Assignment: Proposal for Effective Interventions Against Criminal Organizations

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Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice

Foreword | A multifaceted strategy is

required to effectively combat organised

crime. A key element of preventing and

responding to organised criminal

activity is to target how individuals

become involved in illicit activities and

to develop effective methods of

preventing their recruitment.

Using prior research into the methods

used by organised crime groups to

identify potential targets or confederates,

and individuals’ motivations to seek or

agree to participate in criminal activity, a

framework is presented that identified key

recruitment pathways together with some

strategies that would make recruitment

and engagement less effective.

Adam Tomison Director

Responding to organised crime through intervention in recruitment pathways Russell G Smith

The essential components of an organised crime group are defined in article 2 of the United

Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a structured group of three

or more persons, existing for a period of time, acting in concert with the aim of committing

serious criminal offences in order to obtain some financial or material benefit (United Nations

2004). As such, organised crime requires three or more persons to come together for

the execution of their common purpose. This paper examines the processes involved in

recruitment and the opportunities and incentives that make participation in organised crime

attractive for suitably motivated individuals. Armed with a sophisticated understanding of

how recruitment takes place, it is possible to develop appropriate intervention strategies

that would seek to disrupt recruitment pathways and to make it difficult for organised crime

groups to secure the services of potential collaborators.

Considerable research has been undertaken into the daily activities of organised crime

groups, including how they fund their operations, maintain control over communities and

launder the proceeds of their criminal enterprises. Organised crime groups in Australia

include outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs; Holmes 2007; Lozusic 2002), ethnic-based

crime groups, family-based crime groups and groups formed on the basis of place of

origin such as prisons (CCC WA 2005). The Australian Crime Commission has noted that:

although most organised crime activities in Australia are focused on illicit drug markets,

organised crime is increasingly diversifying its activities, with convergences being observed

between legitimate or licit markets and illicit markets (ACC 2013: 7).

Organised crime exists on a continuum of seriousness and complexity of activity as shown

in Figure 1. At the lower end of seriousness are instances of small-scale street crime

committed by small groups of individuals, often young people or family members who

become involved in low-level property or violent crime. Small groups of individuals

can also commit economic crimes such as small business-related revenue fraud. Other

No. 473 October 2014

2 | Australian Institute of Criminology

criminal networks are involved in organised

cybercrime and online consumer scams

that are coordinated entirely online (Choo &

Smith 2008). Organised criminal activities

are also linked to environmental crime,

intellectual property infringement, maritime

piracy and financial crime, which require

the presence of multiple players in order for

offences to be planned and perpetrated.

Arguably, at the most serious level are

large-scale, organised criminal activities

related to child exploitation, human

trafficking, corporate fraud and illicit

drug production and supply. Large-scale

terrorist activity can also entail extensive

organisation and planning.

The extent of co-offending

At the outset, it is important to understand

the extent to which serious crime is carried

out collaboratively, as the pathways of

recruitment will differ depending on the

number of individuals involved and the

complexity of their relationships. Recruiting

two individuals to carry out a major fraud

within a bank is substantively different from

the recruitment of 50 skilled participants

to conduct a major drug production and

distribution network.

Research carried out by the Australian Institute

of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers

(Smith 2003) found that out of 155 case files

involving serious fraud in Australia and New

Zealand, 84 percent had only one accused

person involved, and in only 11 case files (7%)

were more than two persons involved (Smith

2003). This finding contradicts the view that

a high proportion of serious economic crime

is perpetrated by criminal organisations. The

study in question, however, examined only

successfully detected serious fraud and it

could be the case that organised crime is

involved in other matters that do not come to

the attention of the authorities.

More recently, KPMG (2013) reported an

increase in the proportion of serious fraud

cases involving more than two offenders

acting together between its 2010 and

2012 fraud surveys. In 2010, 23 percent

of internal fraud involved collusion (KPMG

2010), while in 2012 this increased to 29

percent (KPMG 2013). The percentage of

cases of internal fraud involving four or more

persons increased from two percent in 2010

to six percent in 2012 (KPMG 2013, 2010).

