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Combat Engineers in the Dominican Republic, 1965 Author(s): H. F. CAMERON JR. Source: The Military Engineer, Vol. 58, No. 381 (January-February 1966), pp. 30-33 Published by: Society of American Military Engineers Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44556997 Accessed: 14-05-2020 04:57 UTC

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Combat Engineers in the Dominican Republic, 1965

By Col. H. F. CAMERON, JR. Corps of Engineers, United States Army

ENGINEER potential lic constitute that operations can a good be developed in example the Dominican of in a the truly engineer Repub- joint ENGINEER lic constitute a good example of the engineer potential that can be developed in a truly joint operation. They show the effects of the present status of planning and the result of recent reorganizations in the United States armed services.

BUILD-UP OF FORCES

The build-up of forces during the early phases of the operation very clearly demonstrate the results of the present-day tendency to "play by ear" in an emergency. The operations in the Dominican Re- public were evolved from a study of the terrain, the estimated potential of the opposing forces, and the total force needed to cope with the emergency. The engineer troop list was developed and phased in to provide a balanced force equipped and supplied to support the operations. Combat engineers were to be moved with the early landing units and were to be promptly followed by corps units equipped for spe- cial tasks. The point of entry either by parachute or air-landing was to be the San Isidro Air Base. The possibility of the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River being destroyed was anticipated and sufficient crossing equipment for this major obstacle was in- cluded with the following echelon. Class II and IV materials were computed and programmed for the missions of the engineer force.

In the initial deployment, a Marine force made an amphibious landing west of Santo Domingo and se- cured the western approaches to the city, and Army elements air-landed without opposition and secured a bridgehead across the Ozama River. The American Forces were assigned to keep peace and contain op- posing forces until the establishment of a stable

government. With this assignment, it became obvi- ous that more troops would be needed to link up rapidly with the Marines by opening a corridor from the Duarte Bridge to the International Zone estab- lished by the Marines.

Additional combat troops, required for this move, were poured into the objective area and flight pri- orities were adjusted to provide for this troop in- crease. In turn, the phase in of engineer combat support troops lagged, and the engineer troop list and schedule were changed.

The Marines landed on April 28 supported by a platoon from Company B, 2d Engineer Battalion (Marine). The 82d Airborne Division began to land at San Isidro Air Base early in the morning of April 30 supported by Company C of the 307th Engineers. On May 1, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade set up headquarters ashore. On the following day a Tac- tical Command Post, Company B (-) of the 307th En- gineers, and a Tactical Engineer Section of XVIII Airborne Corps landed and became operational.

To increase the engineer support, the Division Engineer requested a utility detachment on May 3 and the Corps Engineer simultaneously recommended that the follow-up company from the 70th Engineers be shipped immediately. It was apparent that the en- gineering needs of the command could not be met by the troops in the area. The Corps Engineer, therefore, gave emergency priority for air shipment to the 618th Airborne Engineer Company (LE) and requested a reproduction detachment from the 66th Engineer Company (Topographic). On May 4 the third com- pany of the 307th Engineers and the 86th Engineer

Key Positions in the Dominican Republic, May 1965

JU The Military Engineer, January-February, 1966

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Detachment (Utility) arrived. On May 5, the Ma- rines brought ashore a platoon of Company C, 2d Engineers, and a detachment of the 64th Engineer Company (Field Maintenance) arrived. On May 6, the first platoon of the 618th Engineers landed, a platoon of Company B, 2d Engineers (Marine), and a section from the 66th Engineer Company (Topo- graphic) arrived. By night of May 7, the 618th En- gineers had closed in the objective area. On May 10, a Marine platoon from Company C, 8th Engineer Battalion (Marine), came ashore and on May 14 the rear echelon of the 307th Engineers arrived. This completed the engineer build-up until May 25 when a detachment of the Navy 2d Seabee Battalion came ashore. The large size of the American Forces in the area caused a freeze to be placed on any additional troops, and the sea-lifted engineers never reached the objective area.

OPERATIONS

The operations of this Joint Engineer Force were as varied as any ever encountered and reflect the changed conditions one can expect in a cold war emergency - very different from the type of warfare taught in service schools. The Marine Engineers and the Airborne Combat Engineers were attached to early landing units until link-up and the establish- ment of a fixed line of communication (LOC) on May 3. Emphasis then switched from assault to barrier operations. The Marine Engineers formed into a composite force under the Brigade Engineer and concentrated on the construction of emplace- ments using 300,000 sandbags and 3,000 rolls of con- certina. The Airborne Engineers kept the combat engineers attached to brigades and supported them with the light equipment company. They used 36,000 sandbags and 1,500 rolls of concertina in their sec- tor, and reinforced their positions with some 200 portable chevaux-de-frise which they made from local timber and barbed wire, and by emplacing three hundred 55-gallon drums filled with earth. The rapid strengthening of the barriers gave a strong, defensible position. The engineering effort was then directed toward improving the living conditions of the troops and preparing a logistical base area.

