Application of Opportunity Lenses
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Competing_Through_Joint_Innova.pdf
W I N T E R 2 0 1 7 I S S U E
Competing Through Joint Innovation
Vol. 58, No. 2 Reprint #58219 http://mitsmr.com/2hqpODW
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EMERGING MARKETS SUCH AS China and India have become the growth drivers of corporate R&D initiatives from all around the world.1 Although there is growing evidence that Chinese companies are
shifting their innovation focus from cost savings to knowledge-based research, the view by many in the
West remains that companies based in emerging markets are not ready to take over the role of leading
innovators from their Western competitors.2 As a result, Chinese multinationals have been at a competitive
disadvantage, particularly in strategic technology industries.
What can Chinese multinationals do to overcome Western barriers to entry in strategically important
technology industries in which “Made in China” or “Designed in China” are viewed as negatives? What
dynamic innovation capabilities — or, put another way, what culturally specific processes3 — should companies
focus on to gain acceptance in the competitive global marketplace?4
To answer these questions, I studied Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.,
the Chinese telecommunications company that has recently made sig-
nificant inroads in Europe’s mature and strategically important
telecommunications industry. (See “About the Research,” p. 28.) Huawei,
which is based in Shenzhen, is one of the first Chinese multinationals to
be competitive in the West in a strategic technology industry, making it a
potential role model for companies in China and other parts of Asia that
hope to transition from being a follower to being a market leader.5
To achieve its position, Huawei has aggressively pursued a strategy of
joint innovation with leading European customers and governments. In
this article, I will discuss how Huawei worked closely with European cus-
tomers to develop joint innovation capabilities. In the process, the company
was able to emerge as a leader in telecommunications in Europe.
Huawei’s Joint Innovation Capabilities Indian companies such as Bharti Airtel Ltd., a telecommunications services
company headquartered in New Delhi, have demonstrated the importance
of adaptive partnerships with suppliers and customers in emerging
markets.6 What sets Huawei apart are its joint innovation capabilities and
Competing Through Joint Innovation The Chinese telecommunications company Huawei recently has made significant inroads into European markets using a strategy of innovation partnerships with customers and governments. BY MANUEL HENSMANS
THE LEADING QUESTION How can com- panies from developing countries compete in technology markets?
FINDINGS Offer customized technologies that meet the pressing needs of resource- constrained customers.
Build customer loy- alty by partnering with customers on innovation.
Enlist the support of governments and industry stakeholders.
WINTER 2017 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 27PLEASE NOTE THAT GRAY AREAS REFLECT ARTWORK THAT HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY REMOVED. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE ARTICLE APPEARS AS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED.
the conditions that prompted and are still fueling
their development. (See “The Building Blocks of
Huawei’s Joint Innovation Strategy,” p. 29.)
Although a common Western view is that China’s
culture of innovation is constrained by cultural and
political forces, the reality is that China has a strong en-
trepreneurial side.7 Many Chinese entrepreneurs have
aspirations and innovation leadership goals that are
aligned with their North American and European
counterparts. Less than a decade after the company
was founded in 1987, Huawei announced that it
wanted to become one of the world’s leading players in
telecommunications. From the beginning, it has re-
cruited talented engineering graduates from top
Chinese universities with competitive salaries and em-
ployee bonuses, and it has made a point of investing
10% or more of its sales in R&D projects as a way to
compete with Western competitors.
Huawei has effectively turned some of the core
values from China’s Cultural Revolution, such as
self-criticism and constant struggle, in the direction
of competition8 while also tapping into more mod-
ern Chinese social values to advance innovation. For
example, success and ambition are highly valued in
China, yet Chinese employees tend to be less focused
on receiving personal credit than their Western
counterparts and more willing to admit to failure.9
Huawei, which had 2015 revenue of $60.1 billion,
has reinforced its values with employee ownership
and a bonus-driven management structure.10
In the early days, Huawei’s strategy in China was
to target rural townships far from the centers of
power and multinational attention. Local opera-
tors, hotels, and factories needed customized
networking gear and central office switches that
could operate under local conditions such as poor
transmission quality (and even rats chewing elec-
trical wires). Because Huawei was not able to obtain
capital from banks or government at that time, its
earliest R&D efforts focused on working with its
local customers on customized, cost-effective solu-
tions. By taking the time and making the necessary
investments to address their requirements, Huawei
was able to overcome barriers to entry that typically
stood in the way of private companies in China.
