PS-CS#4

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next?

In its first 18 months of operation. Euro Disney, a new theme park outside Paris, France, lost almost $1 billion. How could an im- proved version of a highly successful enterprise like Disneyland in California fare so poorly? This article attempts to highlight Disney's miscalculations in translating its theme park experiences from one culture to another, and suggests a possible course of action to ad- dress Euro Disney's problems.

ABSTRACT

Euro Disney, which cost almost $4 billion to build, is owned jointly by a consortium of 60 banks and the Walt Disney Company, which is also responsible for its management. Dis- ney operates two wholly owned theme parks in the U.S.: Dis- neyland in Anaheim, California (opened in 1955), and the Walt Disney World resort in Orlando, Florida (opened in 1971). The company also earns royalties on revenues from Tokyo Disneyland, a park owned and operated by an inde- pendent Japanese company, the Oriental Land Company Limited (opened in 1983).

By December 1993, less than two years affer opening. Euro Disney ran out of cash and had to borrow $175 million just to keep operating. Three months later, on 15 March 1994, Dis- ney and its partners announced a restructuring agreement, ending speculation that the park might close. The agreement included a $1.05 billion capital infusion to be shared equally by both parties. Although this agreement represents a major commitment to Euro Disney's survival, it has virtually no im- pact on the real issues causing Euro Disney's troubles.

The arguments and conclusions presented in this article were synthesized from an extensive collection of printed sources. Additional research was conducted to identify Euro Disney's future external challenges, using procedures suggested in the paper, "Strategic Issue Management" (Ansoff 1980).

Earl P. Spencer

Submitted May 1995 Revised July 1995 September 1995

C> Journal of International Marketing Vol. 3, No. 3, 1995, pp. 103-114 ISSN 1069-O31X

103

PERSISTENT PROBLEMS AT EURO DISNEY

What Are Euro Disney's Problems?

What Caused These Problems?

A

Euro Disney's ability to generate revenue is determined by two primary occurrences:

1. Number of visitors in attendance 2. Visitors' average length of stay

Although first year's attendance was substantial (9.5 million), it was below the operating break-even level of 11 million. \^s- itors' average length of stay was also reportedly well below plan (Toy 1994). It should be noted that the bailout of $1 bil- lion, which will be used to relieve some of Euro Disney's crushing interest burden ($290 million per year), does noth- ing to address Euro Disney's shortcomings in these two areas.

Shortfalls in visitor attendance and average length of stay seem to be related to a number of miscalculations, based on Disney's U.S. theme park experiences.

1) Quality and design standards of U.S. parks deemed in- adequate for European marketplace. As the park was be- ing constructed, Disney became concerned that the original plans, based on the Magic Kingdom in Galifomia, were too spurious for this land of real castles, kings, and queens. As a result, enhancements were ordered, and the park, originally budgeted at $2.0 billion ended up costing $3.8 billion (Economist 1992; Gumbel and Tlinier 1994). This pushed Euro Disney's break-even parameters sharply higher, perhaps beyond its ability to deliver.

2) Paris winters are particularly uninviting. The nasty cold and rain between November and March depressed attendance far below expectations. Disney seems to have greatly underestimated the importance of warm weather on winter attendance (Laitamaki 1994; Solo- man 1994). Its Florida and Galifomia experiences were not discounted enough, especially in winter.

3) Unlike Americans, Europeans will not take their kids out of school to visit Euro Disney. Europeans take school very seriously. They are far less likely than Americans to pull their kids out of school for frivolous reasons like visiting a theme park (Laitamaki 1994). This further erodes Euro Disney attendance, especially during the long 10-month period when schools are in session.

4) Unlike Americans, European vacation habits run counter to short, expensive visits to Euro Disney. Euro- pean families strongly favor three- or four-week long va- cations in summer. Their family vacation budgets, which are more modest than in the United States, are carefully rationed to sustain these longer vacations. Eu- ropeans are far less likely to spend their whole budget on an expensive two- or three-day visit to Euro Disney, and then return home (King 1993; Soloman 1994). As a result, many families limit their Euro Disney visit to just one day, on the way to their final destinations.

