87 .85 1.76 .84 .82

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267RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

variance in the variables most conceptually relevant to the respective subscales and not account for unique variance in other variables. There were no issues with multicollinearity (i.e., no VIFs greater than 5; highest VIF was 2.44). Due to risk of inflated Type I error from multiple comparisons, we adjusted all significance levels from beta weights and R2 from validity testing regressions in Study 1 using the Holm correction method.

In general, the RANGES subscales showed expected associa- tions with the broad, one-item reasons for nonbelief. The Current Socialization subscale was not significantly associated with any of the broad reasons for nonbelief; the text of the broad socialization reason for nonbelief item emphasized early socialization experi- ences and was associated with the Early Socialization subscale.

The RANGES subscales also performed well predicting sources of religious doubt developed by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997). Some sources of doubt were predicted by a single subscale. Other times, more than one subscale accounted for unique variance in predicting the source of doubt, in a way consistent with subscale content. (e.g., “intolerance by religious people to some groups” related to both the Bad Experiences with Religion and Societal Concerns subscales.) Of note, the

Current Socialization subscale did not relate positively to any of the sources of doubt, and it showed a negative association with several sources of doubt.

Predictive validity. We conducted multiple regressions pre- dicting current and past experiences with (and attitudes toward) aspects of belief and nonbelief in the existence of god(s; Table 8). In general, the RANGES subscales were associated with appropriate constructs. Lifetime negative experiences with re- ligious people (an item measuring personal experiences) was positively associated with the Bad Experiences with Religion subscale, while lifetime negative feelings about religion (an item assessing more general attitudes) was associated with the Societal Concerns subscale. The Intellectual subscale was as- sociated with greater certainty of nonbelief. The Relational subscale was associated with more lifetime anger toward god(s), more experiences of believing god(s) were angry at them, and more divine struggles. As expected, the Agnostic subscale was predictive of both having agnostic beliefs and labeling oneself as agnostic. Of note, the Current Socialization, Emotional, and Intuitive subscales were not significantly asso- ciated with any of the predictive validity indicators.

Table 3 Exploratory Factor Analysis Loadings for Retained RANGES Items, Study 1

Abbreviated items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Belief in God would make me an outcast. .87 .02 .04 .01 .05 �.01 .01 �.03 �.03 Belief in God is not accepted in my group. .87 .00 .00 .02 �.02 .02 �.03 �.02 �.01 It is easier for me to fit in as a nonbeliever. .78 �.04 .06 .01 �.03 .01 .05 .02 �.03 Others would look down on me if I believed in God. .77 .00 �.04 .01 �.05 .11 .07 .02 .06 Scientific reasons for not believing in God. �.04 .76 .06 �.02 .03 .07 .04 .06 �.03 God’s existence doesn’t make logical sense. �.06 .73 �.05 .02 .01 .05 .02 .00 �.15 No scientific evidence for the existence of God. .02 .67 �.03 .07 �.02 �.02 �.02 �.04 �.05 The natural world makes more sense without God. �.04 .66 .01 �.07 .05 .08 .10 �.02 �.06 The idea of God is full of contradictions. .00 .59 .06 .14 �.09 �.07 �.07 �.14 �.05 The events of history are inconsistent with the existence of God. .09 .55 .02 �.02 �.04 �.05 �.03 �.07 �.01 I have been hurt by religious people in the past. .06 .06 .84 .00 .02 .07 .03 .08 �.02 Religious people have made my life worse. .06 .06 .63 �.05 �.09 �.03 .08 �.21 .00 I have been let down by religious institutions. .01 �.06 .53 .07 �.19 .01 .06 �.15 .01 No one knows for sure whether God exists. .03 .02 .00 .78 �.04 �.03 �.01 �.05 �.08 It would be arrogant to claim that I know for sure whether God exists. .05 �.03 .05 .59 .08 .11 .06 �.08 .09 God’s existence or non-existence can’t be proven. �.03 .27 �.08 .58 �.08 �.03 .08 .01 .07 I’m not sure whether or not God exists. .03 �.12 .04 .55 �.06 .03 �.04 .07 �.11 If God does exist, God has caused me to suffer. �.02 .01 �.07 �.06 �.85 .09 .03 �.06 .00 If God does exist, God should have eased my suffering. .04 .09 .03 .07 �.77 �.06 �.02 �.02 .02 Earlier in my life, I felt mistreated by God. .16 .00 .11 �.04 �.61 .06 .07 .08 .02 In the past, I felt as though God disappointed me. �.04 �.10 .11 .08 �.56 .02 .06 .00 �.07 My parents or caretakers did not believe in God. .01 .01 �.04 .00 �.04 .81 .00 �.06 �.02 Growing up, people around me did not believe. .07 .06 .07 .05 �.01 .68 .00 .02 �.02 I find it uplifting to believe that God does not exist. �.04 .02 .06 .02 .02 .00 .85 �.02 �.02 I find it comforting to believe that God does not exist. .09 .02 .01 .05 �.04 .01 .73 �.04 �.02 It would be depressing for me to believe that God exists. .12 �.10 �.01 .00 �.14 .07 .60 �.05 �.15 The possibility that God exists is unpleasant for me to consider. .23 .02 .03 .01 �.14 .04 .53 �.03 �.03 Religion is bad for society. .07 �.01 �.03 .03 �.03 .04 �.04 �.87 �.03 Religious institutions are too powerful in society. �.07 �.05 .19 .16 .02 .06 .03 �.63 .02 The world would likely be better off if no one believed in God. .06 .12 .01 �.08 .01 .01 .15 �.58 �.08 Belief in God prevents people from making society better. �.01 .13 .01 �.11 �.08 .00 .10 �.56 �.07 I have an intuitive sense that there is no God. �.03 �.03 .06 �.01 �.04 .08 .00 .06 �.79 I know, at a deep, personal level, that God does not exist. .01 .08 �.02 �.02 .00 .03 .08 �.06 �.64 I just know that God doesn’t exist. .08 .05 �.09 .03 .04 �.03 .10 �.06 �.63 The concept of God doesn’t make sense on a gut level. .00 .22 .09 .08 �.02 �.05 �.07 �.09 �.57