Local bureaucrats operating far from the centers of
capital and power began to see Huawei as an im-
portant vehicle for public-private cooperation.
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Through its work with local operators in China,
Huawei learned how to collaborate successfully
with partners (including governments) to provide
customized telecommunications equipment. Even-
tually, it was able to leverage this capability to gain
a foothold with China’s largest telecom customers
in the major cities. Huawei’s CEO and founder,
Ren Zhengfei, who came from a rural town and was
an engineer and scientist in the People’s Liberation
Army, has attributed the company’s approach to in-
novation to two very different main influences: the
principles of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and
the customer-centric views of former IBM Corp.
CEO Louis Gerstner.11
A Three-Stage Strategy for Europe In order to make inroads in Europe, Huawei has
typically relied on the same strategy it used to build
its market position in China: (1) offer customized
technologies that meet the practical needs and
resource constraints of target customers; (2) build
customer loyalty by enhancing practical innovation
with longer-term joint innovation partnerships; and
(3) enlist the support of governments, universities,
and other industry stakeholders by customizing fur-
ther innovation investments to their priorities, so as
to be viewed as a “model citizen.”12 (See “Huawei’s
Three-Stage Approach,” p. 30.)
While the first two stages are sequential, the tim-
ing for the third stage varies depending on the
particular innovation context and the barriers to
entry in the specific market. Some markets, such as
the United States, have been especially difficult to
penetrate, as will be discussed. Regardless of the
exact chronology, the three stages often overlap, as
Huawei’s innovation experience in both China and
Europe demonstrates.
STAGE 1: Offer customized technologies that
meet the practical needs and resource constraints
of target customers. Anticipating significant cus-
tomer and government barriers to entry in Western
European markets, Huawei starting sending em-
ployees there beginning in 2001. Even with direct
support from top management, Huawei had a diffi-
cult time persuading European operators that
a Chinese company was capable of producing
anything but simple products — especially the state-
of-the-art, high-tech equipment they sought. The
first breakthrough occurred in 2004 with Telfort
B.V., a mobile telecommunications provider based
in Amsterdam. At the time, Telfort billed itself as a
no-frills challenger to the established norms of the
mobile industry. Lacking the financial strength of
bigger operators such as London-based Vodafone or
Paris-based France Télécom (now Orange), and
looking for a way to go up against established equip-
ment suppliers such as Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent,
Telfort was willing to make a bet on Huawei’s
products.13 Huawei demonstrated a refreshing will-
ingness to listen closely to Telfort’s requests and find
smart solutions to its unmet needs. By working
closely with Telfort, Huawei was able to produce a
distributed base station that cost less and required
less energy to operate than traditional ones.
Winning over customers such as Telfort was no
easy feat. To do so, Huawei had to present a low-risk
alternative to what the established vendors pro-
vided. It achieved this by offering free testing and
technical support. The hardware itself was often
priced significantly below that of established com-
petitors.14 What’s more, instead of limiting service
to typical Monday through Friday business hours,
Huawei promised service availability 24/7, with
equipment transportation, installation, and main-
tenance at no extra charge.
Huawei’s innovation model has been closely
tied to its heavy investment in R&D. The company
has typically invested more than 10% of its reve-
nues in R&D during the past 15 years, outspending
its European competitors in absolute terms.15
Given the relatively low cost of Chinese engineer-
ing talent, Huawei is able to assign more engineers
to projects than its competitors can. For instance,
even when the company had its first conversations
with prospective customers in Western Europe
in 2000, it employed 10,000 university-trained
engineers. Today, it employs more than 50,000
developers and engineers, more than any of its
Western competitors. In its attempts to be seen as
best of class, Huawei made huge investments in
technology testing, and it has encouraged employ-
ees to get involved with the major standardization
bodies. Through these actions, Huawei has com-
municated the emphasis it places on quality while
still offering custom solutions that are configured
to meet the needs of individual customers.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH This article is based on a five-year study of how Chinese technology com- panies have upgraded their capabilities in the European Union.i Not only had Huawei become a leading telecommunica- tions equipment provider and a leader in terms of its number of patent applica- tions, competitors were recognizing its innovation collaborations with Euro- pean telecom operators as best practice. To under- stand the origins of Huawei’s success, I studied the company’s development from 1987 through its emergence as an influential competitor in the European Union. With the help of two research assistants, I conducted 56 semistructured inter- views with Huawei managers, competitors, policymakers, lobbyists, and customers in China, the European Union, North America, and Latin America, and reviewed materials such as com- pany histories, annual reports, internal docu- ments, and other reports. We explored how Huawei managers were able to convince customers in China and Western Europe to choose their services and products over those of established competitors and how it developed its innovation capability.