104 Earl P. Spencer

5) The Magic Kingdom concept, successful in California and Tokyo, is not compelling enough for Europe. The existing facility (Magic Kingdom, appealing primarily to kids) is not compelling enough to entice Europeans to extend their stay beyond one or two days, especially with their long vacation mentality and budget con- straints (Toy 1994). The original plan for Euro Disney called for the delayed addition of a second "gate," the MGM movie theme park, with completion in 1996. Many analysts consider this addition critical for solving Ein-o Disney's length-of-stay problem (Wall Street Jour- nal 1993). Even with the $1.05 billion bailout, this at- traction is on hold, since funds are still insufficient to begin construction.

Solving Euro Disney's problems is not going to be easy, given the sheer size of its losses plus the powerful forces at work limiting attendance and length of stay. This challenge raises a number of important, long-term issues for Euro Disney, as discussed below.

There are many internal factors that can impact a company's performance. In Disney's case, there appears to be one over- riding fault that occurs time after time in its site selection planning—a failure to capitalize on all the key opportunities inherent in a project and to maximize their return. And the profits sacrificed by this one shortcoming alone are huge. Consider one example: Tokyo Disneyland. When a Japanese company first proposed this park to Disney, Disney opted for the security of royalty payments in lieu of the risks of owner- ship. In 1992, Tokyo Disneyland earned more than $200 mil- lion during the worst recession in modem Japanese history. (That same year, the entire Walt Disney Company earned only $299 million). If we extrapolate Tokyo Disneyland's 1992 earnings over the 11 years this park has been in exis- tence, Disney has probably sacrificed well over $2 billion in profits to date, from this one misstep alone.

Disney's failure to maximize its return from theme park oper- ations results from several management shortcomings, as dis- cussed below.

Disney management relies too heavily on Disney's appeal to carry a new project, often failing to identify or thoroughly evaluate the fundamental assumptions on which a project is based. (Relax, the Mouse will prevail). A prime example in Euro Disney's case is winter weather and its damaging effect on attendance. Although Disney recognized this problem, it failed to probe deep enough to fully comprehend the threat Paris winters posed. In a meeting of senior Disney execu- tives, one official expressed the concern, "I'm not sure Eiu-o- peans will stand in line in winter." One of Eisner's (Disney

DISNEY'S INTERNAL CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT

How Did Euro Disney GetOffn-ack?

Over-Reliance on the Disney Mystique

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 105

chairman) men replied, "the Japanese do" (Soloman 1994). No one raised the fact that the Japanese are not Europeans.

Paris is not Tokyo. Tokyo Disneyland has been open every winter and has attracted a viable number of visitors each year. Although the designs of Euro Disney and Tokyo Disneyland are quite similar, Paris-based Euro Disney could logically ex- pect far fewer visitors in winter than Tokyo Disneyland be- cause of differences between the two locations. In the following comparison, 1985 figin-es are used, since that is the year Disney conducted its site evaluation for Euro Disney.

• Tokyo had more than three times as many inhabitants as Paris (8.5 vs. 2.3 million).

• Tokyo's average per capita income was 43 percent greater than Paris's ($10,300 vs. $7,200).

• Tokyo Disneyland is only six miles from downtown Tokyo; Euro Disney is 20 miles outside Paris.

• The average Japanese family has no practical alternative to Tokyo Disneyland since the Disney park in California is distant and the expense is great. Europeans have much greater access to the closer, bigger, and more appealing Disney World in Florida, especially with the many tour packages offered by U.S. and European airlines.

Paris Winters Are Not Tokyo Winters. Perhaps the most dra- matic difference affecting winter attendance between Tokyo and Paris is the weather. The average number of rain days during the winter is three times greater in Paris than Tokyo, averaging 15 days per month for Paris and only 5 days a month for Tokyo. Temperature wise, both Paris and Tokyo av- erage a cold 34°F on the low side, while Tokyo's highs are an average 5 degrees wanner (52°F versus 47°F). Overall, Paris's combination of cold temperatures and frequent rainfall would seem to be anathema for winter attendance, especially for families with small children

What the above comparisons demonstrate is that attendance at Euro Disney in winter could be expected to be four to six times less than Tokyo Disneyland, that the viability of winter operations near Paris is suspect, and that Paris itself may not have been a wise choice for Euro Disney's location.

_ Another cultural impediment at Disney is management's Difficulty Recognizing/ much-publicized determination to never make the same mis- Anticipatmg Problems ^^^^ twice—an exercise that appears to satisfy their inquisi-

tive thirst. While previous deficiencies are tracked down with a vengeance and corrected, new problems are frequently overlooked or misjudged. As a result, surprises keep surfac- ing, leaving Disney always scrambling.