The vast majority of serious fraud reported

in the surveys was, however, perpetrated

by individuals acting alone.

Figure 1 Ranked seriousness of organised criminal activities

High

Medium

Low

• Terrorist activity

• Serious financial crime

• Small-scale business fraud and tax evasion • Family-based local crime

• Small-scale street crime

Seriousness

• Organised cybercrime and scams • Organised environmental crime

• Organised maritime piracy

• Child exploitation • Human trafficking

• Corporate fraud • Drug cartels

Australian Institute of Criminology | 3

Theoretical approaches

Criminological theory provides a number

of insights into the processes through

which crime is commissioned. Edwin

Sutherland’s (1939) theory of differential

association, for example, that was

developed in the late 1930s in the United

States to explain juvenile gang behaviour,

proposed that criminal behaviour is learned

through a process of social interaction

between individuals in which they learn

how to commit crimes and to justify their

illegal conduct (Sutherland 1939). He

argued that if the conditions favourable

to acting illegally outweigh the frequency

and intensity of conditions unfavourable

to violating the law, then an individual is

more likely to decide to break the law

(Sutherland & Cressey 1974). Sutherland

(1937) developed the theory drawing on

his classic study, The Professional Thief,

in which he analysed and described

ethnographically the life and daily routines

of professional thieves in the United States.

More recently, Derek Cornish (1994)

developed the notion of ‘crime scripts’

to understand the processes by which

criminals conduct their activities. Research

of this kind has been applied in relation to

the resale of stolen vehicles (Tremblay, Talon

& Hurley 2001), cheque forgery (Lacoste

& Tremblay 2003) and organised crime

(Hancock & Laycock 2010).

Crime scripts, according to Cornish (1994:

161) are a sequence of ‘script functions’ and

accompanying ‘script actions’ that organise

our knowledge and understanding of routine

behavioural processes. In the present

context, these relate to the identification and

engagement of co-offenders who can be

encouraged to join in the illegal activity.

The recruitment of a third party to commit

a crime can be broken down into a number

of routine processes. These include

preconditions, initiation, actualisation,

doing and post-conditions, and these

script functions have corresponding script

actions (Cornish 1994). By developing

an understanding of how organised

crime groups may seek to recruit new

members, a script analysis can then be

used to identify the script functions and

corresponding actions.

This paper explores the processes by which

recruitment for organised crime takes place

from the perspectives of:

• existing members of organised crime

groups seeking out new members to

facilitate proposed criminal activities

(recruiter pathways); and

• environmental opportunities, which

make participation in organised crime

attractive for previously law abiding

citizens (recruitee pathways).

Research evidence and anecdotal

illustrations of identified pathways are

drawn from a number of ethnographic

studies of organised crime published in

the academic literature. These include

Dick Hobbs’s Lush Life (2013), which

explored organised crime in ‘Dogtown’,

a composite of various East London

communities that he examined and Jan

Goldstraw-White’s (2012) work for which

she interviewed 41 incarcerated white-

collar offenders in the United Kingdom.

Organised financial crime has also been

studied extensively by Mike Levi (2008) in

his interview-based research into long-

firm fraud (planned bankruptcies); while

in 2007 the consultancy firm, Matrix

Knowledge Group (2007), carried out a

study of 222 convicted drug traffickers

for the Home Office in the report The Illicit

Drug Trade in the United Kingdom.

Research has also been conducted at the

Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime

and Law Enforcement at the Research and

Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry

of Security and Justice in particular, research

supporting the Organized Crime Monitor that

examined 1,092 organised crime offenders

including in-depth interviews with inmates

convicted of participation in organised

crime and incarcerated in Dutch prisons

(Kleemans & De Poot 2008; Van Koppen

2012; Van Koppen & De Poot 2013).

In the United States, Adler and Adler

(1983) spent six years observing and

interviewing 65 upper-level marijuana and

cocaine traffickers and their associates in

south-western California, and examining

their typical career paths. They noted how

‘potential recruits are lured into the drug

business by materialism, hedonism, glamor,

and excitement’ (Adler & Adler 1983: 206).