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STAGE 2: Build customer loyalty by enhancing
practical innovation w ith longer-ter m joint
innovation partnerships. On its own, Huawei’s
customer-centered perspective was only able to
take the company so far. Indeed, the company had
to work hard to counter the perception that its
products were not up to the quality of those made
by competitors. Huawei began to downplay that it
was the least expensive provider; while offering
highly competitive prices, it emphasizes its ability
to mobilize its large numbers of technical people to
design and implement smart solutions quickly.
Huawei’s innovation strategy began to pay off in
significant ways after it signed a deal in 2005 with
Vodafone, one of the largest mobile telecommuni-
cations companies in the world. Eager to gain an
edge against Telefónica in Spain, Telefónica’s home
market, Vodafone looked for an equipment sup-
plier that could help it build a large number of
third-generation wireless network base stations
using the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommuni-
cations System) standard. It selected Huawei over
leading competitors to provide the radio-access
part of the network. What distinguished Huawei’s
winning bid from those of others was only partly
price; it was also the speed of execution. Huawei
helped Vodafone build and install 10,000 base sta-
tions within one year, two to three times faster than
competitors.16
In 2011, Telenor Group, a large Norwegian mobile
telecommunications company that operates in Scan-
dinavia, Eastern Europe, and Asia, became another
Huawei customer. Telenor wanted to build a high-
speed wireless base station in one of the most remote
and frigid parts of Norway. Other equipment provid-
ers shunned the project due to the extreme working
conditions, the tight schedule, and high overhead
costs, leaving Huawei as the sole bidder. Huawei used
the project to showcase the practicality of its latest net-
work solution, which supported multiple mobile
communications standards and wireless telephone
services on one network. At the same time, the
company demonstrated the flexibility and customer-
centricity of its engineers and its ability to perform
under adverse conditions. Using a wide range of
transportation modes (including helicopters and
snowmobiles), Huawei engineers completed the 4G
wireless base-station project faster than expected.
Huawei was able to formalize its relationships
with leading European operators such as Vodafone
and Telenor by establishing what it calls joint inno-
vation centers, which provide a collaborative
environment for managing the customer-supplier
relationship and remove some of the long-term
uncertainties. Joint innovation centers provide a
platform for Huawei and its customers to work
through complex issues together.
Rather than undertaking several projects at once,
joint innovation centers focus on one problem at a
time. Representatives of the telecom operator and
Huawei come together to explore problems and
potential solutions. Input from senior management
on both sides is an important part of the process.
Such high-level involvement helps build trust, which
is reinforced by clear rules for protecting intellectual
property and sharing risk.
To appreciate how joint innovation centers work
and how they can enhance strategic partnerships
with operators, consider the way Huawei collabo-
rated with Vodafone in 2006 and 2007 to develop a
radio-access technology to enable mobile telecom-
munications operators to support multiple mobile
communications standards and wireless telephone
services on one network. To manage this project,
Vodafone’s global network director and a director of
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HUAWEI’S JOINT INNOVATION STRATEGY Huawei has relied on a combination of practices as the basis of its joint innovation strategy. These building blocks have been effective in both emerging and developed markets.
INNOVATE FROM THE PERIPHERY
TO THE CENTER
• Build an independent R&D path via customers with challenging needs
• Develop partnerships with governments
TARGET CUSTOMERS WITH
CHALLENGING NEEDS BEFORE MAINSTREAM CUSTOMERS
• Start by building quality partnerships with customers with challenging needs
• Use customization to lock in the relationship
FOCUS ON INNOVATING
WITH CUSTOMERS
• Think in terms of joint innovation pull rather than technology push
• Solve customer problems through joint innovation centers
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Huawei’s enterprise management team brought
their teams to Madrid twice a year, where they re-
viewed progress and determined what to do next.