1 0 6 Earl P. Spencer

From U.S. to Tokyo to Paris to Virginia: New Problems, Old Story. A recent Newsweek article (Haas and Nayyar 1994) cited the following examples in praise of Disney's ability to learn from past mistakes. From Disneyland, Disney realized the importance of owning the land surrounding its parks. From Disney World, Disney learned it should build and own the hotels. From Tokyo Disneyland, it learned it should al- ways own the park itself. Finally, from Euro Disney, Disney learned that big parks involve big risks.

Just a few observations about Disney's pride in lesson learn- ing. Although learning from one's mistakes is admirable, not making them in the first place is far more preferable. The lessons mentioned above, although seemingly unique, are all related to the same basic subject: site locations for theme parks, an activity Disney has been engaged in for 40 years. So as one ponders Disney's record, a question that seems to nat- urally come to mind is: "Will Disney ever get it right?" Dis- ney's latest project, an American historical theme park planned for Virginia, is a good case in point. Disney appar- ently failed to learn any lessons about harmonizing with its host community in France, as Disney has recreated the same kind of animosity in Virginia, by demanding that the commu- nity put up $160 million, or Disney will go elsewhere. Dis- ney's tactics in Virginia have been so overbearing that even the New York Times in an editorial (24 February 1994) rec- ommended that the community turn Disney out.

Environmental Issues Raised in France, Ignored in Virginia. But that's not all. Once again, Disney appears to have been to- tally surprised by a controversy it failed to anticipate, this time from historians and conservationists over the potential dese- cration the park's sprawl might cause to the Givil War's most hallowed grounds nearby. Yet in France eight years earlier, farmers staged protests on the environmental impact of Euro Disney on the surrounding region. Will Disney ever get it right? (Editor's note: Disney recently bowed to the "hallowed grounds" pressure in Virginia and is searching for another site).

Disney's shortcomings in learning lessons from its own expe- riences are aggravated by its myopic perspective in the global arena. Two examples illustrate the point.

Accepted International Marketing Practices "Lost" on Dis- ney. In the late 1970s, exporting companies began to embrace the concept of market integration, adapting their products to the needs and customs of their overseas clients. Researchers were also expounding this movement, with breakthrough studies (Hofstede 1983; Lee 1983). By 1990, this movement was well in place and Disney stood to benefit from these groundbreaking precedents. Instead, Disney alienated most of France by imposing intact its American standards of dress.

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 107

EURO DISNEY'S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Could Changing Conditions in Europe Rescue Euro Disney?

behavior, and morality on the operations of its French-based park (Laitamaki 1994).

Euro Disney Denied the Synergy of Global Alliances. Another example of Disney's limited international perspective has to do with strategic alliances. In the 1980s, companies, even for- mer enemies, began capitalizing on the advantages of joining together. One might have expected Disney's theme park divi- sion to be a pioneer in alliance formation since they and their host communities are joined for life and have common inter- ests. This did not happen. Right up until Euro Disney's open- ing in mid 1992, Disney's overbearing attitude was alienating the French, and it is repeating that performance in Virginia today. If traditional rivals like Apple and IBM can find grounds for cooperation, why can't Disney cultivate a more positive relationship with the communities it hopes to share?

What the above examples suggest is that Disney's global per- spective is flawed. Disney needs to expand its horizons and take in the world. (What are other international companies doing? What can I leam?) Otherwise, as Euro Disney's results might be foretelling, Disney could see its prosperity decline, as it continues to miss opportunities and make mistakes.

Although Euro Disney's future looks questionable, one factor has the potential to invigorate attendance and length of stay and generally compensate for all of Eiuro Disney's shortcom- ings. That is its future external environment. If Europe's economies were to rebound vigorously. Euro Disney might recover. However, as we shall see in this section, the primary external factors determining Euro Disney's future are un- likely to provide much relief. What is worse, management's conviction that an economic turnaround will solve all of its problems is squandering valuable time.

Euro Disney's future will be shaped by many outside influ- ences over time. After weighing each factor's impact on our two primary concerns—visitor attendance and average length of stay—four trends and/or events were identified as having the greatest potential influence on Euro Disney's fu- ture over the next five years. These are:

1. European Real Disposable Income Per Capita 2. Vacation Patterns and Habits 3. Oil Prices 4. Cultiu-al Hostility

Again, the methodology used to select these four dominant variables was based on procedures outlined in the paper, "Strategic Issue Management" (Ansoff 1980).