Note. Factor 1 � Current Socialization, Factor 2 � Intellectual, Factor 3 � Bad Experiences with Religion, Factor 4 � Agnostic, Factor 5 � Relational, Factor 6 � Early Socialization, Factor 7 � Emotional, Factor 8 � Societal Concerns, Factor 9 � Intuitive. Bold factor loading indicates factor item loaded onto most strongly.

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268 BRADLEY, EXLINE, UZDAVINES, STAUNER, AND GRUBBS

Several findings shed light on the nature of different kinds of nonbelief. For example, the Agnostic subscale was associated with more positive past feelings toward a god or gods. While not providing evidence about the subscale’s validity, this finding is informative. The positive association between the Agnostic sub- scale and self-identification as agnostic, holding agnostic beliefs, and religious quest complexity supported the subscale’s validity of the subscale.

Study 2: Factor Confirmation and Further Psychometric Evaluation

Method

Participants and procedure. Participants were 295 U.S. adults (148 female, 147 male, Mage � 32.73, SDage � 11.22) recruited from MTurk and paid $3.00 for their participation. None of the participants in Study 1 participated in Study 2. To reflect differences in conceptions of nonbelief in the existence of god(s), we defined nonbelief as the absence of belief in Study 2, whereas we used a forced-choice description of beliefs in Study 1. All participants indicated that they did not believe in the existence of God by responding 0 on a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 10 (Totally) to the question, “To what extent do you believe that God exists?” As a result, compared to Study 1, Study 2 had significantly fewer participants with agnostic be- liefs (48.7% vs. 9.5%) or who self-labeled as agnostic (44.8% vs. 22.7%). No other demographic differences were observed.

Study 2 participants were contacted one year later and invited to complete a follow-up survey. Of the 295 original participants, 133 (45%) completed the 1-year follow-up and were paid an additional $3.00 for their participation.

Measures. We used the same measures used in Study 1 for the following constructs: demographics, belief in God’s existence, religious/nonreligious identity, desire for a god or gods to exist, past beliefs and attitudes toward God, religious and spiritual strug- gles, complexity of approach to religion and spirituality, broad reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s), and sources of religious doubt. Before conducting Study 2, we added three items aiming to improve the coverage of two of the subscales (Early Socialization and Bad Experiences with Religion), leading to a 38-item version of the RANGES. The Study 2 follow-up group completed only the RANGES.