Diego Gambetta’s Codes of the Underworld

(2009) also provides an extensive analysis

of how organised criminals communicate

with each other, and use signals and

intimidation to support their activities, while

Carlo Morselli’s Contacts, Opportunities

and Criminal Enterprise (2005) provides

a social network analysis of a number of

case studies of criminal organisations taken

from Canadian police operations (see also

Morselli 2009).

In Australia, Arthur Veno, in his book The Brotherhoods (2012) presents the results

of his ethnographic study of bikie gangs in

Australia over 27 years; while in the United

States, Robert Mazur in The Infiltrator (2009)

gives an account of his five years’ undercover

work for the FBI infiltrating the criminal

hierarchy of Colombia’s drug cartels.

These are clearly only a small selection of

the published literature on organised crime,

but they provide firsthand, ethnographic

accounts of recruitment practices in various

organised crime contexts, which are relevant

illustrations of the processes identified in

this paper. Generally, there has been little

specific research on recruitment processes,

apart from one doctoral dissertation that

presented an economic model of how

government policies can affect membership

patterns among organised crime groups

(Long 2013).

Some caution, however, needs to be

exercised when trying to fit the results

of prior ethnographic research into a set

of predetermined categories. In many

respects, organised criminal activity is far

from organised and as Dick Hobbs (2013: 5)

rightly observes:

criminal collaborations generate chaotic

sets of personal and commercial

affiliations featuring fluid and often

unpredictable interchanges that are

ill suited to the sociometric analysis

favoured by police and police science.

4 | Australian Institute of Criminology

Recruitment pathways

With this admonition in mind, certain

pathways in which organised crime

recruitment occurs can begin to be

identified. Pathways can be examined

from the points of view of those who

are seeking to recruit new members to

become involved in criminal enterprises

(recruiter pathways) and those who may

be the targets of recruitment initiatives

(recruitee pathways). Often, recruitees

are individuals without prior criminal

connections who are seeking to raise

funds in order to maintain their lifestyle or

to consort with established crime figures

for various reasons, as explained below.

The pathways to recruitment also vary

according to the organisational structure

displayed by the group in question—be it

hierarchically based, network-based, or

via more diffuse, loose arrangements (see

UNODC 2002). Having centralised control

can often make recruitment activities more

targeted and efficient, while unstructured

groups, such as those that exist online,

often recruit in an ad hoc manner.

Recruiter pathways

Established members of organised crime

groups seek out new members for a variety

of reasons including the skillsets they offer,

which might facilitate criminal activities such

as the manufacture of illicit drugs or the

counterfeiting of payment cards; their ability

to use violence and intimidation, which

crime bosses might not wish to undertake

themselves; skills they possess in facilitating

the laundering of the proceeds of crime;

and their willingness to engage in high-risk

activities involving weapons or explosives

or other activities likely to lead to arrest.

In addition, organised crime groups can

seek to establish relationships with those

in influential government positions who can

assist in facilitating the flow of information

or decisions relevant to proposed criminal

activities. The case of ‘Ron’, a drug courier

manager, is an example of how organised

crime can seek to recruit otherwise law-

abiding individuals (see Box 1).

Box 1 Recruitment of drug couriers

Ron was in his mid-50s and had been retired from his job in law enforcement for a decade when he first became involved in the drug trade. Ron managed an operation based on couriers importing cocaine into the United Kingdom from Granada and his role was to recruit and manage the couriers. He frequented a local casino where he spotted potential couriers from among the casino’s clientele, tending to target white, middle-aged men, low on money and ‘who needed a holiday’. Ron made all the travel arrangements, purchased the airline tickets, provided the suitcase and handed over the spending money…The couriers would have their holiday and return with an identical suitcase containing cocaine. On the successful arrival of a consignment into the United Kingdom, Ron would collect the case from the courier at the airport and hand the drugs over to his bosses, who would be waiting in a nearby carpark. The boss would pay Ron £12,000 in cash, which was £7,000 for the courier (who had also had a 2 week holiday) and £5,000 for Ron. Matrix Knowledge Group in Hobbs (2013: 242).