108 Earl P. Spencer

Probably the most critical factor affecting the number of visi- tors to Euro Disney and their length of stay is the cost. How many families can afford the experience? As in the United States, European take-home pay adjusted for inflation has re- mained fairly constant for many years. European economies have been in a recession since the beginning of the decade. Even as Europe stirs from recession, its long-term competitive postiu-e remains suspect, since it has put off the painful process of reengineering and right-sizing that American businesses have been doing for some time. Finally, structural unemploy- ment caused by technological advances will keep many work- ers idle as previous jobs are lost for good. Even as the recovery takes place, the prospects for a noticeable increase in dispos- able income on a per capita basis do not look good.

Underlying Conditions in United States More Favorable than Europe. Other factors are likely to dampen any revival of per capita income in Europe. Government debt levels generally exceed the United States debt levels and need to be reduced through tax increases or spending cuts, both of which could hurt average income. Europeans already pay about half of their gross income on taxes. Job creation is also a problem. Since 1970, the United States has generated 41 million new jobs while Europe, with a population a third larger than the United States, has added only 8 million new jobs.

Because Euro Disney needs several million additional visi- tors just to break even, continuing stagnation or an actual erosion in average household purchasing power could deal a serious blow to Euro Disney's prospects for recovery.

As a family vacation resort. Euro Disney should have been vi- tally concerned with European vacation habits because of their direct correlation with attendance and length of stay ex- penditures. Yet once again, Disney seems to have misjudged an important variable.

European Vacations Longer, Budgets Lower, than in the United States. Unlike Americans, Europeans generally take long, four- or five-week vacations in simimer, when many companies shut down for several weeks. European vacation budgets, which are more modest than Americans', must stretch over these longer periods. Families that do stop at Euro Disney appear to do so only briefly on their way to their final destinations, which ad- versely affects Euro Disney's average length of stay. When visit- ing the park, Europeans also conserve their funds, as food and merchandise sales are well below the averages at other Disney facilities. Finally, with most Europeans taking their entire vaca- tion in summer, Euro Disney attendance at other times of the year seems to suffer, especially in winter.

Europeans More Conservative than Americans Concerning School Attendance. Parents are not as likely as Americans to

European Real Disposable Income per Capita: Mirroring the Overall U.S. Experience

Vacation Habits and Customs: U.S. and European Experiences Diverge

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 109

Oil Prices: Europe Even More Vulnerable than the

United States

take their children out of school for holiday trips, because at- titudes toward education are conservative and strict. Differ- ences in the educational systems, including testing schedules for promotion to the next grade level, also discovu"- age such interference. Finally, while Disney's parks in Florida and Galifomia offer warm respites from winter's wrath for Americans willing to pull their kids out of school. Euro Disney offers Europeans no such incentive.

Europeans Have an American Option. Europeans who do want a Disney vacation have another alternative—Disney World in Orlando, Florida. About 20 percent of all visitors to Disney World are Europeans. The attraction: much to do (three major parks instead of one), the sun and beaches of Florida, and the opportunity to see America.

Because of Europe's heavy dependence on imported oil (over 70 percent vs. 50 percent for the United States), fiuctuations in world oil prices could directly impact Euro Disney, first through the cost of transportation to and from the park and, most important, through families' discretionary income. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Gountries (OPEG) triggered the oil crises in 1973 and 1978, they resulted in the worst worldwide recessions since the 1930s. Any event with this kind of potential deserves to be taken seriously.

World demand for oil, fiat for the last four years, is expected to increase by 4 percent, or an additional 3 million barrels in 1994, due to economic growth in Southeast Asia, Ghina, In- dia, and the United States.

All these factors point to the strategic importance of OPEG. It has 77 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, or 800 billion barrels. By contrast, the North Sea has only 13 billion barrels. OPEG is the only producer capable of meeting increased world demand with its 2.5 million barrels per day in ready reserve.

So what could happen in the next five years? Prices will probably rise due to increases in world demand. If OPEG wants to force prices even higher, it can. The only restraint holding OPEG in check is one member country—Saudi Ara- bia. With their 11 billion barrels per day capacity, one third of OPEG's total, the Saudi's have a strong hand. The real question is how long can Saudi Arabia withstand the pres- sure from its 11 OPEG partners?