The Vodafone and Huawei engineers had identi-
fied a looming strategic problem: Vodafone needed
to retire 110,000 2G sites over the next three years and
replace them with equipment to support the next
generation of mobile technology. Realizing how
disruptive the transition might be for Vodafone
and its customers, the team proposed investigating a
less complicated (and less expensive) way to achieve
the network upgrade, using software rather than
hardware; the steering committee agreed to invest
substantial resources.
The project involved significant risks for both
companies. Although there was the possibility that
Huawei could neutralize the technological threat that
loomed over 2G network owners, doing so would re-
quire significant investment at a time when its role in
the European network infrastructure was extremely
limited. For Vodafone, there was a question of whether
casting its lot with Huawei, a relative upstart, was a
prudent move. As the industry wrestled over the fu-
ture industry standard, no doubt there were safer
moves. At this juncture, the two companies recog-
nized that they needed to move beyond the traditional
supplier-buyer model to embrace joint innovation.
This also involved sorting out the intellectual
property rights issues that may ensue from the
codevelopment of a distributed base station. As part
of their agreement to work together, Huawei and
Vodafone agreed to protect each other’s intellectual
property in the domain they were working in. After
two years of development and several meetings, Hua-
wei delivered the first updated network in 2008. The
solution increased wireless coverage by 25%, reduced
the number of required base-station sites by 40%,
and reduced the total cost of ownership by one-third.
Between 2006 to 2012, Huawei and Vodafone
teamed up on six joint innovation centers. Although
the solutions Huawei and Vodafone develop have been
geared toward solving particular problems, they have
greatly expanded Huawei’s global solution capabilities.
In 2011, the two companies saw an opportunity to link
the joint innovation centers together, thereby enhanc-
ing Huawei’s capability to provide more efficient
global solutions to Vodafone and new customers.
By 2016, Huawei was partnering with a list of
leading European telecom operators that included
Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom, BT, Orange, and
Telefónica in 18 joint innovation centers; in all, it had
34 innovation centers around the world. “The joint
innovation centers really changed perceptions of
Huawei from being a follower to being a leader,” a
senior executive at Ericsson said.17 Huawei’s approach
was so successful that competitors such as Ericsson
established joint innovation partnerships of their
own to develop practical and long-term innovations.
HUAWEI’S THREE-STAGE APPROACH In order to make inroads in Europe, Huawei has relied on a three-pronged strategy to attract business and collaborate with leading customers and governments.
• Appeal to resource-challenged customers with practical innovation
• Identify customers with pressing needs
• Offer a practical customization model
• Provide top executive support
• Capture the mainstream market through joint innovation
• Solve a pressing customer need that Western competitors can’t or won’t solve
• Use joint innovation centers (50/50 ownership)
• Save customers money and time
• Offer customized solutions from conception to delivery
• Ground innovation in model citizenship
• Respond to public scrutiny by offering investments that benefit the public
• Launch innovation projects that create skilled jobs and raise R&D investments in the host country
STAGE 1
OFFER CUSTOMIZATION FOR CUSTOMERS WITH CHALLENGING NEEDS
STAGE 2
USE PARTNERSHIPS TO ENTER THE MAINSTREAM
STAGE 3
FOSTER PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
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STAGE 3: Enlist the support of governments,
universities, and other industry stakeholders. The
success of Huawei’s approach to innovation has also
depended on being accepted by governments and
larger industry players. Although it’s common for
multinationals to try to gain the favor of governments
in the countries they seek to do business in by offering
to build local manufacturing facilities, hiring well-
connected local representatives, or launching PR
campaigns,18 Huawei has gone to considerable lengths
to present itself as the kind of partner European gov-
ernments could work with. During the global
financial crisis and the subsequent recession, for ex-
ample, the company maintained high levels of
investment in R&D in Europe and became a cham-
pion for major innovation projects. To consolidate its
market position in Europe, it set up a special public
affairs and communications office in Brussels whose
job is to frame the company’s investments in terms of
how they advance the efforts of European govern-
ments and industry players to meet the global
innovation challenges of the 21st century. In 2013,
Huawei pledged to create 5,500 new jobs in Europe by
2019, which would increase its number of employees
in the European Union by more than 50%. One of
Huawei’s new initiatives is a R&D center in Belgium
that will spearhead and coordinate research around
standards for 5G telecommunications from 18 R&D
sites in Europe. Another is a collaborative effort lo-
cated in Munich, Germany, called Openlab, which
aims to work with partner companies such as Intel
and SAP to drive innovation in areas such as the inter-
net of things, cloud computing, and big data.19
Huawei’s expansion in Europe follows a pattern
that closely resembles the one the company used to
build its position in China: Start at the perimeter and
work toward the center. In Europe, Huawei initially
targeted business opportunities in the United King-
dom and Hungary. Both governments seemed open to
hedging their bets away from European Union
companies and toward China and China-based com-
panies. A big break came at the end of 2005, when
Huawei was awarded a contract to provide transmis-
sion equipment to BT to upgrade its network. In
selecting Huawei as a European supplier, BT gave
Huawei an important boost in the European Union.
