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ISLAMIC REALPOLITIK: TWO- LEVEL IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan Department of Political Science Central Washington University

400 East University Way Ellensburg, Washington 98926

USA Barbara Ann Reiffer-Flanagan is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Central Washington University and previously served as Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bethany College, She earned her Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where her dissertation was on religious nationalism. She has coauthored The International Committee ofthe Red Cross: A Neutral Humanitarian Actor and is cur- rently working on a book on The Evolution of Iran, assessing the evolution ofthe theocratic regime in Tehran over the last three decades, arguing that Iran's economic problems will gradually move the country towards a more liberal, democratic political system. She has published articles related to democracy, religious nadonalism and terrorism.

This essay examines the evolution of Iranian foreign policy on the 30th anniversary ofthe revolution. Iranian foreign policy operates on two levels: domestic politics and international politics. Statements offered for domestic consumption can be given less attention than those remarks and actions at the international level. While religious rhetoric often billowed from Friday sermons, pragmatic policies driven by a basic understanding of realism generally determined foreign policy over the last thirty years. The United States and other countries dealing with Iran should understand Iran's national interests and find some common interests upon which to cooperate and reduce tensions, or they wiU face continued hostilities and failed policies. Any calls for a grand bargain should be rejected because this would be inconsistent with Iran's approach to foreign policy.

I. INTRODUCTION

Tolicy makers in the West have often been frustrated and baffled by state- ments from Tehran concerning foreign policy including bellicose statements such as President Ahmandinejad's remark that Israel should be "wiped off the map" or comments about Iran's right under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty to produce nuclear energy. Given these statements should western policy makers conclude that Iran is seeking nuclear energy and not nuclear weapons? Should the West be concerned about harsh language about Israel? Or is this merely rhetoric meant largely for domestic consumption? More generally speaking, what is the orientation of Iranian foreign policy?

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Over time, the Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrated that Islam and religious principles would mostly take a backseat to realism, power politics, and the survival ofthe state. Many in the West have not appreciated the realism that is at the heart of Tehran's foreign policy.

Some prominent scholars and practitioners have argued that the West in general and the United States in particular have misunderstood Iranian foreign policy.̂ Ray Takeyh summarized this sentiment when he stated: "the United States has persistently misjudged Iran's clerical oligarchs."^ Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also admitted that the former admin- istration did not understand Iran.^ These misunderstandings, especially with the United States, have created mutual hostilities and confrontations which make improving relations with Tehran rather difficult. ^^^^^^^^^^ÊmÊmÊÊ^^mÊmmm In order to understand Tehran's Over time, the Islamic intentions policy makers must understand Republic of Iran Iranian foreign policy on the two levels demonstrated that Islam ^^ich it operates: on the level of domes-

and religious principles ^'"^ P''"^^" ^"'^ ^ ^ ^^""^^ °^ international would mostly take a P""^''^"" ^ ' ' ' ' countries must be con- . , ^ ^ ,. cerned with domestic pressures as well as hackseat t o realism, , , r r i u

• i_ t h e reality ot international politics w h e n power politics, and the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^^^.^^ p^jj^^ Unfortunately, the survival of the state. inabiHty of some in the West to distinguish ^ ^ ^ " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ the religious rhetoric offered for domestic consumption from the realism often practiced at the international level has resulted in many misguided policies.

Understanding which audience an Iranian leader has in mind can explain various policy statements. It can also help guide Western leaders. State- ments offered for domestic consumption can be given less attention than those remarks and actions taken at the international level. This essay will examine both levels at play in Iranian foreign policy and argue that a focus on the international level and Iran's emphasis on realism is what Western leaders should be most concerned with. Although foreign policy in the early years ofthe theocracy emphasized the religious nature of politics, this was primarily to consolidate domestic power. While religious rhetoric often billowed from Friday sermons and speeches, pragmatic policies driven by a basic understanding of realism generally determined foreign policy over

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the last thirty years. Thus the proper approach for the United States and other countries dealing with Iran is to understand Iran's national interests and to find some common interests upon which to cooperate and reduce tensions. Failure to do so will result in continued hostilities and failed policies. Furthermore, calls for a grand bargain should be rejected because history has demonstrated that would be inconsistent with Iran's approach to foreign policy.

II. DOMESTIC POLITICS

A. Factional Politics

Making Foreign Policy in Iran To understand how foreign policy is formed and carried out one needs to understand the competing actors and their political strength at any given moment. This is no easy task especially given the lack of transparency in policy matters. Furthermore, the constitution does not provide much guidance on the distribution of power with regard to foreign policy. The articles that are most relevant to foreign policy arcT^ticles 3 and 52 and they do not go beyond expressing a disdain for imperialism and foreign infiuence.

In Iran, the most important figure in foreign policy is the Supreme Leader. He has the power to declare war or peace (article 110) and has control over the armed forces.* However, other politicians have tried to alter the direction of Iranian foreign policy. Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami attempted to improve relations with the United States. Ahmadinejad reversed many of those efforts taking a much more confi"ontational approach to the United States and the West. The Supreme National Security Coun- cil̂ as well as the Majlis (Parliament) have also had their hand in foreign policy. Furthermore, complicating these factors is the ideological divisions within the country between reformists, conservatives and neoconserva- tives. Conservatives, such as Rafsanjani, have pursued a less revolutionary foreign policy by trying to improve economic relations with the United States and the West due to the realization that the only way to attract much-needed foreign investment is to adopt a less hostile foreign policy. Reformists aligned with Khatami also argue for improved relations with other countries. Khatami denounced terrorism and encouraged a dialogue

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among civilizations.^ Neoconservatives or hardline conservatives strongly oppose improving relations with the United States, adhering to the strong admonishments of former Supreme Leader Khomeini. As Sandra Mackey notes, "in their view, Iranian foreign policy centers on the export of the revolution, even by subversion and terrorism."'' These competing forces help shape Iranian foreign policy.

Two of these political factions (conservatives and reformists) have often pursued a realist foreign policy. Classical realism with its emphasis on state power, anarchy in international relations, and the importance of the survival ofthe state have been evident in a number of Tehran's foreign policy decisions over the last thirty years .̂ Although defining any state's national interests is fraught with difficulty, many foreign policy makers in ^^^^^^gg^ig^^^^^^^^^ Tehran have agreed that the survival ofthe One implication to be Islamic Republic of Iran is ftindamental

drawn from the fact that ' ° ^ ^ country's national interests. Many, Iran has largely pursued •'̂ '̂ ^ '̂̂ "S Khatami and Rafsanjani, have

,. , , . ,. also concluded that improving Iran's a realist foreign policy . . . /, . T n • J

, , «« . economic situation (high inflation and over t h e last 30 years is ^„employment) is also key to the Repub- a rejection of a "grand ,¿̂ ,3 i^„g , ^ ^ ^ ̂ ^^^-^^^ bargain. QJ^^ implication to be drawn from the

largely pursued a realist foreign policy over the last 30 years is a rejection of a "grand bargain. Some scholars and policy makers have argued that a successful resolution to the standoff with Iran requires a "grand bargain." Flynt Leverett has argued that "the United States needs to pursue a 'grand bargain' with the Islamic Republic—that is, a broad based strategic understanding in which all of the outstanding bilateral differences between the two countries would be resolved as a package."' Any grand bargain would include Iran's nuclear program, support for terrorist organizations, security guarantees for Iran, and lifting of sanctions on Iran. Given Iran's realist approach to global politics, its insecurity in the region and its distrust of the United States, a grand bargain is not only inconsistent with its foreign policy ori- entation but is also bound to fail. Instead, the Obama administration and other western leaders should pursue a confidence-building approach that gradually builds trust.