Recruitee pathways

Pathways can also be understood from the

perspective of those who are the subject of

recruitment. Otherwise law-abiding citizens

may seek to become involved in criminal

enterprises for a variety of reasons. They

might need funds to satisfy debts or lifestyle

expenditure, they may have a desire to

enhance their financial or social standing

or they might demonstrate an interest in

risk-taking activities, or possess motivations

based in pathological psychological

processes (Hobbs 2013; Kleemans & De

Poot 2008; KPMG 2013). Rather than

commence criminal activities in isolation,

they might seek out known criminals who

could be seen to assist in their proposed

course of action. The case of ‘Billy’, a used

car dealer, is illustrative of such a person

(see Box 2).

Crime scripts of recruitment

Hancock and Laycock (2010) have applied

Cornish’s (1994) approach to analysing

criminal behaviour through the use of crime

scripts to the disruption of organised crime

and identified recruitment as one area

where disruption might have potential. The

present discussion identifies three main

stages in the recruitment process as—

target identification, establishing trust and

engaging in compliance, and enforcement

script actions.

Target identification

One of the initial tasks that both recruiters

and the targets of their recruitment have to

undertake is the identification of willing and

cooperative collaborators. This activity is

fraught with risk as identifying participants

for criminal activity can, itself, be criminal

and can also lead to threats of, or actual

violence, being inflicted.

Identification by recruiters

Potential criminals are able to be sourced

from many occupational and other groups

in society, largely based on their interests

and the skills they possess. This can include

those with experience in telemarketing who

can participate in boiler-room investment

fraud (ACC 2012), ex-military personnel who

have experience in the use of weapons and

explosives, and members of the public willing

to act as drug or money mules. On other

occasions, organised crime groups may

seek out those working in the professions

such as lawyers and accountants who can

assist in laundering the proceeds of crime or

in establishing corporate entities and other

vehicles for use in tax evasion (see Choo et

al. 2012).

Box 2 Recruitment of a used car dealer

Billy was a successful car dealer and nightclub owner, and had also made money from an expanding property portfolio before he was introduced to a group of drug importers who were contemplating how to invest their profits. Attracted by the prospect of easy money, Billy fed these profits through his car dealership and progressed to become a ‘middle man’, seeking out buyers for the drug importers. Eventually, he ran the enterprise, becoming embroiled with the day-to-day workings of a large operation consisting of storers, mixers, testers and legitimate professionals, many of whom were paid a salary. Billy also courted the friendship of police officers who, in exchange for free drinks, would provide him with information and carry out background checks on business associates and employees. Matrix Knowledge Group in Hobbs (2013: 241).

Those working in the information technology

and security industries also have attractive

skills that organised crime can use. The

other productive location for recruitment is

the public sector, particularly those working

in law enforcement, border control, intelligence

and corrections. Rowe et al. (2013) provide

examples of recent instances in which public

servants in Australia have been recruited by

Australian Institute of Criminology | 5

organised crime to provide access to law

enforcement intelligence through a range of

corrupt practices.

Prisons, in particular, provide many

opportunities for inmates to establish

ties with other offenders, sometimes

individuals with low-level convictions who

can be recruited into more serious criminal

enterprises both while incarcerated, as

well as after their release (see Box 3).

Prison recruitment also carries the benefit

that everyone involved can be assured

that those whom they approach have

criminal records sufficient to warrant a

term of imprisonment.

Identification by recruitees

Arguably, a more difficult task exists for

those in the law-abiding community who

wish to become involved in organised

crime. One cannot simply approach

people who appear to be criminal and

seek membership of an illegal organisation.

Some traditional organised crime

groups are clearly recognisable, such

as the Yakuza with their tattooed bodies

(Adelstein 2010), or OMCGs with their club

colours and patches (Veno 2012). Even

if individuals are recognisably members

of a criminal enterprise, there may still be

many procedures that they are required to

undertake in order to establish trust and to

secure membership.