The retention of United States forces in a fixed corridor (while ensuring the containment of the op- posing forces and the separation of the two warring Dominican factions) placed the Americans in the awkward position of having only a small beach to the west of Santo Domingo to support the Marines and an airfield east of Santo Domingo to support the Army. The Port of Santo Domingo was com- pletely dominated by the surrounded forces, and the Port of Jaina was occupied by the Dominican Navy. Since the United States was neutral, they could not use this port. The air support, with planes landing every five minutes, was tremendous but was not suf- ficient for continued support of so large a force. Seaborne supplies were at sea, but there was still no adequate place to land them. A small sugar port, Port Andres, 30 miles east of Santo Domingo, of- fered a solution. Engineers reconnoitered the site on May 8 and on May 10 a secondary depot was begun with the building of two LST ramps, a net of distri- bution roads with hard stands, and a portable POL storage area. The urgency of this work can be real- ized since port work was started on May 10 and the

Portable Barriers Built by Combat Engineers in Santo Domingo

first LST beached on May 11. The work of the 618th Engineers in this area was hectic in their efforts to keep ahead of the incoming supplies.

In the stalemate following the stabilization of the LOC another problem arose. It was in the interest of the American Forces to encourage the rapid re- opening of industry and a return to normal. POL was the key to this. Although the Americans con- trolled the large POL tank farm east of the Ozama River, they could not replenish stocks while the sur- rounded forces dominated the discharge point in the harbor. Fuel reserves shrank rapidly as civilian tankers made daily trips all over the island. In addition to the gasoline for the local economy, the shortage of fuel for the steam power plant, which produces 75 percent of the power generated in the entire country, was growing acute. A joint POL con- ference, including local oil men and Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives, was held on May 9 to solve the problem. The development of a floating POL discharge point was agreed upon. The Army was to

Forward Observation Post in City Street

The Military Engineer, No. 381 31

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blast a ramp through the coral cliffs in a position defiladed from opposing fire; the Navy would rig a floating discharge point and install a 6-inch black fuel line; and a Marine Bulk Fuel Unit would lay two floating 4-inch white fuel lines. Work on this project began on May 19, and, despite a storm on May 26 that closed operations for four days because of high seas, the first oil went through the line on May 31. Daily discharges soon doubled the daily consumption and this problem was licked.

The electricity throughout the city was frequently interrupted as gunfire severed lines or hit trans- formers. The city electrical employees under the guidance of the 307th Engineers made rapid repairs several times under fire, and by the time of the cease fire order on May 21 had restored fairly dependable power throughout most of the city.

Unusual engineer assignments in this type of oper- ation should be recorded because of their difference from the "normal" engineer work and because of the ingenuity shown in adapting to the situation. The LOC was barely passable on May 3 and was cluttered with a mass of burned vehicles, destroyed barricades, and piles of uncollected garbage, the lat- ter possibly threatening an epidemic. Eleven of the seventeen city garbage trucks had been destroyed in the fighting, and the city incinerator had been damaged by gunfire and was inoperable. The 307th Engineers got the incinerator working, organized the local people into sweeping units, and, with the 618th Engineers' loaders, soon had the cleanest area that many Santo Domingans had ever seen.

Being tied to a fixed position and not firing until fired upon was extremely exasperating and costly in casualties. Sneak attacks were made by the opposing elements in violation of the cease-fire order. They crawled within grenade range of an outpost, tossed a grenade or fired submachine guns, and dodged into buildings before fire could be returned. City street lights were mounted on a makeshift bracket which placed them out in the street facing toward the enemy. These lights were controlled from the out- posts and could be flipped on as desired. The ef- fectiveness of these lights is attested by the fact that complaints were made to the OAS that their use constituted an aggressive act, was insulting, and showed a lack of confidence in cease-fire agreements.

ENGINEER INTELLIGENCE AND MAPPING

The need for an accurate city map with correct street names for tactical planning and detailed re- porting was critical. On May 4, the Engineer Section of corps sent a noncommissioned officer to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with a corrected map (scale 1:12,800) which had been obtained locally. On May 5, the 66th Engineer Company turned out 1,200 copies of a black and white reproduction which were sent to the Dominican Republic and distributed to the units there that same day/ Reports and over- lays in even greater detail were needed, so the map was blown up on May 6. The demands for more de- tails for city combat increased, and the 66th En- gineers promptly provided a map to a scale of ap- proximately 1 :6,250. The Army Map Service revised its first edition of the city plan of Santo Domingo using reconnaissance photography, and published a new edition on May 12 and a third edition .on May 15. These editions did not contain revised street

Emergency POL Line

names. Correction information was received by the Army Map Service on June 8 and the revised map was published on June 17. This was received in the Dominican Republic on June 18.

The need for the city map and information on the water, electrical, and sewage distribution systems was urgent right from the start. Prints of the three utility systems were field checked, and brought up to date in the office of the Corps Engineer for actual operations. The need for speed must be stressed if map production is to stay ahead of the requirements in cold war operations.