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B. Early Years of the Revolution: Foreign Policy as a Means of Solidifying Domestic Power.

1979 Hostage Crisis On November 4,1979, Americans at the US embassy in Tehran were taken hostage and held for 444 days. Carter's efforts to secure the release of the hostages (freezing Iranian assets in the U.S., breaking diplomatic relations, economic sanctions and a rescue attempt) all failed.'"

By taking over the American embassy, the students (Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line) believed the United States would not be able to influence the political situation on the ground. One of their goals was to prevent the restoration of the Shah." The students involved did not realize that their actions would turn into a year long crisis and were surprised ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ by the reaction from various international Khomeini, w h o had Mttle actors. respect for international

Carter's inability to remedy this situ- law, used the h o s t a g e ation was partly due to the administra- crisis t o build support for tion's misunderstanding of Khomeini. To his allies and t o solidify officials in the Carter Administration they their power. were "dealing with a religious fanatic."'-^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I H H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B Khomeini, who had littie respect for inter- national law,'̂ used the hostage crisis to build support for his allies and to solidify their power. He offered his support to the students by saying, "I have said repeatedly that the taking of hostages by our militant, committed Muslim students was a natural reaction to the blows our nation suffered at the hands of America.'"'* While Khomeini genuinely hated "The Great Satan'"^ there was domestic capital to be had by continuing to hold the hostages. As Takeyh notes, "Khomeini exploited them [the hostages] as a means of radicalizing the populace, claiming that the revolution was in danger from the manipulations of America and its internal accomplices."'*^ This enhanced the status of Khomeini's followers who were taking a direct stance on the great imperialist—United States—relative to the left-leaning factions. Holding Amedcans hostage had littie to do with Islamic tenets (and actually violated Islamic traditions of protecting visitors) and more to do with enhancing the appeal of a specific political faction. While domestically

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this may have strengthened Khomeini's hand, it made Iran a pariah state within the international community. Thus we see that a domestic power struggle trumped Islam.

War with Iraq in the 1980s: The most threatening challenge that the Islamic Republic faced since the revolution was the attack by Saddam Hussein in September 1980. Iraq saw the Iranian revolution as a weakness to be exploited. This weakness stemmed from the fact that the clerics leading the revolution had no expe- rience in international relations or in conducting a war. Furthermore, the revolutionary leaders had executed or removed many high-ranking military leaders who were deemed loyal to the Shah. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The early years ofthe conflict led to a

Iraq saw the Iranian f f ff^ , .. , cienes used to solidify domestic power.

revolution as a weakness „ ,. . , , ,, , , . , _ , . Religious leaders would use the war to

to be exploited. This , . . . , ^ remove domestic cntics and opposition

weakness stemmed fromthe fact that the clerics ^^^^^^ Although religion played a role, as leading the revolution the conflict wore on, the religious goal of had no experience in spreading the revolution took a backseat international relations or to the survival ofthe state. in conducting a war. At the beginning of the eight year ^^^^^^^a^^^^^^m^^^ war with Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini saw

the conflict in religious terms. This was a war between good and evil: "It is not a question of a fight between one government and another... This is a rebellion by blasphemy against Islam."^^ Khomeini was fighting for Allah, while Saddam Hussein and his secular Baath Party were fighting for the devil.

Khomeini told his followers that dying in Allah's fight against the infi- dels was honorable: "We should all sacrifice our loved ones for the sake of Islam. If we are killed, we have performed our duty."^* Many took this call to arms seriously. This motivation turned out to be quite significant. Iran's population and their willingness to fight and die for the religiously-defined nation (rally around the flag and Allah) was the advantage Iran had over Iraq. While Iraq had support fi-om many countries in the Middle East and

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had superior weapons, and had in the first few weeks occupied thousands of square miles of Iranian territory, Iran managed to eventually repel these attacks.'^ Western countries such as France, Britain, and the United States supported Saddam Hussein in part because they feared the spread ofthe Iranian revolution with its reliance on political Islam, throughout the region. Furthermore, the hostage crisis had not endeared Tehran's new leaders to the international community. The United States assisted Iraq by providing satellite photos of Iranian troop movements, helped Baghdad devise military strategy, and provided access to economic resources.•̂ ° For these reasons the survival ofthe Islamic Republic was rather unexpected.

Over the course ofthe eight long years of war, Iraq and Iran fought to a stalemate. By 1987-88 Iran was also experiencing some disadvantages. Iraq's use of chemical weapons had a dev- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ astating effect on Iran's military morale, y^estern countries With tije lure of religious martyrdom fad- ing and the devastating effects of this long war on the Iranian people, Iran agreed to a United Nations-negotiated ceasefire, supported Saddam Although the Supreme Leader's reii^Hussein m part because gious rhetoric made compromising with they feared the spread Saddam Hussein more difficult, in the of the Iranian revolution end Khomeini accepted this "poisoned with its reliance on chalice" because he realized after years of political Islam. bloodshed and a military stalemate that ^ ^ • • • • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • i ^ " ^ " " Iran's national interests required an end to the war.

By the time the war ended, Khomeini's supporters had consolidated their power and removed all political opponents through the use of a call to a religious rally around the

n i . INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

All states must operate in a global environment that lacks a world gov- ernment. Thus many have adopted a realist approach to foreign policy in which they pursue their national interests which includes preserving the independence of their state by ensuring that the country's national security

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is defended. Likewise throughout the past thirty years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has generally pursued realist policies. However, many policymakers in the West have been more inclined to treat Iranian foreign policy as being irrationally guided by revolutionary fervor and Islamic tenets. Some of this is a result ofthe religious rhetoric that billows from mosques throughout Iran. This section will examine some ofthe major foreign policy decisions that have been taken over the last thirty years and argue that realism rather than irrational, religious tenets are driving Tehran's foreign policy.