Bottom line, increases in oil prices would reduce Eiu-opeans' discretionary income and affect Euro Disney attendance and length of stay. More critically, any sudden, dramatic increase in prices, like those caused by OPEG in 1973 and 1978, could prove disastrous for Euro Disney on this front.

110 Earl P. Spencer

To be successful. Euro Disney must attract large numbers of French visitors year in and year out. The last thing Disney needs is conflict with its French hosts. Yet Exiro Disney oper- ates in an environment of potential cultural hostility. To any- one familiar with the U.S.-French relationship, the following statements will come as no siu-prise. The French, in general, harbor a modicum of hostility toward American culture. The present day extension of this phenomenon emanates from two expressions, as aptly described in a speech by France's Cultural Minister Lang who chastised "certain great nations, which have no other morality than that of profit, and seek to impose a uniform culture on the whole world." (Laitamaki 1994). Consistent with this theme. Euro Disney was fre- quently referred to in the French media as a "cultural Cher- nobyl" (King 1993).

Another potential source of hostility in France is the Disney Company itself, a film and media behemoth. The French elite particularly resent the American film industry, seeing it as the purveyor of American values that threaten two icons of French culture—its own movie industry and its language.

In short. Euro Disney, as a symbol of American influence, is vulnerable to French agitation. Even a modest ebb in atten- dance by aggrieved Parisians, not to mention the French in general, could have a devastating impact on Euro Disney's re- sults. Cultural hostility could still bring Euro Disney down.

Euro Disney has two primary shortcomings: attendance and visitor's average length of stay, which are both insufficient to meet the park's break-even requirements. The recent bailout by Disney and its partners will reduce Euro Disney's interest burden. However, it will have little impact on its operational difficulties with respect to attendance and length of stay.

Although management expects a turnaround in Europe's economies to solve all of its problems, there are reasons to believe that Europe's recovery may not rescue Euro Disney. Real income on a per capita basis is not expected to improve, and other external factors like vacation habits, oil prices, and cultural hostility all seem poised to exert a dampening effect on Euro Disney attendance.

Given all these factors, it appears that a turnaround at Euro Disney is doubtful. Something needs to be done to address its two fundamental operating problems: inadequate attendance and length of stay.

First and most important, Disney needs to take a large dose of reality and recognize the precarious situation it is facing. By investing over $1.0 billion in the bailout, the inclination might be to assume that the challenge has been met and the worst is

Cultural Hostility: French Resentment of American Encroachment

CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? I l l

over. This is not the case. The bailout funds bought time by re- tiring debt cind reducing interest payments. They did nothing to address Euro Disney's two fundamental shortcomings.

Next, Disney should decide whether Euro Disney, as presently constituted, is a viable concept. Does Euro Disney have the potential to increase attendance and average length of stay enough to exceed its break-even requirements? Will an eco- nomic recovery in Europe really solve Euro Disney's prob- lems? If the answers to these questions are no, Disney should quickly focus its attention on its remaining options, includ- ing the addition of a second gate—the MGM theme park.

A second theme park like MGM confronts Euro Disney's two biggest problems head on. It enhances the attraction of Euro Disney and hence, attendance, by adding a dimension appeal- ing to adiilts. This would make convention business more vi- able (with their multiple-day sessions) while giving families and other visitors a compelling reason to extend their stay. Without an attraction appealing to adults, and with its loca- tion 20 miles from, and in the shadow of Paris, it is unlikely Euro Disney will develop a meaningful convention business.

Of course, the overriding consideration with respect to the second attraction is, "Can it pay for itself? Will the increases in attendance and length of stay generate the $1 billion price tag for the new park? This will be a difficult call for Disney but if the answer is no, Disney might start contemplating the final solution—closing Eiu-o Disney down.

And it just might happen that pondering the close of Euro Disney might make the risks of a second theme park more palatable. Euro Disney's closing would be an obvious blow to Disney's pride and reputation, and it would seriously affect Disney's ability to raise financing for future parks. Finally, closing could prove to be an extremely expensive option since Disney, as the operator of the park, might be liable for its partners' losses under French bankruptcy laws.

In summary, if Euro Disney does not find a solution to its pri- mary operating problems of attendance and length of stay, it will be subject to deficits year in and year out. Given the size of its losses, only a major effort, like the addition of a second attraction, would seem practical. Otherwise, Etiro Disney as a profitable enterprise appears doomed.

s^^^^^=!==^==^== Companies weighing entry into foreign markets can benefit MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS from Euro Disney's experiences, as discussed below.