Diego Gambetta (2009) has explored

in detail the use of non-verbal cues to

facilitate identification of those involved

in criminal enterprises and notes how the

use of language and behavioural cues can

facilitate covert introductions in ways that

do not attract attention from authorities

or others who may be disposed to report

what transpires to the police. Subtle

conventions in the use of language, dialect,

dress and behaviour are used to ensure

that trust and legitimacy in the criminal

enterprise are guaranteed.

Serendipitous identification

Finally, identification of potential criminal

collaborators may take place accidentally

or inadvertently through contact that

occurs in common meeting places such

as pubs, casinos, gyms, brothels and

internet sites. Often, these are places at

which individuals with either law-abiding or

criminal orientations meet, establish social

relationships and begin the process of

criminal collaboration. Similarly, unplanned

recruitment can also arise within extended

families such as has been documented

in the case of Mafia families (Tyler 1971),

while more recently, social media have

provided abundant ways in which people

with common interests can establish

relationships—both for legitimate and

illegal purposes (Choo & Smith 2008).

On occasions, organised crime groups

have simply advertised online for new

recruits such as the following (unedited)

online invitation for people to undertake

credit card skimming operations:

We are private organisation for your

special developing requests. We are

focused at Electronic and Computer

Engineering. If you need special

hardwares (especially hi-tech) nor

software that can not be done or even

discuss in your Country because of

any reason such as laws etc. then

u are at the very right place. We are

offering absolutely anonymous &

offshore developing for your projects.

We don’t care what you want to do

with hardwares and softwares you

requested to be done by us. Needless

to say, your privacy is very important for

us and we don’t share with anyone else

because of any reason. We don’t need

your Name, Adress etc. because of any

reason. We only need your email. You

will have a certificate and account for

secure login to our private forum for

tracking your development, you even

may ask question to engineers who

engineering your project. If you reach

this Web Site then you already know us.

We are not cheap developers and we

cant make partnership with you. If you

wish your dreams to come true then u

have to have enough money to invest

for your dreams. You even have to pay

for request for quote from us for your

project (Glenny 2011: 203–204).

Such online advertising for willing recruits

is also prevalent in connection with online

consumer scams such as work-from-home

scams and online romance and dating

fraud. Although increasing in sophistication,

many such invitations are barely credible

and yet continue to trick unsuspecting

individuals into participation (Jorna &

Hutchings 2013).

Box 3 Recruitment in correctional settings

Karl was a former accountant who was serving a term of imprisonment for tax fraud in Western Australia. While in prison, he was approached by another prisoner who needed his assistance in order to obtain funds from the Tax Office. The accountant assisted him, but later found out that the claim was not legitimate. He was then approached by other prisoners who asked him to prepare false income tax returns with false business details and other fabricated evidence. Over a period of a year he filed 210 fraudulent tax returns on behalf of 125 fellow prisoners in which fraudulent tax refunds, amounting to almost $1.3m were claimed. A total of half a million dollars was refunded by the Tax Office to the prisoners. Karl administered the scheme using a computer for online banking and mobile phone and received $61,000 in commissions and fees over the 12 month period. He argued that he was forced to carry out the scheme under duress, but was sentenced to an additional two years with a non-parole period of 12 months. [2002] WASC 265 (CCA, 20 September 2002).

A further example of serendipitous

recruitment in the Netherlands concerned a

former truck driver who had set up a café to

be able to spend more time with his family

and who was recruited into transporting

heroin for an organised crime group through

contacts he had with a group of customers

at his café. This provides a clear example

of how routine activities can facilitate the

recruitment process (Felson & Clarke 1998).

The café owner was eventually sentenced to

12 years’ imprisonment for heroin trafficking

(Van Koppen & De Poot 2013). He explained

how he became involved as follows:

You start talking and ask each other:

‘What did you do before and where do

you come from?’ That’s the first thing

you do. And when I mentioned I’d been

a truck driver for years, that triggered

something of course. He should know

people, maybe he wants to. But I never

wanted to [. . .] I wasn’t interested at

all. I did not need the money and did

not bite, it did not fascinate me. After

some months, however…After all,

they are your frequent customers and

you talk to them all the time. There

comes a time it goes through your mind

that some others you know have the

ability to and probably want to do it. At

6 | Australian Institute of Criminology

first I thought: I’ll do them both a favour

and I can earn some additional money,

you know. I really did not see the danger in

doing it (Van Koppen & De Poot 2013: 82).