Iran's fervent anti-Western stance has contributed to some of its regional stature. Iran is one of the few countries in the region that is not diplomatically, militarily, nor financially dependent on the West and especially the United States. Some in the Middle East respect Iran for its independence from the United States and because Iran has not caved in

^ ^ to pressure from the Iran has generally pursued realist poücies, ^ uS-Iranian Relations yet many policymakers in the West have been With the exception of a few short periods more inclined to treat of rapprochement, the United States and

Iranian foreign policy as '̂"̂ '̂ !^^7 P̂̂ Ĵ̂ "^^'^^.f ^^ ]^'' '^^^ being irrationally guided t'̂ ''̂ ?' T . !?l;''í T ' T ' ', , . , the other. The difficulties between these by revolutionary fervor ^ ^ „̂̂ .̂̂ ^̂ ^̂ ĵĵ ^ ^^^^ ^^^.^ ^^^^^ .^ and Islamic tenets. ^j^^ ^953 American-sponsored removal ^ " ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ of Mosaddeq and the restoration to the throne of the Shah. Continued support for the Shah both in economic and military terms further solidified the negative attitudes many Iranians held for Washington.

Despite the diplomatic breach that took place as a result ofthe hostage crisis, Tehran and Washington cannot escape the fact that their foreign policies are intertwined. Given American activities in the Middle East, including the rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as national interests in the region (access to energy sources, ensuring the security of Israel, prevention ofthe proliferation of WMD and terrorism) these two countries simply cannot avoid each other.

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Iran-Contra The Iran-Contra affair reveals how pragmatic Iranian leaders, including Khomeini, can be. The Iran-Contra Scandal, which involved selling arms to Tehran via a third party (Israel) and using the money to support the Contras in Nicaragua in an effort to secure the release of hostages being held in Lebanon, was an odd policy for many ofthe actors involved and yet it showed that foreign policy decisions were driven by realpolitik. Iran needed to buy arms for its ongoing war with Iraq. Iran's military efforts suffered due to an inability to purchase new military supplies. Given the hostage crisis and the theocracy's general antipathy for the West, many Western countries were unwilling to sell arms to Iran. Much ofthe Shah's military equipment—^purchased over the years from Washington—^had been destroyed or needed replacement parts in the mid-to-late 1980s.

The arms sales, despite Reagan's ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I M I H ^ ^ ^ H H ^ ^ ^ H ^ pledge that he would not negotiate with The arms sales, despite terrorists, were supposed to win support Reagan's pledge that from Iran's leaders to put pressure on he would not negotiate Shia groups in Lebanon. In the 1980s, a ^ m , terrorists, were number of Western nationals^were taken

supposed to win support hostage in Lebanon (including Terry ^ ^ ^ ^ ,^g^,g ,^^^^^3 ̂ ^ Anderson) .̂ ^ Washington wanted Tehran „ . .

. . a II pressure on Shia groups to use Its lnrluence with these groups to . . . •# •

. , c u u ° ^ in Lebanon. get the release of these hostages.

That Iran's leaders agreed to not only purchase arms from the Great Satan, but were willing to deal with the Israelis, demonstrates that with the survival of the regime at stake, they would trade Islam and religious principles for the realism of international relations. Khomeini terminated this embarrassing relationship when it became public in November 1986.-̂ * B. Iranian Attempts to Improve Relations with the West

Afrer the death of Khomeini in 1989 there was a power vacuum in Iran. Khomeini had embodied the revolution and had steered domestic and foreign policy for a decade. He was able to balance the different factions from the lefr and the right in the political arena. Khameini's ascension to the

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position of Supreme Leader did not immediately elevate him to Khomeini's stature. In truth it would be difficult to fill Khomeini's shoes, but Khameini lacked Khomeini's charisma and loyal following. It took Khameini a few years to build up his base of support. In the meantime President Rafsanjani filled the void and guided Iranian foreign policy.

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became the most influential political leader in the aftermath of Khomeini's death. Although he was a cleric and had received religious training, his focus in the early 1990s was economic reform in Iran. As Ansari notes, "he was a shrewd politician and a merchant, with little time for Islamic austerity."^^ It was his desire to improve Iran's economic foundation that would lead him towards improving diplomatic relations wdth "the Great Satan."

Rafsanjani wanted to use economic cooperation and ties as a means to start the process of improving relations with the United States. In July 1994 he gave an interview in which he said:

I have always been opposed to completely breaking our ties with the United States, they provide us with much needed spare parts and we sell them petrol. Therefore, our economic ties have never been completely halted and some kind of dialogue must always exist. Although we pursue pragmatism in foreign policy, we will not be the first to initiate further dialogue with the Americans.̂ *

If improved relations could lead to the dismantiing of economic sanc- tions and more investment in Iran all the better. Thus offering a billion dollar contract to the American oil company Conoco was a small step on that path.^'' Rafanjani's attempts to slowly but gradually improve relations were rejected. President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957 on March 15, 1995 wdth "comprehensive sanctions" to "deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national secutity, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Govern- ment of Iran."

Khatami, like his predecessor, tried to improve relations with the West. He, like Rafsanjani, was a cleric but one who had spent time in the West (Germany). Khatami wanted to improve relations with the United States and like Rafsanjani before him saw no difficulties with economic

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cooperation: "From our point of view there are no obstacles preventing economic cooperation with the US."^* He also articulated the value of realism and Iran's national interest. Chubin notes that Khatami, "insists that Iran's foreign policy is based on the principles and values of national interest, and in his speeches in the countryside has been known to say 'first comes Iran, then Islam.'"^'

He was willing to make the first move to start a dialogue with the United States. These efforts were consistent with the views of many in Iran. In 2002 a poll was taken of residents of Tehran with 74 percent saying they favored talks with the United States.^" In an interview with CNN he said that he rejected terrorism, which was significant because many western leaders saw Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism due to its links with groups such as Hezbollah. Furthermore, he expressed ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • • • • • ^ H regret for the hostage crisis.^' Despite cooperation

This olive branch was not appreci- ^vith the United S t a t e s in ated in the West and many in the United Afghanistan, George W. States including the Clinton administra- g^g,, placed'iran in the ' tion (with its policy of dual containment) « . » •„, ... ,

^ , . , , , , ^ ,. ' axis of evil With Iraq did not know what to make of^this soft- zim -̂ii—ix t-

and North Korea m his spoken new president of Iran. Khatami s ^ ^ ^ „ _ cooperation in the aftermath of 9 / 1 1 ^002 S t a t e of t h e Union.cooperation in the aftermath of 9 / 1 1 was still not enough to see any improve- "'"'^'^ ^ ^ ^ r e s e n t e d by ment in US-Iranian relations. Despite 'nsny ' " Iran. cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan,̂ -̂ George W. Bush placed Iran in the "axis of evil" with Iraq and North Korea in his 2002 State ofthe Union speech. This was resented by many in Iran. Not only did it weaken Khatami and the reformists who had gambled by trying to improve relations with the United States, but it also allowed other politicians to harden their position with the United States. When asked in September 2008 about improving relations with the United States, President Ahmadinejad said:

I have said many dmes that we would like to have good relations with everyone, including the United States. But these relations must be based on justice, fairness and mutual respect.. .One can embark on a new period of talks. I've said that our absolute principle for these talks are fairness and