Results

Confirmatory factor analysis. Responses to the 38-item RANGES measure were analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We conducted the CFA using the R software package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). We did not allow errors to correlate. Because the RANGES uses a Likert-type scale, we treated the data as ordinal and used the mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least square estimator (WLSMV), which calculates a scaled chi-square test statistic, to evaluate goodness of model fit. Common criteria for adequate model fit are CFI � .95, RMSEA � .06, and SRMR � .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). By these standards, the nine-factor model of the RANGES demon- strated adequate fit (scaled �2[629] � 1161.17, p � .001;

CFI � .966; RMSEA � .055, 90% CI [.050, .060]; SRMR � .083). Items loaded strongly onto their assigned factors (i.e., all standardized loadings �.70; see Table 4 for factor loadings), and the factors showed good reliability (i.e., all �s � .80).

RANGES descriptive statistics. Table 5 reports means, standard deviations, and reliability for the RANGES subscales. We found significant differences in mean scores of the sub- scales using repeated-measures ANOVA, F(8, 2352) � 260.54, p � .001. Holm-corrected test of main effects revealed that intellectual reasons for nonbelief were the most strongly en- dorsed, and the least endorsed reasons were early socialization and current socialization, which did not significantly differ. Correlations appear below the diagonal in Table 6. In general, subscale scores correlated positively and significantly with each other. However, the Agnostic and Early Socialization subscales generally did not correlate strongly with the other subscales.

Convergent and discriminant validity. As in Study 1, we used multiple regression to predict other measures of reasons for nonbelief using the nine RANGES subscales (see Table 7), using the Holm method to adjust for multiple comparisons. There were no issues with multicollinearity (highest VIF was 1.91). The RANGES subscales related to the appropriate broad, one-item reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s), except the Current Socialization subscale, which was not associated with the single socialization item.

The RANGES subscales performed well predicting responses to Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1997) list of sources of religious doubts. The pattern of associations followed that of Study 1, except that several relationships between the Bad Experiences with Religion subscale and sources of doubt were not present. In each case the doubt item was predicted by another subscale in a way that made theoretical sense.

Predictive validity. As in Study 1, we used multiple regres- sion to predict current and past experiences with (and attitudes toward) aspects of belief and nonbelief (see Table 8). In general, the RANGES subscales were associated with appropriate con- structs. The Intellectual subscale was associated with certainty of nonbelief. The Bad Experiences with Religion subscale was asso- ciated with reporting more negative experiences with religious people throughout one’s life. The Agnostic subscale was associ- ated with likelihood of holding agnostic beliefs and self- identifying as agnostic. The Relational subscale was associated with experiencing more anger toward, and perceiving more anger from, a god or gods. The Societal Concerns subscale was associ- ated with greater lifetime history of negative feelings toward religion. No statistically significant relationships were found in- volving the Current Socialization, Early Socialization, Emotional, or Intuitive subscales.

Temporal stability. Using responses from the 133 partici- pants in the 1-year follow-up, we calculated the intraclass corre- lation (ICC) for each subscale (see Table 5). The RANGES sub- scales showed modest to moderate stability after one year (ICCs ranging from .52 to .72). The highest ICCs were observed in the Early Socialization and Relational subscales, both of which reflect prior experiences unlikely to change within a year. Meanwhile, the lowest ICCs were found for the Intuitive and Emotional subscales, which may be more state-dependent.

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269RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

Discussion

This project involved the creation and preliminary validation of a multiitem measure to assess the self-reported importance of reasons for nonbelief in the existence of a god or gods. While previous research has suggested that atheists and agnostics have a variety of reasons for their nonbelief (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997; Exline et al., 2017; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), the RANGES provides a valid multidimensional measure of a broad range of rea- sons for nonbelief held and acknowledged by atheists and agnostics. Whereas an open-ended question about reasons for nonbelief likely draws the most important reasons for nonbelief (often intellectual reasons), the RANGES, as a multiitem measure, encourages atheists and agnostics to communicate to researchers their nuanced reasons for

nonbelief. Additionally, we argue that the RANGES also facilitates quantitative comparisons and correlations between reasons, individu- als, and external factors, such as potential causes and consequences of nonbelief in the existence of god(s). Our research is unique in that it used two independent samples from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk worker pool, and our studies were not advertised as studies about nonbelievers, whereas other studies have either 1) relied on theoretical speculation, or 2) relied upon snowball sampling methods drawn primarily from people active in organized atheist groups.