Huawei has also benefited from its ties to Hun-
gary.20 In 2009, the company chose to locate its
European distribution center in Hungary, and in
2011 it invested in a logistics center there, serving
Europe, North Africa, Russia, and the Middle
East.21 In the wake of these investments, Hungary
has been instrumental in promoting broader ac-
ceptance of Huawei by other EU governments.
Huawei’s relationship with France has been more
challenging. A 2012 report on cyberdefense by the
French Senate recommended prohibiting the use of
Chinese routers in either French or European telecom-
munications infrastructure.22 In response to France’s
security concerns, Huawei in 2012 vowed to become
more transparent; among other things, it promised to
divulge its source codes to the French and European
governments. In 2014, the company also took an un-
usual position with regard to French taxes. At a time
when global companies such as Google Inc. were being
criticized for not paying their fair share of taxes to the
French government, Huawei France decided to forgo
some of the tax benefits it might have claimed (from
R&D credits and losses). Huawei also made a commit-
ment to invest $1.9 billion in R&D facilities in France
by 2018, which was expected to generate about 2,000
new technical jobs through direct hires and sourcing
from the French tech ecosystem made up of local sup-
pliers, universities, research centers, and startups.
Impediments to Growth Huawei has moved from relative obscurity to being a
significant force in the telecommunications industry
and has shown an ability to work closely with cus-
tomers to solve difficult problems and address their
Huawei’s expansion in Europe follows a pattern that closely resembles the one the company used to build its position in China: Start at the perimeter and work toward the center.
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unmet needs. Despite the company’s market accep-
tance in Europe, though, it has been seriously stymied
in its efforts to break into the telecommunications
equipment market in the United States. Although
Huawei has had cooperative research relationships
with major U.S. companies including IBM, Intel,
Microsoft, and Qualcomm, it has faced questions
about its policies about intellectual property and
about the potential for espionage by China. In
particular, it has faced suspicion from the U.S. gov-
ernment on national security grounds.23
In 2008, a U.S. government panel rejected Hua-
wei’s attempt to acquire 3Com Corp., a maker of
internet router and networking equipment, citing
concerns about national security. 3Com made anti-
hacking computer software for the U.S. military,
among other things, and Huawei is thought to have
ties to the Chinese military.24 Similarly, Huawei was
forced to abandon plans in 2011 to purchase 3Leaf
Systems Inc., a U.S.-based company specializing in
server virtualization solutions.25 Although Huawei
executives including CEO Ren have consistently
denied espionage allegations, saying that Huawei
has no ties to the Chinese government and that it
has never received a request from the Chinese gov-
ernment to spy on the United States, security
concerns continue to limit Huawei’s ability to sell
network equipment to U.S. companies.
Lately, Huawei has been making a strong push to
expand beyond telecommunications equipment
into consumer products. After several years of sup-
plying operators such as Vodafone and Orange
with unbranded handsets, Huawei in 2011 set up a
division to launch branded smartphones and, more
recently, smart watches.26 By the summer of 2016,
the company’s consumer division made up more
than 30% of revenues, and in 2015, it was the first
Chinese company to sell more than 100 million
smartphones in a year.
The extent to which the U.S. intelligence con-
cerns will influence Huawei’s position with other
governments remains to be seen. Australian gov-
ernment officials, for example, have voiced security
concerns and raised the prospect of prohibiting the
use of certain Huawei products in its network
infrastructure.27 So far, Huawei has attempted to tie
its brand closely to innovation and economic
development within the markets in which it does
business. How well it will be able to continue with
this strategy going forward remains to be seen.
Manuel Hensmans is a professor of strategy and innovation at Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management in Brussels, Belgium. Comment on this article at http://sloanreview.mit.edu/x/58219, or contact the author at [email protected].