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mutual respect. We helped in Afghanistan. The result of that assistance was Mr. Bush directly threatening us with a military attack. For six years he has been engaged in similar talk against us.̂ ^

Hostility between the United States and Iran continued throughout 2008. American and British warships conducted a series of naval maneuvers on July 9, 2008. In response to this and to Israel's test flights for a pos- sible strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, Iran fired a number of missiles from a desert launching site.̂ * Although there were some questions about the tests—including the range and number of missiles fired—Iran appeared to be sending a message to the United States and Israel.̂ ^ Should either country launch an attack on Iran, Iran would retaliate and make both countries suffer. ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ * " " ^ " " i " * " " ^ i ^ i ^ ^ " An aide to Supreme Leader Khame- Amidst all this nei, Ali Shirazi said, "The first US shot belligerent rhetoric on Iran would set the United States' vital and activities are some interest in the world on fire.. .Tel Aviv and economic consequences t^e US fleet in the Persian Gulf would be which could be painful ^^^ targets "̂ ^ for Iran Amidst all this belligerent rhetoric ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ and activities are some economic conse-

quences which could be painful for Iran. The French energy company Total decided against an investment project in Iran's South Pars gas field saying that the project was politically too risky.̂ '' This hurts Iran's energy development which could have increased Iran's gas exports and the economic profit that comes with it.

It is not clear that any of the participants in these tensions want to go to war. While Israel does not want Iran to cross certain red lines with regard to its nuclear program, Israel also does not want to see Iranian mis- siles hitting Tel Aviv or other Israeli cities. Tel Aviv has genuine security concerns about Iran's growing power in the Middle East. Even in the run up to the war with Iraq in 2003, Prime Minister Sharon stressed to Washington that he believed Tehran was a greater threat to the region than Baghdad. Iran, despite its posturing, is no match for American or Israeli weapons. Although Iran could inflict pain in response to an attack, Tehran is too weak to defeat militarily either country outright. Furthermore, it

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is worth noting that since the revolution, Iran has never closed the Strait of Hormuz which could infiict serious economic pain on the world since much ofthe world's oil passes through the strait.̂ * And the United States also does not want another war in the region. Despite President Bush's numerous statements that all options were on the table, he never ordered a military attack on Iran. In addition, he rejected a request from Israel for bunker-busting bombs and Tel Aviv's request to fiy over Iraq to reach the nuclear complex at Natanz.^^

C. Islamic Support When Convenient

Although one of Khomeini's early aspirations was to spread the Islamic Revolution throughout the Middle East this goal would be restrained as the regime moved fiarther away from the revolution. He said, "until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be a struggle."*" His harsh rhetoric aimed at monarchies in the Middle East, especially the Saudis, created few fiiends in the region.*' These efforts made neighboring leaders (many who are Sunnis) fear Shia uprisings within their

-sodeties~Khomeini ultimately failed in his^fforts'to spread his revolution to other countries in the Middle East. Iran's isolation during the war vWth Iraq as well as the economic problems that the conflict caused prevented Khomeini fi-om successfiilly exporting the revolution. Financial support to groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad would not result in theocratic governments elsewhere in the Middle East. Furthermore, lead- ers in the post-Khomeini years (he died on June 3, 1989) would distance themselves from Khomeini's rhetoric. Supreme Leader Khameini down- played talk of exporting the Iranian Revolution when he said:

The export of the revolution did not mean that we would rise up and throw our weight and power around and begin wars, forcing people to revolt and carry out revolutions. That was not the Imam's intention at all. This is not part of our policies and in fact it is against them... .This is what exporting the revolution means: to enable all nations in the world to see that they are capable of standing on their own feet, resisting submission with all of their strength by relying on their own will and determination and by replacing their trust in

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Not only did post-Khomeini political leaders distance themselves from the revolutionary leaders' harsh rhetoric but they also took meaningñil steps to improve relations with other countries in the Middle East (save Israel). President Khatami traveled to other states in the Persian Gulf including Saudi Arabia and extended a hand of friendship. And it is worth noting that Ahmadinejad has not reversed this policy.

Ultimately support for Islamic groups and Islamic states were a part of Iranian foreign policy to the degree that it furthered Iranian interests. This was not simply done for the sake of Islamic solidarity or Shia solidarity. Material support for Hezbollah, including financial and military support dating back to Israel's war in Lebanon in 1982, allowed Iran to increase its status in the region. By extension, Iran's political stock rose in the region ^a^^^^^m^^^^^^mi^^^ when Hezbollah was able to hold off Ultimately support for ^^^^^^ during the war in the summer of Islamic groups and ^006. That Hezbollah was able to stand

Islamic states were a "P °̂ '^^ '"«̂ ^ P"^ '̂'̂ ! "^^^^'^ ^° f̂ '" , , , . , . the Middle East was a victory even it not

part of Iranian foreign .,. . ,, . . a military victory.*^

policy t o tne degree ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^̂ ^ similar pragmatic reasons that it furthered Iranian ^̂ ^ ^̂ pp̂ ^̂ ̂ ^ j^^qj ^^.^ ĝ ^̂ p̂ ^^^^ interests. This w a s not ^̂ ^ ^ Supreme Council for the Islamic simply done for the sake Revolution in Iraq.** Allowing Al Hakim of Islamic solidarity or and other prominent members of SCIRI Shia solidarity. to reside in Iran during Saddam Hus-

regime could be seen not only as generosity towards fellow Shiites but also as a strategic investment in the future. This investment paid dividends when the United States and allies removed Iran's archenemy Saddam Hussein from power in 2003.*^ With Saddam removed from power, Tehran could rest assured that the military threat from its neighbor had subsided. Furthermore, Tehran had good relations with some ofthe leadership ofthe Shia political parties including Dawa and SCIRI. Thus when elections were held and dominated by Shia groups this furthered Iranian national interests.

However, we also see that solidarity with fellow Shiites can be trumped when perceived national security interests require. We see frirther evidence of Iranian realism in its dealings with Azerbaijan. Iran has supported Armenia

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over Azerbaijan in their conflict over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The natural relationship would have been with the Azerbaijanis who are Shia instead of the Christian Armenians, but Azerbaijan had placed some distance with Iran, stressing their Turkish connections in an effort to secure oil deals for Caspian Sea Oil with the United States. In addition, during the civil war in Tajikistan in the early to mid 1990s Tehran tried to negotiate an end to the conflict. Tehran did not favor the Islamic movement or its desire to create an Islamic state.*^ Even in Afghanistan, Iran seemed more concerned with stability in their neighbor than in promoting a theocratic state.

IV. SYMMETRY ON TWO LEVELS.

On some issues the religious rhetoric aimed primarily at domestic audiences coincides with the realist approach to foreign policy. When dealing with issues such as the nuclear program or Israel's treatment of Palestinians, the harsh language employed for domestic consumption can help to further the national security interests of the state.