Adler and Adler (1983) also found instances

of serendipitous recruitment in which law-

abiding individuals gradually became involved

in drug trafficking in order to make use of

their skills or to enhance their income (see

Box 4).

Box 4 Recruitment into money laundering

I used to be into real estate making good money. I was the only person at my firm renting to longhairs and dealing with their money. I slowly started getting friendly with them, although I didn’t realize how heavy they were. I knew ways of buying real estate and putting it under fictitious names, laundering money so that it went in as hot cash and came out as spendable income. I slowly got more and more involved with this one guy until I was neglecting my real estate business and just partying with him all the time. My spending went up but my income went down and suddenly I had to look around for another way to make money fast. I took the money I was laundering for him, bought some bricks from another dealer friend of his and sold them out of state before I gave him back the cash. Within six months I was turning [selling] 100 bricks at a time (Adler & Adler 1983: 198).

Establishing trust

Establishing trust and confidence that the

person with whom one is dealing is not

an undercover police officer, or someone

likely to blow the whistle, is often a lengthy

and invasive operation both for organised

criminals and those whom they are seeking

to recruit. In many cases, this can entail

initiation tasks such as demonstrating

criminal skills, providing samples of actual

criminal conduct (particularly the use of

violence) and showing a willingness to

share confidential information with other

group members.

In the case of online organised crime

groups engaged in sharing child exploitation

material, it is often the case that recruits

need to supply extensive libraries of illegal

exploitation images in order to establish

their bona fides and to gain access to group

libraries of similar material (Choo & Smith

2008; Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell 2011).

Establishing trust in the online criminal

world can also require the use of various

anonymising and security technologies.

In particular, it is important to ensure that

one’s true identity is not revealed and so

aliases and false identities are invariably

used when logging on to illicit websites.

Security of data is also required and

organised crime groups now make use

of encryption, steganography, biometrics

and Tor software that reduces the risk

of online activities being monitored by

law enforcement. Some organised crime

groups also require identity verification both

during enrolment and when undergoing

regular checks designed to confirm trust

and security of group members. An

example exists in the case of OMCGs

(Lozusic 2002).

Trust also needs to be maintained during

the early stages of group membership and

tests are often used to demonstrate an

absence of risk, proof of veracity and loyalty

to the organisation. Occasionally this can

entail involvement in successful criminal

operations to demonstrate skills and in the

case of unsuccessful activities, willingness

to be convicted and serve prison time.

Compliance and reinforcement

Further proof of commitment to the cause

may require financial investment in the

organisation and successful recruitment of

new members of the organisation—such as

occurs in connection with online networks

that share child exploitation material.

Failed recruitment

On occasions, recruitment may be

unsuccessful and fail. This can occur

where criminal activity is detected by

law enforcement and new recruits are

suspected of whistleblowing or of being

undercover operatives (Mazur 2009).

In the case of hierarchically organised

networks, sanctions of escalating severity

may be imposed leading to expulsion

from membership, or threats of, or actual,

violence and murder.

Intervening in recruitment pathways

Having explored the various pathways for

the recruitment of individuals to engage

in organised crime and identified the

crime scripts associated with methods

of recruitment, it is possible to identify

strategies that could be considered to

intervene in such pathways so as to make

recruitment difficult and likely to lead to

detection by law enforcement.

Not all of the available opportunities for

intervention may be possible, having regard

to privacy, human rights and legislative

limitations on taking action. At a minimum,

however, the ways in which recruitment

takes place can be identified and made

obvious and available for official scrutiny.