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In 2008, a U.S. government panel rejected Huawei’s attempt to acquire 3Com Corp., a maker of internet router and networking equipment, citing concerns about national security.
SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU WINTER 2017 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 33
Innovators,” press release, Nov. 6, 2014, www.prnewswire .com; and Interbrand, “Best Global Brands 2014,” n.d., www.rankingthebrands.com. For more on the need for Chinese firms to strategically transform, see the Chinese edition of M. Hensmans, G. Johnson, and G. Yip, ”Strategic Transformation,” originally published in Basingstoke, United Kingdom, by Palgrave Macmillan in 2013 and published in Beijing in 2015 by China Machine Press.
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12. In a 2012 interview, John Lord, chairman of Huawei’s Australian division, described its approach: “We’re devel- oping a model and once that model is mature, that model will be exported to other regions and countries around the world.” See “China’s Huawei Vows to Become More Transparent,” Oct. 24, 2012, www.reuters.com.
13. “Huawei Technologies Has Been Selected by Dutch Operator Telfort B.V. for Its UMTS Roll-Out,” news release, Dec. 9, 2004, http://pr.huawei.com.
14. This was part of a policy of offering extremely high rebates (anywhere from 35% up to 95%) in return for a long-term relationship. Huawei’s top management initially came to Europe to personally offer discounts to potential customers. This practice was considered illegitimate by leading European customers, however, as well as proof of the low-quality, “imitation” reputation of Chinese technology companies. Huawei subsequently hired local account managers. Based on their input, the company ended its discount practices and upgraded its price offering to be in line with European expectations of a quality offering.
15. According to the companies’ annual reports, Huawei has outspent its main European competitors of Ericsson, Nokia, and Alcatel-Lucent in absolute terms since 2010, beating Ericsson even in relative percentage terms since 2015. Nevertheless, Huawei obtains an increasingly large share of its revenues from the less R&D-intensive B2C segment of smartphones.
16. T. Wei, Huawei Technologies vice president of delivery management, interview with the author, Jan. 10, 2015.
17. Ericsson executive, interview with the author, June 5, 2015.
18. See, for example, J. Cherry, “Korean Multinationals in Europe” (Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 2001); and M. Mason and D. Encarnation, eds., “Does Ownership Matter?: Japanese Multinationals in Europe” (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1994). On lobbying and localization of personnel, see Y. Hamada, “The Impact of the Traditional Business–Government Relationship on the Europeanization of Japanese Firms,” Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 3 (April 2007): 404-421.
19. R. Ding, “Open Innovation for a Better Connected World,” November 2015, www.huawei.com; and C. Gnam, “Munich Becomes Europe’s Leading Hub for IoT,” Invest in Bavaria (blog), March 21, 2016, www.invest-in- bavaria.com.
20. “Beijing Considers Hungary Bridgehead to Europe, Says Chinese Formin,” Oct. 29, 2014, http://dailynewshungary.com.
21. “Hungarian PM Welcomes Upgrade to Huawei Logistics Center,” Dec. 3, 2013, www.chinadaily.com.
22. Sénat, “Rapport d’information de M. Jean-Marie Bockel, fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées,” July 18, 2012, www.senat.fr.
23. See, for example, “The Company That Spooked the World,” The Economist, Aug. 4, 2012; and M. Kan, “China’s Huawei and ZTE Grilled by U.S. Committee Over Spying Concerns,” Sept. 14, 2012, www.pcworld.com.
24. S.R. Weisman, “Sale of 3Com to Huawei Is Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns,” The New York Times, Feb. 21, 2008.
25. M. Kan, “China’s Huawei to Reverse Controversial Deal for 3Leaf,” Feb. 19, 2011, www.pcworld.com.
26. L. Lucas, “Huawei’s Smartwatch Tries to Win the West,” Financial Times, Sept. 26, 2016.
27. B. Grubb, “Telcos Could Face Huawei Ban, Malcolm Turnbull Confirms,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 27, 2015; and A. Coyne, “Australian MPs Still Scared of Huawei,” Oct. 17, 2016, www.itnews.com.au.
i. See also M. Hensmans and G. Liu, “How Do the Normativity of Headquarters and the Knowledge Autonomy of Subsidiaries Co-Evolve?” iCite working paper WP2016-020, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium, Oct. 11, 2016, https://ideas.repec.org.
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