A. Relationship with Israel

Despite the hostilities from Tehran, the Islamic Republic has taken a mostly pragmatic approach to Tel Aviv. Khomeini and the conservative regime worked with Israel to acquire weapons in the 1980s (as noted in the dis- cussion of the Iran-Contra Affair).

Even support for groups such as Hamas (Sunni) or Hezbollah (Shia) is not motivated solely by religion. Although some scholars such as Takeyh have argued that Iran's relations with Israel demonstrate a radical foreign policy which pursues a revolutionary Islam, I disagree. Iran, for all of its support for violent groups like Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, has always been careful not to confront Tel Aviv directly or to provoke an attack. While many clerics have denounced the state of Israel,*'' the political regime in Tehran has not acted irrationally by confronting Israel's military directly. In addition, Iran has never transferred chemical weapons to either of these two groups. By supporting groups such as Hamas, Tehran has upheld its revolutionary rhetoric vdthout starting a war that could lead to

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its destruction.^^ Even in the war between Israel and Hamas in December 2008, Tehran remained careful to stay out ofthe fighting. When Iranian men started to volunteer to go to Gaza to fight. Supreme Leader Khamenei toned down the rhetoric. In January 2009, he said, "I thank the pious and devoted youth who have asked to go to Gaza., .but it must be noted that our hands are tied in this arena." Although he criticized countries such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, the Supreme Leader made sure not to get drawn into the confiict.**

Furthermore, as long as Tel Aviv is busy dealing with Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel will not be able to concentrate ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ its full attention or its military on Tehran. _ . . .. ^ ^ ̂ . ^ Tehran's harsh rhetoric on Israel also Given the distrust that cc T • i

orrers Iran a means to improve relations many of the Gulf States ^ ^ other Arab states in the region. Given had for Khomeini and the ^j^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ̂ ^^ ^^^^^ Gulf Statesrevolution, playing up ^ad for Khomeini and the revolution, the threat of Israel gives playing up the threat of Israel gives Iran Iran a c o m m o n interest a common interest with other states in with other s t a t e s in the the Middle East. This again demonstrates Middle East. that realism more than revolutionary wm^^^mm^^mimmim^mma^^^ Islam dictates foreign policy. One can also analyze the President's comments about Israel and the Holocaust in this light. His suggestion that Israel should be "wiped off the map" or his doubts about the Holocaust can be seen as an attempt to win supporters by attacking Zionists and supporting Palestinians which has popular support in Iran and in the Arab world.^" Thus, support for groups such as Hamas or Hezbollah and harsh criticisms of Israel demonstrate a powerfiil combina- tion of realism and religious ideology in foreign policy.

C. Nuclear policies in Iran

Developing nuclear energy has been a goal of Iran's leadership since the time of the Shah. Pursuing nuclear energy, which is what Iranian leaders have stated they are interested in (world leaders are skeptical of this claim and worry that Iran is developing nuclear weapons), is a decision made by the Supreme Leader.̂ ^ Khameini stated in January 2008: "The Islamic Republic

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of Iran has repeatedly announced that in principle, based on Shari'a, it is opposed to the production and use of nuclear weapons."" Other Iranian leaders have echoed these remarks.̂ ^

While some politicians have argued that Iran needs to develop nuclear energy because the country's oil reserves will not last forever, one can also understand the motivation for developing nuclear weapons as well as nuclear energy. Given the fact that the United States has launched two wars in the region and that it has refrained fi-om attacking North Korea, which already possesses nuclear weapons, it is not difficult to understand the vulnerability of Iran's leaders and why they might think that nuclear weapons would protect them from regime change by the United States.

The rhetoric coming from Iran H H I ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ became more defiant after Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad became president in 2005. For the some- transformed the times brash president, nuclear develop- „udear issue into ment/technology was Iran's natural right ^ .^^ ^^ national and one that he would never relinquish. • J p» I " Ahmadinejad transformed the nuclear . " . .

oping nuclear energy would demonstrate demonstrate what an ^ what an advanced society Iran is. Despite advanced society Iran is. much domestic support many in the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ ' " international community are concerned by the prospect ofa nuclear Iran. President Ahmadinejad's offer to share Iran's technological know-how was particularly alarming. He told the prime minister of Turkey that "with respect to the needs of Islamic countries, we are ready to transfer nuclear know-how to these countries."^* This raised the spectre ofthe proliferation of nuclear states in the Middle East, which is not a welcome thought for many diplomats. However, it is worth recalling that any decisions on the nuclear issue must be approved by Khameini.

Many countries, most forcefully Israel, have expressed their concern about Iran's nuclear activities. It is reasonable to assume that Iran is, if not currently developing nuclear weapons, then at least holding out the potential for their development at a later point in time."

Additionally, Iranian leaders have maintained a working, albeit strained relationship with the The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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The head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, has issued various reports over the last few years concerning Iran's nuclear program. In May 2008 the IAEA issued a report suggesting that Iran was not fully cooperating and its nuclear program remained "a matter of serious concern."^"^ It is also true that the report stated that a number of plants remain under "agency containment and surveillance." Four months later the IAEA again com- plained of a lack of complete cooperation concerning information on the production of nuclear warheads.^^

Given Tehran's lack of transparency in the past, international distrust is understandable.^^ As a result ofthe discrepancies over Iran's nuclear pro- gram and its enrichment of uranium, the West has sought to place economic sanctions on Iran. The United States also placed sanctions on Bank Mellat and IRGC because they support Iran's nuclear activities.^' The efficacy of the economic sanctions has been questioned by many. In January 2008, the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report which questioned whether the economic sanctions on Iran were having their intended effects. The report stated, "U.S. officials and experts report that U.S. sanctions have specific impacts on Iran; however, the extent of such impacts is difficult to determine."*° The report cited Iran's contracts with foreign firms worth up to $20 billion. Given that economic sanctions have been imposed on Iran since the revolution, Iran appears to be able to weather much ofthe economic sanctions storm. Ahmadinejad has contin- ued to dismiss the sanctions as irrelevant. Tehran has further argued that pressure from the West will not change Iranian policy.

This punishment has also been coupled with incentives packages to induce more cooperative behaviour from Tehran. The sanctions and hostile reaction fi-om many countries in the West has led some prominent politi- cians, including Rafsanjani, to call for a more pragmatic and less confron- tational approach to nuclear negotiations.*' However, Iran has not been very receptive to the incentives thus far offered.

Despite the West's concerns about Iran's nuclear program, many Iranian believe it is their national right to develop nuclear energy as set out in the NPT. "84 percent said that it was very important for Iran to have a full- fuel cycle nuclear program."*^ Given the fact that many ofthe countries on the United Nations Security Gouncil who are debating sanctions (China, Erance, Russia, UK, USA) are nuclear powers, and the fact that India, Israel

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and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons, Iran sees the hypocrisy in preventing Iran from developing nuclear technology.