Across two studies, our results suggested that the RANGES is a reliable, valid instrument with nine discrete subscales. Differences in inclusion criteria in Study 1 and Study 2 led to fewer agnostics in Study 2, but no other demographic differences. The goodness of

Table 4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings for RANGES Factors, Study 2

Full items Unstd SE Std

Factor 1: Current Socialization It is easier for me to fit in with my social group as a nonbeliever. 1.00 — .85 Belief in God would be make me an outcast in my social group. .93 .06 .79 Belief in God is not accepted in my social group. 1.07 .06 .91 Other people would look down on me if I believed in God. 1.11 .06 .94

Factor 2: Intellectual The natural world makes more sense without the existence of God. 1.00 — .82 I have scientific reasons for not believing in God’s existence. .98 .05 .81 The existence of God doesn’t make logical sense. 1.06 .05 .87 There is no scientific evidence for the existence of God. .98 .06 .80 The idea of God is full of contradictions. .95 .06 .78 The events of history are inconsistent with the existence of God. .89 .05 .73

Factor 3: Bad Experiences with Religion Religious people have made my life worse. 1.00 — .87 I have been hurt by religious people in the past. 1.12 .03 .98 I have been let down by religious institutions. .95 .03 .82 Religious institutions have harmed me as an individual. 1.11 .02 .96

Factor 4: Agnostic No one really knows for sure whether God does or doesn’t exist. 1.00 — .92 It would be arrogant to claim that I know for sure whether or not God exists. .82 .05 .75 God’s existence or non-existence cannot be proven. .92 .05 .85 I’m not sure whether or not God exists. .80 .05 .74

Factor 5: Relational If God does exist, that means that God has caused me to suffer. 1.00 — .92 If God does exist, God should have been there for me when I was suffering. .96 .03 .82 Earlier in my life, I felt as though I was mistreated by God. 1.01 .03 .92 In the past, I felt as though God disappointed me. 1.04 .02 .95

Factor 6: Early Socialization Growing up, my parents or caretakers did not believe in God. 1.00 — .93 Growing up, people around me did not believe in God. .99 .03 .92 When I was a child, my parents or caretakers taught me that God does not exist. .98 .03 .91 When I was a child, people around me told me that God does not exist. 1.03 .03 .95

Factor 7: Emotional It would be depressing for me to believe that God exists. 1.00 — .86 I find it uplifting to believe that God does not exist. .99 .05 .86 I find it comforting to believe that God does not exist. 1.08 .04 .93 The possibility that God exists is unpleasant for me to consider. .98 .05 .85

Factor 8: Societal Concerns Religion is bad for society. 1.00 — .88 Religious institutions are too powerful in society. .91 .04 .81 The world would likely be better off if no one believed in God. .98 .04 .87 Belief in God prevents people from making society better. 1.01 .03 .90

Factor 9: Intuitive The concept of God doesn’t make sense on a gut level. 1.00 — .85 I have an intuitive sense that there is no God. .96 .03 .82 I know, at a deep, personal level, that God does not exist. 1.05 .04 .89 I just know that God doesn’t exist. .99 .04 .84

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270 BRADLEY, EXLINE, UZDAVINES, STAUNER, AND GRUBBS

model fit and consistency in validity results across the two samples suggest, though do not prove, the RANGES applies validly to different forms of nonbelief. The RANGES subscales showed modest to moderate levels of stability at 1-year follow-up. This level of stability is not unusual, and is consistent with levels of stability found in other constructs, such as personality traits cap- tured by the Big Five Inventory (as low as .70 at 3-year follow-up; Hampson & Goldberg, 2006) and Personality Psychopathology Five Scale (as low as .44 at 6-month follow-up; Trull, Useda, Costa, & McCrae, 1995). A certain level of temporal instability is therefore expected, likely due to a combination of measurement error, inconsistent responding, and true change over time. Specif- ically related to reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s), some nonbelievers may experience an interchange between intui- tive and other reasons, with intuitive reasons rising when the question of gods’ existence is considered settled and, for example, intellectual reasons rising when more actively engaging with the question. Nonbelievers may have further interactions with believ- ers, with further positive or negative experiences altering scores on subscales such as Societal Concerns and Bad Experiences with Religion. Further research is necessary to track longitudinal changes in reasons for nonbelief as they relate to the development of nonbeliever identity.