Table 1 summarises a number of possible

intervention points in recruitment pathways

that could be explored by policymakers

seeking to control organised criminal

activities. Although some may be difficult

to implement, discussion of each could

be examined as possible ways in which to

control recruitment activities. It develops

Hancock and Laycock’s (2010) comparable

presentation of prevention strategies arising

from crime script analysis that are applicable

to organised criminal activities generally. The

principal areas to address in connection with

recruitment relate to the use by organised

crime of anonymity, reliance on professional

advisers, convenient meeting locations

and the availability of motivated recruitees.

There is also a need to publicise the risks

associated with involvement in organised

crime from the perspective of likelihood of

arrest, confiscation of assets and physical

harms that may be inflicted both personally

and on friends and relatives of recruitees

who participate in organised crime.

Addressing anonymity

First, as Hancock and Laycock (2010) rightly

emphasised, there is a need to address the

use of anonymity among organised crime

groups, especially those that operate online.

In particular, removing the ability of organised

crime to access pre-paid information and

communication technologies (ICT) services

and regulating the use of anonymising

software and encryption for illegal purposes

would be beneficial. Further, making effective

use of existing lawful databases of persons

convicted organised crime could assist law

enforcement with identification of recruitment

activities, while enhanced data analysis of

financial and cyber intelligence including

associated tracking of funds transfer

locations might be possible.

Australian Institute of Criminology | 7

Table 1 Potential interventions in recruitment pathways relevant to identified crime scripts

Script action Intervention category Intervention

Act anonymously under law enforcement radar Anonymity Remove anonymity afforded by access to pre-paid ICT services (mobile phones, Internet services, payment cards)

Regulating the use of anonymising software and encryption for illegal activities

Using intelligence databases of convicted organised criminals

Enhanced analysis of financial intelligence collected by Financial Intelligence Units

Enhanced data-matching and e-authentication procedures

Obtain professional advice on commission of crime and laundering of proceeds

Use of professionals Enhanced regulation of accountants and financial advisers

Enhanced regulation of ICT professionals and transport sector workers

Full compliance with FATF anti-money laundering recommendations for professional advisers

Tighter controls and identity checks on company formation

Enhanced checks on convicted organised criminals seeking to form companies

Coordination of anti-corruption measures

Improved protection of whistleblowers who report organised crime and improvement of reporting mechanisms

Identify places to meet Meeting locations Monitoring high-risk meeting locations

Anti-fortification laws directed at fortified organised crime club premises

Mandatory membership records for high-risk meeting locations such as gyms, fitness clubs, gambling venues and for sex industry proprietors

Improving the collection and sharing of prison intelligence among law enforcement and correctional agencies

Locate motivated recruitees Motivated recruitees Address the red flags of fraud and rationalisations for the commission of financial crime (eg problem gambling, excessive lifestyle expenditure with inadequate assets, small business failures)

Publicise high-risk lifestyle and fun associated with organised crime

Risk awareness Enact and publicise uniform unexplained wealth and assets confiscation laws

Publicise the harms associated with organised crime lifestyles (eg violence, intimidation, family loss, asset loss, addictions)

Publicise the cost–benefit balance associated with organised crime lifestyles

Publicise the probability of detection of serious crime and sanctions applicable to organised criminal activity

Enhance opportunities for lawful avenues of risk-taking activities

Regulating professional advisers

Enhanced efforts could also be made

to ensure that financial advisers and

accountants, in particular, are adequately

regulated to ensure that their services

cannot be used, overtly or unwittingly, by

organised crime groups.

Additional controls may need to be

developed for other occupational groups,

such as those in the transportation and ICT

industries. Having procedures that could

identify high-risk individuals within these

sectors could assist in locating red flags

for corruption before they are acted upon.

For example, enhanced reference checking

for those seeking employment in trusted

positions in the transport industry and those

working in ICT may help to identify individuals

who may be subject to corruption. Similarly,

having national standards and disciplinary

controls for those working in ICT may help to

identify high-risk individuals.

Prohibitions could also be enforced against

those convicted of serious crimes from

forming companies and enhanced identity

checks undertaken when businesses are

being established that could be used in

connection with organised crime. In addition,

the use of Australia’s anti-corruption regime

could be used to identify potential infiltration

of government by organised crime groups

(Rowe et al. 2013). Allied to this is the need

to encourage reporting of serious crime and

the protection of those who make reports in

the public interest.

Controlling meeting places

There is compelling evidence that

recruitment takes place in a limited

number of high-risk locations, particularly

prisons, pubs, fitness clubs and brothels.

Ensuring that fit-and-proper persons’

tests applicable to those in charge of such

venues are enforced might help to deter

organised crime involvement. Similarly,

ensuring that such businesses maintain

accurate and verifiable records of members

and regular users could also make some

premises unattractive to organised crime.

Recent anti-organised crime legislative

measures such as anti-fortification laws and

anti-association laws could also be useful in

ensuring that meeting places frequented by

8 | Australian Institute of Criminology

organised criminals are made less desirable

places to congregate.

Finally, when police task forces are

targeting organised crime groups, it would

be beneficial to focus some activity on

increasing the probability of detection of

organised crime groups when attempting

to recruit new members. Improving

prison security and further development

of corrections agency intelligence could

assist in disrupting recruitment activities

that take place within prisons, while

allowing online data monitoring—with

judicial authorisation—would assist

law enforcement in identifying high-risk

recruitment environments.

Attacking recruitee motivations

Attacking the motivations for involvement

in organised crime by otherwise law-

abiding individuals is an essential element

in breaking pathways to recruitment.

For example, there is now an established

awareness of the red flags of individuals

becoming susceptible to involvement in

serious financial crime (eg KPMG 2013),

such as the presence of lifestyle pressures,

gambling addiction and business failure.

An illustration of how personal financial

difficulties led a senior public servant

to be recruited by organised crime to

obtain confidential intelligence for the

group is the case of the former Assistant

Director Investigations at the NSW Crime

Commission who became involved with

a drug trafficking organisation and the

importation of 300kg of pseudoephedrine.

His motivations for becoming involved in the

criminal organisation were clearly financial

gain, to clear himself of debts and to provide

for his family. To this end, he entered into

an agreement with an informant and a

legitimate businessman to import a large

quantity of pseudoephedrine concealed in

a container of rice ([2011] NSW Supreme

Court 1422, 8 December 2011). Had the

NSW Crime Commission been aware of

his financial position, his vulnerability to

corruption could have been identified and

perhaps prevented. Any such monitoring

of personnel would need to comply with

privacy and human rights protections.

There is also evidence that neutralising

the rationalisations or justifications for

involvement in serious crime can be an

effective deterrent to individuals acting

illegally (Duffield & Grabosky 2001).

Publicising risks

Making organised crime unattractive and

unprofitable through the confiscation of

assets and use of unexplained wealth laws

has been identified as a key strategy in

preventing and responding to organised

crime (Parliamentary Joint Committee

on Law Enforcement 2012). Recent

legislation that has sought to proscribe

membership of organised crime groups

could also have the indirect beneficial

effect of deterring individuals from seeking

to become new members of such groups

through fear of prosecution as a member of

a proscribed gang.

Broadhurst, Lauchs and Lohrisch (2014)

argue, for example, that many OMCG

members are simply motivated by a desire

to have ‘fun’ and to engage in risk-taking.

Publicising the negative consequences of

criminality including the potential physical and

mental harms, risk of imprisonment, loss of

livelihood and involvement in addictions could

all help to make organised crime appear to

be an unattractive lifestyle choice.

Organised crime is a multifaceted, complex

phenomenon and as such, requires a

multifaceted response strategy. Initiatives

need to be flexible and dynamic and able

to meet changes in the nature of organised

crime as they become apparent. A key

element of preventing and responding to

organised criminal activity is to interdict

or prevent individuals being recruited into

criminal organisations. This paper has

identified some potential ways in which this

may be achieved that reinforce a multifaceted

approach to combat organised crime.

Acknowledgements

Preliminary research for this paper was

carried out by Cienan Muir during an

Internship at the AIC in 2013. The author is

grateful to the anonymous reviewers who

provided comments on an earlier draft.

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