V. CONTRADICTION ON TWO LEVELS

There are also situations when the religious and revolutionary rhetoric used for domestic audience directly contradicts the realism at work in Iran's rela- tions with the international community. These situations require delicate balancing acts by the political leaders in Iran and ofren have to be dealt with by a direct pronouncement by the supreme leader.

When the arms deal with the United States became known, many hardliners demanded to know which individuals had compromised the goals ofthe revolution by working with the "Great Satan." The arms sale demonstrated how Tehran could adopt a policy of realism but also that conflicts arise when the domestic rhetoric does not match foreign policy actions in global politics. It was Khomeini's intervention which ended the controversy. He criticized members ofthe Majlis when he said, "you should not create schism. This is contrary to Islam."^^

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY MAKERS IN THE WEST

How should western foreign policy makers deal with Tehran given the twin pressures from domestic and international politics? To begin with, the West should find shared interests with Iran and pursue common goals. Ultimately, understanding Iranian foreign policy means understanding both levels but focusing on the international playing field and national interests. Western leaders should show respect with language directed at the domestic level, but organize foreign policy around national interests and realism. The harsh rhetoric ofthe George W. Bush administration was a misguided policy. It increased tensions uàthout making security gains. Nick Burns, who handled the issue of Iran at the State Department in the George W. Bush Admin- istration admitted this when he said, "We had advocated regime change. We had a very threatening posture towards Iran for a number of years. It didn't produce any movement whatsoever."^

The Obama administration has an opportunity to improve relations

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with Tehran although this process will be fraught with difficulties. To begin with. President Obama, although he may enjoy more goodwill than his predecessor, does not have the luxury of operating wdth a blank slate. Decades of mistrust and failed policies are the legacy he has inherited. In fact, a few days after his inauguration. President Ahmadinejad demanded an apology for "crimes committed against Iran," including the 1953 coup and US support for Iraq in the 1980s.^^ The presidential election in 2009, with allegations of a fraudulent and stolen election, makes cooperation between Tehran and Washington more difHcult, although not impossible. It is more difficult because of the harsh crackdown in the aftermath of the election and the fact that the Supreme Leader is dealing with domestic instability and criticisms from various opposition leaders. President Obama's stated ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " " • ^ ^ ^ ^ M willingness to engage in direct talks with Washington should Tehran, even in the aftermath of the elec- not threaten Tehran tion and the violence that followed, may w i t h r e g i m e c h a n g e . It provide a thaw in relations between the is counterproductive ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ ̂ ^^ i« merely a first step. to threaten regime ^ o begin witii, tiie new administration

c h a n g e b e c a u s e t h a t '̂ ''̂ '̂̂ ^"^"'P^ *° "^'^^ P""^'"'^^ "̂ ^̂ ^̂ s i m p l y reaffirms Iranian '^^;''^^' witii Iranian national interests.

,. . . , Washmgton should not threaten Tehran nationalism and defense u u T J

with regime change. It is counterproduc- Of the homeland. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ' ^ " ^ " " that simply reaffirms Iranian nationalism and defense of the homeland. Given Iran's long history of foreign inter- ference (Russian and British in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), perceptions of foreign meddling tend to reinforce resentment and bting back memories of the coup in 1953. If fundamental political changes are going to occur in Iran, these changes will most likely occur from within the populace. Threats to the regime also tend to strengthen the hard line conservatives in Iran and lessen the opportunities for cooperation with the West. Offering to treat Iran with respect would also help to improve the rhetotic and interaction between these two states. President Obama's video message on the Persian holiday of Nowruz (New Year) was a first step in that direction as he emphasized mutual respect.*** In addition, Washington should give Tehran a seat at the table concerning some regional issues such

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as Iraq and Afghanistan. Inviting Iran to the table, (as the Obama admin- istration did with regard to the Afghan conference on March 31, 2009), would also send a signal of mutual respect.

Secondly, Iran and the United States share common security interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither wants Iraq to descend into chaos or a civil war. Given President Obama's desire to increase the American military presence in Afghanistan to improve the security situation there, the last thing the president wants is instability in Iraq. Tehran is also interested in the security and stability of Iraq because it does not want to deal with an influx of Iraqi refugees should the situation deteriorate. Iran appears to have taken some step in this direction as well. Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz said that the number of Iranian-made bombs had decreased at the end of 2008. He specifically indicated that US troops ^ ^ ^ ^ H I B H H ^ ^ ^ ^ H H H ^ ^ ^ were seeing less "Iranian-made Explo- Afghanistan offers sively Formed Penetrators" which had another area where previously caused significant American Washington and Tehran causalities.*"' In this respect, Tehran and ,. i. j • * x „- ,. , ^ , . have shared interests. Washington share some common goals in Iraq^hichcouldbethebasisforimprov ing relations and building trust needed to ' " Afghanistan Will deal with other issues. contribute to problems in

Afghanistan offers another area where ' ® h ra n. Washington and Tehran have shared ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • " " • ' • ' ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ interests. Gontinuing instability in Afghanistan will contribute to problems in Tehran. The production fi-om poppy fields in neighboring Afghanistan has resulted in an increase in drug-related problems in Iran. An increase in violence in Afghanistan would also likely result in more Afghan refugees showing up at Iran's border. UNHCR estimated that there were over 900,000 registered Afghan refiigees in Iran.** Washington also seeks a stable Afghanistan and one not controlled by the Taliban (or having pockets of the country controlled by the Taliban). This increased security is in both Tehran's and Washington's interest. To accomplish this goal, the Obama administration should make a concerted effort to work with Tehran on Afghan issues.

The US should try to help improve the economic situation in Iran. Given the economic problems facing Iran, including unemployment and inflation.

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the United States should formulate policies for economic investment and economic growth in Iran. President Obama's decision in March of 2009 to extend U.S. sanctions on Iran is not helpful in this regard. If oil prices remain low ($40-50 dollars a barrel down from a high of $140), this may be an opportune time to offer economic incentives to Tehran in return for cooperation on the nuclear issue and Tehran's support for terrorist groups. Economic policies that reformists and conservatives could agree on could help to develop a political coalition in Iran which had better relations with the rest ofthe world. Many ofthe political elite in Iran do not want to be isolated from the rest of the world. Political leaders in Iran have opened the door to improving relations with the United States. In January 2008, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki suggested that Iran would resume ^^m^m^^^^^mm^^^^mm^ diplomatic ties when the U.S. changed its President Obama's politics.*^ Even Khamenei said it might at decision itO extend some point be possible to improve rela- U.S. sanctions on Iran 'io"^ with the United States. is not helpful. This '̂ • '̂̂ '^^"l^ 1̂̂ ° coincide with some may be an opportune European concerns. Many European lead- .. . „ . ers tried to encourage the Bush admin- time t o offer economic . . m

_ , . lstration to offer some economic carrots incentives to Tehran .n ^̂ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^ return for cooperation ^^^^^^^ negotiations. Some European on the nuclear issue and i^^^^j.^ ̂ ^uld like to see more investment Tehran's support for j ^ Iran's energy production to provide terrorist groups. Europe with an additional source of gas. ^ ^ • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • • • • • ' ^ ^ ^ ^ Given the disruptions to European gas in December 2008 and January 2009, due to Russia's contract dispute with Ukraine, Europe would like to secure alternative energy sources and Iran offers that potential source of energy.