WATER SUPPLY

Water supply in Santo Domingo could have been an extremely difficult problem. One of the worst droughts recorded in the country had just ended. There was practically no surface water and the few limited sources were too brackish for use. There were a few deep wells east of the city which were tied into the city water system. This was in a poor operational state. There were numerous leaks and breaks in the mains, the reservoir was at an all time low, and there were many makeshift temporary repairs that formed bottlenecks where small pipes had been in- stalled to bypass major breaks. Pressure within the system was low, and in outlying areas, such as the San Isidro Air Base, it could not raise water to the second floor of buildings. At first, the water points of tactical units were considered sufficient for the operations, but the increase in forces made them inadequate almost immediately.

As in other phases of the engineer operations, in- stantaneous reaction to the change in troop strength had to be made. The revised troop list required more ļ water than was originally considered essential. To meet this, a detachment of the 14th Engineers (Com- bat) from Fort Bragg brought in two 1,500-gph Erdlators on May 3. The main source of supply was from local fire hydrants. At the start of opera- tions many of these were in forward positions and were fired upon by snipers. The engineer water points produced all the water needed despite the tactical and operational handicaps.

Water distribution showed the usual curve. The initial low requirement of active combat was fol-

32 The Military Engineer, January-February, 1966 !

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lowed by a period of minor use as troops drank all the local soft drinks. As the soldiers' money ran out and the active combat was reduced, water re- quirements reached a peak and did not slack off until the supported troop strength was reduced.

The hot weather brought with it the demand for potable ice. The medics approved production in a local plant if the whole plant were scrubbed with a super-saturated chlorine solution. An adjacent water point provided 9,000 gallons of treated water per day to the sanitized plant.

The Marines can probably be credited with the most exotic water point in history beside the swim- ming pool at the stylish Embajador Hotel where the operators under palm-thatched shelters were sur- rounded by bikini-clad sunbathers.

The first million gallons of treated water were de- livered by May 25.

ORGANIZATION

The problems of the "Directorate"-oriented staff to cope with actual field operations were of particular interest. The United States Forces Dominican Re- public staff has an Engineer who normally has oper- ational control of all nondivisional engineer units, and co-ordinates and directs all engineer activities in the theater. The 82d Airborne Division and the 4th Marine Engineer Brigade were organized similarly, each with an Engineer responsible for operations. The other major command, organized "functionally" with a directorate-type staff, had an engineer officer in the Director of Supply Maintenance and Service Section, but he was ordered away early in the oper- ations.

The Force Engineer, the Brigade Engineer, and the Division Engineer worked effectively as a team which was able to employ engineers very efficiently to support the force as a whole and to assist each other as required. The organization, with a func- tional set-up, could not develop requirements or re- spond readily to operational engineer requirements. Subordinate units were unaccustomed to operating in this type of organization and did not know where to turn for engineer support. As a result, most of them applied directly to the Force Engineer, by- passing channels. Those following channels found

Vehicles Being Checked by Troops at Santo Domingo Barricade

that their requests ended up in different sections and were held for additional justification by staff officers who did not know the requirements and were technically incapable of evaluating them. Delay and frustration ensued. The ultimate absurdity of this system came to light when planning for resupply. The only engineer officer remaining in the command, a second lieutenant commanding a small detachment of a maintenance unit, was assigned to develop the 30-day requirement for engineer spare parts and lumber. In sheer dismay, he appealed to the Force Engineer who assisted him in solving his problem.

LESSONS

No new doctrine or startling theories have evolved from this operation, but the most important points can be summed up.

Planning must not be completely discarded in an actual operation. Senior staffs must utilize the long- developed professional competence of the special staff officers to ensure that the force deployed is balanced and that the combat support and service support reach the objective area in the proper time to perform the mission, or face the possibility of failure.

Combat is still the most demanding and un- predictable taskmaster. In reaction to cold war pres- sures, flexibility and rapid reaction to changing con- ditions are essential.

Intelligence and mapping personnel must be pre- pared to provide the material needed by the highly mobile, fast-reacting forces being deployed in flash operations.

Present troop and equipment organizations are in- adequate for world-wide deployments now in force. Task forces of tactical troops tailored to particular situations and environments must be accompanied by tailored support units with specialists and equip- ment for the specific mission. The Engineer Tables of Organization and Equipment, carefully and prop- erly developed to support a general war against an organized enemy, are too wasteful in men and equip- ment for present-day "brush-fire" operations. In such operations, the emphasis is on re-establishing slightly damaged utilities rather than full recon- struction of lines of communications destroyed by bombs and artillery.

"Directorate" staffs must not be over-function- alized by arbitrary organizational arrangements. Specifically, the engineer staff is a distinct function and must be responsive and closely co-ordinated with each of the normal staffs such as personnel, intel- ligence, operations, supply and maintenance. To be otherwise creates a weakness in technical response to operating conditions and is inadequate when rapid reaction and concentrated efforts are essential. Cen- tralized control and command of supporting forces are necessary to obtain the greatest output from the most economical force. The whole range of technical support cannot be adequately given by diffusion of effort and separation of essential elements of opera- tions into loosely defined "functions." Effective en- gineer support results from the co-ordination and application of essential elements from the fields of intelligence, operations, and supply and maintenance by one section professionally competent to assimilate the varied information and to direct it toward the ultimate goal.

The Military Engineer, No. 381 33

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