As expected, intellectual reasons were the most strongly en- dorsed type of reason for nonbelief in the existence of god(s). However, it is worth noting that the Intuitive, Agnostic, and Societal Concerns subscales were also strongly endorsed in both samples, significantly higher than reasons focused on negative personal experiences (i.e., the Relational and Bad Experiences with Religion subscales). This suggests that nonbelievers perceive their nonbelief as an intellectual decision, but they also perceive their nonbelief as a decision made in consideration of intuitive processes, the limits of knowledge, and the best interest of society, with personal experiences of pain and disappointment relatively less important. At the same time, it is likely that all nine types of reasons for nonbelief are important in understanding the popula- tion of nonbelievers.

Several of the sources of religious doubt were associated with unexpected RANGES subscales, which might shed some light on how atheists and agnostics think about different issues. For exam- ple, doubt caused by the intolerance some religious people show to some groups was associated with societal concerns and bad expe- riences with religion, suggesting some people may become or maintain their identity as atheists or agnostics due to the intoler- ance they experience from religious people. Similarly, some athe- ists and agnostics experience religious doubt due to the presence of

Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for RANGES Subscale Scores

Study 1 Study 2, Time 1 Study 2, Time 2

M SD � M SD � M SD � ICC

Intellectual 3.60a 1.07 .86 3.95a 1.00 .85 3.91a .89 .79 .59 Agnostic 3.03b 1.13 .75 2.79c 1.22 .83 2.65c 1.21 .82 .66 Societal Concerns 2.90b 1.23 .82 3.10b 1.31 .88 3.25b 1.27 .88 .67 Current Socialization 1.55f .91 .92 1.36e .68 .82 1.23e .53 .80 .59 Early Socialization 1.83e 1.05 .77 1.39e .79 .90 1.32e .78 .91 .72 Intuitive 2.76c 1.17 .82 3.13b 1.21 .87 3.11b,c 1.22 .83 .52 Relational 2.13d 1.12 .85 1.99d 1.18 .90 1.73d 1.03 .84 .68 Bad Experiences with Religion 2.25d 1.22 .83 2.04d 1.14 .90 1.96d 1.12 .89 .60 Emotional 1.84e 1.02 .87 1.87d 1.07 .85 1.81d 1.09 .86 .56

Note. Means of subscales with different superscripts within a given column differ from other values within the column, Holm-corrected p � .05. ICC calculated using one-year follow-up sample from Study 2.

Table 6 Correlations Among RANGES Subscales

Current Socialization Intellectual

Bad Experiences

with Religion Agnostic God

Relational Early

Socialization Emotional Societal

Concerns Intuitive

Current Socialization — .04 .44� .26� .46� .47� .63� .28� .22�

Intellectual �.01 — .18� .22� .16� .12� .26� .49� .58�

Bad Experiences with Religion .37� .09 — .28� .54� .36� .49� .52� .24�

Agnostic .21� .20� .27� — .34� .26� .24� .25� .19�

God Relational .29� .15 .58� .29� — .34� .53� .34� .28�

Early Socialization .58� �.08 .16 .12 .16 — .46� .27� .28�

Emotional .36� .20� .53� .10 .52� .19� — .51� .43�

Societal Concerns .17 .57� .32� .09 .28� �.02 .41� — .42�

Intuitive .18� .47� .10 .08 .19� .12 .38� .40� —

Note. Values above the diagonal are from Study 1. Values below the diagonal are from Study 2. � p � .05, Holm-corrected.

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271RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

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272 BRADLEY, EXLINE, UZDAVINES, STAUNER, AND GRUBBS

unnecessary suffering in the world (i.e., the problem of evil), which was associated most strongly with the Relational subscale, not the Intellectual subscale. This finding raises the possibility that for some nonbelievers, the problem of suffering affects the desir- ability and perceived worthiness of god(s) as relational partners, and is not simply an intellectual challenge to the existence of a god or gods. This is consistent with prior research, which found that the presence of suffering in an individual’s personal life related to more anger toward God (e.g., Exline et al., 2011; Hale-Smith, Park, & Edmondson, 2012). We also found that religious doubts caused by hearing threats about an unpleasant afterlife (e.g., Hell) related to more societal concerns reasons for nonbelief, suggesting that some nonbelievers see threats of Hell as causing problems for society rather than personal discomfort or making a god seem like an unfavorable relational partner.