Lastly, another area where the U.S. and Iran could potentially cooperate is on environmental issues. Iran is currently confronting a range of environ- mental problems including destruction of ecosystems in the Caspian Sea and pollution in major cities such as Tehran. If the U.S. offered knowledge and assistance to Iran to help address pollution, this could be another step towards improving relations. It would have the further benefit of improving the lives of millions of Iranians in a politically non-threatening way.

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. CONCLUSION

Although the first years afber the revolution in Iran saw the promotion of an Islamic ideology, realism has mostly guided foreign policy there. While religious rhetoric fi'om Iranian leaders gave the impression at times of an Islamically-driven foreign policy, this was not what oftien determined the direction of Iran's relations with the rest ofthe world. It would be wrong for Washington or the West to view Tehran as solely driven by a radical Islamic ideology. Iran is best understood as a conservative, and at times, defensive state that is motivated by traditional national interests more so than religious ideology. The regime's first priority is self-preservation. That Tehran has no long-term allies only furthers the cleric's insecurity. Islamic ideology and goals (although not rhetoric) have taken a backseat to real- ism when the clerical leadership fears they are in danger of being removed fi'om power.

The regime's willingness to deal with the United States and Israel to secure arms to fight the war against Iraq in the 1980s demonstrates that Iranian political leaders were willing to sacrifice the religious ideology that drove the revolution to the realism that would allow Iran to survive as an independent state. Iran's development of nuclear energy and, potentially, nuclear weapons can also be seen as a way to ensure the survival of the regime. Given recent wars in the region (Afghanistan and Iraq) as well as American troops near its borders, it is not surprising that Iran is seeking to enhance its security/military capabilities. Tehran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas, while consistent with the religious ideology ofthe revolution, can also serve to strengthen Iran's national interests. The more Israel is forced to deal with hostilities on its borders, the less likely it will be to strike Iran.

Thus, this essay has argued that policy makers in the west should reject presenting a grand bargain to Tehran. Given the lack of trust built up over the last three decades, this is bound to fail. The best approach is to build confidence with Iran by dealing with policies in which Iran and the West share common interests. Furthering common interests in Iraq or Afghani- stan can provide the starting point for dealing with more difficult problems such as Iran's nuclear program and support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Gradually improving relations will also allow Tehran to tone down the rhetoric that has supported the clerics since 1979.

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Notes

1. Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran, (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Ken Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House, 2004). 2. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran., (New York: Times Books, 2006) page 2. 3. Wm. Scott Harrop, "Muhammad Khatami: A Dialogue beyond Paradox," in The Iranian Revolution at 30, Middle East Institute, page 115. www.mideasti. org. 4. Akbar Ganji, the journalist and dissident, called him "the latter day Sultan" given how extensive his powers are in domestic and foreign policy. "The Latter- Day Sultan: Power and Politics in Iran," Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2008) Vol 87, No. 6, pages 45-66. 5. SNSC is a body of high-ranking officials that is responsible for foreign pol- icy, military, and intelligence operations. 6. Conservatives and Reformists differ more on domestic social policy. 7. Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation, (New York: Plume, 1998), 344. 8. Various realists emphasize some theoretical concepts more than others. But most acknowledge that since the international system is anarchic, states must be concerned with security and the survival ofthe state. To ensure the survival ofthe state, leaders must enhance their military and economic capabilities. Thus power, although sometimes difficult to measure, is an important aspect of realism. Most realists also take a state-centric approach. For a discussion of realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Sdentifie Man Versus Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 1946); Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964); Jack Donnelly, Realism in International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 9. Flynt Leverett, "Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options Toward Iran," (NY: The Century Foundation, 2006). This report can be found at www.tcf.org. The authored served on the National Security Council. See also Joschka Fisher, "The Case for Bargaining with Iran," The Washington Post, May 29,2006, A23; Ted Galen Carpenter, "Toward a Grand Bargain with Iran," Med- iterranean Quarterly, 18:1 (Winter 2007), pages 12-27.

10. Ansari, 89. 11. That President Carter had allowed the Shah entry into the United States on October 22, 1979 for medical treatment only made Iranian hostility worse. 12. Mackey, p.xix.

13. Ironically, when the United States detained five Iranian diplomats from the

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Iranian consulate in Irbil (the United States denies that they were diplomats argu- ing that they were contributing to the violence in Iraq) in January 2007, Tehran protested that their detention violated international law! "Iran says U.S. stance on Iraq Talks is Ambiguous," Tehran Times, 7 / 9 / 0 7 .

14. RuhoUah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated by Hamid Algar, (Berkley: Mizan Press, 1981) page 306.

15. He said, "America is the number one enemy of the deprived and oppressed people in the world. There is no crime America will not commit in order to main- tain its political, economic, cultural and military domination of those parts of the world where it predominates. Were we to compromise with America and the other superpowers, we would not suffer from these misfortunes. But our nation is no longer ready to submit to humiliation and abjection; it prefers a bloody death to a life of shame. We are ready to be killed and we have made a covenant with God to follow the path of our leader, the Lord of the Martyrs." (Algar, page 305). 16. Takeyh, page 24. 17. Robin Wright, In the Name of God, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), page 88. 18. Ibid., 87.

19. Wright suggests that Iraq had "a five to one advantage in tanks, a nine to one edge in heavy artillery, and a six to one advantage in warplanes." Wright, 1989, pages 25 and 28. 20. Wright, page 175. 21. Gary Sick, All Fall Down, (New York: Penguin Books, 1986) p. xx. See also Mackey, page 322.

22. Graham Fuller, The Future of Politieal Islam, (New York: Palgrave Mac- millan, 2004) pages 102 and 105. 23. Tehran aided in obtaining Anderson's release. Congress had legislated against support to the Contras. Mackey, pages 326-7. 24. Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) p. 142. 25. Ansari, 119.

26. Quoted in Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in post-Khomeini Iran, (Syra- cuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), page 225. 27. Ansari, 142. 28. Takeyh, 121. 29. Chubin, 26.

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30. Bahram Rajaee, "Deciphering Iran: The Political Evolution o f t h e Islamic Republic and U.S. Foreign Policy After Sept 1 1 , " Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24:1 (2004) p. 165.

