Colombia: What factors explain peace between the rebels and government, and what factors will lead to its success or failure?

Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: have Santos and FARC learnt the lessons from the past?

ANDREI GOMEZ-SUAREZ & JONATHAN NEWMAN

ABSTRACT This article discusses the lessons of previous peace processes between the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It has two policy implications. In regard to Colombia it sug- gests that safeguarding the lives of demobilised FARC members is necessary for the current peace process to succeed, hence it proposes a hybrid Specialised Protection Force (SPF). In terms of peace building the article discusses the challenges for SPFs to avoid becoming tools of foreign policy diplomacy that perpetuate conflicts. The article aims to contribute to both the critique of liberal peace and of the negotiating teams in the current Colombian peace process.

On 4 September 2012 Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos delivered a public speech announcing an agreement to start formal negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Ten years after the failure of the Pastrana–FARC peace talks, Santos had opted for a negotiated solution to end the armed conflict with FARC. Although Santos’s decision took many people by surprise, in fact members of FARC and the Santos administration had been patiently exploring the possibility of holding peace talks only a few days after Santos was inaugurated in the presidential office in August 2010. The willing- ness of both sides to negotiate was visible by the fact that FARC had decided to continue with the preliminary talks, even though its chief-in-command, Alfonso Cano, had been killed on 4 November 2011 when the talks were already taking place.1 Santos announced that the peace talks were to start in Oslo in mid-Octo- ber and that later they would move to Havana. By then academics were sug- gesting that ‘a peacemaking policy must rely on the lessons left by previous

Andrei Gomez-Suarez is at the Sussex Centre for Conflict and Security Research, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ, UK. Email: [email protected]. Jonathan Newman is in the Department of Anthropology, University of Sussex. Email: [email protected].

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peace processes’.2 Santos’s speech started by addressing such a concern; he stated that the first principle for his administration to start the peace talks ‘was to have learnt from past mistakes’.3 Once the peace agreement and the negotia- tion strategy were unveiled, scholars agreed that the following lessons had been learnt regarding the need 1) for the parties to hold preliminary meetings before the main peace talks; 2) for the parties to explore areas of key concessions secluded from the media and the public; 3) to locate the talks in a place that did not generate additional tensions; 4) to state clear objectives for the talks; and 5) to start with the land issue, which is a theme central to the conflict. Hence these scholars considered that the Santos–FARC peace talks held a realistic promise of bringing the armed conflict to an end.4

Nevertheless, the speech delivered by the FARC negotiator, Ivan Marquez, at the inauguration of the peace talks, on 17 October 2012 in Oslo, brought to the fore scepticism among observers and analysts. For example, according to secu- rity analyst Alfredo Rangel, Marquez’s confrontational position demonstrated that the peace talks were going to be difficult and that people should be warned against an excess of optimism.5 The general commentary was that FARC had not moved away from its hard-line approach and was only seeking to take advantage of the peace talks in order to regroup and escalate the armed struggle. In this context a group of scholars held a conference in London, on 26 October 2012, to assess the Santos–FARC peace talks. They confirmed that lessons had been learnt by the parties, including limiting time and scope of the peace talks and the inclu- sion of key sectors of the Colombian establishment. Moreover, they identified that, although the Santos administration was aware of the need to provide effec- tive guarantees to demobilised FARC members, serious challenges still remained, such as the actual ability of the Santos administration to offer the necessary pro- tection to such demobilised members, the continuation of the conflict during the peace talks, and whether the Santos government had the necessary political leverage to ensure the support of regional elites for the peace process.6

At the meeting there was general agreement that the difference between the current and the previous peace talks was that the Santos–FARC talks were taking place in the context of structural reform and were restricted to the five points agreed in the agenda, namely agrarian development, political participation, end of the conflict, drug trafficking and victims’ rights. However, other analysts narrowed the lessons learnt to the failure of the Pastrana–FARC peace talks (1999–2002) which, according to them, was caused by FARC’s use of the 42 000 km2 demilitarised zone (DMZ) ‘as a command and control centre for operations elsewhere in Colombia and for stationing thousands of troops, as well as for industrial-scale coca production and as a holding point for kidnapping victims’.7

We use the term ‘Caguán script’ to describe this simplified narrative, which over-emphasises the deceitful nature of FARC taking military and criminal advan- tage.8 The DMZ is at the core of the Caguán script not only because of how it was used but also because it is linked to the demoralisation of the Colombian Army and the fear of Colombia being labelled a failed state. Where such a fear is concerned, policy makers believe that one of the lessons learnt is that the peace talks must take place outside Colombia. Moreover, by constantly referring to the Caguán script, some intellectuals of statecraft are effectively putting

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forward a blinkered analysis of the previous 30 years of peace processes in Colombia and a position that is incompatible with negotiated solutions with FARC.9 Yet a historical analysis shows that the most important lessons to learn date back to 1984. This article reveals why understanding the Betancur–FARC peace talks

(1984–86) is crucial to ensuring the success of the Santos–FARC peace talks. It argues that today, as in the 1980s, safeguarding political guarantees for demobi- lised FARC members is the most serious challenge that the Santos administration faces if an agreement is reached during the negotiation phase. These guarantees, which are not limited to political participation and the creation of mechanisms for democratic participation, are a central issue, not only to the success of the peace talks, but for the whole of Colombian society. The genocide of the Unión Patriótica (UP) shows that, once violence targets demobilised combatants, it spreads to social networks associated with the political projects these combat- ants are involved in.10

In order to ensure political guarantees and avoid the proliferation of violence during the implementation of a final agreement with FARC, the article critically assesses the viability of a sui generis Peace Support Operation (PSO). Although PSOs have generally been associated with the military’s peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, nowadays they are used to refer to those other ‘peace- related operations which include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuild- ing and humanitarian assistance’.11 Regardless of whether the military plays a marginal or a central role in an international intervention in a conflict-torn region, International Relations scholars are sharply divided between those who see any military Western involvement in a conflict as part of US imperialism,12

and those who believe PSOs are necessary to end the suffering of those living in conflict-torn regions.13

This article takes a different path in this debate. By looking at the current Colombian peace negotiations, it considers whether a hybrid PSO, which centres on building up the capacity of a Special Protection Force (SPF), comprised of demobilised FARC members and Colombian Armed Forces, could help to protect the success of the Santos–FARC peace talks. Furthermore, the article addresses the difficulties such an SPF would face in order, for example, to avoid becoming a tool for the exclusive fulfilment of US foreign policy interests. The article has two important policy implications. First, it proposes a different

engagement of the international community with Colombia. Such an engage- ment should go beyond US military and unilateral involvement, which allowed the covert partnership between the USA and the Colombian armies in counterin- surgency and counter-narcotic operations during the global war on terror, a part- nership which was most of the time unaccountable.14 Instead, recognising that the Santos administration must guarantee the political participation of demobi- lised FARC leaders for the peace process to succeed, the international community should consider supporting an SPF. The second implication relates more broadly to the study of international peace-building operations and considers how a hybrid SPF could merge hard and soft power mechanisms and should aim to advance the Security Sector Reform (SSR) needed in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

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The article is structured in four parts. First, it discusses how political guarantees might be understood within the framework of the Santos–FARC peace talks. Second, it looks back at the lack of political guarantees for FARC-associ- ated members between 1984 and 1987 and assesses its impact in balancing the political and military components of FARC thereafter. The third part focuses on the Santos–FARC peace talks and shows that, although lessons have been learnt, the polarisation of Colombian society is likely to generate serious challenges for the protection of demobilised FARC leaders. The final part critically appraises the creation of an SPF to safeguard the lives of demobilised FARC members willing to participate in politics.

Political guarantees

The lack of political guarantees for the opposition to participate in Colombian politics has been one of the main arguments for guerrilla groups to legitimate their existence throughout history. FARC itself is the product of the lack of security for demobilised liberal guerrilla fighters in the 1950s.15 Likewise the radicalisation of FARC is the product of the lack of protection for political leaders associated with its political project in the 1980s.16 Therefore it is not surprising that political guarantees are the second point in the Santos–FARC peace talks. According to the agenda set out in the General Agreement for Ending the Con- flict and Constructing a Stable and Long-lasting Peace signed on 26 August 2012 in Havana (hereafter the Havana Agreement), the discussion on political participation must focus on: 1) the right to and guarantees for exercising politi- cal opposition, in particular for those movements created after a final agreement is reached; 2) the design of democratic mechanisms for popular participation; and 3) the consolidation of measures to enable vulnerable sectors of society to participate in local, regional and national policy making. The discussion about the openness and efficacy of the Colombian political

system is not restricted to the Santos–FARC peace talks. It has always been part of serious disagreements among scholars and practitioners. In the past 20 years the core of the disagreement has been the 1991 National Assembly, which promulgated a new Colombian constitution. According to those who could be considered as the founding fathers of the 1991 constitution, the problem is not that of issuing a new constitution to democratise the political system but the lack of political willingness to implement the 1991 constitution.17 Others, how- ever, suggest that the political system gained in representation but that political transaction costs have increased, thereby having a negative impact, in particular on fiscal policy.18 FARC’s argument is that a new National Assembly is needed to legitimate the final agreement, which in their view will entail democratic transformations such as bringing about autonomy (self-government and self- determination) for peasant territories, through the promulgation of a new constitution.19 The idea of a new constitutional assembly is supported within democratic sectors, for example by Conservative politician Alvaro Leyva and even by right-wing politicians, such as the staunch opponent of FARC, former president Alvaro Uribe, but opposed by defenders of the 1991 constitution, including the Santos administration.20

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If the idea of a new constitution is rejected on the basis that the 1991 constitution created the mechanisms to ensure an open and pluralist political system, then comparing the Havana Agreement’s point regarding political participation with FARC’s demands in the 1980s would suggest that FARC is still trapped in old political grievances. However, two elements should be taken into consideration before making such a claim. First, as Erika Moreno rightly points out, ‘the reforms that were so successful in creating new parties and political movements also opened the door to legalise party factions and potentially reward traditional politicians’.21 As a result, it can still be seen today that the majority of the most influential actors in the national political arena belong to or have inherited their political capital from the Liberal and Conservative Par- ties. Second, and perhaps more dramatically, the creation of new leftist political parties has been opposed with violent force and this violence has spread to democratic forms of political representation such as social movements, in partic- ular those which are generally associated with FARC. Although analysts consider that the 1991 constitution is quite progressive in

terms of political rights and democratic mechanisms, even at a worldwide level,22 the problem has been that social movements have had to fight hard to translate these mechanisms and rights into practice. The proliferation of paramil- itary groups in the 1990s targeted social movements associated with FARC and other guerrilla groups and made the materialisation of the political rights pro- moted by the 1991 constitution almost impossible. Such a proliferation, together with the stigmatisation of social movements as supporters of terrorist organisa- tions by the Uribe administrations (2002–10) hampered the full implementation of the mechanisms for direct participation in policy making and the consolidation of democratic popular representation. However, as democratic mechanisms and rights formally started to exist from

the early 1980s onwards, social movements have been patiently transforming local practices and regaining political strength, despite constant victimisation and threats against community leaders. The resurrection of the political influence of 1980s social movements has continued to be visible since the turn of the millen- nium. The experience of the Frente Social y Político and the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) enabled the left to elect the Mayor of Bogota three times, as well as winning many other important public positions across the country. Today, and perhaps more importantly for the Santos–FARC peace talks, social movements from conflict-torn regions and marginal sectors of society have come together under Marcha Patriótica, a socio-political platform that demonstrates how local actors have found ways to fight for political participation by resorting to the transformations implemented in the 1991 constitution. Nevertheless, the neo-paramilitary groups that have been regrouping after the

demobilisation of the paramilitary umbrella organisation Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in 2006 continue to threaten social movements.23 Moreover, PDA Congressman Ivan Cepeda recently claimed that an alliance of politicians and paramilitaries was plotting to kill him.24 The constant threat against social movements and leftist political leaders has been the most serious obstacle to translating the formal democracy created in the 1991 constitution into a real democratic society in which diversity is accepted and respected. Therefore

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political guarantees in today’s agenda are not so much about creating new democratic mechanisms of popular participation; rather, we argue, what is at stake is FARC leaders’ scepticism about whether or not the Colombian govern- ment is capable of protecting the lives of those who are willing to participate in politics. To understand the recent historic roots of FARC’s scepticism, the next part revisits the lack of political guarantees during the 1980s peace processes.

Lack of political guarantees, the onset of the UP genocide and its aftermath

After 20 years of FARC’s armed struggle President Belisario Betancur (1982–86) decided to start negotiations with guerrilla groups. FARC took Bentacur’s offer on board and, after meeting members of the Betancur administration, the Uribe Accord was signed in 1984.25 As part of the accord the decision was taken to create the Unión Patriótica (UP), a political party that would enable FARC to tran- sit from war to peace.26 The Colombian government recognised the legality of the party and agreed to offer protection and carry out structural transformations to ensure the equal participation of the UP in Colombian politics. The political reforms resulted in the introduction of the democratic election of mayors in 1988. Although the UP was launched by FARC in May 1985, many of the people who joined it were not FARC members or communists.27 The hope of bringing to an end the armed conflict and of finally bringing about the opening up of a closed political system made the UP gain momentum in a process of democrati- sation. Unfortunately, as Carroll demonstrates, this ended up being a ‘violent democratisation’.28

The violence against social movements started before the launch of the UP. Most scholars agree that the 1977 National Strike was the turning point for the violent repression of social movements.29 Therefore it is not possible to estab- lish a particular incident as the starting point of the violence against the UP. The documentation of the early violence against it is even more difficult because the Uribe Accord did not set up a clear mechanism for monitoring the political par- ticipation of disarmed FARC members, nor did it envisage an impartial verifica- tion commission to scrutinise the security mechanisms put in place to protect the lives of those disarmed members.30 As a result, FARC members were in charge of their own security, at the same time that some UP members received protection from the state. Regrettably, as the 1992 report of Colombia’s Ombudsman, Jaime Córdoba Triviño, demonstrated, some of the very officers protecting UP members were implicated in assassinations and the circulation of death threats against them.31

The perpetrators legitimated the violence against UP members by arguing that they were fighting FARC’s armed political strategy. Assertions, such as that made by Gen (ret) Fernando Landazábal, that in Colombia ‘the guerrillas are legalised because the Betancur and Barco administrations recognised them as the Com- munist Party–UP’s armed branch’ contributed to the targeting of non-FARC UP members.32 The blurred combatant/non-combatant dichotomy that allowed the free circulation of disarmed FARC members to campaign for the UP was the prod- uct of an improvised and rushed negotiation between the parties to sign off a truce rather than, as Dudley contends, a symptom of the cunning nature of FARC

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(and its political leader at the time, Jacobo Arenas).33 Such a hurried negotiation omitted setting up clear rules for disarmed FARC members of UP to move back and forth from guerrilla headquarters in the Colombian Andes to the political arena in cities and the countryside. As a result, there was no verification mecha- nism to document how many disarmed FARC members participated in the UP across the country during the truce. For this reason the number of disarmed FARC members killed during the truce

can only be speculated about and must be estimated from newspaper sources and interviews with FARC leaders at the time. According to Jacobo Arenas, for example, about 200 disarmed FARC members were killed while campaigning for the UP.34 Whether the numbers are correct or not, the fact is that by 1987 dis- armed FARC members of UP had left the UP and public offices to rearm; they claimed that they did so to protect their lives. By then two UP congressman and at least a dozen mayors and municipal officers had already been assassinated, in what has increasingly been recognised as a case of political genocide.35

Violations to the truce by FARC, such as the siege of Mutatá (Northeastern Antioquia) on 27 January 1987, helped to reinforce the narrative put forward by army officers and right-wing political elites that FARC were carrying out a procelitismo armado, that is, armed political campaigning.36 Thanks to this script, the assassinations and death threats against UP members were legitimated by broad sectors of Colombian society.37 The lack of action to protect the lives of disarmed FARC members of UP made the targeting of non-FARC UP members possible. This allowed the consolidation of perverse alliances between illegal and legal actors seeking to protect political and economic gains and maintain the status quo.38 The targeting of the UP convinced FARC that political repression against social movements translated as the conditions for FARC to reignite the final stage of the armed strategy to take control of the state, a strategy formu- lated in 1982 at the seventh FARC conference before the Betancur–FARC peace talks. By 1993, six years after FARC had left the up, more than 2000 UP members

had been assassinated and new plans were unfolding to wipe out the up from Urabá, one of the last UP strongholds.39 In this context, and thanks to the mili- tary build-up of the previous 10 years, FARC decided in its eighth conference to regroup its fronts into seven blocs under the command of a member of the Sec- retariat. The threefold aim was to become a regular army, control territories and lay siege to main cities.40 The 1999–2002 Pastrana–FARC peace talks were framed in this logic. The peace process was doomed to fail from the very beginning, not only

because of the strategic military advantages that could be gained, but also because FARC did not trust President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) to be able to offer guarantees for the exercise of political opposition. FARC’s mistrust was fed by the proliferation of paramilitary groups under the AUC.41 In 2000 FARC made clear to the Colombian public their suspicion that the Pastrana administration was incapable of offering personal safety and security to its members. They cre- ated a political party and a social movement which were under the direction of FARC’s Secretariat and relied on secret membership to protect the lives of its members. The Partido Comunista Clandestino and the Movimiento Bolivariano

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por la Nueva Colombia remain the bases for the large social network of supporters that FARC has been seeking to build during the past 15 years. In short, the transformation of political structures in the 1980s was met by an

outrageous spiral of violence. At the beginning, disarmed FARC members of the UP were targeted but later the victimisation spread to other parts of the UP politi- cal platform and beyond. Carroll demonstrates that the violent democratisation was also directed at what was broadly identified by the perpetrators as ‘the Left’.42 The lack of security for disarmed FARC members radicalised FARC and created the mistrust that has dominated its military strategy ever since. In this sense, FARC’s Secretariat claims that the democratic mechanisms of the 1991 constitution do not guarantee the exercise of political opposition in Colombia. Therefore, although FARC sees political guarantees as intertwined with the struc- tural transformation of the Colombian political system, its central concern is in fact a universal human right: the right to life, liberty and security of person.43

The next section of the article discusses the context in which the current peace talks are taking place and the reasons that reinforce FARC’s concern for the future safety of its members.

The Santos–FARC peace talks: lessons learnt in a polarised society

Following recent analysis,44 we argue that the pillar of the current peace talks is what the Santos administration regards as a triangle of lessons learnt from previous peace processes. First, the talks have to take place outside Colombia. Second, a ceasefire will only occur during the implementation of the final agree- ment. Third, the negotiations have to be restricted to the five-point agenda agreed on 26 August 2012. This triangle is essential for Santos’s negotiation strategy because it counterbalances the Caguán script, which links negotiation in Colombia with demoralisation of the troops, the military build-up of FARC and the manipulation of the negotiation agenda. Even though FARC agreed to Santos’s demands, it has been pushing, from the beginning of negotiations, for a bilateral ceasefire and has sought to broaden the agenda. However, because the Caguán script hangs heavily over different sectors of Colombian society, both parties in Havana have been held within this conflict-agenda triangle. Keeping the negotiations within such a triangle is not necessarily a bad thing, not only because it maintains the focus of the negotiations, hence avoiding the further polarisation of Colombian society, but also because it has helped to rein- force the legitimacy of the talks by widening what Wagner-Pacifici calls the ‘system of cross-witnessing’.45 By inviting Chile and Venezuela as facilitators and Cuba and Norway as guarantors, Santos and FARC expanded the system of cross-witnessing, thereby managing 1) to convey to the Colombian public that the teams are honouring the Havana Agreement; and 2) to contain the amount of mistrust that usually spreads rapidly among collective witnesses once peace talks start. Thus the expansion of the system of cross-witnessing, which has resulted from the conflict-agenda triangle, explains why there is a large support for the talks within the Colombian and international communities. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the talks remains weak in Colombia. For they

are taking place in the context of a polarised society in the middle of an armed

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conflict. The lack of a ceasefire consolidates the polarisation of society and leaves the door open for the escalation of the conflict.46 This is not to say that a rushed ceasefire would reduce polarisation of social relations in Colombia for, as the previous section suggests, history shows that the poorly designed truce in the 1980s opened a window of opportunity for illegal and legal actors to con- solidate a network of spoilers to the peace talks and by doing so further polar- ised Colombian society. The challenges surrounding the possibility of a ceasefire highlight the impor-

tance of looking at the proposals made by different analysts. There are different stands on this issue. Analysts such as Leon Valencia recommend a bilateral ceasefire in order to avoid undermining agreements reached at the negotiating table.47 Critics of this position, such as Alfredo Rangel and General (ret) Harold Bedoya, rely on the Caguán script, thus simplifying the complexity and chal- lenges of a bilateral truce as a straightforward path for FARC’s military build- up.48 Therefore alternative forms of ceasefire have been proposed. Juan Carlos Garzón, for example, suggests the implementation of a ‘selective and dissuasive truce’, in which the military engages and pursues FARC fronts carrying out hos- tile attacks but abstains from a military offensive in regions in which FARC ceases military harassment.49 Alvaro Leyva meanwhile proposes a controlled bilateral ceasefire overlooked by an International Verification Commission, a proposal the FARC negotiating team welcomes.50

Nevertheless, the Santos administration has so far stated that the ceasefire will only be discussed once an agreement has been reached on the five points of the agenda. This shows that Santos is aware that a rushed ceasefire would weaken the peace talks. Within the negotiating table, an improvised ceasefire will have a negative impact on both the affective and instrumental satisfaction that the recent rounds have achieved. Negotiators’ satisfaction, according to Shapiro, is related to how they ‘feel about their feelings’ and ‘the extent to which the parties manage to work efficiently and effectively to agree on substantive commitments to which they aspire’.51 Outside the negotiations a spasmodic ceasefire would reinforce the polarisation of Colombian society, in particular allowing the critics of the peace talks to continue using the Caguán script to create the hyper-real sense that Colombia is falling into mayhem. Although the negotiation strategy seems to be working, thereby producing

affective and instrumental satisfaction, the sense of a hyper-real mayhem spread- ing across Colombia has been circulated by different sectors. Let us look into these two issues. The decision to have 30 people in each negotiating team, but only five members per team sitting at the same time at the negotiating table, is one of the keys to the positive developments in the round of discussions that ended on 1 March 2013 in Havana. Following Fisher and Ury,52 it could be argued that the Santos–FARC peace talks’ negotiation scheme has helped the par- ties to realise that different interests regarding the agrarian issue can be recon- ciled if they re-evaluate their positions. This, without doubt, is a significant step forward over a thorny issue for Colombian society. For this reason, perhaps, both President Santos and FARC’s chief of command, Timoleon Jimenez, have publicly declared that the positive disposition of the negotiating teams suggest that substantive commitments could be reached.53

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The foregoing shows that FARC is increasingly recognised as a political actor with whom it is possible to negotiate a way forward for the transformation of social-economic relations in Colombia’s countryside. However, the problem of the recognition of FARC as a political actor is that such recognition is tied to the military actions carried out by FARC during the peace talks. Although it seems naive to expect FARC to step down its military campaign while the Santos administration maintains an offensive strategy against it (which has resulted in the killing of the senior commander of the Fifth Front),54 national media, politi- cians and some sectors of civil society seem to consider any FARC military action as a demonstration of its criminal character and as evidence of the may- hem spreading across Colombia.55 This is not new in the history of Colombian peace processes. However, in the current peace talks the fluctuation of opinions, considering FARC sometimes as a political actor and at other times as a criminal gang, has been transferred for the first time to the Colombian government nego- tiating team in Havana.56 Such a fluctuation not only shows the pressures that negotiating members and the Santos administration are experiencing from critics of the peace talks, but also the difficulty that Colombian society will face when trying to accommodate demobilised FARC members within the social fabric of a polarised nation. In the middle of the armed conflict it is difficult to maintain recognition of

FARC as a political actor; thus FARC’s criminal character is used by right-wing elites to fuel the polarisation of Colombian society and is connected to the issue of security for demobilised FARC members. This reinforces what we have argued above, that is, if the parties are getting closer on the agrarian issue, the more serious challenge for the peace talks is not to reach an agreement on the other four points of the agenda, political participation included, but actually to create the mechanisms to ensure the protection of high-profile FARC figures during and in the aftermath of the demobilisation and disarmament processes; such mecha- nisms should remain in place as an integral part of the reintegration schemes. Before turning to suggest a possible mechanism for safeguarding the lives of demobilised FARC members, it is important to outline the contribution of right- wing elites to the polarised conjuncture within which the Santos–FARC peace talks are taking place. An important, but not exclusive, reason that makes the protection of the lives

of disarmed FARC members a serious challenge is that Colombian society continues to be polarised by right-wing sectors, most of whom are associated with ex-president Alvaro Uribe. Today journalists such as Claudia Gurisatti, economic elites represented by national figures such as José Felix Lafaurie, and politicians such as Conservative Party congressman José Dario Salazar seem to be following a script similar to that of the 1980s right-wing sectors, re-empha- sising the scripting of FARC as a criminal gang without a political agenda. The lack of recognition of FARC’s political character among large sectors of Colom- bian society translates into a hostile environment in which it is almost impossi- ble to guarantee the exercise of political opposition without the threat of being killed, if there is a perception that such political participation is associated with FARC. This, together with the continued proliferation of paramilitary violence, usually underplayed by scripting it as part of organised crime, is likely to

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produce (just as in the 1980s) perverse regional coalitions bringing together legal and illegal actors that engage in violent tactics.57 Thus ‘indiscriminate vio- lence’, coming from anywhere and anyone, would probably mushroom across the country (as it has before), almost certainly destroying agreements to end the armed conflict with FARC. Such a possibility has started to be publicly denounced by NGOs. For example, on 29 January 2013, the director of the Jus- tice and Peace Inter-Ecclesiastic Commission, Jesús Alberto Franco, said that Alvaro Uribe, Jose Obdulio Gaviria and Fernando Londoño were damaging the land restitution process. He claimed that, because of their comments, criminal actors, the armed forces and the police have put at risk such processes in vari- ous regions of Colombia, in particular in Bajo Atrato (Antioquia).58

Despite denunciations made by Jesús Alberto Franco, violence against social and political leaders supporting the Santos–FARC peace talks, or associated with implementing the structural reforms upon which the resolution of the agrarian issue rests, have been silently spreading in Colombia. According to the Platform for Peace and Human Rights in Colombia, Franco survived an assassination attempt on 13 February 2013, Yolanda Becerra and Gloria Amparo Suárez, members of the Organización Femenina Popular, have received death threats and, in the first two months of 2013, social activists Alba Mery Chilito, Elizabeth Guitérrez, Juan Carlos Pérez and Jon Fayber Díaz were assassinated. The killings of non-combatants who share similar ideas on the agrarian issue to FARC demonstrates that one of the greatest challenges faced by the Santos–FARC peace talks is to create a mechanism to safeguard the lives of those unarmed civilians involved in the implementation of the final agreement. The final part of this article turns to discuss such mechanisms.

Safeguarding political guarantees: would a hybrid Special Protection Force help?

As the security of non-armed social and political activists remains a critical issue for the Colombian peace process, effective security policies need to go beyond the simplistic assumption that, under a peace agreement, those groups previously targeted by violence will automatically have sufficient protection. What options are there to provide protection? First, the security forces of the Colombian state could continue in their legal

role to provide security to all citizens. However, it has been shown that the mil- itary and police do not have the capability to protect human rights defenders, much less the capacity to safeguard demobilised FARC members. It would be remiss, however, to disregard the important reforms that have been taking place within the security sector in Colombia.59 The modernisation undertaken in the past 10 years, mainly regarding operations and accountability of the Colombian Army, is a significant transformation. Nevertheless, in order to overcome a his- tory of collaboration in the assassination of former FARC members and leftist political activists, a more radical security sector reform (SSR) would need to take place. Yet to push for such reform in the middle of post-conflict reconstruction pro-

cesses is unrealistic. The dominant military mindset, which has been part of the

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past two centuries of national history, would not accept such a transformation. Such a reform would probably side those sectors of the security forces hesitant about supporting the Santos–FARC peace talks with inside and outside spoilers. Following Stedman,60 one could expect SSR policies to solidify grievances against the eventual peace agreement within various sectors of the security forces; these inside spoilers would then be more likely to carry out covert oper- ations to obstruct the implementation of the agreement. Equally dangerously, one could anticipate SSRs pushing critics of the eventual

peace agreement within the security forces to forge alliances with outside spoil- ers who were not part of the negotiations, in particular with the so-called BACRIMs (militarised criminal gangs), thereby creating a window of opportunity for the proliferation of overt attacks against sectors associated with the peace talks and the implementation of the final agreement. To avoid such a scenario, policy makers do not need to drop SSRs altogether; rather, SSRs should be a con- tinual process towards better practice in line with international human rights leg- islation. The suggestion here is that reforms should be implemented incrementally in order to avoid a violent backlash from within the security forces. Second, FARC could provide its own security forces to protect its members.

However, such an approach is unthinkable, because maintaining a quasi-autono- mous force would in effect undermine the process of disarmament and demobi- lisation. Moreover, such a force would be unacceptable to most of the Colombian state security forces, thus resulting in the strong possibility of a movement from within the Colombian state to violently disrupt the peace pro- cess. Additionally, much of Colombian society would find this form of security objectionable. Third, the United Nations could provide a peacekeeping force to assist in the

reintegration of demobilised FARC members. However, it is highly unlikely that the Colombian government would wish to pursue such an option, since previous Colombian administrations have invested heavily in transforming Colombia into what they consider to be a resilient state able to address its problems indepen- dently. Moreover, recent statements by the Director of the UN Development Programme in Colombia show that it is supportive of a local solution between the parties.61 Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider how an international sup- port operation might contribute to the provision of security. For example, in the case of Burundi, where the conflict was situated in a

polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi groups, it was agreed that

A new special protection force [SPF] under Burundian command would be formed, given that no UN peacekeeping operation force would be deployed as long as there was no cease-fire. This special force…would consist of equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi soldiers and policemen. Its task would be to protect the transitional institutions and, in particular, the Hutu politicians returning to Burundi from exile to take up posts in the government or in par- liament. The special force would be trained by a planned international peace keeping force from Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.62

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Unfortunately, this effort failed because, even six months after the transitional government had taken office in November 2001, the SPF was not in place. By 2003 only South Africa had deployed 750 troops; the expected troop contribu- tions by the other countries failed to materialise.63 More recently, following the creation of the US Africa Command (USAC), SPFs in North and West Africa have been heavily criticised because, under the USAC, these forces have sought to pro- tect US petroleum interests rather than transitional institutions and local people at risk.64

As the African experience shows, SPFs are not always a safe means of protect- ing peace. The experience does, however, provide important knowledge of how SPFs could contribute towards providing security in post-conflict processes. First, in order to avoid the failure of international peacekeepers becoming operational, SPFs should not be dependent on a planned peacekeeping force from neighbour- ing countries: when the international support of the peace agreement is with- drawn, the end result is the disempowerment of local ownership, which puts at risk the success of implementing an SPF. Second, both parties should agree to create SPFs and contribute with military personnel. In this way both parties would build trust and the SPF would be part of a broader reintegration strategy, which does not disregard the military training of former combatants but actually professionalises their skills to deal with the rise of insecurity in post-conflict reconstruction processes. Third, in order to avoid the possibility that SPFs fall prey to foreign policy diplomacy and resource interests in conflict-torn regions, SPFs should be trained by various security forces from around the world. Although this does not guarantee that SPFs will carry out their mission, the chances of accountability increase when they are part of multilateral efforts. As discussed, the three exclusive categories of a state security force, FARC or

an international peacekeeping force are, in themselves, unlikely to provide the sufficient protection necessary in the Colombian case. Yet a hybrid of these security forces could provide a more effective form of security. Although verifi- cation commissions have been created in previous peace talks in Colombia, an SPF has never been considered. A hybrid SPF would not only offer the necessary security but would also provide a practical and symbolic platform for transi- tional reintegration. According to Theidon, writing about the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and

Reintegration (DDR) of Colombian paramilitaries in 2005, the weakest link of that process was reintegration.65 Theidon identifies two reasons for this: first, the fact that hard security approaches had, until recently, dominated the DDR agenda. Second, she identifies the fact that the reintegration process failed to deal with the militarised masculinities of former combatants, which had shaped a form of warrior attitude, whereby political and social practice was aggres- sively interpreted through military and violent lenses.66

This section does not suggest going back to a security approach that focuses exclusively on the use of force; rather it proposes that, in order to ensure the reintegration of demobilised FARC members, it is necessary to design a mecha- nism to protect their lives. Such a mechanism must comprise both hard and soft elements; a military structure with a social dimension behind it. This would address Theidon’s valuable proposal for the reconstruction of masculinities of

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former combatants in a different way. This article advances the idea that such a reconstruction cannot only take place through the combatants’ renunciation of being part of a military organisation. Instead, because military organisations are part of how social relations in a given society are structured, what needs to be reformed is the way in which such organisations are constituted and the ratio- nale behind them. Thus, despite the danger that an SPF could reproduce mascu- line, military rationales while facilitating reintegration through a continuation of hard security, the relatively small number of demobilised FARC members and the involvement of the international community would offer a counter scenario. The SPF could be a well trained security unit that operates strictly within the account- ability of national and international law; something not common in Colombia. Before concluding, six challenges that a Colombian hybrid SPF would face

need to be considered. The discussion reveals important principles that affect the entire peace process.

(1) Would Santos be able to convince the leadership of the security forces to accept the creation of a hybrid SPF to ensure the security of demobilised FARC members willing to participate in politics? In other words, is there sufficient agreement and congruence between political and military wings within both parties of the peace process to work together in the years after an agreement?

(2) If this were the case, the SPF would probably consist of soldiers, police- men, members of the new National Intelligence Agency, and former FARC combatants. If demobilised FARC members were able to unite with the state forces to protect the lives of those at risk it would be a step for- ward, offering assurance to sceptics who doubt the capacity of the Santos administration to implement the agreements reached. The danger remains that such a move could marginalise people who have been victims of vio- lence by either state or guerrilla forces, as well as radicalise those sectors of society that feel that their country has been sold out. In this context, the SPF provides a symbolic model of the reconciliation process and leaves the question as to how far it would be tolerated by different ele- ments in Colombian society.

(3) If an SPF were created as outlined above, the next step would be to seek the support of the international community to provide training. However, such a move brings further political obstacles. First, the USA has had a significant military involvement in Colombia since the 1950s, providing intelligence, weaponry, training and personnel. Given FARC’s mistrust of US forces, to what extent would the US military be involved in training and providing equipment to the SPF? Would it be wise to strengthen the existing links between the UK and the Colombian police in order to set up a UK-led training course on intelligence for the SPF and would that be more readily accepted than US interventions? Reducing the dependency on the USA as the principle provider of security by inviting in other members of the international community would help navigate the issue of trust. Whether the USA would be willing to loosen its military relation- ship with Colombia is, however, another matter altogether. Second,

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because of the importance of complying with international human rights standards, it would be necessary to decide which NGOs could contribute towards training an SPF on human rights and international humanitarian law.

(4) With the involvement of political and military departments of the state and the international community, the question also arises as to how the financing of an SPF would be spread out and what the new stakeholders would want in return. As Smith has shown,67 in developing countries it is necessary to have the involvement of the international community because the creation of an SPF, as part of an SSR, could not be financed exclusively by the host state. The support of intergovernmental organisa- tions might be the key to success, not only by contributing financially to the establishment of the SPF but also by setting up a mission to verify the implementation of any eventual peace agreement. Yet would the involve- ment of these additional parties bring economic deals that could cause political disagreements?

(5) International verification missions overlooking the implementation of the peace agreement will be important to ensure that the SPF is accountable. Yet this returns us to the possibility of an overreliance on the interna- tional community which, as was the case in Burundi, may not materialise as a nationwide agency on the ground. In the ongoing relationship between Colombia and international stakeholders the potential to swing from an environment of support to one of dependency is delicate and tied into multiple agendas.

(6) Finally, an SPF would be a security organisation with a high concentration of military personnel charged with providing security to a geographically dispersed group against threats and assassinations. In such circumstances how could an SPF avoid being trapped in an aggressively masculine mili- tarised rationale? As defenders of demobilised FARC members, they would need to interpret political and social practice around them through mili- tary and violent lenses in order to do their job effectively. Thus, the pro- vision of security has an inherent bias towards producing violent militarisation.

In sum, a hybrid SPF that deals with the challenges discussed above could suc- ceed in safeguarding demobilised FARC members and propel a process of SSR in Colombia. This would provide an important contribution to the protection of the peace process. However, the protection of the wider population of Colombia, who still live under conditions of insecurity, would not be guaranteed. As the international community and Colombian government invest resources and human rights training in an SPF, there is a danger that they would ignore the security needs of the general public, who are not in their predicament simply because of FARC’s armed struggle. Yet their insecurity is unlikely to improve while the con- flict continues. As previous peace processes around the world indicate, some- times it is better to strive for a minimalist agenda to ensure what Galtung calls ‘negative peace’, which sets up the ground for the structural transformations needed to walk the path to achieving ‘social justice’.68

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Conclusion

Over the past decade scholars have rightly criticised what have been broadly called liberal peace interventions. The critique is based on the fact that, although the international community seeks to impose a model of conflict reso- lution across the globe, the interaction between liberal peace agents and local actors always results in a hybrid peace which takes different forms depending on ‘the ability of the local actors to resist, ignore or adapt liberal peace inter- ventions; and the ability of local actors, networks and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking’.69 Following Mark Duffield, some scholars have even argued that peace support operations (PSO) serve a narrow, problem-solving purpose to the dysfunctions of the global political economy.70

The African experience of SPFs discussed above supports this claim and high- lights the importance of reconsidering the utility of PSOs. This does not mean rejecting PSOs altogether for, all things considered, hybrid peace is an improve- ment on war, whether it is a degenerate war (ie including the targeting of civil- ians) or not.71

Bearing in mind that each case needs to be approached focusing on its own specificity, we would argue that, in the case of Colombia, a traditional PSO would be counterproductive. What the analysis suggests is that the international community could support, both technically and financially, an SPF consisting of a multiplicity of local actors. By strengthening local ownership, the international community would not only help to protect the agreements with a hard security mechanism but also build trust among the conflicting parties by setting up an example for healing the fragmentation of Colombia’s social fabric. The challenges for the Santos administration are not less than the challenges

facing Colombian society. Throughout their history the people of Colombia have seen how the transitions from war to peace are bloody and usually end up reigniting conflict. Tragically each transition to peace becomes, instead, a transi- tion from one cycle of violence to another, in which war degenerates even more. In order to avoid history repeating itself, the challenge is to protect the right to life of former combatants who decide to demobilise and reintegrate into Colombian society. This would not only show that the Colombian political sys- tem offers political guarantees for the exercise of political opposition but would also send a strong signal to violent entrepreneurs who are willing to continue benefiting from the war economy.

Notes

A first draft of this article was presented at the workshop ‘Ending Colombia’s Internal Conflict: Prospects for Peace with the FARC and Beyond’ held at the Royal United Services Institute in partnership with Canning House, the UCL Institute of the Americas and the Sussex Centre for Conflict and Security Research. We thank the participants for the discussion, Benjamin Dix, who offered insightful comments for the preparation of the first draft, and Martin Shaw’s review of the final draft. The mistakes as usual remain our own.

1 http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/que-sabe-del-proceso-paz/264009-3, accessed 8 February 2013. 2 V Bouvier, M Chernick, M García Durán & F Sarmiento, 10 Years after Caguan: Lessons for Peace in Colombia Today, CLAS-Uniandes-Cinep Report, Bogotá/Washington, 2012, p 2.

3 http://www.rcnradio.com/videos/discurso-de-santos-anunciando-acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farc-19370, accessed 1 February 2013.

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4 V Bouvier, M Chernick, M García Durán, C Nasi, A Rettberg, F Sarmiento & ME Wills, ‘Lessons for Colombia peace talks in Oslo and Havana’, CLAS-Uniandes-Cinep Report, Bogotá/Washington, October 2012, pp 4–6.

5 http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-despachada-ivan-marquez-agito-aguas/266537-3, accessed 1 Feb- ruary 2013.

6 P Engstrom & A Gomez-Suarez, ‘Colombia 2013: towards ending the longest armed conflict in the wes- tern hemisphere’, IA–UCL Policy Brief, London, December 2012, pp 1–3.

7 P DeShazo, J Meldenson Forman & P McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lesson from Colombia, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009, p 11.

8 A script, according to Gerad Toal, ‘is meant to describe a set of representations...which are deemed rele- vant and appropriate to defining a place in foreign policy’. The problem arises when a script ‘precedes actual events...The consequence is the marginalization of alternative meanings and alternative scripts.’ G Toal, ‘Foreign policy and the hyperreal: the Reagan administration and the scripting of “South Africa”’, in TJ Barnes & JS Duncan (eds), Writing Worlds: Discourse, Texts and Metaphors in the Representation of Landscape, London: Routledge, 1992, p 156.

9 http://www.elespectador.com/opinion/columna-382203-el-costo-de-justificar-farc, accessed 8 February 2013. 10 A Gomez-Suarez, ‘A genocidal geopolitical conjuncture: contextualizing the destruction of the Union Patri-

otica in Colombia (1980s–2010)’, PhD dissertation, University of Sussex, 2011, p 92. 11 P Wilkinson, ‘Sharpening the weapons of peace: peace support operations and complex emergencies’,

International Peacekeeping, 7(1), 2000, pp 63–79. 12 T Barkawi & M Laffey, ‘The imperial peace: democracy, force and globalization’, European Journal of

International Relations, 5(4), 1999, pp 403–434. 13 N Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 2000. 14 D Stokes, America’s other War: Terrorizing Colombia, London: Zed Books, 2004. 15 A Alape, Tirofijo: Las vidas de Pedro Antonio Marín, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, Bogotá: Planeta, 1989. 16 F Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Criminal rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian experience’,

Politics and Society, 32(2), 2004, pp 257–285. 17 http://www.eluniversal.com.co/antonio-navarro-wolf/“la-del-91-es-una-constitucion-de-paz”-navarro-wolff-

53705, accessed 11 February 2013. 18 M Cardenas, R Jungito & M Pachón, ‘Political institutions and policy outcomes in Colombia: the effects

of the 1991 constitution’, IDB Working Paper, 203, Washington, 2006, p 7. 19 http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-403937-farc-proponen-autogobierno-los-territorios-

campesinos, accessed 12 February 2013. 20 http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12571791.html, accessed

12 February 2013. 21 E Moreno, ‘Whither the Colombian two-party system? An assessment of political reforms and their limits’,

Electoral Studies, 24(3), 2005, p 508. 22 A Fiszbein, ‘The emergence of local capacity: lessons from Colombia’, World Development, 25(7), 1997,

pp 1029–1043. 23 http://justiciaypazcolombia.com/Paramilitares-operan-con-total, accessed 8 February 2013. 24 http://www.canalcapital.gov.co/noticias-capital/9961-representante-ivan-cepeda-estaria-en-peligro, accessed 12

February 2013. 25 O Behar, Las guerras de la paz, Bogotá: Planeta, 1985. 26 J Arenas, Cese al fuego: una historia política de las FARC, Bogotá: Oveja Negra, 1985. 27 A Gomez-Suarez, ‘Perpetrator blocs, genocidal mentalities and geographies: the destruction of the Union

Patriotica in Colombia and its lessons for genocide studies’, Journal of Genocide Research, 9(4), 2007, p 639.

28 L Carroll, Violent Democratization: Social Movements, Elites, and Politics in Colombia’s Rrural War Zones, 1984/2008, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011.

29 See, for example, C Medina Gallego, FARC-EP: Temas y problemas nacionales 1958–2008, Bogotá: Univers- idad Nacional de Colombia, 2009.

30 C González Posso, ‘Negotiations with FARC 1982–2002’, Accord, 14, 2004, pp 46–51. According to Gon- zález Posso, ‘The Uribe Accord did not represent a national consensus on the political settlement of the conflict. Consequently, the Peace and Verification Commission gradually became a body without real power and at best an organization for “good offices”’.

31 J Córdoba Triviño, Informe del Defensor del Pueblo para el gobierno, el Congreso y el Procurador Gen- eral de la Nación. Estudio de casos de homicidio de miembros de la Unión Parótica y Esperanza Paz y Libertad, Bogotá: Defensoría del Pueblo, 1992.

32 ‘La guerrilla está legalizada afirma el general Landazábal’, El Espectador, 3 July 1987, p 3A. 33 S Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, New York: Routledge, 2004. 34 Gomez-Suarez, ‘A genocidal geopolitical conjuncture’, p 55.

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35 ID Ortiz Palacios, El genocidio contra la Unión Patriótica: informe de avance de investigación, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1999; I Cepeda, ‘Genocidio político: el caso de la Unión Patriótica en Colombia’, Revista Cetil, 1(2), 2006, pp 101–12; and E Castellanos Roso, Control de legalidad Hebert Veloza, in Sala de Justicia y Paz Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, 2012.

36 J Herrera, ‘Asalto de 7 horas a Mutatá’, El Espectador, 28 January 1987, p 10A. 37 A Gomez-Suarez, ‘US–Colombian relations in the 1980s: political violence and the onset of the UP geno-

cide’, in M Esparza, H Huttenbach & D Feierstein (eds), State Violence and Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War Years, New York: Routledge, 2010.

38 A Gomez-Suarez, ‘Bloques perpetradores y mentalidades genocidas: el caso de la destrucción de la Unión Patriótica en Colombia’, Revista de Estudios sobre Genocidio, 1(2), 2008, pp 42–55.

39 LA Matta, Poder Capitalista y Violencia Política en Colombia: Terrorismo de Estado y Genocidio contra la Unión Patriótica, Bogotá: Ideas y Soluciones Gráficas, 2002.

40 C Echandía, Situación actual de las FARC: Un análisis de los cambios en las estrategias y la territorialidad (1990–2011), Bogotá: Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2011.

41 M Romero, Paramilitares y Autodefensas 1982–2003, Bogotá: IEPRI, 2003. 42 Carroll, Violent Democratization, pp 43–49. 43 Art 3 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a1,

accessed 4 February 2013. 44 Bouvier et al, ‘Lessons for Colombia peace talks’; and Engstrom & Gomez-Suarez, ‘Colombia 2013’. 45 RE Wagner-Pacifici, The Art of Surrender: Decomposing Sovereignty at Conflict’s End, Chicago, IL: Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 2005, p 55. 46 Cf J Esteban & D Ray, ‘Polarization, fractionalization and conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 45(2),

2008, pp 163–182. 47 http://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/para-que-sirvio-tregua/330030-3, accessed 1 February 2013. 48 http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/proceso-paz-por-insisten-farc-cese-bilateral-fuego, accessed

19 February 2013. 49 http://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/conflicto-drogas-y-paz-temas-30/3530-la-tregua-verdades-a-medias-

y-propuesta-alternativa.html, accessed 1 February 2013. 50 For Leyva’s proposal, see http://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/2-2013-la-barca-de-calder%C3%B3n.

html-1, accessed 19 February 2013. The FARC negotiating team’s reaction was released in Havana on 19 February 2013.

51 D Shapiro, ‘Negotiating emotions’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 20(1), 2002, p 69. 52 R Fisher & W Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving in, Boston, MA: Houghton

Mifflin, 1981. 53 For Santos’s comments, see http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-403049-creo-vamos-bien-

cuba-pesar-de-gente-dice-santos. For Timoleón Jímenez’s statement, see http://www.pacocol.org/index.php/ noticias/2234-por-primera-vez-timochenko-maximo-jefe-de-las-farc-ep-habla-sobre-el-proceso-de-paz-en-la- habana-en-entrevista-exclusiva-al-semanario-voz, accessed 13 February 2013.

54 http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/severo-golpe-frente-clave-farc/331328-3, accessed 5 February 2013. 55 See, for example, the Statement of the President of the Episcopal Conference of Colombia Ruben Salazar,

at http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-403323-iglesia-asegura-farc-no-dan-muestras-de-querer- paz, accessed 13 February 2013.

56 http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/crisis-la-habana/331532-3, accessed 5 February 2013. 57 C López, Y refundaron la patria…de cómo mafiosos y políticos reconfiguraron el estado colombiano,

Bogotá: Debate, 2010. 58 http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-401854-allegados-alvaro-uribe-estarian-impidiendo-restitu-

cion-de-tierra, accessed 4 February 2013. 59 See M Schultze-Kraft, ‘La cuestión militar en Colombia: la fuerza publica y los retos de la construcción

de paz’, in A Rettberg (ed), Construcción de paz en Colombia, Bogotá: Uniandes, 2013; and F Leal, La Seguridad Nacional a la Deriva, Bogotá: Alfaomega-Uniandes-Flacso, 2002.

60 SJ Stedman, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, International Security, 22(2), 1997, pp 5–53. 61 http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-407341-onu-preve-un-brillante-futuro-colombia-si-logra-

el-fin-del-confl, accessed 2 March 2013. 62 http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/470_1164104125_3d8f0dc54.pdf, accessed 5 February 2013. 63 KP Coleman, ‘Innovations in “African solutions to African problems”: the evolving practice of regional

peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49(4), 2011, pp 517–545. 64 H Campbell, ‘Remilitarisation of African societies: analysis of the planning behind proposed US Africa

Command’, International Journal of African Renaissance Studies—Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity, 3 (1), 2008, pp 6–34.

65 K Theidon, ‘Transitional subjects: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in Colombia’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(1), 2007, pp 66–90.

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66 K Theidon, ‘Reconstructing masculinities: the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants in Colombia’, Human Rights Quarterly, 31(1), 2009, pp 1–34.

67 C Smith, ‘Security-sector reform: development breakthrough or institutional engineering?’, Conflict, Secu- rity & Development, 1(1), 2001, pp 5–20.

68 J Galtung, Essays in Peace Research, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975, pp 103–134. 69 R Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid peace: the interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace’, Security Dialogue,

41(4), 2010, pp 391–412. 70 M Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and critical theory’, International Peacekeeping, 11(1), 2004, pp 39–58. 71 Cf M Shaw, War and Genocide, Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p 45.

Notes on Contributors

Andrei Gomez-Suarez is Associate Researcher at the University of Sussex, member of the Sussex Centre for Conflict and Security Research, and of the Centre for Historical Memory of the Department for Social Prosperity of the Colombian Government. He is consultant on conflict and development in Colombia for Signum Consulting and teaches on Peace Processes and Post-conflict Reconstruction. He has also taught at the University of Cauca, Externado University, and has written on the Unión Patriótica genocide extensively.

Jonathan Newman is PhD candidate in Social Anthropology at the University of Sussex examining violence and conflict among farming communities in Colombia. He is currently an Associate Tutor at Sussex. He has published on the markets of Higher Education and on psychosocial training needs for emergency workers.

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