1) When considering a new market, preliminary re- search should be directed toward those market condi- tions that represent the greatest risk/ threat to success, and research results should be interpreted objectively.

1 1 2 Earl P Spencer

Euro Disney conducted numerous studies but in the end, they were still caught off guard by basic leisure market operatives like vacation and spending habits, school attendance, and the weather. 2) The more successful a company, the greater the need to ensure objectivity in overseas evaluations. Success can breed a false sense of security, especially when a whole new operating environment can radically change the game, as Disney unfortunately discovered. 3) Euro Disney "assumed" success without prudent fi- nancial regards for the risks of debuting in uncharted territory. An excessive number of hotels were built be- fore Etiro Disney was up and running, even though ho- tels in nearby Paris could adequately service this need. When the park's appeal proved lacking. Euro Disney was faced with an additional liability besides inade- quate attendance—hotel vacancies. Furthermore, the funds needed to provide a solution, a second theme park, were tied up in the hotels. Glearly, a more conser- vative approach was desirable, like limiting hotel devel- opment, until the park proved successful.

4) In Disney's haste to recoup its investment, it almost completely ignored the customer and the marketplace, with disastrous results. Entrance fees were set 20 percent higher than in the United States, even though conditions in Europe—lower disposable income, an acute recession, and conservative vacation and spending habits—all sug- gested an alternative approach. As always, the customer should be the first priority, and the final checkpoint. 5) Euro Disney's high prices and resulting poor start cre- ated a public relations nightmare, as media critics throughout Europe gleefully heaped ridicule on the park's sagging fortunes. Future bookings began to erode amid speculation that the park might close. Disney seemed to make decisions without considering their ef- fect in its new surroundings (unfavorable media cli- mate). Under these circumstances, Disney might have invested more to guarantee a successful launch, includ- ing lower prices. A good start and environmental hedges can be crucial when operating in uncharted territory. 6) When all is said and done, there is no substitute for common sense, especially when it comes to the con- sumer. Euro Disney was so surprised by poor attendance in winter that it had to unexpectedly close several ho- tels. Gouldn't Disney recognize the possibility that fam- ilies with small children might not fiock to a theme park in winter, to spend several days in the rain and temper- atures in the 30s?

7) With all the attention afforded the ideology of "Glob- alization" today, international marketers are more likely

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 1 1 3

THE AUTHOR

Earl P. Spencer is a doctoral can- didate in marketing and interna-

tional business at Pace University, New York Gity campus.

to focus on the similarities in consumer attitudes in var- ious markets, versus their differences. Euro Disney should serve as a reminder that underestimating con- sumer differences, such as spending habits, can prove embarrassing. And if Disney, a household word throughout the world, is xmable to ignore cultural influ- ences in the international marketplace, surely less pres- tigious enterprises should take note.

REFERENCES Ansoff, H.I. "Strategic Issue Management." Strategic Management

Journal [1980): 131-48.

Gumbel, Peter, and R. Turner. "Mouse Trap: Fans Like Euro Disney But Its Parent's Goofs Weigh the Park Down." Wall Street Journai, 10 March 1994, Al.

Hass, Nancy, and S. Nayyar. "Learning Its Lessons Well." Newsweek, 14 February 1994, 37.

Hofstede, G. "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories." Journal of International Business Studies (Fall 1993): 75-89.

King, Thomas R. "Euro Disney 3rd Quarter Loss To Spur Study of Woes By U.S. Concern." Wall Street Journal, 9 July 1993, A3.

Laitamaki, Jukka M. "Is It Mickey Mouse or Senior Mickey? A Cross- Cultural Case Study of Disney Theme Park Business Plan in Latin- America." New York: Fordham University-Lincoln Center, 1994.

Lee, James A. "Cultural Analysis In Overseas Operations." Reprinted in "Managing Effectively in the World Marketplace." Harvard Business Review (1983): 54-68.

New York Times. "Virginia, Say No to the Mouse." Editorial, 24 February 1994, A22.

Soloman, Jolie. "Mickey's Trip To Trouble." Newsweek, 14 Febru- ary 1994,34-38.

The Economist. "The Not So Magic Kingdom." 26 September 1992, 87.

Toy, Stewart, and P. Dwyer. "Is Disney Headed For The Euro Trash Heap?" Business Week, 24 January 1994, 52.

Wall Street Journal. "Euro Disney to Slash 950 Jobs To Cut Costs." 19 October 1993, A12.

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