31. Ansari, 155. 32. Iran accepted millions of Afghan reñigees and agreed to assist U.S. pilots if they went down in Iranian territory. Iran also pledged over $500 million in aid to Afghanistan starting in 2002. Thus we see that in Afghanistan, American and Iranian national interests overlapped. Rajaee, 166. 33. Interview with the New Tork Times, September 26,2008. In addition, some neoconservatives do not want the reformists to get credit for improving relations with the United States for the domestic impact it may have. 34. Alan Cowell and William Broad, "Iran Reports Missile Test, Drawing Rebuke," New Tork Times, July 10, 2008. www.nydmes.com/2008/07/10/ world/asia/10iran.html?ei=5070&en=b7dlc36aa7298. 35. Iran claimed that it fired a Shahab-3 that could hit a target 1250 miles away, which would put Tel Aviv within range. There was also the question ofthe actual number of missiles fired. Some wondered about digitally altered pictures showing 4 missiles firing simultaneously. 36. BBC, "Iran in Warning to US and Israel," July 8, 2008. news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fi/-/2/hi/middle_east/7494961.stm. 37. BBC, "US Warns Iran on Missile Threat," July 10, 2008. news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fi-//2/hi/middle_east/7499198.stm. 38. Wright, page 135. 39. David Sänger, "U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site," New Tork Times, January 11, 2009. www.nydmes.com/2009/01/ll/ washington/1 liran.html. 40. Quoted in Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran, (New York: Knopf, 2000), page 66. 4 1 . Khomeini called the House of Saud "a bunch of pleasure-seeking mercenar- ies." Quoted in Mackey, page 312. 42. Moslem, 150. 43. Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel's War with Iran," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 6, (November/December 2006). 44. In May 2007 SCIRI changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council.

45. Iran remained neutral in the first Persian Gulf War. Rafsanjani specifically announced that "Iran will not interfere unless its interests are endangered." Moslem, 178.

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46. Kaveh Afrasiahi and Abbas Maleki, "Iran's Foreign Policy after 11 Septem- ber," n}eBrownJournalofWorldAffairs,(W'mtcr/Spnng2003),Vo\lX,lssue2, pp. 255-265, at p. 257. 47. Supreme Leader Khamenei stated his opposition to Israel and its people in September 2008 saying, "They (Israelis) are partners to occupying the land and possessions of Palestinian people and are the instruments ofthe Zionist authori- ties." Nazila Fathi, "Iran's Chief Cleric Says Country is Not a Friend to Israe- lis," New York Times, September 20, 2008. www.nydmes.com./2008/09/20/ world/middleeast/20iran. html.

48. Takeyh argues that in Tehran's approach to Israel it is not upholding real- ism: "During the last two decades Iran has gradually displaced ideological imper- atives with national interest calculations as a guide to its international policy, but this trajectory has not affected its approach to Israel, which still reflects the linger- ing influence of its revolutionary Islamic heritage." Page 190. 49. Michael Slackman, "Iran Gives Hamas Enthusiastic Support, but Dis- creetly, Just in Case," New Tork Times, January 13, 2009, www.nytimes. com/2009/01/13/world/middleeast/l 3iran.html. 50. The president's remarks at a Racism Conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2009 can also be seen in this light. Referring to Israel as a racist government allows Ahmadinejad to gain support in the Arab world and helps to shore up

Tlomestic support before presidential elections in June-2OO9-0ne can also seethe- Iranian president taking a hard line on Israel to give him some cover for potential talks with the United States. 51. Charles Recknagel, "Iran: Election of Ahmadinejad Unlikely to Affect Nuclear Negotiations," www.rferl.org and www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ library/news/iran/2005/iran-050627 rferlO3.htm. 52. "Islamic Law Prohibits Production of Nuclear Arms: Leader," Tehran Times, January 13, 2008. www.tehrandmes.com/index_view.asp?code=161066. Nazila Fathi, "Chief Cleric says Iran Does Not Seek Nuclear Arms," New Tork Times, June 4, 2008. www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/world/middleeast/04iran. html. 53. The Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, echoed his opposition to nuclear weapons: "Our position regarding nuclear weapons is very clear. We ftin- damentally believe that nuclear weapons—not only for small states, but for big states, big powers—is not a resolution to the problems they have, and cannot bring about security for any one of them." Interview with Fareed Zakaria, July 6, 2008, CNN. 54. Naji, page 127. 55. Israeli leaders believe that Iran is much closer to crossing the nuclear threshold than the Americans do. David Sänger and William Broad, "Allies'

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Clock Tick Differently on Iran," New Tork Times, 3/15/2009. www.nytimes. com/2009/03/15/weekinreview/15SANGER.html. 56. Elaine Sciolino, "Atomic Monitor Signals Concern over Iran's Work," New York Times, May 27, 2008. www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/world/middlee- ast/27.iran.html. "Implementation ofthe NPT Safeguards Agreement and Rel- evant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 26 May 2008. The report can be found at www. IAEA.org.

57. BBC, "UN Nuclear Agency Criticizes Iran", 9 / 1 5 / 0 8 . news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7616744.stm. 58. In 2002 an Iranian opposition group. National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), informed the world that it had evidence of Iran's nuclear program. Ansari, page 198. 59. Tehran Times, n/04/07. 60. Sue Pleming, "New U.S. Audit Questions Efficacy of Iran Sanctions," Reu- ters, January 16, 2008. www.reuters.com. 61. Nazila Fathi, "Iran's Stocks Plunge after Vote for UN Review of Nuclear Program," New Tork Times, October 9, 2005, 5. The Tehran Times has also echoed that this is in the country's national interest. In January 2009 Rafsan- jani told the French Ambassador Poletti that "using the language of threat, and unfriendly rhetoric will not help resolve the problems. Iran is truly ready to settle issues through negotiations without preconditions and within the ftamework of international law." "Rafsanjani Slams France's Stance on Iran's Nuclear Issue," Tehran Times, January 19, 2009.

62. Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, "Improving Democracy in Religious Nation- States: Norms of Moderation and Cooperation in Ireland and Iran," Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 2, (2007) page 25. See also www.WorldOpinionPoll.org.

63. Takeyh, page 109.

64. BBC, "Iran in 'backroom offers' to West" 2 / 2 0 / 0 9 . news.bbc.co.uk/go/ pr/fr/-2/hi/Europe/7901101 .stm. 65. BBC, "Iranian leader demands US apology," 1/28/09. news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7855444.stm. Former Secretary of State Albright had offered an apology towards the end ofthe Clinton administration. This apology was rejected as meaningless by the Supreme Leader Khamenei.

66. This does not mean that political leaders will immediately embrace this opportunity. Ayatollah Khamenei rejected Obama's overture saying that he was waiting for real change in U.S. policy before the relationship would improve. Given the long history of hostility between these two countries, improving

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ISLAMIC REALPOLITIÎC: TWO LEVEL IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

relations will take some time. Disregarding the rhetoric that has long been a pillar of Iranian politics will not come easily.

67. BBC, "Iran cuts support for Iraq groups," 1 2 / 1 2 / 0 8 . news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7779333.stm. 68. State Department Report on Human Rights, 2 / 2 5 / 0 9 . 69. "Iran says Break with U.S. Won't Last Forever," New York Times, 1/26/08. www.nytimes.com/reuters/washington/politics-davos-iran-usa.html.

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