Some differences between results in the two studies arose per- taining to the Agnosticism subscale: Study 1, which had a greater proportion of agnostics than Study 2, showed several statistically significant relationships with the Agnostic subscale not present in Study 2. However, in both studies we found significant associa- tions between the Agnostic reasons subscale and both self-labeling as agnostic and endorsing agnostic beliefs about the existence of a god or gods.

One unexpected finding was that in both studies there was a negative relationship between intellectual reasons and a desire for a god or gods to exist (in other words, a positive relationship between intellectual reasons and wanting a god or gods to not exist). Perhaps those with stronger intellectual reasons feel they have more to lose, in terms of their understanding of science and their general way of understanding the world. Alternatively, per- haps people who more strongly value holding true beliefs in general tend to investigate matters more intellectually, hoping to increase their odds of being correct. A third possibility is that those who have engaged in an intellectual examination of the existence of gods find the existence of loving gods to be incompatible with the level of suffering in the world. They conclude that if gods exist, these gods would not be loving gods, and therefore these nonbe- lievers would not want such gods to exist.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our aim was to capture nonbelievers’ own sense of their reasons for nonbelief in the existence of god(s), and for that reason we developed a self-report measure. However, self-report measures have well-known limitations (Chan, 2009). Response biases can- not be ruled out, and participants may be reluctant to report nonintellectual reasons for nonbelief. This measure is only capable of detecting those reasons that respondents are aware of, and should not be used to definitively answer the “real” reason non- believers hold their positions. For example, nonbelievers might build intellectual reasons on top of intuitive and emotional reasons, while only being aware of the intellectual reasons, not the more foundational, potentially causal reasons. Some nonbelievers may be unable or unwilling to acknowledge social influences for non- belief, as this might threaten the individual’s sense of autonomy. Finally, the RANGES items related to past relationships with god(s) may seem contradictory and hard to endorse for some, even if bad relationships with imagined god(s) did actually lead to nonbelief.T

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273RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

Regarding sampling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk likely pro- vided a sample more representative of the atheist and agnostic population compared to many sampling techniques common in nonbelief research, such as recruitment from active members of nonbelief groups or advertising through announcements on blogs focused on nonbelief. However, the sample was by necessity limited to individuals with Internet access and a willingness to complete a survey for less than the current U.S. minimum wage rate. Also, the sample was confined to individuals in the U.S.; future research should explore whether the constructs measured in the RANGES are applicable in other cultures. For example, in Western Europe, nonbelief in the existence of god(s) is more common than in the United States, which may lead to higher endorsement of socialization reasons for nonbelief (WIN�Gallup International, 2012). It is also unknown how well the RANGES would apply to cultures where polytheism is a common belief structure. Specifically, the use of the term “God” in the RANGES’ items may pose difficulties in cross-cultural work. The instructions to the measure do ask respondents to personalize their understand- ing of the term “God”; however, alterations of the term to “god and/or gods” may be more culturally valid. Further testing of measurement invariance in non-U.S. groups is a necessary part of testing the validity of this measure for use in other cultures.

The RANGES and its subscales have many potential uses. Longitudinal work could track the ways that nonbelief in the existence of god(s) unfolds over time, with one of the changes over time being responses to the RANGES. For example, perhaps emotional and relational reasons for nonbelief arise first, but either the awareness or the current importance of these reasons for nonbelief fades over time. If the RANGES is shown to be a valid instrument in non-U.S. settings, differences among nonbelievers in different cultural contexts could be examined using the RANGES subscales. Finally, understanding that nonbelief in the existence of god(s) is a complex construct for many nonbelievers may help others reject false stereotypes of nonbelievers and promote a deeper understanding of these populations.

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us er

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is no

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in at

ed br

oa dl

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Received September 18, 2017 Revision received January 17, 2018 Revision received March 23, 2018 �

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275RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION