6 pages sociology term paper

Violence

A MICRO-SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Randall Collins

P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

P R I N C E T O N A N D O X F O R D

Copyright © 2008 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, N e w Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire O X 2 0 1SY

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Collins, Randall, 1 9 4 1 - Violence : a micro-sociological theory / Randall Collins,

p . cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N - 1 3 : 978-0-691-13313-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-691-13313-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Violence—United States. 2. Violence—United States—Psychological aspects. 1. Title. HM1121.C64 2008 303.60973—dc22 2007015426

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

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1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

List of Illustrations and Tables ix

Acknowledgments xiii

1. T h e Micro-sociology of Violent C o n f r o n t a t i o n s 1 Violent Situations 1 Micro-evidence: Situational Recordings, Reconstructions,

and Observations 3 Comparing Situations across Types of Violence 8 Fight Myths 10 Violent Situations Are Shaped by an Emotional Field

of Tension and Fear 19 Alternative Theoretical Approaches 20 Historical Evolution of Social Techniques for Controlling

Confrontational Tension 25 Sources 29 Preview 32 The Complementarity of Micro and Macro Theories 34

PART O N E : The Dirty Secrets of Violence 3 7 2 . C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l Tension a n d I n c o m p e t e n t Violence 3 9

Brave, Competent and Evenly Matched? 39 The Central Reality: Confrontational Tension 41 Tension/Fear and Non-performance in Military Combat 43 Low Fighting Competence 57 Friendly Fire and Bystander Hits 59 Joy of Combat: Under What Conditions? 66 The Continuum of Tension/Fear and Combat Ferformance 68 Confrontational Tension in Policing and Non-Military Fighting 70 Fear of What? 73

3 . F o r w a r d Panic 8 3 Confrontational Tension and Release: Hot Rush, Piling On,

Overkill 89 Atrocities of War 94 Caveat: The Multiple Causation of Atrocities 99 Asymmetrical Entrainment of Forward Panic and

Paralyzed Victims 102

vi • Contents

Forward Panics and One-Sided Casualties in Decisive Battles 1 0 4 Atrocities of Peace 1 1 2 Crowd Violence 1 1 5 Demonstrators and Crowd-Control Forces 1 2 1 The Crowd Multiplier 1 2 8 Alternatives to Forward Panic 1 3 2

4 . A t t a c k i n g t h e W e a k : I . D o m e s t i c A b u s e 1 3 4 The Emotional Definition of the Situation 1 3 4 Background and Foreground Explanations 1 3 5 Abusing the Exceptionally Weak: Time-patterns

from Normalcy to Atrocity 1 3 7 Three Pathways: Normal Limited Conflict, Severe Forward

Panic, and Terroristic Torture Regime 1 4 1 Negotiating Interactional Techniques of Violence

and Victimhood 1 4 8

5 . A t t a c k i n g t h e W e a k : I I . B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , a n d H o l d u p s 1 5 6 The Continuum of Total Institutions 1 6 5 Muggings and Holdups 1 7 4 Battening on Interactional Weakness 1 8 6

PART T W O : Cleaned-up and Staged Violence 1 9 1 6 . S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s 1 9 3

Hero versus Hero 1 9 4 Audience Supports and Limits on Violence 1 9 8 Fighting Schools and Fighting Manners 2 0 7 Displaying Risk and Manipulating Danger in Sword

and Pistol Duels 2 1 2 The Decline of Elite Dueling and Its Replacement

by the Gunfight 2 2 0 Honor without Fairness: Vendettas as Chains

of Unbalanced Fights • 2 2 3 Ephemeral Situational Honor and Leap-Frog Escalation

to One-Gun Fights 226 Behind the Facade of Honor and Disrespect 2 2 9 The Cultural Prestige of Fair and Unfair Fights 2 3 7

7 . V i o l e n c e a s F u n a n d E n t e r t a i n m e n t 2 4 2 Moral Holidays 2 4 3 Looting and Destruction as Participation Sustainers 2 4 5 The Wild Party as Elite Potlatch 2 5 3 Carousing Zones and Boundary Exclusion Violence 256 End-Resisting Violence 2 5 9

Contents • vii

Frustrated Carousing and Stirring up Effervescence 261 Paradox: Why Does Most Intoxication N o t Lead to Violence? 263 The One-Fight-Per-Venue Limitation 2 7 0 Fighting as Action and Fun 21A Mock Fights and Mosh Pits 277

8. Sports Violence 2 8 2 Sports as Dramatically Contrived Conflicts 2 8 3 Came Dynamics and Player Violence 2 8 5 Winning by Practical Skills for Producing Emotional

Energy Dominance 296 The Timing of Player Violence: Loser-Frustration Fights

and Turning-I'oint Fights 3 0 2 Spectators' Game-Dependent Violence 3 0 7 Off site Fans' Violence: Celebration and Defeat Riots 3 1 1 Offsite Violence as Sophisticated Technique: Soccer Hooligans 3 1 5 The Dramatic Local Construction of Antagonistic Identities 3 2 4 Revolt of the Audience in the Era of Entertainers' Domination 3 2 8

PART T H R E E : Dynamics and Structure 3 3 5 of Violent Situations

9 . H o w Fights Start, o r N o t 3 3 7 Normal Limited Acrimony: Griping, Whining, Arguing,

Quarreling 3 3 8 Boasting and Blustering 3 4 5 The Code of the Street: Institutionalized Bluster and Threat 3 4 8 Pathways into the Tunnel of Violence 3 6 0

1 0 . T h e Violent Few 3 7 0 Small Numbers of the Actively and Competently Violent 3 7 0 Confrontation Leaders and Action-Seekers: Police 3 7 5 Who Wins? 3 8 1

Military Snipers: Concealed and Absorbed in Technique 3 8 1 Fighter Pilot Aces: Aggressively Imposing Momentum 3 8 7

In the Zone versus the Glaze of Combat: Micro-situational Techniques of Interactional Dominance 399

The 9/11 Cockpit Fight 4 0 9

1 1 . Violence as D o m i n a n c e in Emotional Attention Space 4 1 3 What Does the Rest of the Crowd Do? 4 1 3 Violence without Audiences: Professional Killers

and Clandestine Violence 4 3 0 Confrontation-Minimizing Terrorist Tactics 4 4 0 Violent Niches in Confrontational Attention Space 4 4 8

viii • Contents

Epilogue Practical Conclusions 4 6 3

Notes 4 6 7

References 527

Index 555

Illustrations and Tables

Illustrations

1.1 Bystanders keep back from fight ( N e w York City, 1 9 5 0 ) . 12 1.2 Turkish m e m b e r s of p a r l i a m e n t fight while colleagues h o l d

each other back (February 2 , 2 0 0 1 ) . 1 3 2 . 1 Tension/fear in military c o m b a t . O n e m a n fires, eleven t a k e

cover ( O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 ) . 4 2 2 . 2 Tension in face a n d b o d y p o s t u r e s : Palestinian g u n m e n battle

Israeli soldiers ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 43 2 . 3 Police SWAT t e a m m o v e s in cautiously u p o n a single g u n m a n

h o l d i n g hostages in r e s t a u r a n t (Berkeley, California, 1 9 9 0 ) . 44 2.4 Fear in faces a n d b o d y p o s t u r e s of Palestinian b o y s , t h r o w i n g

r o c k s a t a n Israeli t a n k ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 4 5 2.5 Soldier backs u p , u n a r m e d c r o w d advances (Baghdad,

O c t o b e r 2 0 0 4 ) . 7 2 3.1 A,B After 100 m p h chase, a p a t r o l m a n catches a n d beats t h e

last of a t r u c k l o a d of illegal i m m i g r a n t s (California, April 1 9 9 6 ) . 84

3.2 R o d n e y King b e a t e n by four policemen after high-speed chase (Los Angeles, M a r c h 1 9 9 1 ) . 90

3.3 A, B Killing s u r r e n d e r e e : Afrikaner resistance fighters, already w o u n d e d , are killed after a failed a t t a c k (South Africa, 1 9 9 4 ) . 96

3.4 Kenya m a r k e t thief s t o m p e d b y t w o m e n while c r o w d w a t c h e s ( N a i r o b i , 1 9 9 6 ) . 116

3.5 G r o u p a t t a c k on fallen victim: Turkish versus Greek Cypriots ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 1 1 7

3.6 Standoff between c r o w d - c o n t r o l forces a n d aggressive edge of protesters (Serbia, 2 0 0 0 ) . 1 2 2

3.7 T w o r o c k - t h r o w e r s in front of c r o w d of d e m o n s t r a t o r s (Genoa, July 2 0 0 1 ) . 1 2 3

3.8 C r o w d b r e a k s up as soldiers fire m a c h i n e - g u n s (Petrograd, July 1 9 1 7 ) . 124

3.9 Cluster of r o c k - t h r o w e r s in Argentina d e m o n s t r a t i o n ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 1 2 6

5.1 Bullying in Pre-school N e t w o r k s . 1 5 7 5.2 T h e Faces of Bullying a n d Playing the Victim ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 1 6 5

x • Illustrations and Tables

5.3 Situational d o m i n a n c e in a street c o n f r o n t a t i o n ( N e w York, 1 9 9 7 ) . 1 7 7

6.1 French s w o r d duel w i t h large audience ( 1 9 0 1 ) . 2 1 8 8.1 M a s c u l i n e athlete in u n v i o l e n t s p o r t : pole-vault c h a m p i o n

( 2 0 0 4 ) . 2 8 7 8.2 B o x e r s ' pre-fight s t a r e - d o w n ( 2 0 0 1 ) . 2 8 8 8.3 Limiting t h e scuffle by use of protective e q u i p m e n t

(July 2 0 0 4 ) . 2 9 3 8.4 A r i t u a l t e a m b r a w l ( 2 0 0 4 ) . 2 9 5 8.5 M a l e a n d female players display identical gestures of

d o m i n a t i o n ( 2 0 0 4 ) . 3 0 6 8.6 Soccer h o o l i g a n s g a n g up on isolated fans of o p p o s i n g t e a m

( M u n i c h , 2 0 0 1 ) . 3 2 3 9.1 Angry c o n f r o n t a t i o n , m o m e n t a r i l y stabilized by repetitious

gesturing (Jerusalem, O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 ) . 3 6 5 1 0 . 1 Visibility of targets at v a r i o u s distances: 1 9 4 2 Soviet

sniping m a n u a l . 3 8 6 10.2 A m e r i c a n pilots in W o r l d War I w i t h flying t o p h a t e m b l e m . 3 9 0 1 0 . 3 Ace s c o r e b o a r d s ( 1 9 4 5 ) . 3 9 3 10.4 K o r e a n w a r pilots s h o w off their s q u a d r o n ' s collective

s c o r e b o a r d . 3 9 4 1 0 . 5 Police s h o o t o u t a t close r a n g e ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 4 0 1 10.6 W i n n i n g by e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e : faces of basketball

r e b o u n d e r s ( 2 0 0 6 ) . 4 0 8 1 1 . 1 . M u l t i p l e layers of a riot: front line, n e a r s u p p o r t e r s , m i d d l e ,

b a c k (Palestine, 2 0 0 3 ) . 4 1 5 1 1 . 2 . Ultra-activist, front cluster, plus b a c k g r o u n d o n l o o k e r s .

Soccer riot in Russia ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 4 1 6 1 1 . 3 . Single d e m o n s t r a t o r confronts police line while c r o w d

r e m a i n s unfocused ( G e n o a , July 2 0 0 1 ) . 4 1 7 11.4 {four-photo sequence) L o n e d e m o n s t r a t o r , energized by small

g r o u p of s u p p o r t e r s , r u n s f o r w a r d to t a u n t police a n d is s h o t ( G o t h e n b u r g , Sweden, 2 0 0 1 ) . 4 1 9

11.5 C r o w d of p r o t e s t e r s r u n from police; t h r e e r o c k - t h r o w e r s r e m a i n f o r w a r d (Jerusalem, 2 0 0 2 ) . 4 2 1

11.6 R i t u a l solidarity gestures b e t w e e n violent front line a n d s u p p o r t e r s . Palestinian y o u t h displays b l o o d o n his h a n d s after lynching ( O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 ) . 4 2 3

1 1 . 7 R i t u a l desecration of enemy in victory celebration. C h a r r e d corpses of A m e r i c a n civilians h u n g from a bridge in Fallujah, I r a q (April 2 0 0 4 ) . 4 2 4

I l l u s t r a t i o n s a n d T a b l e s • xi

1 1 . 8 V i o l e n t cluster i n d e m o n s t r a t i o n ( A n k a r a , T u r k e y , 2 0 0 1 ) . 4 2 8 1 1 . 9 C o n t r a c t K i l l e r s . " M a d D o g " Sullivan ( 1 9 8 2 )

a n d J o e y G a l l o ( 1 9 5 7 ) . 4 3 4 1 1 . 1 0 Suicide b o m b e r p o s e s f o r p h o t o s h o r t l y b e f o r e a t t a c k

( M a r c h 2 0 0 2 ) . 4 4 3 1 1 . 1 1 F o u r suicide b o m b e r s beginning t h e i r mission (July 2 0 0 5 ) . 4 4 5 1 1 . 1 2 Suicide b o m b e r e s c a p i n g a f t e r a failed a t t a c k ( L o n d o n ,

J u l y 2 0 0 5 ) . 4 4 7

Tables

2 . 1 F r e q u e n c y o f f i r i n g i n l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g e n e m y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s 5 2 2 . 2 P e r c e n t a g e o f t r o o p s firing i n c o m b a t p h o t o s 5 3 6.1 S e r i o u s n e s s o f fight a f f e c t e d b y a u d i e n c e b e h a v i o r 2 0 3 6 . 2 S e r i o u s n e s s o f fight a f f e c t e d b y size o f belligerent g r o u p s 2 0 4 6 . 3 Severity o f fights i n scheduled and unscheduled s i t u a t i o n s 2 3 6

Acknowledgments

I A M I N D E B T E D t o t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r a d v i c e , c o m m e n t s , o r i n f o r m a t i o n : J a c k K a t z , E l i j a h A n d e r s o n , E a r r y S h e r m a n , A n t h o n y K i n g , C u r t i s J a c k s o n - J a c o b s , G e o r g i D c r l u g i a n , D a v i d G r a z i a n , M a r c S a g e m a n , T o m S c h e f f , E r i c D u n n i n g , J o h a n G o u d s b l o m , J o h a n H e i l b r o n , M u r r a y M i l - ner, R o b i n W a g n e r - P a c i f i c i , K a t h e r i n e N e w m a n , D a n C h a m b l i s s , J e r r y M . L e w i s , G e o f f r e y A l p e r t , J e n s L u d w i g , M e r e d i t h R o s s n e r , W e s S k o g a n , L o d e W a l g r a v e , I a n O ' D o n n e l l , N i k k i J o n e s , Peter M o s k o s , A l i c e G o f f m a n , D e a n n a W i l k i n s o n , M a r e n M c C o n n e l l - C o l l i n s , K e n D o n o w , J o n O l e s b e r g , J o n T u r n e r , R a e L e s s e r B l u m b c r g , A n t h o n y O b - e r s c h a l l , R o s e C h e n e y , l r m a E l o , P a t r i c i a M a l o n c y , M o l l i c R u b i n , C l a r k M c C a u l e y , J u d i t h M c C o n n e l l , H e a t h e r S t r a n g , S t e f a n K l u s e m a n n , D o n - ald L e v i n e , R o b e r t E m e r s o n , J e f f G o o d w i n , R i c h a r d T r e m b l e y , a n d An- t h o n y M c C o n n e l l - C o l l i n s . I t h a n k a l s o c o l l o q u i u m p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t h e universities o f A m s t e r d a m , C a m b r i d g e , C o p e n h a g e n , G a l w a y , U n i v e r - sity C o l l e g e D u b l i n , N o t r e D a m e , P r i n c e t o n , K e n t S t a t e , U C L A , a n d a t t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a ! I n s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e S o c i o l o g y o f L a w a t O n a t i , S p a i n ; officers o f t h e S a n D i e g o a n d P h i l a d e l p h i a P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t s , C a l i f o r - n i a H i g h w a y P a t r o l , N e w J e r s e y S t a t e P o l i c e , a n d the Irish G a r d a ; a n d m e m b e r s o f m y c l a s s e s i n s o c i a l c o n f l i c t a t U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a R i v e r - side a n d University o f P e n n s y l v a n i a . I o w e s p e c i a l t h a n k s t o D a n i e l l e K a n e , w h o p r o v i d e d i n v a l u a b l e r e s e a r c h a s s i s t a n c e . T h e S o l o m o n Asch C e n t e r f o r S t u d y o f E t h n o p o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t h a s p r o v i d e d a s t i m u l a t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t f o r d i s c u s s i o n s o f m u l t i p l e a s p e c t s o f c o n f l i c t , a s h a v e t h e J e r r y L e e C e n t e r f o r C r i m i n o l o g y a n d t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f C r i m i n o l o g y a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f P e n n s y l v a n i a .

Violence

C H A P T E R 1

The Micro-sociology of Violent Confrontations

T H E R E IS A VAST ARRAY of types of violence. It is s h o r t a n d episodic as a slap in the face; or massive a n d organized as a war. It can be p a s s i o n a t e a n d angry as a q u a r r e l ; or callous a n d impersonal as the b u r e a u c r a t i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of gas c h a m b e r s . It is h a p p y as d r u n k e n c a r o u s i n g , fearful as soldiers in c o m b a t , vicious as a torturer. It can be furtive and hidden as a r a p e - m u r d e r , or public as a ritual execution. It is p r o g r a m m e d enter- t a i n m e n t in the form of s p o r t i n g contests, the plot tension of d r a m a , the action of a c t i o n - a d v e n t u r e , the staple shocker of the n ews edition. It is horrible a n d heroic, disgusting a n d exciting, the m o s t c o n d e m n e d a n d glorified of h u m a n acts.

This vast a r r a y can be explained by a relatively c o m p a c t theory. A few main processes, in c o m b i n a t i o n and in differing degrees of intensity, give the c o n d i t i o n s for when a n d h o w the various forms of violence occur.

T w o moves will set up the analysis. First, p u t the interaction in the center of the analysis, n o t the individual, the social b a c k g r o u n d , the cul- t u r e , or even the m o t i v a t i o n : t h a t is to say, look for the characteristics of violent s i t u a t i o n s . T h a t m e a n s looking for d a t a t h a t gets us as close as possible into the dynamics of s i t u a t i o n s . Second, c o m p a r e across different kinds of violence. We need to break d o w n the usual c a t e g o r i e s — h o m i - cides in one research specialty, w a r in another, child abuse in another, police violence yet elsewhere—and look for the situations t h a t occur within t h e m . N o t t h a t all situations are the same; we w a n t to c o m p a r e the range of variation in s i t u a t i o n s , which affects the kind and a m o u n t of violence t h a t emerges. This will t u r n the wide variety of violence i n t o a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a d v a n t a g e , giving clues to the circumstances t h a t explain w h e n a n d in w h a t m a n n e r violence unfolds.

V I O L E N T S I T U A T I O N S

N o t violent individuals, b u t violent situations—this is w h a t a micro-socio- logical t h e o r y is a b o u t . We seek the c o n t o u r s of s i t u a t i o n s , which shape the e m o t i o n s a n d acts of the individuals w h o step inside t h e m . It is a false lead to look for types of violent individuals, c o n s t a n t across s i t u a t i o n s . A huge a m o u n t of research has n o t yielded very s t r o n g results here. Young

2 • Chapter 1

m e n , yes, are m o s t likely to be p e r p e t r a t o r s of m a n y kinds of violence. But n o t all y o u n g m e n are violent. A n d middle-aged m e n , children, a n d w o m e n are violent t o o , i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s i t u a t i o n s . Similarly w i t h back- g r o u n d variables such as poverty, r a c e , a n d origins in divorce or single- p a r e n t families. T h o u g h t h e r e are s o m e statistical c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n these variables a n d certain kinds of violence, these fall s h o r t of predicting m o s t violence in at least t h r e e aspects:

First, m o s t y o u n g m e n , p o o r p e o p l e , black p e o p l e , or children of di- vorce d o n o t b e c o m e m u r d e r e r s , r a p i s t s , b a t t e r e r s , o r a r m e d r o b b e r s ; a n d there are a certain n u m b e r of affluent p e r s o n s , w h i t e p e o p l e , or p r o d u c t s of c o n v e n t i o n a l families w h o d o . Similarly, the m u c h asserted e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t violent offenders are typically p a s t victims of child abuse a c c o u n t s for only a m i n o r i t y of the c a s e s . 1

Second, such analysis conveys a plausible picture of t h e etiology of violence only because it restricts the d e p e n d e n t variable to p a r t i c u l a r cate- gories of illegal or highly stigmatized violence; it does n o t h o l d up well w h e n we b r o a d e n o u t to all kinds of violence. Poverty, family strain, child a b u s e , a n d t h e like do n o t a c c o u n t for police violence or for w h i c h soldiers do t h e m o s t killing in c o m b a t , for w h o r u n s gas c h a m b e r s or c o m m i t s ethnic cleansing. No one h a s s h o w n t h a t being a b u s e d as a child is likely to m a k e s o m e o n e a c o w b o y c o p , a c a r o u s i n g d r u n k , or a d e c o r a t e d w a r h e r o . N o d o u b t t h e r e are r e a d e r s w h o will bridle a t the suggestion; for t h e m , violence n a t u r a l l y falls i n t o hermetically sealed sections, a n d " b a d " social c o n d i t i o n s s houl d be responsible for " b a d " violence, w h e r e a s " g o o d " violence—which is n o t seen as violence at all, w h e n it is c a r r i e d o u t by a u t h o r i z e d state agents—is n o t subject to analysis since it is p a r t of n o r m a l social order. In this w a y of t h i n k i n g , t h e r e is an i n t e r m e d i a t e category of i n n o c u o u s or " n a u g h t y " violence (i.e., c a r o u s i n g t h a t gets o u t of h a n d ) , or violence t h a t is c o m m i t t e d by " g o o d " p e r s o n s ; this is ex- p l a i n e d , or e x p l a i n e d away, by a n o t h e r set of m o r a l categories. Such dis- tinctions are a g o o d e x a m p l e of c o n v e n t i o n a l social categories getting in the w a y of sociological analysis. If we zero in on the s i t u a t i o n of i n t e r a c - t i o n — t h e angry boyfriend w i t h the crying baby, the a r m e d r o b b e r squeez- ing the trigger on the h o l d u p victim, the c o p beating u p t h e suspect—we can see p a t t e r n s of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t e n s i o n , a n d e m o t i o n a l flow, w h i c h are at t h e h e a r t of the s i t u a t i o n w h e r e violence is carried o u t . This is a n o t h e r w a y o f seeing t h a t t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s — p o v e r t y , r a c e , c h i l d h o o d experiences—are a long w a y from w h a t is crucial to the d y n a m i c s of t h e violent s i t u a t i o n .

T h i r d , even t h o s e p e r s o n s w h o are violent, are violent only a small p a r t of the time. Consider w h a t we m e a n w h e n we say t h a t a p e r s o n is violent, or "very v i o l e n t . " We h a v e in m i n d s o m e o n e w h o is a convicted murderer, or h a s c o m m i t t e d a string of m u r d e r s ; w h o has been in m a n y fights,

Violent Confrontations • 3

slashed p e o p l e w i t h a knife, or b a t t e r e d t h e m w i t h fists. But if we consider t h a t everyday life unfolds in a chain of s i t u a t i o n s , m i n u t e by m i n u t e , m o s t of t h e time t h e r e is very little violence. This is a p p a r e n t from e t h n o g r a p h i c o b s e r v a t i o n s , even in statistically very violent n e i g h b o r h o o d s . A h o micid e r a t e of ten d e a t h s p e r 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n s (the r a t e in t h e United States p e a k - ing in 1990) is a fairly high r a t e , b u t it m e a n s t h a t 99,990 o u t of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n s do n o t get m u r d e r e d in a year; a n d 9 7 , 0 0 0 of t h e m (again, t a k i n g t h e p e a k rate) are n o t assaulted even in m i n o r incidents. A n d these violent incidents are s p r e a d o u t over a year; the chances of m u r d e r or assault h a p p e n i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n at any p a r t i c u l a r m o m e n t on a p a r t i c u l a r d a y d u r i n g t h a t year are very small. T h i s applies even to those p e r s o n s w h o actually d o c o m m i t one o r m o r e m u r d e r s , assaults, a r m e d r o b b e r i e s , or r a p e s (or for t h a t matter, c o p s w h o beat up suspects) d u r i n g t h e course of t h e year. Even t h o s e p e r s o n s w h o statistically c o m m i t a lot of crime scarcely do so at a r a t e of m o r e t h a n once a w e e k or so; t h e m o s t n o t o r i o u s massacres in schools, w o r k p l a c e s , or p u b l i c places, carried o u t by lone individuals, h a v e killed as m a n y as twenty-five p e r s o n s , b u t generally w i t h i n a single episodes (Hickey 2 0 0 2 ; N e w m a n et al. 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e m o s t sustained violent p e r s o n s are serial killers, w h o average between six a n d t h i r t e e n victims over a p e r i o d of years; b u t these are extremely r a r e ( a b o u t o n e victim per five million p o p u l a t i o n ) , a n d even these r e p e a t killers go m o n t h s b e t w e e n killings, w a i t i n g for just the right s i t u a t i o n to strike (Hickey 2 0 0 2 : 1 2 - 1 3 , 2 4 1 - 4 2 ) . A n o t h e r k i n d o f r a r e cluster o f violence, crime sprees, m a y c o n t i n u e for a p e r i o d of days, in a chain of events linked closely by e m o t i o n s a n d circumstances so as to c o m p r i s e a t u n n e l of vio- lence. Leaving these e x t e n d e d sequences of violence aside for the m o m e n t , I w a n t to u n d e r l i n e t h e conclusion: even p e o p l e t h a t we t h i n k of as very violent—because t h e y h a v e been violent i n m o r e t h a n o n e s i t u a t i o n , o r spectacularly violent on s o m e o c c a s i o n — a r e violent only in very p a r t i c u - lar s i t u a t i o n s . 2 Even t h e t o u g h e s t h o o d l u m s are off d u t y some of the time. M o s t of the t i m e , the m o s t d a n g e r o u s , m o s t violent p e r s o n s are n o t d o i n g a n y t h i n g violent. Even for these p e o p l e , t h e d y n a m i c s of situations are crucial in e x p l a i n i n g w h a t violence they actually d o .

M I C R O - E V I D E N C E : S I T U A T I O N A L R E C O R D I N G S , R E C O N S T R U C T I O N S ,

A N D O B S E R V A T I O N S

Surveys of individuals orient o u r theories to t h e characteristics of individ- uals, p a c k a g e d in t h e t e r m s of s t a n d a r d sociological variables. To m o v e to a sociological theory, n o t of violent individuals, b u t of violent situa- t i o n s , we m u s t emphasize a different w a y of collecting a n d analyzing d a t a . We need direct o b s e r v a t i o n of violent i n t e r a c t i o n to c a p t u r e the process

4 • Chapter 1

of violence as it actually is performed. O u r theories are c o n s t r a i n e d by h a v i n g been based u p o n statistics assembled after the fact, p a c k a g e d by t h e criminal justice system, or u p o n interviews w i t h convicted prisoners or o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s . Victim surveys are a step in the right direction, b u t they r e m a i n limited, n o t only by the issue of to w h a t e x t e n t victims are telling the t r u t h , b u t also by the p r o b l e m t h a t p e r s o n s are generally n o t g o o d observers of the details a n d contexts of d r a m a t i c events. O u r ordi- n a r y discourse does n o t provide the l a n g u a g e in w h i c h to describe m i c r o - interaction well; instead, it offers a set of cliches a n d m y t h s t h a t predeter- mine w h a t people will say. T h i s is t r u e also of military violence, r i o t s , sports violence, o r even o r d i n a r y quarrels; w h e n p a r t i c i p a n t s t a l k a b o u t violent situations, they t e n d to give a very t r u n c a t e d , a n d by their o w n lights, idealized version of w h a t w e n t o n .

A n e w era has emerged in recent decades as it has become possible to study violence as r e c o r d e d on video t a p e from security systems, police r e c o r d i n g s , a n d new s a n d a m a t e u r video p h o t o g r a p h e r s . W h e n o r d i n a r y observers see such recordings, they are usually shocked. A riot eventually followed the publicity given to a video r e c o r d i n g , t a k e n by an a m a t e u r w i t h a n e w camcorder, of the R o d n e y King arrest in Los Angeles in 1 9 9 1 . Events are always i n t e r p r e t e d in t e r m s of prevailing ideological categories; the concepts easily at h a n d w e r e t h o s e of a racially m o t i v a t e d beating. But w h a t w a s so shocking a b o u t the R o d n e y King video w a s n o t its racial aspect; it w a s t h e beating itself, w h i c h did n o t look at all like w h a t we t h i n k violence is s u p p o s e d to l o o k like. Visual evidence s h o w s us some- t h i n g a b o u t violence t h a t w e are n o t p r e p a r e d t o see. T h e p a t t e r n looks m u c h t h e s a m e in a w i d e r a n g e of incidents, in m a n y different ethnic c o m b i n a t i o n s w i t h i n a n d across ethnic g r o u p lines (we will e x a m i n e some of these in c h a p t e r s 2 a n d 3). Racism m a y c o n t r i b u t e to building up s o m e situations of violence, b u t it is one lead-in c o n d i t i o n a m o n g o t h e r s , a n d neither a necessary n o r a sufficient c o n d i t i o n ; the situation of violence itself has a d y n a m i c s t h a t is m o r e pervasive t h a n racism.

Violence as it actually becomes visible in real-life situations is a b o u t the i n t e r t w i n i n g of h u m a n e m o t i o n s of fear, anger, a n d excitement, in way s t h a t r u n right against the c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y of n o r m a l s i t u a t i o n s . It is just this shocking a n d u n e x p e c t e d quality of violence, as it actually a p p e a r s in the cold eye of the c a m e r a , t h a t gives a clue to the e m o t i o n a l dynamics at the center of a m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l t h e o r y of violence.

We live in an era in w h i c h o u r ability to see w h a t h a p p e n s in real-life situations is far greater t h a n ever before. We o w e this n e w vision to a c o m b i n a t i o n of technology a n d sociological m e t h o d . T h e e t h n o m e t h o d o l - ogists of the 1960s a n d 1 9 7 0 s t o o k off as an intellectual m o v e m e n t in t a n d e m w i t h the use of newly p o r t a b l e cassette t a p e recorders; this m a d e it possible to r e c o r d at least t h e a u d i o p a r t of real-life social interactions,

Violent Confrontations • 5

a n d to play it back repeatedly, slowing it d o w n a n d subjecting it to analy- sis in a w a y t h a t h a d been barely possible w i t h fleeting o b s e r v a t i o n s in real t i m e , giving rise to t h e field of c o n v e r s a t i o n analysis (Sacks, Sche- gloff, a n d Jefferson 1 9 7 4 ; Schegloff 1 9 9 2 ) . As video r e c o r d i n g devices b e c a m e m o r e p o r t a b l e a n d u b i q u i t o u s , i t h a s been possible t o l o o k a t o t h e r aspects of micro-behavior, including bodily r h y t h m s , p o s t u r e s , a n d expressions of e m o t i o n . T h u s it is n o t surprising t h a t the p e r i o d from a b o u t 1 9 8 0 o n w a r d has been the golden age for the sociology of e m o t i o n s (Katz 1 9 9 9 , a m o n g m a n y o t h e r s ) .

It is n o t literally true t h a t a picture is w o r t h a t h o u s a n d w o r d s . M o s t people will n o t see w h a t is in a picture, or will see it t h r o u g h the m o s t readily available visual cliches. It takes training a n d an analytical v o cab u - lary to talk a b o u t w h a t is in a picture, a n d to k n o w w h a t to look for. A picture is w o r t h a t h o u s a n d w o r d s only for those w h o already have inter- nalized an a d e q u a t e vocabulary. This is particularly so w h e n we have to t r a i n ourselves to see micro-details: the m o v e m e n t s of some facial muscles rather t h a n others t h a t distinguish a false smile from a s p o n t a n e o u s one; the m o v e m e n t s t h a t display fear, tension, a n d other emotions; the s m o o t h - ness of rhythmic c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d the hitches t h a t indicate disattunement a n d conflict; the p a t t e r n s in w h i c h one p e r s o n or a n o t h e r seizes the initia- tive a n d imposes a r h y t h m u p o n others. T h e m e t h o d s of visual a n d a u d i t o r y recording n o w available o p e n up the potential to see a vast n e w landscape of h u m a n interaction; b u t o u r ability to see goes in t a n d e m w i t h the expan- sion of o u r theories of w h a t processes are o u t there to be seen.

This is so also in the micro-sociology of violence. T h e video r e v o l u t i o n h a s m a d e available m u c h m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t w h a t h a p p e n s i n vio- lent situations t h a n ever before. But real-life recording c o n d i t i o n s are n o t like H o l l y w o o d film studios; lighting a n d c o m p o s i t i o n are far from ideal, a n d the c a m e r a angles a n d distance m a y n o t be just t h e ones a m i c r o - sociologist w o u l d prefer. We need to disengage ourselves from the conven- t i o n s of dramati cal l y satisfying film (including TV commercials) w h e r e t h e c a m e r a cuts to a n e w angle every few seconds at t h e m o s t , a n d a great deal of editing has g o n e on to j u x t a p o s e an interesting a n d engaging sequence. A micro-sociologist c a n spot the difference between r a w obser- v a t i o n a l r e c o r d i n g a n d artistically or editorially processed film, usually w i t h i n seconds. R a w conflict is n o t very engaging, for all sorts of r e a s o n s ; as micro-sociologists, we are n o t in it for e n t e r t a i n m e n t .

O t h e r a p p r o a c h e s besides live video h a v e o p e n e d up t h e l a n d s c a p e of violence as it really h a p p e n s . Still p h o t o g r a p h y h a s g o t t e n better t h r o u g h - o u t t h e p a s t c e n t u r y a n d a half; c a m e r a s h a v e b e c o m e m o r e p o r t a b l e , a n d lenses a n d lighting devices h a v e m a d e it possible to c a p t u r e scenes t h a t previously w o u l d h a v e been limited t o static p o s e d s h o t s i n relatively sheltered c o n d i t i o n s . Professional p h o t o g r a p h e r s h a v e b e c o m e m o r e in-

6 • Chapter 1

t r c p i d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r i o t s , d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , a n d w a r zones; the n u m b e r of p h o t o g r a p h e r s killed has g o n e up drastically in the past ten years, far a b o v e any previous p e r i o d . ' T h i s t o o is an o p p o r t u n i t y for m i c r o - sociologists, a l t h o u g h the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d caveats again apply. Still p h o - tos are often better t h a n videos for c a p t u r i n g the e m o t i o n a l aspects of violent i n t e r a c t i o n . W h e n we analyze a video of a conflict sequence (or indeed a n y video of i n t e r a c t i o n ) , we may slow it d o w n to s e g m e n t s of m i c r o - s e c o n d s (frame-by-frame in older c a m e r a film) to pull o u t just t h o s e details of bodily p o s t u r e , facial e x p r e s s i o n , a n d sequence of m i c r o - m o v e m e n t s . In d e p i c t i o n s of r i o t s , which 1 use extensively in this w o r k , still p h o t o s d r a m a t i c a l l y s h o w the division between the active few on the violent front a n d the s u p p o r t i n g m a s s of d e m o n s t r a t o r s . T h e d a n g e r is in a s s u m i n g one can read the still p h o t o w i t h o u t sociological sensibilities. Highly artistic or ideological p h o t o g r a p h e r s are less useful here t h a n r o u - tine news p h o t o g r a p h e r s ; s o m e p h o t o s o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o r c o m b a t h a v e a n artistic o r political message t h a t governs the w h o l e c o m p o s i t i o n ; we need to look from a different v a n t a g e p o i n t to get at the m i c r o - s o c i o - logical aspects of conflict.

An intellectual stance on w h a t to look for has gone a l o n g w i t h t e c h n o - logical a d v a n c e s , and sometimes preceded t h e m . T h e military historian J o h n Keegan (1976) set o u t to r e c o n s t r u c t battles from the g r o u n d u p , investigating w h a t must actually have h a p p e n e d as each segment of t r o o p s rushed forward or fell d o w n ; as horses, men, and vehicles got tangled in traffic jams; as w e a p o n s were wielded skillfully, accidentally, or n o t at all. O t h e r military analysts have found o u t h o w m a n y g u n s were loaded when recovered from dead t r o o p s on battlefields; a n d historical battles have been reconstructed with laser b e a m s . W h a t we have learned a b o u t sol- diers in c o m b a t has o p e n e d the d o o r for u n d e r s t a n d i n g violent situations in general. T h e e m o t i o n a l relationships between soldiers a n d their c o m - r a d e s , and between them a n d their equally h u m a n enemies, provided one of the first clues to h o w violent situations u n f o l d . 4

In o u r o r d i n a r y c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d w a y of viewing things, it is a leap from military history to r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of police violence, b u t the m e t h - o d o l o g i c a l a n d theoretical parallels are s t r o n g . We c a n u n d e r s t a n d the occasions on which police are violent by t e c h n i q u e s such as video re- c o r d i n g s a n d t h r o u g h m e t h o d s of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g events, such as ballistics analysis of the trajectories of bullets, h o w m a n y hit i n t e n d e d a n d unin- t e n d e d t a r g e t s , a n d h o w m a n y missed entirely. O l d - f a s h i o n e d e t h n o - g r a p h i e s have helped t o o ; ride-alongs by sociologists in police c a r s , dat- ing to the 1 9 6 0 s , preceded some of these t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s and p r o v i d e d s o m e key t h e o r e t i c a l c o m p o n e n t s . Technologies by themselves rarely p r o v i d e real insight; it is their c o m b i n a t i o n with analytical view- p o i n t s t h a t is crucial.

Violent Confrontations • 7

To s u m m a r i z e , t h e r e are at least t h r e e m e t h o d s for getting at situational details of violent interactions: recordings, r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s , a n d observa- t i o n s . T h e y are m o s t useful w h e n used in c o m b i n a t i o n .

Technologies of r e c o r d i n g real-life conflict are useful for a series of rea- sons: t h e y can p r o v i d e us details t h a t we otherwise w o u l d n ' t see at all, t h a t w e w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d t o l o o k at, o r did n o t k n o w w e r e there; they c a n give us a m o r e analytical stance, m o r e d e t a c h e d from the everyday p e r c e p t u a l gestalts a n d t h e cliches of c o n v e n t i o n a l language for talking a b o u t violence; they enable us to l o o k at a situation over a n d over, getting b e y o n d t h e initial s h o c k (or j a d e d n e s s , p r u r i e n t interest, a n d the like) so t h a t w e c a n bring o u r theoretical m i n d s t o bear, a n d t o m a k e discoveries or test theories.

R e c o n s t r u c t i o n s are i m p o r t a n t because violent situations are relatively r a r e , a n d for m a n y incidents w e w o u l d m o s t like t o u n d e r s t a n d , t h e r e w e r e no r e c o r d i n g devices available at the time. We are n o t as m u c h in t h e d a r k a s w e once t h o u g h t w e w e r e : a s w e h a v e g o t t e n better a t situational analysis, a n d (coming from a n o t h e r angle) as n e w techniques keep on being developed for analyzing physical clues left on the g r o u n d , it has been possible to r e c o n s t r u c t m a n y violent scenes. A wide r a n g e of r e c o n - structions is useful to u s , including historical events, because they give us theoretical leverage for finding b o t h the c o m m o n a l i t i e s a n d the dimen- sions of v a r i a t i o n a m o n g violent s i t u a t i o n s .

Finally, t h e r e is h u m a n o b s e r v a t i o n . T h i s can be old-fashioned e t h n o - graphy, especially t h e p a r t i c i p a n t o b s e r v a t i o n version in w h i c h the sociol- ogist (or a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , psychologist, or sophisticated journalist) gets in- side t h e scene w i t h his or her senses s h a r p e n e d , l o o k i n g for telling details. A v a r i a n t is equally old-fashioned self-observation, r e p o r t s on w h a t o n e - self experienced as a p a r t i c i p a n t . In the field of violence, m u c h of w h a t we h a v e learned c o m e s from r e p o r t s by ex-soldiers, ex-criminals, or in- deed n o t s o " e x " p e r s o n s , w h o are reflective e n o u g h t o talk a b o u t f i g h t s they h a v e seen or been in. T h e r e is also m u c h of value here in r e p o r t s from victims of violence, a l t h o u g h this has n o t been m u c h exploited by sociologists, b e y o n d b a r e statistical c o u n t s of h o w often certain kinds of victimization occurs. M o r e o v e r , as we gain a better theoretical u n d e r - s t a n d i n g of w h a t are the i m p o r t a n t micro-details of violent c o n f r o n t a - t i o n s , w e become better a t i n t e r r o g a t i n g o u r o w n experience, a n d better at asking retrospective observers for the k i n d of details we w o u l d like to k n o w a b o u t their e n c o u n t e r s w i t h violence. By p r o v i d i n g a vocabulary, we m a k e o u r i n f o r m a n t s often q u i t e g o o d r e p o r t e r s of details they o t h e r - wise gloss over.

T h e t h r e e kinds of s i t u a t i o n a l evidence fit together. T h e y c o m p l e m e n t each o t h e r n o t only ethodologically b u t also substantively. T h e y all reveal a c o m m o n situational d y n a m i c . T h a t is w h a t this b o o k is a b o u t .

8 • Chapter 1

C O M P A R I N G S I T U A T I O N S A C R O S S T Y P E S O F V I O L E N C E

To develop a theory of the dynamics of violence requires a n o t h e r shift: to w o r k across research specialties, rather t h a n be confined within them. The center of this a p p r o a c h is to c o m p a r e different kinds of violence in a com- m o n theoretical framework. Is this not to c o m p a r e apples and oranges, or at best merely to taxonomizc? This is a point that c a n n o t be decided a priori. Once we look, we find t h a t violence is an array of processes t h a t all follow from a c o m m o n situational feature of violent confrontations.

I will state the p o i n t cryptically here: violence is a set of p a t h w a y s a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear. Despite their bluster, and even in situations of a p p a r e n t l y u n c o n t r o l l a b l e anger, people are tense a n d often fearful in the i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t of violence—including their o w n violence; this is the e m o t i o n a l d y n a m i c t h a t determines w h a t they will do if fighting actually breaks o u t . W h e t h e r indeed t h a t will h a p p e n d e p e n d s on a series of c o n d i t i o n s or t u r n i n g - p o i n t s t h a t shape the tension a n d fear in p a r t i c u - lar directions, reorganizing the e m o t i o n s as an interactional process in- volving everyone present: the a n t a g o n i s t s , a u d i e n c e , a n d even ostensibly disengaged b y s t a n d e r s .

H o w do we k n o w this? T h e theoretical point has developed from accu- m u l a t i n g information on a variety of violent s i t u a t i o n s . T h e first break- t h r o u g h c a m e from the study of military c o m b a t . Fear, wild firing, hitting soldiers on o n e ' s o w n side, freezing u p : these were features noted by offi- cers analyzing the behavior of frontline t r o o p s in battle, beginning with the nineteenth-century French officer A r d a n t du Picq, w h o collected ques- t i o n n a i r e s from c o m b a t officers. S.L.A. M a r s h a l l got closer to the immedi- ate action in his World War II post-battle interviews w i t h soldiers t h e m - selves. In the 1970s, the picture of battle behavior w a s systematized in historical reconstructions by Keegan and o t h e r s . By the 1 9 9 0 s , the mili- tary psychologist Dave G r o s s m a n synthesized a t h e o r y of c o m b a t cen- tered on the m a n a g e m e n t of fear. An even m o r e p r o n o u n c e d p a t t e r n of a l t e r n a t i n g fearful a n d aggressive behavior is seen in e t h n o g r a p h i c films m a d e in the 1960s of fighting a m o n g tribal societies. C o m p a r i n g across different kinds of military violence leads to a theoretical insight: armies vary in their p e r f o r m a n c e because of the kind of orga niz a tion used to c o n t r o l fear a m o n g their t r o o p s . Generalizing the point, we can say t h a t all types of violence fit a small n u m b e r of p a t t e r n s for circumventing the barrier of tension and fear t h a t rises up whenever people c o m e into a n t a g - onistic c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

T h e military model also fits police violence d u r i n g arrests and h a n d l i n g prisoners. Police and military c o n f r o n t a t i o n s lead to atrocities by the same p a t h : the sequence of e m o t i o n a l events t h a t , in c h a p t e r 3 , 1 call " f o r w a r d

Violent Confrontations • 9

p a n i c . " C r o w d violence or riot also resembles military violence in s o m e c e n t r a l m e c h a n i s m s ; m u c h of the t i m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n is largely bluster a n d gesture b u t leads to little real h a r m ; w h a t is fateful are s u d d e n b r e a k s in the solidarity of o n e side, w h i c h spreads t h e m o u t into an o p e n field of small g r o u p s , w h e r e a superior n u m b e r from o n e side can isolate a n d b e a t up an individual or t w o separate from their c o m r a d e s . These are all very ugly forms of violence w h e n we actually see t h e m in detail; indeed, t h e disparity between their idealized self-image a n d their a t r o c i o u s reality is o n e m o r e s i t u a t i o n a l feature they h a v e i n c o m m o n .

T h e s e v a r i o u s forms of violence are subtypes w i t h i n o n e of the m a i n p a t h w a y s a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n a n d fear: find a w e a k victim to a t t a c k . D o m e s t i c violence is h a r d e r for outside observers to s t u d y directly, a n d recordings are virtually n o n e x i s t e n t ; we rely here on interview recon- s t r u c t i o n s , w h i c h are limited by being largely confined to r e p o r t s from just one p a r t i c i p a n t . Nevertheless, w o r k i n g t h r o u g h a large b o d y of evidence, I c o n c l u d e t h a t the major forms of domestic violence resemble t h e type of military a n d police s i t u a t i o n t h a t fits u n d e r t h e r u b r i c of " a t t a c k i n g the w e a k . " T h e nastiest version of this h a p p e n s w h e n the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension builds high, followed by a s u d d e n collapse so t h a t an o p p o n e n t w h o initially seems t h r e a t e n i n g or frustrating t u r n s o u t to be helpless, u n l e a s h i n g in t h e o t h e r a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of fear a n d t e n s i o n i n t o ferocious a t t a c k . T h e r e are also m o r e institutionalized forms of a t t a c k i n g t h e w e a k , repetitive p a t t e r n s in w h i c h o n e or b o t h sides b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d to act- ing o u t t h e roles of s t r o n g a n d w e a k in a s i t u a t i o n a l d r a m a . These include bullying a n d also t h e kinds p e r f o r m e d by specialists in criminal violence, muggers a n d h o l d u p artists, w h o h a v e perfected their skills at finding t h e right kinds of victims in t h e right kinds of situations; their success d e p e n d s u p o n b a t t e n i n g u p o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n itself. C o m p a r i s o n s across d i s p a r a t e forms of violence t h u s u n c o v e r similar m e c h a n i s m s of e m o - t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n .

In a n o t h e r large set of s i t u a t i o n s , a very different p a t h w a y circumvents situational t e n s i o n a n d fear. Instead of finding a w e a k victim, t h e focus of e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n is on the audience before w h o m the fight is per- formed. These fights differ greatly from the attacking-the-situationally- w e a k k i n d of p a t h w a y , because the f i ght er s a t t e n d m u c h m o r e to their audience t h a n to each other; as we shall see from evidence presented in c h a p t e r 6, t h e stance of the audience h a s an o v e r w h e l m i n g effect on w h e t h e r a n d h o w m u c h violence is carried o u t . Such fights are typically stylized a n d limited, a l t h o u g h w h a t h a p p e n s w i t h i n t h o s e limits m a y b e b l o o d y e n o u g h or indeed deadly; in o n e major v a r i a n t , violence is socially organized as fair fights, limited to certain kinds of a p p r o p r i a t e l y m a t c h e d o p p o n e n t s . H e r e again the social structures p r o m o t i n g a n d c o n t r o l l i n g such fights best b e c o m e visible by c o m p a r i n g across s i t u a t i o n s . T h e s e

10 • C h a p t e r 1

include personal fights as observed on streets or places of e n t e r t a i n m e n t ; fighting as a form of c a r o u s i n g fun; children's o r d i n a r y scuffling a n d mock-violence; dueling; m a r t i a l arts a n d o t h e r f i g h t i n g schools; a n d sports violence a m o n g b o t h players a n d fans. T h i s set of situations m i g h t be regarded as violence for fun a n d honor, in c o n t r a s t to the truly nasty forms of violence noted earlier, which d e p e n d u p o n finding a situationally w e a k victim. Nevertheless, as we look into the micro-realities of fighting for fun and honor, we find they t o o remain shaped by c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear; people are still for the m o s t p a r t n o t g o o d at violence, a n d w h a t they m a n a g e t o d o depends o n h o w a t t u n e d they are w i t h a n audience t h a t gives t h e m e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e over an o p p o n e n t .

F I G H T M Y T H S

T h e most c o m m o n p a t h w a y a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear is a very short o n e , leading no further: people do not get beyond the e m o t i o n a l tensions of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but confine themselves to bluster, or to finding face-saving or sometimes humiliating way s of backing d o w n . W h e n violence does break o u t , it is usually i n c o m p e t e n t , because tension a n d fear r e m a i n d u r i n g the p e r f o r m a n c e .

O n e reason t h a t real violence looks so ugly is because we have been exposed to so m u c h mythical violence. T h a t we actually see it unfolding before o u r eyes in films a n d on television m a k e s us feel t h a t this is w h a t real violence is like. C o n t e m p o r a r y film style of g r a b b i n g the viewers' a t t e n t i o n w i t h bloody injuries a n d b r u t a l aggressiveness m a y give m a n y people the sense t h a t e n t e r t a i n m e n t violence is, if a n y t h i n g , t o o realistic. N o t h i n g could be farther from the t r u t h . T h e c o n v e n t i o n s of p o r t r a y i n g violence a l m o s t always miss the most i m p o r t a n t dynamics of violence: t h a t it starts from c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear, t h a t most of the time it is bluster, a n d t h a t the circumstances t h a t allow this tension to be over- c o m e lead to violence t h a t is m o r e ugly t h a n e n t e r t a i n i n g . T h e entertain- m e n t media are n o t the only sources of pervasive d isto rtio n s of the reality of fighting; the verbal c o n v e n t i o n s of bragging a n d t h r e a t , a n d of telling stories a b o u t fights we have seen, all c o n t r i b u t e to m a k i n g violence a mod- ern-day mythology.

A p a r t i c u l a r l y silly myth is t h a t fights are c o n t a g i o u s . T h i s is a staple of old film c o m e d i e s a n d m e l o d r a m a s . O n e p e r s o n p u n c h e s a n o t h e r in a c r o w d e d b a r or r e s t a u r a n t ; the w a i t e r t o p p l e s over with a tray, o u t r a g i n g a n o t h e r p a t r o n , a n d i n t h e n e x t frames e v e r y o n e i s h i t t i n g e v e r y o n e a r o u n d t h e m . T h i s fighting of all a g a i n s t all, I am q u i t e c e r t a i n , h a s never o c c u r r e d as a serious m a t t e r in real life. T h e typical r e s p o n s e of b y s t a n d - ers w h e n a fight b r e a k s o u t in a c r o w d e d place is to b a c k a w a y to a safe

Violent Confrontations • 11

d i s t a n c e a n d w a t c h . Polite middle-class c r o w d s r e a c t w i t h m o r e u n e a s e o r h o r r o r , s h r i n k i n g a w a y a s far a s possible w i t h o u t s h o w i n g o v e r t p a n i c ; I h a v e w i t n e s s e d t h i s , for i n s t a n c e , w h e n a c o u p l e of h o m e l e s s m e n g o t i n t o a scuffle on t h e s i d e w a l k o u t s i d e a d o w n t o w n t h e a t e r w h i l e t h e a u d i e n c e w a s o u t s i d e d u r i n g i n t e r m i s s i o n . T h e p u n c h - t h r o w i n g w a s brief, followed by t h e u s u a l hostile m u t t e r i n g a n d g e s t u r i n g ; t h e well- dressed middle-class p e o p l e k e p t their w a r y d i s t a n c e i n h u s h e d u n e a s e . I n b o i s t e r o u s w o r k i n g - c l a s s o r y o u t h scenes, t h e c r o w d generally will m a k e a space for t h e i n d i v i d u a l s to fight; it s o m e t i m e s cheers a n d s h o u t s e n c o u r a g e m e n t from a safe d i s t a n c e . But if t h e level of a n g e r is high a m o n g t h e p r i n c i p a l s , o n l o o k e r s t e n d t o s h r i n k b a c k vocally a s well a s physically. ^ Even m o r e so w i t h fights in sparsely p o p u l a t e d p u b l i c places: b y s t a n d e r s k e e p their d i s t a n c e .

W h a t one does n o t see is a c o n t a g i o n of belligerence, everyone starting to fight w i t h everyone else. People are n o t on a h a i r trigger of aggressive- ness, r e a d y to be released by the slightest catalyst. T h e H o b b e s i a n image of h u m a n s , judging from t h e m o s t c o m m o n evidence, is empirically w r o n g . Fighting, a n d indeed m o s t overt expressions of conflict, m o s t typi- cally call o u t fear or at least w a r i n e s s .

T h e exception to n o n - c o n t a g i o u s n e s s is w h e n t h e c r o w d is already di- vided i n t o a n t a g o n i s t i c g r o u p identities. If a fight b r e a k s o u t between indi- viduals from o p p o s i n g g r o u p s , others from their side m a y join in, a n d the fight will e x p a n d . This is one typical scenario by w h i c h c r o w d s of rival football s u p p o r t e r s (so-called football h o o l i g a n s , especially British) begin their violence; it is also an instigator of ethnic violence a n d o t h e r kinds of w h a t Tilly (2003) calls " b o u n d a r y a c t i v a t i o n " of collective identities. This is n o t w a r of all against all; the inaptly n a m e d "free-for-all" m a y l o o k c h a o t i c a n d u n s t r u c t u r e d to o u t s i d e r s , b u t it is indeed quite strongly o r g a n i z e d . This o r g a n i z a t i o n is w h a t enables individuals to o v e r c o m e the pervasive fear t h a t keeps m o s t of t h e m from fighting; if it w e r e n o t socially well organized, w i d e - p a r t i c i p a t i o n fighting w o u l d n o t be possible.

Even in these instances, we s h o u l d be w a r y of assuming t h a t all confron- t a t i o n s of individuals belonging to hostile g r o u p s lead to m a s s p a r t i c i p a - t i o n . F o o t b a l l h o o l i g a n s in a strange t o w n , e n c o u n t e r i n g the local s u p - p o r t e r s , m a y s h o u t insults, t h r e a t e n , even skirmish a little, r u n n i n g f o r w a r d a n d t h e n b a c k i n t o t h e safety of their side; b u t in m a n y instances they do n o t get into a full-scale " a g g r o . " T h e catalytic m o m e n t does n o t always h a p p e n ; t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s o n b o t h sides are often c o n t e n t t o f i n d excuses, especially w h e n they are o v e r m a t c h e d , or even just equally di- vided; the c o n f r o n t a t i o n they are looking for, they decide, is still in the future. Such m i n i - c o n f r o n t a t i o n s play a considerable p a r t in the o n g o i n g lore of the g r o u p ; it is w h a t they like to talk a b o u t , w h a t their conversa- tional rituals center on in their d r i n k i n g gatherings, as they reinterpret the

12 • C h a p t e r 1

Figure 1.1 Bystanders keep back from fight (New York City, 1950). Elliott Erwitt/ Magnum Photos.

events of t h e p a s t h o u r s or days; t h e standoff is often b l o w n up i n t o a battle, or t a k e n as a sign of the o t h e r side's c o w a r d i c e in b a c k i n g d o w n from their t o u g h n e s s (King 2 0 0 1 ; Eric D u n n i n g , p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n M a r c h 2 0 0 1 ) . G r o u p s t h a t engage i n some f i g h t i n g build u p mythologies a r o u n d themselves, exaggerating the a m o u n t of fighting a n d their perfor- m a n c e in it, a n d d o w n p l a y i n g their o w n tendencies to back a w a y from m o s t f i g h t s .

A n o t h e r a p p a r e n t e x c e p t i o n to the n o n - c o n t a g i o u s n e s s of fighting is the friendly free-for-all such as pillow fights or food fights. Pillow fights at a festive occasion such as a children's sleep-over typically h a v e an all- against-all c h a r a c t e r ; this b o t h p r o m o t e s a n d enhances a m o o d of hilarity, implying t h a t the situation is very u n u s u a l , framed as an exceptionally

Violent Confrontations • 13

Figure 1.2 Turkish members of parliament fight while colleagues hold each other back (2001). Reuters.

g o o d j o k e . T h e multi-sidedness of t h e pillow fight is m o r e of a p a r t i c i p a - tion-spreader, bringing everyone i n t o the collective fun. In this respect, friendly pillow fights are like N e w Year's or o t h e r carnival celebrations, w h i c h involve t h r o w i n g s t r e a m e r s a n d b l o w i n g noise-makers indiscrimi- nately at o t h e r p eopl e. T h e same goes for b a t h e r s playfully splashing w a t e r at each o t h e r in a s w i m m i n g p o o l — b y my o b s e r v a t i o n s , this occurs in the early m o m e n t s , as s o o n as a g r o u p of a c q u a i n t a n c e s h a s entered t h e p o o l , t h a t is, entered the festive space. Nevertheless, if t h e play t u r n s at all r o u g h , it falls i n t o a two-sided p a t t e r n . Pillow fights t a k i n g place as a f o r m of e n t e r t a i n m e n t in p r i s o n cells, for e x a m p l e , often escalate by p u t t i n g b o o k s or other h a r d objects inside t h e pillow cases, a n d these t u r n into ganging u p o n t h e w e a k e s t victim, the one m o s t p r o n e t o b r e a k d o w n ( O ' D o n n e l l a n d E d g a r 1 9 9 8 a : 2 7 1 ) . D u r i n g food fights in institutional dining halls, p e o p l e t h r o w food a r o u n d m o r e o r less r a n d o m l y , w i t h o u t l o o k i n g at targets; they t h r o w it up in the air, generally in the direction of p e r s o n s at distant seats, or better yet, d i s t a n t tables. In these settings, food fights h a v e b o t h t h e c h a r a c t e r of s p o n t a n e o u s self-entertainment, b u t also a revolt against a u t h o r i t y in t o t a l institutions. F o o d fights are also o b -

14 • C h a p t e r 1

served in p o p u l a r lunch-time g r o u p s in A m e r i c a n high schools, b u t here it is less a free-for-all a n d m o r e often a form of boy-girl flirting or playful activity a m o n g friends, the same p e r s o n s w h o engage in food sharing as a sign of intimacy (Milner 2 0 0 4 : c h a p . 3). T h e u p s h o t is t h a t we can be p r e t t y sure, w h e n we see a fight in the all-vs.-all m o d e , t h a t this is only play-violence, n o t serious; the e m o t i o n a l t o n e is n o t c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension-fear, a n d everyone can sense w h e n it is or isn't.

A second m y t h is t h a t fights are long. In H o l l y w o o d films (not to m e n - t i o n H o n g K o n g kung-fu f i l m s a n d similar action a d v e n t u r e f i l m s the w o r l d over), fist fights as well as gunfights go on for m a n y m i n u t e s . Fight- ers are resilient, t a k i n g m a n y blows a n d c o m i n g back t o dish t h e m o u t ; crashing over t abl es , k n o c k i n g d o w n shelves of bottles, b o u n c i n g off walls, falling over balconies a n d d o w n stairs a n d hillsides, in a n d o u t of cars a n d o t h e r speeding vehicles. Shooting involves m u c h resolute stalk- ing, r u n n i n g from cover to cover, sometimes daringly outflanking the o p - p o n e n t , b u t never retreating; on the o t h e r side, the evil-doers k e e p c o m i n g b a c k , sneakily a n d warily if n o t by sheer p u g n a c i t y a n d ferociousness. In t h e 1 9 8 1 film Raiders of the Lost Ark, the h e r o t r a d e s p u n c h e s w i t h a beefy villain for four m i n u t e s ; t h e n he immediately j u m p s on a h o r s e to chase a n d b o a r d a speeding t r u c k in a n o t h e r fight sequence, lasting eight a n d a half m i n u t e s . D u r i n g the course of these sequences, the h e r o kills or k n o c k s o u t fifteen of t h e enemy, plus a n o t h e r seven civilian b y s t a n d e r s . D r a m a t i c time of course is n o t real time; b u t w h e r e a s m o s t film a n d stage d r a m a s c o m p r e s s real t i m e to gloss over t h e dull a n d r o u t i n e m o m e n t s of o r d i n a r y life, they e x p a n d fighting time by m a n y times over. T h e illusion is further bolstered by fights staged as e n t e r t a i n m e n t . Boxing m a t c h e s typically are p l a n n e d for a series of t h r e e - m i n u t e r o u n d s , up to a m a x i - m u m of thirty or forty-five m i n u t e s of fighting (in the n i n e t e e n t h cen tu ry sometimes m u c h longer); b u t these are deliberately c o n t r o l l e d by social a n d physical s u p p o r t s a n d c o n s t r a i n t s s o a s t o m a k e m o s t m a t c h e s p r o - duce m a n y m i n u t e s of m o r e or less c o n t i n u o u s fighting. Even h e r e , refer- ees generally h a v e to p r o d b o x e r s to s t o p stalling or tying each o t h e r up by clinching. It t a k e s c o n t i n u o u s social pressure to k e e p a fight going. Such fighting is an entirely artificial c o n s t r u c t i o n ; it is an e n t e r t a i n i n g spectacle precisely because of its e x t r e m e d e p a r t u r e from o r d i n a r y reality.

In reality, m o s t serious fights on the individual or small-g ro u p level are extremely s h o r t . If we cut o u t t h e preliminaries a n d the a f t e r m a t h , w i t h their insults, noise, a n d gesturing, a n d look only at t h e violence, it is often r e m a r k a b l y brief. T h e a c t u a l gunfight at t h e O.K. C o r r a l in T o m b s t o n e , A r i z o n a , in 1 8 8 1 t o o k less t h a n t h i r t y seconds (see r e p r i n t of Tombstone Epitaph, Oct. 1 8 8 1 ) ; t h e 1 9 5 7 m o v i e version t o o k seven m i n u t e s . Crimes involving the use of guns a l m o s t never t a k e the form of gunfights between sides b o t h a r m e d a n d firing at each other. T h e vast majority of m u r d e r s

Violent Confrontations • 15

a n d assaults w i t h deadly w e a p o n s consist o f o n e o r m o r e a r m e d p e r s o n s briefly a t t a c k i n g an u n a r m e d p e r s o n . Since t h e latter half of t h e t w e n t i e t h century, gang fights, d r u g turf battles, or r e p u t a t i o n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , as in violence-prone areas such as inner-city racial g h e t t o s , often involve g u n s . But they are usually n o t gun-battles, b u t very brief episodes, usually w i t h only one side firing.

Fist fights are also generally brief. M a n y b a r - r o o m b r a w l s a n d street fights are o n e - p u n c h affairs. T h e lore of such fighting is t h a t w h o e v e r gets in t h e first p u n c h generally w i n s . W h y s h o u l d this be so? Consider the alternatives. A t w o - s i d e d , relatively evenly m a t c h e d fight could h y p o t h e t i - cally go on for s o m e time. But evenly m a t c h e d scuffling is likely to be unsatisfying w h e n , as is usually t h e case, neither does m u c h d a m a g e , or n o t h i n g h a p p e n s t h a t c o u n t s as a d r a m a t i c b l o w p r o d u c i n g d o m i n a n c e . Fighters in such situations settle for d e m o n s t r a t i n g their willingness to fight, a n d t h e n t r u n c a t i n g the actual fighting by letting it degenerate into gesturing a n d name-calling. A n o t h e r c o m m o n occurrence is t h a t o n e of the fighters h u r t s himself, such as by b r e a k i n g his h a n d in t h r o w i n g a p u n c h . 6 Injuries of this sort are often r e g a r d e d as fair g r o u n d s for ending the fight. A key issue t h e n is w h e n a fight is considered to be over. F a r from seeking long-term, k n o c k - d o w n d r a g - o u t fights of the H o l l y w o o d film or b o x i n g m a t c h t y p e , o r d i n a r y belligerents are satisfied for fights to be s h o r t d r a m a t i c episodes, minimizing the p e r i o d w h e n they are actually fighting. T h e y are willing to give or t a k e a h u r t during t h a t p e r i o d , a n d t h e n use the h u r t as a r e s o l u t i o n for the fight, at least for the time being.

A fight of this sort m a y be p a r t of a series of violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; for e x a m p l e , a s h o r t fight in a b a r m a y lead to one of the p a r t i c i p a n t s leaving, getting a g u n , a n d r e t u r n i n g to s h o o t the w i n n e r of t h e first fight. But this is typically t w o s h o r t episodes of m i c r o - c o n f r o n t a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l s ' anger a n d feelings of being involved in a conflict are n o t coextensive w i t h their p e a k capacity actually t o c a r r y o u t violence.

Fights w i t h knives a n d o t h e r cutting w e a p o n s also t e n d to be brief. F o r the m o s t p a r t , these are situations of flashing knives at each o t h e r b u t letting t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n t u r n i n t o a standoff; w h e r e serious injury is d o n e , a quick b l o w is struck, a n d the fight is t h e r e b y r e g a r d e d as at an end. T h u s a n o t h e r staple of e n t e r t a i n m e n t lore r e g a r d i n g an earlier historical p e r i o d , the e x t e n d e d swordfight as c h o r e o g r a p h e d in films a n d plays, w a s p r o b a b l y for the m o s t p a r t mythical. In early m o d e r n E u r o p e , if s o m e o n e actually succeeded in killing the other, or inflicting serious injury (cases likely to c o m e to t h e notice of authorities), it w a s usually described as an a m b u s h , or a g r o u p a t t a c k on an individual (Spierenburg 1 9 9 4 ) . This w o u l d be the equivalent of the o n e - p u n c h , sucker-punch b a r fight.

T h e r e are t w o i m p o r t a n t classes of exceptions. Exceptions to a general- ization are valuable because they enable us to refine t h e e x p l a n a t i o n .

16 • C h a p t e r 1

W h e r e individual or s m al l - gr oup fights are prolonged beyond a few m o - m e n t s , it is typically because either (a) the fight is highly circumscribed, so t h a t it is n o t really " s e r i o u s , " or it is clearly u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e are safeguards to limit the fighting; or (b) the type of exception described by the expression " h i t t i n g a m a n w h e n he is d o w n " ( a l t h o u g h the victim m a y well be a w o m a n or a child), w h e r e in effect t h e r e is no real fight b u t a m a s s a c r e o r p u n i s h m e n t .

T h e typical e x c e p t i o n of type (a) has t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e b o x i n g m a t c h , or even m o r e so, s p a r r i n g practice for such a m a t c h . E u r o p e a n a r i s t o c r a t s in t h e seventeenth a n d eighteenth centuries spent m u c h time in fencing lessons; n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n university students belonged to duel- ing fraternities, fighting m a t c h e s t h a t ended n o t so m u c h in victory as in getting a scar on o n e ' s face as a m a r k of honor. These are c o n t r o l l e d forms of fighting a n d could be e x t e n d e d for as long as fifteen m i n u t e s (Twain 1 8 8 0 / 1 9 7 7 : 2 9 - 3 1 ) ; n o t only is the e x t e n t of injury generally quite lim- ited, b u t also t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l m o o d is d a m p e n e d ; these are n o t angry e n c o u n t e r s , b u t even a f o r m of solidarity.

J u s t h o w n a r r o w i s this e x c e p t i o n becomes a p p a r e n t w h e n w e c o m p a r e practicing for duels w i t h t h e duels themselves (for further detail, see c h a p . 6). M o s t pistol duels w e r e literally o n e - s h o t fig h ts—th at is, o n e s h o t w a s p l a n n e d to be fired by each side. T h e m o m e n t of danger, t h o u g h real, w a s brief; if b o t h survived, h o n o r could be considered satisfied. Duels h a d the same s t r u c t u r e as m o d e r n fights: typically very brief, w i t h i n a few seconds of a c t u a l violence; p r e c e d e d by a build-up p e r i o d of ritual ex ch an g e of insults; a n d t e r m i n a t e d by m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t as the result of the conflict, w h e t h e r by explicit t r a d i t i o n or implicitly.

T h e same p a t t e r n a p p e a r s i n J a p a n d u r i n g t h e T o k u g a w a era (seven- teenth a n d eighteenth centuries). S a m u r a i w e r e ideally expected to defend their h o n o r w i t h a fight to the d e a t h , a n d could be quite t o u c h y a b o u t insults in public places (Ikegami 1 9 9 5 , p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) . Indeed, s a m u r a i w e n t o u t of their w a y to m a k e insults very easy, since an acciden- tal k n o c k i n g of s w o r d s c a b b a r d s in passing w a s t a k e n as an affront. O n e side effect—or p e r h a p s it w a s the m a i n effect, m o t i v a t i n g t h e p r a c t i c e — w a s t h a t s a m u r a i w e n t a b o u t clutching their s c a b b a r d s , one o n each side, t h e m a r k a n d privilege o f the s a m u r a i r a n k being t o w e a r t w o s w o r d s . This k e p t t h e m c o n s t a n t l y focused on their e m b l e m of social identity as fighters, even as it prevented m o s t o u t b u r s t s from occurring. If a fight b r o k e o u t , it h a p p e n e d on the spot, w i t h o u t the a p p a r a t u s of challenges, seconds, a n d a d v a n c e scheduling found in E u r o p e a n duels. S a m u r a i t h u s t e n d e d to be in a c o n s t a n t state of t h r e a t a n d gesture r a t h e r t h a n a c t u a l fighting. A c c o r d i n g to t h e professional lore of t h e s w o r d i n s t r u c t o r s , deadly fights s h o u l d be very brief, consisting of a s u d d e n decisive s t r o k e ; in reality, m o s t fighters w e r e p r o b a b l y n o t this accomplished, a l t h o u g h

Violent Confrontations • 17

the ideology m a y have justified the brevity of actual fights. Vastly m o r e time w a s spent in s a m u r a i schools, practicing fighting in controlled w a y s t h a t obviated injury as well as angry e m o t i o n ; indeed, such schools t e n d e d t o w a r d formal exercises of m o v e m e n t s aimed at imaginary o p p o n e n t s — like the katas, which m a k e up much of the activity of martial arts schools in k a r a t e .

T h e m o s t famous case of a s a m u r a i avenging an insult was the so-called forty-seven ronin, in 1 7 0 2 . O n e h i g h - r a n k i n g s a m u r a i w a s insulted by a n o t h e r over a m a t t e r of etiquette in the s h o g u n ' s palace; he d r e w his s w o r d and w o u n d e d the insulter, but w a s quickly disarmed by o t h e r a t t e n - d a n t s . T h i s w a s n o t a duel, since the insulter did n o t d r a w a w e a p o n ; it w a s n o t highly effective, since the m a n w a s n o t killed. T h e incident w a s a p p a r e n t l y very brief, resulting in a few slashes. T h e a t t a c k e r w a s con- d e m n e d for d r a w i n g his s w o r d in the palace, a n d required to c o m m i t seppuku. T h e forty-seven retainers {ronin) eventually avenged the d e a t h of their master, again n o t by dueling, but by a military assault on the h o u s e of the original insulter, killing a n u m b e r of g u a r d s a n d the s a m u r a i lord, w h o did n o t defend himself. N o n e of the forty-seven w a s killed in the a t t a c k , indicating t h a t they had o v e r w h e l m i n g force, the typical p a t t e r n of a s t r o n g force ganging up on a w e a k e r o n e . Even the aftermath did n o t m a t c h the heroic c o d e . T h e c o u r t ruled t h a t avenging h o n o r w a s n o t a n excuse in this case, b u t the forty-seven ronin were allowed to c o m m i t seppuku as an h o n o r a b l e way to die. Ideally, this w a s s u p p o s e d to consist of cutting o p e n o n e ' s bowels w i t h a s h o r t knife across the s t o m a c h ; the agony then w o u l d be cut short by being beheaded by a m a n s t a n d i n g behind the seated s a m u r a i . In reality, the forty-seven c o m m i t t e d "fan sep- puku"—instead of a knife they held a fan w i t h which they gestured a s t o m a c h slash, w h e r e u p o n they were beheaded (Ikegami 1995). It w a s in fact an execution by beheading, mitigated by the formalities of ritual sui- cide, which w a s h o w the event w a s publicly a n n o u n c e d a n d received. J a p - anese s a m u r a i movies, c o n t i n u i n g an earlier genre of stories, are as mythi- cal as H o l l y w o o d westerns.

A n o t h e r v a r i a n t on the p a t t e r n of p r o l o n g e d p r o t e c t e d fights comes into focus w h e n we e x a m i n e children's fights. Fighting a m o n g children is the most c o m m o n form of violence in the family; it is far m o r e c o m m o n t h a n spousal violence or child abuse (see c h a p t e r 4 ) . But children are rarely injured in these fights; in p a r t because children, especially w h e n small, have little capacity to h u r t each o t h e r in these scuffles. M o r e imp o rtan tly , children pick their occasions for such scuffles, generally when p a r e n t s or c a r e t a k e r s are nearby, so t h a t if the fight escalates, they can call for help a n d end the fight. An e x a m p l e from my e t h n o g r a p h i c notes:

Somerville, Mass. December 1994. Family in working-class n e i g h b o r - h o o d , getting into car on Sunday m o r n i n g . F a t h e r sitting at wheel,

18 • C h a p t e r 1

w a r m i n g up car; t w o boys ( a b o u t ages 8 a n d 10) playing a r o u n d behind car (in alley w h e r e it's p a r k e d , outside house), with a little girl (about 3 or 4); m o t h e r ( w o m a n a r o u n d 30) c o m i n g o u t of house last. Little girl is getting into back seat from left side of 4 - d o o r car; smaller boy b u m p s her with the d o o r and she starts to cry, w h e r e u p o n bigger boy hits y o u n g e r boy, " l o o k w h a t you d i d ! " M o t h e r comes o u t at just this time; father ignores it. M o t h e r n o w hurriedly tries to m a k e the boys get into car. They evade her, going behind car a n d start r u n n i n g a r o u n d a n d swiping at each other. Bigger boy has a soft drink sitting on t r u n k ; smaller boy spills it o n t o g r o u n d . Bigger boy n o w hits him h a r d and m a k e s h i m cry. M o t h e r intervenes, t h r e a t e n s the bigger boy, w h o r u n s a w a y from her. She t u r n s a n d puts the smaller boy into the car from the left rear side. T h e bigger boy n o w comes a n d tries to pull him o u t : " T h a t ' s my s e a t ! " F a t h e r t u r n s a r o u n d from front seat a n d half-heart- edly tries to pull o n e of the boys off. T h e mother, w h o starts o u t hurried b u t fairly quiet, starts screaming, a n d pulls the bigger boy o u t of the car. T h e bigger boy n o w appeals to his father, says he's forgotten some- thing in the h o u s e . He goes into h o u s e . N o w m o t h e r d e m a n d s smaller boy to move over to o t h e r side of car; he resists, she finally pulls him o u t and forces him to m o v e over, protesting t h a t he's the victim of his older brother. O l d e r boy comes back; same sequence of fighting over back seat, but briefer; finally all get into car (older boy in left back) a n d car leaves.

In this sense, children act like a d u l t s , except t h a t the latter have developed m e a n s of bringing fights to an end on their o w n , w h e r e a s children rely on outsiders to do it for t h e m / Similarly, fights t h a t break o u t in schools c o m m o n l y occur in the presence of a teacher, or w h e r e a teacher will likely come quickly to break it u p ; in prisons, m o s t fights occur in the presence of g u a r d s (Edgar a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 8 ) . This is a m e c h a n i s m by which fights are kept s h o r t .

Exception (b) consists in longer violence t h a t m a y t a k e place in in- stances w h e r e there is o v e r w h e l m i n g disparity in force between the t w o sides, a g r o u p gives an isolated enemy a p r o l o n g e d beating, or a s t r o n g individual beats on a weaker. T h e lesson suggested by this exception is t h a t it is the fighting c o n f r o n t a t i o n r a t h e r than violence per se t h a t is h a r d to sustain for very long: the tension of a o n e - o n - o n e fight or evenly m a t c h e d small g r o u p s , t r a d i n g blow for blow, shot for shot; b u t if o n e side gets the other d o w n or in an u n p r o t e c t e d position, the tension is resolved a n d violence can proceed.

Real fights are generally short; p a r t i c i p a n t s do n o t a p p e a r to have re- serves of m o t i v a t i o n t h a t carry them into a prolonged violent struggle with a n o t h e r individual. Fights are k e p t s h o r t because p a r t i c i p a n t s are good at finding s t o p p i n g points t h a t they regard as dramatically a p p r o -

Violent Confrontations • 19

p r i a t e . Fights can t a k e longer w h e n they are deliberately staged as n o t serious, n o t p a r t of the g r o u n d - z e r o real w o r l d . Violent episodes can be longer a n d m o r e d r a w n o u t if they are c o n t r o l l e d , restrained b o t h in their likelihood of injury a n d in their a t m o s p h e r e of hostility; practice-fighting is t h u s m u c h lengthier t h a n real fights. Even angry fights t e n d to h a p p e n in places w h e r e they can be b r o k e n u p .

A n o t h e r e n t e r t a i n m e n t m y t h is t h e smiling, joking killer or b a d guy. It is extremely r a r e t h a t killers, r o b b e r s , or fighters are in a laughing g o o d h u m o r , or even display s a r d o n i c w i t . 8 T h e laughing villain image comes across so well precisely because it is unrealistic, giving a c o d e d message t h a t t h e villainous deeds are n o t real, b u t e n c a p s u l a t e d w i t h i n an enter- t a i n m e n t frame; hence it is a favored stereotype for c a r t o o n s a n d comic/ fantasy m e l o d r a m a , a n d i n t r o d u c e s just such a comic tinge i n t o allegedly serious d r a m a . T h e image enables the viewer t o t a k e the e n t e r t a i n m e n t - audience a t t i t u d e , n o t the horrified a t t i t u d e t h a t w o u l d occur w i t h real violence. O n c e again, e n t e r t a i n m e n t violence m a n a g e s to present violence so t h a t its key f e a t u r e — c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n a n d fear—is covered u p .

V I O L E N T S I T U A T I O N S A R E S H A P E D B Y A N E M O T I O N A L F I E L D

O F T E N S I O N A N D F E A R

My aim is a general t h e o r y of violence as situational process. Violent situa- tions are s h a p e d by an e m o t i o n a l field of tension a n d fear. A n y successful violence m u s t o v e r c o m e this tension a n d fear. O n e w a y this is d o n e is by t u r n i n g the e m o t i o n a l tension i n t o e m o t i o n a l energy, usually by o n e side of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n at the expense of the other. Successful violence bat- tens on c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear as one side a p p r o p r i a t e s the e m o - tional r h y t h m as d o m i n a t o r a n d t h e other gets c a u g h t in it as victim. But only small n u m b e r s of p e r s o n s c a n do this. T h i s is a s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t y of situational fields, n o t a p r o p e r t y of individuals.

As I h a v e a r g u e d in a previous b o o k , Interaction Ritual Chains (Collins 2 0 0 4 ) , e m o t i o n a l energy (which I abbreviate as E E ) is a variable o u t c o m e o f all interactional s i t u a t i o n s , m o s t o f w h i c h are n o t violent. E E varies w i t h t h e degree t h a t the p e o p l e present become e n t r a i n e d in each o t h e r ' s e m o t i o n s a n d bodily r h y t h m s , a n d c a u g h t up in a c o m m o n focus of a t t e n - t i o n . These are positive experiences w h e n all p a r t i c i p a n t s feel solidarity a n d intersubjectivity. In these successful interaction rituals, individuals come a w a y w i t h feelings of strength, confidence, a n d e n t h u s i a s m for w h a t e v e r the g r o u p w a s doing: these feelings are w h a t I call e m o t i o n a l energy. Conversely, if the i n t e r a c t i o n fails to p r o d u c e e n t r a i n m e n t for cer- tain individuals (or if they are s u b o r d i n a t e d or excluded by others), they

20 • Chapter 1

lose EE, a n d c o m e a w a y feeling depressed, lacking in initiative, a n d alien- a t e d from the g r o u p ' s c o n c e r n s .

Violent interactions are difficult because they go against the g r a i n of n o r m a l interaction rituals. T h e t e n d e n c y to become e n t r a i n e d in each o t h - er's r h y t h m s a n d e m o t i o n s m e a n s t h a t w h e n the interaction is at cross p u r p o s e s — a n a n t a g o n i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n — p e o p l e experience a pervasive feeling of tension. This is w h a t I call c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension; at higher levels of intensity, it shades over i n t o fear. For this r e a s o n , violence is difficult to c a r r y o u t , n o t easy. T h o s e individuals w h o are g o o d at violence are t h o s e w h o have found a w a y to circumvent c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/ fear, b y t u r n i n g t h e e m o t i o n a l situation t o their o w n a d v a n t a g e a n d t o the d i s a d v a n t a g e of their o p p o n e n t .

It is the features of situations t h a t determine w h a t kinds of violence will o r will n o t h a p p e n , a n d w h e n a n d how. This m e a n s t h a t w h a t h a p p e n s further b a c k , before p e o p l e arrive in a s i t u a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , is n o t the key factor as to w h e t h e r they will fight, n o r h o w they will fight if the situation moves i n t h a t direction; n o r indeed w h o will w i n a n d w h a t k i n d of d a m a g e gets d o n e .

A L T E R N A T I V E T H E O R E T I C A L A P P R O A C H E S

M o s t existing e x p l a n a t i o n s of violence fall into t h e category of back- g r o u n d e x p l a n a t i o n s : factors outside the situation t h a t lead u p t o a n d cause t h e observed violence. Some b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s m a y be neces- sary or at least strongly predisposing, b u t they certainly are n o t sufficient; s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s are always necessary, a n d sometimes they are suffi- cient, giving violence a m u c h m o r e emergent quality t h a n any o t h e r k i n d of h u m a n behavior. As a l r e a d y n o t e d , c o n d i t i o n s such as being subjected to poverty, racial discrimination, family d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , a b u s e , a n d stress are far from d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r violence will h a p p e n or n o t . This is also t r u e for the venerable psychological hypothesis t h a t frustration leads to aggression, w h e r e frustration m a y be far in the b a c k g r o u n d but also c o u l d be quite p r o x i m a t e .

My objection across the b o a r d is t h a t such e x p l a n a t i o n s assume vio- lence is easy once the m o t i v a t i o n exists. M i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l evidence, to the contrary, s h o w s t h a t violence i s h a r d . N o m a t t e r h o w m o t i v a t e d some- o n e m a y be, if t h e situation does n o t unfold so t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l ten- sion/fear is o v e r c o m e , violence will n o t proceed. Conflict, even quite overtly expressed conflict, is n o t the same as violence, a n d t a k i n g the last step is n o t at all a u t o m a t i c . This holds as well for a frustration t h a t c r o p s up immediately in t h e situation: s o m e o n e m a y b e c o m e angry at t h e frus- t r a t i o n a n d at the p e r s o n held responsible for it, b u t t h a t still is n o t e n o u g h

Violent Confrontations • 21

t o p r o c e e d t o violence. M a n y , p r o b a b l y m o s t , frustrated p e r s o n s s w a l l o w their anger, or let it go w i t h bluster a n d bluff.

It m i g h t seem a n a t u r a l step to f o r m a multi-level theory, c o m b i n i n g b a c k g r o u n d a n d situational c o n d i t i o n s . This m a y eventually t u r n o u t t o be a g o o d w a y to p r o c e e d . But t h e r e is m u c h to be u n d e r s t o o d before t a k i n g t h a t step. M o s t b a c k g r o u n d theories of violence are c o n c e r n e d w i t h criminal violence in a n a r r o w sense. But there is a lot of violence t h a t is n o t well u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s at all: for e x a m p l e , the violence c o m m i t t e d by the small p r o p o r t i o n s of soldiers w h o are effective fighters, a n d by rioters, police, athletes a n d fans, duelists a n d o t h e r elites, c a r o u s e r s a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t audiences. Often these violent p e r s o n s come from the o p p o s i t e sorts of b a c k g r o u n d as those alleged to be crucial for criminal violence; a n d these forms of violence have p a t t e r n s of situational emergence in w h i c h e m o t i o n a l d y n a m i c s of the g r o u p are overwhelmingly a p p a r e n t . My preferred strategy is to p u s h as far as possi- ble w i t h a situational a p p r o a c h ; eventually we m a y be in a p o s i t i o n to w o r k b a c k w a r d a n d i n c o r p o r a t e some b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s ; b u t I a m n o t yet convinced t h a t is going to be as i m p o r t a n t as we have usually believed. H e r e it m a y be m o r e useful to reverse the gestalt completely, a n d c o n c e n t r a t e on the f o r e g r o u n d to t h e exclusion of all else.

O p p o r t u n i t y a n d social c o n t r o l theories give a s i t u a t i o n a l e m p h a s i s t h a t is surely on the right t r a c k . These theories d o w n p l a y b a c k g r o u n d motives. Generally they assume t h a t motives for violence are w i d e s p r e a d ; or t h a t motives for transgressions m a y be situationally emergent. R o u t i n e activi- ties t h e o r y (Cohen a n d Felson 1 9 7 9 ; Felson 1 9 9 4 ; M e i e r a n d M i e t h e 1 9 9 3 ; O s g o o d et al. 1 9 9 6 ) , the m o s t p r o m i n e n t version of an o p p o r t u n i t y a p p r o a c h , is a t h e o r y of crime generally, w h i c h is n o t necessarily violent. In a typical case, the r e a s o n a g r o u p of y o u t h s steal a car m a y simply be t h a t they found o n e w i t h the keys left in. Such o p p o r t u n i t y e x p l a n a t i o n s leave a m u c h w i d e r gulf to be j u m p e d w h e n the crime is a violent o n e . T h e formula for crime is a coincidence in t i m e a n d space of a m o t i v a t e d offender, an accessible victim, a n d t h e absence of social c o n t r o l agents w h o could deter the crime. T h e emphasis in r o u t i n e activities t h e o r y is on v a r i a t i o n s in the latter t w o c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h are held to explain shifts in crime rates a p a r t from any shift in m o t i v a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s (like the back- g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s discussed earlier). W h a t such research h a s s h o w n is m a i n l y t h a t w o r k a n d c a r o u s i n g p a t t e r n s (such a s t h o s e t h a t involve being o u t late at n i g h t ) , t o g e t h e r w i t h d e m o g r a p h i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r kinds of p e r s o n s in p a r t i c u l a r n e i g h b o r h o o d s , affect victimization r a t e s . Since this is an interactive m o d e l of several variables, t h e r e need n o t be a n y c h a n g e in criminal m o t i v a t i o n to a c c o u n t for changes in crime r a t e s ; a n d indeed criminals' m o t i v a t i o n s need n o t be very s t r o n g if the o p p o r t u - nities are particularly easy. A l t h o u g h t h e a p p r o a c h is s i t u a t i o n a l , the a n a l -

22 • Chapter 1

ysis mainly focuses on macro-level c o m p a r i s o n s . T h u s it does n o t get closely i n t o the process by w h i c h violence t a k e s place. T h e incompleteness of o p p o r t u n i t y t h e o r y is t h a t it assumes violence is easy; if an o p p o r t u n i t y presents itself a n d no authorities are a r o u n d to p r e v e n t violence, t h e n it p o p s o u t automatically. But violence is n o t easy, a n d situational p a t t e r n s of incipient, t h r e a t e n e d violence are a barrier t h a t has to be g o t t e n a r o u n d . T h e m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m still h a s to be supplied.

A similar limitation exists w i t h D o n a l d Black's (1998) t h e o r y of the b e h a v i o r of law. T h e t h e o r y is valid as far as it goes, b u t w h e r e it goes is an e x p l a n a t i o n of h o w conflict is m a n a g e d once it b r e a k s out; varying a m o u n t s of formal legal i n t e r v e n t i o n are d e t e r m i n e d by repetitive, t r a n s - situational features of the social s t r u c t u r e : the hierarchical distance a m o n g the parties to the dispute, a n d their degree of intimacy. It is an i m p o r t a n t theoretical a d v a n c e to see t h a t m o r a l i z i n g a b o u t violence is a variable t h a t can be explained by the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' a n d the social c o n t r o l - lers' locations in social space. But t h e t h e o r y still assumes t h a t violence is easy; its focus is on w h a t h a p p e n s after violence b r e a k s o u t , on the societal r e a c t i o n . It is t r u e , for e x a m p l e , t h a t m u c h violence is self-help, the escala- t i o n of o n g o i n g conflicts a m o n g p e r s o n s k n o w n to each other, a n d t h a t t h e very intimacy of the relationship deters formal intervention by police a n d legal a u t h o r i t i e s . But self-help violence still needs to be situationally constructed; it still needs to get p a s t t h e barrier of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear. This is n o t easy; a n d there is n o t as m u c h self-help violence as m i g h t be expected from the n u m b e r s of p e r s o n s w h o h a v e motives to help themselves against local a n t a g o n i s t s (described, for e x a m p l e , in u n p u b - lished research b y R o b e r t E m e r s o n , U C L A , o n r o o m m a t e quarrels).

A similar p r o b l e m exists w i t h m o r e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of violence, w h i c h includes theorizing violence as resistance. Resistance theories frame violence as a local r e s p o n s e to s u b o r d i n a t e location in large-scale social s t r u c t u r e ; usually this is class location in t h e capitalist economy, s o m e - times a b s t r a c t e d m o r e generally i n t o a s t r u c t u r e of d o m i n a t i o n t h a t in- cludes race a n d gender. 9 T h e m i c r o thesis again applies: resistance t h e o r y assumes t h a t violence is easy, t h a t all it t a k e s is a motive. But resistance violence is just as h a r d as any other k i n d of violence. W h e n resistance violence o c c u r s — o r at least violence t h a t plausibly can be c o n s t r u e d as such, because it occurs in the l o w e r class or a racial g h e t t o — i t is by going along w i t h s i t u a t i o n a l dynamics a n d c o n s t r a i n t s . These are t h e same pat- terns found elsewhere: small n u m b e r s of violent specialists, getting their energy from t h e unviolent p a r t of the g r o u p , requiring the s u p p o r t of audiences, a n d b a t t e n i n g o n the e m o t i o n a l l y w e a k . M i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l con- ditions favor a t t a c k i n g victims inside t h e c o m m u n i t y of the oppressed, m u c h m o r e t h a n its ostensible class o p p r e s s o r s . Resistance t h e o r y often has a twisted quality: as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p u t f o r w a r d by altruistic outsid-

Violent Confrontations • 23

ers b e n d i n g over b a c k w a r d to be s y m p a t h e t i c , it heroizes a n d justifies violent p r e d a t o r s w h o p e r f o r m m o s t of their violence against the m e m b e r s of their o w n oppressed g r o u p .

Even in t h o s e instances w h e r e violence is m o s t explicitly resistance, as in g h e t t o uprisings u n d e r slogans of rebellion against racial injustice, the violence is a l m o s t all local, a n d m o s t of t h e d e s t r u c t i o n is in o n e ' s o w n n e i g h b o r h o o d . T h e r h e t o r i c of t h e uprising is o n e t h i n g , the actual vio- lence is a n o t h e r ; t h e a t t a c k s are local because this is the situationally easi- est way. W h e n an ideologically a r o u s e d g r o u p invades s o m e o n e else's n e i g h b o r h o o d , it is less likely to be vertical resistance to the overarching social order, b u t r a t h e r a lateral assault on some o t h e r ethnic g r o u p , t h u s forfeiting the m o r a l legitimacy of being seen as resistance by altruistic o n l o o k e r s from higher social classes.

C u l t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f violence are a l m o s t a l w a y s m a c r o e x p l a n a - t i o n s ; a w i d e - r a n g i n g , t r a n s - s i t u a t i o n a l c u l t u r e is a s s u m e d to be t h e (nec- essary, a n d implicitly even sufficient) e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y t h e violence t a k e s place. T h e r e is t h e s a m e flaw h e r e , f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l analysis, as i n resistance t h e o r i e s , even w h e n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n is t u r n e d a r o u n d . Some t h e o r i e s r e g a r d violence, n o t as r e s i s t a n c e , b u t as i m p o s i t i o n from a b o v e , disciplining a n d d e t e r r i n g resisters in t h e n a m e of u p h o l d i n g t h e c u l t u r a l order. T h u s a c u l t u r e of r a c i s m , h o m o - p h o b i a , or m a c h i s m o is offered as an e x p l a n a t i o n of a t t a c k s on m i n o r i - ties, w o m e n , a n d o t h e r victims. T h i s k i n d of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n at least is on s t r o n g e r empirical g r o u n d s t h a n resistance i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , since s u c h a t t a c k e r s u s u a l l y vocally state their prejudices d u r i n g their a t t a c k , w h e r e a s t h e alleged resisters u s u a l l y do n o t . But t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suf- fers from failing to l o o k closely at t h e d y n a m i c s of m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n s ; t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y of t h e m involve bl us t er a n d bluff, s u b s t i t u t i n g verbal in- sult for a c t u a l violence, a n d s o m e t i m e s (given a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s ) using t h e energy of bl us t er to c a r r y over i n t o a c t u a l violence. It is n o t at all clear t h a t t h e insulting e x p r e s s i o n s used in these s i t u a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t long-held beliefs a n d deep-seated m o t i v a t i o n s for a c t i o n . I will discuss this in g r e a t e r detail in c h a p t e r 8, in r e g a r d to t h e r i t u a l insults used by s p o r t s fans a n d soccer h o o l i g a n s . T h e r e is m i c r o - s o c i o l o g i c a l evidence t h a t r a c i s m a n d h o m o p h o b i a a r e s i t u a t i o n a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d t o o . T h e fact t h a t these w o r d s are n o u n s misleads u s i n t o reifying w h a t are actually fluctuating a n d t e m p o r a l l y s i t u a t e d processes.

A similar line of a r g u m e n t applies to " c u l t u r e of v i o l e n c e " e x p l a n a t i o n s in criminology. H e r e t h e r e is m o r e e t h n o g r a p h i c g r o u n d i n g , less imposi- t i o n of a political i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u p o n the d a t a . But t h e fact t h a t we can observe distinct g r o u p s of p e r s o n s (such as y o u n g m e n in p o v e r t y zones) w h o t a l k in a favorable w a y a b o u t violence does n o t m e a n t h a t this talk carries over a u t o m a t i c a l l y into violent behavior. Violence is h a r d , n o t

24 • Chapter 1

easy. Virtually no cultural discourse a d m i t s this; neither p e r p e t r a t o r s n o r pro-violence g r o u p s , n o r victims, n o r altruistic or righteous observers- from-a-distance. Everyone thinks violence is easy to perform, w h e t h e r one brags a b o u t it, fears it, or hopes to eliminate it. But the micro-situational realities of talking a b o u t violence fall into ritual p a t t e r n s of bluster a n d bluff, a n d these rituals provide an ideology t h a t covers up the real n a t u r e of violence—that it is h a r d to per f or m , t h a t most people are n o t g o o d at it, including those w h o are d o i n g the bragging a n d swaggering. T h e r e are cultures of violence in the sense of distinctive n e t w o r k s w h o circulate this kind of violent talk; but we need to get beyond t a k i n g them at their w o r d .

M a c r o - c u l t u r a l a p p r o a c h e s t o violence become v a c u o u s w h e n they reach the concept of " s y m b o l i c violence." This helps us n o t at all to ex- plain real violence, but m u d d i e s the analytical t a s k . Physical violence has a clear core referent, which we can study using micro-situational observa- tions. We are in a very different c o n c e p t u a l universe, w h e n Bourdieu writes of schooling r e q u i r e m e n t s as symbolic violence, a n d in general in- vokes the entire arena of symbolic possessions as " t h e gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, a n d is n o t so m u c h u n d e r g o n e as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, per- sonal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, g r a t i t u d e , piety. . . . fSjymbolic violence is the gentle, hidden form w h i c h violence takes w h e n overt violence is i m p o s s i b l e " (Bourdieu 1 9 7 2 / 1 9 7 7 : 1 9 2 , 195). This is a merely rhetorical usage, a way of d r a m a t i z i n g the a r g u m e n t t h a t school achievement, cul- tural tastes, a n d ritual practices are p a r t of a self-reproducing s t r u c t u r e of stratification, which the a u t h o r w a n t s to impress on his audience is morally illegitimate. But t h e d y n a m i c s of school requirements a n d cul- tural stratification are n o t at all similar to the d y n a m i c s of physically vio- lent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . T h e latter is a micro-situational process revolving a r o u n d e m o t i o n s of fear, tension, a n d f or ward panic, with s t r o n g elements of emergence; Bourdieu's " s y m b o l i c violence," to the contrary, is s m o o t h , tension-free, n o n - c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l , highly repetitive, a n d w i t h o u t situa- tional c o n t i n g e n c i e s . 1 0

Of c o u r s e , any core c o n c e p t has its borderline a r e a s . It is not useful to insist t h a t violence must fit an exact preconceived definition. W h e n people aim blows or w e a p o n s at each other, t h e r e is a period of b u i l d u p a n d a n t i c i p a t i o n , a n d these p e r i o d s are w o r t h studying even when they do n o t lead to actual violence. As we k n o w , blows a n d projectiles often miss their targets; sometimes they are n o t very m u c h intended to hit; sometimes they hit s o m e o n e unintentionally. W h e r e do we d r a w the b o u n d a r i e s ? Are t h r e a t s a form of violence? Clearly they are close e n o u g h to it t h a t we have to p u t t h e m into the model of situational d y n a m i c s . And this is so even t h o u g h there is a g o o d deal of cursing which does n o t lead to vio- lence. By the same t o k e n , we will study the situational d y n a m i c s of q u a r -

Violent Confrontations • 25

reling, a n d of fearful, tense, a n d hostile e m o t i o n s generally. T h e m e t h o d - ological rule s h o u l d be to let the research process find its o w n b o r d e r s . By this criterion, rhetorical p s e u d o - e x p l a n a t i o n s get ruled o u t because they d o not c o n n e c t .

"Symbolic violence" is mere theoretical w o r d play; to take it literally w o u l d be to grossly m i s u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e of real violence. Symbolic violence is easy; real violence is h a r d . T h e former goes w i t h the flow of situational interaction, m a k i n g use of the n o r m a l propensities for interac- tion rituals. T h e latter goes against the interactional grain; it is because the t h r e a t of real violence runs c o u n t e r to the basic m e c h a n i s m s of e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t and interactional solidarity t h a t violent situations are so dif- ficult. It is precisely this tension t h a t p r o d u c e s c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension and fear, the chief feature of micro-situational interaction on w h i c h pivot all the features of violence w h e n it docs occur.

H I S T O R I C A L E V O L U T I O N O F S O C I A L T E C H N I Q U E S F O R C O N T R O L L I N G

C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L T E N S I O N

Finally, a few w o r d s a b o u t a p r o m i n e n t research p r o g r a m t h a t has a very explicit theory of violence, e v o l u t i o n a r y psychology. This t h e o r y e x t r a p o - lates from a general theory a b o u t evolutionary genetics to specific h u m a n behaviors including h o m i c i d e , fighting, a n d r a p e (Daly a n d Wilson 1 9 8 8 ; T h o r n h i l l a n d Palmer 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e theory m a k e s m u c h of the empirical p a t t e r n s t h a t y o u n g m e n of peak r e p r o d u c t i v e ages perform most vio- lence, and t h a t the instigation of violence is often sexual jealousy or m a s - culine p o s t u r i n g . Violence is interpreted as an evolutionary selected p r o - pensity for males to struggle over r e p r o d u c t i v e d o m i n a n c e .

O n e c a n n o t rule o u t a priori the possibility t h a t there arc genetic c o m - p o n e n t s of h u m a n behavior. But a wide range of empirical c o m p a r i s o n s lead to the conclusion t h a t the genetic c o m p o n e n t , if it exists, is small, a n d is o v e r w h e l m e d by social c o n d i t i o n s . For o n e thing, violence is n o t confined to y o u n g men of r e p r o d u c t i v e age. T h e most c o m m o n type of violence in the family, for e x a m p l e , is not between adult sexual p a r t n e r s ; this is outweighed by parent/child violence, typically in t h e form of severe c o r p o r a ] p u n i s h m e n t ; a n d t h a t in turn is less frequent t h a n violence a m o n g children (see c h a p t e r 4 ) . Violence a m o n g children is n o t very se- vere, for reasons t h a t we will consider, including the tendency for violence t h a t is restricted a n d regulated by outsiders (in this case, adults) to be c h r o n i c r a t h e r t h a n severe. This poses a puzzle for e v o l u t i o n a r y theory; children scuffling starts at quite y o u n g ages, a n d often involves aggression by little girls, which is g r a d u a l l y restricted as they get older (Trembley 2 0 0 4 ) . In sheer quantity, the greatest frequency of incidents of violence

26 • C h a p t e r 1

occurs at n o n - r e p r o d u c t i v e ages, a n d is n o t exclusively i n t r a - m a l e . Evolu- t i o n a r y psychologists m a y overlook this k i n d of violence because it is n o t very severe, a n d d o e s n ' t get r e c o r d e d in the official crime statistics; never- theless a comprehensive t h e o r y s houl d a c c o u n t for all sorts a n d all levels of intensity of violence. M i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l t h e o r y does quite well in incor- p o r a t i n g d a t a on children; as we shall see, scuffling a m o n g small children s h o w s the same t w o p a t t e r n s t h a t are at the center of a d u l t violence: the situationally s t r o n g ganging up on the w e a k a n d fearful, a n d staged, lim- ited fights. T h e p a t t e r n is s t r u c t u r a l r a t h e r t h a n individual; t a k i n g children o u t of the g r o u p a n d p u t t i n g in others r e a r r a n g e s t h e p a t t e r n of d o m i - n a n c e , a n d shifts w h o plays the roles of bully a n d victim ( M o n t a g n e r et al. 1 9 8 8 ) .

E v o l u t i o n a r y psychology is also vulnerable on its m a i n turf, t h e p r o p e n - sity of y o u n g m e n to be involved in serious violence. It is n o t difficult to c o n s t r u c t alternative e x p l a n a t i o n s of w h y y o u n g m e n are violent, based on social c o n d i t i o n s . Of any age g r o u p , they h a v e the m o s t a m b i g u o u s status in society; physical strength a n d violence is the o n e resource in w h i c h they h a v e superiority, w h e r e a s they r a n k l o w in e c o n o m i c position, deference, a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l power. T h e p o i n t I w a n t to stress again is my micro-sociological refrain: evolutionary t h e o r y assumes t h a t violence is easy—provided t h a t the genes are p r i m e d for it—whereas in fact vio- lence is h a r d , even for y o u n g m e n . Indeed, the majority of o u r m i c r o - evidence is a b o u t the failures of violence a m o n g y o u n g m e n .

Large sectors of the intellectual w o r l d t o d a y dismiss e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r y : partly in response to its perceived insensitivity to cultural a n d interactional p a t t e r n s ; partly o u t of long-standing intellectual a n t a g o n i s m between interpretive a n d positivistic a p p r o a c h e s , between Geisteswis- senschaft a n d Naturwissenscbaft. A l t h o u g h my intellectual alliances are largely w i t h the interpretive c a m p , nevertheless I w a n t to cross over to evolutionist t e r r a i n a n d suggest t h a t e v o l u t i o n a r y psychology has m a d e t w o serious mistakes, o n its o w n t e r m s .

T h e first m i s t a k e is a b o u t w h a t has genetically evolved. T h e evolution- ary o r t h o d o x y of t o d a y holds t h a t h u m a n s have evolved to be egotistical gene p r o p a g a t o r s , a n d t h a t males h a v e evolved the biological h a r d - w i r i n g to be aggressive in o r d e r to p r o p a g a t e their genes in preference to some o t h e r m a l e ' s genes. I suggest a very different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of w h a t is the m a i n e v o l u t i o n a r y heritage on the biological level. As I h a v e a r g u e d elsewhere (Collins 2 0 0 4 : 2 2 7 - 2 8 , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f explaining h u m a n eroticism), h u m a n s h a v e evolved to h a v e particularly high sensitivities to the m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l signals given off by o t h e r h u m a n s . H u m a n s are h a r d - w i r e d to get c a u g h t in a m u t u a l focus of intersubjective a t t e n t i o n , a n d t o r e s o n a t e e m o t i o n s from o n e b o d y t o a n o t h e r i n c o m m o n r h y t h m s . This is an evolved biological p r o p e n s i t y ; h u m a n s get situationally c a u g h t up in the m o m e n t a r y n u a n c e s of each o t h e r ' s n e r v o u s a n d e n d o c r i n o l o g i -

Violent Confrontations • 27

cal systems in a w a y t h a t m a k e s t h e m p r o n e to create i n t e r a c t i o n rituals a n d t h u s t o k e e p u p face-to-face solidarity. I a m m a k i n g m o r e t h a n the b a n a l p o i n t t h a t h u m a n s h a v e evolved w i t h large brains a n d a capacity for learning c u l t u r e . We have evolved to be h y p e r - a t t u n e d to each other emotionally, a n d hence to be especially susceptible to t h e dynamics of i n t e r a c t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s .

T h e evolution of h u m a n egotism, t h e n , is far from p r i m a r y ; it emerges only in special circumstances, for the m o s t p a r t r a t h e r late in h u m a n his- t o r y (see Collins 2 0 0 4 , c h a p . 9, "Individualism a n d I n w a r d n e s s as Social P r o d u c t s " ) . All this h a s a direct effect on h u m a n violence, a l t h o u g h r a t h e r the o p p o s i t e of t h e premises of e v o l u t i o n a r y psychology. H u m a n s are h a r d - w i r e d for i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t a n d solidarity; a n d this is w h a t m a k e s violence so difficult. C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear, as I will explain in greater detail, is n o t merely an individual's selfish fear of bodily h a r m ; it is a t e n s i o n t h a t directly c o n t r a v e n e s the t e n d e n c y for entrain- m e n t in each o t h e r ' s e m o t i o n s w h e n there is a c o m m o n focus of a t t e n t i o n . We h a v e evolved, on the physiological level, in such a w a y t h a t fighting e n c o u n t e r s a deep i n t e r a c t i o n a l obstacle, because of t h e w a y o u r n e u r o - logical h a r d - w i r i n g m a k e s us act in t h e i m m e d i a t e presence of o t h e r h u m a n beings. C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear is the e v o l u t i o n a r y price we p a y for civilization.

H u m a n s h a v e the capacity t o b e angry a n d t o mobilize bodily energies to be forceful a n d aggressive. T h e s e , t o o , h a v e physiological bases; they are universal in all societies ( E k m a n a n d Friesen 1 9 7 5 ) , a n d are found a m o n g m o s t small c h i l d r e n . 1 1 T h e capacity for anger is explained in evolu- t i o n a r y psychology as a m e a n s of mobilizing bodily effort to o v e r c o m e an obstacle (Frijda 1 9 8 6 : 19). But w h e n the obstacle is a n o t h e r h u m a n being, the h a r d - w i r e d capacity for anger a n d aggression meets an even stronger form of h a r d - w i r i n g : the p r o p e n s i t y to b e c o m e c a u g h t up in a s h a r e d focus of a t t e n t i o n a n d the e m o t i o n a l r h y t h m s of o t h e r p e o p l e . H o w d o w e k n o w t h e p r o p e n s i t y for i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t i s s t r o n g e r t h a n mobilized aggression? Because t h e m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l evidence, re- viewed t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k , s h o w s the m o s t frequent t e n d e n c y is to s t o p s h o r t of o p e n violence; a n d w h e n violence does emerge, it h a p p e n s in an i n t e r a c t i o n a l process t h a t is oriented in detail to o v e r c o m i n g the confron- t a t i o n a l tension, while c o n t i n u i n g to leave traces of it.

T h a t is n o t to say t h a t h u m a n s c a n n o t be in conflict. They often have conflicting interests, a n d they often express their a n t a g o n i s m t o w a r d o p p o - nents. But this antagonism is expressed for the m o s t p a r t against other persons (or better yet, vaguely indicated groups) w h o are at a distance, preferably out of sight a n d hearing. It is the immediately situational con- frontation t h a t brings up an overwhelming tension; for face-to-face violence to occur, there m u s t be some situational w a y a r o u n d this emotional field.

28 • C h a p t e r 1

H e r e I will i n t r o d u c e a second feature of evolution t h a t is relevant to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of h u m a n violence. N o w we are concerned n o t with bio- logical evolution of the physical h a r d - w i r i n g of h u m a n bodies, but w i t h h u m a n institutions, which can also be seen as evolving over time, with some institutions being selected for survival a n d o t h e r s selected o u t . If h u m a n s beings have evolved on the physiological level to be full of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension w h e n they e n c o u n t e r a n o t h e r h u m a n in an a n t a g - onistic m o d e , the d e v e l o p m e n t of violence in h u m a n history m u s t be due to the social evolution of techniques for o v e r c o m i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear.

H i s t o r i c a l c o m p a r i s o n s s h o w t h a t social o r g a n i z a t i o n is a huge c o m - p o n e n t in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a m o u n t of violence t h a t t a k e s place. T h e his- t o r y of a r m i e s is the h i s t o r y of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t e c h n i q u e s for keeping men fighting, or at least n o t r u n n i n g a w a y , even t h o u g h they are afraid. In tribal societies, battles are s h o r t , m o s t l y skirmishes a m o n g a few h u n - dred men or less, i n t e r m i t t e n t l y for a few h o u r s , usually e n d i n g w h e n a single victim is killed or seriously w o u n d e d . W i t h o u t social o r g a n i z a t i o n to k e e p soldiers t o g e t h e r in r a n k s , they d a r t back and forth a c r o s s a skirmish line, a few m e n at a t i m e , r u n n i n g a w a y if they are in e n e m y t e r r a i n for m o r e t h a n a few s e c o n d s . T h e s t r u c t u r e is a n a l o g o u s to t o - d a y ' s gangs w h o c a r r y on v e n d e t t a s in t h e form of reciprocal drive-by a t t a c k s , firing at the o p p o s i n g g r o u p from a passing car: w h e n o n e g r o u p meets the o t h e r en m a s s e , they generally bluster a n d insult b u t c o n t r i v e to evade an o p e n clash. T h e c o m p a r i s o n s h o w s t h a t evolution o f social t e c h n i q u e for p r o m o t i n g violence is n o t just a m a t t e r of historical t i m e ; g r o u p s w i t h i n m o d e r n societies are in the s a m e s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n as small primitive t r i b e s , w i t h o u t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a p p a r a t u s for c o m p e l - ling t r o o p s to stay in a c o m b a t s i t u a t i o n . 1 2

M o r e c o m p l e x social o r g a n i z a t i o n in ancient Greece, R o m e , a n d C h i n a b r o u g h t larger n u m b e r s (sometimes on the o r d e r of tens of t h o u s a n d s ) a n d m o r e disciplined t r o o p s into battle a n d could keep t h e m in c o m b a t as long as a day. O n e day w a s also the n o r m a l length of battles in medieval E u r o p e . By the time of the N a p o l e o n i c w a r s , armies were sometimes on the o r d e r of h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of men, a n d battles lasted as long as three days. In the w o r l d w a r s of the t w e n t i e t h century, battles were sus- tained as long as six m o n t h s or m o r e (e.g., V e r d u n , Stalingrad), backed up by a massive b u r e a u c r a t i c a p p a r a t u s . In all historical p e r i o d s , m o s t of the t r o o p s were y o u n g men a r o u n d peak reproductive age, but w h a t determines the a m o u n t of killing d o n e is the kind of social o r g a n i z a t i o n . Struggle for r e p r o d u c t i v e fitness does n o t h i n g in explaining the variance. W h a t has evolved have been the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l techniques for keeping soldiers in line w h e r e they could do s o m e d a m a g e (or at least to stand up t o long-distance w e a p o n s t h a t w o u l d d o d a m a g e t o t h e m ) . These tech- niques have evolved t h r o u g h such devices as the close-ranked p h a l a n x ;

V i o l e n t C o n f r o n t a t i o n s • 2 9

p a r a d e - g r o u n d drilled t r o o p s s u r r o u n d e d by an officer corps concerned w i t h keeping t h e m in line; the politicized appeals and morale-building techniques of m o d e r n mass armies; b u r e a u c r a t i c m e t h o d s for e n t r a p p i n g individuals in an inescapable o r g a n i z a t i o n ; as well as coercive specialists like military police w h o s e job is to keep soldiers from r u n n i n g a w a y (Kce- gan [ 1 9 7 6 | may be read as a c o m p a r i s o n of such techniques across several historical periods; see also M c N e i l l [ 1 9 8 2 , 1995]).

Military organization is the easiest place to trace the social techniques for o v e r c o m i n g o u r biological propensity n o t to be violent. T h e r e are o t h e r spheres of violence w h e r e techniques have evolved, such as the evo- lution of dueling, martial arts a n d other fighting schools, a n d of sports fans' collective behavior r o u t i n e s . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of football hooligans in t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Britain, for e x a m p l e , m a y be seen as the evolution of techniques beginning w i t h participation in the staged excitement of sports contests, t h e n e m a n c i p a t i n g the excitement a w a y from the g a m e itself so t h a t an elite of specialists can p r o m o t e their o w n form of " r i o t on d e m a n d . " These themes will be taken up in later c h a p t e r s .

T h e old-fashioned usage of " e v o l u t i o n a r y " to m e a n progress does not fit well with the historical p a t t e r n of violence; if there is a historical pat- tern, it is t h a t the capacity for violence has increased with the level of social o r g a n i z a t i o n . Violence is n o t p r i m o r d i a l , and civilization does n o t t a m e it; the o p p o s i t e is m u c h n e a r e r the t r u t h . But there is an aspect of evolutionary t h e o r y in a technical sense t h a t is relevant here. Its conclu- sions are n o t c o m f o r t i n g ones. In N o r b e r t Elias's t e r m s , the p a t t e r n can be as m u c h "decivilizing" as it is a "civilizing p r o c e s s . " 1 3 1 am n o t w e d d e d to an evolutionary c o n c e p t u a l v o c a b u l a r y ; I am m o r e inclined to see his- torical sequences in terms of a Weberian theory of multi-dimensional changes in the social organization of p o w e r (on this, the m o s t c o m p r e h e n - sive formulation is M a n n [ 1 9 8 6 , 1 9 9 3 , 20051). Techniques for carrying o u t violence m u s t always be fitted to the task of o v e r c o m i n g confronta- tional tension/fear; h o w e v e r extensive these o r g a n i z a t i o n s are at the m a c r o a n d mcso level, their effectiveness is always tested at the m i c r o level. W h a t the evolutionary perspective does for us here is chiefly to re- mind ourselves of a very long-run perspective; it is the biological h a r d - wiring of h u m a n beings to have so m u c h e m o t i o n a l difficulty at face-to- face violence t h a t has set the p r o b l e m which the d e v e l o p m e n t of social techniques has t e n d e d to solve. F o r t u n a t e l y for h u m a n welfare, the p r o b - lem to a large degree still resists s o l u t i o n .

S O U R C E S

T h e b o o k is theoretically organized but strongly oriented t o w a r d the d a t a . It aims to depict violence at as close range as possible. I have pressed into

30 • C h a p t e r 1

service every source of information t h a t has been accessible to m e . I have tried to exploit visual r e c o r d s w h e r e v e r possible. Video recordings of fights are chiefly accessible for police, s p o r t s , a n d c r o w d violence. Video is occasionally useful on c o n t e m p o r a r y w a r f a r e ; m o r e revealing is a n t h r o - pological film of tribal war. Still p h o t o s h a v e t u r n e d o u t to be even m o r e useful t h a n video t a p e , since they can catch e m o t i o n a n d s h o w the details of bodies in space. I insert p h o t o s in the t e x t as m u c h as possible w i t h i n practical c o n s t r a i n t s . Some of my generalizations d r a w on my entire p h o t o collections of p a r t i c u l a r kinds of violence.

A n o t h e r major source is o b s e r v a t i o n . I have m a d e use of my o w n obser- v a t i o n s wherever there w a s s o m e t h i n g to gleaned from t h e m . Some of these w e r e deliberately g a t h e r e d , w h e n I w a s in violent zones at d a n g e r o u s times (living in certain p a r t s of East C o a s t cities has facilitated this), or by police ride-alongs; others have come from being alert, ready to d r o p i n t o a sociological m o d e a n d to look carefully a n d m a k e notes w h e n some- t h i n g comes u p . This is n o t as m e l o d r a m a t i c as one m i g h t think; I am interested in conflict situations at l o w levels as well as high, a n d it is of interest t o see h o w p e o p l e h a n d l e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , m o s t o f w h i c h d o n o t in fact escalate all the w a y to violence, let alone e x t r e m e v i o l e n c e . 1 4

On some topics in this b o o k , I h a v e m a d e extensive use of s t u d e n t re- p o r t s . These are retrospective a c c o u n t s of situations t h a t my students h a v e observed. I have p r i m e d t h e m by instructing w h a t to p a y a t t e n t i o n t o : e m o t i o n s , b o d y p o s t u r e s , the details of timing. I asked t h e m to describe a conflict they h a v e seen up close, w h i c h did n o t h a v e to be violent; the c o r p u s includes q u a r r e l s a n d abortive fights, an i m p o r t a n t p a r t of the range of situational d y n a m i c s . Given t h a t these students are largely from middle-class b a c k g r o u n d s (although widely r a n g i n g in ethnicity a n d c o u n t r y of origin), the kinds of violence they r e p o r t t e n d to be limited to c a r o u s i n g , e n t e r t a i n m e n t , a n d sports settings, w i t h a certain a m o u n t of domestic conflict, a n d s o m e descriptions of d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d riots. O b - viously such d a t a c a n n o t be used to c o u n t the statistical frequency of v a r i o u s kinds of violence; b u t they are very revealing on the relationship a m o n g different features of s i t u a t i o n s , w h i c h is w h a t I am after.

I h a v e interviewed p e r s o n s w h o have observed or been involved in vio- lence in v a r i o u s w a y s : police officers in several c o u n t r i e s , ex-soldiers, y o u t h scene musicians, b o u n c e r s , judges, a n d criminals. T h r o u g h o u t m y e m p h a s i s has been o n w h a t they h a v e observed, less u p o n h o w they inter- p r e t or explain w h a t t h e y see ( a l t h o u g h one c a n h a r d l y exclude t h a t ) . Interviewing has r a n g e d from highly s t r u c t u r e d (but open-ended) ques- tioning, to informal discussion; w h e r e it h a s been fruitful, I have engaged in lengthy a n d repeated discussions. It has been particularly useful to ask for o b s e r v a t i o n a l detail from o t h e r e t h n o g r a p h i c researchers, w h o h a v e told me things t h a t go b e y o n d their published r e p o r t s — n o t because they

Violent Confrontations • 31

w e r e h o l d i n g a n y t h i n g b a c k , b u t because I h a v e p u s h e d for m a t e r i a l from a n e w angle of relevance. I h a v e also g o t t e n s o m e detailed a c c o u n t s of v a r i o u s kinds of violence from c o u r t sources. My years of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in v a r i o u s m a r t i a l arts schools h a s also been a source of i n f o r m a t i o n .

N e w s r e p o r t s figure largely on s o m e topics. These v a r y a great deal in t h e situational detail t h e y p r o v i d e ; b u t since violence, especially in its m o r e e l a b o r a t e forms, is a relatively r a r e event, t h e r e is often no substitute for n e w s a c c o u n t s . T h e y are especially useful w h e r e they r e p o r t follow- up i n f o r m a t i o n in police cases such as ballistics r e p o r t s . T h e r e are also s o m e long stories (such as on riots) available on the Internet, w h i c h give m u c h m o r e detail t h a n t h e t r u n c a t e d new s dispatches. Television n ews r e p o r t s are usually m o r e cryptic a n d m o r e c o m m e n t a r y - l a d e n , hence less useful, except w h e r e they provide videos. T h e m a i n exception here is on sports violence. I h a v e used my o w n obs er vat i on s of televised games for analysis of player a n d fans violence. A m e r i c a n s p o r t s are so r e c o r d - oriented t h a t o n e c a n often go from a cryptic n ews story of a fight to r e c o n s t r u c t m u c h of the c o n t e x t : for e x a m p l e , h o w t h e players a n d t e a m s w e r e d o i n g in t h e c o m p e t i t i o n leading up to t h e fight. I h a v e also been able to check certain features such as h o w frequently players are hit by pitches in r e l a t i o n to w h e n these lead to fights.

Previously p u b l i s h e d materials are w o v e n into the analysis t h r o u g h o u t t h e b o o k . Some of these are from o t h e r researchers; especially valuable are t h e e t h n o g r a p h e r s of violence (Elijah A n d e r s o n , A n t h o n y King, Bill Buford, Curtis J a c k s o n - J a c o b s , N i k k i Jones', a n d others), a n d t h o s e w h o study t h e milieux in w h i c h certain kinds of violence occur (David G r a z i a n o n e n t e r t a i n m e n t scenes; M u r r a y M i l n e r o n high school status systems). I am p a r t i c u l a r l y i n d e b t e d to researchers like J a c k K a t z w h o h a v e p i o - neered in bringing t o g e t h e r all t h e close-up d a t a from v a r i o u s angles. A n u m b e r of these colleagues (Katz, Milner, Grazian) use collective e t h n o - g r a p h i e s — o b s e r v a t i o n a l r e p o r t s from a n u m b e r of observers collected ei- t h e r retrospectively, or from observers sent o u t to cover p a r t i c u l a r scenes. This a p p r o a c h has n o t been m u c h discussed in t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l litera- t u r e , b u t i t has m a n y a d v a n t a g e s a n d deserves w i d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

I d r a w on published interviews (such as w i t h criminals, in or o u t of jail), as well as b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l a c c o u n t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s in violence (especially military violence). H i s t o r i a n s h a v e been useful w h e r e they give m i c r o - o b s e r v a t i o n a l details from their sources.

Literary sources are also sometimes useful. O n e needs to p r o c e e d w i t h care h e r e , since literary a c c o u n t s of violence are a major source of t h e m y t h o l o g y t h a t obscures o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . This is especially t r u e of film d r a m a , w h i c h w i t h tiny exceptions are extremely unreliable depictions of violence. Some literary a c c o u n t s , chiefly in t h e naturalistic style of the early t w e n t i e t h century, are useful for detail on w a r f a r e a n d on fights, a n d

32 • Chapter 1

for t h e m i c r o - d y n a m i c s t h a t lead up to fights, or for t h e c a r o u s i n g scenes t h a t are their b a c k g r o u n d . A few w r i t e r s , like Tolstoy, H e m i n g w a y , a n d Fitzgerald, w e r e micro-sociologists before the o c c u p a t i o n w a s invented. O l d e r literature such a s H o m e r a n d Shakespeare, m y t h o l o g y - p r o p a g a t i n g in o t h e r respects, nevertheless is sometimes useful for describing t h e ritual- ism s u r r o u n d i n g violence in p a r t i c u l a r historical p e r i o d s if n o t the process of violence itself.

Q u a n t i t a t i v e d a t a is also used h e r e w h e r e relevant. It has been useful (though h a r d to get) on certain aspects of police violence; a n d military r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s h a v e been at the h e a r t of the a c a d e m i c a w a k e n i n g of h o w violence really h a p p e n s , including c o u n t s of soldiers firing, hits, a m m u n i - t i o n e x p e n d e d , a n d casualties. A few d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d their casualties (such as the 1 9 7 0 Kent State n a t i o n a l g u a r d killings) h a v e been r e c o n - structed in detail; a n d I h a v e d r a w n on d a t a on looting, arrests, a n d time- p a t t e r n s of the spread a n d severity of r i o t s .

T h r o u g h o u t I follow t h e rule to m a k e my o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the d a t a . T h i s often m e a n s d e t a c h i n g t h e m from the r e p o r t e r ' s o r t h e previous analyst's c o n c e r n for w h a t is i m p o r t a n t , a n d from their f r a m e w o r k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O n e m i g h t say t h a t sociology is to a large e x t e n t t h e a r t of reframing other p e o p l e ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s . W h e r e t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s are those of previous sociologists a n d t h e reframing is strongly o v e r l a p p i n g , we can s p e a k of c u m u l a t i v e theoretical progress.

My sources are very h e t e r o g e n e o u s . This is as it s h o u l d be. We need as m a n y angles o f vision a s possible t o bear o n t h e p h e n o m e n o n . M e t h o d - ological p u r i t y is a big s t u m b l i n g block to u n d e r s t a n d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y for s o m e t h i n g as h a r d to get at as violence. Obviously, t h e micro-sociological study of violence can be d o n e better in the future t h a n as I h a v e d o n e here; for n o w , it is the direction of m o v e m e n t t h a t c o u n t s .

P R E V I E W

C h a p t e r 2 lays o u t t h e basic m o d e l : violent situations are full of c o n f r o n t a - t i o n a l tension a n d fear. H e n c e , m o s t violence is bluster a n d standoff, w i t h little actually h a p p e n i n g , or i n c o m p e t e n t p e r f o r m a n c e w i t h m o s t l y ancil- lary a n d u n i n t e n d e d d a m a g e . For real h a r m to be inflicted on the enemy, t h e r e m u s t b e p a t h w a y s a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear; w h a t these are is m a p p e d o u t in the following c h a p t e r s .

C h a p t e r 3 describes a special k i n d of d y n a m i c sequence w h e n a tense c o n f r o n t a t i o n is s u d d e n l y resolved in favor of one side, w h i c h t a k e s over- w h e l m i n g superiority. T h e result is w h a t I call a f o r w a r d p a n i c . M a n y f a m o u s atrocities (including m a n y in t h e headline news) c o m e a b o u t in this way.

Violent Confrontations • 33

C h a p t e r s 4 a n d 5 e x a m i n e the p a t h w a y s a r o u n d confrontational ten- sion/fcar t h a t consist in a t t a c k i n g a weak victim. I lere we look at the situational d y n a m i c s of domestic violence, bullying, mugging, a n d hold- u p s . Some of these are m o r e institutionalized t h a n o t h e r s , going on repeti- tively over time. F o r w a r d p a n i c , treated in the previous chapter, is also a v a r i a n t on a t t a c k i n g the w e a k , although at the o t h e r end of the contin- u u m , w h e r e the w e a k n e s s is emergent a n d the suddenness of the e m o - tional shift is the key to the ferocity of the a t t a c k . All these forms of a t t a c k i n g the w e a k s h o w a key feature of successful violence: picking a target t h a t is emotionally w e a k , which is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n being physically w e a k .

So far, these c h a p t e r s deal w i t h violence t h a t is ugly a n d morally despi- cable, o n c e we see it close u p . T h e second p a r t of the b o o k covers a differ- ent set of p a t h w a y s a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. Here the vio- lence is h o n o r a b l e , happy, ebullient, or at least in an in-between zone w h e r e it is socially excused a n d covertly e n c o u r a g e d . C h a p t e r 6 deals with fighting t h a t is deliberately staged for an audience; the same features t h a t m a k e it limited a n d protected also tend to elevate its p r a c t i t i o n e r s into the sphere of an h o n o r e d elite. Even here, c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear remains and shapes the violence, like the return of the repressed.

C h a p t e r 7 considers v a r i o u s w a y s t h a t happy occasions of celebration, c a r o u s i n g , a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t can give rise to violence; as well as h o w some kinds of u n h a p p y violence, such as riots, can t a k e on a c a r o u s - ing t o n e .

C h a p t e r 8 explains h o w the structure of sports as d r a m a t i c p s e u d o - violence gives rise to real violence at predictable m o m e n t s a m o n g players a n d fans. I consider also the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which fans' violence spills over outside the s p o r t s a r e n a , a n d even becomes a u t o n o m o u s of it: the " B - t e a m " p r o m o t i n g itself to equal or superior status to the " A - t e a m " in the e m o t i o n a l d r a m a t i c s of s p o r t i n g a c t i o n .

C h a p t e r 9 looks at h o w fights do or do not start. I focus in on the m i c r o - d y n a m i c s of bluster a n d bluff, a n d e x a m i n e h o w these m a y be insti- tutionalized as a preferred style in the inner-city c o d e of the street.

C h a p t e r s 1 0 and 1 1 consider w h o wins a n d loses f i g h t s a s a process o f micro-situational d o m i n a t i o n . Success in violence is stratification of an e m o t i o n a l field, parallel to the " l a w of small n u m b e r s " t h a t shapes cre- ativity in intellectual a n d artistic fields; all these are variants on seizing emotional d o m i n a n c e over limited niches in an a t t e n t i o n space. T h o s e w h o become the violent elite—"elite," of c o u r s e , in a structural sense, which m a y be morally despised as well as a d u l a t e d — g e t their e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e from all the o t h e r p e r s o n s in the field. They batten emotionally on their victims, d r a w i n g their success from the same process t h a t m a k e s

34 • Chapter 1

their o p p o n e n t s fail; a n d they c a p t u r e t h e e m o t i o n a l energies of lesser m e m b e r s of the s u p p o r t i n g cast a n d a u d i e n c e .

T h e r e is at least this m u c h of a sociological silver lining. Violence has very s t r o n g s t r u c t u r a l limits, by its very n a t u r e as t h e p r o d u c t of an e m o - t i o n a l field. T h e same features t h a t m a k e a m i n o r i t y of p e r s o n s success- fully violent m a k e s the rest of us unviolent. W h a t we can m a k e of this p a t t e r n constructively for t h e future r e m a i n s to be seen.

T H E C O M P L E M E N T A R I T Y O F M I C R O A N D M A C R O T H E O R I E S

Since we social scientists t e n d to be polemical, a n d to act as if o u r o w n theoretical a p p r o a c h is the only correct o n e , I w o u l d like to go on r e c o r d as saying t h a t micro-sociological t h e o r y is n o t t h e w h o l e of sociology. Researchers h a v e successfully studied large-scale s t r u c t u r e s — n e t w o r k s , m a r k e t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d states a n d their interplay i n t h e w o r l d a r e n a — w i t h o u t looking at micro-details. We h a v e c u m u l a t e d some useful theories a b o u t these meso a n d m a c r o s t r u c t u r e s , a n d I a m n o t suggesting t h a t sociologists s houl d t h r o w these aside to c o n c e n t r a t e only o n face-to- face situations. T h e issue isn't o n t o l o g i c a l — w h a t is real a n d w h a t i s n ' t — b u t p r a g m a t i c : w h a t w o r k s a n d w h a t d o e s n ' t . I n t h e p a r t i c u l a r area o f violence research, p e r h a p s m o r e t h a n a n y other t o p i c , w e h a v e m i s u n d e r - s t o o d the m o s t basic m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l p a t t e r n . W e h a v e a s s u m e d t h a t violence is easy for individuals to c a r r y o u t , so we skip the m i c r o level as u n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d t u r n t o c o n d i t i o n s i n the m e s o b a c k g r o u n d o r the m a c r o o r g a n i z a t i o n o r overarching cul t ur e.

This t u r n s o u t to be a p r a g m a t i c m i s t a k e . Violence is n o t easy, a n d t h e key s t u m b l i n g blocks a n d t u r n i n g p o i n t s are at the m i c r o level. T h a t does n o t m e a n t h a t m e s o a n d m a c r o c o n d i t i o n s d o n ' t exist, o r t h a t they c a n n o t be usefully integrated into a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e theory, once we get the m i c r o m e c h a n i s m s right.

T h i s b o o k m a y strike m a n y r e a d e r s a s a l t o g e t h e r t o o m i c r o . I t cuts o u t p r e c e d i n g m o t i v a t i o n s , b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s , a n d l o n g - t e r m c o n - sequences of violence. It also o m i t s the w a y in w h i c h violence is p r o - d u c e d by larger social s t r u c t u r e s t h a n the i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n , such as by militaries or politics. I agree. But in o r d e r to focus closely on the m i c r o - d y n a m i c s of violence, it is necessary here to b r a c k e t t h e rest. T h i s b o o k is the first of a t w o - v o l u m e series. T h e second e x p a n d s the frame to w h a t has been left o u t . A m o n g o t h e r things, it c o n s i d e r s w h a t we k n o w a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d violence, or rather, t h a t which is repetitive, s t r u c t u r e d , and t h u s o r g a n i z e d into m e s o - a n d m a c r o - o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t p r o v i d e a r e g u l a r flow of resources for specialists in violence. It will

Violent Confrontations • 35

c o n s i d e r such topics as w a r a n d geopolitics, as well as t o r t u r e a n d the m a n y c o n t e x t s a n d varieties of r a p e .

T h i s e x p a n s i o n of the t o p i c of violence pushes across several c o n c e p - tual and empirical b o u n d a r i e s . T h e t o p i c of large-scale a n d l o n g - t e r m s t r u c t u r e s for p r o d u c i n g violence b o r d e r s on the t h e o r y of conflict gener- ally; this is a larger t o p i c , since conflict is often n o t violent. T h e t w o are c o n n e c t e d by a process of escalation a n d c o u n t e r - e s c a l a t i o n , which I will b r o a d e n to include the crucial b u t less often considered t h e o r y of de- e s c a l a t i o n . T h e second v o l u m e will focus on conflict—violent a n d u n v i o - lent a l i k e — a s a process swelling up a n d e b b i n g a w a y in time. It will a t t e m p t t o m a p o u t the t i m e - l a w s o f w h e n a n d h o w conflict occurs a t s o m e m o m e n t s a n d n o t in o t h e r s . T h i s will m a k e t i m e - p r o c e s s a key feature of violence in its o w n right, a p a r t from o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s t h a t p r o m o t e violence; the o c c u r r e n c e of violent events d e p e n d s on its t i m i n g in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r such events, as well as in t h e internal flow of t i m i n g in m i c r o - i n c i d e n t s . T h i s m a y t a k e us s o m e further distance t o w a r d u n - d e r s t a n d i n g violence as a relatively r a r e event, u n d e r d e t e r m i n e d by back- g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s .

T h e a p p r o p r i a t e relationship of micro- a n d macro-sociology is n o t to reduce one to the other, but to c o o r d i n a t e the t w o levels of analysis where it leads to s o m e useful result. Violence is one area w h e r e d o i n g so is cru- cial. Despite the shift in scale, there is a t h r e a d connecting b o t h volumes. This is the theory of the interactional processes of emotional fields, laid o u t for micro slices of time and space in the present b o o k , a n d for larger slices in the following o n e .

In w h a t follows, 1 will use the male p r o n o u n s " h e , " " h i s , " and " h i m " deliberately to refer to males. T h e r e are similarities between males and females in their behavior in violent situations, but the n o w - c o n v e n t i o n a l expression " h e or s h e " w o u l d be highly misleading for this to p ic. I will discuss female-on-female violence a n d male/female violence separately a n d explicitly.

P A R T O N E

The Dirty Secrets of Violence

C H A P T E R 2

Confrontational Tension and Incompetent Violence

F r o m m y e t h n o g r a p h i c n o t e s :

Somerville, Mass. (a working-class area of Boston) Oct. 1994, ca. 11:30 p.m. weekday. I ' m w a l k i n g a l o n g the street a n d see a flashy car pull up at the c u r b in a business district, in front of a w a r e h o u s e / b u s i - ness. Young w h i t e guy in his 20s in s h o r t jacket gets o u t , s l a m m i n g t h e door. I k e e p on w a l k i n g . F a r t h e r d o w n t h e street (on the o p p o s i t e sidewalk, the right side as I t u r n a r o u n d to l o o k back up the street) is a n o t h e r y o u n g w h i t e guy. He starts pulling bottles o u t of t h e g a r b a g e (on the street for n e x t m o r n i n g collection) a n d smashing t h e m on the sidewalk. H e ' s angry, p a c i n g a r o u n d . He spots the guy across the street, a b o u t 40 y a r d s or so back. Yells: "Joey! [ O B S C E N I T I E S | " a n d s o m e - thing like: " I ' m going to get you J o e y ! " He rushes into the middle of the street (main traffic street, r a t h e r wide, no traffic at all at this h o u r ) , w h e r e the o t h e r guy comes rushing to meet him from the left side. (Ap- parently they've been waiting for each other.) At the same time, a third guy comes r u n n i n g o u t from up the street, 50 yards or so back, on the right side I t h i n k . T h e t w o allies (Joey a n d friend) attack the bottle- smasher. They take a few swings at each other; I d o n ' t t h i n k any p u n c h e s are landed. Bottle-smasher starts yelling: "Hey, fair fight, fair fight! N o t w o against o n e ! O n e against o n e ! " They recede back u p the street from w h e r e I'm s t a n d i n g . For a couple of minutes the s h o u t i n g c o n t i n u e s , quiets d o w n ; then b r e a k s o u t again. Finally I leave (after a b o u t 5 m i n u t e s , w a t c h i n g from 50 y a r d s a w a y ; a n o t h e r passerby, a w o m a n stands near m e t o w a t c h ; the f i g h t e r s d o n ' t pay a t t e n t i o n t o us). It's n o t clear t h a t they actually landed any p u n c h e s at all.

T h e fighters start off m a k i n g a s h o w of being t o u g h , angry, belligerent— b r e a k i n g bottles, s l a m m i n g d o o r s , yelling obscenities. T h e y t h r o w a cou- ple of p u n c h e s , w h i c h miss. Very quickly they find an excuse to s t o p fight- ing; n o t only the one w h o is o u t n u m b e r e d , but also the ones w h o have the a d v a n t a g e seem to accept the excuse. T h e aftermath consists in m a k - ing angry noises for a while.

BRAVE, C O M P E T E N T , A N D EVENLY M A T C H E D ?

T h e prevailing m y t h o l o g y a b o u t fights may be s u m m e d up in the formula t h a t the fighters are brave, c o m p e t e n t , and evenly m a t c h e d . In entertain-

4 0 • C h a p t e r 2

m e n t a n d in t h e t r o p e s of o r d i n a r y discourse, belligerents are usually dis- tinguished in m o r a l t e r m s , as heroes a n d villains, the h o n o r a b l e a n d the culpable; b u t the b a d guy is a g o o d s t r o n g fighter, otherwise the d r a m a is spoiled, a n d t h e story does n o t cast such a g o o d light on its p r o t a g o n i s t . Sports, w h i c h are e n t e r t a i n m e n t s organized to h a v e t h e s t r u c t u r e of d r a - matically satisfying conflicts, are usually devised so t h a t the c o m p e t i t i o n is evenly m a t c h e d . In fictionalized c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , u n m a t c h e d forces are a p p r o p r i a t e only if the h e r o w i n s o u t against superior strength; this is, of c o u r s e , easier to achieve in fiction t h a n in real life.

T h e reality is a l m o s t entirely the o p p o s i t e . Fighters are mostly fearful a n d i n c o m p e t e n t in their exercise of violence; w h e n they are evenly m a t c h e d , they t e n d to be particularly i n c o m p e t e n t . It is w h e n the s t r o n g a t t a c k the w e a k t h a t m o s t violence is successful.

T h e p a t t e r n is well illustrated in an e t h n o g r a p h i c film, Dead Birds, de- picting tribal w a r f a r e i n h i g h l a n d N e w Guinea ( G a r n e r 1 9 6 2 ) . T h e f i g h t - ers consist of all t h e a d u l t males of t w o n e i g h b o r i n g tribes, several h u n - dred on each side. T h e y meet at their t r a d i t i o n a l fighting g r o u n d on the b o r d e r b e t w e e n their territories. T h e film s h o w s a d o z e n or so fighters in the forefront, w i t h a n individual o r t w o d a r t i n g f o r w a r d t o s h o o t a n a r r o w at t h e enemy side; w h e n this h a p p e n s , the o t h e r side falls b a c k . T h e battle has a r h y t h m i c p a t t e r n of w a v e s , rushing f o r w a r d a n d t h e n b a c k , as if t h e r e w e r e a m a g n e t i c force t h a t keeps even the bravest fighters from going far b e y o n d the dividing line; as if the c o u r a g e of a t t a c k w e r e a force t h a t e x p e n d s itself as the individual p e n e t r a t e s deeper into enemy territory, even a few y a r d s , a n d the relapse b a c k w a r d is m a t c h e d by a surge of c o u r a g e by the enemy c o m i n g f o r w a r d . M o s t of the a r r o w s miss. M o s t w o u n d s are i n the b u t t o c k s o r b a c k , incurred w h e n r u n n i n g away. T h e r e a p p e a r to be relatively few w o u n d s d u r i n g a d a y ' s fighting, s o m e - t h i n g on t h e o r d e r of 1 or 2 percent of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . Fighting goes on repetitively over a p e r i o d of days, until s o m e o n e is killed or injured se- verely e n o u g h to be expected to die of w o u n d s .

W h e n o n e p e r s o n is killed, the fighting stops; the b o d y is t a k e n back to the village for the funeral ceremony, a n d the killing side carries o u t their o w n celebration. This p e r i o d of celebration is implicitly a truce; the fron- tier does n o t h a v e t o b e g u a r d e d a n d everyone c a n a t t e n d their o w n cere- m o n i e s . T h e r e are a d d i t i o n a l w a y s in w h i c h t h e a m o u n t of fighting is restricted: the fighters are willing to call off the fighting w h e n t h e w e a t h e r gets b a d , or w h e n the r a i n will ruin their w a r d e c o r a t i o n s ; they t a k e breaks during the battle t o eat a n d discuss h o w they have performed—typically w i t h m u c h bragging a n d e x a g g e r a t i o n .

T r i b a l w a r f a r e of this s o r t h a s t h e s t r u c t u r e of a v e n d e t t a ; generally o n e victim is killed at a t i m e , a n d each victim m u s t be a v e n g e d , t h u s setting up future b a t t l e s . A n y m e m b e r of the o p p o s i n g g r o u p is a suitable victim. In Dead Birds, a r a i d i n g p a r t y of t h e e n e m y crosses i n t o t r i b a l

Confrontational Tension • 41

t e r r i t o r y a n d kills a small b o y in an o u t l y i n g field. Full-scale b a t t l e c o n - f r o n t a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e entire a d u l t forces of each side generally are standoffs, ballet-like s e m b l a n c e s of w a r f a r e b u t q u i t e i n c o m p e t e n t in killing t h e e n e m y ; a n a t t a c k o n isolated a n d w e a k m e m b e r s o f t h e t r i b e are m o r e effective. T h e p a t t e r n h o l d s generally i n t r i b a l w a r f a r e (Divale 1 9 7 3 ; Keeley 1 9 9 6 ) . I n a d d i t i o n t o full-scale b a t t l e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , tribes also engage in r a i d i n g , a t t e m p t i n g to surprise a village, especially w h e n t h e fighting m e n are a w a y ; o r t h e y m a y e n g a g e i n a m b u s h e s . W h e n t r i b a l fighters h a v e the a d v a n t a g e over defenseless enemies, t h e y often m a s s a - cre t h e m . Keeley gives n u m e r o u s e x a m p l e s from w a r f a r e o f N o r t h A m e r - ican I n d i a n t r i b e s a t t a c k i n g b o t h I n d i a n a n d w h i t e E u r o p e a n settle- m e n t s . T h e biggest i n c i d e n t s of violence h a p p e n w h e r e o p p o s i n g sides are very u n m a t c h e d i n s t r e n g t h . 1

If t h e d r a m a t i c image of fighters is so i n a c c u r a t e , h o w does it survive? In p a r t because e n t e r t a i n m e n t violence, including its sports version, is c o n - trived to stage a dramatically satisfying image. T h e same is so in the con- versations of everyday life, w h i c h are little stagings of d r a m a s in w h i c h one tells stories a b o u t oneself or other persons; the appeal of conversation is in being attention-getting a n d entertaining, n o t in being strictly t r u e . These are r e a s o n s w h y individuals generally lack the v o c a b u l a r y w i t h w h i c h to describe fights accurately; for fights they have been in themselves, t h e r e is overwhelming incentive to fall into the stereotypes of depicting oneself as brave, c o m p e t e n t , a n d m a t c h e d w i t h a s t r o n g enemy; a n d t h e r e is no virtue in w i n n i n g over a fearful, i n c o m p e t e n t e n e m y — a n d m u c h less in r u n n i n g a w a y from such an enemy. To be sure, there is a form of r h e t o r i c t h a t insults the enemy by calling him c o w a r d l y ; w h a t this usually m e a n s is t h a t the enemy's a t t a c k w a s successful because it w a s u n e x p e c t e d , sneaky, a n d n o t a fair fight; or it is a morale-building b o a s t t h a t we will w i n w h e n w e meet h i m h e a d - o n . Soldiers w h o have been i n c o m b a t a n d h a d direct c o n t a c t w i t h the enemy tend to depict him as c o u r a g e o u s ; it is enemies o n m o r e d i s t a n t c o m b a t zones w h o are n o t respected; a n d soldiers in r e a r a r e a s , a n d even m o r e so civilians at h o m e , w h o express a l o w r e g a r d for the enemy (Stouffer et al. 1 9 4 9 : 1 5 8 - 6 5 ) . In fact, b e h a v i o r in c o m b a t , as in other kinds of fights, is generally quite fearful, a n d so the frontline soldiers are also p e r p e t r a t i n g a m y t h a b o u t the enemy as well as themselves. T h a t is w h y we need to use direct evidence of h o w h u m a n s behave in conflict situations, n o t relying on w h a t they say a b o u t it.

T H E C E N T R A L R E A L I T Y : C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L T E N S I O N

I began this c h a p t e r w i t h a description of a fight b e t w e e n Boston t o u g h guys t h a t did n o t c o m e t o m u c h . T h e simplest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t t h e fighters get into a state of fear or at least high tension as s o o n as the

42 • Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Tension/fear in military combat. One man fires, eleven take cover. Pales- tinian policemen firing back at Israelis near Gaza (October 2000). Reuters.

c o n f r o n t a t i o n comes to t h e p o i n t of violence. I will call this tension/fear; it is a collective interactional m o o d t h a t characterizes the violent e n c o u n - ter on all sides, a n d t h a t shapes t h e b e h a v i o r of all its p a r t i c i p a n t s in several typical w a y s .

T h e e m o t i o n a l p a t t e r n comes o u t w h e n w e see w h a t c o m b a t actually looks like a n d a t t e m p t to analyze its n o n v e r b a l expressions. Figures 2 . 1 a n d 2 . 2 s h o w m e n u n d e r fire; some of their actions m i g h t be called c o u r a - geous. Even s o , their p o s t u r e s a n d facial expressions are c r o u c h e d a n d fearful; even t h e m o s t active firers are tense a n d strained. In figure 2 . 3 , a SWAT t e a m (Special W e a p o n s a n d Tactics—i.e., a police unit specially formed for military-like a t t a c k operations) is m o v i n g in on a lone g u n m a n h o l d i n g h o s t a g e s . T h e y h a v e h i m o u t n u m b e r e d a n d o u t g u n n e d , b u t their p o s t u r e s are creeping, slow, c a u t i o u s , as if p u s h i n g their unwilling bodies f o r w a r d by sheer will.

Figure 2 . 4 s h o w s facial expressions close u p . A g r o u p of boys in the Palestinian intifada are t h r o w i n g stones at an Israeli t a n k . T h e y are n o t actually being s h o t at, and their action is essentially b r a v a d o ; but they are all in the grip of the e m o t i o n s of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . T h e boy in the front

Confrontational Tension • 43

Figure 2.2 Tension in face and body postures: Palestinian gunmen battle Israeli soldiers (2002). AP/World Wide Photos.

s h o w s the classic signs of fear: b r o w s raised a n d d r a w n together, w r i n k l e s arching across center of forehead, u p p e r eyelids raised, l o w eyelids tensed, m o u t h o p e n w i t h lips slightly tensed ( E k m a n a n d Friesen 1 9 7 5 : 6 3 ) . T h e b o y t h r o w i n g a r o c k has a similar expression on his face; c o u r a g e is acting even w h e n afraid, n o t t h e absence of fear. T h e others are c r o u c h i n g or cowering in various degrees of tension.

W h a t e v e r h a p p e n s in a fight situation is s h a p e d by tension/fear: h o w t h e violence is carried o u t , w h i c h is to say, for the m o s t p a r t , i n c o m p e - tently; t h e length of fighting; a n d the t e n d e n c y to avoid fighting once it becomes an i m m i n e n t t h r e a t , a n d to find w ays of ending it or avoid p a r t i c - ipating in it. H o w tension/fear is m a n a g e d also determines w h e n a n d to w h a t e x t e n t violence is successfully unleashed, a n d against w h o m .

T E N S I O N / F E A R A N D N O N - P E R F O R M A N C E I N M I L I T A R Y C O M B A T

T h e m o s t extensive evidence on fear a n d its effects has been gathered on the performance of soldiers in c o m b a t . S.L.A. M a r s h a l l (1947), the chief c o m b a t historian for the U.S. A r m y in the central Pacific in 1943 a n d in Europe in 1944—45, interviewed t r o o p s immediately after battle. M a r s h a l l

44 • Chapter 2

Figure 2.3 Police SWAT team moves in cautiously upon a single gunman holding hostages in restaurant (Berkeley, California, 1990). AP/World Wide Photos.

concluded t h a t typically only 15 percent of frontline t r o o p s fired their guns in c o m b a t , reaching at m o s t 25 percent in the m o s t effective units.

W h e n (a c o m m a n d e r of infantry) engages the enemy n o t m o r e t h a n one q u a r t e r of his m e n will ever strike a real b l o w unless they are compelled by a l m o s t o v e r p o w e r i n g circumstances or unless all junior leaders con- stantly " r i d e h e r d " on t r o o p s w i t h t h e specific mission of increasing their fire. T h e 25 percent estimate s t a n d s even for well-trained a n d c a m - paign-seasoned t r o o p s . I m e a n t h a t 7 5 % per cent will n o t fire or will not persist in firing against the e n e m y a n d his w o r k s . These m e n m a y face the d a n g e r b u t they will n o t fight. ( 1 9 4 7 : 5 0 , emphasis added)

W e found t h a t o n a n average n o t m o r e t h a n 1 5 percent o f the m e n h a d actually fired at the enemy positions . . . t h e figure did n o t rise a b o v e 20 to 2 5 % of t h e t o t a l for any a c t i o n . . . . M o s t of t h e actions h a d t a k e n place u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of g r o u n d a n d m a n e u v e r w h e r e it w o u l d h a v e been possible for at least 80 percent of the m e n to fire, a n d w h e r e nearly all h a n d s , at one t i m e or another, w e r e o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n satisfactory firing distance of e n e m y w o r k s . Scarcely one of the actions h a d been a casual affair. T h e greater n u m b e r h a d been decisive local actions in w h i c h t h e o p e r a t i o n s of a c o m p a n y h a d h a d critical effect u p o n the fortunes of s o m e larger b o d y a n d in w h i c h t h e c o m p a n y itself

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l T e n s i o n • 4 5

F i g u r e 2 . 4 F e a r i n f a c e s a n d b o d y p o s t u r e s o f P a l e s t i n i a n b o y s , a f e w o f w h o m

a r e t h r o w i n g r o c k s a t a n Israeli t a n k . B o y i n t h e f r o n t s h o w s t h e c l a s s i c signs o f

f e a r : b r o w s r a i s e d a n d d r a w n t o g e t h e r , w r i n k l e s a r c h i n g a c r o s s c e n t e r o f f o r e h e a d ,

u p p e r e y e l i d s r a i s e d , l o w e r eyelids t e n s e d , m o u t h o p e n w i t h lips s l i g h t l y t e n s e d

( 2 0 0 2 ) . R e u t e r s .

h a d been hard-pr cs s cd. In m o s t cases the c o m p a n y had achieved a sub- stantial success. In some cases, it h a d been driven back a n d locally de- feated by enemy fire. ( 1 9 4 7 : 54)

In an average experienced infantry c o m p a n y in an average stern d a y ' s a c t i o n , the n u m b e r engaging with any a n d all w e a p o n s w a s a p p r o x i - mately 15 per cent of t o t a l strength. In the m o s t aggressive infantry c o m p a n i e s , u n d e r the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose a b o v e 25 per cent of t o t a l strength from the o p e n i n g to the close of action. . . . Moreover, the m a n did n o t have to m a i n t a i n fire to be c o u n t e d a m o n g the active firers. If he had so m u c h as fired a rifle once or twice, t h o u g h n o t aiming it a n y t h i n g in particular, or lobbed a g r e n a d e roughly in the direction of the enemy, he w a s scored on the positive side. . . . Terrain, the tactical situation, a n d even t h e n a t u r e of the enemy a n d the accuracy of his fire a p p e a r e d to have a l m o s t no bearing on the r a t i o of active firers to non-firers. N o r did the element of battle experience t h r o u g h three or four c a m p a i g n s p r o d u c e any such radical changes as might be expected. T h e results a p p e a r e d to indicate t h a t the ceiling was fixed by some c o n s t a n t which w a s inherent in the n a t u r e of

4 6 • C h a p t e r 2

t r o o p s or p e r h a p s in o u r failure to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t n a t u r e sufficiently t o apply the p r o p e r correctives. ( 1 9 4 7 : 5 6 - 5 7 )

T h e firing r a t i o w o u l d increase if an officer w a s directly beside an infan- t r y m a n d e m a n d i n g t h a t h e f i r e ; b u t a s M a r s h a l l n o t e d , m o s t N C O s ( N o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d Officers) " c a n n o t for long m o v e up a n d d o w n a fire line b o o t i n g his m e n until they use their w e a p o n s " ( 1 9 4 7 : 5 7 - 5 8 ) . N o t only is he likely to be killed constantly m o v i n g a b o u t , b u t he is m o r e likely to b e trying t o f i r e his o w n w e a p o n t o beat b a c k t h e enemy, a n d " s u p p o r t i n g a n d e n c o u r a g i n g the relatively few willing spirits w h o are sustaining the a c t i o n . "

In M a r s h a l l ' s p i c t u r e , a small p o r t i o n of t r o o p s , on b o t h sides, are d o i n g all t h e fighting. (I will refer to this as t h e S L A M effect, after S.L.A. M a r - shall's n i c k n a m e , t a k e n from his initials.) Even they are n o t necessarily effective; m o s t of their w e a p o n s miss. W h a t are the o t h e r s doing? In vary- ing degrees, they are i n c a p a c i t a t e d by the c o m b a t s i t u a t i o n . H e r e is o n e closeup e x a m p l e , from t h e A m e r i c a n t r o o p s w h o entered Peking d u r i n g t h e Boxer Rebellion in 1 9 0 0 :

O n e Chinese soldier d a r t e d behind a fence a n d w a s p u m p i n g a w a y at us as fast as he could l o a d . A m a n from the F o u r t e e n t h Infantry p o i n t e d h i m o u t to U p h a m , yelling " T h e r e he is! Shoot him! Shoot h i m ! " I asked h i m w h y he d i d n ' t do a little s h o o t i n g himself. T h e m a n did n o t reply b u t k e p t j u m p i n g u p a n d d o w n , yelling " S h o o t h i m ! " (Preston 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 3 - 4 4 )

U p h a m fired a n d hit the Chinese soldier on his t h i r d shot. Sometimes soldiers r u n away. This is usually very noticeable a n d con-

sidered very d i s h o n o r a b l e , unless the w h o l e b o d y of t r o o p s retreats in a p a n i c , in w h i c h case individual soldiers are likely to be excused. Full-scale p a n i c retreats can be i m p o r t a n t in decisive battles, b u t they are n o t the m o s t c o m m o n form of incapacitating fear in battle. R u n n i n g a w a y on one's o w n gets one labeled a c o w a r d , b u t o t h e r types of fear are generally c o n d o n e d by fellow soldiers; r u n n i n g away, especially w i t h o u t t h e a c c o m - p a n i m e n t of o t h e r s , is the action accepted as e m b l e m a t i c of d i s h o n o r a b l e fear; b u t all disgrace is c o n c e n t r a t e d on this one action, allowing o t h e r manifestations of fear to r e m a i n h o n o r a b l e or at least u n r e m a r k e d u p o n .

N o t u n c o m m o n is loss of c o n t r o l of one's sphincters, u r i n a t i n g or shit- ting in one's p a n t s (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 0 5 ; Stouffer et al. 1 9 4 9 vol. 2, D o l l a r d 1 9 4 4 ; G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 6 9 - 7 0 ) . A m e r i c a n figures in W o r l d W a r II w e r e 5 to 6 p e r c e n t , up to a high of 20 p e r c e n t in s o m e c o m b a t divisions. Soiling oneself is also described for British a n d G e r m a n t r o o p s , a n d for U.S. t r o o p s in V i e t n a m . N o r does this seem to be distinctively m o d e r n squea- mishness; Pizarro's soldiers u r i n a t e d in fear before c a p t u r i n g t h e Inca em-

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l T e n s i o n • 4 7

p c r o r (Miller 2 0 0 0 : 3 0 2 ) . War is a dirty business in m o r e way s t h a n o n e . O t h e r physiological reactions include violent p o u n d i n g of the heart (re- ported by a l m o s t 70 percent of soldiers), as well as trembling, cold sweat, w e a k n e s s , a n d vomiting.

Some soldiers a t t e m p t to b u r r o w into the g r o u n d , covering their faces a n d h e a d s ; or cover themselves with blankets or sleeping bags (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 6 6 - 6 8 ) . This behavior can occur out in the o p e n , in the midst of crucial periods of c o m b a t , w h e r e there is no prospect of being unnoticed by the enemy. It is a paralysis of terror, a n d sometimes t r o o p s in this c o n d i t i o n are unable even to surrender, much less fight back, a n d arc killed w h e r e they lie. It does n o t a p p e a r to be merely m o d e r n Western softness; instances are r e c o r d e d for G e r m a n , French, J a p a n e s e , Viet C o n g , A m e r i c a n , Argentine, and Israeli soldiers, a n d for p a r t i c i p a n t s in medieval a n d early m o d e r n c o m b a t (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 6 7 ) .

M a r s h a l l ' s figure of 15 to 25 percent of American t r o o p s in World War II doing all the firing has been controversial. T h e main criticism has been m e t h o d o l o g i c a l : t h a t M a r s h a l l did n o t engage in systematic interviews asking every soldier explicitly if he fired (Spiller 1 9 8 8 ; Smoler 1989). Some World War TI c o m b a t c o m m a n d e r s (typically h i g h - r a n k i n g officers) dismissed his figures as a b s u r d ; o t h e r veterans s u p p o r t e d his conclusions on non-firing in c o m b a t ( M o o r e 1 9 4 5 ; Kelly 1 9 4 6 ; Glenn 2 0 0 0 a : 5 - 6 , 2 0 0 0 b : 1-2, 1 3 4 - 3 6 ) . A G e r m a n officer w r o t e t h a t t h e r e were n u m e r o u s n o n - s h o o t e r s in t h e G e r m a n infantry b u t t h a t "their percentage is u n - k n o w n " (Kissel 1 9 5 6 ) . An A u s t r a l i a n officer endo rsed M a r s h a l l ' s general p o s i t i o n a s t o t h e G e r m a n a r m y i n W o r l d W a r I I a n d British C o m m o n - w e a l t h t r o o p s in K o r e a , n o t i n g in t h e latter case t h a t 40 to 50 percent of t r o o p s m i g h t n o t r e t u r n fire w h e n u n d e r a t t a c k (Langtry 1 9 5 8 ) . A British a r m y c o m p a r i s o n of the difference b e t w e e n t r a i n i n g trials a n d a c t u a l c o m - b a t results found it w a s consistent w i t h M a r s h a l l ' s estimate of 15 percent f i r i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( R o w l a n d 1 9 8 6 ) .

T h e different a c c o u n t s m a y be reconciled by positing a c o m b i n a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s : (a) observers from different military v a n t a g e - p o i n t s h a d their biases in h o w they c o n s t r u c t e d their a c c o u n t s of battle p e r f o r m a n c e ; (b) w e s h o u l d m a k e m o r e refined distinctions a s t o h o w often a n d i n w h a t m a n n e r soldiers fired in c o m b a t ; a n d (c) t h e p r o p o r t i o n s of highly active firers, non-firers, a n d those in-between c h a n g e d historically between dif- ferent w a r s as military o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a n g e d .

We w o u l d expect t h a t higher-ranking officers w o u l d be least likely to perceive the p r o b l e m . In all o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h o s e at t h e highest r a n k s are least likely to h a v e a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n on w h a t is going on at t h e lowest level of practical action; in a d d i t i o n , t h e higher t h e r a n k , t h e m o r e the p e r s o n identifies w i t h the formal frontstage ideals of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d is likely to t a l k in official r h e t o r i c . Frontline c o m b a t soldiers of the

48 • C h a p t e r 2

lower r a n k s w o u l d have a different v i e w p o i n t . Yet a n o t h e r bias comes from the c o n t r a s t between detailed o b s e r v a t i o n of w h a t is h a p p e n i n g in each m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n , and s u m m a r y a c c o u n t s of an ideal-typical version of p e r f o r m a n c e ; the latter w o u l d tend to be m o r e idealized t o w a r d a favor- able image, a n d we w o u l d expect t h a t this bias w o u l d g r o w with time as the actual m e m o r i e s of c o m b a t experience become m o r e distant. In these respects, SLAM's m e t h o d of interviewing the entire c o m b a t g r o u p imme- diately after c o m b a t , asking each one w h a t he h a d d o n e and observed (Marshall 1 9 8 2 : 1), is still a m o n g o u r best d a t a . 2 Particularly valuable w a s M a r s h a l l ' s m e t h o d of bringing all the soldiers together, like a focus g r o u p , a n d questioning them w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of r a n k , p r o b i n g until a full a n d consistent r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s m a d e .

As we see in the preceding q u o t e s , M a r s h a l l hedges his figures in various w a y s , suggesting t h a t in some circumstances, for brief p e r i o d s , the figure rises a b o v e 25 percent. It seems clear t h a t M a r s h a l l is n o t presenting a statistical a r g u m e n t , b u t w a s s u m m a r i z i n g his j u d g m e n t — a s o n e of the first to look into the question up close, which he did d u r i n g a period of m o r e t h a n t w o years i n c o m b a t zones, interviewing a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 0 0 infantry c o m p a n i e s — t h a t a large majority of c o m b a t soldiers did little or no firing.

M a r s h a l l ' s impression, imprecise as it m a y sometimes be, is b o r n e o u t by his detailed descriptions of p a r t i c u l a r individual c o m b a t s . O n e in- stance is the defense by a b a t t a l i o n (at full strength, this should be 6 0 0 to 1,000 men) against an all-night a t t a c k by J a p a n e s e t r o o p s in the Gilbert Islands, N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . T h e J a p a n e s e a t t a c k failed, w i t h heavy casual- ties. " M o s t of the killing t o o k place at less t h a n a ten-yard interval. . . . Every position w a s ringed with enemy d e a d . " O n the American side, " a p - proximately half of the o c c u p a n t s of t h e fo rward foxholes were either killed or w o u n d e d . " M a r s h a l l s u m m a r i z e s his findings as follows:

We began the investigation to d e t e r m i n e h o w m a n y of o u r men had fought with their w e a p o n s . It w a s an exhaustive search, m a n by m a n a n d gun crew by gun crew, each m a n being asked exactly w h a t he h a d d o n e . Yet m a k i n g allowances for the d e a d , we could identify only thirty-six m e n as having fired at the enemy with all w e a p o n s . T h e ma- jority were heavy w e a p o n s men. T h e really active firers were usually in small g r o u p s w o r k i n g together. T h e r e were some men in the positions directly u n d e r a t t a c k w h o did not fire at all or a t t e m p t to use a w e a p o n even w h e n the position w a s being o v e r r u n . (Marshall 1 9 4 7 : 5 5 - 5 6 )

This is a r e m a r k a b l y small percentage: 36 men (of those still alive at the end) had d o n e all the firing, o u t of a total of 6 0 0 or m o r e . Even if t h e r e were only t w o c o m p a n i e s on the front foxholes, a n d half of them were killed or i n c a p a c i t a t e d , the firing r a t i o is a b o u t 3 6 / 2 0 0 , or 1 8 p e r c e n t . 3

Confrontational Tension • 49

M a r s h a l l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of p r e d o m i n a n t l y i n c o m p e t e n t perfor- m a n c e , qualitatively if n o t quantitatively, has been s u p p o r t e d by the prin- cipal scholars of c o m b a t . T h e first to inquire specifically into c o m b a t behavior, Colonel Charles A r d a n t du Picq ( 1 9 0 3 / 1 9 9 9 ) , distributed ques- t i o n n a i r e s to French a r m y officers in the 1 8 6 0 s , w h o r e p o r t e d a t e n d e n c y for soldiers to fire wildly in t h e air. J o h n Keegan ( 1 9 7 6 ) , w h o led the m o v e m e n t by m o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s to r e c o n s t r u c t a c t u a l battlefield behavior, described the c o m b a t z o n e as a place of t e r r o r r a t h e r t h a n heroic aggres- sion, including medieval battles, the N a p o l e o n i c w a r s , a n d W o r l d W a r I. In eighteenth- a n d early n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y massed firing f o r m a t i o n s , N C O s w e r e typically s t a t i o n e d just behind the firing line, often pressing their s w o r d s horizontally against the back of soldiers to force t h e m to h o l d their position (Keegan 1 9 7 6 : 1 7 9 - 8 5 , 2 8 2 , 3 3 0 - 3 1 ) . I n the w o r l d w a r s , all major armies h a d battle police, typically picked from a m o n g the biggest a n d m o s t imposing m e n , w h o s e job w a s t o keep soldiers from r u n n i n g from the front. T h e pre-Soviet Russian a r m y used m o u n t e d C o s - sacks for t h a t task, giving t h e m a p u r p o s e well p a s t the p e r i o d w h e n horses h a d become an a n a c h r o n i s t i c vulnerability against m o d e r n firepower. A similar use of cavalry w a s a d v o c a t e d by a general during t h e T h i r t y Years' W a r ( 1 6 1 8 - 4 8 ) , along w i t h cutting off one's o w n lines of r e t r e a t to give c o w a r d s n o o p t i o n s , a n d detailing t r o o p s t o s h o o t those w h o r e t r e a t e d (Miller 2 0 0 0 : 1 3 1 ) . Griffith (1989) finds a similar pervasiveness of fear a n d firing i n c o m p e t e n c e in t h e A m e r i c a n Civil War. H o l m e s (1985) a n d G r o s s m a n (1995) d o c u m e n t it extensively for t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y w a r s , a n d u p h o l d M a r s h a l l ' s position after reviewing the evidence against it. Dyer (1985) estimated the v o l u m e of fire in J a p a n e s e a n d G e r m a n armies as similar to t h o s e in Allied forces, concluding t h a t the level of non-firing w a s similar in all armies.

H o w m u c h o f this battle fear can b e a t t r i b u t e d t o soldiers w h o are conscripts u n u s e d to military life, or to the s h o c k of first battle experi- ence? Ulysses S. G r a n t ( 1 8 8 5 / 1 9 9 0 : 2 3 1 - 3 2 , 1005) describes the first day of the battle of Shiloh in April 1 8 6 2 , in w h i c h r a w t r o o p s , w h o h a d just arrived at t h e battle z o n e a n d just been issued their w e a p o n s , b r o k e u n d e r Confederate a t t a c k a n d fled in p a n i c ; some four to five t h o u s a n d ( a p p r o x i - m a t e l y o n e entire division of t h e five divisions initially engaged on t h e U n i o n side) ended up c o w e r i n g below the r i v e r b a n k t h a t w a s the r e a r of the Federal p o s i t i o n . G r a n t r e m a r k s t h a t he h a d a b o u t a dozen officers arrested for c o w a r d i c e .

Nevertheless, the difference b e t w e e n " g r e e n " t r o o p s a n d " s e a s o n e d vet- e r a n s " is n o t large. Studies on Allied soldiers in W o r l d W a r II suggested t h a t soldiers r e a c h e d their m a x i m u m efficiency a t a r o u n d ten t o t h i r t y days of c o m b a t experience; if they stayed in c o m b a t c o n t i n u o u s l y thereaf- ter, they became jittery a n d hyper-reactive, a n d after fifty days reached

50 • C h a p t e r 2

e m o t i o n a l e x h a u s t i o n (Swank a n d M a r c h a n d 1 9 4 6 ; H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 : 2 1 4 - 2 2 ) . W i t h i n t e r m i t t e n t rest p e r i o d s a w a y from c o m b a t , it w a s suggested t h a t incapacitating b e h a v i o r m i g h t generally b e p o s t p o n e d t o " 2 0 0 t o 2 4 0 aggregate c o m b a t d a y s " (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 1 5 ) . Officers, t o o , experienced a b r e a k d o w n in effectiveness, even w h e n they suppressed signs of fear (or p e r h a p s because of the strain of d o i n g so), usually a r o u n d a year of c o m - bat; a m o n g their s y m p t o m s were passiveness, slow-wittedness, a p a t h y a s well as s h i r k i n g . 4 T h e effect of c o m b a t experience is n o t just " h a r d e n i n g " b u t also " s o f t e n i n g " t h r o u g h . p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d physical strain. In con- firmation, a m o n g British divisions in the N o r m a n d y c a m p a i g n in 1 9 4 4 , the p e r f o r m a n c e o f the v e t e r a n units w a s m u c h w o r s e t h a n t h o s e w h o h a d never been i n c o m b a t (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 2 2 ) .

Indeed, " h a r d e n e d " t r o o p s subjected t o lo n g -term b a t t e r i n g m a y g o to extremes in their unwillingness to fight. M u t i n i e s b r e a k o u t late in c a m p a i g n s , a n d a m o n g v e t e r a n s . Keegan ( 1 9 7 6 : 2 7 5 - 7 7 ) offers a general e x p l a n a t i o n : w h e n a n a r m y has t a k e n 100 percent casualties—everyone from the original t r o o p strength has been killed or seriously w o u n d e d , so t h a t t h e r e is a clear sense t h a t everyone is a r e p l a c e m e n t — t h e soldiers r e g a r d themselves as g o o d as d e a d , a n d refuse to fight further. M u t i n i e s in W o r l d W a r I occurred a m o n g all the armies t h a t h a d been long in ac- t i o n , or h a d t a k e n a c c u m u l a t e d casualties of t h a t scale: t h e French in M a y a n d July 1 9 1 7 ; Russian in July a n d September 1 9 1 7 ; Italian in N o v e m b e r 1 9 1 7 ; British i n September 1 9 1 7 a n d M a r c h 1 9 1 8 ; A u s t r i a n a n d H u n g a r - ian i n M a y 1 9 1 8 ; G e r m a n s w e r e t h e latest t o mutiny, i n O c t o b e r 1 9 1 8 , a l t h o u g h they h a d been sustained by victories t h r o u g h m o s t of the war. T h e A m e r i c a n a r m y w a s the m a i n exception, b u t i t h a d been i n c o m b a t in a n y considerable n u m b e r s for less t h a n six m o n t h s (Gilbert 1 9 9 4 : 3 1 9 , 3 2 4 - 4 3 , 3 4 9 , 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 , 3 9 7 , 4 2 1 - 2 2 , 4 2 9 , 4 6 1 - 6 2 , 4 8 1 - 8 5 , 4 9 3 - 9 8 ) .

T h e effects of tension a n d fear on c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e vary historically d e p e n d i n g on w h a t armies do to c o n t r o l t h e fear. M a r s h a l l ' s estimate of a m i n o r i t y of fighters, s o m e w h e r e a r o u n d a q u a r t e r of t r o o p s w h o actively fire their guns in c o m b a t , holds up well for t h e w o r l d w a r s of t h e t w e n t i e t h century a n d for similar w a r s of t h e nineteenth century. But the estimated firing r a t i o for A m e r i c a n t r o o p s in the K o r e a n w a r rose to 55 percent ( d o c u m e n t e d by M a r s h a l l himself); a n d in the V i e t n a m war, 80 to 95 percent, a t least for t h e best t r o o p s ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 3 5 ; Glenn 2 0 0 0 a : 4, 2 1 2 - 1 3 ) . Armies have c h a n g e d over t h e years in their o r g a n i z a t i o n d u r i n g c o m b a t , as well as in t r a i n i n g a n d r e c r u i t m e n t . Historically earlier p a r a d e - g r o u n d f o r m a t i o n s of massed infantry firing t o g e t h e r in r a n k s t e n d e d t o have high f i r i n g rates, b u t their p r o b l e m w a s t h e o p p o s i t e : wild over-firing w i t h p o o r aim a n d m u c h in the w a y of friendly fire casualties. T h e o p e n skirmish f o r m a t i o n s of t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y w a r s , designed to re- duce the target for m a c h i n e - g u n fire, eliminated the tight organizational

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l T e n s i o n • 5 1

c o n t r o l a n d p u t soldiers m a x i m a l l y on their o w n on the battlefield; this left t h e m m o s t susceptible to c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear, w i t h o u t the countervailing effects of s t r o n g social s u p p o r t . Recognizing this p r o b l e m in r e s p o n s e to M a r s h a l l ' s findings, the U.S. Army, after the K o r e a n war, redesigned t r a i n i n g a n d c o m b a t o r g a n i z a t i o n t o p r o m o t e f i r i n g a n d keep up social cohesion in the c o m b a t unit. H e r e is a r a r e instance w h e r e a social science finding has been used as a basis of social change. T r a d i t i o n a l firing-range practice w a s replaced by realistic c o m b a t situations in w h i c h soldiers are c o n d i t i o n e d t o f i r e a u t o m a t i c a l l y a t suddenly a p p e a r i n g tar- gets ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 2 5 7 - 6 0 ) . R e c r u i t m e n t t o o h a d its effects: the draftee armies of the w o r l d w a r s p e r f o r m e d w i t h a l o w e r level of firing t h a n volunteer enlisted armies (as we will see from G l e n n ' s [2000a] evidence). T h u s the soldiers w h o m S L A M observed in W o r l d W a r II were t h o s e w h o , o n all c o u n t s , w o u l d likely h a v e h a d the p o o r e s t overall c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e .

T h e effects of this c h a n g e in t r a i n i n g m e t h o d s , as well as their limits, can be seen in G l e n n ' s ( 2 0 0 0 b : 3 7 - 3 9 , 1 5 9 - 6 1 ) survey of V i e t n a m c o m b a t v e t e r a n s . O n l y 3 percent of the t r o o p s r e p o r t e d t h a t they themselves ever h a d an episode w h e r e they did n o t fire in a c o m b a t s i t u a t i o n w h e r e they s h o u l d have f i r e d ; i n o t h e r w o r d s , the self-reported f i r i n g r a t e w a s 9 7 percent. W h e n asked w h e t h e r they h a d ever seen a n o t h e r soldier w h o failed to fire u n d e r such circumstances, however, a b o u t 50 percent said they h a d witnessed this one or m o r e times. Fear w a s cited by 80 percent of the t r o o p s as t h e r e a s o n for o t h e r s ' non-firing.

We h a v e a r a n g e of figures: 97 p e r c e n t firing from self-reports (an ego- tistical bias); 50 p e r c e n t non-firing occasionally, as observed by o t h e r s ; 83 p e r c e n t estimated by o t h e r soldiers to fire w h e n necessary. Are these figures t o o high? T h e surveys h a v e some likely biases: they were retrospec- tive, m a d e b e t w e e n fifteen a n d t w e n t y - t w o years after these soldiers h a d been in c o m b a t , a n d they l u m p e d specific situations t o g e t h e r into a gener- alized memory. T h e r e is an u p w a r d bias in the sample t o w a r d higher r a n k s , w h i c h w o u l d lead to a m o r e idealized pi ctu re. A n d the sample w a s weighted t o w a r d the m o r e g u n g - h o , c o m b a t - s e e k i n g t r o o p s , m o r e of a sample of the best fighters, r a t h e r t h a n of the average fighters.^

G l e n n ' s d a t a ( 2 0 0 0 b : 1 6 2 - 6 3 ) c a n b e recalculated t o give t h e distribu- t i o n of soldiers' firing behavior, by their o w n r e p o r t . Relatively few of t h e m r e p o r t e d t h a t they rarely f i r e d their guns (those w h o estimated f i r i n g b e t w e e n 0 a n d 15 percent of the times in w h i c h they were engaged w i t h the enemy in a life-threatening situation); b u t t h e r e is considerable varia- t i o n in w h e t h e r they r e p o r t e d themselves as virtually always firing (in 85 to 100 percent of such situations), or in-between, sometimes firing, sometimes n o t .

52 • C h a p t e r 2

TABLE 2 . 1 F r e q u e n c y o f firing i n l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g e n e m y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

Fired Rarely Sometimes Virtually always N

N o n - w e a p o n s r o l e s a 2 3 % 5 4 % 2 3 % 4 3

C o m b a t e n l i s t e d m e n 1 2 % 4 8 % 4 0 % 7 3

N C O s 4 % 4 2 % 5 2 % 6 9

H e l i c o p t e r c r e w s 1 0 % 1 4 % 7 6 % 2 8

M a c h i n e - g u n n e r s 0 1 4 % 8 6 % 7

A l l i n f a n t r y 9 % 4 5 % 4 6 % 1 8 1 b

T h e s e a r e s o l d i e r s w h o s e p r i m a r y t a s k w a s o t h e r t h a n t o use d i r e c t - f i r e w e a p - o n s , i n c l u d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s , a r t i l l e r y , e n g i n e e r s , e t c . , b u t w h o did c o m e i n t o e n e m y e n g a g e m e n t a n d h a d s m a l l a r m s t h a t t h e y c o u l d h a v e u s e d .

T h i s line i s c a l c u l a t e d f r o m C l c n n ( 2 0 0 0 b : 1 6 2 ) a n d e x c l u d e s a r t i l l e r y , a v i a t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d o t h e r s ; h e n c e , i t i s n o t a t o t a l o f the a b o v e c a t e g o r i e s .

T h e g r o u p o f high-firers i s a b o u t 4 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e o r d i n a r y c o m b a t t r o o p s . T h i s i s higher t h a n M a r s h a l l ' s W o r l d W a r I I f i g u r e s ; i m p r o v e d t r a i n i n g a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m e t h o d s s u c c e e d e d in raising the r a t e . C o m - bat o f f i c e r s — s q u a d leaders a n d p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t s — w e r e higher ( 5 2 p e r - c e n t ) ; this is in keeping w i t h surveys in K o r e a in w h i c h the aggressiveness o f enlisted men i s related t o their r a n k ( G l e n n 2 0 0 0 b : 1 4 0 ) . Those w h o o p e r a t e d c r e w - s e r v e d w e a p o n s ( h e l i c o p t e r s a n d m a c h i n e - g u n n e r s ) w e r e especially likely to be in the high-firing g r o u p (76 to 84 p e r c e n t ) — a g a i n , c o n s i s t e n t with M a r s h a l l ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s . Finally, we c a n n o t e as a c o m p a r - ison g r o u p , t h a t t r o o p s t h a t w e r e n o t especially o r g a n i z e d t o f i r e w e a p o n s i n c o m b a t — a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r o t h e r a u x i l i a r y service t r o o p s w h o c a m e u n d e r f i r e a n d had w e a p o n s with w h i c h t o r e s p o n d — w e r e much m o r e like S L A M ' s e s t i m a t e s : 2 3 p e r c e n t w e r e high-firers w h e n t h e o c c a s i o n a r o s e . T h e y a l s o c a s t light o n w h a t m a y b e the p r o b a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f S L A M ' s relative n o n - f i r e r s : a b o u t a q u a r t e r rarely f i r e d a t a l l , f i n d i n g w a y s t o a v o i d c o m b a t entirely; a n o t h e r h a l f o c c a s i o n a l l y t o o k p a r t . And o v e r - a l l , i t a p p e a r s t h a t — e x c e p t for t h o s e special w e a p o n s c r e w s , w h o c o n - sisted a l m o s t entirely o f h i g h - f i r e r s — r o u g h l y h a l f o f all t h e soldiers w e r e in this middle g r o u p , s o m e t i m e s j o i n i n g in, s o m e t i m e s n o t . G i v e n the e x i s - t e n c e of d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t s in t r a i n i n g a n d c o m b a t o r g a n i z a t i o n in t h e p o s t - S L A M a r m y to k e e p up firing r a t e s , it is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t t h e r e still is a division between a highly aggressive elite a n d the m a s s of the o r d i n a r y s o l d i e r s . In this respect they a r c like w o r k e r s in f a c t o r i e s a n d o t h e r m a n u a l

Confrontational Tension • 53

TABLE 2.2 Percentage of troops firing in combat photos

All photos No. of troops Photos where at No. in in photos least 1 is firing photos

Vietnam 18% 342 4 6 % 133

Other twentieth- 7-13 % a 338-640 a 3 1 % 146 century wars

Iraq 8-14% b 6 3 - 1 0 3 b 2 8 - 5 0 % b 10-50 b

a One photo shows a Russian infantry attack in World War I, in which no one in a massed battalion of 300 appears to be firing. The higher firing percentage is based on excluding this photo.

b One photo shows a Marine Corps platoon of forty men in a tight firing line. My estimate of how many are firing may be inaccurate. Excluding this photo gives 8 percent firing for all photos, 28 percent firing for photos in which at least one person is firing.

l a b o r : m o s t will do e n o u g h to give an a p p e a r a n c e of keeping up the aver- age r a t e of w o r k (Roy 1 9 5 2 ) .

A n alternative t o surveying soldiers i s t o use p h o t o s a n d m a k e o u r o w n c o u n t s of h o w m a n y t r o o p s are firing. 6

P h o t o evidence generally backs up the p a t t e r n of relatively l o w c o m b a t firing. Taking all t h e c o m b a t p h o t o s together, we find the firing rates are very m u c h in S L A M ' s l o w r a n g e — 1 3 to 18 percent (and possibly as l o w as 7 to 8 percent if we allow single p h o t o s of large n u m b e r s of t r o o p s to skew the averages). If we t a k e a m o r e restrictive s t a n d a r d — w h e r e at least o n e p e r s o n in t h e p h o t o is firing—we get t o p firing rates of 46 to 50 percent. These are for A m e r i c a n t r o o p s in V i e t n a m a n d I r a q , after n e w t r a i n i n g m e t h o d s h a d t a k e n h o l d ; t r o o p s o f m a n y n a t i o n s i n earlier w a r s , a n d p a r a m i l i t a r i e s in recent y e a r s , are lower, b u t still at the t o p of S L A M ' s r a n g e . On t h e w h o l e , the t o p of the range is still only a b o u t half or less o f the t r o o p s firing w h e n w e w o u l d m o s t expect t h e m t o d o so. S L A M w a s m o r e right t h a n w r o n g . A n d t h e r e a p p e a r t o b e limits o n h o w m u c h military o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n d o a b o u t it.

T h e p r o b l e m of tension/fear is w h a t fighting o r g a n i z a t i o n s , of w h a t e v e r k i n d , h a v e to deal w i t h ; t h e n a t u r e of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d its perfor- m a n c e is s h a p e d by w h a t devices it a d o p t s to deal w i t h it. O n e of these m e t h o d s is to t a k e individual initiative a w a y from the soldier, by p u t t i n g t r o o p s in m a s s e d f o r m a t i o n s acting in concert. In t h e West, t h e r e h a v e been t w o p e r i o d s of such massed f o r m a t i o n s : in the ancient M e d i t e r r a - n e a n , these w e r e p h a l a n x e s of m e n w i t h spears or pikes; such pike f o r m a -

54 • C h a p t e r 2

tions w e r e revived a n d c o n t i n u e d in late medieval a n d early m o d e r n Eu- r o p e , up t h r o u g h the early g u n - p o w d e r p e r i o d of t h e seventeenth century. P h a l a n x e s were typically superior to undisciplined bodies of t r o o p s t h a t relied on individual valor of heroic fighters w h o d a r t e d fo rward from the larger mass of s u p p o r t e r s , r a t h e r like the skirmishers in Dead Birds. R o m a n legions usually defeated larger armies of Gauls or G e r m a n s ; 7 this w o u l d have resulted n o t only from the a d v a n t a g e of greater discipline in the p h a l a n x in p r o m o t i n g confidence a n d a firm defense, but the fact t h a t the berserkers or other individual heroes w h o faced them were a small p r o p o r t i o n of the tribal forces. Using SLAM r a t i o s , the aggressive fighters in the tribal armies w o u l d have been numerically w e a k e r t h a n the R o m a n s w h o actually used their a r m s . As M a r s h a l l , M c N e i l l , a n d others have n o t e d , the use of a r m s is highest in closely c o o r d i n a t e d g r o u p s , a n d with g r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s . T h e p r o p o r t i o n effectively using their spears or s w o r d s in a R o m a n c o m b a t f o r m a t i o n did n o t have to be especially high for it to o u t w e i g h t h a t of a typical tribal army.

W h e n p h a l a n x e s fought other p h a l a n x e s (the Greek city-state w a r s , the R o m a n Punic a n d civil wars) the a m o u n t of tension/fear seemed to be a b o u t the same on both sides. Ancient a u t h o r s (Thucydides Book 5: p a r a . 71) noticed the tendency of a p h a l a n x to c r o w d t o w a r d the right by trying to shelter increasingly under the shield of the man on t h a t side. T h e p h a - lanx formation o p e r a t e d primarily to keep men in line a n d prevent their r u n n i n g a w a y ; battles were generally p u s h i n g m a t c h e s , in w h i c h relatively little d a m a g e w a s d o n e , unless one side b r o k e fo rmatio n . And even t h e n , in Greek city-state w a r f a r e it w a s n o t c u s t o m a r y to pursue a b r o k e n a n d fleeing p h a l a n x , a n d casualties were generally limited to a b o u t 15 percent a t w o r s t (Keegan 1 9 9 3 : 2 4 8 - 5 1 ) .

F r o m the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, close-order drill w a s the preferred formation for E u r o p e a n a r m i e s . In p a r t this w a s an effort to speed u p , by mass drill, the reloading of firearms, which h a d to take place after every shot; in p a r t , to keep d o w n self-inflicted casualties by firing together on c o m m a n d ; a n d in p a r t , given the relative inaccuracy of fire, to c o n c e n t r a t e its effect by a s i m u l t a n e o u s volley. As n o t e d , p a r a d e - g r o u n d formations also had an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e in keeping sol- diers from r u n n i n g a w a y ; a n d as a m o d e of discipline, they were no d o u b t attractive to officers in an era w h e n armies were escalating in size, from on the o r d e r of several t h o u s a n d men in medieval battles to formations t h a t reached h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s in the N a p o l e o n i c w a r s . But the firing r a t i o in p a r a d e - g r o u n d f o r m a t i o n s w a s far from m a x i m a l . In American Civil War battles, 90 percent of muzzle-loading muskets collected after the battle of G e t t y s b u r g were found loaded, a n d half of those were multi- ply loaded, with t w o or m o r e r o u n d s on t o p of one a n o t h e r in the barrel (Grossman 1 9 9 5 : 2 1 - 2 2 ) ; this implies t h a t at least half the t r o o p s , at the

Confrontational Tension • 55

m o m e n t t h e y w e r e hit o r t h r e w a w a y their a r m s , h a d been repeatedly going t h r o u g h t h e m o t i o n s of l o a d i n g , b u t w i t h o u t actually firing, time after time. As we see later, casualties p r o d u c e d by these m a s s - f o r m a t i o n t r o o p s w e r e n o t high, a n d t h a t could b e a t t r i b u t e d p a r t l y t o non-firing, p a r t l y t o i n a c c u r a t e f i r i n g .

P a r a d e - g r o u n d battle f o r m a t i o n s started going o u t of style in the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century, as breech-loading rifles, a n d t h e n m a c h i n e - g u n s , b r o u g h t a m u c h higher aggregate level of fire to the battlefield, a n d m a d e m a s s infantry f o r m a t i o n s t o o vulnerable a s targets; these f o r m a t i o n s h a d survived for over t w o h u n d r e d years, be it n o t e d , because they w e r e n o t so very d a n g e r o u s to each other. Battles n o w w e r e fought in dispersed f o r m a t i o n , soldiers s t r u n g o u t across a long line, avoiding b u n c h i n g , a n d seeking cover on their o w n initiative. Nevertheless, close-order m a r c h i n g drill has r e m a i n e d a staple of military t r a i n i n g , a n d of n o n - c o m b a t , h o m e - front a n d peacetime a r m y life. It is rationalized as a necessary m e a n s of establishing discipline, t h e a u t o m a t i c obedience to a u t h o r i t y t h a t will en- able a soldier to p e r f o r m well u n d e r the stresses of c o m b a t . By e x t r a p o l a - t i o n , even in an era of SLAM-inspired sophistication a b o u t c o m b a t fear a n d l o w firing r a t i o , close-order drill can be p r o m o t e d as a solution p r e - cisely t o t h e m o t i v a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s h o w n i n M a r s h a l l ' s a n d similar stud- ies. But in fact r o b o t - l i k e obedience does n o t p r o m o t e effective firing in c o m b a t ; M a r s h a l l n o t e d ( 1 9 4 7 : 6 0 - 6 1 ) t h a t the m i n o r i t y o f c o m b a t f i r e r s often contains soldiers w h o are otherwise u n a m e n a b l e t o discipline, w h o p e r f o r m badly in b a r r a c k s drills, a n d often are in the g u a r d h o u s e for viola- tions of authority. T h u s it a p p e a r s likely t h a t even in the era of m a s s - f o r m a t i o n firing, p a r a d e drill w a s n o t really a m e a n s of m a k i n g t r o o p s effective in c o m b a t ; it w a s even t h e n largely a ritual of peacetime disci- pline, a symbolic effort to display an image of the a r m y impressive to outsiders a n d , indeed, to itself. M a r c h i n g a n d drill could get the t r o o p s into c o m b a t ; b u t it could n o t m a k e t h e m effective fighters. It c o n t i n u e s as an initiation ritual for n e w soldiers, a n d a symbolic m a r k e r b e t w e e n t h e m a n d civilians in an era w h e n it is irrelevant to t h e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m b a t .

A higher firing r a t i o (and m o r e generally across history, a higher fre- q u e n c y of using o n e ' s w e a p o n s ) is the result of a n u m b e r of c o n d i t i o n s . ( M a n y of these are s u m m a r i z e d in G r o s s m a n 1995.)

1. G r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s : t e a m s of soldiers m a n n i n g m a c h i n e - g u n s , b a z o o k a s o r r o c k e t l a u n c h e r s , m o r t a r s , a n d o t h e r w e a p o n s w h e r e p a r t of t h e t e a m feeds a m m u n i t i o n or provides ancillary services.

2. Greater distance from the enemy: artillery has a high firing r a t e ; snipers firing at long distance w i t h telescopes h a v e a high r a t e ;

56 • C h a p t e r 2

infantry firing in close c o m b a t has a low r a t e ; a n d use of w e a p o n s in h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t is very low.

3. A stronger c o m m a n d hierarchy: s u p e r i o r officers on the spot w h o directly o r d e r soldiers to fire. This w a s easier to achieve in mass f o r m a t i o n s a n d in very small g r o u p s ; relatively difficult in dispersed battlefield c o n d i t i o n s of m o d e r n fighting.

4. Psychologically realistic training: n o t p a r a d e - g r o u n d drill, n o r t a r - get practice, but simulation of the c h a o s a n d tension of battlefield c o n d i t i o n s , with exercises t h a t m a k e firing at suddenly a p p e a r i n g threats an a u t o m a t i c reflex.

All of these are w ays of c o u n t e r a c t i n g the tension/fear of violent confron- t a t i o n . G r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s rely on solidarity at the m o s t m i c r o level; the effective c o m b a t t e a m is one in which the soldiers are paying a t t e n t i o n t o each other m o r e t h a n t o the enemy. G r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s are i m p o r t a n t , t h e n , n o t so m u c h because of the specific technology but because they facilitate a m o o d of solidarity; there is some evidence t h a t just getting going at firing is a catalyst, a n d t h a t soldiers in these w e a p o n s teams switched from one w e a p o n t o a n o t h e r a s the f i g h t i n g w e n t o n . 8

O v e r a n d above the f i r e - p o w e r they p r o v i d e , g r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s facilitate t r o o p s falling into an interaction ritual w i t h each other, e n t r a i n - ing their bodies into a collective enterprise a n d a c o m m o n r h y t h m ; just as in non-conflictual rituals, e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m c n t a n d m u t u a l focus of a t t e n t i o n creates a c o c o o n of local solidarity a n d e m o t i o n a l energy, the confidence a n d enthusiasm to fire even w h e n others s u c c u m b to the debili- t a t i n g tension of c o m b a t .

Such rituals can be deliberately inculcated in t r a i n i n g . British t r o o p s at the turn of the twenty-first cent ur y trained with special emphasis on keep- ing up a c o n t i n u o u s chain of c o m m u n i c a t i o n — b y voice or predesignated gestures—from o n e m a n to the n e x t d u r i n g c o m b a t a n d thus to use social cohesion t o p r o m o t e a p p r o p r i a t e f i r i n g (King 2 0 0 5 ) . T h e infantry s q u a d w a s trained to move a n d fire in an a l t e r n a t i n g r h y t h m with each other, in effect t u r n i n g individual w e a p o n s into g r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s .

Distance from the enemy cuts d o w n just those cues t h a t m a k e the con- frontation fearful. C o m m a n d authority, by itself a l o n e , is p r o b a b l y the least effective. C o m m a n d a u t h o r i t y may o p e r a t e as a w a y of reestablish- ing g r o u p a t t e n t i o n ; there are n u m e r o u s instances w h e r e a panic retreat is quickly s t o p p e d by officers issuing firm o r d e r s , a n d conversely w h e r e a g r o u p of men in retreat become u n c o n t r o l l a b l y afraid w h e n officers are vacillating or are themselves panicked (Holmes 1 9 8 5 ) . And finally, realis- tic combat-style training was instituted o u t of a conscious effort to give men an a u t o m a t i c response of firing in c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l situations.

Confrontational Tension • 57

Yet t h e effectiveness of these conditions themselves varies: g r o u p soli- d a r i t y m a y be high b u t instead of p r o m o t i n g firing, it m a y e n c o u r a g e soldiers to resist or ignore higher c o m m a n d . To these we m u s t a d d a fifth source of v a r i a t i o n : even across these c o n d i t i o n s , a m i n o r i t y of soldiers do m o s t of t h e active fighting. T h e theoretical p r o b l e m is to a c c o u n t for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of these individuals; t h a t is, to bring all of these i n t o a deeper e x p l a n a t i o n of h o w t h e situation of fear a n d t e n s i o n gets resolved i n t o a m i n o r i t y w h o ride t h e w a v e of fear, a n d a majority w h o are s w e p t a l o n g by it.

L o w F I G H T I N G C O M P E T E N C E

W h e t h e r soldiers fire their g u n s or n o t — o r otherwise use their w e a p o n s — they still do n o t a p p e a r to be very effective w i t h t h e m . A high firing r a t i o is n o t the same as high effectiveness in hitting t h e target. T h e m i n o r i t y of effective soldiers m a y t h u s b e m u c h lower t h a n 1 5 t o 2 5 percent; a n d firing levels of 80 percent or m o r e indicated for the V i e t n a m w a r in fact t u r n o u t n o t t o b e m o r e effective t h a n p r e v i o u s w a r p e r f o r m a n c e .

In the m u s k e t era, c o n t e m p o r a r y estimates r a n g e d from o n e hit for 5 0 0 r o u n d s f i r e d , u p t o o n e hit p e r 2 , 0 0 0 o r 3 , 0 0 0 ; m o d e r n r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s suggest a 5 p e r c e n t m a x i m u m for t h a t p e r i o d . S m o o t h b o r e m u s k e t s were n o t very a c c u r a t e at long r a n g e . But t h e Prussian a r m y in the late 1 7 0 0 s firing at targets representing the size of an e n e m y f o r m a t i o n s h o w e d " 4 0 percent hits at 150 y a r d s , a n d 60 percent hits at 75 y a r d s ; " b u t in battle their firing at very close r a n g e of thirty y a r d s resulted in less t h a n 3 p e r c e n t hits ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 10; Keegan a n d H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 ) . T h e high p o i n t could be s o m e w h a t better; an elite unit of British m a r k s m e n in the N a p o - leonic w a r s fought an e n g a g e m e n t in w h i c h they fired volleys t o t a l i n g 1,890 r o u n d s a n d caused 4 3 0 casualties, a hit r a t e of a b o u t 23 percent; they were in s t a t i o n a r y p o s i t i o n receiving a French a t t a c k , a n d fired vol- leys b e t w e e n 1 1 5 a n d 3 0 y a r d s (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 1 6 7 - 6 8 ) . But this w a s exceptional; m o s t t r o o p s of t h e N a p o l e o n i c a n d Civil W a r era firing at an e x p o s e d f o r m a t i o n , typically at t h e close distance of t h i r t y y a r d s , w o u l d hit " o n l y o n e o r t w o m e n per m i n u t e , " b y a u n i t c o n t a i n i n g b e t w e e n t w o h u n d r e d a n d o n e t h o u s a n d m e n . Griffith (1989) c o m m e n t s : "Casualties m o u n t e d because the cont es t w e n t o n s o l o n g , n o t because the f i r e w a s particularly deadly."

T h e breech-loading rifles of the late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y w e r e technically better w e a p o n s b u t their m a i n effect w a s to increase t h e n u m b e r of r o u n d s fired per p e r i o d of t i m e , n o t to i m p r o v e t h e r a t i o of hits. A battle in the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n w a r o f 1 8 7 0 s a w the G e r m a n s f i r e 8 0 , 0 0 0 r o u n d s t o hit 4 0 0 F r e n c h m e n , a n d t h e latter f i r i n g 4 8 , 0 0 0 r o u n d s t o hit 4 0 4 G e r m a n s ;

58 • C h a p t e r 2

hit r a t i o s w e r e one per 2 0 0 a n d o n e per 1 1 9 r o u n d s respectively. A m e r i c a n t r o o p s in a battle on t h e w e s t e r n plains in 1 8 7 6 fired 2 5 2 bullets for every I n d i a n casualty. An a b u n d a n c e of easy targets at p o i n t - b l a n k r a n g e w o u l d i m p r o v e the hit r a t i o b u t n o t give a high level of reliability. In South Africa in 1 8 7 9 , a British u n i t of 140 m e n w a s nearly o v e r w h e l m e d by t h r e e t h o u - sand Z u l u s , a n d f i r e d over t w e n t y t h o u s a n d r o u n d s i n repulsing t h e at- tack; b u t Z u l u casualty rates w e r e a t m o s t o n e per t h i r t e e n r o u n d s f i r e d . 9

In W o r l d W a r I battles in w h i c h rifle firing w a s p r e d o m i n a n t , typical hit r a t i o s w e r e one per twenty-seven r o u n d s f i r e d . I n t h e V i e t n a m war, w h e r e A m e r i c a n soldiers were e q u i p p e d w i t h a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s , estimates w e r e on t h e o r d e r of fifty t h o u s a n d bullets fired per enemy killed (Gross- m a n 1 9 9 5 : 9 - 1 2 ; H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 : 1 6 7 - 7 2 ) . O n e a l m o s t ritualistic p r o c e - d u r e w a s t h e so-called m a d m o m e n t w h e n a u n i t settled d o w n i n t o a battlefield p o s i t i o n , soldiers w o u l d e m p t y their w e a p o n s w i t h firing all a r o u n d t h e perimeter ( D a u g h t e r t y a n d M a t t s o n 2 0 0 1 : 1 1 6 - 1 7 ) . I n s h o r t , as w e a p o n s became better, overall efficiency r e m a i n e d low; better w e a p - ons allowed a greater v o l u m e of wild a n d i n a c c u r a t e s h o o t i n g . 1 0 In W o r l d W a r II, m o r e t h a n half of soldiers believed t h a t they have never killed a n y o n e (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 7 6 ) . This is no d o u b t t r u e ; indeed, m o s t of t h o s e w h o claim they have killed w e r e p r o b a b l y exaggerating.

A few individuals have been highly a c c u r a t e c o m b a t s h o o t e r s . Chief a m o n g these are snipers, b u t these h a v e been a very small p r o p o r t i o n o f t r o o p s , a n d individuals f i r i n g w i t h great accuracy are n o t h o w m o s t casualties in battle are inflicted. In the m o d e r n era, casualties were caused p r i m a r i l y by artillery fired at long distance. In the m u s k e t era of p a r a d e - g r o u n d f o r m a t i o n s , c a n n o n o p e r a t i n g closer to t h e battle line generally a c c o u n t e d for m o r e t h a n 50 percent of the casualties; the m o s t successful generals, including G u s t a v u s A d o l p h u s in the seventeenth cen tu ry a n d N a p o l e o n at t h e t u r n of t h e n i n e t e e n t h , emphasized small m o b i l e field- pieces s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t c o m b a t units t h a t could be fired at close r a n g e , especially w i t h g r a p e s h o t t h a t gave a m a c h i n e - g u n - l i k e effect ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 1 1 ; 1 5 4 ) . In W o r l d W a r I, artillery caused a l m o s t 60 p e r c e n t of British casualties, bullets a b o u t 40 percent; in W o r l d W a r II, artillery a n d aerial b o m b s caused a b o u t 75 percent, bullets less t h a n 10 p e r c e n t . In K o r e a , shells a n d m o r t a r s caused a b o u t 60 percent of A m e r i c a n casual- ties, while small a r m s caused 3 percent of d e a t h s a n d 27 percent of w o u n d s (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 1 0 ) . This does n o t m e a n t h a t artillery i s particu- larly cost-effective for the v o l u m e of fire. On o n e day in 1 9 1 6 , for e x a m - ple, t h e British fired 2 2 4 , 0 0 0 shells a n d killed six t h o u s a n d G e r m a n s (a r a t i o of one hit for thirty-seven shells fired); t h e Western F r o n t of W o r l d W a r I w a s t h e a p e x for sheer v o l u m e of artillery fire, b u t c o m p a r a b l e ratios of shells to casualties are found for World War II a n d smaller w a r s of the late twentieth century (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 1 7 0 - 7 1 ) .

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l T e n s i o n • 5 9

H o w a r e w e t o i n t e r p r e t this p a t t e r n ? A s G r o s s m a n d o c u m e n t s , artil- lery achieve a higher level of firing t h a n riflemen a n d frontline t r o o p s generally; t h e sheer distance from the enemy, a n d especially being shielded from p e r s o n a l l y seeing the m e n o n e is trying to kill, increases the level of p e r f o r m a n c e . Additionally, artillery are g r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n s ; local s m a l l - g r o u p solidarity a n d e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t keeps m e n on the j o b , k e e p i n g up a regular r a t e of fire. Artillery t h u s o v e r c o m e s the S L A M p r o b l e m of a low firing r a t e . Even s o , high firing rates are n o t the s a m e as highly a c c u r a t e r a t e s ; in the fog of b a t t l e , firing often misses. And even w h e n it hits its t a r g e t , enemy soldiers a r e often p r o t e c t e d by defensive p o s i t i o n s . Fighting is intrinsically inefficient, all the w a y a r o u n d . D i s t a n c e w e a p o n s have b e c o m e m o r e i m p o r t a n t i n c a u s i n g casu- alties chiefly because the logistics of w a r f a r e h a v e i m p r o v e d so t h a t huge a m o u n t s of firepower can be b r o u g h t to the battlefield, a n d fire can be sustained for a long e n o u g h p e r i o d so t h a t the casualties m o u n t up even w i t h a low r a t i o of effectiveness. T h e tension/fear of c o m b a t is a l m o s t completely d e b i l i t a t i n g at close r a n g e , a n d in the individual use of small a r m s ; at longer r a n g e , tension/fear is o v e r c o m e , b u t s o m e t h i n g like it r e m a i n s in a degree. As long as b o t h sides r e m a i n e n g a g e d , d a m a g e is d o n e by keeping up a c h r o n i c c o n d i t i o n of low-efficiency firing, r a t h e r t h a n a n a c u t e m o m e n t o f a l l - o u t d e s t r u c t i o n . "

F R I E N D L Y E I R E A N D B Y S T A N D E R H I T S

All evidence points to the fact t h a t fighting takes place in a c o n d i t i o n of tension and fear. M o s t fighters close up to the enemy t a k e little or no belligerent action; w h e n pressed by s t r o n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s , or s u p - p o r t e d by small g r o u p ties, they engage in firing, and s o m e small p r o p o r - t i o n of fighters become aggressive p a r t i c i p a n t s . But most of these firers, reluctant a n d enthusiastic alike, are quite i n c o m p e t e n t at it. They often fire wildly a b o u t t h e m . As a result, it s houl d n o t be surprising t h a t they often hit t r o o p s on their o w n side. In the late t w e n t i e t h century, this be- came publicized as "friendly fire"—fire by the "friendlies" r a t h e r t h a n by the enemy.

Friendly fire a p p e a r s to have existed in all armies of all historical peri- o d s , a n d indeed in all fight situations. In the era of mass f o r m a t i o n s , w h e r e there w a s m o r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l pressure to fire, a t r o o p of soldiers m a r c h i n g into c o m b a t might s h o o t off their guns in a m u t u a l c o n t a g i o n of excitement. A nineteenth-century French officer speaks of soldiers be- c o m i n g " d r u n k on rifle fire," a n d A r d a n t du Picq, as well as G e r m a n officers, describes t r o o p s firing from the hip w i t h o u t t a k i n g a i m , a n d mostly firing wildly in the air (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 173). This "panic-firing" or

60 • C h a p t e r 2

" n e r v o u s firing" as nineteenth-century military writers referred to it, tends to t a k e place at such distance from the enemy t h a t it is just w a s t i n g a m m u n i t i o n , c o n t r a v e n i n g the "fire-discipline" d e m a n d e d by their offi- cers. T h e collective m o o d of t r o o p s entering c o m b a t might be m o r e aptly described as symbolic of c o m b a t . It is essentially a blustering gesture from a psychologically safe distance, at considerable remove from the real con- frontation w h e n firing becomes considerably h a r d e r . 1 2 T h u s they over- c o m e the SLAM p r o b l e m to a degree, but not the incompetence p r o b l e m ; a n d they create a n o t h e r p r o b l e m , the tendency to injure each other. " M a r - shal Saint-Cyr estimated t h a t o n e - q u a r t e r of French infantry casualties d u r i n g the N a p o l e o n i c period were caused by men in the front rank being accidentally shot by those behind t h e m " (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 173).

Despite the fact that the close-order formation was drilled explicitly, and indeed in p a r t designed, to prevent firing within one's o w n r a n k s , when battle broke o u t , this discipline tended to disintegrate. 1 3 Similar problems apparently afflicted the older phalanx formations: they could keep a sem- blance of concerted threat when they held long spears t h a t extended far to the front, but w h e n men came into close c o m b a t and began to swing a b o u t with s w o r d s a n d clubs, they n o t only were often ineffective against the enemy, but must have inflicted w o u n d s on themselves. A m o n g the most famous of such casualties w a s the Persian king Cambyscs in 5 2 2 B . C . , w o u n d e d by his own s w o r d (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 1 90). It is the same in m o d e r n times. In 1936, the most p o p u l a r anarchist leader in the Spanish Civil War, Buenaventura D u r r u t i , was killed by his o w n c o m p a n i o n when his machine pistol caught on a car d o o r (Beevor 1999: 2 0 0 ) .

T h e problem continues in the very different formations of modern w a r - fare, with t r o o p s spread o u t along a firing line. H o l m e s ( 1 9 8 5 : 1 8 9 - 9 2 ) gives n u m e r o u s examples: artillery firing on their o w n t r o o p s in World War I (killing 7 5 , 0 0 0 French soldiers alone); b o m b e r s b o m b i n g their o w n positions in World War II; t r o o p s attacking allied positions because of fail- ing to recognize them. Sentries a n d pickets firing on a p p a r e n t strangers have killed m a n y of their o w n officers, in French, Prussian, British, a n d other armies. T h e death of the Confederate general Stonewall J a c k s o n at the end of the victorious battle of Chancellorsville in 1 8 6 3 , shot by his o w n sentries w h o did not recognize him, was only one of m a n y such incidents.

Keegan ( 1 9 7 6 : 3 1 1 to 13) estimates t h a t 15 to 25 percent of battle casualties are from accident. In the era of mechanized warfare, these in- creasingly occur from traffic or heavy e q u i p m e n t accidents: being run over by t a n k s or t r u c k s , being crushed by artillery or o t h e r large w e a p o n s while m o v i n g t h e m a r o u n d . In t h e a t e r s of difficult m o v e m e n t , such as the British front in Burma 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 , n o n - b a t t l e injuries o u t n u m b e r e d battle injuries by five to one (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 191). A t t e m p t s to supply t r o o p s by air have resulted in d e a t h s , as w h e n g r o u n d forces had crates of food d r o p p e d on

Confrontational Tension • 61

their h e a d s . It is n o t so m u c h ironic as a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t General P a t t o n , famed for speedy t a n k m o v e m e n t , s houl d h a v e been killed in an a u t o crash s o o n after t h e end of W o r l d W a r II. M i l i t a r y aircraft are m u c h m o r e p r o n e t o traffic p r o b l e m s t h a n civilian aviation; over a n d a b o v e enemy fire, an a d d i t i o n a l 20 percent of U.S. planes w e r e lost in Korea by acci- dents (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 2 7 3 ) . T h e shift t o high-mobility helicopter t r a n s p o r t has b r o u g h t its c o r r e s p o n d i n g form of t r a n s p o r t casualties. In the Afghan- istan w a r of 2 0 0 1 - 0 2 , a large p r o p o r t i o n of casualties w e r e from helicop- ter accidents. I n t h e I r a q w a r from M a r c h 2 0 0 3 t o A u g u s t 2 0 0 5 , 1 9 per- cent of A m e r i c a n t r o o p d e a t h s were by accidents (Philadelphia Inquirer, A u g . 1 1 , 2 0 0 5 ; from iCasualties.org). Tension infects n o t just the soldiers using their o w n w e a p o n s , t o the p o t e n t i a l h a r m o f t h o s e n e a r e s t t o t h e m , b u t also the larger-scale o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t , w h e r e the w a r con- sists in m o v i n g large a n d d a n g e r o u s m a t e r i a l objects in w a y s t h a t often lead t o collisions w i t h h u m a n s i n the t e n s i o n - r i d d e n s i t u a t i o n . 1 4

M y analysis t h u s far h a s d r a w n largely u p o n military c o m b a t , b u t the p a t t e r n s apply generally to all violent conflicts. T h e category of friendly fire, a n d a n e a r extension t h a t we m a y call b y s t a n d e r hits, w h i c h t h e mili- t a r y calls "collateral d a m a g e , " is p r o m i n e n t in small-scale civilian con- flicts as well.

A major form of gang fighting, at least on the West C o a s t , is drive-by s h o o t i n g s , in w h i c h m e m b e r s of o n e g a n g in a car s h o o t at a g a t h e r i n g of an o p p o s i n g gang (Sanders 1 9 9 4 ) . Often these are w e d d i n g s , parties, or o t h e r festive gatherings, since they are the k i n d of occasions w h e r e a g a n g k n o w s targets c a n be found. Usually just one s h o t is fired into the g r o u p , while t h e car speeds away. Since these are v e n d e t t a s h o o t i n g s , a n y m e m b e r of t h e g r o u p , male or female, c a n be an a p p r o p r i a t e victim. Generally g a n g m e m b e r s themselves are n o t hit, a l t h o u g h their friends a n d families a r e . Such drive-by shootings m a y hit a totally u n r e l a t e d bystander, includ- ing a child or o t h e r especially helpless victim.

T h e a p p a r e n t l y high p r o p o r t i o n of g a n g - v e n d e t t a shootings t h a t hit b y s t a n d e r s , a n d t h e l o w p r o p o r t i o n t h a t hit f i g h t i n g m e m b e r s o f t h e o p - posing gang, seems perversely unjust. H o w e v e r , it fits a well-established p a t t e r n in a n o t h e r area: in disasters, t h o s e m o s t likely to die are children a n d old p e o p l e , while able-bodied y o u n g males are m o s t likely to survive (Bourque et al. 2 0 0 6 ) . A fight s i t u a t i o n resembles a disaster scene in t h a t the m o s t n i m b l e a n d alert are m o s t likely to evade the d a n g e r s , while the m o s t helpless are m o s t likely to s u c c u m b — i n this case, to r e m a i n oblivi- ous or i m m o b i l e in the line of fire.

T h e same i s t r u e i n small g r o u p a n d individual f i g h t s , w i t h a n d w i t h o u t w e a p o n s . In t h e high-tension situation of t h e fight, m e m b e r s of a g r o u p are likely to swing wildly, a n d are likely to hit m e m b e r s of their o w n side, especially if t h e y are p a c k e d close together.

62 • C h a p t e r 2

From a student report: A g r o u p of fifteen teenage boys came into a high school locker r o o m to confront one boy w h o h a d been in a dispute w i t h t w o of t h e m . T h e observer n o t e d the t e n s i o n on all sides: the target sweated, t r e m b l e d , a n d a t t e m p t e d t o hide; the attackers w e r e bodily tense, b r e a t h i n g heavily, a n d continually e n c o u r a g e d each other as if to w o r k u p their c o u r a g e . W h e n they s a w their t a r g e t ' s fear, they r u s h e d a t h i m , p u n c h e d a n d k n o c k e d h i m d o w n , a n d kicked h i m o n t h e g r o u n d . Since t h e beating occurred in the n a r r o w space of the locker r o o m , several p u n c h e s hit the attackers themselves; o n e h a d a finger b r o k e n w h e n h e t r i p p e d a n d w a s stepped o n ; a n o t h e r w a s bruised o n t h e a r m . Bystanders w h o g a t h e r e d t o w a t c h t h e f i g h t w e r e u n a b l e t o keep a safe distance, a n d one of t h e m w a s accidentally p u n c h e d in the face. Total casualties included the victim, t w o a t t a c k e r s (b o th from friendly fire), a n d one bystander.

From another student report: A g r o u p of seventeen m e m b e r s of a teen- age g a n g set o u t in four cars to find the h o u s e of a m e m b e r of an o p p o s - ing g a n g . F r o m t h e outset t h e r e w a s confusion: a lengthy discussion over w h o w o u l d ride in w h i c h car, as well as n u m e r o u s w r o n g t u r n s in traveling t o t h e t a r g e t ' s h o u s e . W h e n they arrived, t h e r e w a s further hesitation a b o u t w h a t t o d o ; n o o n e k n o c k e d o n the door. After ten m i n u t e s , the victim's older brother, a twenty-eight-year-old m a n , c a m e o u t a n d said t h a t he w a s n o t at h o m e . After a thirty-second a r g u m e n t t h r o u g h the car w i n d o w , the m o s t aggressive of the gang m e m b e r s j u m p e d o u t a n d started a scuffle. As s o o n as the m a n w a s k n o c k e d d o w n , t h e rest of the gang left the cars a n d rushed to join in s t o m p i n g h i m o n the g r o u n d . A t this j u n c t u r e the g a n g w a s reduced t o fourteen, since t h r e e of t h e m , as the altercation b e g a n , j u m p e d i n t o t w o of the cars a n d d r o v e off, leaving the rest w i t h only t w o cars. T h e majority of the gang w e r e t o o busy t o notice, since they w e r e c r o w d i n g each other to get an o p p o r t u n i t y t o kick the m a n o n the g r o u n d ; at least t w o o f the a t t a c k e r s p u n c h e d each other in the melee. In a b o u t t w o m i n u t e s , a g r o u p of t w o m e n a n d t w o w o m e n , older family m e m b e r s of the twenty-eight-year old, came o u t of the h o u s e a n d began to t h r o w bot- tles a n d r o c k s at the cars. This u n e x p e c t e d source of resistance p a n i c k e d t h e a t t a c k e r s , w h o a t t e m p t e d t o c r o w d back into t h e t w o r e m a i n i n g cars. This seemed t o e m b o l d e n the b o t t l e - t h r o w e r s , w h o , a l t h o u g h s h o w i n g fear on their faces, pressed their a t t a c k on the r e t r e a t i n g side, w h o w e r e t u m b l i n g over each o t h e r a t t e m p t i n g t o get into the c a r s . O n e driver h a d to get o u t a n d c h a n g e seats, u n a b l e to drive because his h a n d s were t o o badly bruised from repeatedly p u n c h i n g the first victim. T h e disorganized r e t r e a t left t h e last car, p a c k e d w i t h eight g a n g m e m - bers, s t r a n d e d for t h r e e m i n u t e s , while the locals continually pelted t h e m from a distance, s m a s h i n g in all the w i n d o w s on one side of the

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l T e n s i o n • 6 3

car. Finally they m a d e their escape. T h e observer n o t e d t h a t after they were safely b a c k on their h o m e territory, t h e y described the events in a m a n n e r t h a t left o u t all the di s r eput abl e details of their p e r f o r m a n c e , instead bragging a b o u t h o w they h a d w o n t h e f i g h t .

Fist fights generally involve wild swinging, a n d b y s t a n d e r s are often hit, unless t h e r e is sufficient w a r n i n g for t h e m to back a w a y quickly to a safe distance. T h i s is n o t always possible in a c r o w d e d place. T h e r e is no systematic d a t a t h a t w o u l d enable us to tell h o w often p a r t i c u l a r kinds of fights lead to b y s t a n d e r hits. J u d g i n g from all sources from w h i c h I h a v e compiled fight descriptions, it a p p e a r s t h a t in a s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y of fights t h e r e are b y s t a n d e r hits. T h e exception is the class of fights in w h i c h a fight is p l a n n e d a n d organized as a spectacle. T h e s e will be t r e a t e d later as "fair fights" in c h a p t e r 6. T h a t is to say, unless fights are specially organized so t h a t they are restricted—with an explicit, high-priority con- cern to avoid friendly fire—the pervasive i n c o m p e t e n c e p r o d u c e d by the t e n s i o n of conflict leads to some s u b s t a n t i a l chance of b y s t a n d e r injury.

Police violence r e s e m b l e s o t h e r k i n d s of violence in this r e s p e c t as well a s i n m o s t o t h e r s . Police s h o o t - o u t s w i t h c r i m i n a l suspects often involve friendly-fire c a s u a l t i e s . O n e s u c h case i n v o l v e d a c h a s e of a m a n w a n t e d for m u r d e r , w h o w a s t r a c e d t o a m o t e l r o o m ( i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d b y s u p e r v i s o r of a s t a t e police force). Ten officers s u r r o u n d e d t h e d o o r in a r o u g h semi-circle; w h e n t h e suspect e m e r g e d , he b r a n d i s h e d a TV r e - m o t e c o n t r o l as if it w e r e a w e a p o n , a n d w a s s h o t by t h e officers. T h e m a n a p p a r e n t l y w a n t e d t o b e killed r a t h e r t h a n b e c a p t u r e d ; t h e c o l l o - q u i a l t e r m for this is " s u i c i d e by c o p . " T h u s , in this c a s e , all bullets w e r e fired by p o l i c e . W h a t is r e l e v a n t h e r e is t h a t t h e t e n officers w o u n d e d o n e o f t h e i r o w n side; ballistics tests s h o w e d t h a t m a n y r o u n d s w e n t w i l d i n t o t h e w a l l s a n d ceiling; only eight of t h e t w e n t y - e i g h t bullets f i r e d hit t h e suspect.

In 1 9 9 8 , sixty of 7 6 0 , 0 0 0 U.S. police officers w e r e killed on duty; 10 p e r c e n t b y their o w n g u n s — t h a t is, b y friendly f i r e . I n 2 0 0 1 , o m i t t i n g the seventy-one officers killed at the W o r l d T r a d e Center, seventy officers w e r e killed in action (mostly by firearms), plus a n o t h e r seventy-eight died in accidents (largely vehicle crashes); altogether eight w e r e killed by their o w n w e a p o n s or w e r e accidentally shot: a friendly-fire r a t i o of 11 p e r c e n t (Los Angeles Times, July 2 6 , 1 9 9 9 ; FBI r e p o r t , Dec. 3, 2 0 0 2 ) .

Police fire also hits b y s t a n d e r s . T h e p a t t e r n here is n o t t o o different from gang s h o o t i n g s , especially w h e n s h o o t i n g is m a d e difficult by speed- ing cars.

Bystander injuries also occur in police a u t o chases (Alpert a n d D u n h a m 1 9 9 0 ; see further discussion in c h a p t e r 3). T h e sociological p o i n t h e r e is n o t t o allocate blame b u t t o p o i n t o u t t h e p a t t e r n : conflict situations in- volving vehicles are m u c h like c o m b a t situations w h e r e m o v i n g military

64 • C h a p t e r 2

e q u i p m e n t across space in high-tension situations while rapidly o u t m a - neuvering the enemy is a priority.

H e r e again e n t e r t a i n m e n t depiction of violence creates a severe distor- t i o n . A staple of a c t i o n - a d v e n t u r e films is t h e a u t o chase scene. T h i s n o r - mally depicts a great deal of accidental d a m a g e to property, a n d climaxes w i t h a spectacular crash, usually depicted in a lighthearted or h u m o r o u s m o d e . Bodily injury or d e a t h of the principals to a movie chase is rarely s h o w n ; at m o s t the b a d guy's car d i s a p p e a r s in flames. Bystander injuries are never depicted.

Bystander hits are a feature of military c o m b a t w h e r e v e r t h e r e are civil- ians present. It is particularly likely in u r b a n fighting, w h e r e civilians h a v e n o t been able t o leave, a n d t h u s h a s o c c u r r e d i n t r a d i t i o n a l a n d m o d e r n sieges; as well as in guerrilla w a r f a r e , w h e r e fighters deliberately hide a m o n g the civilian p o p u l a t i o n . To fight at all in a heavily p o p u l a t e d area is b o u n d to p r o d u c e n o n - c o m b a t a n t casualties, w h a t e v e r care is t a k e n to avoid t h e m , s h o r t of n o t firing at all.

Technological i m p r o v e m e n t s hypothetically m i g h t reduce bystander hits; by the t u r n of the twenty-first century, these included c o m p u t e r con- trolled firing, r e m o t e r a d a r a n d satellite sensing, a n d highly a c c u r a t e navi- g a t i o n a l systems for b o m b s a n d missiles, as well as i m p r o v e m e n t s in sighting a n d sensing systems for g r o u n d w e a p o n s a n d small a r m s . N e v e r - theless, the experience of early twenty-first-century w a r s c o n t i n u e s to s h o w p r o b l e m s of b y s t a n d e r hits a n d friendly fire. 1 5 These p a t t e r n s suggest t h a t the r o o t p r o b l e m is n o t the technology, b u t the fog or tension of c o m b a t itself. T h e w e a p o n , no m a t t e r h o w technically reliable, is always controlled by h u m a n s w h o pick o u t targets or at least set the criteria for firing at t h e m — h o w e v e r a u t o m a t i c a l l y these are carried o u t . Given t h a t c o m b a t is a m a t t e r of defensive evasions, deceptions, a n d m a n e u v e r i n g s , picking a target is intrinsically difficult to judge accurately. T h u s it is n o t unlikely t h a t a n Afghani w e d d i n g p a r t y w o u l d b e t a k e n for a l - Q a e d a t r o o p s , especially w h e n the sensing a p p a r a t u s is in o u t e r space; or t h a t a h o s p i t a l can be r e g a r d e d as a disguise for a w e a p o n s d u m p . D e v a s t a t i n g firepower m o t i v a t e s o p p o n e n t s to h i d e w h e r e they c a n , including in civil- ian installations or close to t h e m ; k n o w i n g this, a t t a c k e r s w i t h high-tech distance w e a p o n s are m o t i v a t e d t o i n t e r p r e t targets b r o a d l y r a t h e r t h a n narrowly. C o m b a t creates a m o o d in w h i c h targets are chosen in a bellig- erent haze. T h e r e is n o t h i n g in the r e c o r d of technological i m p r o v e m e n t s , w h i c h h a v e already gone t h r o u g h m a n y g e n e r a t i o n s , t o suggest t h a t these factors will cease to be i m p o r t a n t .

As c o m b a t casualties go d o w n , friendly-fire casualties go u p . In the Afghanistan w a r d u r i n g 2 0 0 1 - 0 2 , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of friendly-fire a n d acci- d e n t a l casualties w a s 6 3 p e r c e n t . 1 6 I n w a r s fought w i t h one-sided t e c h n o - logical superiority, casualties inflicted by enemies on high-tech t r o o p s t e n d

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l T e n s i o n • 6 5

to be low; these t r o o p s typically fire from a distance a n d have high m o b i l - ity a n d evacuation capacity, t h u s deadly casualties are especially likely to be l o w as c o m b a t w o u n d s are m o r e easily t e n d e d . Friendly fire, a n d espe- cially the borderline self-inflicted casualties of traffic accidents, a c c o u n t for a higher p r o p o r t i o n of d e a t h s , b o t h because e n e m y casualties m a k e up a smaller p r o p o r t i o n a n d because the high-tech mobility of the army, especially battle helicopters a n d o t h e r intrinsically d a n g e r o u s machinery, is m o r e heavily relied u p o n . T h e increasing p o w e r of m u n i t i o n s also poses a risk for a n y o n e w h o is a r o u n d t h e m , especially t r o o p s w h o m o v e a n d store t h e m . In the I r a q w a r 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 , a considerable p r o p o r t i o n of d e a t h s from accident w e r e from m u n i t i o n s accidents.

It w a s in this c o n t e x t of d w i n d l i n g c o m b a t casualties in U.S. actions d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 0 s t h a t t h e n e w s m e d i a discovered the p h e n o m e n o n of friendly fire. W h e n casualties occur in incidents of one or a few m e n at a t i m e s p r e a d over m a n y w e e k s , events s u c h as a single pilot being s h o t d o w n , or a single CIA operative being killed while i n t e r r o g a t i n g p r i s o n e r s , get a large a m o u n t of m e d i a a t t e n t i o n ; this w o u l d n o t h a v e been possible i n previous w a r s w h e r e casualties w e r e s o c o m m o n t h a t m o s t were neces- sarily a n o n y m o u s . U n d e r this type of publicity, friendly-fire accidents re- ceive great scrutiny, w h e r e a s they w o u l d h a v e been h i d d e n u n d e r t h e m a s - sive casualties of W o r l d War II. Investigations a n d a p p o r t i o n i n g of b l a m e for friendly fire, however, are n o t likely to bring a b o u t a decline in its incidence, since it is structurally built i n t o violent conflict s i t u a t i o n s . Like political scandals, these kinds of controversies are repetitive, a n d investi- g a t i o n s , outcries, a n d p u n i s h m e n t s d o n o t m a k e t h e m g o a w a y . 1 7

Friendly fire a n d b y s t a n d e r hits are offshoots of t h e basic c h a r a c t e r of fight situations: tension/fear a n d resulting i n c o m p e t e n c e . This is a version of h a s t e m a k e s w a s t e , considering t h a t fighting p u t s a p r e m i u m u p o n hasty a c t i o n at the m o m e n t t h a t violence is going o n . W h a t is sometimes called t h e fog of c o m b a t can also be described as a psychological condi- t i o n of t u n n e l vision. Fighting takes up the c o m p l e t e a t t e n t i o n of t h o s e w h o are engaged in it; it o v e r w h e l m s t h e senses a n d focuses t h e m i n d so t h a t all else fades i n t o invisibility. It is h a r d e n o u g h to m a i n t a i n an effec- tive focus on the enemyr; t e m p o r a r y obliviousness to w h o e v e r else m i g h t be in t h e fighting z o n e is inevitable. T h i s is t r u e of angry m e n engaged in a cursing a n d gesturing m a t c h , oblivious to the c o n s t e r n a t i o n of b y s t a n d e r s ; police officers w h o expect their blaring sirens, l o u d s q u a w k b o x e s , fast driving, a n d other gestures of designating a crime scene to t a k e precedence over all o t h e r n o r m a l h u m a n c o n c e r n s ; 1 8 a n d soldiers i n battle p u t t i n g everything on the battlefield at their disposal, w h e t h e r to occupy houses o r t o b l o w t h e m u p .

This self-centeredness of fight situations affects even the fighting elite: those w h o are in S L A M ' s elite of firers, a n d the smaller-still elite of t h o s e

66 • C h a p t e r 2

w h o fire accurately. In o n e famous case, the R u b y Ridge standoff in 1 9 9 2 , a police sniper with a telescopic sight hit n o t the m a n w h o w a s the object of the s t a k e - o u t in his m o u n t a i n cabin, but his wife w h o came to the w i n d o w carrying a child ( W h i t c o m b 2 0 0 1 : 2 4 1 - 3 1 1 ; Kopel a n d Black- m a n 1 9 9 7 : 3 2 - 3 8 ) . T h i s is a case of a b y s t a n d e r hit. It is n o t an instance of technical incompetence; s h a r p - s h o o t e r s are unlike everyone else in being extremely accurate at hitting h u m a n targets. In this case, the kill r a t i o w a s one bullet, one kill. T h e sniper simply misidentified the target c o m i n g into the w i n d o w w h e r e he expected his m a n to be. Fighting limits a t t e n t i o n ; in t h a t tunnel of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension, d a m a g e is often d o n e , in ways t h a t are only loosely connected w i t h w h a t w a s consciously intended out- side the t u n n e l .

J O Y O F C O M B A T . U N D E R W H A T C O N D I T I O N S ?

Fighting is shaped by tension a n d fear. But some p r o p o r t i o n of individu- als, in s o m e s i t u a t i o n s , enjoy fighting. H o w do we a c c o u n t for this m i n o r - ity? Better yet, w h a t light does such an investigation cast on the variable processes t h a t p r o d u c e violent action?

An e x t r e m e position, taken by some a u t h o r s , is t h a t men typically like c o m b a t . This is an explicitly gendered a r g u m e n t ; males, w h e t h e r because of m a c h o culture or genetics, are fighters a n d killers a n d get pleasure o u t of these a c t i o n s . T h e m o s t e x t r e m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t h a t killing is a sexu- ally pleasurable drive (Bourke 1 9 9 9 ) .

Evidence for this a r g u m e n t needs to distinguish the kinds of situations in w h i c h men (and in some instances, w o m e n ) express feelings of joy a b o u t c o m b a t . O n e type is pre-battle elation. Bourke ( 1 9 9 9 : 2 7 4 ) q u o t e s a World War I British chaplain w h o describes his o w n , a n d his t r o o p s ' " s t r a n g e a n d fearsome delight at being at last up 'really' up against it." This is a case of feelings prior to these m e n ' s first battle, still in the phase of r h e t o r i c . Ulysses S. G r a n t ( 1 8 8 5 / 1 9 9 0 : 178) similarly describes t r o o p s in N o v e m b e r 1861 in his first Civil War c o m m a n d , w h o were so eager for battle t h a t he felt he could not m a i n t a i n discipline if he did n o t find an e n g a g e m e n t for t h e m to fight.

Related to this type is the b l o o d t h i r s t y r h e t o r i c expressed at a distance from the front. Given the size of the logistics a n d s u p p o r t train for twenti- eth- and twenty-first-century armies, a considerable p r o p o r t i o n of t r o o p s are in no position actually to fire at the enemy, and in relatively little d a n g e r of receiving fire; but they often carry w e a p o n s a n d have been trained to use t h e m , and so they have s o m e plausible self-description as fighting s o l d i e r s . " Soldiers in rear areas express m o r e hatred of the enemy, a n d m o r e ferocious a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e m , t h a n frontline t r o o p s (Stouffer et al. 1 9 4 9 : 1 5 8 - 6 5 ) . W h e r e a s c o m b a t soldiers are m o r e likely to treat

Confrontational Tension • 67

p r i s o n e r s well—once t h e danger p o i n t has been p a s s e d w h e n t h e y are actually being c a p t u r e d , often sharing food a n d w a t e r w i t h t h e m — r e a r - area t r o o p s t e n d to t r e a t prisoners m o r e callously, or even brutally (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 6 8 - 7 8 , 3 8 2 ) . C o n t i n u i n g the p r o g r e s s i o n , civilians a t h o m e are m o r e likely to express violent r h e t o r i c a l h a t r e d against the e n e m y a n d blood-thirsty joy in killing t h e m (Bourke 1 9 9 9 : 1 4 4 - 5 3 ) . Given the relatively high p r o p o r t i o n of w o m e n on the civilian h o m e f r o n t , there is r e a s o n to d o u b t t h a t gender per se, r a t h e r t h a n s i t u a t i o n a l differ- ences, accounts for differences in ferociousness.

T h e farther from t h e front, the m o r e rhetorical ferociousness is ex- pressed, a n d rhetorical e n t h u s i a s m for t h e w h o l e fighting enterprise. This fits t h e general p a t t e r n of all fights: s u r r o u n d e d by bluster a n d gesture up until the a c t u a l f i g h t situation, w h e n t h e e m o t i o n shifts drastically a n d tension/fear t a k e s over ( d o c u m e n t e d i n H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 : 7 5 - 8 , citing m a n y observers). T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f e m p t y r h e t o r i c e x p a n d s w i t h each step t o - w a r d t h e rear; w a r is successively m o r e idealized, t h e enemy successively m o r e d e h u m a n i z e d , attitudes t o w a r d killing successively m o r e callous, a n d t h e w h o l e affair m o r e like t h e cheering of s p o r t s fans.

R a r e r is joy in actual c o m b a t . H e r e we need to be very precise a b o u t just w h a t is being experienced. Given S L A M ' s l o w firing r a t i o , this is n o t necessarily the experience of firing one's w e a p o n ; nor, given l o w effective- ness, t h e experience of hitting the enemy. T h u s B o u r k e ( 1 9 9 9 : 21) q u o t e s a British W o r l d W a r II pilot w h o liked t h e s o u n d of firing bullets: " W h a t a t h r i l l ! " As M a r s h a l l a n d others h a v e n o t e d , soldiers typically find the m o s t enjoyable p a r t of military t r a i n i n g is firing g u n s on t h e r a n g e ; b u t this is quite different from t h e feelings of hitting an enemy.

Finally, we c o m e to expression of positive e m o t i o n s a b o u t killing an enemy. B o u r k e (1999) presents q u o t a t i o n s culled from letters, diaries, a n d reminiscences of A n g l o p h o n e soldiers—British, C a n a d i a n , A u s t r a l i a n , A m e r i c a n — i n the t w o w o r l d w a r s , K o r e a , a n d V i e t n a m . She gives t w e n t y - eight such cases. O n l y four of B o u r k e ' s cases describe s o m e t h i n g like sex- u a l pleasure in killing; a n o t h e r n i n e describe t h e e x h i l a r a t i o n or frenzy of close-up killing, w h e r e t h e enemy c a n be actually seen. T h e latter generally l o o k like t h e special s i t u a t i o n t h a t , in c h a p t e r 3 , 1 will describe as a "for- w a r d p a n i c . " T h e rest of the cases—half or m o r e — a r e instances of d i s t a n t killing, s h a r p s h o o t i n g by former a n i m a l h u n t e r s , or victories by fighter pilots. But as we shall see in c h a p t e r 1 1 , snipers a n d ace pilots are t h e m o s t u n u s u a l of all fighters, c o m p e t e n t w h e r e m o s t others are n o t , because of their special e m o t i o n a l techniques for o v e r c o m i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l ten- sion. Carefully e x a m i n e d , m u c h of w h a t Bourke interprets as joy of killing are expressions of pride or relief in successful p e r f o r m a n c e — t h e majority o f pilots s h o o t d o w n n o enemy p l a n e s , a n d t h o s e w h o d o are t r e a t e d a s a special elite.

68 • C h a p t e r 2

Within the relatively small p r o p o r t i o n of soldiers w h o kill in c o m b a t , t h e r e are a variety of e m o t i o n s : cold a n d businesslike; pride in o n e ' s c o m - petence; elation at a job well d o n e ; h a t r e d , frenzy, feelings of revenge for d e a t h s on o n e ' s o w n side; positive pleasure. It is difficult to tell w h a t p r o p o r t i o n s of soldiers feel w h i c h of these e m o t i o n s ; m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y for theoretical e x p l a n a t i o n , we need to seek o u t the circumstances in w h i c h they feel t h e m . Positive e m o t i o n s s h o u l d also be b a l a n c e d w i t h negative e m o t i o n s to killing, such as the following e x a m p l e from the Boxer Rebellion:

[A British marine] h a d s h o t and b a y o n e t e d a m a n early in the siege, driving the b a y o n e t in up to the hilt in t h e m a n ' s chest a n d t h e n dis- charging t h e entire c o n t e n t s of his m a g a z i n e . N o w , badly t r a u m a t i z e d , he lay t h r a s h i n g a b o u t , shrieking h o u r after h o u r " H o w it splashes! H o w i t splashes!" (Preston 2 0 0 0 : 2 1 3 )

T H E C O N T I N U U M O F T E N S I O N / F E A R A N D C O M B A T P E R F O R M A N C E

T h e r e are a variety of w a y s t h a t soldiers behave in c o m b a t . T h i s is best seen as a c o n t i n u u m of degrees a n d kinds of t e n s i o n a n d fear, w i t h differ- ent degrees of i n c o m p e t e n c e or c o m p e t e n c e in resulting p e r f o r m a n c e . At one end is frozen incapacity, b u r r o w i n g i n t o the g r o u n d or childishly hid- ing from sight of the enemy. N e x t is p a n i c retreat. N e x t comes shitting a n d pissing in o n e ' s p a n t s , physical manifestations of fear b u t n o t necessarily s t o p p i n g o n e from at least going t h r o u g h the m o t i o n s of fighting. T h i s p a r t of the c o n t i n u u m also includes lagging back from the front line, seek- ing excuses t o d o s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n m o v e f o r w a r d , drifting a w a y (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 2 9 ) . T h e n comes m o v i n g f o r w a r d b u t n o t f i r i n g ; n o t f i r - ing b u t helping those w h o are firing, such as by giving t h e m a m m u n i t i o n or reloading for t h e m ; t h e n firing o n e ' s w e a p o n s b u t incompetently, miss- ing the enemy. Finally, at the high end, t h e r e is a c c u r a t e a n d well-timed firing, a n d o t h e r aggressive m a n e u v e r s in c o m b a t . We have as yet no clear evidence as to w h a t the e m o t i o n s are at the high e n d of c o m p e t e n t vio- lence. Is it simply no overt expression of fear; m o r e rarely, c o m p l e t e lack of subjective or covert fear? A relatively small n u m b e r of m e n r e p o r t no fear in battle (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 0 4 ) . Is it at this end of the c o n t i n u u m t h a t we will find e x h i l a r a t i o n , enjoyment of battle? A n d still m o r e e x t r e m e , enjoyment of killing? A l t h o u g h t h e r e are folk theories a b o u t t h i s , it re- m a i n s to be s h o w n : is c o m p e t e n t violence h o t or cold?

Let u s t u r n t o the p h o t o g r a p h i c evidence again. Using the c o m b a t p h o - tos from t h e sources listed earlier in n o t e 6 it is possible to judge the e m o t i o n s of 2 9 0 soldiers from visible faces and body p o s t u r e s . 2 0 T h e dis- t r i b u t i o n of e m o t i o n s is as follows:

Confrontational Tension • 69

Strong fear: 18 p e r c e n t M i l d fear, a p p r e h e n s i o n , w o r r y : 12 p e r c e n t Stunned, e x h a u s t e d , sad, anguished, p a i n e d : 7 percent Yelling, s h o u t i n g o r d e r s , calling for h e l p : 2 p e r c e n t Tense, w a r y : 2 1 percent Alert, c o n c e n t r a t e d , serious, m a k i n g effort: 11 percent N e u t r a l , calm, impassive, relaxed: 2 6 percent Anger: 6 p e r c e n t Joy, smiling: 0.3 p e r c e n t

A b o u t a t h i r d of the soldiers (30 percent) s h o w either s t r o n g or mild fear. A n o t h e r t h i r d (32 percent) are in the m i d d l e g r o u n d of t e n s i o n a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n . A q u a r t e r (26 percent) are c a l m a n d n e u t r a l . O n e m i g h t conjecture t h a t the last g r o u p w o u l d b e the m o s t c o m p e t e n t i n c o m b a t , b u t t h e y are just as likely to be a m o n g non-firers as t h o s e w h o are firing their w e a p o n s .

A small g r o u p (7 percent) are s t u n n e d or i n c a p a c i t a t e d . These are chiefly t h e w o u n d e d a n d dying, plus prisoners a n d subjects of t o r t u r e . Some of those a b o u t to be executed s h o w fear, b u t fear is m o r e c o m m o n a m o n g n o n - w o u n d e d soldiers. I n o n e f a m o u s p h o t o ( H o w e 2 0 0 2 : 26) a Saigon police official executes a c a p t u r e d Viet C o n g w i t h a pistol; t h e victim s h o w s a blend of fear a n d shock, b u t t h e strongest expression of h o r r o r is on the face of a n o t h e r p o l i c e m a n l o o k i n g o n . T h e e x e c u t i o n e r ' s face is impassive, as is generally t h e case w i t h p h o t o s of i n t e r r o g a t o r s .

Joy in t h e m o m e n t of c o m b a t is a l m o s t n o n e x i s t e n t . O n l y o n e p h o t o s h o w s a m e m b e r of a m o r t a r c r e w smiling—and this is a distance w e a p o n , n o t directly c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l . T h e c o m p l e t e p h o t o collections include a n - other fifteen p h o t o s of soldiers smiling, all of t h e m outside of c o m b a t situations. M o s t of t h e m are in m o m e n t s of v i c t o r y — s h o w i n g off w e a p - ons c a p t u r e d from the enemy, or the time w h e n peace is declared. Smiles are m o s t c o m m o n a m o n g f i g h t e r pilots elated a t r e t u r n i n g t o base w i t h their victory t o t a l s establishing their r a n k i n g as aces; some are depicted smiling in front of their planes (found also in Toliver a n d C o n s t a b l e 1 9 9 7 ) . In o n e p h o t o , t h e first A m e r i c a n ace in V i e t n a m r e c o u n t s his air battle to a circle of smiling s h i p m a t e s , a l t h o u g h t h e pilot himself, c a u g h t up in his story, has an expression of anger a n d aggression ( D a u g h e r t y a n d M a t t s o n 2 0 0 1 : 5 0 8 ) .

Perhaps m o s t surprising is the r a r i t y of expressions of anger in c o m b a t . Only 6 percent of t h e soldiers s h o w this. A n d m o s t of the anger is n o t in t h e form of striking o u t at t h e enemy. T h e r e are a couple of instances w h e r e m a c h i n e g u n n e r s fire w i t h a h a r d - s e t anger m o u t h . Anger is m o r e often s h o w n by prisoners (especially in Vietnam) a n d victims of t o r t u r e if they are n o t stunned; sometimes their anger blends w i t h fear. W o u n d e d soldiers are mostly stunned, sometimes mildly fearful; anger comes o u t

70 • C h a p t e r 2

m o r e in the faces of buddies a n d medics w h o are tending to t h e m , especially w h e n calling for help—usually in a blend w i t h sadness or fear. Torturers themselves do n o t look angry, although several p h o t o s s h o w angry expres- sions on soldiers w h o are dragging prisoners into captivity—here anger blends w i t h muscular effort to overcome resistance. Anger in fact seems to occur mostly in m o m e n t s of intense effort. We see this in the expressions of officers calling o u t orders in the heat of c o m b a t . T w o of the strongest anger faces are of U.S. security g u a r d s in a tussle w i t h a panicked c r o w d attempting to b o a r d a plane evacuating Saigon during its fall to the enemy; the g u a r d s are straining their muscles to clear the d o o r so the plane can t a k e off, a n d one of t h e m punches a civilian (Daugherty a n d M a t t s o n 2 0 0 1 : 5 5 6 ) . T h e most intense expression of anger in the b o o k of 850 Vietnam w a r p h o t o s is n o t in the w a r zone at all, b u t of a peace d e m o n s t r a t o r in the United States (Daugherty a n d M a t t s o n 2 0 0 1 : 184).

This gives us a clue to t h e r a t h e r disjointed relationship between anger a n d violence. C o m p e t e n t use of w e a p o n s is for t h e m o s t p a r t n o t angry. Anger is effective only in situations w h e r e sheer m u s c u l a r force is at issue, a n d t h e n m o r e i n the effort t o exert c o m p l i a n c e t h a n t o cause a c t u a l h a r m to an o p p o n e n t . Anger comes o u t w h e r e t h e r e is little or no confronta- tional fear: in c o n t r o l l e d situations w h e r e the o p p o n e n t is already s u b - d u e d , or in completely symbolic c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w h e r e t h e r e is no fighting b u t o p i n i o n s are expressed or v e n t e d . 2 1 Ironically, there is p r o b a b l y m o r e anger in civilian life t h a n in a c t u a l c o m b a t .

To ask w h e t h e r the basic h u m a n p r o p e n s i t y is fear, or pleasure in kill- ing, or s o m e t h i n g else, is t h e w r o n g w a y to go a b o u t p r o d u c i n g an expla- n a t i o n . Better to p r o c e e d on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t all h u m a n s are basically alike a n d t h a t situational d y n a m i c s over very specific p e r i o d s of t i m e de- t e r m i n e w h e r e individual fighters will be on the c o n t i n u u m . T h e very same soldiers w h o m i n u t e s earlier were in a frenzy of killing a helpless enemy, or exulting over victory, can be sharing r a t i o n s w i t h s u r r e n d e r e d prisoners (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 7 0 - 7 1 ) ; an h o u r before t h a t , they could be in a p h a s e of high tension, non-firing, a n d half-paralysis. N o t violent individuals, b u t violent situations; a n d also, n o t fearful individuals b u t fearful positions in situations. A n d t h u s across the b o a r d .

C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L T E N S I O N I N P O L I C I N G A N D N O N - M I L I T A R Y F I G H T I N G

T h e same kinds of p a t t e r n s t h a t d e m o n s t r a t e the i m p o r t a n c e of tension/ fear in military c o m b a t are present in virtually all o t h e r kinds of fighting. T h e m a i n exception is w h e r e violence is e n c a p s u l a t e d a n d restricted so t h a t it m a k e s a recognizably artificial situation, such as the dueling a n d

Confrontational Tension • 71

e n t e r t a i n m e n t violence t h a t we will deal w i t h in c h a p t e r s 6, 7, a n d 8. O t h e r t h a n this, " s e r i o u s " violence is basically the same everywhere. We see this in the case of police violence: the relatively small p r o p o r t i o n of police w h o fire their g u n s or physically beat suspects; the e x t e n t to w h i c h police w h o do fire do so wildly, missing t a r g e t s , causing casualties by friendly fire or b y s t a n d e r fire; instances of overkill a n d f o r w a r d p a n i c .

T h e same is t r u e for gang fights: the prevalence of drive-bys a n d o t h e r kinds of h i t - a n d - r u n a t t a c k s ; violence against o u t n u m b e r e d enemies, espe- cially t h o s e w h o are c a u g h t alone or in very small n u m b e r s in enemy territory. In c o n t r a s t are the standoffs, gesturing, a n d blustering t h a t occur w h e n gangs e n c o u n t e r each o t h e r in full force.

Similarly again in riots, including ethnic r i o t s . As we shall see, c r o w d violence is a l m o s t always carried o u t by a small p r o p o r t i o n of p e r s o n s at the front, t h r o w i n g stones, t a u n t i n g the enemy, b u r n i n g or s m a s h i n g enemy property. T h e b e h a v i o r of m o s t p e o p l e in riots s h o w s t e n s i o n a n d fear, manifested in great c a u t i o n , a n d frequently in r u n n i n g t o w a r d safety at signs of c o u n t e r - a t t a c k from t h e other side. T h e " e l i t e " of c r o w d fight- ers, t h o s e at the front, also generally s h o w s some manifestations of fear or at least high degrees of tension. We generally see a p a t t e r n of r u n n i n g f o r w a r d a n d b a c k , exactly like t h e film evidence of tribal w a r f a r e . C r o w d fighters—rioters—pick their targets carefully, a t t a c k i n g w h e r e they h a v e a few of the enemy quite o u t n u m b e r e d , or helpless a n d u n a b l e to fight b a c k . W h e r e enemies m a k e a s t r o n g s h o w i n g , or w h e r e police or other a u t h o r i t i e s display clear willingness to use force, the rioters a l m o s t always r e t r e a t , at least in t h a t i m m e d i a t e locality. 2 2 Figure 2.5 s h o w s the obverse of this situation: the U.S. soldier h a s the g u n a n d t h e b o d y armor, b u t it is t h e u n a r m e d I r a q i c r o w d t h a t is a d v a n c i n g on h i m w i t h hostile gestures, while he backs a w a y from the c o n f r o n t a t i o n . In the collective m o o d of such c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e m o m e n t u m of r e t r e a t a n d a t t a c k are reciprocally e n t w i n e d .

Individual fights, as we h a v e seen, are s t r u c t u r e d by t e n s i o n a n d fear. In m o s t fights a m o n g t h e relatively evenly m a t c h e d , t h e r e is m u c h bluster, little action, a n d t h a t action d e m o n s t r a t e s little c o m p e t e n c e . W h e r e vio- lence does t a k e place it occurs by t h e s t r o n g a t t a c k i n g the w e a k — t h o s e w i t h m u c h greater n u m b e r s a t t a c k i n g isolated victims, t h e heavily a r m e d a t t a c k i n g the u n a r m e d , the bigger a n d m o r e m u s c u l a r beating the smaller. A n d such fights often s h o w i n c o m p e t e n c e by missing targets, w i t h civilian versions of friendly fire a n d b y s t a n d e r hits. T h e s e also h a p p e n in fights w i t h f i s t s a n d other c r u d e w e a p o n s .

We have little systematic evidence, c o m p a r a b l e to non-firing a n d hit rates in military c o m b a t , for ineffectiveness in civilian fights. Scattered d a t a on police s h o o t - o u t s are t h e closest to this, a n d these resemble the military p a t t e r n . W e have n o d a t a o n h o w m a n y drive-by shootings miss

72 • Chapter 2

Figure 2.5 Soldier backs up, unarmed crowd advances (Baghdad, October 2004). AP/Worid Wide Photos.

their targets a n d h o w m a n y hit t h e w r o n g p e r s o n . Sanders ( 1 9 9 4 : 6 7 , 75) indicates t h a t n o t all g a n g m e m b e r s like to go h u n t i n g for rival m e m b e r s , a n d t h a t of those in the car, usually only one s h o o t s ; a n d so the firing r a t i o in drive-bys is p r o b a b l y o n e in four p e r s o n s or less. Since t h e p o i n t of the car a t t a c k is to keep the c o n f r o n t a t i o n as brief as possible, t h e r e is a very l o w r a t e of sustained fire. T h e m o s t extensive d a t a on g a n g s h o o t - ings is W i l k i n s o n ' s (2003) study of violent offenders in black a n d H i s - p a n i c p o v e r t y areas i n N e w York, w h i c h asked t h e m t o describe v a r i o u s kinds of violent incidents they h a d been involved in. Of 1 5 1 incidents in w h i c h guns w e r e present, they were fired 71 percent of the time; w h e n they w e r e fired, s o m e o n e w a s injured 67 percent of t h e time (calculated from W i l k i n s o n 2 0 0 3 : 1 2 8 - 3 0 , 2 1 6 ) . W h e n s o m e o n e w a s hit, 3 6 percent of the time it w a s a b y s t a n d e r r a t h e r t h a n one of the principals, indicating a high level of friendly fire.2 3

C o m p a r i s o n of civilian a n d military violence casts light on a n o t h e r p o i n t . Tension/fear is o n e e x p l a n a t i o n for l o w firing r a t i o s a m o n g sol- diers, a n d for relatively i n c o m p e t e n t p e r f o r m a n c e in hitting e n e m y tar- gets. But o t h e r r e a s o n s m a y be involved: O n e is t h a t on the m o d e r n battle- field, soldiers are dispersed a n d t a k e cover, so t h a t the battlefield looks e m p t y ; 2 4 t h u s lack of visible targets m a y be responsible for s o m e of the non-firing or ineffective firing. But M a r s h a l l himself discounts this, by s h o w i n g non-firing also in situations of close c o m b a t ; a n d historically

Confrontational Tension • 73

t h e r e are similar p a t t e r n s i n p r e m o d e r n m a s s e d f i r i n g . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , in sustained w a r f a r e , soldiers are often deprived of sleep; they are physi- cally w o r n d o w n , by e x p o s u r e to t h e elements, sometimes by lack of food, sometimes by the noise a n d e m o t i o n a l b a t t e r i n g of e n e m y fire over a long p e r i o d o f t i m e (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 1 1 5 - 2 5 ; G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 6 7 - 7 3 ) . U n d e r these c o n d i t i o n s , soldiers m a y fall i n t o a dull, zombie-like state w h e r e they do n o t fire, or do n o t fire accurately. But civilians in violent situations t e n d to act similarly to soldiers—a l o w p r o p o r t i o n of active p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a considerable a m o u n t of ineffective violence—even t h o u g h their targets are clear, a n d they are n o t subject to p r o l o n g e d sleep-deprivation, physical stresses, or l o n g - t e r m debilitation. This suggests t h e tension/fear in the situation of violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself determines violent p e r f o r m a n c e , irrespective of the special difficulties of military c o m b a t .

No d o u b t t h e r e are a p r o p o r t i o n of civilians w h o are on t h e higher end of t h e c o n t i n u u m of fighting p e r f o r m a n c e : s o m e of t h e m are n o t afraid of violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; o t h e r s c h a n n e l t e n s i o n i n t o a n o n s l a u g h t ; s o m e enjoy t h e violence, a b o r t i v e or successful. Some are " c o w b o y c o p s " dis- p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y involved in s h o o t i n g or beating suspects; s o m e g u a r d s are sadistic as a m a t t e r of r o u t i n e ; s o m e children are bullies. But they are a m i n o r i t y of p e r s o n s a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y for a t h e o r y of situational action, a m i n o r i t y of s i t u a t i o n s . As in t h e case of soldiers r e p o r t i n g their feelings a b o u t c o m b a t , we need to be careful to distinguish to w h a t e x t e n t these r e p o r t s are general expressions of feelings a b o u t fights at v a r i o u s distances, a n d h o w m u c h of this t a l k is bluster, bragging, or covering up a c t u a l fighting p e r f o r m a n c e . In big-city black g h e t t o s , fighting is some- times r e g a r d e d a s " s h o w t i m e " (Anderson 1 9 9 9 ) , b u t this m a y b e m o r e t h e feelings of o n l o o k e r s of well-staged fights t h a n of t h e fighters t h e m - selves. Nevertheless, t h e r e are a m i n o r i t y of cases w h e r e effective violence does emerge; o u r p a t h w a y to u n d e r s t a n d i n g this is t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w some p o s i t i o n s i n situations enable s o m e individuals t o t a k e a d v a n - tage of t h e tension/fear a n d t r a n s f o r m it into violence against o t h e r s .

F E A R O F "WHAT?

W h a t k i n d of fear do m o s t p e o p l e h a v e in violent situations? M o s t obvi- ously, it w o u l d seem they are afraid of being killed or injured. Soldiers w h o see their fellows, or enemies, t o r n by shells, pieces of bodies b l o w n a p a r t , or the a g o n y of the w o u n d e d w i t h b l o o d y gashes or o r g a n s p r o t r u d - ing, are u n d e r s t a n d a b l y l o a t h e to h a v e this h a p p e n to themselves. This is c o n s o n a n t w i t h the p a t t e r n t h a t m o s t p e o p l e t r y t o stay a w a y from sources of physical danger: soldiers h a n g i n g back from t h e front line, rioters keep- ing a safe distance, gangs speeding a w a y from a drive-by. It also fits t h e

74 • C h a p t e r 2

p a t t e r n t h a t fighting is m o s t c h r o n i c a n d p r o l o n g e d w h e r e it is p r o t e c t e d , so t h a t injuries are slight: we will see in c h a p t e r 8 t h a t violence is m o s t c o m m o n in the kinds of athletics w h e r e players are m o s t heavily p a d d e d against injury. A n d t h e social category t h a t has the highest incidence of violence is a m o n g children, w h e r e the ability to injure is s l i g h t . 2 5

But this e x p l a n a t i o n e n c o u n t e r s several p a r a d o x e s . O n e is t h a t u n d e r some social circumstances, persons willingly u n d e r g o n o t only severe d a n - ger b u t actually w e l c o m e p a i n a n d injury. Initiation rites, w h i c h usually involve s o m e degree of discomfort a n d h u m i l i a t i o n , are sometimes very painful. N o r t h American tribal coming-of-age initiations for w a r r i o r s in- cluded n o t only painful ordeals b u t also b o d y slashings; captives w h o p e r f o r m e d well u n d e r t o r t u r e w e r e h o n o r e d a n d might b e a d o p t e d i n t o the t r i b e . Some gang initiations involve having to fight a bigger p e r s o n a n d receive a considerable beating (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 8 6 - 8 7 ) ; the J a p a n e s e Yakuza (organized crime) ritual involves t h e m u t i l a t i o n of cutting off a finger (Whiting 1 9 9 9 : 1 3 1 - 3 2 ) . Scars, black eyes, a n d b a n d a g e s c a n be m a r k s of pride for athletes in violent sports a n d for youthful males gener- ally. These ar e, to be sure, limited s i t u a t i o n s , w h e r e the violence is ex- pected to h a v e a clear t e r m i n a t i o n p o i n t , a n d in m a n y cases physical injury is n o t so severe as injuries in all-out fights. But t h e p a i n a n d injury m a y also be quite severe in ritualized s i t u a t i o n s , as in r i t u a l suicide such as J a p a n e s e seppuku.

U n d e r g o i n g p a i n a n d injury can be successfully ritualized w h e n they occur at t h e focus of social a t t e n t i o n t h a t conveys a s t r o n g sense of m e m - bership in an exclusive g r o u p . It becomes w h a t D u r k h e i m ( 1 9 1 2 / 1 9 6 4 ) called the negative cult: voluntarily to u n d e r t a k e p a i n t h a t m o s t o r d i n a r y p e r s o n s s h u n p u t s o n e in an elite g r o u p . But the key to this ritual status is u n d e r g o i n g suffering, n o t inflicting it on o t h e r s . T h u s a large p r o p o r t i o n of soldiers in c o m b a t risk p a i n , m u t i l a t i o n , or d e a t h , even t h o u g h m a n y of t h e m do little else while they are in t h e c o m b a t z o n e t h a n just be t h e r e ; it is easier to p u t up w i t h injury a n d d e a t h t h a n it is to inflict it. It is often said t h a t fear of dishonor, fear of letting t h e g r o u p d o w n , overcomes fear of injury in fighting. But this kind of social fear seems to be stronger in o v e r c o m i n g fear of injury a n d d e a t h , t h a n in o v e r c o m i n g t h e t e n s i o n t h a t gets in the w a y of p e r f o r m i n g effectively in c o m b a t . Fear of injury a n d d e a t h t e n d to be biggest at the outset, indeed before first going i n t o battle (Shalit 1 9 8 8 ) ; once soldiers have g o t t e n used to seeing dead or m u t i l a t e d bodies, they become s o m e w h a t inured to t h e m ; a l t h o u g h , as we h a v e seen, their f i g h t i n g p e r f o r m a n c e does n o t i m p r o v e very m u c h , indicating t h a t the larger tension is still t h e r e .

A related p r o b l e m is t h a t the circumstances t h a t cause the m o s t fear are n o t necessarily t h o s e t h a t are objectively the m o s t d a n g e r o u s . Artillery shells a n d m o r t a r s , as we h a v e seen, cause by far the m o s t casualties—and

Confrontational Tension • 75

the soldiers themselves generally k n o w t h a t (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 2 0 9 - 1 0 ) — b u t the greatest difficulty in c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e is in confronting small-arms fire at the f o r w a r d edge of t h e c o m b a t zone. Some surveys s h o w relatively high fear of being killed by b a y o n e t a n d knife, events r a r e to the p o i n t of fantasy b u t indicating t h e quality of soldiers' imagery a b o u t w h a t they feel is in front of t h e m . N o r do p e r s o n s in highly d a n g e r o u s situations all s h o w the signs of incapacitating fear t h a t affects frontline t r o o p s (Gross- m a n 1 9 9 5 : 5 5 - 6 4 ) : n a v y p e r s o n n e l are subject t o the same d an g ers a s a r m y soldiers of being b l o w n a p a r t by enemy shells—the largest source of g r o u n d c o m b a t casualties—in a d d i t i o n to p r o s p e c t s of d r o w n i n g , b u t d a t a on long-term b r e a k d o w n from c o m b a t stress—which is one m e a s u r e of c o m b a t fear—shows m u c h lower rates of b r e a k d o w n for sailors in c o m b a t zones. Similarly for civilians u n d e r b o m b a r d m e n t , including long- t e r m blitzes such as t h e G e r m a n a t t a c k on E n g l a n d , or the Allied b o m b - ings of G e r m a n cities; casualties included being b u r n e d alive or sustaining e x t r e m e bodily m u t i l a t i o n s resulting from b u r n s . Nevertheless, civilian psychiatric casualties w e r e l o w i n these areas c o m p a r e d t o a r m y t r o o p s .

Several refined c o m p a r i s o n s are revealing of the precise source of ten- sion/fear. Prisoners of w a r u n d e r fire or aerial b o m b a r d m e n t h a d no in- crease in psychiatric casualties; w h e r e a s their g u a r d s a p p a r e n t l y under- w e n t increased tension, since their psychiatric rates w e n t up ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 5 7 - 5 8 ; Gabriel 1 9 8 6 , 1 9 8 7 ) . T h a t is to say, the g u a r d s w e r e still in a c o m b a t m o d e , p e r h a p s because they w e r e confronted w i t h enemies u n d e r their o w n eyes, a t the same time they w e r e struggling t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l over t h e m ; w h e r e a s the stance of the P O W s w a s merely to e n d u r e . G r o s s m a n ( 1 9 9 5 : 6 0 - 6 1 ) also p o i n t s o u t t h a t reconnaissance p a t r o l s be- hind enemy lines, a l t h o u g h extremely d a n g e r o u s , do n o t lead to psychiat- ric casualties. T h e r e a s o n , G r o s s m a n argues, is t h a t such p a t r o l s are at- t e m p t i n g to g a t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n by stealth a n d , a b o v e all, to avoid a t t a c k i n g the enemy. A n d c o m b a t officers, a l t h o u g h in m o s t w a r s they have h a d physical casualty rates considerably higher t h a n their m e n , have h a d a m u c h lower r a t e of psychiatric casualties ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 6 4 ) . H e r e we see t h a t the source of strain is neither fear of d e a t h a n d injury, n o r aversion to killing in principle, since officers are in charge of directing their m e n t o w a r d killing, a n d indeed pressing t h e m to overcome their fear a n d i n c o m p e t e n c e . W h a t is different, a n d w h a t seems to buffer t h e m from tension/fear, i s t h a t they personally d o n o t h a v e t o d o t h e killing. T h e same goes for non-firers, w h o often p e r f o r m o t h e r useful t a s k s on the battlefield, such as helping l o a d a m m u n i t i o n i n t o the firers' guns (Gross- m a n 1 9 9 5 : 15). This s h o w s they are often willing to expose themselves to as m u c h danger as t h e firers. It isn't even t h a t they are o p p o s e d to killing; they just c a n ' t bring themselves to do it themselves.

76 • C h a p t e r 2

M e d i c s in g r o u n d c o m b a t are subject to the same sorts of d an g ers as infantry t r o o p s ; yet their r a t e of c o m b a t fatigue is m u c h lower ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 6 2 - 6 4 , 3 3 5 ) . Their p e a k p e r f o r m a n c e s are a p p a r e n t l y m o r e c o m - m o n : medics received a high a n d increasing p r o p o r t i o n of m e d a l s of h o n o r in t h e A m e r i c a n w a r s of t h e t w e n t i e t h century, evidence of their high level of bravery (Miller 2 0 0 0 : 1 2 1 - 2 4 ) . A n d their level of r o u t i n e p e r f o r m a n c e in c o m b a t is higher; we do n o t h e a r of n o n - p e r f o r m a n c e a m o n g medics c o m p a r a b l e t o non-firing r a t e s , a l t h o u g h soldiers o n t h e battlefield m i g h t be expected to c o m p l a i n if medics shirked in helping the w o u n d e d . Yet medics are those w h o m o s t consistently witness the painful a n d m u t i l a t i n g effects of enemy fire. This indicates t h a t they h a v e a social m e c h a n i s m for distancing themselves from fear of bodily injury, a n d even m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , from the m o r e basic source of tension/fear in c o m b a t . Their focus is n o t on c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e enemy; n o t on killing, b u t on life-saving. T h e y reverse the n o r m a l gestalt for viewing injuries, seeing t h e m in a different frame: this is w h a t sends t h e m i n t o a c t i o n . 2 6

Yet a n o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t fear of injury is n o t t h e only source of fight tension is t h e fact t h a t t h e r e are indications of fear even a m o n g t h o s e w h o h a v e the u p p e r h a n d , w h o are in little or no danger of being injured. Interviews w i t h g u n m e n , a n d w i t h their victims, indicate t h a t t h e stickup situation is o n e of high t e n s i o n ; t h e " s t r e e t - w i s e " p e r s o n in high-crime areas k n o w s t h a t to survive a stickup one sh o u ld avoid m a k i n g t h e g u n - m a n s n a p over the edge from tension to s h o o t i n g . Especially significant is to avoid l o o k i n g the g u n m a n in the eye—not merely in the sense of identi- fying h i m , b u t to avoid the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l stare t h a t gives a sense of hostile challenge (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 1 2 7 ) . 2 7 T h u s even in n o n - s t i c k u p situa- tions in the violent street z o n e , a challenging eye-to-eye c o n f r o n t a t i o n m a y well p r o v o k e a fight.

This suggests t h a t the t e n s i o n of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself is t h e m o s t central feature. G r o s s m a n (1995) argues t h a t it is fear of killing. In an earlier i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the military evidence, M a r s h a l l suggested t h a t the s t a n d a r d s of civilized behavior, deeply engrained by civilian experience, create a blockage against trying to kill p e o p l e , even if they are enemies w h o are trying to kill oneself. But this cultural-inhibition m o d e l does n o t a d e q u a t e l y explain the r a n g e of c u l t u r a l settings in w h i c h tension/fear inhibits fighting p e r f o r m a n c e . Tribal w a r f a r e also s h o w s a l o w level of effectiveness a n d high degree of fear b e h a v i o r on the front line; the perfor- m a n c e of c o m b a t t r o o p s is similar across all p e r i o d s of history, including societies w h o s e cultures endorse e x t r e m e ferociousness t o w a r d enemies. A n d w i t h i n the same societies a n d a r m i e s , the degree to w h i c h fear inhibits violent b e h a v i o r is highly situational: those w h o w i t h h o l d using their w e a p o n s , or use t h e m badly in pitched c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , can be q u i t e fero- cious in situations of massacring enemies in a m b u s h e s or captives in a

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l Tension • 77

besieged city. Tcnsion/fcar seems universal across cultures, b o t h those t h a t claim to be ferocious and those t h a t claim to be peaceful; a n d so are cir- cumstances w h e r e tension/fear is overcome to generate violence. And even in m o d e r n Western cultures, where cultural socialization against violence exists, o n e may participate as audience in witnessing a n d e n c o u r a g i n g considerable ferocity and h a r m (as we shall sec in detail in c h a p t e r 6). T h e same p e r s o n s w h o are enthusiastic a b o u t violence as m e m b e r s of an audience s h o w very s t r o n g limits w h e n in a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , face to face, with o n e ' s a n t a g o n i s t .

Is it, t h e n , a p r i m o r d i a l dislike of killing? On this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h u m a n beings are genetically h a r d - w i r e d w i t h an a n t i p a t h y to killing each other. This inhibition is n o t so s t r o n g t h a t it c a n n o t be o v e r c o m e by o t h e r s t r o n g social forces; but when this h a p p e n s , h u m a n s feel badly and express m a n i - festations of their discomfort in physical a n d psychological s y m p t o m s . G r o s s m a n (1995) argues t h a t soldiers w h o have been conditioned to kill pay the price subjectively in p o s t - c o m b a t stress a n d b r e a k d o w n .

But this line of a r g u m e n t goes t o o far. After all, h u m a n s do kill a n d injure each other, in various kinds of situations t h a t we can specify. And these social a r r a n g e m e n t s often justify the killing to those w h o take p a r t , so t h a t they feel no neurotic consequences. Later chapters will present some of these structures in which killing a n d injuring o t h e r s is morally neutralized or even morally favorable. In the Dead Birds film, we witness a celebration after an enemy has been killed; the feelings expressed are n o t guilt b u t joy a n d e n t h u s i a s m .

T h e r e is a confrontational tension t h a t arises in all situations of p o t e n - tial violence. It is n o t merely fear of killing, since we see it in instances w h e r e the attackers intend only to beat s o m e o n e u p , or, indeed, w h e r e they are only t h r e a t e n i n g to engage in angry a r g u m e n t . T h r e a t e n i n g to kill s o m e o n e , or confronting s o m e o n e w h o t h r e a t e n s to kill or severely injure oneself, is only a p a r t of this larger c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension. T h e ability of h u m a n beings to carry o u t violence against a n o t h e r person de- pends n o t only on the social pressure and s u p p o r t in the b a c k g r o u n d t h a t pushes t h e m into this situation, a n d t h a t will r e w a r d them after they have gotten t h r o u g h the s i t u a t i o n , but also on the social characteristics of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself. G r o s s m a n ( 1 9 9 5 : 9 7 - 1 10) s h o w s t h a t the degree of willingness to fire at an enemy depends on the physical distance from t h a t person. O p e r a t o r s of b o m b e r s , long-distance ballistic missiles, a n d artillery achieve the highest rates of fire, a n d have the highest willingness to kill the enemy; for t h e m , the target is m o s t depersonalized, even t h o u g h they m a y well have an explicit cognition of the h u m a n casualties they are causing. This is similar to the higher degree of rhetorical ferociousness found in the rear c o m b a t areas a n d at h o m e , c o m p a r e d to soldiers at the front. 1 w o u l d interpret this to mean t h a t tension is inhibiting their conflict

78 • C h a p t e r 2

b e h a v i o r so little, n o t because they are u n a w a r e of their h u m a n t a r g e t s , b u t because they are n o t in a bodily face-to-face situation w i t h t h e m .

Difficulty in carrying o u t violent actions increases as the social situation becomes m o r e closely focused. Firing guns or o t h e r missiles at a distance of h u n d r e d s of y a r d s is easier t h a n firing close-range. W h e n the latter does h a p p e n , the shots often go wild; we see graphic evidence of this in police s h o o t i n g s , w h e r e officers often miss at ten feet or less, even t h o u g h they are a c c u r a t e shooters o n target ranges a t m a n y times t h a t distance (Klinger 2 0 0 4 ; A r t w o h l a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 ) . Still closer is killing w i t h edged w e a p o n s : spears, s w o r d s , b a y o n e t s , knives—or w i t h clubs o r other blunt i n s t r u m e n t s . I n ancient a n d medieval w a r f a r e , t h e r e a p p e a r s t o have been a high degree of i n c o m p e t e n c e in the use of these w e a p o n s , judging from battlefield casualty r a t i o s : m o s t such killing o c c u r r e d in a f o r w a r d p a n i c , w h i c h , as we shall e x a m i n e shortly, occurs w h e n the t e n s i o n is t a k e n off. M o s t use of s w o r d s a n d knives has been by slashing, even t h o u g h a f o r w a r d t h r u s t directly i n t o the enemy's b o d y p r o d u c e s a m u c h deadlier w o u n d ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 1 1 0 - 3 2 ) . M o d e r n evidence i s m o r e de- tailed: b a y o n e t killing is extremely r a r e , m a k i n g up well b e l o w 1 percent of w o u n d s inflicted at W a t e r l o o a n d the S o m m e (Keegan 1 9 7 7 : 2 6 8 - 6 9 ) . In t r e n c h w a r f a r e (mainly in W o r l d W a r I), t r o o p s successfully s t o r m i n g a t r e n c h preferred to t h r o w in g r e n a d e s , w h i c h k e p t t h e m at a s o m e w h a t greater distance a n d o u t of sight of the m e n they were killing; t r o o p s w i t h fixed b a y o n e t s t e n d e d to reverse their rifles a n d use t h e m as clubs; some t r o o p s (notably the G e r m a n s ) preferred to use their t r e n c h shovels as clubs (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 7 9 ) . T h e r e a p p e a r s to be a special difficulty in confront- ing a n o t h e r p e r s o n face to face a n d sticking h i m w i t h a knife-edged b l a d e . W h e n knife a t t a c k s are used, as in c o m m a n d o w a r f a r e , by far the p r e - ferred m e t h o d of killing is from b e h i n d , as if to avoid seeing the eyes of the m a n being killed ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 129). T h i s is also t h e case w i t h r e c o r d e d knife a t t a c k s in historical d a t a ; in early m o d e r n A m s t e r d a m , m o s t knife a t t a c k s were from the r e a r or the side, rarely directly h e a d on (Spierenburg 1 9 9 4 ) . This fits as well the p r o c e d u r e s of executions; the executioner, w h e t h e r ceremonially b e h e a d i n g a c o n d e m n e d p e r s o n w i t h an axe or s w o r d , or a g a n g l a n d or terroristic police agent s h o o t i n g a vic- tim in the back of the h e a d , virtually always s t a n d s behind the victim, avoiding face-to-face c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Similarly, k i d n a p victims are m o r e likely to be executed if they are h o o d e d ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 1 2 8 ) . This is the i n t e r a c t i o n a l significance of blindfolding the p e r s o n s t a n d i n g before a firing s q u a d , as m u c h for the benefit of t h e firers as of the victim.

T h e special difficulties of killing victims face to face comes o u t g r a p h i - cally in evidence on G e r m a n military police w h o performed mass s h o o t - ings in the H o l o c a u s t (Browning 1992). Their victims were a l m o s t entirely helpless a n d passive, a n d the soldiers generally accepted the ideological

Confrontational Tension • 79

a t m o s p h e r e of N a z i anti-Semitism a n d w a r p r o p a g a n d a , as well as u p - h o l d i n g military solidarity w i t h i n their o w n r a n k s . Nevertheless the great majority f o u n d these killings to be revolting, a n d even after considerable acclimation, highly depressing. Psychological revulsion to killing w a s es- pecially s t r o n g w h e n soldiers h a d close c o n t a c t w i t h their victims, m o s t of w h o m t h e y s h o t p o i n t - b l a n k in t h e b a c k of the h e a d while m a d e to lie p r o n e o n the g r o u n d . Even a t this r a n g e , soldiers frequently missed ( 6 2 - 6 5 ) . A r e m a r k a b l e instance of bodily revulsion to o v e r w h e l m i n g ideology is a c o m m i t t e d N a z i officer w h o developed a p s y c h o s o m a t i c illness (stom- ach colitis) t h a t prevented h i m from a c c o m p a n y i n g his t r o o p s in p e r s o n on their killing missions (pp. 1 1 4 - 2 0 ) . He recovered from his illness w h e n h e w a s transferred t o regular frontline duty, w h e r e s h o o t i n g w a s d o n e a t a distance, a n d he distinguished himself in a c t i o n .

Disfunctioning b o w e l s are found in situations of high tension a n d fear, occurring in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s r a n g i n g from soldiers w h o shit their p a n t s in c o m b a t , t o burglars w h o give a w a y their presence t o the police b y t h e smell they l e a v e . 2 8 T h u s the expressions "intestinal f o r t i t u d e " a n d having the " g u t s " o r t h e " s t o m a c h " for fighting are n o t merely m e t a p h o r i c a l , b u t also p o i n t to a deep bodily revulsion from violence t h a t m u s t be overcome by t h o s e w h o are successful at it.

Antagonistic c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself, as distinct from violence, has its o w n tension. People t e n d to avoid c o n f r o n t a t i o n even in merely verbal conflict: p e o p l e are m u c h m o r e likely t o express negative a n d hostile s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t p e r s o n s w h o are n o t immediately present, t h a n t o express such s t a t e m e n t s t o p e r s o n s w h o are i n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e m . C o n v e r s a t i o n analysis of t a p e - r e c o r d e d t a l k in n a t u r a l settings s h o w s a s t r o n g p r o p e n - sity to a g r e e m e n t (Boden, 1 9 9 0 ; H e r i t a g e 1 9 8 4 ) . 2 9 H e n c e conflict is ex- pressed largely at a distance, t o w a r d p e r s o n s w h o are absent. H e n c e w h e n conflict h a s t o c o m e d o w n t o t h e i m m e d i a t e m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n , t h e r e are great difficulties in carrying o u t conflict, a n d especially violence.

C o m p a r e w h a t w e k n o w a b o u t h u m a n interaction from the o t h e r side, n o r m a l interaction r a t h e r t h a n violence. T h e basic t e n d e n c y is for p e r s o n s to b e c o m e c a u g h t up in a m u t u a l focus of a t t e n t i o n , a n d to b e c o m e en- t r a i n e d in each o t h e r ' s bodily r h y t h m s a n d e m o t i o n a l t o n e s (evidence for this p a t t e r n is s u m m a r i z e d in Collins 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e s e processes are u n c o n - scious a n d a u t o m a t i c . T h e y are also highly attractive; the m o s t pleasur- able kinds of h u m a n activity are w h e r e p e r s o n s b e c o m e c a u g h t in a p r o - n o u n c e d m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l r h y t h m : a s m o o t h l y flowing c o n v e r s a t i o n to the b e a t of a c o m m o n i n t o n a t i o n a l p u n c t u a t i o n ; s h a r e d laughter; c r o w d e n t h u s i a s m ; m u t u a l sexual a r o u s a l . O r d i n a r i l y these processes c o n s t i t u t e an i n t e r a c t i o n r i t u a l bringing feelings of intersubjectivity a n d m o r a l soli- darity, at least for the present m o m e n t . Face-to-face conflict is difficult a b o v e all because it violates this s h a r e d consciousness a n d bodily-emo-

80 • Chapter 2

t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t . Violent i n t e r a c t i o n is all the m o r e difficult because w i n n i n g a fight d e p e n d s on upsetting t h e e n e m y ' s r h y t h m s , b reak in g t h r o u g h his m o d e o f e n t r a i n m e n t a n d i m p o s i n g o n e ' s o w n action.

T h e r e is a p a l p a b l e b a r r i e r to getting into a violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n . It goes against o n e ' s physiological h a r d - w i r i n g , the h u m a n p r o p e n s i t y t o become c a u g h t up in the m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l rituals of solidarity. O n e needs to cut o u t all o n e ' s sensitivity to cues of h u m a n - t o - h u m a n ritual solidarity, to c o n c e n t r a t e instead on t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the o t h e r ' s w e a k - nesses. Soldiers a p p r o a c h i n g the c o m b a t z o n e are m o v i n g i n t o a region w h e r e they feel, in their o w n bodies, the sense t h a t t h e e n e m y is nearer, t h a t they will get close to this kind of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Up to t h a t p o i n t , they are interacting a l m o s t exclusively w i t h each other, w i t h friends or n o r m a l i n t e r a c t a n t s , a n d the c o n t e n t of w h a t they say to each other, a n d w h a t feelings t h a t they h a v e a n d express, can c o n t a i n a great deal of nega- tives a b o u t t h e e n e m y — w h o , after all, is n o t here. T h e m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l reality of the h o m e front or the rear staging areas is all us, even as its talk refers to the enemy as a symbolic object defining t h e o u t e r b o u n d a r i e s of t h e g r o u p . C o m i n g n e a r e r t h e front, one's a t t e n t i o n shifts m o r e a n d m o r e to t h e enemy as a real social presence. As this h a p p e n s , t h e r e is increasing difficulty in firing, even in orienting oneself to t h e enemy by o n e ' s o w n physical p o s t u r e . We see this in t h e soldiers of W o r l d W a r I going "over the t o p " i n t o n o - m a n ' s land: all p h o t o s s h o w t h e m leaning f o r w a r d , as if into a stiff w i n d ; this is n o t a physical w i n d , b u t t h e gradient of a p - p r o a c h i n g the enemy steadily from a distance. T h e c o u r a g e of W o r l d W a r I soldiers w a s n o t so m u c h in firing w e a p o n s , b u t in going f o r w a r d against heavy fire. It w a s n o t so m u c h c o u r a g e to kill, as c o u r a g e to be killed.

We h a v e seen t h a t officers generally s h o w less fear in c o m b a t t h a n t h e m e n t h e y c o m m a n d . O n t h e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l level, officers d o n o t e x p e r i e n c e n e a r l y s o m u c h c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t . Officers focus their a t t e n t i o n — a n d their e y e s — o n i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h their o w n m e n , t r y - ing to k e e p up a positive flow of c o o r d i n a t e d e n t r a i n m e n t on their o w n side; t h e y are n o t focused o n t h e e n e m y p e r se, w h e r e a s t h e m e n a c t u a l l y a t t e m p t i n g t o use their w e a p o n s b e a r t h e b r u n t o f t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n .

T h i s is w h y eyes are so i m p o r t a n t in violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Soldiers paralyzed in t e r r o r avert their eyes, just as they m a k e childish-magical gestures to avoid being seen. Battle victors h a t e to see t h e eyes of the enemy they are killing. In o r d i n a r y life, staring contests are h a r d to m a i n - tain m o r e t h a n a few seconds, a n d often m o r e t h a n fragments of seconds ( M a z u r et al. 1 9 8 0 ) . Eye-to-eye c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , h o w e v e r t r u n c a t e d , be- t w e e n h o l d u p m a n a n d victim, a p p e a r t o b e u n b e a r a b l e for the g u n m a n t o sustain.

Pushing f o r w a r d to this barrier, invisible b u t p a l p a b l y a n d bodily felt, some m i n o r i t y of c o m b a t a n t s (on a m i n o r i t y of occasions) go t h r o u g h the

Confrontational Tension • 81

barrier. Often it h a p p e n s w i t h a s u d d e n rush, as if p u s h i n g t h r o u g h a glass w a l l , t h e n falling wildly o n t o t h e o t h e r side: the o t h e r side w h e r e t h e r e is f o r w a r d p a n i c , a n d all the t e n s i o n n o w goes into a t t a c k . For some fighters, the b a r r i e r becomes l o w e r e d in a m o r e p e r m a n e n t w a y or at least for an e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of time; they are in the subjective fighting z o n e , w h e r e they do the firing, t a k e the initiative, sometimes even fire well. These are the violent elite. We will e x a m i n e t h e m in m o r e detail in c h a p t e r 8; b u t we can say t h a t they t o o are s h a p e d by the barrier of tension/fear t h a t is the e m o t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a c o m b a t s i t u a t i o n , quite literally e m o t i o n s as s p r e a d o u t over a region in space. Some, t h e cold or cool ones, are t h o s e w h o perceive t h e tension/fear of o t h e r p e r s o n s from a detached distance; their success comes from their d e t a c h e d relationship to the tension/fear. O t h e r s , the h o t a n d frenzied ones, are b a t t e n i n g on the fear in the o t h e r s , less consciously b u t by a kind of asymmetrical e n t r a i n m e n t , fear on o n e side d r a w i n g o u t frenzied a t t a c k on the other.

T h e battlefield is often described as the "fog of c o m b a t . " This pervasive confusion, h a s t e , a n d difficulty in c o o r d i n a t i o n operates on m a n y levels: o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , c o m m u n i c a t i v e , logistical, a n d literally visual. I have ar- gued t h a t its biggest c o m p o n e n t is the tension of b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h n o r m a l i n t e r a c t i o n a l solidarity. It also involves o t h e r c o m p o n e n t fears: fear of killing other people as well as fear of injury a n d m u t i l a t i o n a n d d e a t h to oneself. These fears c o n c a t e n a t e i n t o a larger feeling of tension. O n e or a n o t h e r of these specific fears can be calmed or r e d u c e d to a level w h e r e it has m o d e r a t e or slight effects on p e r f o r m a n c e ; this is especially the case w i t h fear of o n e ' s o w n injury or d e a t h , w h i c h seems to be the easiest fear to o v e r c o m e , w i t h the help of social s u p p o r t or u n d e r social p r e s s u r e . Fear of killing others also can be o v e r c o m e , especially by t r a n s f o r m i n g the collective t e n s i o n of c o m b a t i n t o m o m e n t s of e n t r a i n m e n t in aggression. T h a t is w h y I h o l d t h a t the deepest e m o t i o n is the t e n s i o n of conflict itself, w h i c h shapes t h e behavior of fighters even at the m o m e n t s w h e n they o v e r c o m e the aspect of fear t h a t impels t h e m to s h r i n k back or r u n away.

T h e fog of c o m b a t is an e m o t i o n a l fog. Sometimes it is dull, sleepy, trance-like; s o m e soldiers describe c o m b a t as like m o v i n g in a d r e a m . Some feel it as t i m e slowed d o w n , or time speeded u p , in either case as a d i s r u p t i o n of the o r d i n a r y r h y t h m s of social life (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 1 5 6 - 5 7 ; B o u r k e 1 9 9 9 : 2 0 8 - 9 ; similar p a t t e r n s from police shootings are r e p o r t e d i n Klinger 2 0 0 4 ; A r t w o h l a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 ) . A n d since o u r e m o t i o n s a n d t h o u g h t s are s h a p e d from t h e outside i n b y o n g o i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s , t o be in t h e c o m b a t zone w h e r e o r d i n a r y processes of e n t r a i n m e n t a n d m u - t u a l focus of a t t e n t i o n are severely d i s r u p t e d , is necessarily to experience a different r h y t h m a n d t o n e , for t h e m o s t p a r t a d i s r u p t e d r h y t h m . Some- times the e m o t i o n a l fog is so thick t h a t it reaches e m o t i o n a l c h a o s or paralysis; sometimes it is merely a light mist, w i t h i n w h i c h c o m b a t a n t s m o v e w i t h some degree of effectiveness.

82 • C h a p t e r 2

T h e fog of c o m b a t is a m e t a p h o r for confrontational tension. T h a t ten- sion encompasses the various kinds of fear, which have real objects t h a t the fighters can pay attention t o : the safety of their o w n bodies; the enemy w h o m one d o e s n ' t w a n t to see, or d o e s n ' t w a n t to see killed; sometimes we can a d d fear of ridicule, fear of being punished by one's o w n officers, fear of letting one's side d o w n , fear of being labeled a c o w a r d ; a n d a m o n g officers, fear of m a k i n g mistakes t h a t will cost the lives of one's m e n . In non-military fighting, the list of fears is generally shorter. But all kinds of violent confrontations have the same basic tension; a n d persons in those situations react in m u c h the same range of way s to those tensions, a n d are shaped by those tensions. T h e fundamental tension is n o t fear of an exter- nal object; it is a struggle of opposing action tendencies within oneself.

T h e basic t e n s i o n can be called n o n - s o l i d a r i t y e n t r a i n m e n t . It c o m e s from trying t o act agai ns t a n o t h e r p e r s o n , a n d t h u s ag ain st o n e ' s o w n p r o p e n s i t i e s to fall into solidarity w i t h t h a t p e r s o n , to get i n t o a c o m m o n r h y t h m a n d c o m m o n cognitive universe. It is all the h a r d e r because the violent s i t u a t i o n h a s its o w n e n t r a i n m e n t a n d focus: t h e r e is focus on the fighting itself, on t h e s i t u a t i o n as a violent o n e , a n d s o m e t i m e s an e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t in w h i c h t h e hostility, anger, a n d e x c i t e m e n t of each side gets t h e o t h e r m o r e a n g r y a n d excited. But these elements of s h a r e d consciousness a n d e n t r a i n m e n t m a k e it all t h e h a r d e r to act in t h a t s i t u a t i o n in a w a y t h a t each c a n effectively c a r r y o u t violence; a n t a g - onists have g o n e s o m e w a y t o w a r d being c a u g h t u p i n collective solidar- ity, a D u r k h e i m i a n collective effervescence, b u t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h a v e to radically shift d i r e c t i o n , so t h a t e a c h is the o t h e r ' s cognitive alien, a n d each tries to i m p o s e a r h y t h m of d o m i n a n c e a n d an e m o t i o n of fear on t h e other.

This is the t e n s i o n of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l zone. M u c h of the t i m e the tension is t o o s t r o n g : individuals c a n n o t a p p r o a c h the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l z o n e closely, being c o n t e n t to fling w o r d s or sometimes missiles from a distance; or they a p p r o a c h it only briefly a n d t h e n are driven a w a y from it by their o w n bodies, e m o t i o n s , a n d n e r v o u s systems. If fighters are orga- nized or forced so as to r e m a i n in t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l z o n e , t h e y are for the m o s t p a r t n o t very effective; a n d staying t h e r e t a k e s its toll on t h e m in the form of c o m b a t fatigue or b r e a k d o w n .

T h e r e is a n o t h e r w a y in w h i c h t h e t e n s i o n is resolved. Kept long e n o u g h in a s i t u a t i o n of high tension, t o r q u e d up bodily a n d emotionally, h u m a n s in conflict sometimes h a v e an o p p o r t u n i t y for falling o u t of the tension z o n e , n o t away from the enemy but t o w a r d him or her. This is the situa- tion of forwar d panic, the most d a n g e r o u s of all social s i t u a t i o n s .

C H A P T E R 3

F o r w a r d Panic

IN A P R I L 1 9 9 6 , t w o s o u t h e r n California d e p u t y sheriffs chased a p i c k u p t r u c k c r o w d e d w i t h M e x i c a n illegal i m m i g r a n t s . T h e t r u c k h a d driven a r o u n d a c h e c k p o i n t n o r t h of the border, refusing to stop t h e n or later as the p a t r o l car followed it at speeds over 100 miles per hour. D u r i n g the chase, weaving t h r o u g h freeway traffic, o c c u p a n t s of the t r u c k t h r e w de- bris a t t h e police car a n d a t t e m p t e d t o r a m other cars t o divert their p u r s u - ers' a t t e n t i o n . After a l m o s t an h o u r a n d having gone eighty miles, t h e truck drove off the side of the r o a d , a n d most of its t w e n t y - o n e o c c u p a n t s climbed o u t a n d ran into a plant nursery. T h e deputies c a u g h t up with only t w o , a w o m a n w h o h a d t r o u b l e getting the front d o o r of the truck c a b o p e n a n d a m a n w h o stayed to help her; these the furious officers beat with their nightsticks. O n e deputy clubbed the m a n on the back a n d shoulders six times, c o n t i n u i n g while he fell to the g r o u n d . As the w o m a n emerged from the c a b , the d e p u t y hit her twice on the back a n d pulled her to the g r o u n d by her hair, as the o t h e r deputy hit her once with his b a t o n . T h e beating lasted a b o u t fifteen seconds (Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1996). A television news helicopter h a d been following the last p a r t of t h e chase, a n d its c a m e r a s taped the beating. W h e n these tapes were s h o w n on the air, there w a s a public outcry; the officers were b r o u g h t to trial, a federal investigation w a s launched into the racial aspect of the incident, a n d the t w e n t y - o n e illegal aliens, including the driver, w e r e of- fered amnesty and admission into the United States.

The incident has the c h a r a c t e r of a f or w ar d panic. This is likely the most frequent kind of police atrocity, a n d p e r h a p s of police violence gen- erally. T h e basic s t r u c t u r e of this kind of i n t e r a c t i o n — a n o n r u s h i n g flow of events in t i m e — c a n be found very widely in civilian a n d military life. M a r i n e Lt. Philip C a p u t o gives a military e x a m p l e from the Vietnam w a r :

A helicopter assault on a hot landing zone creates e m o t i o n a l pressures far m o r e intense t h a n a c o n v e n t i o n a l g r o u n d assault. It is the enclosed space, the noise, the speed, a n d , a b o v e all, the sense of t o t a l help- lessness. T h e r e is a certain excitement to it the first t i m e , b u t after t h a t it is one of the m o r e u n p l e a s a n t experiences offered by m o d e r n war. On the g r o u n d , an i n f a n t r y m a n has some c o n t r o l over his destiny, or at least the illusion of it. In a helicopter u n d e r fire, he h a s n ' t even the illusion. C o n f r o n t e d by the indifferent forces of gravity, ballistics, a n d machinery, he is himself pulled in several directions at once by the range

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Figure 3.1 A,B After 100 mph chase, a patrolman catches and beats the last of a truckload of illegal immigrants, who is too weak to escape (California, April 1996). AP/World Wide Photos.

of e x t r e m e , conflicting e m o t i o n s . C l a u s t r o p h o b i a plagues h i m in the small space: t h e sense of being t r a p p e d a n d powerless in a m a c h i n e is u n b e a r a b l e , a n d yet he has to bear it. Bearing it, he begins to feel a

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blind fury t o w a r d t h e forces t h a t h a v e m a d e h i m p o w e r l e s s , b u t he has to c o n t r o l his fury until he is o u t of the helicopter a n d on the g r o u n d again. He yearns to be on the g r o u n d , b u t the desire is c o u n t e r e d by the danger he k n o w s is t h e r e . Yet, he is also a t t r a c t e d by the danger, for he k n o w s he can o v e r c o m e his fear only by facing it. His blind rage t h e n begins to focus on the m e n w h o are the source of the d a n g e r — a n d of his fear. It c o n c e n t r a t e s inside h i m , a n d t h r o u g h s o m e chemistry is t r a n s f o r m e d into a fierce resolve to fight until the danger ceases to exist. But this resolve, w h i c h is sometimes called c o u r a g e , c a n n o t be sepa- r a t e d from the fear t h a t has a r o u s e d it. Its very m e a s u r e is the m e a s u r e of t h a t fear. It is, in fact, a powerful urge n o t to be afraid a n y m o r e , to rid himself of fear by eliminating the source of it. T h i s inner, e m o t i o n a l w a r p r o d u c e s a tension a l m o s t sexual in its intensity. It is t o o painful to e n d u r e for long. All a soldier c a n t h i n k a b o u t is t h e m o m e n t w h e n he can escape his i m p o t e n t confinement a n d release this tension. All other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the rights a n d w r o n g s of w h a t he is d o i n g , the chances for victory or defeat in t h e battle, the battle's p u r p o s e or lack of it, become so a b s u r d as to be less t h a n irrelevant. N o t h i n g m a t t e r s except the final, critical i n s t a n t w h e n he leaps o u t i n t o the violent ca- tharsis h e b o t h seeks a n d d r e a d s . ( C a p u t o , 1 9 7 7 : 2 7 7 - 7 8 )

A f o r w a r d p a n i c starts w i t h tension a n d fear in a conflict situation. This is the n o r m a l c o n d i t i o n of violent conflict, b u t here t h e t e n s i o n is p r o - longed a n d built u p ; it has a d r a m a t i c s h a p e of increasing tension, striving t o w a r d a c l i m a x . T h e police car aims to c a t c h up w i t h t h e speeding truck; the helicopter m a n e u v e r s t h r o u g h the fire z o n e to the landing. T h e r e is a shift from relatively passive—waiting, holding back until one is in a posi- tion to bring the conflict to a h e a d — t o be fully active. When the o p p o r t u - nity finally arrives, the tension/fear comes o u t in an e m o t i o n a l r u s h . Ar- d a n t du Picq, observing the p a t t e r n repeatedly in military battles, called it "flight to the f r o n t " ( 1 9 0 3 / 1 9 9 9 : 8 8 - 8 9 ) . It resembles a p a n i c , and in- deed the physiological c o m p o n e n t s are similar; instead of r u n n i n g away, c a u g h t up in a m o o d in which r u n n i n g and fear feed each o t h e r as specified in the J a m e s - L a n g e theory of e m o t i o n , the fighters rush f o r w a r d , t o w a r d the enemy. R u n n i n g f or w ar d or b a c k w a r d , in either case they are in an o v e r p o w e r i n g e m o t i o n a l r h y t h m , carrying t h e m on to actions t h a t they w o u l d n o r m a l l y n o t a p p r o v e of in calm, reflective m o m e n t s .

T h e e m o t i o n a l sequence is described in detail by C a p u t o in a second incident: First he is full of enthusiasm leading a p a t r o l . His m o o d switches w h e n three of his a d v a n c e men locate enemy soldiers u n a w a r e of their presence, in a village immediately across a river. C a p u t o n o w feels signs of e x t r e m e excitement: " M y h e a r t b e a t s o u n d e d like a k e t t l e - d r u m p o u n d - ing in a t u n n e l . " In p a r t this is suppression of the anticipated a t t a c k , since

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he is trying to keep quiet in o r d e r to c r a w l b a c k in the jungle to call up m o r e of his m e n for t h e a t t a c k . W h e n firing b r e a k s o u t , he m o m e n t a r i l y b u r r o w s into the g r o u n d . " T h e experience of being u n d e r fire is like suffo- cating; t h e air s u d d e n l y becomes as lethal as a p o i s o n g a s . "

T h e n c o m e s a n e m o t i o n a l switch:

An eerie sense of c a l m came over m e . My m i n d w a s w o r k i n g w i t h a speed a n d clarity I w o u l d h a v e found r e m a r k a b l e if I h a d h a d t h e time to reflect u p o n it. . . . T h e w h o l e p l a n of a t t a c k flashed t h r o u g h my m i n d in a m a t t e r of seconds. At t h e s a m e time my b o d y w a s tensing itself to spring. Q u i t e separate from my t h o u g h t s or will, it w a s concen- t r a t i n g itself to m a k e a r u s h for the tree line. A n d t h a t intense c o n c e n t r a - tion of physical energy w a s b o r n of fear. I could n o t r e m a i n in t h e hol- l o w for longer t h a n a few m o r e seconds. After t h a t , the Viet C o n g w o u l d r a n g e in on m e , a s t a t i o n a r y t a r g e t in an e x p o s e d p o s i t i o n . I h a d to m o v e , to face a n d o v e r c o m e the danger. . . . W i t h o u t a c o m m a n d from my conscious m i n d , I lunged into the w o o d s a n d crashed d o w n t h e trail, [calling for reinforcements].

W h e n these arrive, he feels elated. T h e entire g r o u p , n o w some thirty strong, begins firing, overpowering the enemy. C a p u t o w a s n o w "shouting myself hoarse to control the p l a t o o n ' s fire. T h e marines were in a frenzy, p o u r i n g volley after volley into the village, some yelling unintelligibly, some screaming obscenities. . . . A bullet smacked the earth between us a n d we w e n t rolling over a n d came rolling back up again, me laughing hysterically." As e n e m y fire fades away, a n d r e p o r t s c o m e in by r a d i o t h a t the Viet C o n g a r e r e t r e a t i n g , C a p u t o tries to find a w a y to get his p l a t o o n across t h e deep river to finish t h e m off. " T h e p l a t o o n became as excited as a p r e d a t o r t h a t sees the back of its fleeing prey. . . . I could feel the w h o l e line w a n t i n g t o c h a r g e across t h e r i v e r " ( 2 4 9 - 5 3 ) . But t h e r e t u r n s o u t t o b e n o w a y t o get across, a n d C a p u t o h a s t r o u b l e c o m i n g d o w n from his e m o t i o n a l high. " I c o u l d n o t c o m e d o w n from the high p r o d u c e d b y the a c t i o n . T h e f i r e - fight w a s over, except for a few desultory exchanges, b u t I did n o t w a n t it to be over." He t h e n deliberately exposes himself to d r a w e n e m y fire so t h a t a sniper c a n be l o c a t e d — " w a l k i n g b a c k a n d forth a n d feeling as invulnerable a s a n I n d i a n w e a r i n g his ghost s h i r t . " W h e n n o t h i n g h a p - p e n s , he begins s h o u t i n g a n d firing wildly, a n d w h e n his o w n t r o o p s begin t o laugh a t h i m , h e laughs u n c o n t r o l l a b l y t o o . Eventually h e calms d o w n ( 2 5 4 - 5 5 ) .

T h e w h o l e i n c i d e n t is a v e r s i o n of f o r w a r d p a n i c , t r u n c a t e d at the e n d b e c a u s e t h e t a r g e t h a s d i s a p p e a r e d . T h e u n d e r t o n e t h r o u g h o u t i s tension/fear, t r a n s m u t e d at times i n t o d e t a c h m e n t , clarity, flickers of p a n i c / s u f f o c a t i o n ; t h e r e are m o m e n t s o f e l a t i o n , w h e n s o m e t h i n g w o r k s

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o u t . W h e n the fear d i s a p p e a r s at the end, he goes i n t o a frenzy, t r y i n g to find o n e last victim.

A third incident described by C a p u t o brings o u t just h o w far fighters may go w h e n c a u g h t up in t h a t e m o t i o n a l zone. C a p u t o ' s t r o o p s , after being pinned d o w n by enemy fire, a d v a n c e t h r o u g h a village believed to have been an enemy base:

T h e noise of the battle w a s c o n s t a n t a n d m a d d e n i n g , as m a d d e n i n g as the barbed hedges a n d the h e a t of the fire raging just behind us.

T h e n it h a p p e n e d . T h e p l a t o o n e x p l o d e d . It was a collective e m o - tional d e t o n a t i o n of m e n w h o h a d been p u s h e d to the extremity of e n d u r a n c e . I lost c o n t r o l of t h e m a n d even of myself. Desperate to get to the hill, wc r a m p a g e d t h r o u g h the rest of the village, w h o o p i n g like savages, t o r c h i n g t h a t c h h u t s , tossing g r e n a d e s into the cement houses we could n o t b u r n . In o u r frenzy, we crashed t h r o u g h the h e d g e r o w s w i t h o u t feeling the stabs of the t h o r n s . We did n o t feel a n y t h i n g . We were past feeling anything for ourselves, let alone for o t h e r s . We shut o u r ears to the cries a n d pleas of the villagers. O n e elderly m a n ran up to m e , a n d , g r a b b i n g me by the front of my shirt, a s k e d , "Tai Sao? Tai Sao?* Why? Why?

" G e t o u t of the g o d d a m n e d way," I said, pulling his h a n d s off. I took hold of his shirt a n d flung him d o w n hard, feeling as if I were watching myself in a movie. . . . M o s t of the pl at oon had no idea of what they were doing. O n e m a r i n e ran up to a hut, set it ablaze, ran on, t u r n e d a r o u n d , clashed through the flames and rescued a civilian inside, then ran on to set fire to the next h u t . We passed through the village like a wind; by the time we started up Hill 5 2 , there was nothing left of Ha Na but a long swath of smoldering ashes, charred tree t r u n k s , their leaves burned off, and heaps of shattered concrete. Of all the ugly sights I saw in Vietnam, t h a t w a s one of the ugliest: the sudden disintegration of my platoon from a g r o u p of disciplined soldiers into an incendiary m o b .

T h e p l a t o o n s n a p p e d out of its m a d n e s s a l m o s t immediately. O u r heads cleared as soon as we escaped from the village into the clear air at the t o p of the hill. . . . T h e c h a n g e in us, from disciplined soldiers to unrestrained savages a n d back to soldiers, h a d been so swift a n d p r o - found as to lend a dreamlike quality to the last p a r t of the battle. De- spite the evidence to the contrary, some of us had a difficult time be- lieving t h a t we were the ones w h o h a d caused all t h a t destruction. ( C a p u t o , 1 9 7 7 : 2 8 7 - 8 9 )

T h e soldiers go into the e m o t i o n a l tunnel of violent a t t a c k , then c o m e back o u t of it at the end. In the village w h e r e they expected resistance, they find no fighting men but only helpless villagers, w h o m they t r e a t brutally. T h e soldiers feel detached from themselves—which is to say,

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their cognitive image of themselves—and in the a f t e r m a t h t r e a t their o w n b e h a v i o r as if it were a s e p a r a t e reality.

C a p u t o ' s description of b u r n i n g the village resembles the m o r e famous case of My Lai, on M a r c h 1 6 , 1 9 6 8 . It w a s the m o s t intense p e r i o d of the V i e t n a m war, d u r i n g the Tet offensive, w h i c h h a d b e g u n six weeks earlier, w h e n Viet C o n g a n d N o r t h Vietnamese t r o o p s t e m p o r a r i l y c a p t u r e d sev- eral large cities a n d p u t A m e r i c a n forces on the defensive. T h e My Lai incident occurred during the counter-offensive a i m e d at driving the enemy back o u t of its c o n q u e s t s . A U.S. A r m y c o m p a n y m a d e a helicopter land- ing on an area long believed to be a Viet C o n g s t r o n g h o l d , expecting heavy resistance. T h e c o m p a n y leading the assault h a d never been in bat- tle, a l t h o u g h it h a d t a k e n casualties from mines a n d b o o b y t r a p s . It t u r n e d o u t t h a t there were n o enemy forces t o b e found i n M y Lai. T h e lead p l a t o o n w e n t on a r a m p a g e , b u r n i n g the buildings, a n d killing t h r e e to four h u n d r e d Vietnamese civilians, m o s t of t h e m w o m e n a n d children, military-age m e n having fled the village (Summers 1 9 9 5 : 140—41). T h e p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r , Lt. Calley, enthusiastically led the killing. W h e n the m a s s a c r e w a s b r o u g h t to official a t t e n t i o n after a y e a r ' s delay, it w a s an e n o r m o u s public s c a n d a l .

Despite the conclusions of the official inquiry to t h e contrary, incidents of this type were fairly c o m m o n in the V i e t n a m war, differing only in h o w extensive t h e killing of civilians, a n d h o w m u c h this w a s embellished w i t h m u t i l a t i o n a n d r a p e (Gibson 1 9 8 6 : 1 3 3 - 5 1 , 2 0 2 - 3 ; Turse a n d N e l s o n 2 0 0 6 ; w w w . l a t i m e s . c o m / v i e t n a m ) . At a m i n i m u m , these were orgies of d e s t r u c t i o n , v a n d a l i s m on an e x t r e m e scale. Given the c h a r a c t e r of guer- rilla war, the c o n d i t i o n s for a f o r w a r d p a n i c are frequent: a p e r i o d of p r o l o n g e d tension/fear, w i t h a h i d d e n enemy a n d s t r o n g suspicions t h a t the n o r m a l s u r r o u n d i n g s a n d civilian p o p u l a t i o n are a cover for s u d d e n a t t a c k s ; f o r w a r d - a d v a n c i n g o p e r a t i o n s in this danger z o n e , building up frustration a n d a n t i c i p a t i o n at finally catching the enemy, a n d triggering m o m e n t s w h e n t h e enemy seems to h a v e been c a u g h t ; a frenzied r u s h of d e s t r u c t i o n . R e g u l a r armies fighting guerrillas t a k e m o s t of their casual- ties w h e n they are c a u g h t off g u a r d ; w h e n they actually catch up w i t h the guerrillas, the disparity in a r m s usually m a k e s for an easy victory. It is the ease of beating a long-sought enemy t h a t m a k e s for the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of tension/fear i n t o the frenzied a t t a c k of f o r w a r d p a n i c . All the m o r e so w h e n t h e enemy t u r n s o u t n o t to be t h e r e at all, b u t only some helpless victims w h o are associated w i t h the e n e m y side: the w o m e n a n d old m e n at My Lai; the w o m a n in t h e speeding p i c k u p t r u c k in Los Angeles.

M o s t incidents of police violence t h a t create public scandals have the c h a r a c t e r of f o r w a r d p a n i c . T h e R o d n e y King beating in Los Angeles, 1 9 9 1 , is an archetypal instance ( w w w . l a w . u m k e . e d u / faculty/projects/ ftrial/lapd). Police chased a speeding car at up to 1 1 5 miles an h o u r for

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eight miles on a freeway a n d city streets; r a d i o calls for b a c k u p b r o u g h t t w e n t y - o n e officers by the e n d of the chase, w h e n King w a s c o r n e r e d be- hind an a p a r t m e n t h o u s e . A famous a m a t e u r video r e c o r d e d the last t h r e e a n d a half m i n u t e s of the arrest. P a t r o l officers were in a m o o d of excite- m e n t a n d tension from the high-speed chase, e n h a n c e d by anger at King's refusal to obey their sirens a n d pull off, a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n to w i n the race a n d bring h i m t o submission. O n emerging from t h e car, i t t u r n e d o u t t h e r e w e r e t w o y o u n g black m e n : o n e a passenger w h o s u b m i t t e d t o ar- rest; t h e o t h e r King, a big, m u s c u l a r m a n , w h o m the officers interpreted w a s likely an ex-convict, judging from his " p r i s o n b o d y " of a weight- lifter; they also t h o u g h t he w a s high on the d r u g PCP. T h e chase w a s n o t yet over. King w a s u n c o o p e r a t i v e to his arrest, creating a brief m o m e n t of c o u n t e r - a t t a c k by r u s h i n g at o n e of the officers; at this p o i n t he w a s k n o c k e d d o w n by four officers using night clubs a n d a taser (a device sending high-voltage electric shock). Beating w i t h the clubs c o n t i n u e d for a n o t h e r eighty s e c o n d s — t h e p a r t c a p t u r e d o n t h e video—until King w a s completely trussed u p , a n d the police p r e p a r e d t o m o v e o u t their vehicles. T h e m o s t active officer—the one w h o h a d been k n o c k e d d o w n b y K i n g — hit h i m over forty-five times w i t h his stick. 1

A m o n g the sidelights t h a t c a p t u r e d public a t t e n t i o n , a n d m a d e the atrocity seem particularly egregious, w a s evidence of the e m o t i o n a l t o n e of the police officers d u r i n g a n d after the beating. A l t h o u g h t w e n t y - o n e officers were present, only four t o o k p a r t in the beating; the others s t o o d a r o u n d in a circle, b a c k i n g up the principals a n d yelling e n c o u r a g e m e n t . Recordings of police r a d i o s after t h e beating also s h o w e d elation: "We really did some hitting . . . it w a s gorillas in t h e m i s t " — a n allusion to a t h e n - p o p u l a r movie a b o u t African gorillas. At the h o s p i t a l w h e r e King w a s t a k e n for his injuries, t h e a t t e n d i n g police officer, full of g o o d h u m o r , k i d d e d King a b o u t his job at the D o d g e r baseball s t a d i u m w i t h such w o r d s a s "We really hit s o m e h o m e r u n s o u t t h e r e t o n i g h t , d i d n ' t w e ? " This is the same sort of elation t h a t C a p u t o described w h e n c o m b a t w e n t well, a n d in the aftermath of an enthusiastic high.

C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L T E N S I O N A N D R E L E A S E : H O T R U S H , P I L I N G O N , O V E R K I L L

Let us consider the e m o t i o n a l sequence in detail. First comes a b u i l d u p of tension, w h i c h is released into a frenzied a t t a c k w h e n the situation m a k e s it easy to do so. T h e previous c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e d t h a t this is a tension/fear peculiar to conflict in i m m e d i a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h o t h e r h u m a n beings. This c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension builds up as p e r s o n s in conflict c o m e close to each other, a n d n o t merely because t h a t is the p o i n t at w h i c h one m i g h t

90 • Chapter 3

Figure 3.2 Rodney King beaten by four policemen after high-speed chase (Los Angeles, March 1991). Getty Images.

be h u r t ; it is at t h e p o i n t t h a t one has to face the o t h e r p e r s o n d o w n , to p u t h i m or her u n d e r o n e ' s violent c o n t r o l against their resistance.

T h e t e n s i o n c a n build up from v a r i o u s c o m p o n e n t s . Police officers in a h i g h - s p e e d chase h a v e s o m e feelings of t h e d a n g e r of f a s t - m o v i n g vehi- cles, especially w h e n p o t e n t i a l l y d o d g i n g o t h e r vehicles a n d o b stacles; their t e n s i o n c a n also b e p a r t l y e x c i t e m e n t , p a r t l y f r u s t r a t i o n a t n o t yet c a t c h i n g o n e ' s t a r g e t . F o r police officers, this is an e x a c e r b a t e d v e r s i o n of t h e i r n o r m a l s i t u a t i o n w h e n dealing w i t h civilians, a n d especially civilian suspects: their effort a l w a y s t o c o n t r o l t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n (Ru- binstein 1 9 7 3 ) . T h e r e s i s t a n c e of a civilian to letting t h e officer c o n t r o l t h e s i t u a t i o n brings a b o u t a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , raising t h e possibil- ity of t h e officer using b o t h official a u t h o r i t y a n d i n f o r m a l p r e s s u r e to gain c o m m a n d . A s R u b i n s t e i n s h o w s from e t h n o g r a p h i c o b s e r v a t i o n , police t r y t o p o s i t i o n t h e i r bodies t o c o n t r o l a n y o n e t h e y s t o p for ques- t i o n i n g ; their n o n v e r b a l m a n e u v e r i n g r a n g e s from p u t t i n g themselves in a p o s i t i o n to d i s a r m i n d i v i d u a l s of w e a p o n s or o v e r p o w e r t h e m , to b r u s h i n g a g a i n s t t h e m i n c a s u a l s e a r c h e s . A t m i n i m u m , police exercise m o r e subtle c o n t r o l by aggressive use of eyes in o b s e r v i n g t h e o t h e r per- s o n in a p r o l o n g e d a n d d e l i b e r a t e fashion c o n t r a r y to n o r m a l civilities of i n t e r p e r s o n a l l o o k i n g a n d eye c o n t a c t . T h u s the police in a chase are

F o r w a r d P a n i c • 9 1

e x p e r i e n c i n g a p r o l o n g e d s i t u a t i o n of being frustrated in w h a t they n o r - mally expect to carry o u t in any i n t e r a c t i o n .

The tensions t h a t p r o d u c e a f o r w a r d p a n i c can also be obse rve d in individual fights. A g o o d s o u r c e is b i o g r a p h i c a l m a t e r i a l on Ty C o b b , w h o w a s involved in m a n y fights t h a t are well d o c u m e n t e d , d u e to his fame as the t o p baseball player of his day. In M a y 1 9 1 2 , C o b b j u m p e d i n t o the s t a n d s to a t t a c k a fan w h o had been jeering h i m . T h e incident h a p p e n e d in N e w York, w h e r e C o b b ' s D e t r o i t t e a m w a s visiting. In an earlier incident, C o b b h a d collided w i t h a N e w York player at third base, d u r i n g C o b b ' s typically aggressive b a s e - r u n n i n g ; the t w o players shoved each other, a n d fans t h r e w debris from the s t a n d s . F o u r days later, a fan sitting n e a r the d u g o u t k e p t up a steady flow of loud insults directed at C o b b . I n the fourth inning—after a b o u t a n h o u r — C o b b took a c t i o n . " L e a p i n g a railing, ( C o b b ) t r a m p l e d fans to get at the t o r m e n t o r , sitting a d o / e n r o w s up in the s t a n d s . He b a t t e r e d L u e k e r ' s head with at least a full dozen p u n c h e s , k n o c k e d him d o w n , a n d w i t h his spikes kicked t h e helpless m a n in the lower body. . . . (The s p e c t a t o r ) h a d no fingers on o n e h a n d , only t w o fingers on the other. . . . (having) lost t h e m in an industrial accident. . . . Fans scattered with s h o u t s of, ' H e h a s no h a n d s ! ' Witnesses said they h e a r d C o b b r e t o r t , '1 d o n ' t care if he has no legs!' " ( S t u m p 1 9 9 4 : 2 0 6 - 7 ) .

T h e beating he inflicted was typical of C o b b ' s violent rages: once he started, he continued, even after getting his o p p o n e n t d o w n . T h e fight was clearly w o n at the outset, but it went on for a flurry of punches a n d then kicking the now-vanquished body on the g r o u n d . In this case, the disparity of p o w e r is underlined, since it turns o u t t h a t the jeering fan was physically h a n d i c a p p e d . 2 In the midst of his rage, this did n o t faze C o b b at all; in the course of a forward panic, any evidence of the weakness of a victim does not matter, even when the perpetrator is explicitly a w a r e of it.

T h e tension in this case has several c o m p o n e n t s : in the i m m e d i a t e fore- g r o u n d , C o b b ' s antagonistic relationship with the N e w York players a n d their fans, which had been at a high level for four days. T h e incident is e m b e d d e d in a larger p a t t e r n : C o b b was successful as a player precisely because of his extremely aggressive style of play; in the previous year he h a d set the record for stolen bases, a n d h a d hit . 4 2 0 — o n e of the highest averages of the m o d e r n era of record-keeping; and his 1 9 1 2 season, then underway, w o u l d result in an unprecedented t w o years in a r o w of hitting over .400 (this time . 4 1 0 ) . 3 Some individuals use their ability to w o r k themselves into a high level of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension as a m e a n s of d o m i - n a t i n g o t h e r s . O n c e they get into a high level of a r o u s a l , however, they can no longer c o n t r o l themselves; t h u s C o b b beating up a s p e c t a t o r — a n d o t h e r s like him—well past the point at which the fight w a s w o n .

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T h e v a r i o u s k i n d s of tension/fear t h a t c o m e o u t in a r u s h of violence h a v e often been described as an a d r e n a l i n r u s h . Soldiers in c o m b a t a n d its i m m e d i a t e aftermath, like police officers at the end of a vehicle chase or an arrest, c a n be seen as u n a b l e to c o n t r o l their a d r e n a l i n (Artwohl a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 ; Klinger 2 0 0 4 ; G r o s s m a n 2 0 0 4 ) . But f o r w a r d p a n i c is n o t simply a physiological process; w h a t a p e r s o n will do while in a c o n d i t i o n of a d r e n a l i n a r o u s a l is shaped in various directions a n d i n t o varying actions, d e p e n d i n g on situational c o n d i t i o n s . After a near-miss of a traffic accident, a driver m a y go t h r o u g h an episode of u n c o n t r o l l a b l e bodily trembling; d u r i n g the m o m e n t w h e n y o u have t o pull the wheel sharply, the b o d y is tensed for action; only w h e n the time for action h a s p a s s e d a n d there is n o t h i n g m o r e to be d o n e does the full effect of the a r o u s a l w o r k itself o u t . Some p e r s o n s r e s p o n d to a crisis, just after it is resolved, by bursting into t e a r s . T h e e m o t i o n one feels u p o n r e a c h i n g a difficult goal, such as the release from tension t h a t occurs u p o n scaling a m o u n t a i n p e a k , 4 is n o t generally a violent o n e . R e a c t i o n s such as anger, or a violent a t t a c k on a now-helpless victim, occur only in p a r t i c u l a r kinds of situational sequences. 5

W h a t k i n d of e m o t i o n is occurring d u r i n g a f o r w a r d p a n i c itself? M o s t obviously, anger in its e x t r e m e forms: rage or fury. T h e c o n n o t a t i o n of these latter t e r m s , a n d especially of the t e r m "frenzy," is t h a t the anger is overriding a n d compelling. But we also see other kinds of e m o t i o n s in these situations of u n c o n t r o l l e d violence: O n e m a y be hysterical laughter, described at several p o i n t s in C a p u t o ' s V i e t n a m incidents. These occur d u r i n g the height of the fighting itself, w h e r e it is highly c o n t a g i o u s : Ca- p u t o rolls on the g r o u n d w i t h a c o m p a n i o n escaping a bullet; later, w h e n he is wildly d a r i n g a sniper, his b r a v a d o m a k e s his t r o o p s l a u g h , w h i c h sets h i m off i n t o m o r e u n c o n t r o l l a b l e laughter. In a different c o n t e x t , tapes of the mass m u r d e r s by t w o students at C o l u m b i n e H i g h School in Littleton, C o l o r a d o , in April 1 9 9 9 s h o w the killers laughing hysterically d u r i n g the s h o o t i n g . L a u g h t e r a n d s h a r e d g o o d h u m o r also m a y c o n t i n u e in t h e p e r i o d after the end of a f o r w a r d p a n i c . In the aftermath of the R o d n e y King beating, the arresting officers are in high spirits; one r e a s o n w h y their behavior seems so shocking is t h a t they c a n n o t keep from ex- pressing their m o o d , by h u m o r o u s messages over the police r a d i o a n d by r e m a r k s at the hospital w h e r e King is t a k e n for his injuries.

Often t h e r e is a m o o d of elation, b o t h d u r i n g the violence a n d some- times afterward. C a p u t o alternates between feeling tense, fearful, a n d angry, a n d feeling superlatively happy. These m i x e d e m o t i o n s are n o t well described by c o n v e n t i o n a l labels. T h e c o m p o s i t e m o o d of a f o r w a r d panic comes from the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of tension/fear i n t o aggressive frenzy, usu- ally centered on rage. T r o o p s in close c o m b a t have historically m a d e a great deal of noise, a m i x t u r e of jeering, cursing, r o a r i n g , or w h o o p i n g

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(Keegan 1 9 7 6 ; H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 ; C a p u t o 1 9 7 7 m e n t i o n s this in each of his episodes; see n o n - m i l i t a r y e x a m p l e s in the section on bluster in c h a p t e r 9). At the m o m e n t of victory, these noises c a n shade over i n t o a n o t e of elation, sometimes of hysterical laughter, s o m e t h i n g between cheering for oneself a n d the sheer energetic expression of o n e ' s f o r w a r d - m o v i n g ac- t i o n . T h e r e do n o t seem to be m a n y silent f o r w a r d panics; it is a climax of noise as well as of violence. This m i x t u r e of aggressive energy, anger, a n d ebullient cheering often carries over i n t o the s i t u a t i o n just after the conflict. A f o r w a r d p a n i c , after all, is a t o t a l victory, at least locally a n d on the physical a n d e m o t i o n a l level, a n d calls for c e l e b r a t i o n . 6

T h e e m o t i o n of a f o r w a r d p a n i c , w h a t e v e r its m i x t u r e , has t w o key characteristics. First, it is a h o t e m o t i o n , a s i t u a t i o n of being highly a r o u s e d , steamed u p . It comes on in a r u s h , explosively; a n d it takes time to c a l m d o w n . It c o n t r a s t s w i t h a far m o r e u n u s u a l type of violence, cold or d e t a c h e d violence found a m o n g specialists such as snipers a n d h i t m e n , t h a t w e will consider i n c h a p t e r s 1 0 a n d 1 1 ; a n d also w i t h half-hearted, fearful violence of t h e kind we h a v e considered in c h a p t e r 2. Second, it is an e m o t i o n t h a t is r h y t h m i c a n d strongly e n t r a i n i n g . Individuals in the t h r o e s of a f o r w a r d p a n i c keep repeating their aggressive actions: the ille- gal m i g r a n t s are clubbed again a n d again by the h i g h w a y p a t r o l ; R o d n e y King is repeatedly hit; C a p u t o ' s m a r i n e s t o r c h one h u t after another, even t h o u g h they already k n o w t h e r e is n o t h i n g there; C o b b keeps kicking his m a n o n t h e g r o u n d . T h e e m o t i o n i s f l o w i n g i n self-reinforcing w a v e s . T h e individual gets c a u g h t up in his or her o w n r h y t h m ; 7 C o b b is acting alone, a l t h o u g h in the b a c k g r o u n d he is a c c u s t o m e d to setting the r h y t h m of action in a baseball g a m e , a n d r e s p o n d i n g to t h e r e p e a t e d — a n d therefore rhythmic—jeering of the fan is p a r t of w h a t he becomes e n t r a i n e d in at the m o m e n t .

M o r e often t h e process is g r o u p e n t r a i n m e n t in a collective e m o t i o n . T h e soldiers get each o t h e r w h o o p i n g , cursing, sometimes hysterically laughing, while they are also firing—as we k n o w , largely inaccurately, b u t the b a m ! b a m ! b a m ! b a m ! of t h e guns is also p a r t of t h e r h y t h m they are c a u g h t up in. As n o t e d , b o t h of the t w o killers in C o l u m b i n e H i g h School w e r e laughing hysterically t h r o u g h o u t the killing; it a p p e a r s also t h a t they stayed t o g e t h e r t h r o u g h o u t t h e episode, even t h o u g h , from a strictly utili- t a r i a n v i e w p o i n t , they w o u l d have been m o r e effective at killing m o r e people if they h a d split up a n d covered different places. Being together allowed each one's m o o d to feed off the o t h e r ' s , a n d this k e p t t h e m locked into their m o o d of frenzy a n d hysterical elation. O n e c a n q u e s t i o n , of c o u r s e , w h e t h e r the e m o t i o n w a s truly one of elation: it surely m u s t h a v e been m i x e d w i t h a feeling t h a t they themselves were going to die, as they s o o n c o m m i t t e d suicide, a n d w o u l d h a v e faced dire p u n i s h m e n t s if they h a d survived. But t h a t is just t h e crucial p o i n t a b o u t the e m o t i o n s felt

94 • Chapter 3

during a forward p a n i c : all the c o m p o n e n t s t h a t c o m e o u t during the h o t rush of a successful, u n o p p o s e d a t t a c k are cycling back u p o n themselves: anger, release from tension/fear, elation, hysterical laughter, sheer noisi- ness as itself a form of aggression—all of these are generating a social a t m o s p h e r e in w h i c h p e r s o n s keep on doing w h a t they are d o i n g , over a n d over, t h o u g h it m a y m a k e no sense even as aggression. 8

A forward panic is violence t h a t for the time being is u n s t o p p a b l e . It is overkill, the overuse of force far beyond w h a t w o u l d have been needed to bring a b o u t the victory. Persons w h o have fallen off the point of tension into a forwar d panic situation have gone d o w n into a tunnel a n d c a n n o t s t o p their m o m e n t u m . They fire far m o r e bullets t h a n they need; they n o t only kill but destroy everything in sight; they t h r o w m o r e punches a n d kicks; they a t t a c k dead bodies. Relative to w h a t kind of conflict it is— after all, C o b b does n o t kill his m a n — t h e r e is far m o r e violence t h a n the violent situation itself w o u l d seem to call for. If there is a g r o u p involved, typically there is a p a t t e r n of ganging up; everyone w a n t s to get in a p u n c h or a kick at the fallen victim; in s p o r t s , this w o u l d be called piling o n .

A forward panic always has the look of an atrocity. It is patently unfair: the s t r o n g against the w e a k ; the a r m e d against the u n a r m e d (or the dis- a r m e d ) ; the c r o w d against the individual or tiny grouplct. A f o r w a r d panic is a very ugly-looking event, even w h e n the victim is n o t badly in- jured. It is the m o r a l look of it which is so offensive. W h e n s o m e o n e is in fact killed or m a i m e d , it is the w a y it is d o n e t h a t m a k e s it an atrocity.

A T R O C I T I E S O F W A R

F o r w a r d panics arc c o m m o n in w a r f a r e . T h e most obvious instance is the tendency for t r o o p s to kill enemy soldiers w h o are trying to surrender. This w a s especially well d o c u m e n t e d for trench warfare in World War I. T r o o p s of all sides, when they reached the enemy d u g o u t s in a d o m i n a n t position, were likely to s h o o t the men w h o emerged to surrender. T h e G e r m a n soldier Ernst J u n g e r s a w this as an e m o t i o n a l m o m e n t u m : "A m a n c a n n o t c h a n g e his feelings again during the last rush with a veil of blood before his eyes. He does n o t w a n t to t a k e prisoners but to kill" (quoted i n H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 : 3 8 1 ) . H o l m e s generalized, " N o soldier w h o fights until his enemy is at close small-arms range, in any war, has m o r e t h a n p e r h a p s a fifty-fifty c h a n c e of being granted q u a r t e r " (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 8 2 , also 3 8 1 - 8 8 ; Keegan 1 9 7 6 : 4 8 - 5 1 , 2 7 7 - 7 8 , 3 2 2 ) . T h e p a t t e r n also w a s d o c u m e n t e d widely in World War II, on the p a r t of American, British, G e r m a n , Russian, J a p a n e s e , Chinese, a n d other t r o o p s , a n d against all of these as victims.

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Some of this killing of s u r r e n d e r e r s has h a d a deliberate c o m p o n e n t , m o t i v a t e d by unwillingness to t a k e on the practical b u r d e n of s h e p h e r d i n g p r i s o n e r s b a c k t o r e a r a r e a s , a n d giving t h e m t h e requisite supplies; some- times it w a s a m a t t e r of being suspicious of w h e t h e r the s u r r e n d e r e r s m i g h t suddenly a n d treacherously t u r n belligerent again. Sometimes the h o t e m o t i o n s involved have been revenge for previous losses. But a consid- erable p r o p o r t i o n of such killings are results of the s i t u a t i o n a l m o m e n t u m itself. We k n o w this w h e r e t h e s u r r e n d e r e r s , once safely p a s t t h e danger m o m e n t , are t r e a t e d in a c o m r a d e l y fashion by their c a p t o r s , indeed gener- ally better t h a n they will be t r e a t e d later by r e a r area t r o o p s (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 8 2 ) . A n d t h e r e are instances w h e r e t r o o p s go into a m o m e n t a r i l y u n c o n t r o l l a b l e r a g e . S.L.A. M a r s h a l l gives an e x a m p l e of U.S. t r o o p s in N o r m a n d y in J u n e 1 9 4 4 , d u r i n g a p e r i o d w h e n their b a t t a l i o n h a d been u n d e r heavy G e r m a n fire for t h r e e days, u n a b l e to evacuate their casual- ties, a n d suffering from s h o r t a g e of water. A p l a t o o n u n d e r Lt. Millsaps b r o k e u n d e r enemy m a c h i n e gunfire a n d r a n a w a y in a panic r e t r e a t , until t h e officers finally b e a t t h e m b a c k into a c t i o n w i t h physical violence:

At last they c h a r g e d the enemy, closing w i t h i n h a n d - g r a p p l i n g distance. T h e slaughter began w i t h g r e n a d e , b a y o n e t , a n d bullet. Some of the p a t r o l w e r e killed a n d some w o u n d e d . But all n o w acted as if oblivious to danger. T h e slaughter once s t a r t e d could n o t be s t o p p e d . Millsaps tried t o regain c o n t r o l b u t his m e n p a i d n o heed. H a v i n g slaughtered every G e r m a n in sight, they r a n on into t h e b a r n s of t h e French farm- houses w h e r e they killed t h e h o g s , c o w s , a n d sheep. T h e orgy e n d e d w h e n the last beast w a s d e a d . " ( M a r s h a l l 1 9 4 7 : 183)

These t r o o p s h a d been u n d e r great pressure, including from their o w n officers. Q u i t e literally, they began w i t h a p a n i c r e t r e a t , w h i c h an h o u r later t u r n e d i n t o a f o r w a r d p a n i c . At the end, they w e r e so c h a r g e d w i t h e m o t i o n t h a t they could n o t s t o p , even slaughtering the livestock—much like Lt. C a p u t o in his V i e t n a m battle l o o k i n g for m o r e enemies to kill. T h e spillover of f o r w a r d p a n i c i n t o killing a n i m a l s , a l t h o u g h bizarre, also h a s its p a r a l l e l s . 9 A c c o r d i n g to one observer, " [ D ] u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 3 riot in K a n o , n o r t h e r n Nigeria [between I b o a n d H a u s a tribes] . . . m u t i l a t i o n s , c a s t r a t i o n s , a n d b u r n i n g s of bodies o c c u r r e d . Periodically, the police were able to s e p a r a t e the c o m b a t a n t s . D u r i n g these intervals, t h e r e w e r e several instances in w h i c h a r m e d Ibo p a r t i c i p a n t s d a n c e d in ' cro co d ile' f o r m a t i o n a n d others in w h i c h they slaughtered w i t h their h a t c h e t s n e a r b y horses, d o n k e y s , a n d g o a t s " ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 116).

Similar p a t t e r n s are found in ancient w a r f a r e . At the end of the decisive battle of T h a p s u s (in m o d e r n Tunisia) in 46 B . C . , w h e n Julius C a e s a r ' s a r m y r o u t e d t h e forces of his rival in the civil w a r s for c o n t r o l of R o m e , the defeated legions a t t e m p t e d to surrender; u n d e r the military politics of

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Figure 3.3 A, B Killing surrenderers: Afrikaner resistance fighters, already wounded, are killed after a failed attack (South Africa, 1994). Reuters.

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t h a t t i m e , these legions w o u l d have been a d d e d to C a e s a r ' s forces, and t h u s it w a s a rational policy for him to accept their surrender. But C a e s a r ' s "veterans were inflamed with anger and r e s e n t m e n t . . . and so all these soldiers of Scipio's, a l t h o u g h pleading to s u r r e n d e r unconditionally to Caesar, were slaughtered d o w n to the last m a n u n d e r C a e s a r ' s very eyes as he begged his men to spare t h e m " (Caesar, Civil War, 2 3 4 - 3 5 ) . T h e victorious t r o o p s had been m a r c h i n g and c o u n t e r - m a r c h i n g in the semi- desert for three m o n t h s a n d e n d u r i n g enemy skirmishing while trying to bring t h e m to a full-scale battle; w h e n they finally got the decisive battle they had been waiting for, they were so charged up by their victory t h a t they w e n t on to kill u n p o p u l a r officers in their o w n army, while Caesar himself was u n a b l e to p r o t e c t t h e m .

A variant, c o m m o n in ancient and medieval w a r f a r e , w a s for a massa- cre of i n h a b i t a n t s to t a k e place at the end of a siege. Sometimes this w a s d o n e as a m a t t e r of deliberate policy, to frighten i n h a b i t a n t s of o t h e r t o w n s to s u r r e n d e r w i t h o u t a siege. In medieval F.urope, the c u s t o m was for the attacking a r m y to pause once a breach had been m a d e in the walls, calling on the garrison to surrender; if they refused, they w o u l d be killed " w i t h o u t giving q u a r t e r " when the battle ended (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 8 8 ; Wagner-Pacifi 2 0 0 5 ) . But such a slaughter, once begun, w a s not easily confined to the soldiers. C r o m w e l l ' s p a r l i a m e n t a r y army, a t t a c k i n g the Catholic royalist s t r o n g h o l d of D r o g h e d a , Ireland, in 1.649, slaughtered not only the defenders but also m o s t of the civilian p o p u l a t i o n as well, 4 , 0 0 0 persons altogether. In 3 3 7 B . C . , A l e x a n d e r ' s M a c e d o n i a n forces c a p t u r e d the Greek city of T h e b e s w h e n , after a battle outside the walls, the T h e b a n s , retreating in panic, were unable to close the gates behind t h e m . Some T h e b a n s were in the peace party, which had been willing to placate the M a c e d o n i a n s : b u t the victorious forces m a d e no distinctions: soldiers a n d civilians alike were massacred, m a n y of them pursued into the s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r y s i d e as they tried to escape (Keegan 1 9 8 7 : 7 3 ) .

T h e most n o t o r i o u s modern instance of this pattern occurred at N a n k i n g in December 1937 (Chang 1997). Japanese forces had been advancing r a p - idly s o u t h w a r d t h r o u g h China since w a r broke out in July 1937, until fi- nally meeting strong resistance in a battle at Shanghai, prolonged between August and November. Having at last won this battle, they were n o w in a position to take the Chinese capital, N a n k i n g , by moving up river 150 miles against the disorganized Chinese t r o o p s . This they did, entering the city on December 1 3 . From the Japanese point of view, this was a decisive victory, giving them control of China, and thus putting them in a jubilant m o o d . There were, however, ninety thousand Chinese t r o o p s surrendered in the city, and a n o t h e r t w o h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d Chinese troops in the sur- r o u n d i n g area, having retreated in disorder from their defeat at Shanghai. Japanese forces on the spot n u m b e r e d only fifty t h o u s a n d , but were well

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armed, organized, a n d emotionally d o m i n a n t , as against their m u c h larger n u m b e r of disorganized a n d demoralized enemy. T h e c o m m a n d i n g general, concerned a b o u t b o t h the logistics a n d the practical difficulties of guarding prisoners o u t n u m b e r i n g his o w n forces by a factor of between 2:1 a n d 6 : 1 , gave the order to kill all prisoners. O n c e the killing began, it became u n s t o p p a b l e . O n the rationale t h a t m a n y Chinese soldiers h a d discarded their w e a p o n s a n d uniforms a n d were hiding in the civilian p o p u l a t i o n , the Japanese began to kill all fighting-age males.

T h e s i t u a t i o n quickly escalated o u t of c o n t r o l of t h e J a p a n e s e c o m - m a n d e r s . Eventually, a b o u t t h r e e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d p e r s o n s w e r e killed, a b o u t half of the p o p u l a t i o n of N a n k i n g t h a t h a d n o t fled t h e city. Killing such a large n u m b e r of p e r s o n s , as a p r a c t i c a l matter, is n o t easy, n o r is the disposing of their bodies. Initially, s o m e of the J a p a n e s e t r o o p s w e r e r e l u c t a n t to engage in the slaughter of unresisting p e r s o n s ; they were p r o d d e d b y lower-ranking officers, w h o w e r e generally t h e m o s t enthusi- astic actors in t h e m a s s a c r e , a n d by t h e pressure of their fellows w h o h a d joined in. Eventually, it a p p e a r s , m a n y or m o s t of t h e J a p a n e s e t r o o p s w e r e c a u g h t up in the m o o d of d e s t r u c t i o n . 1 0 Officers initially tried t r a d i - t i o n a l Japanese-style executions w i t h s w o r d s , b u t this w a s t o o inefficient; it w a s superceded by firing on victims at the edge of m a s s graves or river- b a n k s , a n d b a y o n e t practice on live t a r g e t s . As t h e slaughter stretched o u t over m a n y d a y s , t h e J a p a n e s e soldiers began to liven the t a s k w i t h killing games: contests a m o n g y o u n g officers t o see h o w m a n y t h e y could kill; t o r t u r e s ; placing bodies of Chinese victims in g r o t e s q u e p o s t u r e s ; m u t i l a - tions a n d collections of severed b o d y p a r t s .

O n c e the o r d e r t o kill prisoners h a d been given, t h e J a p a n e s e c o m m a n d - ers h a d n o m o r e c o n t r o l over their t r o o p s . T h e r e w a s n o i m m e d i a t e mili- t a r y t h r e a t t o distract t h e m a n d call t h e m b a c k t o duty. T h e y entered the situational zone t h a t sociologists of collective b e h a v i o r call a " m o r a l h o l i d a y , " like rioters on a looting r a m p a g e , in w h i c h m o r a l c o n s t r a i n t s are suspended, a n d n o o n e restrains a n y o n e else from violating n o r m a l civilized p r a c t i c e s . 1 1 O n c e the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n became targets for more-or-less universal killing, all lesser t a b o o s fell a w a y t o o . T h e J a p a n e s e began t o r a p e y o u n g Chinese w o m e n , t h e n older ones. Sporadic r a p i n g w a s historically a c o m m o n occurrence a m o n g victorious t r o o p s in m o s t armies until very recent times, w h e n s o m e t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y armies began to institutionalize stricter o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s . A n d it fitted official J a p a n e s e policy to t a k e w o m e n of c o n q u e r e d p o p u l a t i o n s as forced p r o s t i - tutes or sex slaves. But t h e r a p e s w e n t b e y o n d these more-or-less institu- tionalized practices, w h i c h generally leave sexually desirable w o m e n alive. Instead, r a p e s w e r e assimilated to the general m o o d of killing, a n d even t a k i n g on its a t m o s p h e r e of m u t i l a t i o n , t o r t u r e , a n d grotesque killing g a m e s . P h o t o s i n C h a n g (1997) s h o w Chinese w o m e n killed while b o u n d in p o r n o g r a p h i c poses or w i t h a b a y o n e t t h r u s t in t h e vagina. These are

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similar to o t h e r p h o t o s t a k e n of severed h e a d s of Chinese soldiers, for instance w i t h cigarettes in their m o u t h s : s a r d o n i c j u x t a p o s i t i o n s express- ing a m o o d of violent mockery.

On t o p of this c a m e looting. T h i s t o o is a n o r m a l practice, at least to a small e x t e n t , in all w a r s (Holmes 1 9 8 5 : 3 5 3 - 5 5 ) . In N a n k i n g , the looting s p r e a d o u t of c o n t r o l to a general d e s t r u c t i o n of p r o p e r t y , a m o o d of deliberate v a n d a l i s m . Eventually m o s t of the city w a s b u r n e d . Like t h e killing a n d the forced sex, the l o o t i n g a n d d e s t r u c t i o n m a y h a v e started w i t h a c o m p o n e n t of practical self-interest, b u t it s p r e a d o u t of c o n t r o l to t h e p o i n t w h e r e it w a s n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n even to the selfish p u r p o s e s of the J a p a n e s e army, destroying t h e very spoils of victory. T h e m o r a l holi- day, once b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h t h e m e m b r a n e of n o r m a l social life—and even the n o r m a l life of an a r m y — b e c a m e a g r o t e s q u e carnival, a celebration of destruction. T h e m o o d in this case lasted u n u s u a l l y long: it w a s at its m o s t intense i n the f i r s t w e e k , from D e c e m b e r 1 3 t o 1 9 , a n d f i n a l l y began to peter o u t in early J a n u a r y 1 9 3 8 , t h r e e w e e k s after it h a d s t a r t e d .

T h e r a p e of N a n k i n g , a l t h o u g h a highly e m o t i o n a l process, w a s n o t an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e frenzy—or rather, frenzy is never asocial, oblivious to all b u t o n e ' s inner urges. J a p a n e s e soldiers did n o t go berserk, lashing o u t in all directions; they did n o t s h o o t each other, a n d they generally respected their o w n hierarchy, a l t h o u g h disregarding higher officers w h o did n o t go along w i t h their orgy of d e s t r u c t i o n . They generally respected t h e b o u n d s of the " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Z o n e , " t h e section of the colonial city w h e r e E u r o p e - ans lived, a n d w h e r e s o m e Chinese fled for shelter; t h e r e w e r e s o m e incur- sions i n t o the z o n e in search of w o m e n to r a p e , b u t these w e r e sometimes repelled by t h e p r o t e s t s of E u r o p e a n civilians. A local G e r m a n official, w e a r i n g his N a z i insignia, w a s especially effective in o v e r a w i n g J a p a n e s e soldiers a n d rescuing C h i n e s e . 1 2 These exceptions d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e soldiers' m o r a l h o l i d a y h a d its implicit b o u n d a r i e s ; it w a s a frenzy of d e s t r u c t i o n , b u t a targeted a n d delineated frenzy. T h i s p a t t e r n t o o is general. A f o r w a r d p a n i c a n d similar m o o d s of o n r u s h i n g , u n c o n - trollable violence is like r o a r i n g d o w n a t u n n e l ; b u t t h e t u n n e l has a place in social space, w i t h a beginning a n d an e n d i n g in t i m e , as well as walls t h a t define its t e r r i t o r y as a place for m o r a l h o l i d a y . 1 3

CAVEAT: T H E M U L T I P L E C A U S A T I O N O F A T R O C I T I E S

N o t all atrocities are the result of f o r w a r d panics. C o u n t i n g this as (1), t h r e e other sources are: (2) deliberate o r d e r s from high military or politi- cal a u t h o r i t i e s to m a s s a c r e a p o p u l a t i o n (e.g., o u t of racial/ethnic, reli- gious, or ideological animosity; or to dispose of P O W s ) ; (3) scorched e a r t h policy to deprive the enemy of resources; or p r e d a t o r y living off the l a n d by t r o o p s , w h i c h destroys t h e m e a n s of livelihood of civilians; usu-

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ally this also involves some direct violence against civilians in t h e process of dispossessing t h e m of food a n d shelter; a n d (4) e x e m p l a r y p u n i s h m e n t o r terroristic r e t a l i a t i o n t o a t t e m p t t o o v e r a w e resistance.

E x a m p l e s of (2) are massacres d u r i n g t h e sixteenth- a n d seventeenth- century E u r o p e a n w a r s o f religion ( C a m e r o n 1 9 9 1 : 3 7 2 - 8 5 ) ; the killing of J e w s , c o m m u n i s t s , a n d o t h e r targets of N a z i ideology on t h e eastern front in W o r l d War II (Bartov 1 9 9 1 ; Fein 1 9 7 9 ) ; a n d the massacres of Tutsis a n d m o d e r a t e H u t u s i n R w a n d a i n 1 9 9 4 ( H u m a n Rights W a t c h 1999). E x a m p l e s of (3) include a great deal of p r e m o d e r n w a r f a r e , as well as colonial w a r s of e x p a n s i o n , British anti-guerrilla tactics in the Boer war, a n d again the b e h a v i o r of the W e h r m a c h t d u r i n g the invasion of the Soviet U n i o n (Keeley 1 9 9 6 ; M a n n 2 0 0 5 ; Bartov 1 9 9 1 ) . E x a m p l e s of (4) are t h e practices of N a z i t r o o p s in retaliating against p a r t i s a n s in con- q u e r e d territories by m a s s a c r i n g entire village p o p u l a t i o n s (Bartov 1 9 9 1 ; B r o w n i n g 1 9 9 2 ) ; a n d practices on b o t h sides in the Spanish Civil W a r (Beevor 1 9 9 9 ) .

Recognizing these multiple causal p a t h s m e a n s t h a t n o t all atrocities c a n be explained in the same w a y ; o u r analysis m u s t m o v e f o r w a r d from p r i o r c o n d i t i o n s a n d processes t o w a r d the o u t c o m e , n o t b a c k w a r d from o u t c o m e s a n d w i t h the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e is only one p a t h w a y to get t h e r e . In f o r w a r d p a n i c , t h e p a t h w a y is a r a p i d e m o t i o n a l flow d u r i n g a discrete local episode, beginning w i t h t h e t e n s i o n of the fight itself, t r a n s - formed i n t o a s u d d e n r u s h of frenzied overkill in an a t m o s p h e r e of hysteri- cal e n t r a i n m e n t . It is like an altered state of consciousness, from w h i c h the p e r p e t r a t o r s often emerge at the end as if r e t u r n i n g from an alien self. T h e o t h e r three p a t h w a y s , in c o n t r a s t , are m u c h less local a n d s i t u a t i o n a l , m o r e e m b e d d e d in r e c u r r e n t institutions a n d m a c r o hierarchies; these lat- ter types of atrocities c o m e a b o u t from deliberate decisions, m a d e in ad- vance a n d passed a l o n g chains of c o m m a n d or in w i d e s p r e a d g r o u p s . Their e m o t i o n s are flatter, m o r e callous; the consciousness of the p e r p e t r a - t o r s is m o r e filled w i t h justifying ideologies or r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s , a n d has less of t h e sense of an episodic b r e a k w i t h n o r m a l c y t h a t characterizes f o r w a r d p a n i c s . All these varieties are ideal types, a n d in some instances they m i g h t overlap. In t h e N a n k i n g massacres, the initiating event w a s the J a p a n e s e c o m m a n d e r ' s o r d e r to kill the Chinese p r i s o n e r s , o u t of practical c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of g u a r d i n g such large n u m b e r s ; this in t u r n unleashed a m o r a l holiday, e m o t i o n a l l y fueled by t h e t e n s i o n of the J a p a n e s e t r o o p s in their p r i o r c a m p a i g n , n o w confronted w i t h t h e t o t a l collapse of resis- tance from their enemy. T h e frenzy of destruction w e n t b e y o n d any r a t i o - n a l scorched e a r t h policy or e x e m p l a r y terror, a n d is best seen as an u n - usually p r o l o n g e d f o r w a r d p a n i c .

After the defeat of J a p a n in W o r l d W a r II, the T o k y o W a r Crimes Trial found the c o m m a n d i n g general of all J a p a n e s e forces in central C h i n a

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guilty of the N a n k i n g massacres, along w i t h the p r i m e minister, a n d con- d e m n e d t h e m t o d e a t h . T h e general w h o actually issued t h e o r d e r t o kill all p r i s o n e r s , a n d the staff officer w h o f o r m u l a t e d it, were n o t p r o s e c u t e d ( C h a n g 1 9 9 7 : 4 0 , 1 7 2 - 7 6 ) . After t h e M y Lai m a s s a c r e i n V i e t n a m c a m e to light, the general in charge of the division w a s reduced in r a n k a n d censured for n o t investigating the atrocity p r o p e r l y ; t h e brigade c o m - m a n d e r , along w i t h t h e c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r C a p t . M e d i n a , Lt. Calley, a n d t w o dozen other officers a n d N C O s were b r o u g h t t o trial; only Calley w a s found guilty (Anderson 1 9 9 8 ; Bilton a n d Sim 1 9 9 2 ) . T h e usual legal a n d political reaction to military atrocity typically focuses on the highest- r a n k i n g officers or g o v e r n m e n t officials; the a s s u m p t i o n is t h a t the crucial causal factor is in the chain of c o m m a n d , w h e t h e r for giving direct o r d e r s , or for setting an e n c o u r a g i n g or permissive a t m o s p h e r e , or for n o t ex- erting sufficient c o n t r o l , or for covering u p . W h a t gets o v e r l o o k e d is the e m o t i o n a l dynamics of t h e local s i t u a t i o n , as if the p e r p e t r a t o r s t h e m - selves—virtually all l o w - r a n k i n g fighters—were mere passive c o n d u i t s of orders from a b o v e . This is n o t to say t h e r e m a y n o t also be o r g a n i z a t i o n a l complicity of the kinds listed a b o v e ; b u t these are n o t a sufficient e x p l a n a - t i o n of w h a t h a p p e n s . T h e o r d e r of the J a p a n e s e general at N a n k i n g to kill all the military p r i s o n e r s w a s a catalyst, b u t the conditions for a for- w a r d p a n i c w e r e also present. T h e same is t r u e for C a p t . M e d i n a , u n d e r w h o s e overall c o m m a n d w a s Lt. Calley's p l a t o o n , a n d w h o m a d e a n in- flammatory speech to his t r o o p s the night before. Nevertheless, it w a s only o n e p l a t o o n ( a b o u t twenty-five to thirty men) of t h e t h r e e t a k i n g p a r t i n the assault w h o carried o u t the m a s s a c r e — t h e p l a t o o n t h a t f i r s t entered the village, while the others were held in reserve or sent to n e a r b y t a r g e t s . T h e local e m o t i o n a l c o n t a g i o n w a s the critical element, the sine q u a n o n of t h e a t r o c i t y . 1 4

A n d so is the case w i t h explanations t h a t emphasize other long-term characteristics of the p e r p e t r a t o r s . Scheff (2006: 1 6 1 - 8 2 ) argues t h a t the chief e x p l a n a t o r y condition w a s the hypermasculine personality of Lt. Calley himself: an individual w h o experienced repeated failure t h r o u g h o u t his school a n d w o r k career, including scornful t r e a t m e n t in the a r m y by his c o m m a n d i n g officer. In the light of Scheff's theory of u n a c k n o w l e d g e d shame turning into anger, Calley w a s an emotionally frozen individual w i t h o u t social b o n d s w h o released his repressed anger into a m u r d e r o u s o u t b u r s t , ordering t r o o p s to kill defenseless civilians, a n d killing m a n y of them himself. It should be n o t e d , t h o u g h , t h a t Calley's p l a t o o n h a d perpe- t r a t e d a good deal of violence on civilians in prior p a t r o l operations (as did m a n y other American units), but h a d never unleashed a concerted massa- cre; the local situation of tension buildup a n d the s u d d e n let-down of dis- covering there were no Viet C o n g soldiers in the village w a s the t e m p o r a l scenario t h a t this massacre had in c o m m o n with most others.

1 0 2 • Chapter 3

We see this yet again w i t h e x p l a n a t i o n s of military atrocities t h a t em- phasize c u l t u r a l scorn, prejudice, or r a c i s m directed against t h e enemy p o p u l a t i o n . Such attitudes are w i d e s p r e a d , a n d are intensified in t h e p o - larization of w a r situations; yet it is only in specific scenarios t h a t m a s s a - cres are carried o u t . A u t h o r s like C h a n g (1997) a n d Bartov (1991) attri- b u t e atrocities largely to the ideology of t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s ; b u t f o r w a r d panics occur in a w i d e r a n g e of s i t u a t i o n s , m a n y of w h i c h lack a n y long- t e r m ideology; a n d ideology alone w i t h o u t s i t u a t i o n a l conditions does n o t p r o d u c e f o r w a r d p a n i c . A n d the f o r w a r d p a n i c d y n a m i c m a y b e c o m - bined w i t h o t h e r causal p a t t e r n s , w h i c h m a y e x p a n d t h e atrocity, b o t h i n t i m e , a n d in the kinds of violence carried o u t . 1 5 M i n u s a d d i t i o n a l condi- t i o n s , the f o r w a r d p a n i c m a y be relatively brief a n d c o n t a i n e d ; soldiers m a y b e killed b u t n o t m u t i l a t e d ; w o m e n m a y b e r a p e d b u t n o t subse- quently killed; a criminal suspect m a y be b e a t e n severely, or less s o . These distinctions m a y n o t seem very relevant in t h e public e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n to a n y p a r t i c u l a r atrocity, w h i c h is a l r e a d y b a d e n o u g h , b u t they m a k e a large difference in t h e d a m a g e d o n e .

A S Y M M E T R I C A L E N T R A I N M E N T O F F O R W A R D P A N I C A N D P A R A L Y Z E D V I C T I M S

Detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of the N a n k i n g case gives insight i n t o a n o t h e r fea- t u r e of t h e d y n a m i c s of such massacres. T h e Chinese t r o o p s greatly o u t - n u m b e r e d t h e J a p a n e s e t r o o p s o n t h e scene; once i t b e c a m e a p p a r e n t they w e r e being slaughtered, w h y d i d n ' t the Chinese f i g h t back? A l t h o u g h they generally lacked w e a p o n s , they could h a v e m o u n t e d some resistance a n d at least h a v e gone d o w n fighting, or possibly o v e r p o w e r e d small g r o u p s of J a p a n e s e . In fact, the J a p a n e s e soldiers themselves quickly a c q u i r e d an a t t i t u d e of c o n t e m p t for the Chinese soldiers for passively going to their d e a t h s . This a t t i t u d e e n h a n c e d the feeling of d e h u m a n i z a t i o n , m a k i n g it easier for the J a p a n e s e to c a r r y o u t t h e killing.

A f o r w a r d p a n i c arises in an a t m o s p h e r e of t o t a l d o m i n a t i o n . Initially this comes a b o u t for military r e a s o n s : o n e side moves f o r w a r d in a suc- cessful a t t a c k , the o t h e r disintegrates a n d is u n a b l e to resist. T h e e m o - t i o n a l t u n n e l , the m o o d of slaughter, opens up t h r o u g h recognition of t h a t s i t u a t i o n , n o t s o m u c h r a t i o n a l a n d cognitive a s e m o t i o n a l a n d collective in the b r o a d e s t possible sense. T h e e m o t i o n a l m o o d is i n t e r a c t i o n a l ; it is s h a r e d on b o t h sides. T h e d o m i n a t i o n is e m o t i o n a l even m o r e t h a n physi- cal; t h e victorious side feels ebullient, c h a r g e d u p ; the losing side feels despairing, helpless, frozen, suffocated. These e m o t i o n s circulate a n d re- inforce each other: in a p a i r of feedback l o o p s w i t h i n each b o d y of t r o o p s , the victors p u m p i n g each o t h e r up i n t o t h e frenzy of d e s t r u c t i o n a n d the

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losers demoralizing each other; a n d in a third l o o p c o n n e c t i n g the t w o l o o p s , the victors feed off of the d e m o r a l i z a t i o n of the losers, a n d the losers are emotionally battered still further by the d o m i n a n t s . It is a p r o - cess of asymmetrical e n t r a i n m e n t ; the w i n n e r becomes e n t r a i n e d in its o w n r h y t h m of a t t a c k , a m o n g o t h e r r e a s o n s , because its moves are rein- forced by the moves of the losers. It is a process found, on a m u c h lower level of violence, in the micro-interactional processes of victory a n d defeat in s p o r t s , a n d in d o m i n a t i o n in the subtleties of interaction in everyday life (Collins 2 0 0 4 : 1 2 1 - 2 5 ) . T h e c o n t e m p t u o u s striking o u t , the cruel jokes of the w i n n e r s , are sustained by the cringing despair a n d dull passivity of their victims. T h e f or w ar d p a n i c of one side is fed by the panic paralysis of the other side. It is s o m e t h i n g like a bullying child g r o w i n g m o r e a n d m o r e infuriated at the cringing of a cat he is t o r t u r i n g .

This paralysis of the defeated has been widely d o c u m e n t e d . At the battle of Granicus in 3 3 4 B . C . , the M a c e d o n i a n s trapped the Persians' mercenary infantry in the midst of a general panic retreat of the Persian army. Keegan quotes an ancient historian: " 'They s t o o d , ' said Arrian, 'rather rooted to the spot by the unexpected c a t a s t r o p h e t h a n from serious resolution.' " Keegan goes on to generalize, " T h a t is a p h e n o m e n o n reported time a n d again from battlefields: the rabbit-like paralysis of soldiers in the face of a p r e d a t o r ' s unanticipated onslaught. They were shortly s u r r o u n d e d and hacked d o w n on the s p o t " ( 1 9 8 7 : 8 0 - 8 1 ) . Over t w o millennia later, the pattern is displayed when Yugoslav partisans killed u n a r m e d G e r m a n pris- oners in 1 9 4 4 : "[Ljike most prisoners, the G e r m a n s were as if paralysed, and d i d n ' t defend themselves or try to flee" (Keegan 1 9 9 3 : 5 4 ) .

T h e r e is an element of passivity in atrocities of virtually all kinds. It has often been questioned why the Jews did not fight back against the H o l o - caust, w h y they did n o t at least m a k e a last stand instead of being led mechanically into the gas c h a m b e r s . It is the same p a t t e r n we see with the defeated Chinese in N a n k i n g ; later, w h e n we consider deadly ethnic riots in India a n d m a n y other places, we see again t h a t victims are almost entirely passive, caught in an emotional paralysis t h a t precludes significant resis- tance. T h e victims do n o t fight back at t h a t m o m e n t in t i m e — a l t h o u g h they might have at some previous m o m e n t , in some other interactional situation—because they are t r a p p e d in a collective emotional a t m o s p h e r e . 1 6

In t e a m sports the m e t a p h o r is used of o n e t e a m gaining the m o m e n - t u m , t h e o t h e r t e a m losing it. This is the situation in atrocities a n d violent d o m i n a t i o n in g e n e r a l — t h e victor imposing m o m e n t u m on the loser. H e r e t h e conflict is m u c h m o r e e x t r e m e , b u t t h e r e is a similar m e c h a n i s m of asymmetrical e n t r a i n m e n t in a c o m m o n e m o t i o n a l definition of the situa- t i o n . In atrocities, this m e c h a n i s m is n o t t h e m o o d of sports victory or defeat, b u t ebullient killers feeding off the hopeless passivity of those w h o arc being killed, a n d the victims c a u g h t in helpless shock a n d depression

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by the e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e of those w h o kill t h e m . This seems i r r a t i o n a l , against all self-interest of t h e victims. Nevertheless, it is a factual p a t t e r n t h a t characterizes virtually all major atrocities. H e r e , the social science p h r a s e " b l a m i n g the v i c t i m " does n o t help u s t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t i s going o n . It is n o t simply t h a t t h e victim could, rationally, h a v e b e h a v e d differ- ently a n d t h e r e b y m a d e it m u c h m o r e difficult for t h e attacker. T h e n a t u r e of conflict is n o t o n e of m a k i n g i n d e p e n d e n t , r a t i o n a l decisions—verbal sequences clearly going t h o u g h their m i n d s . Persons m i g h t m a k e such decisions before the c o n t a c t actually begins. O n c e locked in c o n f r o n t a - t i o n , they are c a u g h t up in a s h a r e d e m o t i o n a l field. T h e r e is c o n t a g i o n of e m o t i o n n o t only a m o n g p e r s o n s on the same side of the conflict, b u t a c o n t a g i o n b e t w e e n the t w o a n t a g o n i s t i c sides. It is t h e form of this e m o - t i o n a l c o n t a g i o n a b o v e all t h a t determines w h e t h e r they will fight a n d h o w intensely, w h e t h e r it will be a standoff, a n d w h o will w i n . At ex- t r e m e s , this e m o t i o n a l field t u r n s i n t o a d o m i n a n c e of m i n d a n d b o d y by o n e side t h a t p r o d u c e s atrocities. T h e h o t r u s h a n d overkill of t h e victors is p a r t of t h e same interactional m o o d as t h e s t u n n e d passivity of the victims; b o t h are constitutive of each other. T h i s c a n n o t be explained by characteristics of the individuals themselves, b u t calls for a t h e o r y of vio- lent i n t e r a c t i o n itself.

As yet, we are assembling evidence of a p a t t e r n . T h e explanation will deepen in later chapters, as we p r o b e the micro-interactional mechanisms.

F O R W A R D P A N I C S A N D O N E - S I D E D C A S U A L T I E S I N D E C I S I V E BATTLES

Atrocities of this k i n d , w h e n the d y n a m i c is allowed to build over an extended p e r i o d of t i m e , are truly horrifying. But some degree of atrocity is n o t u n c o m m o n in fighting, because decisive w a r victories generally h a v e c o m e a b o u t w h e n conditions arose c u l m i n a t i n g in a f o r w a r d p a n i c .

A g o o d e x a m p l e is the battle of A g i n c o u r t in 1 4 1 5 . T h e English a r m y of 6,000 or 7 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , m o s t l y a r c h e r s , defeated a French a r m y of a b o u t 2 5 , 0 0 0 , mostly h e a v y - a r m o r e d k n i g h t s , s o m e f i g h t i n g o n h o r s e b a c k , o t h - ers d i s m o u n t e d . T h e F r e n c h lost a b o u t 6,000 dead, t h e English a few h u n d r e d w o u n d e d a n d small n u m b e r s o f d e a d (Keegan 1 9 7 6 : 8 2 - 1 1 4 ) . H o w w a s this possible? H o w did a smaller a r m y beat a larger o n e , a n d suffer p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y far fewer casualties? T h e secret of the size of ar- mies, in an era of h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t , w a s t h a t large n u m b e r s c o u n t e d only if they could actually be b r o u g h t up close to the enemy w h e r e they could strike at h i m . T h e English chose their position in a m e a d o w a few h u n d r e d y a r d s w i d e between t w o w o o d s . T h e m u c h larger French forces a t t a c k e d i n t o this funnel; their front line could be at m o s t a b o u t as n u m e r - ous as the front line of the English, even t h o u g h a m u c h larger g r o u p

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c r o w d e d behind t h e m . T h e initial French a t t a c k of a r m o r e d k n i g h t s on h o r s e b a c k a l m o s t b r o k e t h e English line; it w a s s t o p p e d only because French horses r a n o n t o t h e r o w of s h a r p e n e d stakes t h a t the English h a d driven i n t o the g r o u n d as a defense.

T h e charge, m o m e n t a r i l y terrifying for the English, [by] French m e n - a t - a r m s , twice their height from the g r o u n d , a n d m o v i n g at ten or fif- teen miles an h o u r on steel-shod a n d grotesquely c a p a r i s o n e d war- horses, h a d s t o p p e d only a few feet distant. . . . A n d as they r o d e off, t h e archers, w i t h all t h e violent anger t h a t comes w i t h release from s u d d e n danger, b e n t their b o w s a n d sent fresh flights of a r r o w s after t h e m , bringing d o w n m o r e horses a n d m a d d e n i n g others i n u n c o n - trolled flight. (Keegan 1 9 7 6 : 96)

T h e horses, less well a r m o r e d t h a n their riders, w h o were covered al- m o s t entirely w i t h steel sheet m e t a l , were m o r e likely to have been h u r t , as well as p a n i c k e d . As Keegan (93) n o t e s , the s o u n d of a r r o w s clanking on the a r m o r m u s t have been a w e i r d c a c o p h o n y , having m a i n l y a p s y c h o - logical r a t h e r t h a n physical effect; the strained a t m o s p h e r e w o u l d have been increased by w o u n d e d horses screaming in p a i n . As the French cav- alry m o m e n t a r i l y recoiled, they crashed into their o n r u s h i n g t r o o p s be- h i n d t h e m , creating a massive traffic j a m . Heavily a r m o r e d soldiers fell d o w n a n d w e r e u n a b l e to rise due to the weight of sixty or seventy p o u n d s of armor, a n d by the t r i p p i n g of soldiers falling on each other. W o u n d e d horses t h r a s h e d a b o u t , t r a m p l i n g soldiers a n d w o r s e n i n g the c r u s h .

At this p o i n t , the English rushed f o r w a r d . This w a s a literal f o r w a r d p a n i c ; t h e archers just m i n u t e s before h a d c o w e r e d behind their s h a r p e n e d stakes a s the F r e n c h cavalry b o r e d o w n o n t h e m . O n e m o m e n t they are terrified by the i m p o s i n g French k n i g h t s a d v a n c i n g in a furious r u s h ; the n e x t m o m e n t they see their enemies helplessly tangled a n d lying on t h e g r o u n d . T h e archers r u s h f o r w a r d t o c a t c h t h e m while they are d o w n , s t a b b i n g t h e m w i t h daggers t h r o u g h the chinks in their armor, c h o p p i n g a n d clubbing t h e m to d e a t h w i t h axes a n d mallets used for driving stakes. T h e reserve lines of French t r o o p s , c o m i n g up to join the melee, became e m b r o i l e d in the traffic jam; those w h o could free themselves r e t r e a t e d to a safe distance, w h e r e they s t o o d disheartened for several h o u r s w i t h o u t r e n e w i n g the battle.

On first r e a d i n g of the disparity in casualties between w i n n e r s a n d los- ers in decisive battles, o n e is inclined to a t t r i b u t e the n u m b e r s to p r o p a - gandistic e x a g g e r a t i o n . But the p a t t e r n is found quite generally, a n d ac- cepted b y realistic m o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s w h o m a k e great efforts t o estimate t r o o p n u m b e r s from logistical necessities. T h e disparity in casualties is explained by a c o m b i n a t i o n of t w o p a t t e r n s : First, in m o s t battles t h e r e are relatively few casualties; this follows from the fact t h a t soldiers are

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u n d e r great tension/fear a n d consequently are i n c a p a b l e of d o i n g m u c h d a m a g e . In an o r d i n a r y battle in t h e era before field artillery, w i t h o u t a decisive b r e a k t h r o u g h , casualties w e r e usually a r o u n d 5 p e r c e n t . 1 7 Sec- o n d , t h e great majority of casualties in decisive battles o c c u r r e d at t h e end of the battle, w h e n one side has b r o k e n up i n t o a disorganized r e t r e a t , a n d the other side j u m p s on t h e m as helpless victims of a f o r w a r d p a n i c . T h u s , at A g i n c o u r t , t h e English outkilled t h e F r e n c h by a r a t i o of m o r e t h a n 2 0 : 1 , virtually all of t h e French casualties c o m i n g in the traffic j a m or melee. It is n o t e w o r t h y , t o o , t h a t in this case the surviving F r e n c h t r o o p s , still greatly o u t n u m b e r i n g the English, w e r e d e m o r a l i z e d a n d u n - able to follow up w i t h a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k . This s h o w s t h a t the m o o d of victory a n d defeat in battle is n o t simply a m a t t e r of n u m b e r s , b u t of e m o t i o n - l a d e n p e r c e p t i o n s . If the n o r m a l level of casualties is on t h e o r d e r of 5 percent, it is t r e m e n d o u s l y shocking to t a k e 6 , 0 0 0 casualties o u t of 2 5 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s — s o m e t h i n g like 25 p e r c e n t of o n e ' s side—in a s h o r t p e r i o d of t i m e . This is experienced as a disaster t h a t n u m b s — m o r e or less liter- ally p a r a l y z e s — t h o s e w h o survive it.

T h e r e are n u m e r o u s similar e x a m p l e s . T h e w o r s t defeat of an ancient R o m a n a r m y h a p p e n e d a t C a n n a e i n 2 1 6 B . C . , w h e n C a r t h a g i n i a n forces c o m m a n d e d b y H a n n i b a l m a n e u v e r e d the R o m a n s i n t o being sur- r o u n d e d , disorganized, a n d demoralized, ending w i t h some 5 0 , 0 0 0 - 7 0 , 0 0 0 of 7 5 , 0 0 0 R o m a n s slaughtered. Since the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost 4 , 5 0 0 of 3 6 , 0 0 0 , m o s t l y in the early going, it is a p p a r e n t t h a t virtually all the casualties t o o k place in t h e p h a s e of battle w h e r e the defeated w e r e p u t - ting u p n o resistance (Keegan 1 9 9 3 : 2 7 1 ) . A r d a n t d u Picq ( 1 9 0 3 / 1 9 9 9 : 1 9 - 2 9 ) used C a n n a e as t h e basis for f o r m u l a t i n g his principle t h a t m o s t casualties occur w h e n one side has b r o k e n d o w n a n d h a s lost the a d v a n - tage in m o r a l e to t h e other.

A l e x a n d e r ' s decisive victories over t h e Persians all h a d the same form: huge n u m b e r s of Persians ( 4 0 , 0 0 0 at G r a n i c u s versus 4 5 , 0 0 0 G r e e k s , b u t the former o u t n u m b e r e d t h e Greeks i n cavalry 2 0 , 0 0 0 t o 5 , 0 0 0 ; a b o u t 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 a t Issus versus 4 0 , 0 0 0 ; 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 o r m o r e a t G a u g a m e l a versus 5 0 , 0 0 0 ) s t a n d i n g in defensive f o r m a t i o n against relatively smaller a n d m o r e c o m p a c t bodies o f M a c e d o n i a n t r o o p s ; the former s t r u n g o u t i n long lines, far t o o w i d e for all to engage t h e enemy, a n d generally further e n c u m b e r e d by a static defense, w h i c h k e p t t h e m from swinging a r o u n d to a t t a c k the G r e e k rear. In each case, A l e x a n d e r ' s m o s t aggressive t r o o p s , his p e r s o n a l cavalry a t t a c k i n g in a w e d g e h e a d e d by himself, picked o u t a vulnerable spot, generally near the c o m m a n d p o s t of t h e Persians. H e r e , despite the overall a d v a n t a g e in n u m b e r s of t h e defenders, the i m m e d i a t e r a t i o s were e q u a l , a n d the m o m e n t u m w e n t t o t h e a t t a c k e r s . Keegan ( 1 9 8 7 : 7 8 - 7 9 ) conjectures t h a t the M a c e d o n i a n s h a d already half w o n the battle t h r o u g h a species of psychological w a r f a r e , inferring t h a t t h e Persians t o o k up defensive positions because t h e y w e r e afraid of t h e m .

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A l e x a n d e r did everything possible to increase t h a t fear by e n c o u r a g i n g aggressive p o s t u r i n g by his army, a n d keeping t h e enemy on edge w a i t i n g for t h e a t t a c k . Q u i t e possibly he l o o k e d for t h e m o m e n t w h e n the Persian line w a v e r e d — s i n c e horses have e m o t i o n s t o o , this could h a v e been seen by their q u a v e r i n g — a n d l a u n c h e d his a t t a c k at just t h a t time a n d p l a c e . 1 8

In each of the t h r e e great b a t t l e s — G r a n i c u s n e a r the edge of the Persian territory in Asia M i n o r ; Issus, w h e r e the Persians a t t e m p t e d to keep Alex- a n d e r o u t of the Fertile Crescent; a n d G a u g a m e l a , w h e r e D a r i u s s t o o d to defend his capital at B a b y l o n — t h e Greeks b r o k e up the Persian line, forc- ing t h e c o m m a n d e r to flee a n d setting off a disorderly p a n i c r e t r e a t t h r o u g h o u t t h e entire army. T h e losses w e r e extremely one-sided in each case: a b o u t 50 p e r c e n t of t h e Persians at G r a n i c u s , p e r h a p s even greater losses at the o t h e r t w o battles; the M a c e d o n i a n s ' biggest loss w a s 130 m e n — a fraction of 1 percent (Keegan 1 9 8 7 : 2 5 - 2 7 , 7 9 - 8 7 ) .

A key feature of these battles is t h a t t h e y w e r e decisive. Since this b e c o m e s k n o w n only after the fact, w e need t o c o n s i d e r w h a t m a k e s t h e difference in t h e processes leading up to decisive vis-a-vis non-decisive b a t t l e s . Julius C a e s a r w a s very c o n s c i o u s of t h e difference, a n d his long- t e r m strategy d u r i n g t h e Civil W a r s w a s a i m e d a t b r i n g i n g a b o u t a deci- sive b a t t l e . W h a t w a s a non-decisive battle? Fighting b e t w e e n p h a l a n x e s of i n f a n t r y t e n d e d to be a s h o v i n g m a t c h , w i t h relatively few casualties unless o n e side b r o k e a p a r t ; t h u s m a n y battles of t h e G r e e k city-state era w e r e nondecisive (and t h e small city-states, w h i c h rarely t o o k n e w territory, m a y h a v e been c o n t e n t t o h a v e t h e m so). A n o t h e r t y p e o f n o n - decisive b a t t l i n g w a s s k i r m i s h i n g a m o n g c a v a l r y o r l i g h t - a r m e d , r a p i d l y m o v i n g t r o o p s , o r b e t w e e n s u c h t r o o p s a n d t h e m o r e p o n d e r o u s heavy- a r m e d p h a l a n x e s . Unless t h e f a s t - m o v i n g t r o o p s got t h e infantry d i s o r g a - n i z e d , o r c a u g h t i t b y surprise o r o n t h e m a r c h , t h e result w a s typically t h a t t h e h o r s e m e n o r o t h e r s k i r m i s h e r s w o u l d r e t r e a t w i t h o u t m u c h d a m a g e t o either side. W h e n C a e s a r w a s seeking t o b r i n g a b o u t a full- scale battle in N o r t h Africa in 46 B . C . , his legions w e r e often h a r a s s e d o n t h e m a r c h b y N u m i d i a n t r i b a l h o r s e m e n a n d l i g h t - a r m e d r u n n e r s ; b u t "if no m o r e t h a n 3 or 4 of C a e s a r ' s v e t e r a n soldiers faced a b o u t a n d t h r e w their spears w i t h all their m i g h t a t t h e N u m i d i a n s w h o w e r e b o t h e r i n g t h e m , m o r e t h a n 2 0 0 0 o f t h e m t o o k flight a s o n e m a n ; t h e n w h e e l i n g their h o r s e s r o u n d a t r a n d o m t h e y w o u l d form u p i n line a g a i n , follow at a d i s t a n c e , a n d h u r l their javelins at t h e l e g i o n a r i e s " (Caesar, Civil War, 2 2 6 - 2 7 ) . In a d a y ' s m a r c h of this k i n d , C a e s a r lost ten w o u n d e d , w h i l e inflicting t h r e e h u n d r e d casualties o n t h e enemy. T h e N u m i d i a n s w e r e p r a c t i c i n g a style of fighting a d o p t e d from t r i b a l w a r - fare, r e p e a t e d l y r u s h i n g f o r w a r d a n d deliberately r e t r e a t i n g , a v o i d i n g a full-scale c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

A decisive battle r e q u i r e d a full-scale, set-piece battle between the m a i n forces of b o t h a r m i e s , lined up in f o r m a t i o n on level g r o u n d . Such a battle

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w a s repeatedly offered by either Caesar or his o p p o n e n t s , b u t infrequently accepted; o n e side m i g h t line up on a hillside w h e r e they h a d the a d v a n - tage of fighting d o w n h i l l ; or o n e side m i g h t be bluffing, m a k i n g a display of their forces, while w a i t i n g for the o t h e r to r u n o u t of w a t e r or supplies. T h u s o n e p a r t of m a k i n g a battle decisive w a s t h a t b o t h sides h a d to agree t h a t they w o u l d fight such a battle. A l e x a n d e r in his c a m p a i g n s against the Persians avoided night a t t a c k s or s u d d e n moves t h a t m i g h t give the enemy the excuse of being c a u g h t off g u a r d ; he aimed at creating the p r o p a g a n d a of having w o n a clear victory t h a t w o u l d bring resistance to an end (Keegan 1 9 8 7 : 8 5 - 8 6 ) . In t h e same way, Caesar m a n e u v e r e d , in each of his c a m p a i g n s — t h a t is, a year's fighting season in a p a r t i c u l a r geographical t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s — t o bring t h e c a m p a i g n to an end w i t h a battle t h a t w o u l d conclude t h a t p a r t of the w a r a n d bring political d o m i - n a n c e over t h a t region.

H a v i n g b r o u g h t a b o u t the battle, the a i m w a s t o m a n e u v e r s o a s t o create a p a n i c r e t r e a t in one p a r t of the enemy's forces, w h i c h w o u l d spread to t h e rest of the a r m y a n d t u r n i n t o a situation of f o r w a r d p a n i c . In 48 B . C . , after c a m p a i g n i n g in Greece a n d the lower Balkan peninsula for seven m o n t h s , Caesar fought a full-scale battle against his rival P o m - pey at Pharsalus (Caesar, Civil War, 1 2 3 - 3 0 ) . Caesar h a d 2 2 , 0 0 0 m e n , of w h i c h he lost a b o u t 1,200 (5 percent); P o m p e y h a d 4 5 , 0 0 0 , b u t lost 1 5 , 0 0 0 (33 percent) in t h e battle, w i t h a n o t h e r 2 4 , 0 0 0 (most of the re- m a i n i n g 3 0 , 0 0 0 ) s u r r e n d e r i n g . P o m p e y ' s a d v a n t a g e i n n u m b e r s h a d n o effect because they could n o t all be b r o u g h t into c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy; as w a s typical in such battles, a decisive m o v e m e n t on o n e p a r t of the battlefield set t h e e m o t i o n a l t o n e a n d direction of action for the rest. T h e battle b e g a n w i t h C a e s a r ' s line a t t a c k i n g straight a h e a d ; initially w i t h little effect, typical of p h a l a n x - o n - p h a l a n x , except to clog t h a t p a r t of the battlefield. T h e t u r n i n g p o i n t c a m e w h e n P o m p e y ' s cavalry a t t a c k e d the left w i n g of C a e s a r ' s line, w i n n i n g a local victory a n d a t t r a c t i n g P o m p e y ' s l i g h t - a r m o r e d t r o o p s , the archers a n d slingers w h o m a d e u p the long- distance missile-throwers, t o r u s h f o r w a r d o n t h a t side. A t this p o i n t Cae- sar sent a reserve force to c o u n t e r - a t t a c k ; this w a s successful—a disci- plined p h a l a n x w i t h its hedge of spears could always b e a t cavalry, w h i c h in this case h a d b e c o m e disorganized by their o w n c h a r g e — a n d n o w P o m - pey's cavalry r a n a w a y in a p a n i c , sweeping r e a r w a r d a n d off t h e battle- field. Worse yet, the several t h o u s a n d archers a n d slingers were left ex- p o s e d a n d w e r e all killed. T h e local scene on t h e left w i n g w a s t h u s a classic f o r w a r d p a n i c : after a p e r i o d of tension a n d m o m e n t a r y defeat, C a e s a r ' s t r o o p s sweep f o r w a r d in a killing frenzy against a now-helpless target, c o n t i n u i n g o n w a r d to find n e w victims in the m a i n b o d y of P o m - pey's infantry, w h o are n o w b e c o m i n g disorganized from the flight of their o w n cavalry, a n d are encircled from behind. T h e result is a general

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p a n i c r e t r e a t , w i t h defeated soldiers t h r o w i n g a w a y their w e a p o n s , a n d a considerable p r o p o r t i o n of t h e m cut d o w n in a defenseless p o s i t i o n .

T h e battle o f T h a p s u s , w h i c h b r o u g h t t o a n e n d t h e c a m p a i g n i n n o r t h Africa i n 4 6 B . C . , w a s simpler. C a e s a r ' s a r m y h a d been m a r c h i n g a b o u t Tunisia a t t e m p t i n g to m a k e Scipio's forces leave their garrisons a n d forti- fied c a m p s a n d fight a set-piece battle. He finally achieved this by m a k i n g Scipio a t t e m p t to relieve the siege of a m a j o r city. O n e section of Scipio's t r o o p s w e r e visibly fearful, as they k e p t r u n n i n g in a n d o u t of t h e gates of their c a m p , w a v e r i n g w h e t h e r to give battle; on seeing this, C a e s a r ' s t r o o p s (already lined up for action) could n o t restrain themselves a n d r u s h e d f o r w a r d to a t t a c k . Panic retreat became general, resulting in the u n c o n t r o l l a b l e slaughter t h a t I h a v e described previously. Scipio's a r m y lost 5 , 0 0 0 of a b o u t 3 0 , 0 0 0 or 4 0 , 0 0 0 ; C a e s a r ' s lost 50 of a b o u t 3 5 , 0 0 0 (Caesar, Civil War, 2 3 1 - 3 5 ) . T h e disparity, a n d a b o v e all the b r e a k d o w n in o r g a n i z a t i o n , w a s e n o u g h to bring the entire p h a s e of w a r to an end.

Panic w a s n o t confined t o h u m a n s ; Scipio's w a r - e l e p h a n t s became terri- fied by a hail of a r r o w s a n d slingers' stones, a n d began r a m p a g i n g t h r o u g h their o w n r a n k s , t r a m p l i n g m a n y o f their o w n m e n . A n incident w i t h the elephants brings this far-off battle to life: " A n e l e p h a n t on t h e left w i n g w a s w o u n d e d , a n d m a d d e n e d w i t h p a i n h a d a t t a c k e d a n u n a r m e d c a m p - follower; the a n i m a l p u t its foot on h i m , t h e n knelt on h i m w i t h all its weight, a n d as it w a s crushing h i m to d e a t h , w a v i n g its t r u n k in the air w i t h a m i g h t y t r u m p e t i n g , t h e soldier (from o n e of C a e s a r ' s legions) could n o t e n d u r e the sight a n d felt b o u n d t o confront t h e a n i m a l . W h e n the e l e p h a n t s a w h i m c o m i n g w i t h his s w o r d raised to strike, it left the corpse, w o u n d its t r u n k r o u n d the soldier, a n d lifted h i m right off the g r o u n d . T h e soldier, being the k i n d of m a n w h o t h o u g h t t h a t in a d a n g e r o u s situa- t i o n like this d e t e r m i n a t i o n w a s r e q u i r e d , k e p t h a c k i n g as h a r d as he could w i t h his s w o r d a t the t r u n k i n w h i c h h e w a s w r a p p e d , a n d caused the beast such p a i n t h a t i t t h r e w h i m aside a n d w i t h t r e m e n d o u s noise a n d flurry rejoined the o t h e r e l e p h a n t s " (Caesar, Civil War, 2 3 4 ) . T h e e l e p h a n t acts r e m a r k a b l y like a h u m a n : frightened by the aggressors, it finds a w e a k target to a t t a c k a n d goes i n t o a k i n d of piling o n . T h e legionary acts quite r e m a r k a b l y for t h e t i m e , since a camp-follower could n o t have been m u c h h i g h e r - r a n k i n g t h a n a slave or a despised ethnic, b u t t h e e l e p h a n t ' s a t t a c k strikes the soldier as so a t r o c i o u s t h a t he goes i n t o his o w n counter- a t t a c k — a n d even t h o u g h the e l e p h a n t ' s victim is n o w d e a d . A n d the ele- p h a n t , f i n a l l y b e a t e n b y the superior p o w e r o f h u m a n w e a p o n s — o r the strength of the h u m a n e m o t i o n a l r u s h — e n d s by retreating to the solidar- ity of the o t h e r e l e p h a n t s .

C a e s a r ' s o w n a r m y at times w a s on the receiving end of a f o r w a r d p a n i c . In Greece in 48 B . C . , a m o n t h before his victory at P h a r s a l u s , Cae- sar h a d been carrying o u t a form of t r e n c h w a r f a r e in t h e o p e n field, trying

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t o pin P o m p e y ' s t r o o p s d o w n b y c o n s t r u c t i n g fortifications a r o u n d h i m , w h o i n t u r n dug counter-fortifications, s o m e t h i n g like m o v e s i n t h e J a p a - nese g a m e of " G o . " A battle b r o k e o u t on o n e of these c o n s t r u c t i o n sites, d u r i n g w h i c h C a e s a r ' s a d v a n c i n g cavalry b e c a m e p a n i c k e d a t being t r a p p e d in t h e enemy fortifications, a n d in their r u s h to escape set off a p a n i c a m o n g n e a r b y infantry, m a n y o f w h o m c r u s h e d each o t h e r t o d e a t h by j u m p i n g d o w n into the ditches on t o p of each o t h e r — a version of the traffic j a m at A g i n c o u r t . " T h e r e w a s such confusion, p a n i c a n d flight all a r o u n d t h a t a l t h o u g h Caesar seized t h e s t a n d a r d s of his fleeing m e n a n d o r d e r e d t h e m to h a l t . . . others in their fear even t h r e w a w a y the stan- d a r d s a n d n o t a single m a n h a l t e d " (Caesar, Civil War 1 1 3 - 1 4 ) . Caesar lost a b o u t 1,000 m e n , a b o u t 6 percent of his t o t a l forces, a n d m o r e seri- ously, a b o u t 15 percent of his officers; m o s t of t h e latter w e r e a p p a r e n t l y t r a m p l e d in trying to h o l d back the flight. W h a t likely k e p t this p a n i c from destroying C a e s a r ' s entire a r m y w a s t h a t his t r o o p s w e r e s p r e a d o u t a l o n g a long line of fortifications, so t h a t t h e local event w a s c o n t a i n e d ; a n d his enemy did n o t press t h e a d v a n t a g e quickly, giving Caesar o p p o r t u - nity to r e g r o u p . It w a s , however, r e g a r d e d by all as a defeat, leading Cae- sar t o w i t h d r a w from the entire battlefield.

A v a r i a n t on f o r w a r d p a n i c is t h e post-victory l e t d o w n . W h e n the e n e m y is easily o v e r c o m e or a p o s i t i o n is t a k e n w i t h o u t expected resis- t a n c e , soldiers t e n d to lapse i n t o a m o d e of celebration. "Tension is the n o r m a l state of m i n d a n d b o d y in c o m b a t , " says M a r s h a l l ( 1 9 4 7 : 194). " W h e n the t e n s i o n suddenly relaxes t h r o u g h t h e w i n n i n g of a first objec- tive, t r o o p s are a p t to be p e r v a d e d by a sense of e x t r e m e well-being a n d t h e r e is a p t to ensue laxness in all its forms a n d w i t h all its d a n g e r s . " A relatively i n n o c u o u s e x a m p l e is G r a n t ' s first Civil W a r battle, at Belmont, M i s s o u r i , i n N o v e m b e r 1 8 6 1 , w h e r e his t r o o p s easily p a n i c k e d t h e C o n - federates i n t o r e t r e a t , a n d t h e n spent the n e x t h o u r s celebrating enthusias- tically in the c a p t u r e d c a m p . W h e n the Confederates b r o u g h t in reinforce- m e n t s to c o u n t e r - a t t a c k , it w a s only w i t h difficultly t h a t G r a n t g o t his t r o o p s back i n t o sufficient o r d e r t o r e t r e a t safely ( G r a n t 1 8 8 5 / 1 9 9 0 : 1 7 8 - 85). Battles sometimes t u r n decisive because of a t w o - s t e p p a t t e r n , in w h i c h an initial victory on o n e p a r t of t h e field so disintegrates t h e victori- ous forces t h a t the entire a r m y is left vulnerable to a disciplined counter- a t t a c k in the second p h a s e .

J u s t this p a t t e r n c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e b a t t l e of N a s e b y in t h e English civil w a r i n 1 6 4 5 , i n w h i c h t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y forces achieved their biggest victory over t h e r o y a l i s t s . B o t h sides b e g a n w i t h their infantry i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e line, consisting of m u s k e t e e r s a n d p i k e s m e n , a n d c a v a l r y on t h e flanks. Seen from t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y p o i n t of view, Prince R u p e r t ' s r o y a l c a v a l r y a t t a c k s o n t h e left w i n g , d o m i n a t i n g t h e m o m e n t u m a n d

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r o u t i n g t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y cavalry. M e a n w h i l e i n the m i d d l e , t h e royalist i n f a n t r y a d v a n c e s uphill on a mild slope, slowly in o r d e r to k e e p m a s s e d in line; since the p a r l i a m e n t a r y volleys d o n ' t h a v e m u c h effect—the u s u a l ineffectiveness of c o m b a t firing, especially in t h e m u s k e t e r a — t h e ad- vance r e a c h e s close q u a r t e r s , a t w h i c h t h e royalists p u s h t h e p a r l i a m e n - t a r i a n s slowly b a c k in severe fighting. P a r l i a m e n t does well only on the r i g h t flank, w h e r e C r o m w e l l ' s c a v a l r y a t t a c k s a n d defeats t h e r o y a l cav- alry on t h a t side of the field. T h u s far t h e b a t t l e l o o k s s y m m e t r i c a l : a royalist a d v a n c e o n the left w i n s a n d drives t h r o u g h t h e r e a r a r e a ; r o y a l - ist a d v a n c e in t h e m i d d l e is eventually s t o p p e d ; a p a r l i a m e n t a r y a d v a n c e o n t h e r i g h t w i n s a n d drives t h r o u g h t o w a r d r e a r a r e a (from N a s e b y battlefield h i s t o r i c a l m a r k e r s ) .

T h e crucial difference occurs because the r o y a l cavalry on the left be- comes disorganized in victory; in a frenzy of celebration, t h e h o r s e m e n c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h t o the r e a r t o sack the baggage t r a i n . T h e y h a v e r i d d e n right off the battlefield, losing all f o r m a t i o n , a n d play no m o r e p a r t in the battle, w h i c h is still going on a n d n o w entering its crucial second p h a s e . In c o n t r a s t , C r o m w e l l ' s cavalry on the right, less flamboyant b u t better disciplined, m a i n t a i n s order, or m a n a g e s to r e g r o u p after its victory over t h e royal cavalry o n t h a t w i n g , t u r n s a n d encircles the r o y a l infantry, driving t h e m into a helpless p o s i t i o n in the center. T h e result is a surrender, followed by w i d e s p r e a d killing of prisoners a n d the i g n o m i n i o u s flight of the king, w h o h a d been w a t c h i n g from a n e a r b y hilltop. In a sense, this victory indicates a shift to m o d e r n o r g a n i z a t i o n of w a r f a r e . A l t h o u g h t h e t r o o p n u m b e r s w e r e relatively s m a l l — a r o u n d ten t h o u s a n d o n each side—the p a r l i a m e n t a r y units are well e n o u g h organized so t h a t a second p h a s e of action can be carried o u t after t h e first p h a s e w a s finished; w h e r e a s the royalists, w i n n i n g initially in a b u r s t of f o r w a r d p a n i c , h a v e only one m o v e t o m a k e , a n d n o c o u n t e r t o t h e second m o v e .

F o r w a r d panics w e r e m o s t decisive in w a r f a r e before the firearms era, w h e n t r o o p n u m b e r s w e r e relatively small c o m p a r e d t o m o d e r n armies; battle f o r m a t i o n s p a c k e d h u m a n (and animal) bodies tightly t o g e t h e r ; a n d t r o o p s h a d t o get w i t h i n h a n d - w e a p o n s r a n g e t o d o m u c h d a m a g e . T h e r e are o t h e r w a y s besides f o r w a r d p a n i c t h a t heavy casualties can occur, especially t h r o u g h artillery f i r e a n d long-distance b o m b a r d m e n t . T h e cru- cial p o i n t is t h a t a l t h o u g h massive killing sometimes h a p p e n s in m o d e r n battles w i t h o u t a f o r w a r d p a n i c , such battles are rarely decisive. 1 9 T h e y are n o t the same k i n d of clear-cut d r a m a t i c event, w h i c h on all sides is r e g a r d e d as a c a t a s t r o p h e bringing a w a r or c a m p a i g n to an end. For the m o s t p a r t , these are b l o o d y standoffs, like m o s t of the m o n t h s - l o n g battles of the western front in W o r l d W a r I.

F o r w a r d panics h a v e generally been r e d u c e d to a detail inside a large- scale m o d e r n war. But the p a t t e r n r e m a i n s relevant today. Civilian fighting

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is very similar to ancient battles, or even to tribal w a r f a r e , as we see in the case of gang fights, ethnic riots, a n d police violence. If guns are used in these k i n d s of fights, it is a l m o s t always at close r a n g e , in the f o r w a r d panic/overkill p a t t e r n , a n d casualties in a n y given incident are heavily one-sided. U n d e r optimistic scenarios, m o b i l i z a t i o n of large armies m a y become infrequent; b u t the fighting of ethnic g r o u p s , c r o w d s , a n d police, as well as smaller-scale civilian fights, a n d anti-guerrilla w a r f a r e , leave us squarely in the p a t t e r n w h e r e f o r w a r d panics prevail.

A T R O C I T I E S O F P E A C E

In t h e n o r m a l r o u t i n e s of life inside the m o d e r n state, a m o n o p o l y on violence is claimed by t h e state, while all others are expected to " k e e p the p e a c e " ; state agents themselves are enjoined to k e e p their a u t h o r i z e d violence to the m i n i m u m necessary. But these ideals frequently clash w i t h the m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l dynamics of f o r w a r d p a n i c . T h e resulting atrocities h a v e existed t h r o u g h o u t t h e history of policing, b u t they have b e c o m e objects of t r e m e n d o u s public scandal since the 1 9 9 0 s , w h e n the details of incidents h a v e become m u c h better k n o w n t h r o u g h ballistics tests, video recordings, a n d the b u i l d u p of new s a t t e n t i o n a n d political r e a c t i o n to police violence.

In a famous case in N e w York City in F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 9 , an African street vendor, A m a d o u Diallo, w a s followed into a n a p a r t m e n t h o u s e h a l l w a y by four u n d e r c o v e r policemen. T h e police were a special detail, p a r t of a city-wide p r o g r a m of l o o k i n g aggressively for street criminals; in effect, they w e r e s o m e t h i n g like anti-guerrilla soldiers on p a t r o l , suspicious of everyone in the civilian p o p u l a t i o n . In this case, the police were l o o k i n g for a n e i g h b o r h o o d rapist, w h o s e description resembled t h a t of Diallo. A p p a r e n t l y frightened by their a p p e a r a n c e , Diallo m a d e a s u d d e n m o v e back into the building, w h i c h the officers i n t e r p r e t e d as a furtive sign of guilty flight—or they w e r e just c a u g h t up in the p a t t e r n of chasing w h a t - ever r u n s a w a y ; they r u s h e d f o r w a r d a n d interpreted Diallo's n e x t gesture as pulling o u t a w e a p o n — a l t h o u g h it t u r n e d o u t he w a s r e a c h i n g for his wallet for identification. All four policemen fired, a t o t a l of forty-one bul- lets, of w h i c h nineteen hit their target. This t r e m e n d o u s overkill w a s the central p o i n t of o u t r a g e in the new s m e d i a a n d the p o p u l a r p r o t e s t s t h a t ensued. But consider a n o t h e r p o i n t : the policemen fired at a distance of less t h a n seven feet, b u t half of their bullets m i s s e d . 2 0 This situation has all the m a r k s of a f o r w a r d p a n i c : tension/fear by the police, a s u d d e n r e t r e a t of the a p p a r e n t enemy, a triggering gesture of a p p a r e n t resistance, a h o t r u s h of a t t a c k , m o r e ferocious t h a n a c c u r a t e . T h e police are en- t r a i n e d i n their o w n f i r i n g , u n a b l e t o s t o p .

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C o m p a r e a case t h a t has a s o m e w h a t different b u i l d u p b u t m u c h the same o u t c o m e . In Riverside, California, in D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 8 , a y o u n g black w o m a n r e t u r n i n g from a p a r t y h a d a car b r e a k d o w n at 2 A . M . ( L O S Angeles Times, J a n . 2, 1 9 9 9 ; San Diego Union, Dec. 3 0 , 1 9 9 8 ; USA Today, J a n . 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 ) . Believing herself (with some justification) to be in a d a n g e r o u s n e i g h b o r h o o d , she s t o p p e d at a gas s t a t i o n , locked herself in the car, a n d used her cell p h o n e to call her family for help. Family m e m - bers arrived, b u t the w o m a n h a d g o n e t o sleep, u n d e r the influence o f alcohol a n d d r u g s , a n d t h e y w e r e u n a b l e t o a w a k e n her. They i n t u r n called the police. Because of her feeling of danger, the w o m a n sleeping in the car h a d placed a h a n d g u n on the car seat n e x t to her. T h e police, accordingly, a p p r o a c h e d the car w i t h their guns d r a w n , a n d after u n s u c - cessfully a t t e m p t i n g to w a k e n her, b r o k e the car w i n d o w . In t h e following seconds, the four policemen fired twenty-seven bullets (as indicated by cartridges found at the scene), hitting her w i t h twelve of t h e m . T h e inci- d e n t h a s overtones of a b s u r d i t y — b e i n g killed by one's o w n rescuers; w h a t w a s m o s t shocking t o b o t h the family a n d the public w a s the sheer a m o u n t of firing unleashed. R e a c t i o n to t h e n e w s w a s o u t r a g e in the local black c o m m u n i t y , d e m o n s t r a t i o n s against the police, a n d investigations l a u n c h e d by political authorities. H e r e again the elements of f o r w a r d p a n i c are clear: tension/fear, a s u d d e n trigger, wild firing, overkill.

N u m e r o u s incidents s h o w a similar p a t t e r n . In Los Angeles, M a r c h 1 9 9 8 , a d r u n k e n thirty-nine-year-old w h i t e m a n w a s s h o t 1 0 6 times b y police. H e h a d b e e n sitting o n a freeway r a m p for a n h o u r , t h e n led police cars in a l o w - s p e e d chase at t w e n t y miles an h o u r to a n o t h e r loca- t i o n , w h e r e h e g o t o u t o f his car, a n d w a v e d w h a t t u r n e d o u t t o b e a n air p i s t o l , at times p o i n t i n g it at his h e a d as if to c o m m i t suicide (Los Angeles Times, July 2 6 , 1 9 9 9 ) . T h e large n u m b e r of bullets fired w e r e d u e t o t h e very large n u m b e r o f police cars t h a t h a d a c c u m u l a t e d d u r i n g t h e long standoff. D u r i n g this p e r i o d , police r a d i o d i s p a t c h e r s s p r e a d e r r o n e o u s r e p o r t s t h a t a m a n h a d been f i r i n g a t police h e l i c o p t e r s a n d at d e p u t i e s on t h e g r o u n d . T h e sheer n u m b e r of police called in from different j u r i s d i c t i o n s n o d o u b t b u i l t u p c o n f u s i o n a n d magnified t h e sense of t h r e a t . Some of t h e police bullets hit a p a r t m e n t h o u s e s t w o blocks away. H e r e w e see b o t h wild, i n a c c u r a t e , a n d b y s t a n d e r - t h r e a t e n - ing fire, as well as the t e n d e n c y for r u m o r s to b e c o m e m o r e i n f l a m m a t o r y as t h e links in t h e c h a i n g r o w longer.

After t w o days of a n t i - w a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s at Kent State University i n M a y 1 9 7 0 , N a t i o n a l G u a r d t r o o p s killed four students a n d w o u n d e d nine o t h e r s . D e m o n s t r a t o r s h a d b u r n e d t h e c a m p u s a r m y R O T C build- ing, a n d were t a u n t i n g the g u a r d s m e n , w i t h s o m e students t h r o w i n g r o c k s . In a s u d d e n thirteen-second burst, t h e g u a r d s m e n fired sixty-one s h o t s . O n e of t h o s e killed w a s a s t u d e n t n o t in the d e m o n s t r a t i o n b u t

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passing near-by on her w a y to class. T h e r a t e of casualties to shots fired w a s t h i r t e e n of sixty-one, a b o u t 20 percent, t h e typical p a t t e r n of wild a n d inaccurate fire (Hensley a n d Lewis 1 9 7 8 ) .

Wild firing is n o t confined to police. In a b a n k r o b b e r y in F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 7 i n Los Angeles, t w o r o b b e r s w e a r i n g b o d y armor, a p p a r e n t l y e m - boldened in t h i n k i n g they w e r e invulnerable, engaged in a fifty-six-minute s h o o t o u t w i t h police. T h e r o b b e r s f i r e d 1,100 r o u n d s from a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s ; t w o h u n d r e d police fired a p r o p o r t i o n a t e n u m b e r of bullets in r e t u r n . Eleven officers a n d six bystanders were w o u n d e d , some by friendly f i r e . T h e t w o r o b b e r s were killed; one w a s s h o t t w e n t y - n i n e times. Police reportedly s h o o e d a w a y p a r a m e d i c s a n d let t h e r o b b e r bleed t o d e a t h while h o l d i n g a gun at his h e a d (Los Angeles Times, M a r c h 1, 1 9 9 7 ; San Diego Union, Feb. 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 ) . Both sides engaged in t r e m e n d o u s overfir- ing, m o s t of it i n a c c u r a t e ; a b o u t 1 percent of t h e bullets hit s o m e o n e .

F u r t h e r cases could be a d d e d . My p o i n t , however, is n o t statistical fre- quency, b u t the p a t t e r n found in such cases. M o s t f a m o u s cases are no d o u b t t h o s e t h a t are f o r w a r d p a n i c atrocities; t h u s w e t e n d t o sample o n the d e p e n d e n t variable, a n d miss those circumstances in w h i c h a police arrest or o t h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n did n o t build up to a f o r w a r d p a n i c . I shall deal w i t h this in s u b s e q u e n t c h a p t e r s , especially in c h a p t e r 9, w h e r e we l o o k a t interactions t h a t d o n o t p r o c e e d t o violence.

M o s t of the political o u t r a g e at these cases in the 1 9 9 0 s a n d thereafter h a v e seen t h e m as manifestations of racism. T h e o u t r a g e o u s b e h a v i o r — usually focusing on the overkill, the r e p e a t e d a n d n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n acts of violence—is w h a t d r a w s a t t e n t i o n to these cases. If o n e bullet were fired, or o n e p u n c h t h r o w n , it seems likely t h a t t h e cases w o u l d n o t h a v e at- t r a c t e d as m u c h a t t e n t i o n . O n c e we h a v e publicly defined t h e cases as o u t r a g e s , we are quick to a t t r i b u t e as cause t h e skin color of the police a n d their victims. But t h e d y n a m i c s of f o r w a r d p a n i c are central. Racism m a y sometimes be involved; b u t it is a c o n t i n g e n t factor, w h i c h sometimes sets up the initial s i t u a t i o n . In the Diallo s h o o t i n g , the police w e r e o p - erating in a black n e i g h b o r h o o d t h a t they t o o k as a general sign of danger; their stereotyping of Diallo w a s w h a t created t h e tension a n d the s u d d e n chase into the hallway. But the wild firing a n d overkill is the m e c h a n i s m of f o r w a r d p a n i c , w h i c h exists very widely a n d is n o t confined to racial b o u n d a r i e s . Similarly in t h e Riverside case, the p e r c e p t i o n of a d a n g e r o u s black n e i g h b o r h o o d (shared by the victim herself), a n d the fact t h a t she is perceived as p a r t of it, is w h a t sets up the police o u t b u r s t . We see this again by c o m p a r i n g the v a r i o u s fights t h a t Ty C o b b h a d d u r i n g his life (Stump 1 9 9 4 ) . C o b b w a s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y a racist, in a w a y t h a t few p e o p l e were in t h e late t w e n t i e t h century; as a S o u t h e r n e r in t h e N o r t h a r o u n d the 1 9 1 0 s , he felt affronted w h e n e v e r a black p e r s o n refused to defer to him. Several of his ferocious assaults o c c u r r e d against black ser-

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vice p e r s o n n e l in a hotel, b u t c h e r s h o p , or s t a d i u m . But C o b b ' s fights w i t h w h i t e p e r s o n s , w h i c h were even m o r e frequent t h a n w i t h blacks, h a d t h e same p a t t e r n , c u l m i n a t i n g in p o u n d i n g a n d kicking the defeated o p p o n e n t on t h e g r o u n d . We also find cases of w h i t e - o n - w h i t e f o r w a r d p a n i c in police s h o o t i n g s , such as the a p p a r e n t suicide on the Los Angeles over- pass, t h e students at K e n t State, a n d the b a n k r o b b e r s in b o d y armor.

We see the dynamics of f or w ar d panic b o t h across a n d within a wide variety of ethnic g r o u p s , graphically illustrated in p h o t o s . A r a t h e r small street boy (probably a r o u n d nine to twelve years old), w h o has been caught stealing in an open-air m a r k e t in Kenya in 1 9 9 2 , is being stepped on a n d beaten by t w o adult men, while a c r o w d of at least fifteen m e n in the back- g r o u n d w a t c h . In an all-white instance, a Greek Cypriot in Cyprus in Au- gust 1 9 9 6 , p a r t of a d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t h a d entered the Turkish zone to protest Turkish occupation, becomes separated from his c o m p a t r i o t s , a n d is n o w a lone individual k n o c k e d to the g r o u n d while four m e n swing long sticks at h i m a n d a n o t h e r nine r u s h up to join in the attack. Photos of c r o w d violence, w h i c h I will consider m o r e systematically later, s h o w m u c h the same p a t t e r n across m a n y contexts a n d ethnic c o m b i n a t i o n s .

R a c i a l p r e j u d i c e c a n b e t h e initial factor t h a t builds t e n s i o n a n d sets off a f o r w a r d p a n i c , a n d t h u s t h e p e r c e p t i o n of an atrocity. But f o r w a r d p a n i c h a s its o w n d y n a m i c s a n d o p e r a t e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f r a c i s m . A s n o t e d , f o r w a r d p a n i c i s o n e p r o c e s s t h a t m a y p l a y i n t o a m u l t i - c a u s a l s i t u a t i o n . T h e u p s h o t is n o t a c o m f o r t i n g o n e ; if r a c i s m did n o t exist, police violence a n d similar a t r o c i t i e s w o u l d still occur. R a c i a l a n t a g o - n i s m i s n o t the o n l y w a y t h a t t h e initial t e n s i o n o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n c a n build u p ; w h e r e it is i n v o l v e d , it often is s u p e r i m p o s e d on t h e m o r e g e n e r a l m e c h a n i s m of tension/fear.

C R O W D V I O L E N C E

F o r w a r d p a n i c is frequently involved in violence p e r p e t r a t e d by c r o w d s ( a l t h o u g h n o t in the case of c a r o u s i n g c r o w d s ) . Tell-tale signs are in t h e massive d i s p r o p o r t i o n of strength b e t w e e n the c r o w d a n d its victims, the r h y t h m i c e n t r a i n m e n t in the act of violence itself, the piling on, a n d t h e overkill. But we c a n n o t infer a f o r w a r d panic merely from the results; we need evidence of a p a t t e r n developing in t i m e , the b u i l d u p of tension/fear a n d t h e shift to s u d d e n w e a k n e s s of the victim t h a t opens t h e d a r k t u n n e l d o w n i n t o w h i c h p e o p l e collectively fall.

Ethnic riots usually s h o w just this p a t t e r n . T h e r e are, of c o u r s e , struc- t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s in the b a c k g r o u n d , m o r e l o n g - t e r m in n a t u r e , w h i c h af- fect w h e t h e r ethnic g r o u p s h a v e an a n t a g o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p . 2 1 But ethnic a n t a g o n i s m s d o n o t always o r even for t h e m o s t p a r t lead t o m u r d e r o u s

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Figure 3.4 Kenya market thief stomped by two men while crowd watches (Nai- robi, 1996). AP/World Wide Photos.

r i o t s ; a n d even a m o n g ethnic g r o u p s w h e r e riots sometimes occur, they do n o t o c c u r every day b u t on very special occasions.

An ethnic riot is a sequence of events w i t h a rising d r a m a t i c intensity, m o n o p o l i z i n g a t t e n t i o n a n d impelling p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e p l o t of this d r a m a , in the largest sense, is always the same: u p o n t h e b a c k g r o u n d of

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Figure 3.5 Group attack on fallen victim: Turkish versus Greek Cypriots (1996). Reuters.

a longer-standing t r o u b l e (consider this the p r o l o g u e to Act I), a precipi- t a t i n g event occurs, s o m e t h i n g t h a t o n e ethnic g r o u p t a k e s as a p r o v o c a - t i o n from a n o t h e r g r o u p (Act I). N e x t comes a p e r i o d of lull, a m o o d of o m i n o u s quiet, t h e c a l m before the s t o r m (Act II). T h e n the o u t b u r s t of ethnic violence, the riot claiming its victims, a l m o s t always in one-sided atrocity (Act III). T h e r e can be further acts in the d r a m a , generally in the form of repetitions of Act III, along w i t h occasional counter-actions by the o p p o s i n g g r o u p , a n d interventions b y the authorities w i t h greater o r lesser success. W h a t I w a n t to focus on here is Act II a n d the beginning of Act III, since this is w h e r e the p a t t e r n of t h e f o r w a r d p a n i c is f o u n d .

T h e lull before the s t o r m is a p e r i o d in w h i c h an ethnic g r o u p g a t h e r s itself t o g e t h e r to create a r e s p o n s e to the precipitating event, s o m e t h i n g t h a t it comes to r e g a r d as a p r o v o c a t i o n . T h e p e r i o d of lull usually lasts less t h a n t w o days, a l t h o u g h occasionally u p t o a w e e k ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 8 9 - 9 3 ) . It is a p e r i o d of o m i n o u s calm, o m i n o u s because the prevailing e m o t i o n is a w i d e s p r e a d feeling of tension. In retrospect, we c a n label the t e n s i o n a sense of foreboding of w h a t is going to h a p p e n , an a n t i c i p a t e d a n d p r e l i m i n a r y tension for the fight t h a t is a b o u t to h a p p e n . But it also is t e n s i o n centered on fear of the enemy. T h e precipitating event, in the i m m e d i a t e b a c k g r o u n d , evokes fear: for e x a m p l e , the enemy has just w o n an election t h a t will result in the p e r m a n e n t exclusion of o u r ethnic g r o u p

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from power, or has just m a r c h e d (or has a n n o u n c e d a p l a n to m a r c h ) in a massive procession in a s h o w of force t h r o u g h o u r territory, or has subjugated o u r c o m p a t r i o t s a n d will s o o n a t t a c k the rest of us ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 2 6 8 - 3 2 3 ) .

T h e lull is a p e r i o d of r u m o r ; it is quiet because t a l k is being carried o u t backstage, o u t of public sight, w h i c h is to say o u t of sight of t h e enemy a n d the a u t h o r i t i e s . But it is an a b n o r m a l quiet; p e o p l e stay off t h e streets w h e r e they w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y be; they avoid their n o r m a l p u r s u i t s a n d pleasures. T h e m o o d is c o n t a g i o u s ; t h e very a b n o r m a l i t y of the public scene m a k e s everyone n e r v o u s , wary, a n d careful even if they are no en- thusiasts for prospective violence. A m a s s public m o o d is established; even those at its fringes b e c o m e a w a r e of it, a n d t h a t increases the sense of i m p o r t a n c e a m o n g those w h o are at its core. It is a w i d e s p r e a d c o n t a g i o u s excitement, n o t b o i s t e r o u s a n d s h o u t e d a n d therefore n o t yet ebullient as it will eventually b e c o m e , b u t full of fear a n d tension.

R u m o r has several effects. It looks b a c k w a r d in time a n d o u t w a r d at the enemy, p a i n t i n g t h e m ever m o r e deeply in t h e colors of malice a n d evil. R u m o r e n h a n c e s fear a n d tension. In p a r t it does this by the process of e x a g g e r a t i o n . If the target g r o u p has already g a t h e r e d for a d e m o n s t r a - t i o n or procession, r u m o r claims t h a t violence has already h a p p e n e d ; if they have n o t gathered, r u m o r describes i m p e n d i n g atrocities ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 7 9 - 8 0 ) . R u m o r s play u p ritualistic offenses, a t t a c k s o n sacred reli- gious places, stories of sexual m u t i l a t i o n , such as c a s t r a t i n g m e n or cut- ting off w o m e n ' s b r e a s t s . 2 2 As stories circulate, belief in t h e m g r o w s stronger; they c a n n o t be s h a k e n by official denials; no a c c o u n t t h a t dis- agrees w i t h t h e r u m o r is t a k e n as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . T h e cognition is t h u s m o r e effect t h a n cause of the g r o u p ' s behavior; its r u m o r - m o n g e r i n g is an e m o t i o n a l c o n t a g i o n of d r a w i n g in on itself. T h e c o n t e n t of the r u m o r is just like a D u r k h e i m i a n s y m b o l , an i d e n t i t y - m a r k e r of the mobilized g r o u p . To credit t h e r u m o r is to s h o w oneself a m e m b e r of the g r o u p ; to q u e s t i o n the r u m o r is to place o n e ' s m e m b e r s h i p in question; to reject it is to p u t yourself outside a n d in o p p o s i t i o n to the g r o u p . T h u s t h e r e is a n o t h e r r e a s o n w h y the p e r i o d of lull t a k e s time: it is a p e r i o d in w h i c h real i n t e r a c t i o n a l w o r k is carried o u t , c o u n t i n g up the b a n d w a g o n , issuing subtle a n d eventually entirely n o n s u b t l e t h r e a t s against t h o s e w h o o p p o s e the g r o u p . A t t a c k s o n p e a c e m a k e r s a n d multi-ethnic c o s m o p o l i t a n s are the business of the day, a n d these are usually the first targets in an escalat- ing atrocity (Kaldor 1 9 9 9 ; C o w a r d 2 0 0 4 ; H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 ) . A n d this i s a n o t h e r feature t h a t m a k e s t h e lull a p e r i o d of g r o w i n g tension.

R u m o r also begins to l o o k f o r w a r d , first in w o n d e r i n g w h a t will h a p - p e n n e x t ; in fear of w h a t t h e enemy will d o ; a n d increasingly in a p l a n to d o s o m e t h i n g t o p r e e m p t , t o s t o p t h e e n e m y before they can c o m m i t great evil u p o n us. R u m o r - m o n g e r i n g becomes p l a n n i n g , shifting from atrocity-

Forward Panic • 119

m o n g e r i n g to p r e m o n i t i o n s t h a t s o m e t h i n g is to be d o n e , it will be d o n e , people are g a t h e r i n g , some of t h e m y o u m a y k n o w yourself, s o m e o n e c a n tell you w h e r e it will h a p p e n . R u m o r is n o t merely cognition, b u t action; it is the action of s p r e a d i n g c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g p e o p l e , getting t h e m fo- cused on a c o m m o n p o i n t of a t t e n t i o n , a n d in the process getting t h e m focused u p o n themselves as a g r o u p . T h e r u m o r i n g process itself m a k e s people feel they are t a k i n g p a r t in a larger c u r r e n t , s o m e t h i n g larger t h a n themselves; a n d therefore s o m e t h i n g strong, s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be victo- rious if it takes a c t i o n . T h e r u m o r - s p r e a d i n g p h a s e , w h e n it is successful, w h i c h is to say w h e n it creates a b a n d w a g o n effect w i t h large n u m b e r s joining in, is a process of m o b i l i z a t i o n .

T h e b u i l d u p of tension is equivalent to the first stage of a f o r w a r d p a n i c . An ethnic riot is a larger-scale tension-and-release p a t t e r n t h a n a small- scale fight or police action or even military action in t h e midst of a b a t t l e ; it takes m o r e time a n d s p r e a d s over m o r e peopl e. It t a k e s m o r e time be- cause it is a collective process in w h i c h p e o p l e try to bring as m a n y allies as possible into the action. It c a n be r e g a r d e d as a meso-level t e n s i o n - a n d - release p a t t e r n ; m o r e s p r e a d o u t on the side of the tension, b u t sometimes in the time p e r i o d of release t o o , a l t h o u g h the m o m e n t of t r a n s i t i o n is t h e same falling i n t o the m o u t h of t h e t u n n e l t h a t we have seen before.

T h e o n r u s h i n g release of tension into m o b violence is heavily one-sided. H o r o w i t z ( 2 0 0 1 : 3 8 5 - 8 6 ) estimates t h a t 8 5 - 9 5 percent o f d e a t h s i n ethnic riots are on one side. This implies t h a t the victims do n o t fight back, even t h o u g h i n a n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n a n d l o c a t i o n 2 3 the a t t a c k m a y have gone successfully in the o p p o s i t e direction. T h e p a t t e r n is again like t h a t of f o r w a r d p a n i c : the surge of violence against a l m o s t entirely helpless vic- tims; a n d the victims are n o t only militarily defenseless in t h a t i m m e d i a t e location a n d s i t u a t i o n , b u t are emotionally passive, i n c a p a b l e of m o u n t - ing a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k . 2 4

T h e m o m e n t of the a t t a c k itself often becomes a m o o d of high excite- m e n t a n d even fun. T o r t u r e a n d m u t i l a t i o n m a y be p e r f o r m e d in a m o o d of hilarious, " m a l e v o l e n t frivolity" ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 1 1 4 ) . In the i m m e d i - ate post-riot p e r i o d , there is an absence of r e m o r s e , defining the incident a s w h a t H o r o w i t z (366) calls " t h e m o r a l m a s s m u r d e r . " T h e t w o fea- t u r e s — g r o t e s q u e enjoyment a n d display of cruelty, a n d t h e lack of m o r a l culpability a f t e r w a r d — a r e especially l o a t h s o m e to outsider observers; b u t t o g e t h e r they give a clue to t h e underlying process. As Lt. C a p u t o writes a b o u t t h e aftermath of a V i e t n a m w a r a t r o c i t y / f o r w a r d p a n i c , there w a s "a dreamlike quality to the last p a r t of the battle . . . (so that) some of us h a d a difficult time believing t h a t we were the ones w h o h a d caused all t h a t d e s t r u c t i o n " ( C a p u t o , 1 9 7 7 : 2 8 9 ) .

P e r p e t r a t o r s of this kind of violence have been in a hermetically sealed zone of socially s h a r e d e m o t i o n , a special reality t h a t n o t only o v e r p o w e r s

1 2 0 • Chapter 3

all o t h e r m o r a l sentiments at the m o m e n t , b u t c a n n o t be p e n e t r a t e d by m e m o r y or m o r a l j u d g m e n t from outside even in retrospect. This sealed e m o t i o n a l enclave, w h a t I h a v e referred to as going d o w n into the t u n n e l , also explains t h e peculiar m o o d of e x a l t a t i o n t h a t is felt while inside it. Hilarity a n d frivolity in the m o s t e x t r e m e cruelty are p a r t of the feeling of being in a special reality, in a z o n e t h a t is cut off from o r d i n a r y m o r a l - ity; the very sense of the b r e a k from w h a t preceded is p a r t of t h e sense of e x a l t a t i o n t h a t comes o u t l o o k i n g like diabolical g o o d h u m o r . It is d o u b t - ful w h e t h e r this m o o d carries o v e r — d o u b t f u l t h a t p e r p e t r a t o r s of these, h o r r o r s c a n r e m e m b e r t h e m in the same m o o d of a hilarious g o o d time; like the d r e a m - w o r l d , it is hermetically sealed from later recollection.

M o b violence of this k i n d is a version of piling-on a t e m p o r a r i l y w e a k victim. T h e emphasis here s houl d be on temporarily. T h e starting p o i n t of the ethnic hostility, a n d the precipitating incident, typically is p e r c e p - t i o n of a s t r o n g enemy; the t h r e a t e n i n g quality of t h e e n e m y is w h a t begins the process of fear a n d tension. H o r o w i t z ( 2 0 0 1 : 1 3 5 - 9 3 ) m a r s h a l s evi- dence to s h o w t h a t ethnic rioters do n o t pick ethnic g r o u p s as targets simply because they are w e a k ; they do n o t displace their frustration from e c o n o m i c or o t h e r p r o b l e m s o n t o a conveniently w e a k scapegoat. To the c o n t r a r y : t h e r e is no c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h the e c o n o m i c success of t a r g e t g r o u p s , either as superiors targeted by jealousy, or inferiors easy to de- s p i s e . 2 5 Targets of ethnic violence are perceived as s t r o n g , aggressive, a n d i m m i n e n t l y t h r e a t e n i n g . But they are a t t a c k a b l e because they are found in a local s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t h e y can be safely a t t a c k e d ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 2 2 0 - 2 1 , 3 8 4 - 9 4 ) . T h a t m e a n s choosing a n e i g h b o r h o o d o r business dis- trict w h e r e the enemy is n o t mobilized—often the n o n - c u l p a b l e , m o r e peaceful cousins of t h o s e w h o m o u n t e d the p r o v o c a t i o n ; a region t h a t is n e a r b y the staging area of the a t t a c k i n g g r o u p , easily accessible a n d also allowing easy r e t r e a t in case of resistance or g o v e r n m e n t intervention. A favorite site is to a t t a c k targets in areas of m i x e d ethnicity, w h e r e the a t t a c k e r s have a s t r o n g m a j o r i t y . 2 6 A t t a c k e r s are g o o d , t o o , at m o n i t o r i n g the a u t h o r i t i e s , seeking signs of their tacit a p p r o v a l or judging their p a s t p e r f o r m a n c e of slackness or inefficiency in p u t t i n g d o w n a r i o t . A t t a c k e r s l o o k for their w i n d o w in time a n d space, a n d exploit it. In this respect they are like armies, seeking local superiority; in b o t h cases, the l a u n c h i n g of a successful a t t a c k typically has the c h a r a c t e r of a f o r w a r d p a n i c .

T h e seeking o u t of w e a k targets is one of the activities in the p e r i o d of lull. Along w i t h r u m o r , the action begins to be mobilized; small g r o u p s of activists, feeling themselves e m p o w e r e d by the gathering c o m m u n i t y t h a t will s o o n spring into a c t i o n , s t a r t to reconnoiter, to find the targets they will a t t a c k . H o u s e s w h e r e the enemy live, shops t h a t they o w n , are n o t e d a n d m a r k e d o u t by signs or spots of p a i n t . This kind of activity, along w i t h the ability of attackers to calculate realistically on the b e h a v i o r

Forward Panic • 121

of the police a n d of their victims, t e n d s to s u p p o r t the side in the d e b a t e between theorists w h o see violence as r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t of interests, as against those w h o see it as e m o t i o n a l a n d expressive. But people always act w i t h a c o m b i n a t i o n of r a t i o n a l calculation a n d socially based e m o t i o n . A f o r w a r d panic is a z o n e in time w h e r e the e m o t i o n a l impulses are over- w h e l m i n g , above all because they are s h a r e d by everyone: by one's s u p - p o r t e r s a n d fellow a t t a c k e r s , a n d in a reciprocal way, by the passive vic- t i m s . A f o r w a r d p a n i c is a p e r i o d of r o a r i n g d o w n i n t o a t u n n e l . But t h e r e can be considerable foresight a n d calculation in finding the m o u t h of the t u n n e l . 2 ' It is t h e same w i t h a r m y a n d police f o r w a r d p a n i c s ; d u r i n g the p e r i o d of tension b u i l d u p , t h e r e is m u c h r a t i o n a l calculation of practical action t h a t leads to the b r i n k of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . F o r w a r d panics, w h e n they h a p p e n , have the look of being o u t of c o n t r o l , so far o u t of the z o n e of n o r m a l b e h a v i o r t h a t they look archetypally i r r a t i o n a l . Yet n o r m a l action a n d n o r m a l calculation is w h a t leads to the o p e n i n g of t h e t u n n e l .

D E M O N S T R A T O R S A N D , C R O W D - C O N T R O L F O R C E S

T h e f o r w a r d p a n i c p a t t e r n is also characteristic of violence t h a t occurs d u r i n g organized d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , b o t h on the side of the d e m o n s t r a t o r s a n d on the side of police or military forces m a r s h a l e d to c o n t r o l t h e m . D e m o n s t r a t i o n s often mass large n u m b e r s of p e r s o n s . But w h e n violence b r e a k s o u t , in the vast majority of instances the serious d a m a g e does n o t occur in a h e a d - o n collision of t w o masses. Like evenly m a t c h e d armies, d e m o n s t r a t o r s a n d their official o p p o n e n t s generally get into standoffs, t a u n t i n g one a n o t h e r (in the m o d e r n situation of police c r o w d c o n t r o l , the t a u n t i n g typically occurs on at first only on one side, as the a u t h o r i t i e s stand in m o r e fixed bureaucratically controlled order) (figures 3.6 a n d 3.7).

C r o w d s of d e m o n s t r a t o r s a n d c r o w d - c o n t r o l forces very m u c h resem- ble armies in the era of p h a l a n x f o r m a t i o n s , a n d their fighting, w h e n it b r e a k s o u t , typically looks like the shoving m a t c h e s t h a t characterized m o s t p h a l a n x fighting. T h u s in some p h o t o s we see mild violence oc- curring w h e n b o t h d e m o n s t r a t o r s a n d c r o w d - c o n t r o l forces k e e p their organized lines intact while they physically clash. In such cases, police use their b a t o n s t o strike r a n d o m l y a t d e m o n s t r a t o r s w h o p u s h i n t o their police line (or are p u s h e d , or even inadvertently stumble i n t o c o n t a c t ) ; this is like a version of the p h a l a n x - m e l e e , a n d t e n d s to cause relatively little d a m a g e , for the same r e a s o n s t h a t p h a l a n x e s are n o t c a p a b l e of very m u c h serious fighting as long as the lines stay together. O n e w a y in w h i c h this comes a b o u t is w h e r e t h e police m a n e u v e r d e m o n s t r a t o r s into an enclosed space, such as cutting off their escape in all directions from an

122 • Chapter 3

Figure 3.6 Standoff between crowd-control forces and aggressive edge of protest- ers (Serbia, 2000). AP/World Wide Photos.

intersection or plaza. T h i s forces the d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n t o a crush, at the perimeter of w h i c h police c a n club individual d e m o n s t r a t o r s as they t r y t o escape. A n e x a m p l e i s t h e M a y D a y d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i n L o n d o n (de- picted in p h o t o g r a p h s in the Daily Mail a n d the [London] Times, M a y 2, 2 0 0 1 ) . M o s t of the d e m o n s t r a t o r s l o o k frightened a n d crushed; a few individuals kick or p u n c h at the police lines, while the police strike o u t w i t h b a t o n s . T h e press did n o t depict the police b e h a v i o r as an atrocity. T h i s sort of c r o w d violence, a l t h o u g h painful to t h e individuals w h o get beaten, a n d an u n p l e a s a n t crush as well as a frightening experience for o t h e r s , does n o t l o o k very spectacular in the eyes of journalists a n d o b - servers, a n d does n o t usually get m u c h publicity. In p a r t this is because f o r w a r d panics do n o t get going a s . l o n g as t h e c r o w d s stay massed on b o t h sides; the situation is n o t set up for the sustained, e m o t i o n a l r u s h of a t t a c k t h a t has such an ugly l o o k .

A n o t h e r relatively rare but spectacular p a t h w a y from standoff to vio- lence results in m o r e casualties because the authorities, m u c h m o r e heavily a r m e d t h a n the d e m o n s t r a t o r s , open fire w i t h guns or other w e a p o n s . A famous historical instance in the Russian Revolution h a p p e n e d in Peters- burg in July 1 9 1 7 at a big m a r c h u n d e r c o m m u n i s t leadership against the r e s u m p t i o n of participation in the w o r l d war. Figure 3.8 shows the m o m e n t t h a t t r o o p s suddenly fired on the marchers; we see some of the c r o w d scat- tered in all directions a w a y from the fire, some have fallen, while m o s t of the c r o w d huddles against the buildings. T h e a r m e d forces u n d e r g o a for-

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Figure 3.7 Two rock-throwers in front of crowd of demonstrators; rear part of crowd is turned away from action (Genoa, July 2001). AP/World Wide Photos.

w a r d panic of their o w n ; the tension of a p r o t e s t is suddenly b r o k e n by firing t h a t m a y start w i t h just o n e soldier a n d t h e n is rapidly taken up in a wave of shooting t h a t sweeps up all of them. Unlike d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w h e r e the lines stay intact, these are very d r a m a t i c events, sometimes historical t u r n i n g points. It is the panicky b r e a k u p t h a t conveys this impression, since it is easily construed either as a massive victory or a massive atrocity. In

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Figure 3.8 Crowd breaks up as soldiers fire machine-guns (Petrograd, July 1917).

the Petersburg "July d a y s , " the m o m e n t u m of the rebellion w a s b r o k e n , a n d by the next day a c r a c k d o w n on dissidents w a s successfully enforced, driving the communists into hiding (Trotsky 1 9 3 0 : chapter 2 5 ) . Or the press a n d public can interpret a similar p a t t e r n of one-sided b r e a k d o w n as an atrocity calling for massive counter-mobilization. A turning point in the civil rights m o v e m e n t occurred in Selma, A l a b a m a , on M a r c h 7, 1 9 6 5 , w h e n police attacked civil rights m a r c h e r s w i t h clubs a n d dogs, injuring sixty-seven of six h u n d r e d m a r c h e r s (Gilbert 2 0 0 0 : 3 2 3 ) . Publicity galva- nized Congress a n d the president to pass a voting rights act as sympathy s w u n g irretrievably against the segregationists.

Yet the d r a m a t i c effect is n o t based simply on the n u m b e r of casualties. In P e t e r s b u r g , t h e casualties were n o t large: a b o u t six or seven killed a n d t w e n t y w o u n d e d ; if the c r o w d w a s ten t h o u s a n d or m o r e , less t h a n 0.3 percent. A t Selma, n o o n e w a s killed, a n d injuries a m o u n t e d t o a b o u t 1 0 - 1 1 percent of t h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s . In military t e r m s , these w e r e light casualties, n o t significant for the m a t e r i a l strength of the o p p o s i t i o n . W h a t w a s i m p o r t a n t for the m o m e n t u m swing w a s t h e d r a m a t i c image of one side being e m o t i o n a l l y terrorized by t h e other. In d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , violence provides the coup de theatre. But the violence m u s t be d r a m a t i - cally clear-cut, susceptible to one of t w o kinds of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s : soldiers fired a n d dispersed the u n r u l y c r o w d , preserving o r d e r ; or a u t h o r i t i e s at- t a c k e d peaceful m a r c h e r s , causing indiscriminate c a r n a g e . In either case, it is the image of the c r o w d b r e a k i n g up in t e r r o r t h a t becomes the socially p r o p a g a t e d reality, n o t the actual c a s u a l t i e s . 2 8

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But m o s t c o m m o n of all forms of c r o w d violence is yet a n o t h e r p a t t e r n , w h e r e b o t h sides act in a n o n - h e r o i c way. H e r e the sordid details do n o t m a k e g o o d t h e a t e r a n d do n o t lend themselves to clear-cut political inter- p r e t a t i o n s . T h e m o s t typical w a y in w h i c h serious h a r m is d o n e by either side is because the m a s s f o r m a t i o n s h a v e b r o k e n up i n t o small g r o u p s , t h e overall c o n f r o n t a t i o n t u r n i n g i n t o a series of small c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . This generally h a p p e n s i n t w o p h a s e s . First, the d e m o n s t r a t o r s b r e a k u p into little clusters. Sometimes these are little roving s q u a d s of violent activ- ists, t h r o w i n g stones or o t h e r projectiles. For e x a m p l e , figure 3.9 s h o w s a d e m o n s t r a t i o n in September 2 0 0 2 in Buenos Aires d u r i n g a presidential crisis, w h e r e a cluster of six m e n are r u n n i n g f o r w a r d on a street littered w i t h c o b b l e s t o n e s . T h e t h r e e m o s t m i l i t a n t are w i t h o u t shirts, i n t h e act o f t h r o w i n g r o c k s , while t w o follow t h e m i n s u p p o r t , a n d a n o t h e r one slightly to t h e side (possibly n o t c o n n e c t e d w i t h this cluster) is in a p o s t u r e of shrinking b a c k . An o p p o s i n g cluster of a b o u t ten helmeted police are visible r u n n i n g up behind t h e m a b o u t t w e n t y y a r d s a w a y ; while a few s p e c t a t o r s — p e r h a p s less militant m e m b e r s of the original d e m o n s t r a - t i o n — a r e scattered in the distance.

So far, these little clusters are likely to p e r f o r m the usual i n c o m p e t e n t violence, m a k i n g a s h o w of b r a v a d o , b u t m o s t l y missing their targets or occasionally hitting s o m e o n e (not necessarily t h e o n e aimed at) by acci- dent. They b e c o m e truly d a n g e r o u s w h e n their m a n e u v e r i n g t h r o u g h the streets results in little local situations of o v e r w h e l m i n g a d v a n t a g e . N o w a g r o u p of police finds itself beating a single d e m o n s t r a t o r , or a g r o u p of d e m o n s t r a t o r s beating a single p o l i c e m a n or soldier. D e m o n s t r a t o r s w r e a k serious violence only w h e n they get a few cops or soldiers isolated from the m a s s in s o m e t h i n g like a four to one or eight to one r a t i o ; the single representative of a u t h o r i t y m a y still be a r m e d , b u t is unwilling to use his w e a p o n s , c a u g h t in the passivity t h a t befalls victims of a m u c h larger a n d m o r e energized g r o u p bearing d o w n on h i m in a f o r w a r d p a n i c . These m i n i - c r o w d s become active w h e r e they catch an enemy in a vulnera- ble position, cut off from s u p p o r t a n d s u r r o u n d e d , u n a b l e to decide w h i c h w a y to face, so he ends up covering his h e a d , c r o u c h i n g or falling to the g r o u n d , w h e r e u p o n t h e c a p t o r s r a i n d o w n a series of kicks a n d b l o w s , sometimes w i t h m e t a l bars a n d o t h e r w e a p o n s . A p h o t o (not s h o w n ) from t h e o v e r t h r o w of the Serbian dictator Milosevic in Belgrade in O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 s h o w s four m e n lunging at a single riot p o l i c e m a n w h o a t t e m p t s to cover his h e a d w i t h his a r m s , m a k i n g no a t t e m p t to reach for his holstered pistol; while t w o of his assailants a t t e m p t to trip or tackle h i m , a n d several swing at h i m w i t h stick a n d tire irons (Daily Telegraph, O c t . 6, 2 0 0 0 ) .

Police violence versus d e m o n s t r a t o r s is a m i r r o r image of the a b o v e : t h e orderly m a r c h or picket line of d e m o n s t r a t o r s breaks up i n t o little p o c k e t s , typically w h e n they are r u n n i n g a w a y from a police c h a r g e . Little

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Figure 3.9 Cluster of rock-throwers in Argentina demonstration (2002). AP/World Wide Photos.

c l u m p s of police g a t h e r a r o u n d a single d e m o n s t r a t o r , beating h i m or her w i t h nightsticks. This is depicted in a p h o t o (not s h o w n ) of a d e m o n s t r a - t i o n of u n e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s in Buenos Aires in July 2 0 0 2 (The Australian, J u n e 2 8 , 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s are r u n n i n g from a police charge; m a n y c o w e r against walls a l o n g the sidewalk, while in t h e street it is t h o s e w h o have fallen t o the g r o u n d , p r e s u m a b l y b y s t u m b l i n g i n the chase, w h o are being b e a t e n b y police a r m e d w i t h b a t o n s .

These m i n i - c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are destructive because each little e n c o u n t e r becomes the d e n o u e m e n t of a f o r w a r d p a n i c : First, a p e r i o d of tension, building up d u r i n g the m a s s e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; the e m o t i o n s are initially just a n t i c i p a t i o n , w a i t i n g for s o m e t h i n g to h a p p e n ; or in case of police, simmering o u t r a g e at the affront to their a u t h o r i t y ; these c a n be m i x e d

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w i t h fear, w h i c h g r o w s w h e n violence e r u p t s , even in small a m o u n t s , a n d also w h e n the crush of bodies becomes m o r e intense. Serious violence starts w i t h a s u d d e n b r e a k t h a t galvanizes b o t h sides i n t o r a p i d action. T h e p r e c i p i t a n t of violence is at t h o s e locations w h e r e tension is followed by a perceived w e a k n e s s of w h a t h a d m o m e n t s before been a massed enemy. Typically this comes from the p r o b l e m of m o v i n g bodies r a p i d l y in a c r o w d , w h i c h b r e a k s its o r d e r l y lines; sometimes it is literally a traffic j a m , like the battle of A g i n c o u r t , w i t h d e m o n s t r a t o r s — o r p o l i c e — t r i p p e d up a n d fallen on t h e g r o u n d . It is precisely the fallen ones, those w h o are n o t agile e n o u g h to get o u t of the w a y or to k e e p in a defensible p o s t u r e w i t h their c o m p a t r i o t s , w h o b e c o m e t h e object o f a t t a c k . 2 9

These processes are illustrated by a description of a M a y D a y d e m o n - s t r a t i o n of radical w o r k e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s in Berlin, in t h e late 1 9 9 0 s (Stefan K l u s e m a n n , u n p u b l i s h e d paper, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 2 0 0 2 ) . A b o u t seven h u n d r e d d e m o n s t r a t o r s m a r c h e d on a r o u t e g u a r d e d by mass r a n k s of a b o u t twenty-five h u n d r e d policemen; b o t h sides k e p t up a high level of noise, a m o u n t i n g to a u d i t o r y assault: t h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s blaring speeches a n d music from l o u d s p e a k e r s m o u n t e d on cars, as well as singing a n d beating d r u m s ; t h e police c o u n t e r e d w i t h sirens a n d repeating o r d e r s b y their o w n l o u d s p e a k e r s . W h e n the d e m o n s t r a t i o n r e a c h e d its t r a d i - tional ending point—a small plaza s u r r o u n d e d by n a r r o w streets— massed walls of police closed in, pressing the d e m o n s t r a t o r s to disperse by s t a n d i n g s h o u l d e r to s h o u l d e r b r a n d i s h i n g shields a n d clubs. T h e ten- sion w a s broken w h e n one d e m o n s t r a t o r ran at high speed across the plaza, thereby setting off a rush in the c r o w d to escape. In o t h e r w o r d s , some of the d e m o n s t r a t o r s w e n t into a panic retreat, at which m o m e n t the police line surged forward to chase t h e m . Police s w u n g their sticks at d e m o n s t r a t o r s r u n n i n g by t h e m , a n d rushed forward in little g r o u p s of three or four hitting those w h o m they c a u g h t , t h r e a t e n i n g and repeatedly striking those w h o fell to the g r o u n d .

Some of the d e m o n s t r a t o r s , in r e t u r n , having reached the shelter of the smaller streets, s t o p p e d to pick up cobblestones to t h r o w at the police. T h e very advance of the police, n o w chasing little g r o u p s of d e m o n s t r a - tors instead of tunneling a solid line of m a r c h e r s , had b r o k e n up the police line. In some places across the fighting front, police had gotten isolated in ones or t w o s , becoming locally o u t n u m b e r e d by d e m o n s t r a t o r s , w h o w o u l d attack t h e m in g r o u p s of four or m o r e . W h e n c a u g h t in this posi- t i o n , the police w o u l d go on the defensive, cowering behind their shields. As larger n u m b e r s of police a p p r o a c h e d within a b o u t thirty meters, the d e m o n s t r a t o r s w h o h a d been boldly a t t a c k i n g w o u l d scatter a n d r u n ; some of these w o u l d become isolated a n d a t t a c k e d in t u r n by g r o u p s of three or four police, w h o w o u l d push a lone individual to the g r o u n d , sitting on him a n d hitting him with their b a t o n s while arresting him (these

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were little series of R o d n e y K i n g - t y p e incidents). This w e n t on recipro- cally, wherever d e m o n s t r a t o r s or police h a d local superiority of n u m b e r s to a t t a c k a w e a k victim. Since on the w h o l e the police h a d greater c o h e - sion a n d better a r m a m e n t , they ended up inflicting m o r e violence, while t a k i n g just e n o u g h h a r m of their o w n to incite t h e m to a t t a c k vociferously w h e r e they could.

F o r w a r d panics are typical in situations w h e r e a g r o u p has o v e r w h e l m - ing local superiority in n u m b e r s a n d strength, following a s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a m o n g organized c r o w d s h a s built up tension. T h e large-scale standoff provides the tension; the b r e a k i n g up into little p o c k - ets provides t h e s u d d e n release. T h i s is t h e m o s t typical scenario w h e r e serious injury is d o n e . Very c o m m o n l y p h o t o s of this k i n d of c r o w d event s h o w a g r o u p a t t a c k i n g a single individual, w h o is usually d o w n on the g r o u n d a n d u n a b l e t o defend h i m o r herself. Examples include n u m e r o u s incidents p h o t o g r a p h e d or described d u r i n g the riots in Los Angeles a n d elsewhere in 1 9 9 2 , following the a c q u i t t a l verdict in the R o d n e y King beating trial, s h o w i n g individuals—white or Asian—being a t t a c k e d by g r o u p s of y o u n g black m e n (Reuters p h o t o s , M a y 1, 1 9 9 2 ) . Similar p a t - terns are found a r o u n d the w o r l d , in m a n y different ethnic c o m b i n a - t i o n s . 3 0 W h a t is c o n s t a n t is the r a t i o : usually in clusters of three or four o n o n e .

This seems to be the archetypal r a t i o . M o s t m e m b e r s of c r o w d s (like m o s t soldiers) are only b a c k g r o u n d participants, a n d the small fighting elite is ineffective in equal confrontations w i t h their c o u n t e r p a r t s on the other side. H e n c e , most instances of effective violence boil d o w n just to t h e m , w h e n they can find isolated victims—at a r a t i o of a b o u t four to one.

T H E C R O W D M U L T I P L I E R

F o r w a r d p a n i c - l i k e p a t t e r n s c a n be found in conflicts as small as o n e - o n - o n e e n c o u n t e r s ; this typically h a p p e n s , as we shall see in the n e x t chapter, w h e r e the o v e r w h e l m i n g a d v a n t a g e of aggressor over victim comes from big differences in size a n d strength, such as adults versus children. T h e m o s t b l a t a n t cases of f o r w a r d p a n i c , however, are in g r o u p s , w h e r e the a d v a n t a g e is the big g r o u p against the isolated individual, or the a r m e d force against the u n a r m e d or t e m p o r a r i l y disarmed o n e . T h e size of the g r o u p p r e s e n t — t h e sheer n u m b e r of bodies at the scene—increases the t e n d e n c y for f o r w a r d p a n i c . T h u s m o s t instances of police atrocities— overkill, p r o l o n g e d beatings—occur w h e r e t h e r e is a considerable g r o u p of officers involved. T h e R o d n e y King beating t o o k place w i t h t w e n t y - o n e officers in on the arrest; it is quite likely t h a t it w o u l d n o t h a v e h a p -

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p e n e d , or n o t to the same extent of p r o l o n g e d violence, if there were only a c o u p l e of officers present.

T h e R o d n e y King beating, in fact, w a s over-determined by a c o n c a t e n a - t i o n of causes, all associated w i t h police violence. Police violence is m o r e frequent w h e n the suspect resists, a n d especially w h e n he tries to escape (Worden 1 9 9 6 ; Geller a n d Toch 1 9 9 6 ; Alpert a n d D u n h a m 2 0 0 4 ) . It is also m o r e frequent following a car chase, a p a r t from resistance. (These p a t t e r n s are b o r n e o u t also by the illegal i m m i g r a n t car chase at the begin- ning o f the c h a p t e r ) . Alpert a n d D u n h a m ( 1 9 9 0 : 2 8 - 3 9 , 9 7 ; a n d m y recal- culations) found t h a t in v a r i o u s jurisdictions, 18 to 30 percent of vehicles in car chases escape; t h u s a p a r t from the t e n s i o n of high-speed driving, a n d anger at defiance of authority, police have a genuine feeling of uncer- tainty a b o u t the o u t c o m e . In 23 to 30 percent of car chases there is an accident w i t h p r o p e r t y d a m a g e . In 10 to 17 percent of the chases, there is bodily injury, a l t h o u g h usually m i n o r (this figure w o u l d be 12 to 24 percent of the cases w h e r e t h e p u r s u e d car does n o t get a w a y ) . In o n e - t h i r d of these cases, the injury h a p p e n s after t h e chase stops: t h a t is to say, the injury is n o t caused by a vehicle accident, b u t by violence. A n o t h e r study found t h a t 46 to 53 p e r c e n t of vehicular chases of fleeing suspects e n d e d w i t h police use of force, a n d 11 to 14 percent w i t h excessive force (Alpert a n d D u n h a m 2 0 0 4 : 2 4 ) .

Causally, the R o d n e y King case w a s one of triple j e o p a r d y : resistance to arrest, high-speed car chase, a n d an a d d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n . This is t h e by- s t a n d e r effect: the m o r e police involved in an arrest (and indeed the m o r e b y s t a n d e r s of a n y k i n d ) , t h e m o r e likelihood of police violence (Worden 1 9 9 6 ; M a s t r o f s k i , Snipes, a n d Supina, 1 9 9 6 ) . G r o u p size has this effect n o t because there are m o r e p e r s o n s w h o t a k e p a r t i n the a t t a c k , since the c r o w d typically has a r a t h e r small s p e a r h e a d , or violent elite, a relatively small n u m b e r of activists no m a t t e r w h a t t h e size of the t o t a l g r o u p ; of the t w e n t y - o n e officers present, four did all the beating of R o d n e y K i n g . 3 1

Instead, the c r o w d acts t o amplify the e m o t i o n : t o m a k e the tension stronger a n d to intensify the flow of action after it is released. T h e m u l t i - plier effect has been d o c u m e n t e d by a n u m b e r of studies of ethnic violence a n d o t h e r political c r o w d s , as well as other kinds of m o b action (these a n d t h e following are s u m m a r i z e d a n d cited i n H o r o w i t z [ 2 0 0 1 : 1 1 6 - 17]). " E x p e r i m e n t a l studies confirm t h a t collectivities aggress m o r e se- verely, sharply, a n d rapidly t h a n do individuals. . . . Larger lynch m o b s c o m m i t t e d m o r e atrocities t h a n smaller ones d i d " (Mullen 1 9 8 6 ) .

Psychologists are p r o n e to e x p l a i n these effects by the n o t i o n of de- i n d i v i d u a t i o n , the loss of i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y in t h e larger g r o u p a n d , w i t h it, a n y i n d i v i d u a l sense of responsibility. T h i s is o v e r s t a t e d , since p e r s o n s generally are r e c r u i t e d i n t o active c r o w d s by n e t w o r k s of a c - q u a i n t a n c e s , a n d m o s t individuals t a k e p a r t a s m e m b e r s o f small g r o u p s

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w i t h i n t h e c r o w d , w h e r e they retain a clear sense of their o w n identities ( M c P h a i l 1 9 9 1 ) . I w o u l d place gr eat er e m p h a s i s o n t h e e m o t i o n a l p r o - cess b u i l d i n g u p i n t i m e , t h e e n t r a i n m e n t i n e m o t i o n a l r h y t h m s from o n e b o d y t o a n o t h e r ; the p r i m e a t t r a c t i o n s a n d p l e a s u r e s o f social i n t e r a c t i o n of all k i n d s c o m e from e n t r a i n m e n t in a strongly r h y t h m i c b o d i l y / e m o - t i o n a l p a t t e r n . H u m a n s are highly susceptible t o s u c h e n t r a i n m e n t ; d u r - ing t h e p e r i o d of b u i l d u p of t e n s i o n , o n e m i g h t say t h a t s h a r i n g t h e t e n - sion is t h e price o n e p a y s for t h e feeling of solidarity w i t h the g r o u p , even as t h e p r o c e s s of folding e v e r y o n e i n t o t h e g r o u p m o o d r a t c h e t s t e n s i o n still higher. A n d the o u t b u r s t i n t o collective violence, a n d espe- cially i n t h e r h y t h m i c , repetitive p a t t e r n t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e overkill a n d t h e atrocity, is so c o m p e l l i n g to its p a r t i c i p a n t s because it c o n s t i t u t e s an e x t r e m e l y h i g h degree of solidarity.

This e n t r a i n m e n t in a z o n e of heightened reality is all the m o r e a t t r a c - tive because violence b r e a k s w i t h o r d i n a r y reality; the violence is the occa- sion for getting into t h a t special zone of experience. T h i s h a p p e n s in situa- tions t h a t are n o t , strictly speaking, f o r w a r d panics, w h e r e t h e r e is little prior b u i l d u p of tension, or at least of the k i n d of tension t h a t builds from fear. Such situations tend to have a m o o d of celebration, w h i c h outsiders find morally g r o t e s q u e . T h u s , in cases of t h r e a t e n e d suicide, "large c r o w d s are m o r e likely t o t a u n t a n d urge the victim t o j u m p t h a n smaller c r o w d s a r e " ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 : 1 1 7 , citing M a n n 1 9 8 1 ) .

A case t h a t c o m b i n e s elements of sheer b y s t a n d e r e n t h u s i a s m a n d fight escalation is the following, w h i c h t o o k place in O a k l a n d , California, in A u g u s t 1 9 9 3 . T h e dispute began w h e n a nineteen-year-old black w o m a n , Stacey Lee, angrily tried to drive a w a y a thirty-one-year-old w o m a n , D e b - o r a h Williams (also black), from her a p a r t m e n t building hall w h e r e she h a d seen Williams s m o k i n g crack:

Williams refused, a n d a fight ensued. Lee quickly got the u p p e r h a n d , p u n c h i n g Williams a n d striking her w i t h a piece of m e t a l bed frame. N e i g h b o r s finally s e p a r a t e d the t w o , a n d Williams fled. Lee then w e n t i n t o her a p a r t m e n t , g r a b b e d a k i t c h e n knife from her sink a n d t o o k up the chase. . . . Bleeding a n d staggering, Williams a t t e m p t e d to t a k e refuge in a liquor store. But witnesses said the store o w n e r s l a m m e d a n d locked the d o o r in her face. . . . M i n u t e s later, Williams w a s t r a p p e d by a g r o u p of ( a b o u t fifteen) y o u n g a d u l t s , mostly m e n , w h o h a d been g a t h e r e d on a street corner. They k n o c k e d her d o w n a n d yelled insults at her. Curled in a fetal p o s i t i o n over t h e g r a t e of a s t o r m d r a i n , she w a s s t o m p e d , kicked a n d struck w i t h a w i n e bottle on the h e a d . . . .

Detectives say Williams w o u l d likely have lived if n o t for the c r o w d . . . w h o t r i p p e d a n d corralled her, t h e n e n c o u r a g e d Lee w i t h s h o u t s of "Kill h e r ! " a n d "Beat her a s s ! " Lee initially t o l d detectives the c r o w d ' s e x h o r -

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t a t i o n s had no effect on her behavior, n o t i n g t h a t she w a s " a l r e a d y m a d . " N o w , she c o n t e n d s t h a t the cheers d r o v e her to straddle Williams a n d s t a b her in t h e side. (Los Angeles Times, A u g . 3 0 , 1993)

Likely t h e m o o d in w h i c h t h e bystanders entered the fight w a s o n e of a m u s e m e n t a t seeing t w o w o m e n f i g h t , a r a r e r occasion t h a n male-on- m a l e fights, a n d t h u s s o m e t h i n g of a spectacle a n d p e r h a p s also a vicarious erotic thrill. Initially, the b y s t a n d e r s were p r o b a b l y just trying to k e e p o n e fighter from getting away, so t h a t the spectacle could be p r o l o n g e d ; this m a y well have been set off as the liquor s t o r e o w n e r s l a m m e d the d o o r on her, creating w h a t to the c r o w d l o o k e d like a pathetic-comic chase. But their b e h a v i o r s o o n escalated i n t o their o w n version of f o r w a r d p a n i c o r a t least e n t r a i n m e n t , since once they h a d the w o m a n k n o c k e d d o w n , they k e p t on beating her. T h e initial fight has elements of f o r w a r d p a n i c , t o o , w i t h the victor i n the f i g h t — L e e — f r u s t r a t e d because the f i g h t h a d first been b r o k e n u p , on the very d o o r s t e p of her o w n turf. T h e t w o for- w a r d p a n i c e n t r a i n m e n t s flowed t o g e t h e r — t h e y o u n g w o m a n ' s a n d t h e street c r o w d ' s — a n d the a t r o c i t y w a s the result.

A similar d y n a m i c is visible in an incident in M i l w a u k e e , Wisconsin, in O c t o b e r 2 0 0 2 , in w h i c h a thirty-six-year-old black m a n w a s b e a t e n to d e a t h by a g r o u p of children a n d teenagers r a n g i n g in age from ten to eighteen. T h e m a n w a s a shabby, disheveled figure, homeless a n d usually inebriated, a w e a k target:

[A] b o u t 16 to 20 y o u n g m e n p r o d d e d a 10-year-old to t h r o w an egg at Young. T h e egg hit the m a n in t h e shoulder, a n d he started chasing the b o y [brief t h r e a t ] . But a 14-year-old got b e t w e e n the t w o , a n d Young p u n c h e d h i m , k n o c k i n g o u t a t o o t h [threat becomes injury, from w h a t is r e g a r d e d as a w e a k a n d despised p e r s o n ] . Several of the y o u t h s t h e n b a n d e d together to a t t a c k Y o u n g . T h e y chased h i m o n t o t h e p o r c h of a h o u s e a n d p u m m e l e d h i m , leaving b l o o d splattered from floor to ceiling [prolonged beating]. Young m a n a g e d briefly to escape into the h o u s e , b u t t h e m o b dragged h i m b a c k outside a n d b e a t h i m until police re- s p o n d e d to a n e i g h b o r ' s 9 1 1 call. (AP N e w s r e p o r t , O c t o b e r 1, 2 0 0 2 )

H e r e the p a t t e r n is b u i l d u p of t a u n t i n g , in e x p e c t a t i o n of aggressive fun; brief c o u n t e r - a t t a c k , creating m o m e n t a r y t e n s i o n increase; p a n i c k e d re- t r e a t by w e a k victim, w h i c h leads to e n t r a i n m e n t of m o b in chase m o d e , e n h a n c e d by c r o w d multiplier.

Such d y n a m i c s c a n h a p p e n w i t h the " g o o d g u y s " t o o . In a s o u t h e r n California beach c o m m u n i t y , a fifty-eight-year-old w o m a n h a d her p u r s e s n a t c h e d by t w o teenage boys while l o a d i n g groceries i n t o her car in a p a r k i n g lot. "She called o u t for help a n d began r u n n i n g after the b o y s . A store employee a n d a b y s t a n d e r followed, a n d a l o n g the w a y a water-

132 • Chapter 3

delivery m a n a n d others joined the p u r s u i t . " T h e c r o w d built u p t o a b o u t fifty p e o p l e , m o s t l y m e n , w h o formed a perimeter a n d scoured the neigh- b o r h o o d i n cars, o n bicycles, a n d o n foot, a n d eventually c a p t u r e d t w o boys, ages sixteen a n d seventeen, hiding in t h e bushes in a b a c k y a r d . Parti- cipants acted w i t h great esprit de c o r p s , p r o u d of themselves for pitching in as a c o m m u n i t y . But here's t h e r u b : " A n unidentified m a n on a bicycle became so involved in t h e m a n h u n t t h a t officers h a d to restrain h i m w h e n the arrests w e r e m a d e " (San Diego Union Tribune, M a r c h 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 ) . In s h o r t , t h e e n t h u s i a s m of g o o d - d o e r s , in p r o t e c t i n g a w o m a n , b e c a m e an e m o t i o n a l r u s h , a n d w h e n t h e target w a s f i n a l l y c a p t u r e d , a t least o n e p a r t i c i p a n t did n o t w a n t to s t o p t h e a t t a c k . 3 2 H e r e , it is easy to label t h e heroes a n d the villains; yet the d y n a m i c of solidarity is m u c h t h e same in any conflict g r o u p , m a k i n g it heroic in its o w n eyes, no m a t t e r h o w m u c h its violence m a y be viewed by outsiders as an atrocity.

ALTERNATIVES T O F O R W A R D P A N I C

F o r w a r d panic underlies m a n y of t h e m o s t spectacular forms of violence, b o t h t h e big victories in m o r a l l y sanitized situations like w a r f a r e , a n d the w o r s t atrocities i n situations w h e r e w e are forced t o see t o o clearly w h a t is h a p p e n i n g — w h e t h e r by m o d e r n h o n e s t y or m o d e r n r e c o r d i n g t e c h n o l - o g y — o r in situations w h e r e the m o r a l dispensation is lacking. F o r w a r d p a n i c is theoretically central, t o o , because it follows so directly from o u r theoretical baseline of conflict. Conflict situations are first a n d foremost full of tension a n d fear; a n d it is this tension/fear t h a t is released i n t o f o r w a r d p a n i c , bringing a b o u t the e n g r o s s m e n t in a r h y t h m of repetitive, t e m p o r a r i l y u n c o n t r o l l e d a t t a c k s on a helpless victim, the piling on a n d overkill t h a t so shocks outside observers a n d a t t r a c t s the label of atrocity. T h e spectacular c h a r a c t e r of f o r w a r d p a n i c m a k e s it t e m p t i n g to see it everywhere. But f o r w a r d p a n i c is only o n e p a t h w a y from t h e starting p o i n t of tension/fear in conflictual c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . F o r w a r d p a n i c is set in m o t i o n only if t h e t e n s i o n is suddenly released, if the a p p a r e n t t h r e a t a n d strength of the o p p o n e n t rapidly t u r n s i n t o w e a k n e s s ; t h e r e m u s t be a space in t h a t situation i n t o w h i c h to r u s h f o r w a r d instead of r u n n i n g away, a v a c u u m i n t o w h i c h the e n c o u n t e r is precipitated. If t h a t v a c u u m does n o t o p e n u p , the s i t u a t i o n flows in a different direction.

Q u i t e often, the tension is n o t released, because there is no sign of dis- p r o p o r t i o n a t e w e a k n e s s o n one side; m a n y conflictual s i t u a t i o n s — i n d e e d m o s t , if we c o u n t all t h e b a n a l incipient conflicts—become standoffs, w i t h m u c h p o s t u r i n g b u t petering o u t w i t h little d a m a g e d o n e . Sometimes, i n r a t h e r r a r e situations, the violence is n o t h o t b u t cold; instead of a h o t e m o t i o n a l rush (or indeed hot harmless p o s t u r i n g ) , there is cool execution

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of a calculated p l a n of violent action; the r a r i t y of such cold violence p u t s it at the a p e x of t h e stratification of violence as a hierarchy of c o m p e t e n t p e r f o r m a n c e , a n d we will consider it in t h a t perspective in c h a p t e r 1 1 . Yet a n o t h e r p a t h w a y is w h e r e fights are socially staged so t h a t they will be fair fights; the p a t t e r n is so m u c h the o p p o s i t e of n o r m a l conflict, w i t h its tension a n d its resulting (if u n a c k n o w l e d g e d ) preference for unfair fights a n d w e a k victims, t h a t we shall need to look for special circum- stances t h a t insulate a n d s u p p o r t this artificial form of fighting. T h e r e are other versions of unfair fights, t o o , besides f o r w a r d p a n i c : p a t t e r n s w h e r e t h e r e is no s u d d e n shift from tension to victim w e a k n e s s , b u t an institu- tionalized situation of violent d o m i n a n c e , bullying, or scapegoating; a n d other p a t t e r n s w h e r e social enclaves p o p u p t h a t are n o t tense b u t j o y o u s , zones of c a r o u s i n g a n d celebration t h a t create places for violence t h a t is p r o t e c t e d e m o t i o n a l l y as well as politically. These alternatives will be t a k e n up in the following c h a p t e r s .

C H A P T E R 4

Attacking the Weak: I. Domestic Abuse

R e c o n s t r u c t e d from forensic evidence:

A female babysitter is giving a one-year-old child a b a t h while t h e p a r - ents are away. T h e child resists, s q u i r m s , a n d cries. T h e babysitter tries h a r d e r to c o n t r o l the child; as they struggle, she t u r n s up the r u s h of w a t e r into the t u b — t h e h o t w a t e r f a u c e t — a n d pushes the child's h a n d u n d e r the spigot. T h e child screams louder, w h i c h increases the b a b y - sitter's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to keep the child in the water. T h e child is eventu- ally scalded, a n d hospitalized w i t h second-degree b u r n s (from Califor- nia c o u r t files).

This is a case of f o r w a r d p a n i c . T h e w o m a n did n o t set o u t to h a r m the child. T h e r e is an escalated struggle over c o n t r o l ; the child resists, going i n t o a p a r o x y s m of rage a n d p a i n ; the adult increases her o w n efforts. At the same time t h a t she is w i n n i n g the b a t t l e — b y sheer physical coercion of forcing the child to stay in the w a t e r — s h e is e n t r a i n e d in t h e victim's m o o d of shrieks, anger, a n d tensed muscles. Both parties to the conflict are o u t of c o n t r o l ; since o n e is very m u c h w e a k e r t h a n the other, the tension of the struggle t u r n s i n t o the h o t r u s h a n d vicious overkill of for- w a r d p a n i c . Recall the m a r i n e s c o m i n g o u t of t h e Vietnamese village they have just b u r n e d (chapter 3); child a b u s e r s , t o o , often c o m e o u t of their scenario of violence like w a k e n i n g from a d r e a m , a m a z e d at w h a t they have d o n e .

T H E E M O T I O N A L D E F I N I T I O N O F T H E S I T U A T I O N

If tension/fear is the d o m i n a n t e m o t i o n in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s of immi- n e n t violence, h o w does a n y o n e d o any damage? M u c h o f the t i m e , they do n o t ; they shy a w a y from the fight, find excuses n o t to join in the a c t i o n , satisfy themselves w i t h bluster a n d p r e t e n c e . For violence to t a k e place, the p e r s o n s involved m u s t find a p a t h w a y a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. T h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t of such p a t h w a y s is a t t a c k i n g a w e a k victim.

W h a t m a k e s the w e a k v u l n e r a b l e i s n o t merely t h a t they c a n n o t f i g h t back, a n d c a n n o t h u r t t h e aggressor; it is n o t so m u c h fear of being killed

Domestic Abuse • 135

or h u r t t h a t generates t h e tension/fear of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , b u t a tension or fear of t h e clash a n d strain in the m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l process. T h e " f e a r " in t h e e n c o u n t e r is t h e tension of b r e a k i n g the f u n d a m e n t a l solidarity r i t u a l , the p r o p e n s i t y to m u t u a l e n t r a i n m e n t . A violent conflict in its first m o m e n t s , a n d until d o m i n a n c e is established, is an interaction ritual t h a t h a s a very s t r o n g m u t u a l focus of a t t e n t i o n , b u t t h e r h y t h m s a t t e m p t e d by t h e t w o sides are very m u c h d i s a t t u n e d . T h e struggle to establish at- t u n e m e n t t o one's o w n p a t t e r n , t o impose one's r h y t h m a n d direction against t h e effort of the o p p o n e n t to evade this a t t u n e m e n t or to establish their o w n initiative u p o n oneself, is at t h e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l core of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n .

In this sense, " f e a r " m a y be a m i s n o m e r ; certainly it does n o t c a p t u r e the w h o l e sense of w h a t is going o n . W h a t m a k e s a victim " w e a k " is situational, an i n t e r a c t i o n a l stance; the fact t h a t the victim c a n n o t defend h i m or herself is i m p o r t a n t chiefly because it allows the aggressor to t a k e the initiative a n d c o n t r o l the process a n d direction of m u t u a l e n t r a i n m e n t . Successful aggression is action no longer at cross-purposes, b u t action t h a t becomes c o o r d i n a t e d ; aggressor a n d victim get i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of e n t r a i n m e n t , w h e r e o n e t a k e s the leading role a n d the o t h e r r e s p o n d s to it. We shall see this w i t h p a r t i c u l a r clarity in t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l details of bullying a n d h o l d u p s , w h e r e the aggressor a t t e m p t s to seize c o n t r o l of the s i t u a t i o n , to m a k e it a one-sided flow, a n d to avoid at all costs a t w o - sided conflictual process; a n d this is over a n d a b o v e t h e possibility of t u r n i n g the tables a n d getting h u r t oneself. In domestic a b u s e , t o o , we see this micro-process of t a k i n g on the role of t h e victim. D o m e s t i c abuse is often described as an effort for c o n t r o l ; a n d t h a t is correct, even in a m u c h wider a n d m o r e generic sense t h a n feminist t h e o r y ' s emphasis on male c o n t r o l of females. Abusers get carried a w a y on a freight t r a i n of e m o - t i o n a l m o m e n t u m , often leading t o atrocities; a n d this h a p p e n s because of the w a y in w h i c h the struggle to get t h r o u g h t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l ten- sion flows i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r l y vicious form of e n t r a i n m e n t b e t w e e n the m o m e n t a r i l y resistant, n o w w e a k victim a n d t h e m o m e n t a r i l y struggling b u t a s c e n d a n t abuser, n o w t h o r o u g h l y d o m i n a n t . D o m i n a n c e is a m a t t e r of seizing c o n t r o l of t h e e m o t i o n a l definition of t h e s i t u a t i o n .

B A C K G R O U N D A N D F O R E G R O U N D E X P L A N A T I O N S

B a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s generally h a v e d e m o n s t r a b l e b u t w e a k relation- ships to violence. Poverty a n d social d i s c r i m i n a t i o n are widely found con- c o m i t a n t s of some kinds of violence. B a c k g r o u n d e x p l a n a t i o n s are w e a k because first, m a n y kinds of violence are n o t confined t o , or even espe- cially characteristic of, lower classes a n d discriminated minorities. This is

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the case w i t h bullying, c a r o u s i n g a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t violence; staged fair fights such as dueling; military a n d police violence; social m o v e m e n t vio- lence; a n d t e r r o r i s m . Second, for the kinds of violence t h a t are m o r e prev- alent in unprivileged g r o u p s , n o t everyone in t h o s e g r o u p s is violent; the majority of p o o r a n d discriminated p e r s o n s are n o t r o b b e r s , street fight- ers, o r d o m e s t i c a b u s e r s . T h e m o d e s t c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h b a c k g r o u n d vari- ables leaves a c t u a l violence u n d e r - d e t e r m i n e d . T h i r d , u n d e r - d e t e r m i n a - t i o n is even greater, since t h o s e p e r s o n s t h a t are sometimes violent are n o t violent all t h e time. J u s t w h e r e a n d w h e n they will b e c o m e violent d e p e n d s o n situational circumstances, a b o v e all, o n conditions t h a t overcome the tension/fear of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d c h a n n e l it into d o m i n a t i o n . P o o r a n d discriminated p e r s o n s need p a t h w a y s a r o u n d these obstacles t o violence, as m u c h as a n y o n e else.

Being a p r i o r victim of a b u s e is yet a n o t h e r b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n ; a l t h o u g h often asserted as an e x p l a n a t i o n of violence, it h a s t h e s a m e s h o r t c o m i n g s . A c o n s i d e r a b l e b o d y of evidence s u p p o r t s t h e p o i n t t h a t p e r s o n s w h o w e r e victims of child a b u s e t e n d later in their lives to be- c o m e themselves p e r p e t r a t o r s — n o t only o f a b u s e b u t also o t h e r crimes of violence (and o t h e r forms of social deviance). But the p a t t e r n is q u i t e u n d e r - d e t e r m i n e d . T h e m a j o r i t y o f victims o f a b u s e d o n o t g o o n t o c o m m i t violence. C h i l d r e n w h o are a b u s e d o r neglected (which a d d s a wider, n o n v i o l e n t b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n ) are a r r e s t e d for a juvenile or a d u l t crime of violence at a r a t e of 18 p e r c e n t ; b u t this is only m a r g i n a l l y h i g h e r t h a n t h e a r r e s t r a t e for a m a t c h e d c o n t r o l g r o u p , 14 p e r c e n t (a r a t i o o f 1.3 t o l ) . 1 Reversing t h e q u e s t i o n , i t has n o t b e e n established t h a t a high p e r c e n t a g e (let a l o n e a majority) of t h o s e w h o c o m m i t vari- ous k i n d s of violence w e r e previously a b u s e d .

Certainly this is n o t going to w o r k as an e x p l a n a t i o n of violence all across t h e s p e c t r u m : p r i o r a b u s e h a s n o t been s h o w n (nor is it likely to be s h o w n ) to explain w h i c h soldiers are in t h e c o m b a t high-performing 1 5 p e r c e n t , w h i c h are the c o w b o y c o p s , w h i c h are the r o c k - t h r o w i n g dem- o n s t r a t o r s , a n d w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in fraternity hazing, in duels a n d other staged fair fights, a n d in carousing a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t violence. It m i g h t be the case t h a t in one specific sphere, being a domestic ab u ser is positively correlated w i t h p r i o r victimization of just this k i n d . But it is still t h e case t h a t t h e majority of p e r p e t r a t o r s of domestic a b u s e w e r e n o t themselves p r i o r victims. 2 T h e r e are o t h e r p a t h w a y s t o domestic a b u s e t h a n having been a b u s e d . 3 Again, r e m o t e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s are only w e a k p r e - dictors; w h a t e v e r t h e l ong- t er m propensities there m i g h t be for t u r n i n g the tables, or p e r h a p s just for using a technique t h a t one has learned by h a r d experience in c h i l d h o o d , these c a n n o t be unleashed unless there are currently existing s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t overcome tension/fear. T h e p a t h w a y to a b u s e h a s to go t h r o u g h o n e of t h e p a t h w a y s t h a t all violence has to t a k e .

Domestic Abuse • 137

A B U S I N G T H E E X C E P T I O N A L L Y W E A K : T I M E - P A T T E R N S F R O M N O R M A L C Y T O A T R O C I T Y

T h e r e are a variety of relationships in domestic violence. O n e spouse c a n a t t a c k a n o t h e r ; adults can beat up children, b u t also vice versa; the adults involved could be p a r e n t s , b u t also s t e p p a r e n t s , casual boyfriends of a p a r e n t , or babysitters. T h e r e is also elder a b u s e of aged p a r e n t s by g r o w n children, a n d similar p a t t e r n s of abuse by elder-care w o r k e r s . A n d finally, the m o s t c o m m o n form of family violence occurs a m o n g siblings (Gelles 1 9 7 7 ) . We should keep this variety of d o m e s t i c violence in m i n d in consid- ering w h e t h e r a general theoretical a r g u m e n t is a d e q u a t e .

T h e usual suspects for causing domestic violence are poverty, stress, life-transitions, a n d social isolation (Straus, Gelles, a n d Steinmetz 1 9 8 8 ; Gelles a n d Straus 1 9 8 8 ; Starr 1 9 8 8 ; Straus 1 9 9 0 ; Giles-Sim 1 9 8 3 ; Stets 1 9 9 2 ; Cazenave a n d Straus 1 9 7 9 ; Gelles a n d Cornell 1 9 9 0 ; Bishop a n d Leadbeater 1 9 9 9 ) . But m o s t p e r s o n s in these situations are n o t violent; it t a k e s a further situational process to create a c t u a l incidents of violence.

We can gain a clue by e x a m i n i n g some of t h e m o s t h o r r e n d o u s situa- t i o n s . Victims of abuse are especially likely to be h a n d i c a p p e d or c h r o n i - cally ill (Lau a n d Kosberg 1 9 7 9 ; Pillemer a n d Finkelhor 1 9 8 8 ; Sprey a n d M a t h e w s 1 9 8 9 ; G a r b a r i n o a n d Gilliam 1 9 8 0 ) . T h i s is a p a t t e r n b o t h of child abuse a n d elder a b u s e , a n d of other a d u l t victims as well. A b u s e of these exceptionally helpless p e r s o n s seems especially vicious, yet its p e r p e t r a t o r s are r a t h e r average h u m a n beings c a u g h t up in a distinctive t e m p o r a l d y n a m i c . H a n d i c a p s a n d illness call for sympathy, a socially highly esteemed quality. But altruism is an ideal t h a t is easiest to p u t i n t o p e r f o r m a n c e for a s h o r t p e r i o d of time; initial crises of illness a n d o t h e r emergencies call o u t a surge of e m o t i o n , t h u s an intensified r i t u a l i s m a n d heightened solidarity. If these are i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the solidarity takes the form of a high c o m m i t m e n t to love t h e needy p e r s o n .

Over time, nevertheless, the p r o b l e m s of caring for a helpless p e r s o n b e c o m e r o u t i n e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t t h e caregiver gets r e d u c e d e m o - t i o n a l energy from playing the altruistic role (the b u r n - o u t t h a t is typical in the helping professions), there is a heightened sense of p o w e r struggle. T h e very fact t h a t the caregiver is c o m m i t t e d to being altruistic gives t h e p a t i e n t a w e a p o n over h i m or her. As in other forms of love r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the principle of least interest h o l d s : the p e r s o n w h o loves m o s t is at a d i s a d v a n t a g e t o the p e r s o n w h o loves less. T h u s a l t h o u g h the h e a l t h y a d u l t caregiver physically has all t h e power, t h e helpless child or elder has an e m o t i o n a l w e a p o n in recognizing a n d t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the c a r e t a k - er's c o m m i t m e n t , w h e t h e r t h a t c o m m i t m e n t comes from the caregiver's religious or altruistic belief, sense of duty, or p e r s o n a l love b o n d . 4 T h e general p a t t e r n of conflict applies: u n e q u a l resources lead to conflict,

1 3 8 • C h a p t e r 4

particularly w h e n t h e r e are t w o different kinds of resources, a n d t h e dis- parity is n o t recognized overtly. This is, of c o u r s e , just w h a t an altruistic, loving ideal does: it denies f u n d a m e n t a l inequality, at the same t i m e t h a t it acts u p o n a practical p r o b l e m based on inequality in resources.

T h e result c a n be the building up of anger a n d r e s e n t m e n t on b o t h sides. T h e c a r e t a k e r in t u r n comes to feel pressured: in p a r t because these d e m a n d s t a k e a w a y from o t h e r life activities; a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y in building up the c o n d i t i o n s for a b u s e , because of a g r o w i n g feeling t h a t he or she is being controlled. T h e p a t i e n t m a y invest energy i n t o this struggle o u t of sheer b o r e d o m , by virtue of immobility a n d helplessness lacking a n y t h i n g else to d o ; better a painful a n d a n n o y i n g p a s t i m e t h a n no p a s - time at all. Struggling w i t h the c a r e t a k e r to get a t t e n t i o n is o n e w a y of getting social c o n t a c t t h a t is otherwise lacking.

Such a c a r e t a k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t a k e s on an increasingly n a s t y t o n e . T h e caregiver m a y t r y t o b r e a k a w a y m o m e n t a r i l y , w i n s o m e o f t h e little contests of will by n o t giving in to d e m a n d s , or n o t i m m e d i a t e l y re- s p o n d i n g ; t h e p a t i e n t replies by increasing w h i n i n g , calling for aid, o r p e r h a p s d r a m a t i c displays o f distress. T h r o u g h e m o t i o n a l / p h y s i o l o g i c a l feedback effects, such a p a t i e n t c a n m a k e h i m or herself m o r e ill by e m o - t i o n a l distress or just by displays of it. Played o u t repetitively, these sce- n a r i o s b r i n g rising d i s t r u s t , b o t h sides suspicious of t h e m o t i v e s a n d sin- cerity of t h e o t h e r : the p a t i e n t suspicious of t h e a v o w e d a l t r u i s m of t h e c a r e t a k e r w h o s e aid is given in an a n n o y e d or hostile t o n e ; s t a t e m e n t s in t h e vein of " l o o k at all I've d o n e for y o u , " given w i t h justifiable p r i d e a n d justifiable e x a s p e r a t i o n , nevertheless feed i n t o the i n t e r a c t i o n a l t o n e b y p u t t i n g m o r e negative e m o t i o n s i n c i r c u l a t i o n . B o t h sides m a y at- t e m p t t o guilt t r i p t h e other. S o m e t i m e s this w o r k s , e v o k i n g m o m e n t a r y c o m p l i a n c e , b u t it is also felt as a p o w e r m o v e , a f o r m of c o n t r o l , c r e a t - ing r e s e n t m e n t a n d r e c i p r o c a l c o u n t e r m o v e s .

These p a t t e r n s are best d o c u m e n t e d in studies of elder abuse, p r i m a r i l y in h o m e situations, a l t h o u g h t h e r e m a y be similar p a t t e r n s in n u r s i n g h o m e s . M u c h of this research has c o n c e n t r a t e d on the stress felt by the caregiver, especially w h e n she (the majority of caregivers are female) has full-time responsibilities for care, w i t h o u t others to help her (Steinmetz 1 9 9 3 ; Philips 1 9 8 3 ) . Spreading the caregiving a r o u n d t o several p e r s o n s , from the p o i n t of view of the p a t i e n t s , also increases n e t w o r k ties, a n d t h u s reduces their social isolation; t h u s t h e social w e a k n e s s of the p a t i e n t is r e d u c e d at the same time t h a t stress on the caregiver is reduced. T h e r e is considerable evidence t h a t t h e elder's degree of d ep en d en cy increases t h e chances of a b u s e (Fulmer a n d O ' M a l l e y 1 9 8 7 ; Fulmer a n d Ashley 1 9 8 9 ) . But it is n o t t h e health of the p a t i e n t per se t h a t m a k e s one a victim; Pillemer (1993) s u m m a r i z e s evidence t h a t there is no i m p o r t a n t difference in health a n d functional status of a b u s e d a n d n o n a b u s e d elders. W h a t

Domestic Abuse • 139

seems to be going on is a building up of a p a t t e r n of conflict, w i t h moves a n d c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s on b o t h sides. Pillemer (1993) notes t h a t abusive caregivers are m o r e likely to be financially d e p e n d e n t on the elder p e r s o n ; t h u s t h e r e are resources on b o t h sides, the elder w i t h h o l d i n g or m a n i p u l a t - ing their c o n t r o l over money, the y o u n g e r feeling additionally frustrated by these c o n t r o l moves c o m p o u n d i n g the n o r m a l stresses of being tied up in caregiving.

M o s t caregivers d o n o t b e c o m e abusive, o r a t least n o t seriously a b u - sive. M a n y caregivers w o r r y a b o u t their o w n feelings a n d fear t h a t they will b e c o m e violent, b u t m o s t of t h e m do n o t ; a n d t h e r e are few dis- cernable b a c k g r o u n d differences b e t w e e n t h e m (Pillemer a n d Suitor 1 9 9 2 ) . Situational processes seem to m a k e m u c h of the difference.

T h e t e m p o r a l process is crucial. A typical scenario m a y t a k e the follow- ing form: a p a t i e n t gets i n t o a p o w e r struggle w i t h a caretaker, starting w i t h m i n o r disputes over p r o m p t n e s s of r e s p o n s e a n d the extent to w h i c h d e m a n d s are t a k e n seriously. O v e r t i m e , t h e c a r e t a k e r escalates against a n n o y a n c e s t h a t are felt to be increasingly unjustified, a n d the p a t i e n t becomes increasingly u n c o o p e r a t i v e or d e m a n d i n g . This m a k e s the job h a r d e r for the caretaker, b o t h physically a n d emotionally; t h e p a t i e n t ' s m a i n w e a p o n s are to act m o r e sick, or m a k e m o r e of a mess w i t h bodily functions a n d eating; to an u n s y m p a t h e t i c eye, the p a t i e n t becomes m o r e a n d m o r e u n a t t r a c t i v e , less w o r t h y an object for altruism. T h e same physi- cal behavior, w h e n experienced initially or in an emergency s i t u a t i o n , is a challenge t h a t a l t r u i s m p r o u d l y rises to meet; b u t the process of escalating conflict leads to p o l a r i z a t i o n of v i e w p o i n t s , a n d it becomes seen increas- ingly in a m o r e negative light.

F r o m this struggle of wills, carried o u t w i t h tactics of services per- formed grudgingly a n d of p r o b l e m s created a n d d e m a n d s escalated, the situation m a y p r o c e e d to physical a b u s e . H e r e t h e severity of disability— w h i c h m a y indeed be g r o w i n g t h r o u g h feedback loops of t h e conflict it- self—can increase the psychological p o l a r i z a t i o n , giving an e m o t i o n a l jus- tification to physical a b u s e . Usually other c o n d i t i o n s need to coincide for this to h a p p e n , n o t a b l y a sealed-off location so t h a t the c a r e t a k e r can fall back on physical force w i t h impunity. T h e s i t u a t i o n m a y well be living hell for the a b u s e d p e r s o n ; emotionally it m a y have the quality of an enclosed hell for the abus er as well.

A b u s e of crying babies has a similar d y n a m i c . T h e i m m e d i a t e p r e c u r s o r is usually the b a b y crying persistently. It m a y be because t h e child is sick or colicky; or because of an o n g o i n g struggle over c o n t r o l w i t h the c a r e t a k e r ; d e m a n d i n g a t t e n t i o n m a y t a k e the form of multi-sided rivalries, such as between siblings for the p a r e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n ; or b e t w e e n a d u l t p a r t n e r s for a t t e n t i o n , t h e r e b y t a k i n g a t t e n t i o n a w a y from the child. These factors interact a n d c u m u l a t e ; a n d they can c o m b i n e further w i t h o t h e r condi-

140 • Chapter 4

t i o n s such as the p a r e n t s being frustrated w i t h other i m m e d i a t e life events. T h u s t h e r e are m a n y scenarios r e p o r t e d in the clinical literature (e.g., Stith, W i l l i a m s , a n d R o s e n 1 9 9 0 ; H u t c h i n g s 1 9 8 8 ; T h o r m a n 1980) o f p a r e n t s w h o are u n e m p l o y e d o r w o r k i n g a t difficult jobs, m o t h e r s w h o are h a r r i e d by c a r e t a k i n g several children w i t h o u t respite, b l o w i n g up at a crying b a b y a n d hitting or s h a k i n g it so h a r d t h a t it is killed or injured.

Abusive violence does n o t occur at the child's first cry; t h e r e is a time- p a t t e r n in w h i c h crying builds u p , a n d efforts to quiet it d o w n are u n s u c - cessful. This involves t w o time c o m p o n e n t s : a lo n g -term p a t t e r n , in w h i c h t h e child has m a n y episodes of lengthy, unresolvable crying, so t h a t the present episode is seen as " h e r e we go a g a i n , " a n o t h e r episode of foresee- able frustration all a r o u n d ; a n d a s h o r t - t e r m p a t t e r n , the a m o u n t of time t h a t the child has been crying persistently, a n d h o w deeply e n t r a i n e d she or he is in the s o b b i n g a n d shrieking. We h a v e little evidence on w h a t length of these t w o c o m p o n e n t s m a k e s for the greatest d a n g e r - p o i n t of a b u s e ; a conjecture is on t h e o r d e r of half a dozen or m o r e p a s t episodes, a n d an i m m e d i a t e situation of fifteen minutes or m o r e of crying a n d at- t e m p t i n g t o m a k e the child s t o p crying.

These t i m e - p a t t e r n s m a y vary w i t h the k i n d s of b a c k g r o u n d factors affecting the p a r e n t s (conditions of social stress, isolation, a n d availability of v a r i o u s c o n t r o l resources); b u t it seems likely t h a t some t i m e - b u i l d u p , in the l o n g - r u n a n d i m m e d i a t e s h o r t - r u n situation, is necessary no m a t t e r w h a t t h o s e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s are; greater stressors, isolation, a n d lack of resources o t h e r t h a n coercion m a y s h o r t e n these t i m e - c o n d i t i o n s , b u t surely n o t to extremely brief ones. O n e p a t t e r n often observed, for instance, is w h e r e a boyfriend is visiting a w o m a n (usually for sex), a n d her child (or children) are whiny, sick, or crying. This is very likely a conflict over a t t e n t i o n (although surreptitious a n d n o t overtly perceived as such); so there is an o n g o i n g battle for at least some m i n u t e s or h o u r s . T h e boyfriend w h o eventually slaps the child into a b r u t a l injury, or t h r o w s the crying b a b y against a wall, is n o t simply acting o u t a m o m e n - t a r y frustration, or even in conjunction w i t h a long series of stressors a n d a p a t t e r n of inability to deal w i t h frustration. This is a time-scenario of conflict, a battle of wills t h a t has gone t h r o u g h a n u m b e r of p h a s e s of escalation. T h e visiting boyfriend m a y be on a shorter fuse t h a n the birth father, a n d being on drugs can also s h o r t e n the fuse, b u t there is still a t i m e - p a t t e r n , steps t h a t h a v e to be escalated t h r o u g h before t h e r e is resort t o o v e r w h e l m i n g force against the physically w e a k . 5

Crying is a conflictual i n t e r a c t i o n . It is a w e a p o n of the w e a k , a n d can be a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n to use, b u t a w e a p o n nevertheless. T h e link be- t w e e n w e a k n e s s , indeed the extreme w e a k n e s s of physical debility, a n d v i c t i m h o o d is m e d i a t e d by a time-process of conflict in w h i c h o n e side's moves are entirely c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d e m o t i o n a l . These are h a r d to ig-

D o m e s t i c A b u s e • 141

n o r e , because they are a m o n g the m o s t interpersonally entraining of all forms of e m o t i o n a l expression. Crying brings asymmetrical e n t r a i n m e n t (unlike symmetrically entraining e m o t i o n s t h a t both sides share, such as joy/laughter, sadness, and sometimes fear a n d anger). Crying is getting w r o u g h t u p , bodily engaged in o n e ' s o w n r h y t h m s in the process of m a k - ing s o u n d s . As Katz ( 1 9 9 9 : 2 2 9 - 7 3 ) s h o w s by micro-detailed analysis of video a n d a u d i o recording, the crying child becomes a b s o r b e d in m a k i n g a repetitive w h i n i n g s o u n d ; it is like singing a song t h a t d r a w s all her a t t e n t i o n into a c o c o o n , sheltered inside her o w n body, only just a w a r e of the body of the c a r e t a k e r impinging outside her shell. T h e c a r e t a k e r (in this case, a nursery school aide) is c a u g h t in the same r h y t h m of body m o v e m e n t s : t h o u g h she is trying to distract the child's a t t e n t i o n o n t o a n - o t h e r activity a n d m a k e her s t o p crying, her o w n m o v e m e n t s are s y n c h r o - nized with the child's u p - a n d - d o w n wailing song t h a t is the w h i n i n g s o u n d . T h e t w o bodies are e n t r a i n e d ; in this case (and in many others), the c a r e t a k e r m a k e s it a benevolent e n t r a i n m e n t , if n o t u n m i x e d with frustration at the difficulty in m a k i n g the child s t o p crying. In this in- stance, t h e r e is relatively little conflict, because the child is in synchrony with the teacher, a n d the a d u l t gives in for the most p a r t . A struggle over e n t r a i n m e n t , built up on both sides into e x a s p e r a t i o n , p e r h a p s also such e m o t i o n s as fear, anger, a n d guilt over one's o w n behavior, is found in the conflictual response to crying t h a t builds up into violence.

All the v a r i o u s k i n d s of a b u s e — c h i l d , s p o u s e , e l d e r — i n v o l v e a t i m e - p r o c e s s in which conflict builds up e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t . K n o w i n g the t i m e - p a t t e r n s w o u l d be helpful for practical m e a s u r e s in t r a i n i n g to p r e v e n t violence; it could give c o n s c i o u s a w a r e n e s s of t h e m a x i m a l d a n g e r z o n e s .

T H R E E PATHWAYS: N O R M A L L I M I T E D C O N F L I C T , S E V E R E F O R W A R D P A N I C ,

A N D T E R R O R I S T I C T O R T U R E R E G I M E

It has been p r o p o s e d t h a t there are t w o kinds of family violence: one J o h n s o n (1995) calls " c o m m o n c o u p l e violence," which is fairly frequent, n o t very severe, a n d practiced r a t h e r equally (in m o d e r n America) by b o t h males and females. T h e second is violence used for p u r p o s e s of c o n t r o l ; J o h n s o n calls it " i n t i m a t e t e r r o r i s m , " involving serious physical injury or an o n g o i n g a t m o s p h e r e of t h r e a t s ; p e r p e t r a t o r s are chiefly males, their victims chiefly females. We will see t h a t severe violence further divides into t w o causal p a t h w a y s : f or w ar d panics a n d terroristic t o r t u r e regimes.

In s p o u s a l violence a n d o t h e r p a r t n e r conflict, the mild version t a k e s the form of r o u t i n e q u a r r e l s , raised voices, a n d h e a t e d e x p r e s s i o n s , esca- lating to s l a p p i n g , s h o v i n g , a n d g r a b b i n g . As m e a s u r e d by c o n v e n t i o n a l

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scales of family conflict t a c t i c s , w o m e n r e p o r t u s i n g these f o r m s of vio- lence on their p a r t n e r s r o u g h l y as often as vice versa ( S u g a r m a n a n d H o t a l i n g 1 9 8 9 ; J o h n s o n a n d F e r r a r o 2 0 0 0 ; K i m m e l 2 0 0 2 ) . H e r e t h e es- c a l a t i o n of violence is c o n t r o l l e d a n d limited; such conflicts a r e a l m o s t a v e r s i o n of p r o t e c t e d fair fights. T h e y are p r o t e c t e d by staying w i t h i n an u n d e r s t o o d r a n g e of e s c a l a t i o n . Injury r a t e s are l o w ( a b o u t 3 p e r c e n t ; Stets a n d Straus 1 9 9 0 ) ; the level of severity does n o t rise over t i m e , im- plying i t i s r o u t i n i z e d , s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a p p e n s r e p e a t e d l y w i t h o u t de- s t r o y i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p .

This k i n d of violence also implies a balance of p o w e r between the p a r t - ners. N e i t h e r is a w e a k victim; given t h e prevalence of tension/fear in violent e n c o u n t e r s , a n d general i n c o m p e t e n c e of violence, neither is in a position to do m u c h d a m a g e . T h e serious i m b a l a n c e t h a t generates a for- w a r d p a n i c does n o t exist, a n d all-out violent frenzies d o n o t occur. N o t to say t h a t individuals in these disputes m a y n o t b e c o m e o u t r a g e d , giving vent t o e m o t i o n s , s h o u t i n g , shrieking, a n d crying; b u t t h a t s h o w s t h a t e m o t i o n s obey social c o n s t r a i n t s a n d are channeled by i n t e r a c t i o n a l p a t - t e r n s . Venting of e m o t i o n can go a l o n g w i t h slapping, t h r o w i n g a n d b r e a k i n g h o u s e h o l d things, b u t nevertheless it c a n stay in a limited r a n g e as far as d o i n g d a m a g e to the partner. In q u a r r e l s of this sort, the partici- p a n t s (especially w o m e n ) d o n o t r e p o r t feeling afraid ( O ' L e a r y 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e f i g h t does n o t get t o t h e z o n e w h e r e a t t e m p t s are unleashed t o seri- ously h u r t or even to deeply challenge the other; it feels p r o t e c t e d , a n d m a y be an accepted r o u t i n e , even a form of excitement a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t .

T h i s limited violence is m o r e frequent a m o n g y o u n g couples, especially d u r i n g t h e d a t i n g / c o u r t s h i p p e r i o d (Stets 1 9 9 2 ; Stets a n d P i r o g - G o o d 1 9 9 0 ; O ' L e a r y 2 0 0 0 ; Kimmel 2 0 0 2 ) . Such incidents are typically r a t h e r mild, involving only p u s h i n g , g r a b b i n g , a n d slapping, a n d are r a t h e r gen- der symmetrical. O n e r e a s o n for this is t h a t couples are testing o u t p o w e r relations (Blood a n d Wolfe 1 9 6 0 ) ; they m a k e m o v e s for d o m i n a n c e in small m a t t e r s (who gets h o w m u c h precedence i n telling the o t h e r w h a t t o d o , controlling the c o n v e r s a t i o n , setting the s i t u a t i o n a l m o o d , choosing social activities) t h a t are contested, giving rise to heightened e m o t i o n s a n d mild escalation. D a t i n g violence, d u r i n g the process of c o u r t s h i p c o m m i t - m e n t , is i n t e r p r e t e d by m a n y w o m e n as a sign of love ( H e n t o n et al. 19 8 3); as if the process of n e g o t i a t i n g c o n t r o l is a m a r k of increasing c o m m i t - m e n t . D u r i n g the c o u r t s h i p p e r i o d , sexual attractiveness of b o t h p a r t n e r s is likely to be at its height; a n d since this is early career stage, m a l e a d v a n - tage in i n c o m e is n o t yet high; w o m e n ' s sexual b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r tends to set t h e m in a fair balance of p o w e r w i t h their prospective p a r t n e r s . This is o n e r e a s o n w h y considerable r o u t i n e q u a r r e l i n g exists at this age in the form of restricted, gender-symmetrical violence.

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B o t h s h o r t - t e r m gender-symmetrical violence a n d lo n g -term m a l e - d o m - inated severe violence m u s t go t h r o u g h s i t u a t i o n a l b u i l d u p s . Like violence of a n y k i n d , these c a n b r e a k o u t only if they c a n find some w a y a r o u n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. T h e difference between c o m m o n couple vio- lence a n d severe r e l a t i o n s h i p violence m u s t be t h a t t h e former kind of c o n f r o n t a t i o n is channeled into p r o t e c t e d , limited violence; w h e r e a s the latter develops i n t o t h e p a t t e r n of situational tension a n d s u d d e n release t h a t leads to the violent overkill of f o r w a r d p a n i c , or to o n g o i n g t o r t u r e .

C o m m o n couple fights go t h r o u g h a few m u t u a l l y acceptable m o v e s , an escalation just so far a n d n o t farther. These disputes h a v e a scripted ending. T h e first o u t b u r s t of violence usually ends t h e episode; once t h e violence establishes the d r a m a t i c p e a k , the tacitly a g r e e d - u p o n limit, t h e fight s t o p s . T h e b l o w u p often clears t h e air; t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s recognize t h a t to go further w o u l d be to t h r e a t e n the r e l a t i o n s h i p , the balance of p o w e r t h a t they h a v e w o r k e d o u t . T h e scene ends; often w i t h some stan- dardized d r a m a t i c gesture, leaving in a huff, s l a m m i n g the door, followed by a cooling-off p e r i o d , a n d either to ignoring t h e incident in u p c o m i n g e n c o u n t e r s , or to apologies a n d reconciliations.

H e r e it is useful to t u r n to a c o m p a r i s o n of parent/child violence, since it also divides into n o r m a l limited violence a n d severe, f o r w a r d p a n i c - like a b u s e . This c o m p a r i s o n s h o w s t h a t t h e cause is n o t gender per se, b u t the situational time-dynamics t h a t limit or fail to limit violent escalation.

Low-level violence against children is c o m m o n . It is especially c o m m o n for A m e r i c a n p a r e n t s to s p a n k , slap, or hit their small children; some studies s h o w t h a t 85 percent of t w o - to three-year-olds, a n d 95 percent of four- to five-year-olds are hit during the year, w i t h frequency rates of 2.5 incidents per w e e k (Dietz 2 0 0 0 ; Straus 1 9 9 4 ; H o l d e n et al. 1 9 9 5 ) . Indeed this is so u b i q u i t o u s t h a t p a r e n t a l ideology m a k e s no difference— those w h o say they are o p p o s e d t o c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t nevertheless use it as m u c h as p a r e n t s w h o e n d o r s e it as a m o d e of c o n t r o l (Straus a n d D o n n e l l y 1 9 9 4 : 2 0 8 ) . This implies t h a t i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n a l d y n a m i c s bring o u t the use of violence over small children. This m a k e s sense, if we consider t h a t m a t e r i a l c o n t r o l s (such as allowances) are n o t applicable to small children; a n d t h a t the m o r e c o m p l e x r i t u a l / e m o t i o n a l forms of con- t r o l d o n o t w o r k for children w h o have n o t yet learned t o speak, o r t o internalize symbols in inner t h i n k i n g . 6 This leaves coercion as t h e m o s t immediately available form of c o n t r o l .

M i l d violence against children arises o u t of the same r a n g e of situations as does c o m m o n , limited spousal violence. It is also r a t h e r gender symmet- rical, in the sense t h a t b o t h male a n d female p a r e n t s / c a r e t a k e r s use it on children; a n d in the situation w h e r e it is m o s t c o m m o n — o n small chil- d r e n — i t t e n d s to be used fairly symmetrically against b o t h boys a n d girls (given the 85 to 95 p e r c e n t rates for at least some incidences); a l t h o u g h

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t h e r e are s o m e indications t h a t girls receive less severe c o r p o r a l p u n i s h - m e n t t h a n boys (Jouriles a n d N o r w o o d 1 9 9 5 ) . M o s t studies find t h a t w o m e n m o r e frequently use r o u t i n e violence against small children t h a n m e n d o , a l t h o u g h this is doubtless because they s p e n d m o r e time a r o u n d children (Dietz 2 0 0 0 : 1 5 3 1 ; Straus a n d D o n n e l l y 1 9 9 9 ) .

At t h e level of m o r e severe violence, it is typically males w h o physi- cally a b u s e t e e n a g e r s , w h e r e a s females are t h e m o s t frequent a b u s e r s of small c h i l d r e n ( G a r b a r i n o a n d Gilliam 1 9 8 0 ; Gelles 1 9 7 7 ) . T h i s is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p a t t e r n t h a t t h e s t r o n g e r a t t a c k the w e a k e r ; older c h i l d r e n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in their t e e n a g e y e a r s , b e c o m e t o o big for females typically t o m a n h a n d l e t h e m (unless t h e t e e n a g e r i s r i t u a l l y a n d e m o t i o n - ally c o w e d i n t o p u t t i n g u p w i t h it). I n t h e m o s t severe violence o n chil- d r e n , infant h o m i c i d e s , m o t h e r s ' boyfriends a n d o t h e r n o n - b i o l o g i c a l p a r e n t s a r e virtually t h e s t e r e o t y p e d offenders i n p u b l i c e s t i m a t i o n . But, in fact, w o m e n kill their o w n babies at a higher r a t e t h a n a n y o n e else d o e s , typically as a w a y of disposing w i t h an u n w a n t e d b i r t h . 7 H e r e I a m n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h analyzing t h e m o t i v e s b u t just t o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e p a t t e r n is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o p p o r t u n i t i e s involving s h a r p differences in s t r e n g t h a n d vulnerability.

It is n o t , on the face of it, a male d o m i n a n c e p a t t e r n ; m e n do n o t use c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t (or for t h a t m a t t e r severe abuse) u p o n girls to a greater degree t h a n u p o n boys; in the case of teenagers, fathers t e n d n o t t o p u n i s h their d a u g h t e r s corporally (although m o t h e r s sometimes do) (Straus a n d D o n n e l l y 2 0 0 1 ) . 8 T h e u p s h o t i s t h a t c o m m o n c o r p o r a l p u n - ishment, or coercive c o n t r o l of children, does n o t fit the p a t t e r n of males using violence to c o n t r o l females. Females use it t o o , sometimes to c o n t r o l males, sometimes t o c o n t r o l females; 9 a n d t h e r e are s o m e indications t h a t a d u l t males use it less against female children. We could describe this as fitting the same p a t t e r n as limited spousal violence; b o t h types s h o w t h a t b o t h sexes use violence, w h e n it is t h e m o s t readily available r e s o u r c e , a p p o s i t e to the situation; a n d b o t h sexes receive violence, w i t h some bias, in this case, t o w a r d m o r e use against males. M o r e o v e r , in the case of severe violence against children, here t o o t h e r e is gender symmetry, ac- c o r d i n g t o o p p o r t u n i t y .

T h e difference between c o m m o n disciplinary violence a n d severe child a b u s e is n o t a m a t t e r of w h i c h o n e is a struggle for c o n t r o l ; they are b o t h struggles for c o n t r o l . W h a t distinguishes t h e m is t h a t the latter, just like spousal a b u s e , is m u c h m o r e escalated, a n d it involves m u c h tighter link- age from one incident to the n e x t . N o r m a l child disciplinary disputes, like c o m m o n spousal f i g h t s , are isolated from one a n o t h e r a n d s o o n forgotten; severe a b u s e in either k i n d of r e l a t i o n s h i p has a c o n t i n u i n g d r a m a t i c b u i l d u p . T h e one is like a scries of short stories; the o t h e r is like a Kafka novel or a Shakespearean tragedy.

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Consider three incidents of domestic violence. T h e first, presented at t h e beginning of the chapter, is the babysitter w h o scalded the child's h a n d . This case is s h o r t a n d episodic, w i t h no a p p a r e n t b a c k g r o u n d , a s u d d e n f o r w a r d p a n i c .

T h e second is r e c o u n t e d by a ten-year-old girl:

O n e day a b o u t t w o m o n t h s ago m y m o m a n d d a d got into a fight. First, my m o m a n d I came h o m e from the mall. We h a d a really nice time there. But, w h e n we c a m e h o m e o u r nice time got to be terrible. I k n e w t h e y were going to get into a fight, so I w e n t into my b e d r o o m a n d did m y h o m e w o r k . I k n e w h e w a s going t o talk t o her a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , b u t I d i d n ' t k n o w w h a t . T h e n I h e a r d my m o m s t a r t screaming a n d I w e n t t o the d o o r a n d asked w h a t w a s w r o n g . M y d a d said, " O h , n o t h - ing is w r o n g . Go do y o u r h o m e w o r k . " But I k n e w s o m e t h i n g w a s w r o n g s o I w e n t a n d p r a y e d t o G o d . M y d a d w a s really m e a n t h a t night. . . . T h e n I h e a r d my m o m scream s o m e t h i n g b u t I d i d n ' t u n d e r - s t a n d w h a t she said because m y d a d covered her m o u t h w i t h his h a n d . A f t e r w a r d she told me she said call the c o p s . Anyway, I w e n t back to t h e d o o r b y the b e d r o o m a n d t o l d m y m o m I needed help o n m y h o m e - w o r k , b u t I d i d n ' t . I just w a n t e d my m o m to c o m e o u t of the b e d r o o m because I w a s afraid. T h e n they b o t h came o u t . A n d I hugged my m o m a n d w e n t to bed. T h e n my d a d started to strangle my m o m . So I w e n t o u t a n d told m y d a d t o s t o p . H e t o l d m e t o g o back t o t h e b e d r o o m a n d go to sleep. So I did. . . . T h e n I h e a r d my m o m screaming. So I w e n t back i n t o t h e living r o o m a n d h e w a s kicking m y m o m . H e w o u l d n ' t s t o p , he k e p t kicking her in the a r m a n d legs. I t o l d h i m to s t o p . H e t o l d m e t o g o b a c k t o bed b u t I said, N o ! T h e n h e t o o k his guitar a n d w a s g o n n a hit her over the h e a d . But I w e n t on t o p of my mother. He told me to get off. But I said, N o ! So he p u t d o w n t h e guitar, t h e n he got her ice for her a r m . T h e n I w e n t to sleep crying. T h e n e x t m o r n i n g I d i d n ' t go to school a n d she d i d n ' t go to w o r k . T h e n he called up the h o u s e a n d talked to her for a while. He t h r e a t e n e d to kill her. So we left to go to t h e shelter. (Stith et al. 1 9 9 0 : 3 8 - 3 9 )

T h e conflict progresses t h r o u g h a series of stages: (1) E m o t i o n a l ten- sion: t h e child k n o w s there will be an a r g u m e n t (implying this has h a p - p e n e d before), b u t the topic is n o t o b v i o u s . (2) T h e a r g u m e n t begins, a n d the w o m a n starts screaming. (3) T h e w o m a n screams to call the cops for aid, a n d the m a n stops her from screaming b y covering her m o u t h w i t h his h a n d — a p p a r e n t l y the first physical c o n t a c t . (4) After a b r e a k caused by the child a t t e m p t i n g to intervene or distract t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s — s h e inter- venes b e t w e e n each of the stages she describes—the m a n tries to strangle the w o m a n : a p p a r e n t l y she is still screaming, a n d this is a progressive step from h a n d s over m o u t h to t h r o a t . (5) N e x t he kicks her repeatedly in

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a r m s a n d legs ( a p p a r e n t l y she is k n o c k e d to t h e g r o u n d ) . (6) Finally he raises a guitar as a w e a p o n to hit her over t h e h e a d . H e r e the child m a n - ages to s t o p the fight by physically interposing her b o d y ; a n d t h e scene w i n d s d o w n in a m i n o r m o v e by the m a n to m a k e a m e n d s as he brings ice for the w o m a n ' s bruises. (7) N e x t day, the q u a r r e l resumes by t e l e p h o n e , escalating further to a d e a t h t h r e a t .

T h e f i g h t t a k e s m a n y h o u r s : from late a f t e r n o o n w h e n m o t h e r a n d d a u g h t e r arrive h o m e , until bedtime a n d later. T h e tension builds from step to step, as a series of n e w tactics, levels of coercion, a n d finally w e a p - ons are b r o u g h t in by t h e m a n . It is difficult to tell h o w m u c h the w o m a n ' s b e h a v i o r a n d t o n e changes, except for heightened screaming from steps (1) to (3); at any r a t e , her c o n t i n u e d screaming keeps h i m e n t r a i n e d in the struggle. Unlike n o r m a l q u a r r e l s , the escalation d o e s n ' t s t o p ; even severe violence itself isn't e n o u g h . T h e r e is a search for n e w m o v e s to m a k e , a t t e m p t s t o d r a m a t i z e his seriousness: h a n d over m o u t h , strangling, kick- ing her fallen b o d y (but on t h e limbs, n o t vital p a r t s ) , using a w e a p o n to her h e a d ( a l t h o u g h a light w e a p o n , a g u i t a r ) , w h i c h also s h o w s he is r e a d y to destroy his o w n p r o p e r t y . Nevertheless his anger is very focused; al- t h o u g h t h e d a u g h t e r repeatedly intervenes, he never hits her, or a p p a r e n t l y even t h r e a t e n s her; a n d she succeeds in bringing the episode to an end by physically p u t t i n g her b o d y i n the w a y w h e r e h e w o u l d h a v e t o strike t h r o u g h her to get at the w o m a n . He is e n t r a i n e d in his o w n anger a n d in his wife's resistance, b u t this is a t u n n e l , a n d he is nevertheless a w a r e of the walls of the t u n n e l , a n d does n o t e n c r o a c h on t h e m . In fact, the child's i n t e r v e n t i o n b r e a k s his e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t , a n d his m o o d c h a n g e s .

This incident s h o w s a m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l p a t t e r n of s h o r t - r u n escalation a n d e n t r a i n m e n t . It is a f o r w a r d p a n i c , w i t h frenzied overkill in the later stages, after a p e r i o d of s t r o n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n t u r n s i n t o all-out d o m i n a t i o n . In t h e t h i r d case, we see a n o t h e r kind of scenario besides the h o t e m o t i o n a l r u s h of f o r w a r d panics: colder, repetitive, terroristic r o u - tine of violent d o m i n a t i o n .

B a r b a r a h a d been living w i t h her boyfriend Bill for twelve years. T h e p a t t e r n always followed the same sequence.

T h e a b u s e repeatedly o c c u r r e d w h e n Bill h a d been d rin k in g , a n d w a s always p r e c e d e d by Bill's d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t B a r b a r a d i d n ' t love h i m a n d w a s going t o leave h i m . H e r solution w a s t o t r y t o reassure h i m o f her love a n d her loyalty. As she became m o r e affectionate a n d solicitous, t h e b a t t e r i n g w o u l d start. Bill w o u l d call her n a m e s , insults w o u l d esca- late to physical shovings or holdings to d e m o n s t r a t e superior p o w e r by Bill. This w o u l d be followed by B a r b a r a expressing s o r r o w , a n d c o n t i n u e d a t t e m p t s of r e a s s u r a n c e . . . . M o r e recently, t h e t h r e a t s of

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abuse w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d by the presence of a large h u n t i n g knife. T h e knife h a d been held at B a r b a r a ' s t h r o a t , a n d Bill h a d pricked her chest w i t h it on m o r e t h a n o n e occasion. (Stith et al. 1 9 9 0 : 62)

T h e p a t t e r n is to a t t a c k the w e a k , indeed precisely as she d e m o n s t r a t e s her w e a k n e s s , the a t t a c k e r becomes e n t r a i n e d in her yielding. As she gives way, physically a n d emotionally, he presses f o r w a r d . T h i s is n o t simply a m a t t e r of the m a n assuring himself he has c o n t r o l ; t h e r e is no i n d i c a t i o n in this case (at a n y r a t e in the materials r e p o r t e d ) t h a t he is m a k i n g up for an initial loss of c o n t r o l . T h e situational d y n a m i c (which seems to go on for at least a half an hour, p e r h a p s several hours) is pulling t h e m deeper a n d deeper into the p a t t e r n of a b u s e . It is like a long d r a w n - o u t f o r w a r d p a n i c in its later p h a s e , except t h e r e is no a p p a r e n t beginning in confron- t a t i o n a l tension a n d no s u d d e n collapse; it is t h e reciprocal e n t r a i n m e n t of the cringing victim (in this case, e m o t i o n a l l y cringing in subservience) a n d the repetitive a t t a c k i n g t h a t we find in t r o o p s c o m m i t t i n g an atrocity against helpless foes. It is a b r o k e n r e c o r d of the w o r s t k i n d — t h e needle c a u g h t in the groove of an old-fashioned vinyl r e c o r d so the same segment of the t u n e is played again a n d again. T h e e m o t i o n a l t o n e is l o w a n d m a u d l i n r a t h e r t h a n h e a t e d a n d strident. It does n o t a p p e a r to be stress- related, b u t r a t h e r an institutionalized g a m e t h a t he plays w i t h her, a ritual in w h i c h he sets all the r h y t h m s .

T h e w o m a n is playing the victim role all t o o well, a n d this is p a r t of the m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l feedback t h a t keeps the d o m i n a t o r e n t r a i n e d in his aggression. In this case, t h e r e is striking evidence t h a t this is so. After her t h e r a p i s t convinces B a r b a r a t h a t the p a t t e r n is n o t going to c h a n g e in t h e future, she t a k e s action.

B a r b a r a entered the n e x t t h e r a p y session w i t h a huge smile. She re- p o r t e d to the t h e r a p i s t t h a t Bill h a d again b e g u n to accuse her of n o t loving h i m a n d she h a d recognized the first stage of yet a n o t h e r abusive episode. She h a d been riding in the car w i t h Bill at the t i m e , h o l d i n g a large c a r r y - o u t cola. B a r b a r a r e p o r t e d t o the t h e r a p i s t t h a t she t o o k the cola a n d " d u m p e d it into Bill's l a p . " "I w a s d a m n e d if I w a s going to play t h a t g a m e again, a n d I t o l d h i m s o . " B a r b a r a r e p o r t e d t h a t Bill w a s so s h o c k e d t h a t they focused on her b e h a v i o r r a t h e r t h a n c o n t i n u i n g t h e typical abusive p a t t e r n . (Stith et al. 1 9 9 0 : 62)

It is t o o simple an a n s w e r to advise w o m e n in such relationships n o t to play the victim role. Sometimes this w o r k s , sometimes it d o e s n ' t . W o m e n w h o fight back risk escalation to m o r e severe violence; leaving can lead to a n o t h e r k i n d of escalation, including stalking by the obsessed m a l e , sometimes a b u i l d u p in the conflict of wills to the p o i n t of m u r d e r (Tjaden

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a n d T h o e n n e s 2 0 0 0 ; Kimmel 2 0 0 2 : 1 3 5 0 - 5 3 ) . This is the same ambiguity in robberies: as we see later, resisting r a t h e r t h a n playing the victim in- creases the chances t h a t the robbery will be unsuccessful, b u t it also in- creases the chances t h a t the victim will get h u r t .

E n t r a i n m e n t of victim with aggressor is a central micro-process t h a t gives abusive episodes their situational m o m e n t u m . T h e key p o i n t in time m u s t be some feature of the escalation chain, p e r h a p s w h e r e repetitions become established. We still lack information on h o w such sequences get started, a p r o b l e m arising from sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable in the detailed case studies t h a t alone can reveal d y n a m i c p a t t e r n s . Research to ferret this o u t w o u l d be of great practical value.

N E G O T I A T I N G I N T E R A C T I O N A L T E C H N I Q U E S O F V I O L E N C E

A N D V I C T I M H O O D

T h e r e seems to be considerable indeterminism in my a r g u m e n t . Back- g r o u n d conditions—stress, life t r a n s i t i o n s , i s o l a t i o n — d o not necessarily lead to severe violence, or any violence at all. And so it is w i t h the situa- tional sequences t h a t I have described; particular forms of these are well d o c u m e n t e d in the case-study literature, but these are sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable, investigating w h e r e an a t r o c i o u s o u t c o m e has oc- curred. 1 have given scenarios by which h a n d i c a p p e d persons, like crying babies, get into a polarizing conflict in w h i c h the o t h e r is d e h u m a n i z e d a n d time-patterns c u l m i n a t e in atrocities; but most crying babies, handi- capped p e r s o n s , a n d elders are n o t severely a b u s e d , because things do not go t h a t far. C o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t of children is very widespread and most of it does not escalate to extremes; n o r do m o s t o r d i n a r y couple quarrels.

We c a n n o t get o u t of this methodological problem simply by avoiding sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable by going back to large N c o m p a r a t i v e studies; these are t o o m u c h limited n o t only by a n a r r o w range of s t a n d a r d variables, but also by being unable to pick o u t the processual d y n a m i c s . W h a t m a k e s a difference between the mild cases of conflict and those t h a t escalate to violence and serious abuse depends on processual t u r n i n g p o i n t s . We can t u r n this variety to o u r analytical a d v a n t a g e if we c o m p a r e situationally across: unviolent domestic conflict; limited and balanced fights; and t w o kinds of severe violence, h o t forward panics and cold terroristic torture-regimes.

W h a t are the differences in micro-mechanisms a m o n g these? They are variants on the mutual focus/emotional e n t r a i n m e n t model t h a t e n c o m - passes all interaction. Let us t a k e up again the most c o n t e n t i o u s p o i n t . 1 have argued t h a t people are not good at violence; the big barrier t h a t any violence must find a w a y a r o u n d is confrontational tension/fear. This is

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w h a t they are chiefly afraid of—not t h e fear of being h u r t , fear of sanc- tions from the larger society, fear of being p u n i s h e d .

T h i s m a y seem inherently implausible. W h a t can be easier t h a n big p e r s o n s beating up small ones, s t r o n g beating up w e a k , a r m e d killing the u n a r m e d ? But ask yourself: can you do it? Specifically a n d concretely, whom could y o u hit, or c o m m i t a n o t h e r form of violence u p o n ? For t h a t matter, w h o m can y o u raise y o u r voice w i t h , or engage in o t h e r conflict tactics w i t h ? ( O r when could y o u do this, at s o m e p a r t i c u l a r t i m e in y o u r life?) P e r h a p s the specific scenarios involve a s p o u s e , a sibling, an a c q u a i n - t a n c e , o n e ' s child, or certain situations a n d scenes involving s t r a n g e r s . In each case t h a t o n e c a n concretely visualize, I s u b m i t t h a t a process of n e g o t i a t i o n w e n t o n , w h i c h led up to t h a t k i n d of violence being allowed; a n d this n e g o t i a t i o n is a m a t t e r of m a n a g i n g the situational t e n s i o n of conflict, n o t p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r of fear of p u n i s h m e n t or retaliation.

This process of n e g o t i a t i n g o n e ' s w a y i n t o a violent r e l a t i o n s h i p is illus- t r a t e d by the following:

Jennie w a s m a r r i e d s o o n after her g r a d u a t i o n from college. H e r h u s - b a n d , R a l p h , g r a d u a t e d from law school the previous year a n d w a s beginning a p r o m i s i n g practice with a p r o m i n e n t attorney. In the sec- o n d year of the m a r r i a g e , Ralph began to become highly critical of J e n n i e . In public s i t u a t i o n s , he w e n t o u t of his way to e m b a r r a s s her w i t h c o m m e n t s a b o u t her lack of intelligence. W h e n they r e t u r n e d h o m e from a visit with friends, he w o u l d criticize her behavior, saying she w a s pushy, aggressive, and unfeminine. D u r i n g these times, Jennie remained quiet. She seldom took a stand against her h u s b a n d , accepted his criticism, a n d agreed to try to please him by c h a n g i n g her behavior.

In the second year of the m a r r i a g e , R a l p h ' s psychological a n d verbal a t t a c k s on Jennie became m o r e severe. Again, Jennie retreated. T h e verbal a t t a c k s became m o r e frequent, a n d eventually, Ralph ended these verbal tirades with a physical a t t a c k on Jennie. T h e a t t a c k s always c a m e late at night. They were usually followed by R a l p h insisting on having sexual relations as a w a y of resolving the p r o b l e m . ( T h o r m a n 1 9 8 0 : 139)

It a p p e a r s t h a t the h u s b a n d ' s o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a t u s is rising relative to his wife's; in this social class, their socializing is likely to be with the m a n ' s professional associates (Kanter 1 9 7 7 ) , a n d t h u s it is w h e n she is in t h e presence of his professional peers t h a t he belittles her, a n d it is in r e g a r d to w h a t he perceives as her faulty self-presentation in these s i t u a t i o n s t h a t he begins to engage in t i r a d e s at h o m e . He is b e c o m i n g relatively s t r o n g e r socially, a n d she is c o m i n g to accept t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e n he escalates his p o w e r a d v a n t a g e , as t h e m o m e n t u m of verbal t i r a d e s flows i n t o physical violence.

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A sociological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e overall p a t t e r n is t h a t w i t h i n t h e first t w o years of their m a r r i a g e , the m a n h a s discovered t h a t he is in an i m p r o v i n g p o s i t i o n on the i n t e r a c t i o n a l m a r k e t relative to his wife; since he a p p a r e n t l y does n o t w a n t to leave his wife, or seek a d d i t i o n a l p a r t n e r s , he uses his implicit m a r k e t p o w e r to d e m a n d greater subservience from his wife in their o w n p e r s o n a l a n d sexual relationships. Blau's (1964) principle applies here: t h e p e r s o n w i t h a w e a k e r ex ch an g e p o s i t i o n c a n c o m p e n s a t e by subservience. His initial criticisms of her indicate recogni- t i o n t h a t she does n o t m a t c h his s t a t u s , a n d t h a t h e w a n t s t o b e w i t h s o m e o n e w h o m a t c h e s his life-style self-presentation; the criticism be- comes a p a t h w a y t o w a r d affirming her situationally passive, w e a k posi- t i o n . In effect, they are trying o u t h o w their b a r g a i n i n g resources will be t u r n e d i n t o o n g o i n g roles: he is learning techniques of building his e m o - t i o n a l m o m e n t u m as d o m i n a t o r , she is learning to be a victim.

I have argued t h a t all violence m u s t find a p a t h w a y a r o u n d the barrier of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. H e r e I a d d a second p o i n t : the specific c h a r a c t e r of t h e violence is a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of confron- t a t i o n a l tension/fear. A n d this is a s i t u a t i o n a l process, going on over time, as p a r t i c u l a r p a i r s of individuals (at least in the case of domestic abuse) develop a p a t h w a y t o g e t h e r i n w h i c h b o t h w o r k t h r o u g h t h e tension/ fear a n d c h a n n e l it i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r scenario of violence. T h e p a t h w a y is simultaneously a w a y in w h i c h individuals develop techniques of conflict, techniques of using their resources to c o n t r o l t h e other, techniques of being violent b u t also of being subject to violence. Obviously s o m e of these " t e c h n i q u e s " are n o t in the interest of t h e individual w h o t h e r e b y has violence p e r f o r m e d u p o n t h e m , b u t they are t w o - s i d e d , i n t e r a c t i o n a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s nevertheless. T h e y are roles t h a t b o t h sides learn to play, a n d to play w i t h each other.

In t h e case of f o r w a r d p a n i c , the process consists in self-reinforcing l o o p s of e n t r a i n m e n t , b e t w e e n a t t a c k e r a n d victim, a n d self-entrainment on the p a r t of the attacker. M u t u a l asymmetrical e n t r a i n m e n t is found at t h e climax of a military f o r w a r d p a n i c ; t h e defeated soldiers going into a despairing, frozen, passive state, while their a t t a c k e r s seem g o a d e d i n t o a frenzy of killing t h a t involves a feeling of disgust at their passive victims. In domestic violence, t o o , t h e r e is often this p a t t e r n of t h e passive, helpless victim w h o s e o s t e n t a t i o u s helplessness, or ineffectual resistance, seems to pull the aggressor i n t o still m o r e p a r o x y s m s of overkill (as in t h e case described earlier, t h e m a n w h o k e p t l o o k i n g for n e w w a y s t o a t t a c k his wife, finally a t t e m p t i n g to b r a i n her w i t h his g u i t a r ) . H e r e again are sub- p a t h w a y s : O n e is t h a t t h e victim's cringing m a k e s the aggressor disgusted a n d increasingly angry; it is a self-perpetuating l o o p since the aggressor feels d r a w n i n t o c o n t i n u i n g t h e a t t a c k just because of his anger at the o t h e r ' s cringing. T h e effect is t h a t a t t a c k e r a n d victim are tied t o g e t h e r

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in the m o m e n t of violence, the t w o organisms sending out bodily a n d e m o t i o n a l signals t h a t are passing t h r o u g h each o t h e r and further e n h a n c - ing w h a t they are doing: m o r e cringing by o n e , m o r e anger a n d a t t a c k i n g by the other.

T h e following e x a m p l e gives the subjective viewpoint or a c c o u n t of an attacker, n o t in a domestic case b u t a n a l o g o u s on this particular point: T w o y o u n g black men k i d n a p an old white w o m a n in her camper.

W h e n she c a m e back to the camper, we pulled a knife on her a n d told her to s t a r t driving. She said, "I'll do a n y t h i n g you w a n t , but please d o n ' t h u r t m e . " . . . After she p a r k e d the camper, she started crying and slobbering. "Please d o n ' t h u r t m e , please d o n ' t h u r t me. I'm sorry, please . . . " I k n e w the old stinking bitch was only lying. Seeing her slobber like t h a t only m a d e me m a d d e r a n d hate her even m o r e .

I j u m p e d out of the camper, g r a b b e d her by the s h o u l d e r s a n d t h r e w her o u t of the c a b . She landed face first in the dirt. She got up on her h a n d s a n d knees and started yelling, " H e l p , police, help police, h e l p . " I said, " S h u t up you old stinking b i t c h , " and kicked her in the s t o m a c h as h a r d as I could a n d k n o c k e d all the wind o u t of t h a t old bag. She rolled up in a ball in the m u d gasping for her b r e a t h , a n d I kicked her again which straightened her o u t like a stick. 1 tried to lift her up by the clothes, but she w a s so m u d d y t h a t she slipped o u t of my h a n d s , so I g r a b b e d her by the hair. J a m e s said, " W o u l d you look at her ugly old face." After I looked at it, I got so m a d , I smacked a n d b a c k h a n d e d her a b o u t t w e n t y times. Then I t h r e w her against the c a m p e r a n d she slumped d o w n on the g r o u n d . J a m e s o p e n e d a can of p o p and asked her, " D o you w a n t some p o p ? " She said, " N o , I only w a n t you to let me g o . " I said, " I ' m not going to let you g o , you stinking old bitch, I'm going to kill y o u . " I g r a b b e d her by the hair again a n d slammed her head back a n d forth against the side of the truck until blood started r u n n i n g o u t from her hair a n d over her ears. Then I d r o p p e d her on the g r o u n d , kicked her over into the m u d p u d d l e a n d left her for d e a d . We got into her c a m p e r and d r o v e off. (Athens 1 9 8 9 : 3)

We see n o t only attacker-victim e n t r a i n m e n t , but self-cntrainment of the a t t a c k e r in his o w n action a n d e m o t i o n . ' " Emotionally a r o u s e d behavior, full of effort, has its o w n bodily tensions a n d r h y t h m s ; like a r u n n e r get- ting c a u g h t up in a r u n n i n g r h y t h m , the a t t a c k e r also gets into feeding on himself (to stick to the male case here); he is " o n a r o l l , " he has m o m e n - t u m . It t o o is an e m o t i o n a l t r a n c e , a h o r m o n a l rush; like eating salted n u t s , it sustains itself as a period of a p p e t i t e , feeling b o t h good a n d feeling like a c o m p u l s i o n , a train he is riding that he neither can n o r w a n t s to get off. T h i s c o m p o n e n t is self-entrainment, insofar as it does not depend

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u p o n feedback from t h e victim; it is o n e ' s o w n r h y t h m s a n d the e m o t i o n a l energy they give off t h a t keep the cycle going.

Consider n o w t h e difference b e t w e e n f o r w a r d p a n i c a n d a cold, deliber- ate p a t t e r n of t o r t u r i n g t h e victim. T h e latter often involves psychological pressures, t h r e a t e n i n g t h e victim over a p e r i o d of h o u r s , playing u p o n her h o p e s of a p p e a s i n g the aggressor, even t h o u g h he is never satisfied w i t h the a p p e a s e m e n t a n d just uses it as a n o t h e r step t o w a r d eventual violence (e.g., t h e m a n w i t h the h u n t i n g knife). T h e pace here is slow r a t h e r t h a n a s u d d e n r u s h ; the e m o t i o n a l t o n e of the aggressor is relatively cool r a t h e r t h a n h o t a n d hysterical. F o r w a r d p a n i c has a d r a m a t i c profile of b u i l d u p to high tension, including the t e n s i o n of standoff or struggle, a n d t h e n s u d d e n collapse i n t o t h e r u s h of aggressor overkill. A terrorist t o r t u r e regime is m o r e like a suspense thriller; it does n o t build on s u d d e n con- f r o n t a t i o n s a n d incidents, b u t seems m u c h m o r e deeply p r e m e d i t a t e d b y the aggressor; if n o t a conscious calculation, at least it is a r o u t i n e in w h i c h the aggressor picks on his victim, l o o k i n g for p e t t y issues a n d occa- sions, or even starting up w i t h o u t ostensible p r o v o c a t i o n of any sort.

H e r e w h a t is lacking, c o m p a r e d to t h e f o r w a r d p a n i c , is the entire first p h a s e , t h e tension b u i l d u p t h a t is released i n t o the s u d d e n r u s h of f o r w a r d p a n i c . Nevertheless, p a r t n e r t o r t u r e has s o m e t h i n g of the c h a r a c t e r of t h e latter p a r t of a f o r w a r d p a n i c , the same loops of e n t r a i n m e n t b e t w e e n victim a n d aggressor in the process of the violence itself; a n d a l o o p of self-entrainment w i t h i n t h e aggressor. O n e m i g h t describe a t o r t u r e rela- t i o n s h i p as a t r u n c a t e d f o r w a r d p a n i c , in w h i c h the t o r t u r e r has found a different p a t h w a y t h a t leads t o the f o r w a r d panic o u t c o m e . T h e t e n s i o n a n d energy t h a t is driving the f o r w a r d p a n i c does n o t come from t h e immediately p r i o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n , as in t h e case of a military battle or police chase, or indeed a h e a t e d domestic a r g u m e n t , b u t it is c h a r g e d up from the i m m e d i a t e process of d o m i n a t i n g the victim. T h e long d r a w n - o u t psychological p h a s e of t o r t u r e is precisely a battle of i m p o s i n g o n e will on another, played in the g a m e of soliciting a p p e a s e m e n t b u t t h e n rejecting it as insufficient, an endless-in-principle tantalizing t h a t the t o r - t u r e r c o n t r o l s . It is a w a y he c a n get t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d use it to m o t i v a t e his o w n violence; it is a deliberate m e t h o d (at least on a n o n v e r b a l level of awareness) of h o w to get oneself i n t o a pleasurable situation of e n t r a i n m e n t w i t h the victim, a n d the high of self-entrainment t h a t goes w i t h it. T h e t o r t u r e r has learned a skill, a r a t h e r c o m p l e x interac- t i o n a l t e c h n i q u e , for getting an e n d - c o n d i t i o n of e m o t i o n a l feedbacks— r a t h e r like creating a d r u g h i g h — o u t of o n e ' s o w n b o d y a n d via the inter- m e d i a r y of a n o t h e r body. H o w e v e r h o r r i b l e , it is a form of k n o w l e d g e , a w a y of feeling c o m f o r t a b l e in the z o n e of being a h a b i t u a l ab u ser of some other p e r s o n , m u c h like an addict feels c o m f o r t a b l e in the z o n e of his d r u g a d d i c t i o n .

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We h a v e l a u n c h e d into this micro-analysis of the g r u e s o m e details of abusive violence in o r d e r to locate t h e kinds of t u r n i n g p o i n t s , or situa- t i o n a l sequences over t i m e t h a t bring it a b o u t . We w a n t to see h o w some p e r s o n s g o d o w n t h a t t u n n e l , while o t h e r s , w h o m a y h a v e the same back- g r o u n d o r even f o r e g r o u n d characteristics, d o n o t . M y a r g u m e n t i s t h a t the forms of abusive violence involve several kinds of e n t r a i n m e n t , a n d t h a t it is these e n t r a i n m e n t loops t h a t become learned, n e g o t i a t e d , or built u p . T h i s is a tacit b a r g a i n i n g process, a process of feeling o n e a n o t h e r o u t , discovering o n e ' s strengths a n d weaknesses; it involves m a k i n g use of one's resources (coercive power, m a t e r i a l resources, e m o t i o n a l rituals, interactional m a r k e t o p p o r t u n i t i e s ) as they can he brought to bear on the immediate situation. It is n o t r a w resources alone t h a t m a t t e r here; they h a v e to be b r o u g h t i n t o a c t i o n so t h a t they w o r k in controlling o n e ' s partner. T h e r e is skill involved in this, techniques t h a t are acquired, or fail to be acquired.

These techniques or skills t h u s include, from the side of t h e aggressor, k n o w i n g h o w to get oneself i n t o a position w h e r e one c a n feed on entrain- m e n t w i t h o n e ' s victim; similarly, into a position w h e r e one can feed on self-entrainment—like going off on a jag of anger t h a t builds on itself. Usually these are relationally specific a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , specific to p a r t i c - u l a r couples or families or g r o u p s ; for if one p e r s o n is going to get his e m o t i o n a l kicks by p u t t i n g himself m o r e a n d m o r e deeply into a zone w h e r e he is getting high on his o w n bodily anger, the others a r o u n d h i m m u s t h a v e negotiated a modus vivendi t h a t has allowed h i m to do so. This involves a chain of processes over time, t a k i n g smaller steps t h a t lead to further steps, like an a r m y g r a d u a l l y t a k i n g g r o u n d before it begins its m a i n assault.

T h e r e are b o t h s h o r t - t e r m techniques (like the e n t r a i n m e n t w i t h self a n d w i t h victim t h a t occurs in violent action), a n d also lo n g -term tech- n i q u e s , techniques o f h o w t o m a n e u v e r d o w n t h a t slope t o get t o t h a t p o i n t . Conversely, t h e r e m u s t be t e c h n i q u e s , implicit a n d unreflective t h o u g h they m a y be, by w h i c h some p e r s o n s (apparently a big majority) resist m o v i n g far on t h a t slope. These include the techniques t h a t are de- veloped in w h a t we have been calling c o m m o n couple violence, tech- niques by w h i c h resources get b a l a n c e d a n d conflicts are s t o p p e d , to go t h u s far a n d no farther.

On the side of the victim, there is a similar a n d parallel process of learn- ing, for all t h a t they are p r o c e d u r e s t h a t h a v e terrible consequences for oneself. O n e learns h o w to b e c o m e a victim. T h i s occurs b o t h in the s h o r t r u n , at t h e violent end of the process, a n d in the long r u n of m o v i n g d o w n the slope. O n e learns h o w t o fall into resolutions t o c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t p u t o n e successively on the defensive, increasingly passive, increasingly allowing the tension/fear of c o n f r o n t a t i o n to transfer energy to the aggres-

1 5 4 • Chapter 4

sor a n d t a k e i t a w a y from t h e victim. H u m a n s are e m o t i o n a l l y p r o - g r a m m e d for solidarity rituals, for m a i n t a i n i n g m u t u a l focus a n d e m o - t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t ; if s o m e o n e else is setting the p a t t e r n of the focus a n d the t o n e a n d r h y t h m , o n e h a s a t e n d e n c y to go a l o n g w i t h it just to avoid the tension of a dispute. Often this t a k e s place just at the level of avoiding m o m e n t a r y u n p l e a s a n t n e s s . It is a b a d b a r g a i n , since c u r r e n t ritual soli- darity, keeping up the Goffmanian surface of interaction for the present, m a y c o m e at t h e cost of a m u c h w o r s e b a r g a i n later o n . Nevertheless, we m a y r e a s o n a b l y describe this as learning techniques for keeping up t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e least disturbed m a n n e r for the present m o m e n t . Victims learn specific scenarios, c o m p l e m e n t a r y to the roles played by their ag- gressors; some learn the role of the victim in episodic b l o w u p s of f o r w a r d p a n i c s ; others learn the role of t h e victim of slow t o r t u r e , repeatedly a p - peasing s o m e o n e w h o s e role is to m a k e a p p e a s e m e n t itself a g a m e of t a n - talizing suspense a n d b e t r a y a l .

In this sense, the i n d e t e r m i n a c y of b a c k g r o u n d variables in predicting domestic violence, as well as the i n d e t e r m i n a c y of going d o w n any of the p a r t i c u l a r p a t h w a y s , is n o t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l or philosophical, b u t real. It is an i n d e t e r m i n a c y in the w o r l d , since it is a m a t t e r of h o w individuals actually w o r k o u t a chain of i n t e r a c t i o n rituals. W h a t h a p p e n s d e p e n d s on the skills t h a t each p e r s o n in a p a r t i c u l a r o n g o i n g relationship ac- quires. F o r an act of abusive violence to t a k e place, t w o (or more) chains of learning techniques m u s t coincide: T h e aggressor m u s t h a v e learned the techniques t h a t will w o r k on this p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n ; some of these involve high degrees of self-entrainment in being w o r k e d up in c o n f r o n t a - t i o n a n d violence; others are skills of h o w to get o n e ' s o w n energies en- t r a i n e d in t h e reaction of a n o t h e r p e r s o n to one's o w n violence.

On the o t h e r side, the victim m u s t have learned t h e techniques o f h o w to get along w i t h the aggressor, keeping the relationship going a n d subtly e n c o u r a g i n g h i m in his techniques of aggression. At the violent end, t h e r e are t w o b r a n c h e s to this p a t h w a y : O n e is w h e r e t h e victim has learned some devices for c o n f r o n t a t i o n , b u t n o t t h e techniques t h a t lead to lim- iting fights at the level of c o m m o n , p o w e r - b a l a n c e d episodes; this is the p a t h w a y t h a t leads t o heightened tensions, t h e n f o r w a r d p a n i c b l o w u p s . T h e o t h e r p a t h w a y leads t o slow insidious a p p e a s e m e n t a n d terroristic t o r t u r e regime; here the victim has learned to get very small ritual payoffs while at t h e cost of falling passively i n t o t h e role of being t o r t u r e d .

T h e r e m a y be o t h e r p a t h w a y s . But all involve the coincidence of t w o lines of learning: a learning of abusive skills on the p a r t of the aggressor, a n d a learning of victim roles, or at least a failure to learn violence limita- t i o n skills, on t h e side of the victim. These t w o roles will c o m e o u t very clearly in t h e case of bullying, w h i c h t a k e s a c o m b i n a t i o n of a skilled

Domestic Abuse • 155

bully a n d a skilled v i c t i m — a l t h o u g h the latter's skill may also t a k e the form of being in m a n y w ays socially skill-less.

This is depressing, but it also is hopeful. B a c k g r o u n d resources are n o t the only thing t h a t c o u n t s ; situational m a n a g e m e n t skills can c o m p e n s a t e for resources. Skill at situational techniques may forestall fights, or bal- ance t h e m off a n d end them quickly when they get going. On the o t h e r side, one may learn the skills to d o m i n a t e , even if o n e lacks other re- sources. In this sense, it m a y n o t simply be males c o m p e n s a t i n g for lost economic or o t h e r positions w h o use violence; violence is n o t b r u t e force a l o n e , b u t w h e r e successful it is a skill at picking a n d m a n e u v e r i n g victims into playing one of the victim roles.

C H A P T E R 5

Attacking the Weak: II. Bullying, Mugging, and H o l d u p s

T H E M O S T F R E Q U E N T K I N D o f attacking the weak i s p r o b a b l y bullying. This is m o s t c o m m o n a m o n g children, and declines with age except in total institutions that in effect treat their inmates like children. I will deal here also with muggings a n d h o l d u p s , which m a k e a typical sequence for g r o w i n g up into a life of crime. All together, these go from easy to h a r d forms of violence; in each case, the p e r p e t r a t o r s have to learn h o w to m a k e them easy to perform.

An unusually full micro-description of the social c o n t e x t of bullying is given in M o n t a g n e r et al. ( 1 9 8 8 ) . This is a study of French daycare cen- ters, w h e r e the children are very y o u n g — f r o m three to thirty-six m o n t h s , and k i n d e r g a r t e n s (ages t w o to six years)—and their b e h a v i o r is recorded on v i d e o t a p e . T h e children fall into five main types (see figure 5.1).

1. Popular d o m i n a n t s : these children arc sociable, but also t h r e a t e n - ing a n d appeas i ng. Always interacting with other children, they are h a p p y and playful, but also c o m p e t e with o t h e r s . They t a k e o t h e r children's toys a w a y from them, but then give them back: as if just to s h o w they can do it, as if starting little disputes just for fun. After they win they are friendly.

2 . Sociable a n d a p p e a s i n g : children w h o are friendly b u t n o n c o m - petitive; w h e n a n o t h e r child tries to t a k e a toy from t h e m , they give it u p . These c h i l d r e n ' s n e t w o r k ties are w i t h the p o p u l a r d o m i - n a n t s (1).

3. Aggressive: children w h o are constantly c o m p e t i n g with o t h e r chil- dren a n d trying to d o m i n a t e t h e m ; they take their toys a w a y from t h e m , m a k e them cry, keep the toys just to s h o w they possess t h e m , a n d toss t h e m a w a y when o t h e r children no longer try to get t h e m . These little bullies associate chiefly with each other, in little bully gangs. They d o n o t aggress against the sociable d o m i n a n t s ( 1 ) , h o w - ever, or their c o m p l a i s a n t pals (2); the d o m i n a n t s win any disputes with the bullies.

4. Fearful victims: these children are timid and cry easily. They are the favorite targets of the bullies (3). They are also followers; to the

Figure 5.1 Bullying in Pre-school Networks

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 157

extent t h a t they play w i t h or n e a r other children, it is the bullies t h a t they follow.

5. Aggressive a n d d o m i n a t e d . These children are generally d o m i n a t e d , b u t they b e c o m e intermittently aggressive. T h e y are typically net- w o r k isolates.

1 5 8 • C h a p t e r 5

In a d d i t i o n to these five stable types, t h e r e are t w o o t h e r s : (A) fluctuat- ing personalities, going t h r o u g h all of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d types; their net- w o r k ties are usually in associating w i t h (3), the bullies. (B) Isolated: these children are n o n - s o c i a b l e , non-aggressive, a n d n o n - a p p e a s i n g ; they have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h the o t h e r s . Typically these are t h e youngest children, b u t m a y m a i n t a i n their personality style until age three or four at w h i c h p o i n t they fall i n t o one of t h e stable types.

T h e bullies resemble t h e d o m i n a n t children in t h a t b o t h are competitive a n d d o m i n a t i n g , a n d they also a t t e m p t t o b e c o n n e c t e d t o o t h e r s ; t h e y differ in t h a t t h e d o m i n a n t s are also m o r e friendly, a n d they use their aggressiveness chiefly as a ritual for establishing m e m b e r s h i p for t h o s e w h o will play w i t h t h e m in a s u b o r d i n a t e capacity. T h e bullies are in the m i d d l e r a n k s of t h e status system. T h e y are n o t p a r t of the n e t w o r k of t h e d o m i n a n t s a n d their followers; they create their o w n n e t w o r k , b o t h a m o n g themselves, a n d w i t h the fearful victims w h o r a n k a t the b o t t o m . O n e m i g h t ask w h y the fearful d o n ' t associate w i t h the d o m i n a n t stars instead of w i t h t h e bullies; t h e a n s w e r m a y be t h a t those w h o do associate w i t h t h e d o m i n a n t s become less fearful, a n d the bullies are left w i t h t h o s e w h o r e m a i n easy t a r g e t s ; a n o t h e r possibility is t h a t t h e d o m i n a n t s , being sociometric stars, already are s u r r o u n d e d by m a n y children a n d t h u s there i s m o r e c o m p e t i t i o n t o b e n e a r t h e m ; hence t h o s e w h o d o n ' t m a k e i t i n t o this circle t h r o u g h its implicit sociability c o m p e t i t i o n h a n g a r o u n d w i t h their t o r m e n t e r s , a social c o n t a c t faute de mieux. Finally, we m i g h t q u e r y t h e status of (5), d o m i n a t e d b u t intermittently aggressive children: these are l o w in t h e hierarchy, w i t h w e a k n e t w o r k ties, b u t they also refuse to p u t up w i t h being targets all the time. O n e t h i n k s of teenagers in the high school system w h o reject the entire status system a n d b e c o m e rebels, w e i r d o s , a d h e r e n t s of intellectual or culturally distinctive styles.

Bullying is m o s t usefully conceptualized as an o n g o i n g social tie of re- petitive d o m i n a n c e a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n . It is n o t a o n e - s h o t incident, b u t an e x p e c t a b l e , locally institutionalized p a t t e r n . Such o n g o i n g relationships include m o c k i n g a n d jeering s o m e o n e as the h a b i t u a l b u t t of jokes; exclu- sion from sociability; stealing (including t a k i n g toys from y o u n g children, later t a k i n g their clothes, food, or m o n e y ) ; a n d beating. Bullying is typi- cally found in schools a n d in prisons; in the latter, t h e r a n g e of institution- alized d o m i n a n t / s u b o r d i n a t e relationships can include one-sided h o m o - sexual relations c o m m a n d i n g a n a l sex.

Bullying resembles the type of domestic abuse t h a t is o n g o i n g t o r m e n t a n d t o r t u r e . T h e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m similarly involves the bully's pleasure in frightening the victim, keeping him/her in suspense, enjoying the victim's p a l p a b l e h u m i l i a t i o n , indeed m o r e of this t h a n ac- t u a l violence. Bullying differs from domestic abuse by being e m b e d d e d in a m o r e c o m p l e x social hierarchy. Bullies have a recognized position in the

B u l l y i n g , .Mugging, a n d H o l d u p s • 1 5 9

status hierarchy of a c o m m u n i t y : they are n o t p a r t of the elite, b u t r a n k in a m i d d l e or a m b i g u o u s p o s i t i o n .

In the classic novel of the British b o a r d i n g school, Tom Brown's School Days (Hughes 1 8 5 7 / 1 9 9 4 ) , the bully, F l a s h m a n , is n o t p a r t of the school elite: he is n o t one of t h e school athletes, w h o are described (as in M o n t a - gner) as brave, d o m i n a n t , b u t also leaderly in their c o n c e r n for t h e school's ideals a n d t h e welfare of the g r o u p . F l a s h m a n is big, r o u g h , a c a r o u s e r w h o joins ostentatiously in all the occasions of u p r o a r a n d fun; he a n d the o t h e r bullies are p a r t of the g a m b l i n g a n d d r i n k i n g set, b u t find their special niche in leading the fun against the y o u n g e r boys. T h e y terrify t h e smaller boys in the d o r m i t o r i e s at curfew, tossing t h e m i n t o the air in a b l a n k e t , s o m e t h i n g of a playful o r d e a l in a spirit of g o o d h u m o r e d fun, b u t t a k i n g special pleasure in hitting t h e m against the ceiling or d r o p - ping t h e m on the floor. T h e bullies also a p p r o p r i a t e their food, m o n e y a l l o w a n c e s , a n d gifts from h o m e ; a n d subject t h e m to a regimen of kick- ing, cuffing, t h r o w i n g things, a n d cursing at t h e m .

This is a description of the 1 8 3 0 s , b u t similar p a t t e r n s are r e p o r t e d for British b o a r d i n g schools from t h e late 1960s t h r o u g h the early 1 9 9 0 s . Boys' rituals included h a n g i n g their victims u p s i d e - d o w n from w i n d o w s ; girls' bullying w a s m o r e psychological.

T h e m o s t p r e v a l e n t s o r t o f bullying w a s " v e r b a l a b u s e ; " t h e r e w a s a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f physical bullying, t h o u g h i n i t i a t i o n c e r e m o n i e s s u c h a s " b o g - w a s h i n g , " i n w h i c h b o y s ' h e a d s w e r e p u s h e d d o w n lava- t o r y basins, a n d " d i v i s i o n a l s c r u b s , " i n w h i c h t h e y w e r e b l a c k e n e d w i t h b o o t p o l i s h , w e r e said to be " p a r t of t h e folklore of t h e p a s t . " M o s t p a r e n t s w e r e perfectly satisfied w i t h t h e s c h o o l a n d s o m e be- lieved " b u l l y i n g a n d t e a s i n g w e r e a g o o d p r e p a r a t i o n for l a t e r life." O n e f o r m e r p u p i l said his residence h o u s e w a s " t h e w o r s t h o u s e for s p r o g - b a s h i n g [beating up t h e n e w boys or y o u n g e r c h i l d r e n ] , a n i g h t l y o c c u r r e n c e t h a t left me h a v i n g p a n i c a t t a c k s at 9 p . m . every n i g h t [after leaving]. . . . " O n c e t h e p e c k i n g o r d e r w a s established y o u w e r e s t u c k , it seems. You k n o w t h e k i n d of t h i n g — p o s s e s s i o n s " b o r - r o w e d , " o p i n i o n s ridiculed, e x c l u d e d from just a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g . (Duffell 2 0 0 0 : 1 8 6 , 188)

T h e m o r e e x t r e m e practices of bullying—stealing a n d physical vio- lence—are m o r e often found a m o n g boys t h a n girls. T h e female equiva- lent is to be verbally aggressive, m a k i n g catty a n d snide r e m a r k s , m o r e t h a n overt public jeering a n d insulting, w h i c h is chiefly a male p r o v i n c e . A l t h o u g h b o t h boys a n d girls pass a r o u n d s o m e of the same items of discourse (e.g., d e g r a d i n g n i c k n a m e s , humiliating stories), girls are less likely to be in the forefront of an active c r o w d jeering a victim to their face, a n d are m o r e active in malicious gossiping a n d s p r e a d i n g r u m o r s .

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B o t h boys a n d girls use r e l a t i o n a l aggression: telling s o m e o n e t h e y are n o t a friend, e x c l u d i n g t h e m from g r o u p s , giving the silent t r e a t m e n t (Prinstein a n d Cillessen 2 0 0 3 ) . Girls chiefly bully (in this v e r b a l a n d c o - v e r t w a y ) o t h e r girls, w h i l e boys bully (especially in t h e m o r e overt forms) o t h e r b o y s (but also girls, in t h e earlier grades) (Pelligrini a n d L o n g 2 0 0 2 ; O l w e u s 1 9 9 3 : 1 5 ) . As t h e y get older, bullying b e c o m e s finely t u n e d t o gender-segregated s t a t u s h i e r a r c h i e s . Girls verbally bully o t h e r s chiefly in t e r m s of their l o w s t a t u s in t h e s e x u a l a t t r a c t i v e n e s s / d a t i n g m a r k e t ; boys physically bully o t h e r s chiefly for their perceived l o w s t a n d i n g in physical aggression, w h i c h in p r a c t i c e m e a n s their self- p r e s e n t a t i o n as confident bluster.

T h e r e is considerable evidence t h a t bullying victims—in playschools, elementary a n d s e c o n d a r y schools, p r i s o n s a n d a r m y c a m p s — a r e those w h o are socially isolated, u n p o p u l a r , shyer, less confident (Olweus 1 9 9 3 ; F a r r i n g t o n 1 9 9 3 ; Ostvik a n d R u d m i n 2 0 0 1 ; N a n s e l e t al. 2 0 0 1 ) . Bullied children also are m o r e likely to h a v e been e m o t i o n a l l y a n d physically m a l t r e a t e d by p a r e n t s ( D u n c a n 1 9 9 9 b ) ; this is n o t a p a t t e r n of the p r e - viously a b u s e d b e c o m i n g a b u s e r s , cycling from b o t t o m to t o p in t h e n e x t r o u n d , b u t r a t h e r c o n t i n u i n g o n e ' s l o w p o s i t i o n from o n e a r e n a t o the n e x t . C h i l d r e n w h o s t a r t o u t w i t h l o w E E from h o m e b e c o m e victims i n school. Bullies are similar in some respects to their victims. Both bullies a n d victims are outside the p o p u l a r g r o u p a n d t e n d to be rejected by other children; b o t h h a v e high anxiety a n d depression, a l t h o u g h t h a t of the victims are even higher t h a n t h a t of their o p p r e s s o r s (Connolly a n d O ' M o o r e 2 0 0 3 ; B o u l t o n a n d Smith 1 9 9 4 ; R i c a n 1 9 9 5 ; K a l t i a l a - H e i n o e t al. 2 0 0 0 ) . O b s e r v a t i o n s of preschoolers at h o m e a n d at p r e s c h o o l s h o w t h a t children w h o have y o u n g e r siblings are m o r e d o m i n a n t i n b o t h places t h a n children w i t h o u t y o u n g e r siblings (Berndt a n d Bulleit 1 9 8 5 ) . Again we see t h a t high aggression in one a r e n a carries over i n t o a n o t h e r ; con- versely, lack of o p p o r t u n i t y to practice skills of being d o m i n a n t at h o m e p u t s children at a d i s a d v a n t a g e (especially the only child) w h e n they go i n t o t h e larger a r e n a of the school, w h e r e they are likely to b e c o m e t a r g e t s .

Some studies s h o w a process of mobility or cycling from role of victim to bully; H a y n i e et al. (2001) found one-half of all middle school bullies h a d been victims; 1 a n d those w h o were c o m b i n a t i o n bullies/victims scored the lowest on psychosocial a n d behavioral measures. There is a hierarchy of maladjustment: bullies/victims at the b o t t o m ; n e x t p u r e victims; then p u r e bullies; best adjusted on all measures were children n o t involved in bullying in any respect. This kind of result p r o b a b l y indicates t h a t the cate- gory of "bullies" w a s construed as including b o t h those w h o d o m i n a t e others a n d those w h o fight back episodically a n d unsuccessfully (no. 5 in figure 5 . 1 , aggressive a n d d o m i n a t e d , a n d / o r A, fluctuating) in M o n t a g n e r ' s n e t w o r k s . T h u s some studies (Espelage a n d H o l t 2 0 0 1 ) r e p o r t t h a t bullies

II|>|!IIII'I!!I'IU|III'ITII '-I" I

B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , and H o l d u p s • 1 6 1

have the same n u m b e r of friends as non-bullies; these are probably the true bullies, the middle class of the system. Bullies have larger n e t w o r k s than their victims (on evidence from early adolescents), but detailed analysis shows that they are connected largely with assistants in bullying, and with "reinforcers" of bullying—children w h o join in by jeering and sympatheti- cally observing (Salmivalli ct al. 1997). In a n o t h e r study, 75 percent of bullies named other bullies as their friends (Kspelagc and Ho lt 2 0 0 1 ) . All this is consistent with M o n t a g n e r ' s network patterns. Victims spent sig- nificantly more time alone (Salmivalli et al. 1997). Bullies had high social and physical self-concepts, although low self-concepts in other areas (such as intelligence); adolescents w h o had low social and physical self-concepts, or indeed low self-concepts in all areas, were the most victimized (Salmivalli 1998). Bullies are a m o n g the gregarious kids; ability to m a k e friends easily is negatively related to being bullied and positively related to bullying (Nansel et al. 2 0 0 1 ) . Bullies have social skills that they use in a manipulative and domineering way (Smith and Brain 2 0 0 0 ) .

Bullies are a p h e n o m e n o n of the m i ddl e, in a l m o s t every respect. As individuals, bullies are in the middle of status hierarchies, lording it over those below, not really accepted into the high-status hierarchy a b o v e . In- stitutionally, bullying h a p p e n s m o s t often in middle schools; a longitudi- nal study following children from fifth t h r o u g h seventh grades found t h a t bullying increased at the transition to middle school, as children at- tempted to establish their position in a new social e n v i r o n m e n t (Pelligrini a n d Long 2 0 0 2 ) — i n d e e d , moving from being the oldest kids in the ele- m e n t a r y school of grades one t h r o u g h six, to the youngest a n d least presti- gious kids in middle school of grades seven t h r o u g h eight or seven t h r o u g h nine. Studies of high schools (Milner 2 0 0 4 ) s h o w a peak of bullying be- havior in the first year.

Aggressive children are perceived by others as popular, but they arc n o t generally well liked—tenth g r a d e r s can see t h a t they are sociably active a n d well-connected, b u t personally they d o n o t w a n t t o b e a r o u n d them (Prinstein a n d Cillessen 2 0 0 3 ; also Eder, Evans, and P a r k e r 1995). W h e n kids perceive s o m e o n e using overt aggression (directly t h r e a t e n i n g , hit- ting, kicking, p u s h i n g , or teasing a n d name-calling) in an i n s t r u m e n t a l f a s h i o n — " t o get w h a t they w a n t , " they t e n d to see h i m or her as highly p o p u l a r ; w h e n they perceive s o m e o n e being aggressive because of being h u r t or in a b a d m o o d , they r e g a r d e d this p e r s o n as especially u n p o p u l a r , as well as s o m e o n e o n e personally w a n t s to avoid. Both p a t t e r n s fit w i t h M o n t a g n e r ' s types: the t o p dogs are m a s t e r s of aggressive tactics, b u t use t h e m in a controlled fashion, t a k i n g the initiative r a t h e r t h a n r e s p o n d i n g b y being upset; t h o s e w h o f i g h t b a c k i n r e a c t i o n t o their l o w s t a n d i n g only reinforce their l o w status. T h e r e is a w h o l e r a n g e of aggressive styles,

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a n d t h e t w o w e have just n o t e d are a t t h e t o p a n d b o t t o m respectively; again bullies c o m e in the m i d d l e .

Bullying overlaps w i t h the n o r m a l processes of c o n s t r u c t i n g status at all levels in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n high school. These are well de- scribed in M i l n e r (2004) a n d M e r t e n ( 1 9 9 7 ) , t h e basis for the following. T h e t o p o f the h i e r a r c h y are t h e " p o p u l a r " elite, t h o s e w h o d o m i n a t e sociability. M e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d s u p o n being fashionably dressed in w h a t - ever are t h e latest of shifting styles, as well as u p o n being g o o d - l o o k i n g , a n d t h u s h i g h - r a n k i n g in t h e sexual m a r k e t ; family w e a l t h is helpful for being fashionable; a n d athletes, w h o occupy the m o s t widely visible focus of a t t e n t i o n , also are generally considered p a r t of t h e elite (the t w o wings are sometimes referred t o a s " p r e p s " a n d " j o c k s " ) . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , this is t h e n e t w o r k w h e r e t h e r e is t h e highest e m o t i o n a l energy, the m o s t a c - t i o n , the m o s t fun, t h e m o s t collective effervescence. Articulate m e m b e r s of the elite w o u l d deny t h a t m e m b e r s h i p is based only on clothes or money, or on sexiness (which m a y well be m o r e b l a t a n t in l o w e r - r a n k i n g c r o w d s ) . T h e elite are t h o s e w h o d o m i n a t e t h e center of a t t e n t i o n , because they are w h e r e t h e m o s t fun is h a p p e n i n g ; they h o s t a n d a t t e n d t h e best parties off school g r o u n d s ; d u r i n g the school day, t h e y d o m i n a t e the c o m - m o n gathering places, especially t h e l u n c h r o o m , w h e r e the pecking o r d e r is m o s t clearly manifested in w h o sits w i t h w h o m , a n d w h i c h tables h a v e the liveliest c o n v e r s a t i o n a n d m o s t laughter. To be isolated is to be farthest from any center of sociability; a n d this establishes t h e lowest end of the hierarchy. W i t h i n a closed system of a w a r e n e s s , being isolated is n o t just to be left a l o n e , b u t to a t t r a c t a t t e n t i o n of a negative sort.

T h e r e are a n u m b e r of m i d d l e - s t a t u s g r o u p s , w h i c h can v a r y consider- ably in large pluralistic schools. T h e r e is a fringe of the p o p u l a r g r o u p , those w h o are m o d e r a t e l y sociable o r w h o h a v e n e t w o r k c o n t a c t s (friend- ships or siblings a n d o t h e r relatives) w i t h some of t h e m , a n d t h u s can be present at some of their g a t h e r i n g s . T h e r e are alternative g r o u p s w i t h their distinctive cultures: musicians w h o t a k e p a r t i n b a n d o r choir; d r a m a clubs w h o dress in black a n d t a k e an a v a n t - g a r d e stance; a variety of counter-culture g r o u p s often based on bizarre dress a n d w h o s e r i t u a l ral- lying p o i n t is a p a r t i c u l a r form of p o p u l a r m u s i c . Intellectuals a n d studi- ous kids are generally denigrated as " n e r d s " (old-fashioned t e r m s : " g r i n d s , " " w o n k s " ) . Working-class a n d r u r a l s t u d e n t s are usually distinc- tive enclaves, l o o k e d d o w n u p o n b y t h e p o p u l a r a n d upper-middle-class students (as " s h i t - k i c k e r s , " " h o o d s , " " g r e a s e r s , " etc.); some of these m a y organize their o w n gangs, violent or quasi-violent. Racial a n d ethnic m i - norities m a y form enclaves or c u t across several of these g r o u p s . T h e r e is also a large g r o u p of average kids, n o t especially noticeable in a n y respect.

L o w status is m a r k e d in several w a y s : as being u n f a s h i o n a b l e in dress (which may be deliberate alternate clothing cults, or just lack of following

B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , a n d H o l d u p s • 1 6 3

c u r r e n t fashions); this is the m o s t obvious m a r k e r a n d m o s t often re- m a r k e d u p o n . But the central feature is being socially inept; t h a t is, n o t fun, playful, skilled at the techniques for being in the sociable action. Since sociability, the skills for having lively fun together, is the s t a n d a r d a r o u n d which the status system is c o n s t r u c t e d , those w h o most conspicu- ously lack this skill are b o u n d a r y m a r k e r s , representing just w h a t the g r o u n d cuts itself off from. In D u r k h e i m i a n t erms, they are negative sa- cred objects; in religious a n d political systems, they call forth righteous anger a n d p u n i s h m e n t ; in a sociability-oriented, fun-oriented status sys- t e m , they call forth righteous (i.e., completely u n s y m p a t h e t i c a n d vindic- tive) scorn expressed in a m o o d of h a p p y jeering.

A great deal of w h a t goes on in such a status system looks like forms of bullying, b u t it is n o t bullying in the full sense of the term (an e n d u r i n g exploitative relationship of d o m i n a n c e a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n between spe- cialized bullies a n d specialized victims). T h e m o r e e x t r e m e forms of bul- lying—threats, physical violence, stealing—are n o t m u c h p a r t of the sys- t e m . O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h r o u g h o u t the hierarchy from t o p t h r o u g h middle to b o t t o m , t h e r e are o n g o i n g practices t h a t also are found in bul- lying: exclusion; malicious gossip a n d mockery out of presence of the target ("behind their b a c k s " ) ; rejection to their face; and face insults a n d jeering. It w o u l d be confusing to refer to the entire high school status system as a multi-level system of bullying; but these milder bullying tactics are constitutive of m u c h of the main hierarchy:

1. Individuals' r a n k d e p e n d s upon w h o m they associate w i t h , a n d hence on w h o m they do n o t associate w i t h . T h e r e is much sorting into categories, which are given collective labels a n d r e p u t a t i o n s , especially u p o n the entry of a n e w c o h o r t (the n i n t h or tenth g r a d e in high school, the seventh g r a d e in m i d d l e school). H e n c e there is m u c h incentive for particular kids to cut loose from their friendships w i t h elementary school or n e i g h b o r h o o d kids, if the latter arc being placed in an undesirable category. Kids w h o w a n t to m o v e up are motivated to d e m o n s t r a t e their distance and superiority to these e n c u m b e r i n g ties by criticizing a n d rejecting t h e m , a n d this causes t h e m to use negative stereotypes a b o u t t h e m . H e n c e there is m u c h feeling of bitterness a b o u t two-facedness, superficiality, a n d o p p o r - t u n i s m of friendships.

2. Talking a b o u t o t h e r s in w ays t h a t puts t h e m d o w n is a chief form of e n t e r t a i n m e n t . Since status is based on having fun, being h u m o r - ous a n d lively, the m o s t convenient source of entertaining conversa- tional material is to m a k e jokes at o t h e r s t u d e n t s ' expense: to tell e m b a r r a s s i n g stories a b o u t t h e m , criticize their clothes, taste, sexual failures, a n d social faux pas. T h e collective effervescence of sociabil-

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ity in this self-conscious c o m m u n i t y is fed to a large e x t e n t by recy- cling a c c o u n t s of the l ow - s t at us behavior of o n e ' s fellows. This is n o t entirely directed d o w n w a r d , however, since students can also create a lively a n d entertaining gossip a b o u t the foibles of their o w n g r o u p m e m b e r s , and a b o u t the elite higher than themselves. This creates further (and justified) c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t back-biting one's o w n friends.

3. O v e r t jeering can be a collective activity when low-status persons invade the territory w h e r e high-status persons are gathered; those w h o enter their special p a r t of the lunch r o o m , or their after-school h a n g o u t , are likely to be spotted and given an u n p l e a s a n t w e l c o m e .

N o n e of this is bullying insofar as it is an ongoing r o u n d of criticism within the middle a n d u p p e r ranks of the popularity hierarchy, in which m a n y persons are b o t h mockers a n d m o c k e d . But full-scale bullying can occur within the system, a n d indeed is p r o m o t e d by this a t m o s p h e r e . It has t w o forms: collective bullying of perennial scapegoats, a n d specialized bullies w h o prey on the especially w e a k . Collective bullying especially con- sists in mass jeering at scapegoats, n o t only m a k i n g t h e m the butt of h u m o r o u t of their presence, but deriding them in public. Such m o b action can escalate into p r a n k s and physical violence; for instance, locking an u n p o p - ular a boy in his hall locker, or taking away his p a n t s , or stealing his clothes or lunch. Generally these actions are carried o u t in a m o o d of ebullient good humor, regarded as p r a n k s , good fun; the victim does n o t usually see it this way, but the status system boundaries prevent those above from e m p a t h y with his point of view. (It a p p e a r s to be generally boys w h o are recipients of the most extreme overt forms of bullying.)

Individual specialized bullies can emerge in this s i t u a t i o n as well. T h e y m a y start as those w h o t a k e t h e lead in collective jeering (we m i g h t call t h e m "jeer-leaders") a n d in violent p r a n k s ; in this respect they are like the small n u m b e r of the violent elite w h o do m o s t of the violent action in m o b s (described in c h a p t e r 10). But the bullying 5 to 10 percent are n o t t h e elite of the status system, b u t only of its lower m i d d l e class, its t o u g h sergeants or p r i s o n g u a r d s on the front line of dealing w i t h the lowest level below. Specialized bullies b e c o m e c o m m i t t e d to this role; t h e y de- velop skills at it, a symbiotic relationship w i t h victims w h o m they are especially g o o d at baiting a n d t o r m e n t i n g . In this respect they converge w i t h the k i n d of domestic a b u s e r s w h o practice psychological as well as physical t o r t u r e o n victims w h o m they h a v e cultivated i n t o long-standing relationships. O n c e established, bullying relationships t e n d to persist for several years (Olweus 1 9 9 3 : 2 8 ) .

I I llu 1.'IITNN'N 'lM!M"'i!:!TI|'!"ITM!

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 165

Figure 5.2 The Faces of Bullying and Playing the Victim. In lieu of good micro- situational pictures of school or prison bullying, the following may be illustrative. Philippine guerrilla leader poses with two American missionaries whom his group has kidnapped and is holding for ransom. Note the two kinds of false smiles: the bully has a domineering grin; the victims display forced smiles, "miserable smiles" in Ekman's (1978) terms. A third American captive was beheaded. After a year of captivity, the male missionary was killed and the woman wounded during a shoot-out between the guerrillas and the army (2002). Reuters.

T H E C O N T I N U U M O F T O T A L I N S T I T U T I O N S

Bullying thrives in a distinctive s t r u c t u r a l setting: t o t a l institutions. These are closed c o m m u n i t i e s , cut off from t h e s u r r o u n d i n g w o r l d , in w h i c h m o s t or all aspects of life are carried on in c o m m o n (Goffman 1 9 6 1 ) . T h u s they are closed r e p u t a t i o n a l systems, in w h i c h social identities are k n o w n by all a n d prestige h i e r a r c h y is inescapable a n d pervasive in t h e activities of daily life. In this respect, o r g a n i z a t i o n s exist on a c o n t i n u u m of totalness; we expect the m o s t severe bullying in the m o s t t o t a l of institu- t i o n s , w i t h lesser a m o u n t s in p a r t i a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n s — a s in high schools w h e r e children g o h o m e a t night, a s c o m p a r e d t o b o a r d i n g schools. Schools w h e r e m o s t sociable activities are centered on the school (e.g., in conjunction w i t h school sports a n d dances) are m o r e t o t a l t h a n those w h e r e leisure activities t a k e place in specialized n e t w o r k s . M o r e o v e r , the

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students can m a k e their school m o r e of a closed system, precisely because they exclude their p a r e n t s a n d h o m e s from any c o n n e c t i o n w i t h it: they refuse to tell p a r e n t s w h a t is h a p p e n i n g , are a s h a m e d to be seen w i t h t h e m by o t h e r s t u d e n t s , a n d cut off their ties (at least while they are at school) w i t h friends from their n e i g h b o r h o o d (Milner 2 0 0 4 ) . These practices m a k e the high school a goldfish b o w l , an artificial t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n . 2

A t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n is c o n d u c i v e to bullying in several w a y s . T h e r e is n o escape; t h e w e a k c a n ' t get a w a y from their t o r m e n t e r s , a n d t h e latter h a v e easily accessible vi ct i m s . It is a s i t u a t i o n of h i g h i n f o r m a t i o n , so t h a t w e a k n e s s e s , once revealed, are w i d e l y b r o a d c a s t . I t also h a s c o n d i - t i o n s for h i g h r i t u a l density, a n d t h u s for reification of m e m b e r s h i p sym- b o l s , a n d e m o t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l i n g r i t u a l p u n i s h m e n t s for v i o l a t i o n s o f g r o u p s t a n d a r d s . A n d t h e r e is a limited center of a t t e n t i o n , c r e a t i n g b o t h h i g h focus u p o n " w h e r e t h e a c t i o n i s , " a n d implicitly a h i g h degree of c o m p e t i t i o n to be in t h a t limited center; c o n s e q u e n t l y , a s t r o n g e r sense of e x c l u s i o n a n d d r a i n i n g of e m o t i o n a l energy for t h o s e w h o fail to be in t h a t center.

O n e o t h e r crucial feature of a t o t a l institution is t h e division b e t w e e n staff a n d i n m a t e s : teachers vis-a-vis s t u d e n t s , officers vis-a-vis military trainees, g u a r d s vis-a-vis p r i s o n e r s , c a m p counselors vis-a-vis s u m m e r c a m p e r s . Despite the large divisions of r a n k a n d practices of d o m i n a n c e w i t h i n the i n m a t e p o p u l a t i o n s , they have one feature of identity in c o m - m o n : they are all students or pr i s oner s ; this g r o u p solidarity is enforced by t h e u b i q u i t o u s code against calling on staff for help, or r e p o r t i n g a n y t h i n g a b o u t a n o t h e r i n m a t e . T h e w o r s t p u n i s h m e n t s in p r i s o n s are reserved for " s n i t c h e s " or " g r a s s e s " (in British slang). O n e w a y to gain at least a small a m o u n t of status in a t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n is to d e m o n s t r a t e o n e ' s loyalty, by n o t r e p o r t i n g m i s b e h a v i o r a t o n e ' s o w n expense. T h i s leaves the i n m a t e g r o u p to be self-policing a n d self-stratifying, often by criteria at o d d s w i t h t h a t of t h e staff.

H i e r a r c h y a m o n g i n m a t e s is generally a m a t t e r of t h e s t r o n g over t h e w e a k , t h e socially c e n t r a l over t h e p e r i p h e r a l . Often it is t h e older a n d m o r e experienced m e m b e r s o f t h e - i n s t i t u t i o n over n e w arrivals. H e r e we s h o u l d distinguish b e t w e e n bullying, as a l o n g - t e r m r e l a t i o n s h i p , a n d h a z i n g , an initiation rite t h a t , o n c e passed, allows o n e to b e c o m e a m e m - ber. H a z i n g is generally p a r t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n w h e r e t h e r e is a regular calendrical i n t a k e of c o h o r t s , a n d especially w h e r e t h e oldest c o h o r t s g r a d u a t e o r m o v e o u t , t h u s g u a r a n t e e i n g u p w a r d m o b i l i t y over t i m e . T h e o t h e r s t r u c t u r a l feature for h a z i n g is high r i t u a l density in the g r o u p , w i t h a s t r o n g sense of b o u n d a r i e s a n d hence of symbolic a n d m o r a l differences b e t w e e n insiders a n d o u t s i d e r s . T h u s q u a s i - t o t a l insti- t u t i o n s , s u c h a s fraternities, w h i c h m a k e u p totally e n c o m p a s s i n g situa- tions for collective living, sociability, a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t (members going

Bullying, Mugging, and I Ioldups • 167

o u t s i d e only t o a t t e n d classes, t o the e x t e n t t h e y d o ) , h a v e r i t u a l h a z i n g t h a t involves h u m i l i a t i o n a n d s o m e t i m e s physical p u n i s h m e n t . H a z i n g i n such g r o u p s is usually c a r r i e d o u t in an a t m o s p h e r e of fun a n d hilarity, at least on t h e p a r t of t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s , helping to legitimate it. T h e same k i n d o f s t r u c t u r a l l o c a t i o n s t h a t p r o m o t e h a z i n g h a v e r i t u a l c a r o u s i n g a n d r i t u a l v a n d a l i s m . I n t h e early t w e n t i e t h century, w h e n A m e r i c a n colleges w e r e m o r e s h a r p l y segregated from n o r m a l life, restricted to all- m a l e s t u d e n t b o d i e s , M o n d a y - t h r o u g h - S a t u r d a y extensive class sched- ules, d o r m i t o r y r e g u l a t i o n s , a n d di ni ng r o o m h o u r s , they also h a d t r a d i - tions involving ritualized violence. T h e s e i n c l u d e d collective rites of p a s s a g e such as f r e s h m a n / s o p h o m o r e battles on a given d a y of t h e year (usually at the b e g i n n i n g or e n d of t h e term) ( H o r o w i t z 1 9 8 7 ) . H e r e again is t h e typical p a t t e r n of hazing: t h e g r o u p t h a t h a s been h a z e d in t h e p r e v i o u s c o h o r t t a k e s the lead in h a z i n g t h e n e x t g r o u p . In this respect, h a z i n g parallels bullying, insofar as bullies are t h e m i d d l e class of t h e hierarchy, n o t t h e elite. In s c h o o l s , at least (but n o t in p r i s o n s ) , c o h o r t i n i t i a t i o n rites c a n act as a s u b s t i t u t e for bullying; since it is collectively p r a c t i c e d , a n d t h e victims are a collectivity r a t h e r t h a n individuals, t h e r e is an aspect of solidarity w i t h i n the c o h o r t a n d a lack of t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d p e r m a n e n t s u b o r d i n a t i o n t h a t m a k e s u p bullying. Collective bul- lying c a n be a s u b s t i t u t e for, a n d a s t r u c t u r a l b a r r i e r against, i n d i v i d u a l bullying. H o w e v e r , if t h e r e a r e also further s u b g r o u p s w i t h i n t h e school, these set the f r a m e w o r k of differential prestige w i t h i n w h i c h further indi- v i d u a l bullying c a n t a k e place.

T h e staff of a t o t a l institution sometimes encourages i n m a t e hierarchy, even officially recognizes a n d s u p p o r t s it (Lloyd-Smith a n d Davies 1 9 9 5 ) . British elite b o a r d i n g schools t r a d i t i o n a l l y t u r n e d over r o u t i n e discipline a n d ceremonial leadership of d o r m i t o r i e s to older boys; each y o u n g e r boy w a s assigned as p e t t y servant to those in t h e t o p form (i.e., w h a t Ameri- cans call " g r a d e " ) , for carrying his b o o k s , fetching things, cleaning his study, etc., a practice k n o w n as "fagging" (from w h i c h the derisory t e r m for h o m o s e x u a l later evolved). This official h i e r a r c h y p r o v i d e d a c o n t e x t for bullying, w h i c h t o o k n o r m a l practice t o a n e x t r e m e (Hughes 1 8 5 7 / 1 9 9 4 ) . A l t h o u g h only the t o p - f o r m boys a n d s c h o o l - a p p o i n t e d s t u d e n t officials h a d the r i g h t to assign y o u n g e r s t u d e n t s as " f a g s , " big boys in the i n t e r m e d i a t e forms could u s u r p a u t h o r i t y a n d informally d e m a n d fagging services. T h e official h i e r a r c h y from the teachers a n d t o p boys on d o w n w e r e a w a r e o f this, b u t they t o o k the stance t h a t the boys sh o u ld m a n a g e their o w n affairs a n d n o t tell tales to official c h a n n e l s . T h e p a t t e r n by w h i c h t h e school officially delegated a u t h o r i t y t o those n e x t l o w e r d o w n t e n d e d to be r e p e a t e d at further levels, including by u s u r p a t i o n .

Bullying violence w a s also e n c o u r a g e d by official practices of c e r e m o - nial c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t : a s t u d e n t might be b o x e d in the ear by the

168 • C h a p t e r 5

h e a d m a s t e r a n n o y e d a t r e p e a t e d p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e i n reciting a n d t r a n s l a t i n g Latin lines (the chief form of e d u c a t i o n a l exercise); students w h o b r o k e serious rules could be flogged w i t h a c a n e , in a public d e m o n - s t r a t i o n before t h e entire school or d o r m i t o r y g r o u p , again delegated to the boy-officials to c a r r y o u t .

T h e school also set an a t m o s p h e r e in w h i c h r o u g h games w e r e r e g a r d e d as m a n l y a n d fun. R u g b y School, the subject of H u g h e s ' s description, w a s the place w h e r e the b r a n d of football by t h a t n a m e originated, a n d w a s the leader in e n c o u r a g i n g sports as p a r t of the school r o u t i n e . F u n in the form of m o c k fights existed at all levels; the y o u n g e r boys w e r e n o t merely victims, b u t engaged in collective games such as t h r o w i n g slippers at each other at b e d t i m e or on arising; the bullies were also described as t h r o w i n g shoes w i t h m o r e serious intent to h u r t , a n d p r o t e c t o r s against bullies used the same w e a p o n s . This does n o t m e a n simply t h a t bullying cycled t o n e w victims, b u t t h a t some violence w a s r e g a r d e d as legitimate, because of being egalitarian or fun.

T h e school became organized into sub-hierarchies b e n e a t h the stronger boys of the u p p e r forms. H u g h e s ( 1 8 5 7 / 1 9 9 4 ) describes t h r e e k i n d s of p a t r o n a g e relations. Some y o u n g e r boys " t o a d y " to the bullies, flattering t h e m , offering t h e m services, a n d insinuating themselves i n t o t h e hierar- chy by acting as go-betweens, seeking o u t targets to p e r f o r m fagging ser- vices a n d carrying tales a b o u t victims a n d rebellions. Beginning as a t o a d y w a s r e g a r d e d as a w a y to w o r k o n e ' s w a y up to b e c o m i n g a bully as o n e g r e w bigger. O t h e r boys are described as " p e t s , " w h o are especially g o o d - l o o k i n g a n d delicate (perhaps a beginning of h o m o s e x u a l affairs); these are p r o t e c t e d by h i g h - r a n k i n g upper-form b o y s , n o t bullies b u t m e m b e r s of the sociable elite, w h o m i g h t c h o o s e t h e m as their fags b u t give t h e m light duties a n d keep t h e m a w a y from h a v i n g to p e r f o r m o n e r o u s fagging for o t h e r s . A n d s o m e of the earnest m o r a l boys of the school t o o k on the role of p r o t e c t o r to w e a k , shy, or artistic y o u n g e r boys, sometimes at the instigation of higher a u t h o r i t i e s or family c o n n e c t i o n s . In reality, the t h r e e types m i g h t blend together; H u g h e s describes the h e r o of his b o o k , w h o is a g o o d p a t r o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h his friends, beating up a " t o a d y " w h o intrudes in his o w n sphere of p r o t e c t i o n , using tactics n o t so different from those bullies used on their victims. T h e pervasive creation of s u b - hierarchies based on violence a n d p r o t e c t i o n might m a k e all varieties dis- tinguished by insiders look s o m e w h a t similar to a disinterested outsider.

T h e s i t u a t i o n in prisons is m o r e c o m p l e x . A l t h o u g h t h e r e is consider- able violence a n d o t h e r e x p l o i t a t i o n a m o n g i n m a t e s , m u c h of this is n o t bullying, or is a m b i g u o u s e n o u g h so t h a t inmates themselves are unclear w h e t h e r to call it bullying ( O ' D o n n e l l a n d E d g a r 1 9 9 8 b ) . Prisons gener- ally h a v e an u n d e r g r o u n d e c o n o m y : buying or t r a d i n g illicit g o o d s smug- gled in, including d r u g s ; legitimate possessions (such as p h o n e c a r d s , per-

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 169

sonal items, a n d cigarettes), w h i c h m a y be b o r r o w e d , also stolen; on t h e borderline of these practices are forced loans. As an u n r e g u l a t e d economy, inmates use violence to settle claims a n d collect d e b t s , b u t also to steal from each other. T h e p e r c e n t a g e of inmates involved in violence, either as p e r p e t r a t o r s or as victims, is larger t h a n t h e percentage involved in o n g o i n g , o n e - o n - o n e exploitative bullying relationships. M o r e o v e r , those w h o bully others in t h e strict sense m a y be m o t i v a t e d by the m a t e r i a l a n d utilitarian aspect of p r i s o n life w i t h its e c o n o m y of scarcity, in c o n t r a s t to school bullying, w h i c h is largely a m a t t e r of prestige a n d d o m i n a n c e of the enclosed e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e . Prison bullying does involve the same range of t e c h n i q u e s — e x c l u s i o n , jeering, stealing, a n d beating. Jeering is often used in o t h e r w a y s t o o , as a form of e n t e r t a i n m e n t a m o n g p riso n ers; a n d such t r a d i n g of insults also leads to fighting, b u t n o t always to a bullying hierarchy, since the fights m a y fend off further insults. Amidst all these o t h e r kinds of violence a n d struggle, bullying exists t o o ; a n d it has the typical p a t t e r n of victimizing the w e a k .

Characteristics a n d behaviors of victims c o n t r i b u t e to their victimiza- t i o n , in p r i s o n as elsewhere; b u t the specific k i n d of w e a k n e s s t h a t m a k e s up vulnerability to bullying m u s t be distinguished from other conditions of p r i s o n life (Edgar a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 8 ) . Taking p a r t in utilitarian activ- ities like t r a d i n g c o m m o d i t i e s in the illegal economy, or merely b o r r o w i n g a n d lending, can lead to fights. T h e r o u t i n e time-space ecology of activities can p u t o n e at risk ( C o h e n a n d Felsen 1979) in places like s h o w e r s a n d toilets, as well as i n t a k e a n d visitor areas w h e r e victims are accessible to aggressors a n d o u t of the p r o t e c t i o n of a u t h o r i t i e s . A n d some fights are victim precipitated: the loser is the one w h o started the fight; a key p r e - dictor of being assaulted is having assaulted o t h e r s . T h e strongest indica- t o r of being bullied t h u s is n o t so m u c h assault, t h r e a t s , a n d i n s u l t s — w h i c h are m o s t often t w o - s i d e d — b u t being subject to r o b b e r y in t h e c o m - m o n a r e a s , forced l o a n s , cell theft, a n d exclusion—such as n o t being al- l o w e d a t u r n at telephones, TV, or g a m e e q u i p m e n t . D o m i n a n t individu- als are n o t subjected to a n y of the latter, a l t h o u g h they can be insulted a n d assaulted ( O ' D o n n e l l a n d E d g a r 1 9 9 9 ) . 3

Being vulnerable in o n e w a y t e n d s to m a k e o n e vulnerable in o t h e r w a y s ( O ' D o n n e l l a n d E d g a r 1 9 9 9 ) . Vulnerability to bullying is n o t just a m a t t e r of a p p e a r a n c e a n d physical w e a k n e s s . Besides being small a n d w e a k , vulnerability includes l o w intelligence or little e d u c a t i o n ; having few possessions; a n d lack of previous p r i s o n experience. O t h e r vulnerabil- ities c o m e from style a n d behavior: acting quiet, timid, or a n x i o u s ; trying to avoid c o n t a c t w i t h other pr i s oner s ; staying close to staff. In s h o r t , all the w a y s of being low - s t at us in the inmate scheme of things, or in a l m o s t any o t h e r status system as well, m a k e one vulnerable.

170 • Chapter 5

L o w status alone is n o t e n o u g h to generate a bullying r e l a t i o n s h i p ; it is developed as an i n t e r a c t i o n a l process. Insults are often t h e first stage. This is in p a r t a test to see h o w the recipient will r e s p o n d . Insults c a n also d a m a g e the p e r s o n ' s r e p u t a t i o n , circulate a s s l a n d e r o u s r u m o r s , resulting in isolation a n d exclusion, a n d t h u s a further step t o w a r d social w e a k n e s s ; the result is b o t h lack of p o t e n t i a l b a c k u p or i n t e r v e n t i o n from t h i r d p a r - ties in fights, a n d loss of e m o t i o n a l energy so t h a t o n e is less c a p a b l e of f i g h t i n g , o r f i g h t i n g well, f i g h t i n g w i t h spirit. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , insulting is a very r o u t i n e activity in p r i s o n s . 4 It is insults t h a t are n o t a n s w e r e d , either by ritually a p p r o p r i a t e insults or o t h e r m o v e s , or by escalation, t h a t o p e n the w a y to a r e p u t a t i o n for vulnerability. Showing fear or lack of self-esteem to defend w h a t are perceived to be o n e ' s interests, a c c o r d i n g t o p r i s o n s t a n d a r d s , opens a d o o r t o further a t t a c k .

Especially devastating is crying:

T h e r e w e r e four of us in o n e d o r m . O n e c o m e off his visit w i t h s o m e c a n n a b i s . H e s h a r e d i t o u t . W e s t a r t e d p i l l o w f i g h t i n g . H e s h o w e d h e w a s t h e w e a k e s t . All t h r e e of us set on h i m . We h a d b o o k s stuffed in p i l l o w s . It t u r n e d n a s t y a n d we w e r e p u n c h i n g h i m . It s t a r t e d as a j o k e , b u t i t g o t s e r i o u s . M y friend held h i m d o w n o n t h e bed a n d I p u t a p i l l o w over his h e a d a n d held it. A n d h e w a s cry in g a n d w e s t a r t e d h i t t i n g h i m . I said, "If y o u d o n ' t s t o p crying we will do it for r e a l . " I p u t t h e p i l l o w b a c k o n a n d held i t longer. M y friend g o t a b r o o m s t i c k a n d p u t it up his b o x e r s h o r t s . If he h a d d o n e s o m e t h i n g to resist it w o u l d h a v e e n d e d r i g h t t h e r e . If he h a d t r i e d to s t a n d up for himself, t h e n things m i g h t h a v e b e e n different. But h e just stayed still a n d t h e o t h e r b o y s h o v e d i t u p his a r s e h o l e . I d o n ' t k n o w w h y w e did it. I n t h e d o r m s , p e o p l e get b o r e d a n d l o o k for e n t e r t a i n m e n t a n d fun. U n - fortunately, i t i s t h e w e a k w h o a r e t h e e n t e r t a i n m e n t . " ( O ' D o n n e l l a n d Edgar, 1 9 9 8 a : 2 7 1 )

T h i s incident has the c h a r a c t e r of ebullient c a r o u s i n g , in w h i c h t h e victim- to-be takes p a r t at first by sharing his d r u g s ; as he s h o w s increasing w e a k - ness, the a t t a c k s on h i m escalate; t h e others b e c o m e e n t r a i n e d , in s o m e - t h i n g like t h e conclusion of a f o r w a r d p a n i c , b u t w i t h t h e special c h a r a c t e r of disgust at s o m e o n e w h o violates t h e g r o u p s t a n d a r d of m e m b e r s h i p , a stance of m a c h o t o u g h n e s s .

R e s p o n d i n g to insults a n d challenges is often a t u r n i n g p o i n t . An other- wise w e a k individual can raise his status by t a k i n g p a r t in w h a t is virtually a ritual of passage:

I w a s in the b o x w a i t i n g for my legal visit. We were all r e a d i n g n e w s p a - p e r s . A friend from the street s a w a girl in t h e p a p e r a n d said she l o o k e d

B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , a n d H o l d u p s • 1 7 1

like my missus. A guy g r a b b e d t h e p a p e r a n d said, "I k n o w y o u r missus. E v e r y o n e ' s h a d h e r . " I t o l d h i m to fuck off. A n d he k i c k e d seven k i n d s o f shit o u t o f m e . I w a s sitting d o w n a n d h e h a m m e r e d i n t o m e , p u n c h - ing, k i c k i n g , h i t t i n g . I w a s all cut up a n d b r u i s e d . T h e n , a c o u p l e of w e e k s later, w a i t i n g t o g o t o c o u r t this b u l l y c a m e u p t o m e . H e de- m a n d e d c i g a r e t t e s . I said, " F u c k off, I ' m n o t giving y o u any. If y o u w a n t t o t a k e m e o n , w i t h o u t y o u r g a n g , let's d o i t n o w . " Bully said, "If w e d o , y o u k n o w y o u ' l l l o s e . " I said, " I k n o w , b u t I ' m n o t giving y o u a n y t h i n g . " H e said, " Y o u ' r e all r i g h t . " L a t e r h e c a m e u p w i t h his g a n g ; a s k e d h o w t h i n g s w e n t i n c o u r t . H e said i t a g a i n , " Y o u ' r e all r i g h t . " T h e n h e w a l k e d a w a y . " (Edgar a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 8 : 6 4 4 )

In the British p r i s o n c u l t u r e , severe a t t a c k s a n d pervasive scorn are viewed as justifiable w a y s of dealing w i t h informers a n d sexual offenders ( O ' D o n - nell a n d E d g a r 1 9 9 8 a ) . Often prisoners b e c o m e labeled as sex offenders inaccurately, a n d starting such r u m o r s is a w a y of beginning a bullying p r o c e s s , since it m a k e s its targets ostracized a n d t h u s cuts t h e m off from allies w h o can deter a t t a c k . Bullying the allegedly sexually deviant in pris- ons illustrates a larger p a t t e r n of bullying in institutions. An ideology of c u l t u r a l inferiority is created in o r d e r to justify bullying the w e a k . In the case of British p r i s o n s , it is alleged sexual offenses; in A m e r i c a n p u b l i c schools, it is often accusations of h o m o s e x u a l i t y (for the m o s t p a r t inaccu- r a t e ) . 5 In b o a r d i n g schools (including those British schools in w h i c h h o - m o s e x u a l i t y itself w a s practiced) , the ideology t a k e s a different form. In all cases, a c u l t u r a l hierarchy is m a n u f a c t u r e d , w h i c h in t u r n serves as an excuse for a t t a c k i n g t h e smaller a n d weaker, w h i c h otherwise w o u l d be r a t h e r d i s h o n o r a b l e .

T h e violent or n o n v i o l e n t culture of the g r o u p per se is n o t a determin- ing factor for bullying (although it m a y affect the k i n d of bullying tactics used). T h u s it is n o t a result of social class. Boarding schools have the m o s t bullying, since they are the m o s t t o t a l institutions. J a p a n e s e public schools h a v e been described as highly conducive to bullying; their official s t r u c t u r e is very a u t h o r i t a r i a n , hierarchical, a n d regimented; at t h e same t i m e , activities are very g r o u p - o r i e n t e d (Yoneyama a n d N a i t o 2 0 0 3 ) . T h e y h a v e high ritual density, w h i c h brings s t r o n g emphasis u p o n inner solidarity a n d e x t e r n a l b o u n d a r i e s ; c o m b i n e d w i t h internal hierarchy, this breeds enforced conformity. Bullying a t t a c k s are especially severe on n e w transfers; it is unclear if these are initiation rites or w h e t h e r t h e bullied are eventually accepted. J a p a n generally h a s very l o w violence r a t e s , w i t h very high collective c o n t r o l s a n d s t r o n g g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p s . H e n c e its violence occurs structurally just w h e r e one w o u l d expect it, at the b o r d e r s of m e m b e r s h i p i n t o highly ritualized g r o u p s .

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As American children move from elementary to secondary school, bul- lying becomes m o r e collective, m o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d on a small n u m b e r of low-status victims, a n d also m o r e verbal and psychological t h a n physical. Children in the early teen years enter larger schools a n d a larger c o n t e x t of status c o m p a r i s o n ; the beginning of the sexual m a r k e t p l a c e imposes a prestige system in which everyone becomes publicly r a n k e d , a n d t h u s gives an ideological justification in terms of which bullying can be carried o u t . This is the peak for collective bullying. O l d e r teenagers, especially in the last year at high school, are looking a h e a d to o t h e r c o n t e x t s of educa- tion a n d career, a n d have m o r e n e t w o r k c o n t a c t s outside the school, w h i c h frees them from the local hierarchy t h a t is the c o n t e x t for bullying. Colleges arc m o r e open and h e t e r o g e n e o u s in activities and n e t w o r k s ; a n d this reduces bullying, either by replacing it with institutionalized c o h o r t relations and hazing rituals, or by dissipating the sense of a collective focus of a t t e n t i o n . T h e degree of bullying is related to the e x t e n t to which the school resembles a total institution.

In American public schools, bullying—at least in the collective form of ostracism a n d jeering—appears to be m o r e prevalent in s m a l l - t o w n a n d s u b u r b a n c o m m u n i t i e s t h a n in big cities. Such schools have m o r e bullying because they are further along the c o n t i n u u m t o w a r d total institutions than urban schools, particularly where u r b a n students c o m m u t e long dis- tances in a city, and w h e r e students participate in m o r e cultural activities a p a r t from the school. T h i s is counter-intuitive in t h a t we associate school violence w i t h inner-city, ethnic m i n o r i t y schools. But bullying a n d gangs—the typical form of o r g a n i z a t i o n of violence in areas of p o v e r t y a n d ethnic segregation—are structurally antithetical. G a n g s c h a n n e l vio- lence into h o r i z o n t a l conflicts, b e t w e e n o n e gang a n d a n o t h e r ; internally they lack stratification, externally they differentiate only between g a n g m e m b e r s a n d the n o n - b e l o n g i n g masses. T h e latter m a y be targets of at- t a c k a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n by gang m e m b e r s (stealing their lunches, clothes, a n d m o n e y ) , b u t this is n o t their chief form of action. T h e classic places for bullying—British b o a r d i n g schools—were very vertically oriented, class- conscious w i t h o u t a n d w i t h i n , b u t they lacked gangs a n d w e r e very far from a culture of violence except in bullying relationships. G a n g s engen- der cycles of violence a m o n g themselves, b u t t h e schools a n d c o m m u n i t i e s w h e r e they are located are n o t t h e places w h e r e m o s t bullying occurs, n o r m a s s retaliations against bullying. Even w h e r e t h e r e is bullying by gang m e m b e r s o f n o n - m e m b e r s w h o h a v e n o g a n g t o p r o t e c t t h e m , kids w h o are bullied could clearly identify the gang as the culprit, n o t t h e school, a n d t h u s w o u l d c h o o s e a different object of r e t a l i a t i o n . 6

Violent g a n g m e m b e r s m a y seem like bullies, in the sense of p r e d a t o r y t o u g h guys, to those outside the g r o u p ; but within the gang, there are no

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 173

regularized relationships of bullies a n d bullying-victims (Jankowski 1 9 9 1 ; Anderson 1999). T h e violent elite c h a r a c t e r of the gang itself within the larger c o m m u n i t y precludes having bullying-victims w i t h i n its r a n k s . G a n g s often practice rituals of hazing, a n d fighting a bigger member, or allowing oneself to be beaten up by the g r o u p , is used as a rite of recruit- m e n t . But hazing, as is generally the case, is a passage into an elite g r o u p , and hence there is no bullying once fully accepted. In the same way, we should distinguish a t t a c k s on the w e a k t h a t a gang m a y carry o u t , from long-term bullying relations; t h u s , in American ethnic n e i g h b o r h o o d s , y o u n g men w h o visit from a n o t h e r n e i g h b o r h o o d (perhaps because they have relatives there) m a y be violently a t t a c k e d by a large g r o u p ; b u t such incidents are n o t the repetitive, exploitative hierarchy of d o m i n a n c e a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n between individually k n o w n bullies a n d k n o w n victims.

We should d o u b t the prevalence of the often-asserted p a t t e r n of bul- lying-victims going on to become bullies in their o w n right. Bullying- victims sometimes retaliate, but the retaliations we k n o w a b o u t , such as spectacular mass school killings, are similar neither in form n o r in q u a n - tity to the original bullying. Bullying is an o n g o i n g relationship, a t o r m e n t by its very continuity a n d implacability; mass s h o o t i n g s are brief events, w i t h o u t a personal relationship of d o m i n a n c e . Estimates of bullying in schools are generally a r o u n d 5 to 15 percent of school children as victims, 7 to 17 percent as bullies (Olweus 1 9 9 3 ; Duffcll 2 0 0 0 ; Nanscl et al. 2 0 0 1 ) ; the a m o u n t of retaliation is p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y miniscule; the vast majority of schools (over 99 percent) are w i t h o u t killings, a n d indeed w i t h o u t seri- ous violence (Kimmcl and M a h l e r 2 0 0 3 ) ; this means t h a t the great major- ity of bullying-victims do no m o r e t h a n d r e a m of revenge. It is conceivable t h a t bullying-victims might t u r n the tables a n d become practitioners of jeering, exclusion, stealing, a n d picking on p a r t i c u l a r individuals; but this w o u l d involve a huge reversal in the status hierarchy of the school. W h a t studies there are of mobility between strata in middle schools or high schools s h o w very little u p w a r d mobility from the b o t t o m , a n d very little d o w n w a r d mobility from the t o p g r o u p , a l t h o u g h some shifting a m o n g g r o u p s in the middle (Milner 2 0 0 4 ; Franzoi et al. 1994)." T h o s e surveys, which s h o w t h a t 2 to 3 percent r e p o r t both bullying others a n d being victims of bullying (Haynie et al. 2 0 0 1 ) m a y well be using the term in an imprecise manner, to indicate any verbal aggression, social exclusion, or violence, w i t h o u t t a k i n g into a c c o u n t the repetitive o n g o i n g relationship t h a t is at the social a n d psychological core of bullying.

Victims of bullying do not usually go on to become bullies, in p a r t because they follow a n o t h e r p a t h w a y : this may well be a source of liber- t a r i a n s . Persons w h o m o s t dislike the experience of total institutions are often the p e r s o n s w h o u p o n release (or g r a d u a t i o n ) become principled

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a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n s . In A m e r i c a n schools, at least, such s t u d e n t s are dis- p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y from t h e intellectual or artistic side, o u t of t u n e w i t h the p a r t y i n g socialites a n d jocks (Milner 2 0 0 4 ) ; a n d these t w o large c l u m p s of students t e n d to c o r r e l a t e , respectively, w i t h a d u l t attitudes t h a t are a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n , o n o n e side, a n d c o n f o r m i s t / a u t h o r i t a r i a n o n t h e other. On the individual level, bullying does n o t p e r p e t u a t e itself by a cycle of reversal; its d e t e r m i n a n t s are in the institutional c o n t e x t .

M U G G I N G S A N D H O L D U P S

M u g g i n g s a n d h o l d u p s are the m o s t immediately s i t u a t i o n a l forms of at- t a c k i n g t h e w e a k , since t h e r e is the least history of i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n a t t a c k e r a n d victim, a n d the least a m o u n t of time to settle into reciprocal roles. Such a t t a c k s also differ from the kinds t h a t we h a v e been consider- ing since they are outside the institutional c o n t e x t of families a n d t o t a l institutions, o u t in t h e p u b l i c w o r l d of strangers. T h e y are in t h e r e a l m of w h a t Goffman called " b e h a v i o r in public p l a c e s . " These characteristics bring o u t especially clearly t h e s i t u a t i o n a l features of m a n a g i n g collective e m o t i o n a l energy in violent conflict.

U n d e r this r u b r i c is a r a n g e of a c t i o n s , from aggressive begging a n d p u r s e - s n a t c h i n g at the b o r d e r l i n e of unviolent behavior, w i t h street h o l d - u p s a n d a r m e d robberies t h a t escalate into serious violence a t t h e o t h e r end. These a t t a c k s fall i n t o a r o u g h order, from t h o s e involving t h e least face c o n f r o n t a t i o n , to t h o s e in w h i c h d o m i n a t i n g t h e intersubjective en- c o u n t e r becomes the m a i n object of t h e a t t a c k .

At the l o w end, the m o s t shying a w a y from c o n f r o n t a t i o n occurs in purse-snatching, especially if it is carried o u t by driving by on a vehicle such as a m o t o r b i k e . N o t m u c h m o r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n exists in rolling d r u n k s or d r u g g e d - o u t p e r s o n s ; h e r e t h e " j a c k - r o l l e r " (to use an early t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y t e r m , classically d o c u m e n t e d by S h a w 1 9 3 0 / 1 9 6 6 ) picks targets w h o are completely i n t o x i c a t e d a n d preferably u n c o n s c i o u s , n o t d r u n k s w h o are i n t h e p h a s e o f energetically staggering a r o u n d . T h e a t t a c k e r t h e r e b y avoids n o t only physical r e t a l i a t i o n , b u t any c o m m u n i c a - tive interaction w i t h a n o t h e r conscious h u m a n being. A slightly higher level of m u g g i n g is " y o k i n g , " g r a b b i n g a victim from b e h i n d , p i n n i n g their a r m s a n d t h u s simultaneously immobilizing t h e m , catching t h e m b y surprise by c o m i n g up o u t of their field of vision, a n d avoiding h a v i n g to l o o k t h e m in the face. O n e m i g h t argue t h a t this is in o r d e r to avoid being recognized, b u t there is also an a v o i d a n c e of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear; as we h a v e seen in t h e case of close military c o m b a t , a n d in execution- killings, seeing the victim's eyes is a d e t e r r e n t to a t t a c k . 8

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 175

Muggers are typically young; the majority are under twenty-one, a n d the m o s t confrontation-avoiding versions are carried o u t by the youngest (often in their early teens) (Pratt 1 9 8 0 ; Shaw 1 9 3 0 / 1 9 6 6 ) . There is a career hierarchy as young muggers w o r k their w a y up to m o r e face-confronting styles. Typically mugging is carried o u t in g r o u p s of t w o , b u t in a b o u t 20 percent of cases (in Britain a n d the United States) it occurs in groups of four or m o r e . W h e n there is m o r e t h a n one victim (i.e., a little g r o u p is the target), the muggers are always a bigger number. In one case, at 10:30 on a Sunday night near the d o r m i t o r y area of an u r b a n university, six teenage boys attacked t w o college boys, but then r a n a w a y w h e n confronted by one plain-clothes security g u a r d , w h o chased t h e m [Daily Pennsylvanian, Feb. 2, 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e passive or frightened p o s t u r e of the student victims m a d e t h e m vulnerable, b u t the aggressive stance of the security g u a r d quickly t u r n e d the m o m e n t u m of fear in the other direction.

Interviews w i t h muggers s h o w t h a t their chief concern is w i t h selecting a w e a k victim, a n d w i t h m a n a g i n g their o w n fear (Lejeune 1 9 7 7 ; Lejeune a n d Alex 1 9 7 3 ) . I n t h e p r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n stage, muggers reassure t h e m - selves by t h i n k i n g of p a s t successful muggings t h a t they have carried o u t ; they also derive a feeling of b r a v a d o from bragging a n d blustering in t h e presence of a g r o u p of peers—in effect, carrying over the e m o t i o n a l effer- vescence of their s u p p o r t g r o u p i n t o their o w n energy to offset fear as they strike o u t as a small " c r e w . " In the p h a s e of actual c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the m u g g e r m a n a g e s fear by choosing w e a k victims, especially those of the respectable, w e l l - m a n n e r e d higher classes, w h o m he expects to offer no r e s i s t a n c e . 5 W h e n all goes well, t h e m u g g e r enjoys a feeling of power, as well as w h a t e v e r m o n e y or g o o d s are t a k e n ; often he further justifies himself by describing his a t t a c k as r e t r i b u t i o n for p a s t injustices of race or class (Lejeune 1 9 7 7 ; J a n k o w s k i 1 9 9 1 ) .

H o l d u p s — t h a t is, using a w e a p o n — i n v o l v e a higher degree of confron- t a t i o n (Katz 1 9 8 8 : 1 6 9 - 9 4 ; Luckenbill 1 9 8 1 ) . For one t h i n g , t h e victim m u s t be m a d e to see t h e w e a p o n , a n d to a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t he or she k n o w s it is there a n d t h a t t h e r e is e x p e c t a t i o n of its being used if c o m p l i - ance is n o t f o r t h c o m i n g ; so it is intrinsically a m o r e interactive c o m m u n i - cative s i t u a t i o n . A r m e d r o b b e r s nevertheless a t t e m p t to multiply their ad- v a n t a g e s , n o t t r u s t i n g merely in their superior a r m a m e n t . Street r o b b e r s prefer to pick victims w h o are elderly, physically u n i m p o s i n g , or smaller a n d w e a k e r t h a n themselves. An a r m e d r o b b e r (as well as a very aggres- sive u n a r m e d mugger) plays up his t h r e a t e n i n g a p p e a r a n c e by p o s t u r e , s h o w of muscles, a n d m a y further d r a m a t i z e himself by style of dress. H i s aim is to shock the victim a n d t h e r e b y gain situational d o m i n a n c e .

R o b b e r s l o a d the dice still further by seeking o u t m o m e n t s of c o n t e x - t u a l w e a k n e s s . Stickups on the street occur chiefly at late night, between 10 p . m . a n d 5 a.m. (Katz 1 9 8 8 : 1 7 0 ; P r a t t 1 9 8 0 ) , in p a r t because this is

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w h e n intoxicated c a r o u s e r s are o u t , b u t also because streets are largely deserted a n d an isolated victim or small g r o u p can be most easily found. Again, the utilitarian aspect—lack of witnesses—may be less i m p o r t a n t t h a n the feeling the r o b b e r has of o p e r a t i n g on his o w n territory—in this case, a time territory; he o w n s the late night, a n d victims often feel uneasy a b o u t being o u t in this alien time-terrain. Conversely, daylight street stickups in the presence of lively foot-traffic are rare in p a r t because the a t m o s p h e r e is a different o n e ; passersby feel m o r e at ease a n d a p p e a r less like w e a k victims, and the confrontational tension/fear of the r o b b e r is heightened because he is o u t of his element. On the o t h e r h a n d , r o b b e r s w h o hold up offices such as b a n k s a n d commercial targets such as jewelry stores like to pick h o u r s when there are few customers a r o u n d (and t h u s avoid r o b b i n g d u r i n g the n o o n hour) ( M o r r i s o n and O ' D o n n e l l 1994).

Stickup artists employ still further tactics to get the j u m p on a victim. They may play the " M u r p h y g a m e " (a recognizable technique t h a t has its o w n n a m e in American criminal t r a d i t i o n ) , in which the victim is s o m e - o n e w h o is venturing into the realm of illegal activities, such as seeking prostitutes or buying drugs (Katz 1 9 8 8 : 170). T h u s he is less likely to call on the police for aid; moreover, he is c a u g h t in a situational d i s a d v a n t a g e : he is t a k i n g a stance of furtivencss in the first place, putting some degree of trust in the u n d e r g r o u n d c h a r a c t e r s he deals with a n d p u t t i n g himself in a position of dependence on t h e m ; they can t h r e a t e n to d e n o u n c e him, a n d at the same time lead him on in the n a m e of deceptive moves t h a t they m u s t m a k e together to avoid detection.'"

A n o t h e r ploy, used in t h e o p p o s i t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e the victim is seemingly a c c o r d e d higher social s t a t u s , is to play on his or her altruistic accessibility (Katz 1 9 8 8 : 1 7 4 ) . An ostensibly a n d indeed o s t e n t a t i o u s l y p o o r person a n d / o r d i s c r i m i n a t e d m i n o r i t y initiates c o n t a c t w i t h a s t r a n g e r and asks for money, or p e r h a p s only for d i r e c t i o n s or c o n v e r s a - t i o n ; the s i t u a t i o n a l aggressor refuses to relinquish c o n t a c t , t h e r e b y lur- ing h i m / h e r into a scene w h e r e they are isolated as well as passive, having ceded up the i n t e r a c t i o n a l initiative to t h e other. O n c e in this s i t u a t i o n , a r m e d r o b b e r y m a y follow; s o m e t i m e s n o w e a p o n i s used o r even b r a n - dished if the victim is sufficiently e n t r a i n e d in the s i t u a t i o n a n d gives in t o p e r s i s t e n t i m p o r t u n i n g for m o r e a n d m o r e money. T h e middle-class w h i t e person m a y well feel a sense of d a n g e r a n d of being led a g a i n s t his or her will, b u t the s i t u a t i o n a l m o m e n t u m is a g a i n s t t h e m , because they are c o n s c i o u s of the implied c h a r g e of class s n o b b e r y or racism t h a t they face if they do n o t t r e a t t h e s i t u a t i o n in the m o s t f a v o r a b l e light; they are forced i n t o keeping up a frontstage p e r f o r m a n c e of polite n o r - malcy a l t h o u g h any degree of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n w o u l d indicate it is far from being s u c h . 1 1

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 177

Figure 5.3 Situational dominance in a street confrontation (New York, 1997). Credit: Ovie Carter.

Getting the j u m p on a victim is often a m a t t e r of fine interactional timing. T h e r o b b e r springs a gun on a s t o r e - o w n e r just at the m o m e n t w h e n he is n o t expecting it, such as w h e n he is closing up the store. Again, this is n o t merely a utilitarian consideration (he has m o r e cash at t h a t time), because the timing can be very refined indeed: the r o b b e r chooses just the m o m e n t w h e n the o w n e r is t u r n e d a r o u n d to lock his door, or stepping outside before he has had a c h a n c e to scan the field of v i s i o n , 1 2

or otherwise in a transitional m o m e n t between one scene a n d another.

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Getting t h e j u m p on a victim is t a k i n g a m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e , establishing the r h y t h m in favor of the r o b b e r a n d t a k i n g it o u t of the h a n d s of the victim; a n d this h a p p e n s over a n d a b o v e t h e b r a n d i s h i n g of a w e a p o n , a n d may even t a k e its place (the w e a p o n being only implied). Getting the j u m p m e a n s getting control of the e m o t i o n a l m o m e n t u m , tak- ing the initiative, in such a way t h a t the entire situation flows in favor of the aggressor and puts the victim in a feeling of going along w i t h the inevitable.

T h e r o b b e r is on the l o o k o u t for signs of fear in a victim, a n d acts to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of these. He b a t t e n s on fear, a n d on all those e m o t i o n a l dynamics t h a t are similar to it. Sometimes this can even result in t u r n i n g the tables against the police:

My friend a n d I were p u n c h i n g the safe when a real y o u n g c o p c a m e in with his g u n d r a w n a n d said, " Y o u ' r e under arrest; p u t y o u r h a n d s u p . " T h e first thing I t h o u g h t w a s here is ten years a n d I d o n ' t w a n t to do any m o r e fucking time. I decided then t h a t I w a s n ' t going to give myself u p . T h e c o p w a l k e d up closer to us and I t h o u g h t a b o u t getting his gun a w a y from him, but I w o n d e r e d where his p a r t n e r w a s . He looked n e r v o u s , scared. I t h o u g h t in the back of my mind t h a t he w o u l d not use the g u n , b u t I d i d n ' t care either. T h e n I figured he d i d n ' t have any p a r t n e r a n d t h o u g h t a b o u t hitting him. I had to get o u t of the s i t u a t i o n . W h e n he got right up to us, I hit him w i t h the h a m m e r [and in fact killed h i m ] . (Athens 1 9 8 0 : 24)

H e r e the c o n t r a s t between the experienced ex-con a n d the nervous r o o k i e c o p leads to a switch in situational d o m i n a n c e ; the r o b b e r strikes just after he interprets the c o p ' s fear as due in p a r t to his being a l o n e — whereas there are t w o r o b b e r s , w h o t h u s generate greater solidarity in the social s i t u a t i o n .

T h e following case is a r a p e t h a t m o m e n t a r i l y disguises itself as a r o b - bery, to t h r o w the w o m a n off g u a r d . A y o u n g black m a n has gone to a white middle-class u r b a n n e i g h b o r h o o d looking for a target:

I g o t a g o o d look at this m i d d l e - a g e d w h i t e b r o a d w a l k i n g a r o u n d s o m e a p a r t m e n t s , and 1 said to myself, " I ' m g o i n g to get t h a t pussy a n d enjoy i t . "

I followed her up to the e n t r a n c e of an a p a r t m e n t building. She used a key to get into the main door, a n d I h a d to get to it fast before it shut. I barely got to the d o o r in time, but I w a i t e d a few seconds before I walked in since I d i d n ' t w a n t her to see m e . W h e n I w e n t in, I heard her going up the stairs a n d I followed her. As s o o n as I got to the t o p of the stairs, I spotted her w a l k i n g d o w n the hallway, a n d I crept up

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b e h i n d her. W h e n she o p e n e d t h e d o o r to her a p a r t m e n t , I p u t my h a n d s over her m o u t h , p u s h e d her t h r o u g h the d o o r a n d said, " D o n ' t m a k e a s o u n d . " T h e n I s h u t the d o o r behind me a n d said, "If y o u m a k e o n e fucking s o u n d , I'll kill y o u r a s s . "

I d i d n ' t w a n t her to p a n i c t o o s o o n , so I t h r e w her off base a n d said, " D o y o u h a v e a n y m o n e y ? " She said, "All I have is the $ 1 0 in my c h u r c h e n v e l o p e . " I said, "Well, give it h e r e . " She t o o k the envelope o u t of her p u r s e a n d h a n d e d it to m e . T h e n I said, " T a k e y o u r c o a t off." I t o o k a long l o o k at her a n d t h o u g h t , " I ' m going to drive this b r o a d all night l o n g . "

I g r a b b e d her by t h e s h o u l d e r s a n d t h r e w her on the floor. She s t a r t e d yelling. " W h a t are y o u d o i n g , w h a t are y o u d o i n g ? " I figured t h a t I better let her k n o w t h a t I m e a n t business, so I j u m p e d right on her ass a n d started s m a s h i n g her in the face a n d saying, " S h u t u p , s h u t u p . " As s o o n as she did, I s t o p p e d hitting her. T h e n I pulled her dress up a b o v e h e r waist a n d r e a c h e d for her m e a t , a n d she started screaming " S t o p , s t o p , s t o p " a n d s t o m p e d t h e floor w i t h her feet. I just t h o u g h t , "I h a v e got to s h u t her ass up fast before s o m e b o d y h e a r s her," a n d t h e n I really cut loose on h e r w i t h lefts a n d rights a n d said, " S h u t u p , s h u t u p , before I b e a t y o u to d e a t h . " Finally she shut the fuck u p , a n d I pulled her dress back u p , t o r e her panties off her legs a n d . . . . " (Ath- ens 1 9 8 0 : 2 3 - 2 4 )

T h e rapist aims for stealth a n d surprise. It did n o t seem necessary for h i m first to ask the victim for money, since he w a s going to b e a t her up s o o n e r or later to m a k e h e r s u b m i t a n d be quiet, b u t he r e g a r d e d this as a w a y to " t h r o w her off b a s e " a n d gain a bit m o r e a d v a n t a g e before she w a s a w a r e a r a p e w a s going to c o m m e n c e .

T h e t e c h n i q u e of violent p r e d a t o r s is a m i n i a t u r i z e d , m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l version of an a r m y ' s tactics. A military u n i t usually w i n s an e n g a g e m e n t n o t by s m a s h i n g against the e n e m y ' s strongest forces, b u t by finding a local a d v a n t a g e , a place w h e r e t h e enemy has fewer forces c o n c e n t r a t e d ; or by hitting a s p o t w h e r e the enemy easily becomes disorganized because it is c a u g h t by surprise, or in t h e m i d s t of s o m e o t h e r activity w h e r e it is n o t p r e p a r e d to fight. H o l d u p tactics are the same, except t h a t instead of m a k i n g an o r g a n i z a t i o n lose coherence a n d initiative, the h o l d u p artist m a k e s an individual b o d y lose its ability to act on its o w n t e r m s .

T h e a r m e d r o b b e r aims t o a c q u i r e d o m i n a n c e b y m e a n s o f t h r e a t , b u t the t h r e a t m a y escalate to violence a n d m u r d e r if t h e r e is resistance from t h e victim. This brings the d o m i n a n c e contest to t h e fore; as Katz argues, the r o b b e r w h o is c o m m i t t e d to his identity as a " h a r d m a n " or " b a d a s s " is n o w playing for t h e largest stakes in his p e r s o n a l universe. After killing a resisting victim, he m a y n o t even t a k e all his or her m o n e y (Katz 1 9 8 8 :

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1 8 6 - 8 7 ) . T h e same goes for u n a r m e d m u g g e r s w h o are physically m u c h stronger t h a n their victims, a n d use display of m u s c u l a r p o w e r as their chief t o o l of d o m i n a t i o n ; if there is resistance, he c a n n o t back d o w n since his f u n d a m e n t a l skill is in q u e s t i o n . Such a m u g g e r at times p r o v o k e s the victim in o r d e r to justify inflicting injury, since he c a n t h e n b l a m e t h e victim for the violence (Lejeune 1 9 7 7 ) . Such cases imply t h a t the confron- t a t i o n a l r o b b e r is p r o u d of his skill, his t e c h n i q u e for d o m i n a n c e , a n d gets pleasure from exercising it to the hilt.

It is instructive to c o m p a r e episodes w h e r e resistance is successful, or does n o t result in escalation to serious injury. In this a c c o u n t , a m a n needs m o n e y t o buy d r u g s , a n d considers v a r i o u s places t o r o b :

Finally a cleaner's flashed in my m i n d . I figured t h a t it w o u l d be the best hit since there w o u l d be e n o u g h m o n e y a n d only old ladies w o r k e d t h e r e . I p u t on my sunglasses, g r a b b e d my . 4 5 , t o o k off the safety clip, a n d h e a d e d for t h e cleaner's. I w a l k e d in the place, pulled o u t my pistol, a n d p o i n t e d it at t h e old lady behind the counter. I said, " T h i s is a h o l d - u p , I d o n ' t w a n t to s h o o t y o u , so give me all t h e m o n e y o u t of t h a t cash register fast." She w a l k e d over to t h e cash register, b u t t h e n just s t o p p e d a n d said, " I ' m n o t going to give y o u this m o n e y " a n d stepped on a b u t t o n o n the f l o o r .

I t o l d myself I w a s going to get t h a t money. I leaned over the c o u n t e r a n d p u t the barrel of t h e pistol in her face a n d said, "Lady, n o w I ' m going to kill y o u . " But just as I w a s going to pull the trigger, she o p e n e d t h e cash register d r a w e r a n d said, "You c a n get the m o n e y yourself." I t h e n t o l d her to get a w a y from the cash register, a n d she did. After I g r a b b e d all the p a p e r money, she smiled a n d said, "I guess I d o n ' t k n o w m u c h a b o u t y o u youngsters these d a y s . " I l o o k e d at her for a m o m e n t a n d t h o u g h t t h a t she w a s just a nice old b a t t y g r a n d m o t h e r . T h e n I split fast." (Athens 1 9 8 0 : 33)

In effect, t h e old w o m a n tests t h e r o b b e r by b l u n t l y refusing h i m ; w h e n he raises t h e t h r e a t level, she m a k e s a c o m p r o m i s e m o v e : verbally she sticks t o h e r g u n s , she d o e s n o t give h i m t h e money, b u t tells h i m t o t a k e i t himself. H e r n e x t c o m m e n t , " I guess I d o n ' t k n o w m u c h a b o u t y o u y o u n g s t e r s these d a y s , " conveys t h a t she is a w a r e t h e y w e r e testing each other. T h e y even leave on a mildly solidaristic n o t e , h a v i n g figured this o u t a b o u t e a c h other, w i t h h e r smile a n d his a t t r i b u t i o n t h a t she i s like a g r a n d m o t h e r .

T h e last instance is a n o t h e r rapist, in the p a r k i n g lot of a s h o p p i n g center while p e o p l e are d o i n g their C h r i s t m a s s h o p p i n g :

1 w a n t e d to find a b r o a d with a nice full ass w a l k i n g alone to her car. I figured t h a t I'd j u m p into her car w i t h her and then m a k e her drive out

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to a deserted area nearby t h a t I knew a b o u t . I w a s w a t c h i n g people going to their cars w h e n I spotted this b r o a d w i t h a nice face a n d big hips a n d a fat r o u n d ass w a l k i n g by herself. She l o o k e d like an easy r i p - off, so I s t a r t e d following her a n d snuck up right behind her. W h e n she stuck her keys in the car door, I g r a b b e d her by the a r m , flashed my knife in her face a n d said, " G e t i n t o y o u r car a n d d o n ' t m a k e a n y n o i s e . " She just s t o o d there like she w a s in a c o m p l e t e daze. So I let go of her a r m a n d g r a b b e d her car keys a n d o p e n e d the car d o o r myself. I t o l d her to get in because we were going for a ride, b u t she just s t a r t e d screaming her ass off. First I decided to force her i n t o t h e car, a n d I g r a b b e d o n t o her again, b u t she k e p t o n screaming a n d started getting a w a y from m e . I figured t h a t o t h e r people were p r o b a b l y seeing by n o w w h a t w a s h a p p e n i n g , so I t h o u g h t I h a d better get the hell o u t of t h e r e fast before I got busted. T h e n I b o o k e d it, a n d she r a n off t o w a r d the stores s c r e a m i n g . " (Athens 1 9 8 0 : 3 5 - 3 6 )

T h e crucial m o m e n t is the w o m a n ' s initial r e a c t i o n , w h i c h is to be c o m - pletely s t u n n e d , " i n a complete d a z e . " As yet she is neither resisting n o r complying; since the r a p i s t needs to get her to drive a w a y w i t h h i m , her opting o u t of the situation, by t o t a l psychological w i t h d r a w a l if only m o - mentarily, m a k e s h i m lose t h e initiative. T h e n she t a k e s c o n t r o l of the s i t u a t i o n , n o d o u b t w i t h o u t m u c h calculation, w h e n her daze gives w a y to u n c o n t r o l l a b l e screaming; unlike the other w o m e n victims in the cases w e reviewed earlier, she does n o t m a k e a n y articulate s t a t e m e n t s , b u t merely shrieks continuously; she seems e n t r a i n e d in her o w n screaming, a n d t h u s impervious t o perceiving any t h r e a t s . T h e r a p i s t h a s n o t d o m i - n a t e d t h e intersubjectivity of the situation; a n d is psychologically forced t o r e t r e a t .

A n u m b e r of h o l d u p s do n o t c o m e off, because the victim resists. T h e r e are indications t h a t in a b o u t half the cases w h e r e the r o b b e r e n c o u n t e r s physical resistance, or just d e t e r m i n e d rejection of the r o b b e r y frame, t h e r o b b e r a b a n d o n s the effort (Luckenbill 1 9 8 1 ) . But chances of injuries go u p : in a Chicago study of robberies w i t h g u n s , 78 percent of resisting victims w e r e injured, c o m p a r e d to 7 percent of those w h o did n o t resist (Block 1 9 7 7 ) . T h e r e are o t h e r r e a s o n s w h y robberies a b o r t , especially inside offices t h a t h a v e security glass or high c o u n t e r s , w h e r e clerks c a n r e t r e a t o r d u c k o u t o f sight ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 ) . These " h a r d - ened t a r g e t s , " however, are n o t invariably safe from r o b b e r y ; it all de- pends o n w h a t t r a n s p i r e s i n the brief m o m e n t s w h e n t h e r o b b e r a t t e m p t s t o establish e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e over t h e s i t u a t i o n .

O n e might think t h a t a gun used against an u n a r m e d person w o u l d provide o v e r w h e l m i n g t h r e a t . Nevertheless, r o b b e r s w h o have guns d o n o t always use t h e m , or s h o o t effectively; a n d the gun may be chiefly a

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m a t t e r of t h r e a t , even of pretense or bluff. T h i s comes o u t particularly clearly in a study by M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l (1994) of some eleven t h o u - s a n d a r m e d r o b b e r i e s i n L o n d o n , along w i t h interviews w i t h t w o h u n d r e d i m p r i s o n e d r o b b e r s . G u n s w e r e n o t often fired; this h a p p e n e d in only 4 percent of the r o b b e r i e s . M o r e o v e r , of the forty-five occasions w h e r e shots w e r e fired, in a third of t h e cases bullets w e r e fired i n t o the g r o u n d or the air or ceiling, usually at t h e beginning of the r o b b e r y w h e n t h e r e w a s some hesitance a b o u t complying w i t h t h e r o b b e r ' s d e m a n d s . I n thirteen (i.e., a little less t h a n 30 percent) of these cases, shots w e r e fired at t h e victims or at g u a r d s or b y s t a n d e r s , b u t only five p e r s o n s w e r e actually hit by bullets—an accuracy r a t e of 38 percent. All this is r a t h e r c o m p a r a b l e to military p e r f o r m a n c e , as we recall from c h a p t e r 2 (and, indeed, police p e r f o r m a n c e ; cops a n d r o b b e r s are on a p r e t t y even basis).

This is n o t to say t h a t r o b b e r y victims do n o t get injured w i t h at least m o d e r a t e frequency: in the English d a t a , a b o u t 7 p e r c e n t of a r m e d r o b - bery victims w e r e h u r t ; b u t of these incidents, the vast m a j o r i t y — 9 4 per- c e n t — w e r e caused b y s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n g u n - s h o t s . M o s t c o m m o n w a s the use of the firearm as a b l u d g e o n — p i s t o l w h i p p i n g or beating w i t h t h e b u t t of a sawed-off s h o t g u n (28 p e r c e n t ) . A l m o s t as m a n y injuries (24 percent) came from kicking or p u n c h i n g . A n o t h e r c o m m o n source of injuries w a s use of s o m e o t h e r w e a p o n , such as a bat, h a m m e r , or knife; m a n y of t h o s e w h o carried guns also carried these o t h e r w e a p o n s . Consid- ering t h a t all the r o b b e r s in t h e sample carried guns (or as we shall shortly see, presented themselves as carrying g u n s ) , it is n o t a b l e t h a t the guns were n o t m u c h used for s h o o t i n g , or even seriously t h r e a t e n i n g to shoot; they w e r e used to present a definition of t h e situation—this is a stick u p , this is a g u n . T h e r e is a quality of symbolic violence a b o u t forcing some- o n e to s u b m i t to a g u n , by shoving t h e g u n at t h e m , even hitting t h e m w i t h it, b u t n o t firing it. Similarly, in Luckenbill's (1981) d a t a , 22 percent of the time t h e a r m e d r o b b e r y began by hitting t h e victim, causing injury as a m o d e of i n t i m i d a t i o n : violence as a w a y of seizing the definition of the s i t u a t i o n .

M o r e o v e r , in t h e L o n d o n r o b b e r i e s , the chances of injury w e n t up the m o r e r o b b e r s were involved. A single r o b b e r acting alone rarely p r o d u c e d an injury, b u t this w e n t up to 25 percent w h e n t h e r e w a s a g a n g of t h r e e or m o r e r o b b i n g a security van ( a r m o r e d car carrying cash), a n d to 50 percent for gangs of four or m o r e r o b b i n g jewelry stores. A similar p a t t e r n w a s found in A u s t r a l i a n d a t a (Kapardis 1 9 8 8 ) : the bigger t h e t e a m of r o b b e r s , the m o r e c h a n c e for injuries. (And as we h a v e seen in c h a p t e r 3, the same is t r u e for the n u m b e r of cops.) This is very m u c h like t h e audi- ence effect t h a t we will see in c h a p t e r 6: bigger fighting g r o u p s create their o w n e m o t i o n a l z o n e , p u m p each o t h e r u p w i t h e n t h u s i a s m , a n d p r o d u c e m o r e serious violence t h a n o n e - o n - o n e fights.

Bullying, Mugging, and Holdups • 183

A n o t a b l e feature of the L o n d o n study is t h a t r o b b e r s could be divided i n t o t h r e e g r o u p s : those w h o carried real g u n s ; those w h o carried repli- cas—fake guns t h a t could n o t be fired, a l t h o u g h they l o o k e d like guns; a n d t h o s e w h o bluffed by indicating an object in a bag or p o c k e t t h a t they said (or stated in a note) w a s a g u n . Real g u n - c a r r y i n g r o b b e r s , as we h a v e seen, did n o t s h o o t their g u n s very m u c h , a n d rarely hit a n y o n e w i t h a bullet. But interviews s h o w e d they w e r e strongly a t t a c h e d to their g u n s , r e g a r d i n g t h e m as a sign of their seriousness. G u n - c a r r y i n g r o b b e r s were by far the m o s t professional a n d dedicated of the a r m e d r o b b e r s ; they identified themselves w i t h criminal careers, a n d expected to c o n t i n u e after they g o t o u t of p r i s o n . T h e y did considerable a d v a n c e p l a n n i n g for their r o b b e r i e s , carefully choosing a n d observing targets, w o r e disguises a n d developed e l a b o r a t e escape p l a n s . These r o b b e r s a l m o s t always w o r k e d in g r o u p s (82 p e r c e n t ) — b y c o n t r a s t , 46 percent of the fake-gun r o b b e r s h a d accomplices, a n d only 16 percent of the bluffers did. T h i s m e a n t , in p a r t , t h a t gun-carrying r o b b e r s w e r e m o r e ensconced i n criminal net- w o r k s ; it also m e a n t t h a t they h a d m o r e social s u p p o r t in their identities a s r o b b e r s . A n d this social s u p p o r t , this g r o u p e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e , carried over to t h e r o b b e r y itself; t h u s they w e r e m o s t likely to be p u m p e d up by the s i t u a t i o n , ready to establish d o m i n a t i o n . H e n c e the greater like- lihood of violence: tough guys performing before an audience of o t h e r tough guys. T h e guns they carried are chiefly to be regarded as m a r k s of g r o u p identity; n o t t h a t they have no o t h e r uses, but their major effect is u p o n the confidence a n d aggressiveness of their carriers.

R o b b e r s w h o used fake guns were less serious in their criminal identi- ties; s o m e indeed expressed the point t h a t the inauthenticity of their gun m a d e the episode only a play: " I ' m only a small time thief—I'm n o t a gangster. . . . For me, the seriousness was taken o u t of it because the gun w a s not r e a l . " A n o t h e r said, "I w o u l d play a p a r t for t h a t 20 m i n u t e s . . . . assume an identity n o t my o w n . " And another, " O n c e you arc in there, you t u r n into a r o b o t . You k n o w w h a t you have to do and you just do i t " ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 7 2 - 7 3 ) . These fake-gun r o b b e r s also expected to m a k e less m o n e y o u t of each robbery, a n d h a d lower confi- dence in their success—many expected to be c a u g h t before long, unlike the gun-carrying professionals. Just as the gun-carriers a p p e a r e d to get confidence, or e m o t i o n a l energy, from their guns a n d all t h a t w e n t w i t h t h e m , the p r e t e n d e r s were n o t m u c h energized by the w e a p o n s t h a t they k n e w were n o t real. They m u s t have hoped their Goffmanian show w o u l d be real for the audience of r o b b e r y victims—and indeed much of the time it w a s — b u t it w a s n o t real for the performers. T h u s , unlike the profession- als, they rarely described any e m o t i o n a l enjoyment in r o b b i n g ; half of them said they felt bodily sick or faint. O n e stated, "I t h i n k I was m o r e frightened t h a n the girl behind the c o u n t e r . " Another, "I avoided eye con-

184 • Chapter 5

tact because I w a s e m b a r r a s s e d a b o u t w h a t I w a s d o i n g " (Morrison and O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 7 3 ) . 1 3

Still further o u t on the c o n t i n u u m were the bluffers. These were individ- uals in a criminal career m o d e as well, insofar as they h a d a long scries of previous arrests (although usually n o t for r o b b e r y ) ; b u t they were at the loose ends of the criminal w o r l d , u n a t t a c h e d individuals, with little skills or c o n n e c t i o n s . T h e i r robberies were usually decided on the spur of the m o m e n t , w h e n feeling an urgent need for m o n e y for g a m b l i n g or d r u g s ; they did little a d v a n c e p l a n n i n g , tended n o t to w e a r disguises or to have an escape plan. Bluffers overwhelmingly (95 percent) regarded themselves as failures in their criminal careers. " I ' m n o t a very g o o d thief a n d I've got n o t h i n g to s h o w for it. I'm in a m e s s " ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n - nell 1994: 7 7 ) . They usually picked the easiest targets, especially building societies (savings a n d loan offices), w h e r e the clerks were w o m e n a n d easy to intimidate.

Bluffers further reduced the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l aspects of r o b b e r y by m a k - ing their d e m a n d s by a written n o t e (two-thirds used n o t e s , c o m p a r e d to o n e - t e n t h of other robbers). R o b b e r s were n o t very confident a b o u t this: "I d i d n ' t expect it to w o r k . I t h o u g h t the cashier w o u l d laugh a n d I w o u l d h a v e to leave with n o t h i n g " ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 7 8 ) . In fact, they may have used the n o t e because their e m o t i o n a l energy w a s so low t h a t they d i d n ' t t r us t their voice to m a k e a convincing s t a t e m e n t ; even their verbal i n t i m i d a t i o n w a s a fake. R o b b e r s w h o carried real g u n s , on the other h a n d , always displayed t h e m . If the gun is not so much a utilitar- ian t h r e a t as a symbol of seriousness, both for the victim a n d even m o r e for the robber, displaying the gun is the crucial ritual act; it is this a b o v e all else t h a t gives r o b b e r s their e m o t i o n a l energy. Lacking this, the r o b b e r does not feel real: "I view it as very petty a n d no big d e a l — n o t a lot different from snatching a p u r s e " ( M o r r i s o n and O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 7 8 ) .

T h e c r u x of being an a r m e d r o b b e r is skill at interactional techniques for establishing situational d o m i n a t i o n . Individuals w h o c o n t i n u e crime m o v e up t h r o u g h a career hierarchy, from the relatively low-confronta- tional forms of mugging to high-confrontational forms; this is n o t merely a career progression t o w a r d r o b b i n g larger a m o u n t s of money, since this may not be t r u e (especially in relation to the money needs of young teenag- ers vis-a-vis adults). It is a progression in sophistication in h o w to m a n a g e a t t a c k s on the w e a k , indeed h o w to p r o d u c e w e a k n e s s by playing on the r h y t h m s of n o r m a l social interaction a n d m a k i n g the o t h e r p e r s o n ' s con- frontational tension/fear w o r k to o n e ' s o w n a d v a n t a g e . 1 4 It should n o t be surprising t h a t individuals w h o have developed these skills are p r o u d of t h e m , a n d regard them as i m p o r t a n t for their own s a k e .

Katz ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 9 5 - 2 3 6 ) points o u t t h a t persisting in stickups is n o t in itself a very rational choice, if one is concerned only with material ends. N o t

B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , a n d H o l d u p s • 1 8 5

only do career a r m e d r o b b e r s tend to get c a u g h t or killed eventually, b u t even if they sometimes r o b fairly large a m o u n t s of money, they usually dissipate it quickly in an ostentatiously hedonistic lifestyle. Katz interprets this as a c o m m i t m e n t to being in the " a c t i o n " scene, the w o r l d of g a m - bling, drugs, c o m m e r c i a l sex, a n d of bragging a n d showing off one's crim- inal exploits; carrying on robberies is itself as m u c h a p a r t of the " a c t i o n " as spending the money. T h e r e is also an element of g a m i n g in the tech- niques of confronting victims: getting t h e j u m p on t h e m , using techniques of c o n n i n g t h e m before springing the stickup on t h e m ; it is a pleasure in controlling s i t u a t i o n a l realities, t h e ability to m a k e other p e o p l e believe t h a t o n e thing is h a p p e n i n g , t h e n shocking t h e m into recognizing t h a t they h a v e been misled a n d n o w they will p a y yet a n o t h e r price, in situational h u m i l i a t i o n .

It can be a d a n g e r o u s g a m e ; in p a r t because there is always the chance s o m e o n e will fight back, and the r o b b e r will have to escalate; there is also the c h a n c e that he will n o t be able to d o m i n a t e , t h a t his technique will fail—an even m o r e serious psychological challenge. In the b a c k g r o u n d , no d o u b t , there is also the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear of all violence- t h r e a t e n i n g situations; the m a t u r e a r m e d r o b b e r is at some distance from the fear-management techniques of the young mugger, but there is fear in the faces of r o b b e r s in the p h o t o s available from closed-circuit video c a m - eras in b a n k s , at A T M s , and o t h e r places.

T h e technique of the m a t u r e r o b b e r i n c o r p o r a t e s all this; he has learned h o w to take the tension of the situation, including his o w n fears, and turn it into an a d d i t i o n a l element of excitement. This is a n a l o g o u s to the w a y in which some p e r s o n s increase their sexual thrills by carrying o u t erotic e n c o u n t e r s in situations w h e r e they risk being c a u g h t by observers.''' It is the same a t t r a c t i o n Katz (1988) describes for girls a n d y o u n g w o m e n shoplifting; it is playing with the Goffmanian p resen tatio n al practices of n o r m a l everyday life, a n d the dangers of getting c a u g h t if one fails to m a n i p u l a t e them properly, t h a t is the e m o t i o n a l payoff. In c o m p a r i s o n to this, the material gains are of little weight.

T h e interaction ritual mechanism t h a t shapes everyday e n c o u n t e r s is an e m o t i o n transformer; it takes initiating e m o t i o n s , a n d , w h e r e condi- tions for m u t u a l cognitive focus and interbodily e n t r a i n m e n t arc present, intensifies them and t r a n s f o r m s t h e m into e m o t i o n a l energy. T h e r o b b e r ' s technique is t h a t he has learned h o w to w o r k a special kind of one-sided d o m i n a n c e ritual in which he gets to m a k e others fearful, w e a k , a n d pas- sive, while he gets the e m o t i o n a l energy. C o u r t i n g danger a n d dealing with his own fears is just an additional w a y of raising the voltage, a d d i n g a n o t h e r e m o t i o n a l tension to the mix t h a t will become t r a n s f o r m e d into a still higher level of e m o t i o n a l energy. If indeed, as I have argued, h u m a n s seek o u t the highest source of e m o t i o n a l energy in their interactional

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o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the a r m e d r o b b e r has found a source for very intense EE spikes. He has learned h o w t o get himself e m o t i o n a l l y high o n an e x t r e m e k i n d of s i t u a t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e . An English a r m e d r o b b e r s u m m e d up his robberies: "I really enjoyed t h e m — i t w a s better t h a n d r u g s — a real b u z z " ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 5 5 ) . It is a technique in t h e same sense t h a t H o w a r d Becker (1953) described as t h e crucial step in b e c o m i n g a m a r i j u a n a user. At t h e t o p of the career h i e r a r c h y of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l crim- inals, the a r m e d r o b b e r is an addict of s i t u a t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e , a p r i s o n e r of his o w n i n t e r a c t i o n a l skill.

B A T T E N I N G O N I N T E R A C T I O N A L W E A K N E S S

D o m e s t i c abuse, bullying, m u g g i n g , a n d h o l d u p s d o n o t just c o m e n a t u - rally. T h e y are n o t merely frustrated r e a c t i o n s to stress, d e p r i v a t i o n , or h a v i n g been a p r i o r recipient of such violence in t h e past. They are tech- niques t h a t individuals h a v e learned; better p u t , they are i n t e r a c t i o n a l styles t h a t h a v e been n e g o t i a t e d over a c h a i n of e n c o u n t e r s . This is easiest to do if the e n c o u n t e r s are always w i t h t h e same p e r s o n s , so t h a t b o t h sides can l e a r n their p a r t s ; t h a t is w h y a b u s e is m o s t c o m m o n in families, w h e r e t h e r e is i n t i m a t e familiarity allowing for all sorts of m u t u a l adjust- m e n t s (positive ones as well, o n e h o p e s ) ; a n d w h y bullying is t h e specific form of a t t a c k i n g the w e a k t h a t occurs in t o t a l institutions w i t h their inescapability a n d their rigid status systems. M u g g i n g a n d r o b b i n g are the m o s t difficult, because they are practiced on a changing cast of victims, a n d the techniques of being successful at these involve forcing the individ- ual i n t o t h e victim role very swiftly w i t h o u t p r i o r rehearsal; even here t h e r e is a t r u n c a t e d history, as the a t t a c k e r m a y s p e n d a few seconds in setting up the victim before he or she is propelled t h r o u g h the t r a p - d o o r i n t o full-scale v i c t i m h o o d (as in t h e case of t h e rapist w h o p r e t e n d s at first to be only after the w o m a n ' s m o n e y ) . T h i s is a r e a s o n w h y m u g g e r s are r a r e r t h a n abusers a n d bullies, a n d a r m e d r o b b e r s are the rarest of all.

T h e r e is a c o n s t a n t r a n k o r d e r i n g in frequency of crime victimization (the following figures c o m e from 1 9 7 2 to 2 0 0 0 , Bureau of Justice Statis- tics; www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs, u p d a t e d August 2 0 0 3 ) :

burglary: ranges from p e a k of a b o u t 1 1 0 per 1,000 p o p u l a t i o n over age 12, d o w n to l o w of 35 per 1,000.

simple assault: ( w i t h o u t w e a p o n s a n d w i t h no or m i n o r injuries): p e a k 30 per 1,000, l o w 15 per 1,000.

aggravated assault: (with w e a p o n s w h e t h e r or n o t injury, or w i t h o u t w e a p o n s b u t w i t h serious injury): p e a k 12 per 1,000, low 6 per 1,000.

robbery: peak 8 per 1,000, low 2 per 1,000. [The category " r o b b e r y " here includes both muggings a n d a r m e d robberies, since it does

B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , a n d H o l d u p s • 1 8 7

not distinguish w h e t h e r w e a p o n s were used a n d w h e t h e r there w a s a face c o n f r o n t a t i o n . ]

homicide: peak 10 per 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , low 5 per 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 [i.e., peak .001 per 1,000, low .000.5 per 1,000].

W h a t we see is t h a t the crime t h a t involves no social presence at all— burglary (similarly a u t o theft, a p a r t from carjacking)—is by far the most frequent; c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l violence is rarer the m o r e force is used, with homicides the most exceptional of all.

Victimization rates for d o m e s t i c abuse a n d for bullying are m u c h higher t h a n all but the most a n o n y m o u s p r o p e r t y crime:

severe abuse occurs a m o n g 2 - 4 percent (i.e., 2 0 - 4 0 per 1,000) of chil- dren (Straus a n d Gelles 1 9 8 6 ) .

serious bullying is inflicted upon 5 - 6 percent of pupils in British b o a r d - ing schools (Duffell 2 0 0 0 : 186), a n d 5 - 9 percent in public middle schools (Olweus 1 9 9 3 ) — 5 0 - 9 0 per 1,000; American estimates range up to 15 percent (Nansel et al. 2 0 0 1 ) — 1 5 0 per 1,000, with outliers at 25 percent or even 50 percent, a l t h o u g h using very loose defini- tions of bullying.

Severe partner violence occurs at a rate of a b o u t 6 percent of domestic couples per y e a r — 6 0 per 1,000.

Common couple violence at a b o u t 16 percent (Straus and Gelles 1986; Kimmel 2 0 0 2 ) — 1 6 0 per 1,000; this figure is at a level well above even the m o s t c o m m o n forms of unviolent crime.

Elder abuse has been estimated at 10 percent for those living with fam- ily m e m b e r s (Lau and Kosberg 1979).

Highest of all, 50 percent of teenagers are physically coerced by parents;

80 percent of children attack their siblings; physical punishment is inflicted on 8 5 - 9 5 percent of small children by

p a r e n t s (Dietz 2 0 0 0 ; Gelles 1 9 7 7 ; Straus a n d Donnelly 1994). For those w h o need help w i t h the a r i t h m e t i c , these n u m b e r s t r a n s l a t e

into 5 0 0 per 1,000, 8 0 0 per 1,000, a n d 8 5 0 - 9 5 0 per 1,000—a long w a y from the a r m e d r o b b e r y rate of 2 - 8 per 1,000.

It also follows t h a t w h a t e v e r genetic or physiological factors m a y exist t h a t predispose particular individuals t o w a r d violent crime, such an indi- vidual c a n n o t become a successful mugger, robber, or indeed even a bully or abuser, w i t h o u t going t h r o u g h a career of learning interactional tech- niques. This has n o t been studied in m u c h detail; but it w o u l d be useful to k n o w w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n w h e n a person with a very s h o r t fuse—a genetic predisposition to react angrily by striking o u t at others—carries this o u t for the first time. Does he (assuming males for the m o m e n t ) be-

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c o m e a successful bully? He w o u l d also have to learn h o w to find bullying- victims; he will n o t find t h e m a m o n g the sociable-leader type of children in M o n t a g n e r ' s p l a y r o o m ; a n d w i t h o u t s o m e sociable skills of his o w n , he will n o t m a k e it i n t o the m i d d l e of the p l a y r o o m status hierarchy w h e r e bullies are located, b u t become an isolate, a n d t h u s u n a b l e to join in any collective forms of a t t a c k i n g o t h e r s . He m i g h t g r o w up to become a lonely serial killer, b u t n o t m o s t of the o t h e r kinds of violent p r a c t i t i o n e r — a n d i n fact h e w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o h a n d l e t h e clandestine tactics a n d n o r m a l cover t h a t characterizes m o s t serial killers (Hickey 2 0 0 2 ) . Again, if his s h o r t fuse is n o t s u p p l e m e n t e d by other sociable t e c h n i q u e s , he is n o t likely to find sexual p a r t n e r s a n d to get into a domestic situation; a w o m a n t h a t he does find m a y be quickly repelled by t h e violence, in the absence of the m o r e subtle or insidious techniques by w h i c h an abusive interaction simultaneously t r a i n s an ongoingly available victim. A n d since mugging is usually learned in small t e a m s , a n d the m o r e difficult forms of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l r o b b e r y c o m e after a p p r e n t i c e s h i p in the easier forms, this individual w i t h the h y p o t h e t i c a l genetic s h o r t fuse w o u l d likely n o t become m u c h of a criminal p r e d a t o r either.

P e r h a p s (some researchers t h i n k u n d o u b t e d l y ) t h e r e are such individu- als o u t t h e r e in the p o p u l a t i o n ; if so, they h a v e been w a l k i n g a r o u n d w i t h their genetic s h o r t fuses for m a n y years, a n d h a v e c o m m i t t e d s o m e p r o - p o r t i o n of the violence on w h i c h we h a v e r e c o r d s . But w h a t we k n o w of such violent actions-—as best we h a v e been able to get up close to t h e m , b e y o n d the merely statistical r e p o r t s , a n d t o l o o k a t the s i t u a t i o n a l p r o - cesses—is t h a t they are c o m m i t t e d in social p a t t e r n s , n o t by isolated indi- viduals w i t h s h o r t fuses; h o w e v e r s h o r t their fuses, it is in social situations a n d relationships of the k i n d we h a v e been describing t h a t they manifest themselves. It also follows t h a t they m u s t fit into the prevailing p a t t e r n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear, c o w a r d i c e , a n d i n c o m p e t e n c e in violence, a n d hence in choosing w e a k victims to a t t a c k , if they are going to success- fully a t t a c k a n y o n e . Bodies w i t h genetic s h o r t fuses (however m a n y t h e r e m a y be) are n o t merely w a l k i n g t i m e - b o m b s ; they h a v e to learn i n t e r a c - t i o n a l techniques just like everyone else. Paradoxically, if their fuses are t o o s h o r t , they m a y never learn e n o u g h of the techniques to be successful a t violence. I t m i g h t m e a n t h a t those w h o are m u c h m o r e n o r m a l m a y b e better at learning those t e c h n i q u e s .

T h o s e w h o successfully a t t a c k t h e w e a k — d o m e s t i c a b u s e r s , bullies, violent r o b b e r s — h a v e l e a r n e d t h a t w e a k n e s s is n o t merely a physical c o n d i t i o n . It is n o t simply a m a t t e r of s o m e p e r s o n s being smaller or less m u s c u l a r t h a n o t h e r s . Victims are generally w e a k in a social sense: ongoingly, a s l o w - s t a t u s p e r s o n s , social isolates, t h o s e w h o h a v e s w a l - l o w e d their h u m i l i a t i o n a n d a d a p t e d themselves t o their t o r m e n t e r s , o r w h o fight a g a i n s t them in ineffective w ays t h a t p r o v o k e w i t h o u t deter-

B u l l y i n g , M u g g i n g , a n d I l o l d u p s • 1 8 9

ring. In p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , they are s i t u a t i o n a l l y w e a k ; s o m e o n e else h a s gotten the j u m p o n t h e m , m a n i p u l a t e d their sense of reality, t a k e n a w a y their initiative, subjected t h e m to an e m o - tional e n t r a i n m e n t from o u t s i d e .

T h e c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r r u n n i n g t h r o u g h all these p a t t e r n s a n d occa- sions of v i c t i m h o o d is loss of e m o t i o n a l energy. O n g o i n g c o n d i t i o n s put t h e m in the s t r a t u m of those w h o have little EE, a n d are obvious targets for those w h o get m o s t of their EE from violence or its threat and are seeking for easy victims on which to b a t t e n . In i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n s , t o o , a victim is s o m e o n e w h o suffers a s u d d e n loss of EE; p e r h a p s there may be no long-term p a t t e r n , b u t just being in the w r o n g place at the w r o n g time, w h e r e s o m e o n e w h o has learned the techniques of getting the situa- tional jump puts their skill into practice. Either way, victimizers batten on fear; they b a t t e n on those low in EE. Something like the vampires of mythology, the blood of their victims is w h a t sustains t h e m ; but it is not because they are healthy living creatures t h a t the v a m p i r e gets the blood he needs to stay alive; it is because they are socially w e a k t h a t he gets into their veins. T h e m e t a p h o r is b o t h g r u e s o m e and inexact. It is an interactional symbiosis; the specialist in violence has found a niche w h e r e he can batten on interactional weakness.

P A R T T W O

Cleaned-up and Staged Violence

C H A P T E R 6

Staging Fair Fights

W o r d was going a r o u n d the high school Friday afternoon there w o u l d be a fight. At a nearby p a r k , 3 o'clock: t w o well-known seniors, D a w - son and R a s h a d , w o u l d find o u t w h o w a s the bigger m a n . A c r o w d of o n e h u n d r e d was gathered fifteen m i n u t e s early, eager with anticipa- tion. After five minutes, D a w s o n a p p e a r e d . He paced a b o u t r h y t h m i - cally; the c r o w d could n o t stand still. An observer reported his o w n h a n d s were shaking as he realized he w a s a b o u t to see a real fight.

T h e n R a s h a d a p p e a r e d at the far end of the p a r k , flanked by t w o followers, moving quickly. Rashad a p p e a r e d calmer than D a w s o n , n o t angry but purposeful a n d determined. D a w s o n was ju mp in g a r o u n d with excitement. R a s h a d never changed his brisk pace, never took his eyes off his target as he m a r c h e d into the horseshoe ring of s p e c t a t o r s . W h e n their eyes met, the observer sensed a glimmer of fear in D a w s o n , and he seemed to freeze. R a s h a d walked straight up to him a n d w i t h o u t opposition landed a p u n c h to his jaw.

T h e c r o w d , hushed until now, erupted; mostly all younger a n d smaller than the t w o fighters, they shoved to get close to the action. Some were silent, some shrieked, all were wide-eyed. R a s h a d landed one p u n c h after a n o t h e r as D a w s o n staggered b a c k w a r d . He went d o w n on his back a n d R a s h a d straddled h i m , p u n c h i n g him in the face in a steady r h y t h m . T h e c r o w d formed a tight circle a r o u n d t h e m , their heads b o b b i n g with the action; the observer described himself a n d o t h - ers as in a t r a n c e .

Finally s o m e o n e from o u t s i d e the circle b r o k e in a n d t o r e R a s h a d off. T h e c r o w d c a m e o u t of its t r a n c e ; s o m e buried their faces in their h a n d s , s o m e t h r e w u p , a few were in t e a r s . D a w s o n w a s lying b l o o d y a n d disfigured. Eventually h e s t o o d u p , a n d the t w o s h o o k h a n d s ; D a w s o n p a t t e d R a s h a d o n the b a c k , c o n c e d i n g defeat ( a d a p t e d from Phillips 2 0 0 2 ) .

R a s h a d seizes the e m o t i o n a l m o m e n t u m in every respect. He m a k e s the best e n t r a n c e : last to arrive, while the others a w a i t him; his o p p o n e n t comes alone, R a s h a d is flanked by his sidekicks, a l t h o u g h the latter stay strictly o u t of the fight. He establishes a r h y t h m as he marches up from the distance, imposes it on his excited but j u m p y o p p o n e n t ; from the m o -

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m e n t their eyes meet, he has established d o m i n a n c e . H i s o p p o n e n t never l a n d s a blow, never even effectively w a r d s o n e off. His entire glory, as it t u r n s o u t , is just to be in t h e fight; in t h e aftermath, he is h a p p y to ac- k n o w l e d g e k i n s h i p w i t h his c o n q u e r o r — a f t e r all, h e w a s the o n e w h o fought h i m . T h e c r o w d is e n t r a i n e d , first by one fighter, t h e n by t h e other; at first, it is n e r v o u s a n d j u m p y in a n t i c i p a t i o n w i t h D a w s o n ; t h e n it is e n t r a n c e d b y R a s h a d ' s r h y t h m i c steps a n d b l o w s .

T h e fight, t h o u g h b r u t a l , i s r e g u l a t e d a n d restricted. N o t h i n g b u t f i s t s are used; there are no w e a p o n s , no kicking, gouging, or hair-pulling; all the blows are to t h e front of the u p p e r b o d y a n d face, face-forward to the attacker. T h e audience t o o is well-behaved, in the m o o d of the situation: no o n e m a k e s a m o v e to intervene (the observer later r e m a r k s on his post- fight feelings of guilt for this); the e x c e p t i o n comes at the conclusion, w h e n s o m e o n e w h o is n o t in t h e inner circle of e n t r a n c e d s p e c t a t o r s b r e a k s up the fight; b u t this is accepted by all, since s o m e t h i n g w a s needed t o bring the r h y t h m i c p o u n d i n g t o a n end. A n d the ending calls o n conven- t i o n a l rituals of solidarity: animosity is g o n e ; the fighters s h a k e h a n d s a n d indicate m a r k s of respect in their now-confirmed status of victor a n d defeated.

B o t h are h e r o e s ; t h a t is, they are status n o t a b l e s . T h e i r fight has re- a r r a n g e d their r a n k i n g relative to each other, b u t also reaffirms t h a t they are in the small elite in t h e center of public a t t e n t i o n .

Of theoretical interest is h o w the micro-details of imposing r h y t h m i c entrainment determines w h o w i n s . But here I w a n t to concentrate on a m o r e basic point: h o w this kind of p r o c e d u r e , a staged fair fight, overcomes n o r m a l confrontational tension/fear a n d allows violence to proceed.

H E R O VERSUS H E R O

T h e original referent of " h e r o " is just such an individual w h o takes p a r t in violent contests while s u b m i t t i n g himself to social rules. These rules are explicitly agreed u p o n beforehand; sometimes they t a k e t h e f o r m of a test t h a t the h e r o m u s t p a s s , as in m y t h o l o g i c a l stories of ordeals t h a t the h e r o m u s t u n d e r g o to w i n a t r e a s u r e , m a r r y a king's daughter, or found a k i n g d o m . Such ordeals m a y be fanciful a n d r o m a n t i c i z e d distor- t i o n s of real-life p r o c e d u r e s . M o r e to the p u r p o s e here is t h e fight of h e r o versus h e r o in single c o m b a t . W h a t e v e r the literary d i s t o r t i o n s , such fights u n d o u b t e d l y h a p p e n e d , indeed, were t h e preferred form of violence in s o m e historical p e r i o d s .

Consider the following, from the Iliad, t h e oldest c a n o n i c a l w o r k of literature of the E u r o p e a n t r a d i t i o n (ca. 7 5 0 B . C . ) . T h e very first event of the first day of battle described in t h e p o e m , before a n y t h i n g else h a p p e n s ,

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is a duel. T h e Trojan p r i n c e , Paris, s t a n d s in front of t h e a r m y of his city a n d its allies, a n d calls o u t t h e leaders of the Greeks to send s o m e o n e to meet h i m in single c o m b a t . T h e one w h o a n s w e r s h i m is M e n e l a o s . This is a p p r o p r i a t e , since the w a r w a s started by Paris a b d u c t i n g H e l e n , M e - nelaos's wife. Paris a n d M e n e l a o s agree t h a t w h o e v e r w i n s t h e duel, gets t h e w o m a n a n d t h e r e b y settles the dispute; the w a r will b e over a n d the t w o sides will s w e a r to be friends. N o t only they personally, b u t b o t h armies swear the o a t h . T h e aged king of Troy, P r i a m , comes o u t a n d offi- ciates at the r i t u a l sacrifice, calling on the gods to enforce the o a t h . T h e ritual does n o t e n d here. M e n e l a o s a n d Paris d r a w lots for w h o will h a v e first t u r n to t h r o w a spear at the other.

T h e duel c o m m e n c e s . Paris gets the w o r s t of it, a n d w h e n he is in danger of being killed, he is spirited a w a y by a goddess w h o takes the Trojan side. At every crucial p o i n t in t h e p o e m , a deity is depicted as intervening to advise a h e r o , or to p r o t e c t or h a r m h i m . We could i n t e r p r e t this in- stance as r u n n i n g a w a y from the duel; in a n y case the duel miscarries. T h e t r o o p s are still sitting d o w n disarmed, i n s p e c t a t o r m o d e , w h e n o n e of the Trojans—egged on by t h e malevolent goddess—fires an a r r o w a n d w o u n d s M e n e l a o s . T h e n a r r a t o r refers to h i m as a fool, p r e s u m a b l y for violating t h e r i t u a l t r u c e ; the deities often inspire i r r a t i o n a l action, a n d so this could be i n t e r p r e t e d as an e m o t i o n a l o u t b u r s t by t h e losing side. Fir- ing the a r r o w is r e g a r d e d by the Greeks as violating the o a t h , a n d sets off full-scale battle.

T h e entire n a r r a t i v e of t h e Iliad is organized a r o u n d single c o m b a t s , w h i c h provide i n t e r m i t t e n t high p o i n t s a n d build up to the climax of the d r a m a . These alternate w i t h battle descriptions, b u t t h e latter are neither strategic m a n e u v e r s n o r clashes b e t w e e n organized bodies of t r o o p s ; in- stead, in each episode a p a r t i c u l a r h e r o goes on a r a m p a g e a n d kills a large n u m b e r of enemies. T h o s e w h o m they kill are m e n of r e p u t e ; H o m e r gives each o n e ' s n a m e a n d genealogy, a n d for i m p o r t a n t cases, a history of his n o t a b l e exploits. T h e w i n n i n g h e r o is t o t t i n g up his o w n r e p u t a - t i o n a l score by t h e significance of the secondary heroes he has killed. 1

T h u s : t h e first day of battle, the Greek h e r o D i o m e d e s goes on a r a m - p a g e t h r o u g h the Trojan army. Finally he is challenged by one of the chief Trojan heroes, Aineias; their single c o m b a t is n o t ritualized by formal o a t h s , b u t they go on at s o m e length in s h o u t i n g challenges to each o t h e r a n d exchanging several b l o w s , until Aineias t o o is spirited a w a y by a protective goddess. T h e victor exults in at least c a p t u r i n g Aineais's horses, since t h e y are a famous possession a n d m a k e a glorious trophy. Later in t h e s a m e battle, D i o m e d e s faces off in t h e mid-space b e t w e e n the armies w i t h a n impressive-looking Trojan h e r o , G l a u k o s ; they ask each o t h e r ' s n a m e s a n d genealogies, a n d discover t h a t they are "guest-friends by lin- e a g e , " since their fathers h a d been h o s t a n d visitor, e x c h a n g i n g ritual gifts.

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So instead of fighting they m a k e a pledge of friendship, clasp h a n d s , a n d exchange valuable pieces of armor.

Finally, as the d a y of battle is n e a r i n g late afternoon, the gods are de- picted as a r r a n g i n g a b r e a k for the armies: a n o t h e r single c o m b a t while the rest of t h e t r o o p s sit d o w n a n d w a t c h . Hector, the strongest Trojan h e r o , challenges the Greeks to send a c h a m p i o n against him; they agree t h a t w h o e v e r wins will get the loser's armor, b u t t h e dead b o d y will be given back for a decent funeral. T h e nine leading Greek heroes volunteer, 2

a n d o n e of t h e m , Aias (Ajax) is chosen by l o t . 3 This fight is m e a n t to be inconclusive; unlike o t h e r fights, they exch an g e quite a few b l o w s , w i t h - o u t serious d a m a g e . As night falls, they b r e a k , s e p a r a t e d by h e r a l d s from b o t h sides w h o act as referees. H e c t o r a n d Aias t h e n give each o t h e r pieces of their clothing a n d w e a p o n s , as " f a m o u s gifts" to s h o w they h a d fought a n d p r o p e r l y reconciled. T h e Greeks t a k e this equal ending as a victory, since H e c t o r is r e p u t e d the better fighter.

T h e second day of battle, t h e tide swings a n d H e c t o r goes on a r a m p a g e t h r o u g h the Greek army. T h i s is h a l t e d only w h e n Achilles, sulking in t h e c a m p , allows his friend P a t r o k l o s t o b o r r o w his a r m o r a n d join t h e battle. Achilles's r e p u t a t i o n is such t h a t this t u r n s the tide again; P a t r o k l o s goes on a r a m p a g e t h r o u g h the T r o j a n s . Finally H e c t o r seeks h i m o u t , ignoring the rest of the battle; w i t h the help of a god, he kills him. But this is n o t a fully ritualized single c o m b a t ; they h a v e m a d e no p r i o r a g r e e m e n t , a n d t h e battle n o w rages over P a t r o k l o s ' s body. H e c t o r settles for t a k i n g Achil- les' a r m o r — w h i c h he henceforth will w e a r himself—and the Greeks fi- nally recover the body.

T h e third a n d last day of battle—as far as t h e Iliad n a r r a t i v e is con- c e r n e d — t a k e s place as Achilles, having received n e w a r m o r from the g o d s , r e t u r n s to the fight a n d goes on a r a m p a g e killing Trojans. H e c t o r k n o w s he is o v e r m a t c h e d , a n d r u n s a w a y from Achilles; the respective armies d r a w b a c k to w a t c h as their chase circles the city walls. This is n o t a formal single c o m b a t , b u t Achilles forbids his allies from s h o o t i n g at H e c t o r a n d t a k i n g a w a y his r e n o w n for the kill. H e c t o r (bolstered by a god) t u r n s to confront Achilles, a n d offers his usual agreement: victor gets t h e a r m o r as spoils, b u t gives b a c k t h e b o d y for a funeral. Achilles, h o w - ever, is a n g r y at having lost his b o s o m friend, a n d refuses to m a k e a cove- n a n t . Achilles kills Hector, a n d drags t h e b o d y ignominiously b e h i n d his c h a r i o t b a c k to c a m p . T h e action of the story is n o w over. But t h e r e is o n e m o r e episode: old King P r i a m sorrowfully goes to the Greek c a m p a n d begs to r a n s o m his s o n ' s body. Achilles is s h a m e d a n d agrees to give the b o d y u p ; a n d s o t h e s t o r y ends: the great h e r o , t h e strongest f i g h t e r , has finally learned to follow the ritual proprieties.

Battles of this k i n d , w h i c h resolve into a series of single c o m b a t s , are c o m m o n in p a r t i c u l a r social f o r m a t i o n s . Celtic w a r r i o r s at the time of t h e

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R o m a n c o n q u e s t s of E u r o p e w o u l d seek o u t an individual enemy; they kept records of their victories by displaying severed h e a d s , h u n g from their belts. These were t r ophi es a n d t o k e n s of honor, similar to scalps or body parts t a k e n by N o r t h American tribal w a r r i o r s ; for the latter, eating the heart or o t h e r organs of a famous enemy i n c o r p o r a t e d his p o w e r into the victor. T h e general p a t t e r n is to build o n e ' s r e p u t a t i o n — a n d o n e ' s fighting confidence, or e m o t i o n a l ascendancy—by t a k i n g a c o m m e m o r a - tive emblem and publicizing it. In H o m e r i c Greece, the heroes repeatedly display their single-combat t r o p h i e s , exchange them as gifts, and a t t r i b u t e their origins—if they are especially r e n o w n e d — t o s u p e r n a t u r a l beings, in every respect treating them as sacred objects. In early medieval Europe, a similar r e p u t a t i o n a l system is reflected in stories of magic s w o r d s t h a t could be w o n only by the strongest a n d bravest h e r o , and of treasure h o a r d s g u a r d e d by d r a g o n s a n d monsters t h a t only a h e r o could kill. In early C h i n a , a n d again in periods of weak dynasties when irregular b a n d i t - a r m i e s flourished, heroes are depicted as experts in single c o m b a t , w h o slaughter lesser persons with ease, a n d gain h o n o r by facing off against o t h e r w e l l - k n o w n fighters; sometimes their fights are resolved by a d o p t i n g one a n o t h e r into a s w o r n b r o t h e r h o o d (Ross 1970; Finlcy 1 9 7 3 ; Brondsted 196.5; Shi and Luo 1988).

T h e social s t r u c t u r e in which single c o m b a t s a m o n g ritually exalted heroes occurs is o n e in w h i c h hierarchically disciplined military forces are a b s e n t . The Celtic w a r r i o r s w e r e explicitly undisciplined; a presti- gious c u s t o m w a s t o strip off their clothes a n d f i g h t n a k e d , i m p e r v i o u s to the elements a n d displaying their c o n t e m p t of bodily danger. A similar p a t t e r n of " b e r s e r k e r s " ( n a m e d after the N o r s e version) is found widely in Bronze a n d I r o n Age fighting from M e s o p o t a m i a to Scandinavia (Speidcl 2 0 0 2 ) . T h a t is to say, c o m b a t centering on e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d i n d i v i d u a l s , p u t t i n g themselves into a c o m b a t frenzy, exists in societies w i t h loose military c o a l i t i o n s — t h a t is, societies t h a t h a v e e x p a n d e d be- y o n d tribal n e t w o r k s , b u t w i t h o u t a firm state o r g a n i z a t i o n of k i n g s h i p , aristocracy, or citizen armies (Searlc 1 9 8 8 ) . Building up this e m o t i o n a l frenzy is a device for m o t i v a t i n g c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e , found in p a r t i c u - lar social c o n d i t i o n s : these include the focus on individualized r e p u t a - t i o n s — m a d e possible by a small scale of w a r f a r e a n d by devices for b r o a d c a s t i n g r e p u t a t i o n s on b o t h sides of a conflict, like t h o s e we have seen a m o n g t h e H o m e r i c G r e e k s .

A n o t h e r c o n d i t i o n is the absence of any o t h e r social o r g a n i z a t i o n of violence superior in d o m i n a t i n g a battlefield. T h e single-combat style— w h e t h e r in the e x t r e m e " b e r s e r k e r " v a r i a n t or in a m o r e courtly fashion— is ineffective against well-organized g r o u p force. R o m a n legions had little difficulty in defeating the Celts and similar w a r r i o r s ; simply by m a i n - taining their massed r a n k s , they could shield themselves against any indi-

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vidual a t t a c k n o m a t t e r h o w frenzied, a n d t h e y could m u s t e r the superior- ity of n u m b e r s in cutting d o w n isolated individuals. T h e R o m a n s severely p r o h i b i t e d b r e a k i n g r a n k s i n c o m b a t ; their emphasis w a s n o t o n s h o w i n g off individual c o u r a g e a n d p r o w e s s , b u t on keeping u p g r o u p discipline. 4

T h e individual " h e r o , " realistically, m u s t h a v e d e p e n d e d for success in considerable p a r t u p o n terrifying an e n e m y — w i t h sheer e m o t i o n a l force, w i t h r e p u t a t i o n . We see this in H o m e r — w h e r e Hector, k n o w n as t h e brav- est a n d best of the Trojan fighters, nevertheless gives w a y against the r e p u - t a t i o n of Achilles; 5 a n d in the c o n t e m p o r a r y high school fight, w h e r e R a s h a d e m o t i o n a l l y overbears D a w s o n from the first m o m e n t of visual c o n t a c t . But w h e r e the e n e m y is organized to keep up its o w n source of e m o t i o n a l force, a n d w h e r e it is tactically c o n c e r n e d n o t w i t h t h e h o n o r of individual r e p u t a t i o n b u t w i t h applying u n e q u a l weight of effective n u m b e r s against the o p p o n e n t ' s w e a k n e s s — i n such circumstances, the h e r o style loses its chief w e a p o n , its e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e . A m a n in the hero/berserker m o d e w h e n confronting disciplined a r m y o r g a n i z a t i o n , o r m o d e r n police forces, is just a p a t h o l o g i c a l individual, a n d a loser to b o o t ; the same style of b e h a v i o r in the situation w h e r e fighting is u n c o o r d i n a t e d by hierarchical o r g a n i z a t i o n becomes h e r o i c .

A U D I E N C E S U P P O R T S A N D L I M I T S O N V I O L E N C E

T h e socially staged a n d limited c h a r a c t e r of a fight co n tro ls c o n f r o n t a - t i o n a l tension/fear, b u t n o t merely because p a r t i c i p a n t s are less w o r r i e d a b o u t being h u r t . In fact the rules m a y allow r a t h e r severe d a m a g e ; only p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s of d a m a g e or tactics are ruled o u t . As I h a v e argued t h r o u g h o u t , the m o s t i m p o r t a n t tension a n d fear comes n o t from c o n c e r n for bodily p a i n ; this is s o m e t h i n g t h a t p e o p l e e n d u r e surprisingly easily (perhaps because so often we h a v e no choice a b o u t it, in t h e course of n o r m a l bodily ailments a n d accidents), a n d w h i c h a large p r o p o r t i o n of people are able to steel themselves to face.

A g r e e d - u p o n l i m i t a t i o n s in a fair fight c o m e a b o u t as a s h a r e d o r i e n t a - t i o n , a tacit or even explicit c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e fighters. Even w h e n t h e y are t r y i n g t o s m a s h o n e a n o t h e r i n t o u n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o r t o kill o n e a n o t h e r , t h e y are k e e p i n g up a level of solidarity in their m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t . T h e y are i n effect c o n s t a n t l y telling o n e a n o t h e r t h a t t h e y d o n o t a n d will n o t engage i n c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s — f o r i n s t a n c e , i n g o u g i n g eyes b u t only in p o u n d i n g fists in t h e face. Every t i m e t h e y s t a r t at a given signal, a n d s t o p at a given b r e a k i n g p o i n t , t h e y are affirming t h a t a t h r e a d of c o n t a c t h o l d s b e n e a t h all t h e a c t i o n at c r o s s - p u r p o s e s . T h e fight, of c o u r s e , b r e a k s n o r m a l i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t ; b u t a fair fight h e d g e d r o u n d b y r i t u a l s a n d l i m i t a t i o n s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i m p o s e s a n o t h e r

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level on w h i c h b o t h sides arc strongly e n t r a i n e d , strongly intersubjective. It is an overtly two-level i n t e r a c t i o n ; the ritualism of the fair fight im- poses an o v e r r i d i n g level of solidarity w i t h i n w h i c h the a n t a g o n i s m is c o n t a i n e d a n d d r o p p e d to a second level of a t t e n t i o n . It is this s t r u c t u r e t h a t o v e r c o m e s tension/fear a n d a l l o w s t h e f i g h t t o p r o c e e d , i n d e e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h e n t h u s i a s m .

T h e audience is crucial in a staged fight; it provides the s u p p o r t t h a t circumvents c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear; a n d it helps enact t h e limits t h a t give the fight its etiquette a n d m a k e it a fair fight. T h e fighter's focus of awareness is on several things: on the o p p o n e n t , of course, in t h e technical aspects of the fight, h o w to a t t a c k a n d defend against him.- H i s focus is also on t h e a u d i e n c e , before w h i c h one m u s t p u t on a g o o d s h o w ; a n d hence it is also on b o t h self a n d o p p o n e n t t o g e t h e r in t h e eyes of the audience; this a d d s yet a n o t h e r layer of m u t u a l awareness between the fighters as to h o w they a p p e a r collectively, a n d therefore in some degree cooperatively, in t h e s h o w they are p u t t i n g o n . T h e fighter's a t t e n t i o n is shifted a w a y from the tension/fear of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d o n t o the social s u p p o r t s a n d pressures t h a t e n c o u r a g e h i m t o f i g h t .

T h e audience c o o p e r a t e s or even takes the lead in the limitations of the fight: signaling the s t a r t i n g a n d s t o p p i n g p o i n t s , a n d m o n i t o r i n g t h e t a c - tics t h a t are agreed u p o n as fair. It m a y also t a k e a considerable h a n d in the selection of w h o will fight, m a t c h i n g equals, s t r o n g versus s t r o n g in- stead of s t r o n g versus w e a k . Collective a t t e n t i o n u p o n these limitations is a n o t h e r w a y in w h i c h tension/fear is o v e r c o m e . T h e e n a c t m e n t of eti- quette c a n also be a c o m p u l s i o n to fight. O n c e the m a c h i n e r y of dealing w i t h an insult by a staged fight is set in m o t i o n — o r closer to the event, once the audience is assembled r e a d y for t h e fighting to begin—there can b e o v e r w h e l m i n g social pressure n o t t o b a c k o u t ; t h e cost c a n r a n g e from ignominy to scornful a t t a c k s such as pelting the hesitant fighter, or w o r s e . These social pressures h a v e often been r e m a r k e d , as if they are to b l a m e for t h e fighting; t h e analytically m o r e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is t h a t t h e audience also provides the social energy a n d solidarity to overcome tension/fear a n d m a k e f i g h t i n g possible a t all. Willing f i g h t e r s p u m p themselves o n social s u p p o r t as m u c h as they c u r b their unwillingness on t h e c o m p u l - sion; it is one a n d the same p r e s s u r e . A fight m a y start, of c o u r s e , from an i n d i v i d u a l ' s grievance; b u t grievances easily get s w a l l o w e d up in the dynamics of a p p e a r i n g before an audience (whether magnified or dimin- ished). A n d grievances m a y be merely an excuse for t a k i n g a p r o m i n e n t position before an a u d i e n c e , as in p r e s e n t - d a y c a r o u s e r s looking for t r o u - ble. It is sometimes difficult to see w h i c h r o u t e is being followed, b u t in m a n y respects it d o e s n ' t matter, if t h e audience is the crucial d e t e r m i n a n t .

A testable hypothesis: a focused audience lowers fighters' tension/fear a n d affects their willingness to fight at all, for h o w long a n d w i t h w h a t

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intensity. Small a n d unfocused g r o u p s in the s u r r o u n d i n g situation sh o u ld result in l o w willingness to fight. T h i s m a y be a crucial factor in so-called h o n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; it is often difficult to tell, since n ews stories a n d police r e p o r t s rarely give i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e size a n d attentiveness of a n a u d i e n c e . 6 T h e fact t h a t h o n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t escalate t o violence d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y occur in e n t e r t a i n m e n t venues a n d c a r o u s i n g situa- tions (i.e., w e e k e n d evenings) implies t h a t t h e r e are large n u m b e r s of p e o - ple a r o u n d , a n d t h a t they are actively interested in witnessing fights. O n e m i g h t hypothesize t h a t a fight is m u c h less likely to h a p p e n in a near- e m p t y b a r on an off night of the week; or in a situation w h e r e the c r o w d is n o t p a y i n g a t t e n t i o n . 7

T h e r e is some illustrative evidence from my o w n o b s e r v a t i o n s a n d from t h e collection of s t u d e n t r e p o r t s . O n e instance is a fight t h a t does n o t c o m e off: A girl w a i t i n g for a ride after school notices t w o teenage boys s h o u t i n g a t each other, b u t n o c r o w d gathers a r o u n d t h e m . T h e o t h e r students are scattered, n o t assembled together b u t w a i t i n g for individual rides from p a r e n t s , a n d they d o n o t t a k e o n a n active audience m o d e . After a few m i n u t e s , the boys themselves drift a p a r t as if in b o r e d o m w i t h the s i t u a t i o n . A second case is from my o w n o b serv atio n s of t h e m i n o r street altercation in Somerville, M a s s a c h u s e t t s (described in c h a p t e r 2): t h e handful of spectators are distant, nearly invisible, a n d n o t very inter- ested, a n d the fight s o o n w i n d s d o w n .

A third incident, w h i c h I observed in Philadelphia in J a n u a r y 2 0 0 3 , began w h e n a w h i t e m a n in his twenties, riding a bicycle in the midst of evening r u s h - h o u r traffic, is lightly struck by a t a x i as he weaves between the lines of cars. T h e m a n is n o t h u r t , a n d his bike is n o t d a m a g e d (since he rides a w a y on it at the end of the incident); b u t he is angry, a p p a r e n t l y at being e m b a r r a s s e d by falling off his bike in front of traffic, p e r h a p s also frightened. He berates the t a x i driver, a black m a n of a b o u t the same size a n d age (apparently an African i m m i g r a n t ) , w h o refuses to get o u t of his c a b . T h e refusal to confront m a k e s the bicyclist even angrier (and p e r h a p s e m b o l d e n s h i m ) . While carrying o n his h a r a n g u e , t h e m a n leaves the bicycle in front of the t a x i , blocking it from m o v i n g ; a n d he s t a n d s in the o t h e r lane of traffic, t h e r e b y blocking all other traffic on the o n e - w a y street. He t h u s accum ul at es an audience in the form of other drivers, w h o h o n k their h o r n s angrily to get the traffic m o v i n g , a l t h o u g h m o s t of t h e m are t o o far back to see w h a t is h a p p e n i n g . Half a dozen passersby (includ- ing myself), s t a n d on the sidewalk at a safe distance a n d w a t c h ; we do n o t c l u m p together or say a n y t h i n g to each other. T h e only a t t e m p t at intervening is by t h e driver of a delivery t r u c k , p a r k e d just behind t h e t a x i ; he asks the bicyclist to t a k e his bike to the sidewalk, b u t the latter ignores him, and the driver (a fairly big w o r k m a n ) shies a w a y and does

Staging Fair Fights • 201

not p u r s u e it. Finally the bicyclist resolves the incident by telling the taxi driver t h a t h e has his n u m b e r a n d will r e p o r t h i m t o the police.

He moves his bike to the sidewalk, a n d traffic begins to m o v e . However, only a few cars get p a s t the stop light at the nearby corner before it t u r n s red. T h e car t h a t reaches the stop line is driven by a muscular American black m a n , w h o h a d been only a few cars back from the incident; he rolls d o w n his w i n d o w a n d yells angry curses at the bicyclist for holding up traffic. T h e bicyclist curses back, t h e n picks up a heavy steel bicycle lock, a n d swinging it menacingly moves t o w a r d the m a n ' s car. T h e m a n opens his d o o r a n d gets out. T h e n the light changes; something rapidly t r a n s p i r e s — p r o b a b l y just t h a t each slightly hesitated; the black m a n gets back in his .car a n d drives away. T h e bicyclist gets on his bike a n d drives off, still in the middle of the street, defiantly weaving his w a y amidst slow-moving cars. T h e w h o l e incident t o o k four minutes. T h e confrontation is mostly bluster all the w a y a r o u n d ; it is consistent w i t h the general principle t h a t lack of a focused a n d supportive audience keeps a fight from escalating.

Yet a n o t h e r abortive fight w i t h a similar i n t e r a c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e comes from J a p a n in 1 8 6 4 , even t h o u g h t h e setting is a lawless o n e a n d t h e fighters are potentially deadly. A s a m u r a i ( F u k u z a w a 1 9 8 1 : 2 3 6 - 3 7 ) re- c o u n t s w a l k i n g h o m e t h r o u g h the deserted streets of E d o (later Tokyo) b e t w e e n long r o w s of l o w w o o d e n houses w i t h their shutters all closed for the night:

T h e time h a d already t u r n e d a n h o u r p a s t m i d n i g h t — a cold a n d clear w i n t e r night w i t h t h e m o o n shining brightly o v e r h e a d . Its silent, w h i t e b e a m s m a d e me feel u n u s u a l l y chilly for no g o o d r e a s o n . I w a l k e d a l o n g the b r o a d , v a c a n t s t r e e t — n o one in sight, absolutely still. Yet I r e m e m - bered t h a t strolling ruffians h a d been a p p e a r i n g every night, cutting d o w n u n f o r t u n a t e victims a t d a r k c o r n e r s . I t u c k e d u p t h e w i d e ends of my divided skirts in o r d e r to be r e a d y to r u n at a n y signal a n d k e p t up a fast pace. . . .

I s a w a m a n c o m i n g t o w a r d m e . He l o o k e d gigantic in t h e m o o n l i g h t , t h o u g h n o w I w o u l d n o t swear t o his s t a t u r e a t all. O n c a m e t h e giant. N o w a d a y s t h e r e are policemen t o d e p e n d u p o n , o r w e c a n r u n i n t o s o m e o n e ' s h o u s e for p r o t e c t i o n , b u t a t t h a t time n o such help w a s t o b e expected. People w o u l d only b a r their d o o r s m o r e heavily a n d w o u l d never t h i n k of c o m i n g o u t to assist a stranger calling for h e l p .

" N o w , here is a p r e t t y p a s s , " I t h o u g h t . "I c a n n o t r u n b a c k , for t h e rascal w o u l d only t a k e a d v a n t a g e of my w e a k n e s s a n d chase me m o r e surely. Perhaps I h a d better go a h e a d . A n d if I go a h e a d , I m u s t p r e t e n d n o t to be afraid. I m u s t even t h r e a t e n h i m . "

I m o v e d o u t diagonally to t h e m i d d l e of t h e street from the left side w h e r e I h a d been w a l k i n g . T h e n t h e o t h e r fellow m o v e d o u t t o o . This

202 • Chapter 6

gave me a shock, b u t n o w there w a s no retreating an inch. If he were to draw, I m u s t d r a w t o o . As I had practiced the a r t of iai, I k n e w h o w t o h a n d l e m y s w o r d .

" H o w shall I kill him? Well, I shall give a t h r u s t from below." I w a s perfectly determined t h a t I w a s going to fight a n d felt ready if

he s h o w e d the slightest challenge. He d r e w nearer. . . . [ N ] o w there seemed no alternative. If the stranger were to s h o w any

offense, I must kill him. At t h a t time there w a s no such thing as police or criminal c o u r t . If I were to kill an u n k n o w n m a n , I w o u l d simply run h o m e , a n d t h a t w o u l d be the end of it. We were a b o u t to meet.

Every step b r o u g h t us nearer, a n d finally we were at a striking dis- tance. He did not draw. Of course I did n o t d r a w either. And we passed each other. With this as a cue, I r a n . I d o n ' t r e m e m b e r h o w fast I r a n . After going a little distance, I t u r n e d to look back as I flew. T h e o t h e r m a n w a s r u n n i n g , t o o , in his direction. I d r e w a breath of relief a n d s a w the funny side of the w h o l e incident. . . . N e i t h e r had the least idea of killing the other, b u t h a d put up a s h o w of boldness in fear of the other. And both ran a t the same m o m e n t . . . . H e m u s t have been fright- ened; I certainly w a s . " 8

Conversely, the audience may be the central feature of the fight. Fox (1977) describes a repetitive p a t t e r n of fights in small c o m m u n i t i e s of western Ireland. Disputes break o u t a m o n g men d r i n k i n g at c o m m u n i t y dances. T h e assembled friends a n d relatives of each fighter s u p p o r t him by flocking a r o u n d a n d m a k i n g noise. But they also hold him back from serious b l o o d s h e d ; m o s t of the action consists in scuffles between each principal a n d his o w n h a n d l e r s , in a loud bluster of "Let me at him, I'll kill h i m ! " a n d efforts to restrain the fighters from carrying o u t their t h r e a t s . T h e same a n t a g o n i s t s w h o have loudly t h r e a t e n e d to kill o n e an- o t h e r ignore each o t h e r w h e n they e n c o u n t e r one a n o t h e r on following days w h e n no audience is present. T h i s is an e x t r e m e instance w h e r e , w i t h o u t the s u p p o r t a n d c o n t r o l of the c r o w d s , the fighters are n o t able to carry on any c o m b a t at all.

T h e p a t t e r n is b o r n e o u t by my collection of eighty-nine first-hand o b - servations of violence-threatening c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , in which a p p r o p r i a t e information is available (seventy-four are s t u d e n t r e p o r t s , fifteen are my o w n observations). In seventeen cases w h e r e the c r o w d cheers and encour- ages the fight, fifteen give rise to serious fights (88 percent), a n d in eight of these, some of the c r o w d joins in the fight. In twelve cases w h e r e the c r o w d ' s expressions are mixed (mildly excited, p a r t of c r o w d en tertain ed , laughing, a m u s e d ) , o n e leads to a serious fight (8 percent), and eight result in p r o l o n g e d but mild scuffles, blustering, or o t h e r ex ten d ed but limited violence (67 percent); three h a v e very brief fights (25 percent). In t w e n t y -

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TABLE 6.1 Seriousness of fight affected by audience behavior

Violence Serious

fight Prolonged/

mild Mild/ stops Aborts Total

Audience

Cheers 15 (88%) 2 (12%) 17

Mixed 1 (8%) 8 (67%) 3 (25%) 12

Neutral 9 (32%) 3 (11%) 10 (36%) 6 (21%) 28

Uneasy/fearful 1 (5%) 4 (19%) 4 (19%) 12 (57%) 21

Intervenes 1 (9%) 5 (45%) 5 (46%) 11

Total 26 18 22 23 89

one cases the c r o w d is silent, uneasy, e m b a r r a s s e d , tense, or afraid: here there is one serious fight (5 percent); four cases of prolonged but mild scuffles (19 percent); four brief and mild episodes of violence (e.g., o n e punch or slap) t h a t end a b r u p t l y (19 percent); and in twelve cases the fight a b o r t s (57 percent). In eleven cases the audience intervenes, mediates, or breaks up the fight: this leads to one case of prolonged scuffling (9 per- cent); five cases of brief, mild violence (45 percent); four cases w h e r e the fight a b o r t s (46 percent). Overall, there are extremely s t r o n g parallels between the degree of e n c o u r a g e m e n t or opposition by the audience, a n d the a m o u n t of violence t h a t takes place.

I have saved for last the type of audience with the m o s t variable out- c o m e s . In twenty-eight cases the audience is neu tral: t h a t is, absent, dis- t a n t , dispersed, invisible, n o t paying a t t e n t i o n , or small in n u m b e r c o m - pared to the belligerents. In nine of these (32 percent) there are serious fights; t h r e e p r o l o n g e d scuffles or blustering quarrels (11 percent); ten mild a n d brief fights, s t o p p i n g a b r u p t l y (36 percent); in six cases the fight a b o r t s w i t h o u t any violence (21 percent). W h a t m a k e s the difference? U n q u e s t i o n a b l y it is the n u m b e r of belligerents; of the nine serious fights, in all but one case, these are substantial g r o u p s (on the o r d e r of ten or fifteen on a side, with the smallest consisting of five vs. five): in t w o of the cases, there are d e m o n s t r a t o r s n u m b e r i n g in the h u n d r e d s . In a l m o s t all the o t h e r cases w i t h n e u t r a l audiences a n d mild or abortive violence, the p a r t i c i p a n t s are few (mostly o n e - o n - o n e , sometimes t w o or three on the defensive side; the only instance of bigger g r o u p s here is six-on-six).

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TABLE 6.2 Seriousness of fight affected by size of belligerent groups (audience neutral)

Violence Serious Prolonged/ Mild/ Aborts Total

fight mild stops

Size of belligerent groups

1-3 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 10 (59%) 5 (29%) 17

5-100s 8 (73%) 2 (18%) 1 (9%) 11

Total 9 3 10 6 28

If the fight b r e a k s o u t w h e r e belligerent g r o u p s are already large, these g r o u p s override any audience effects; in effect, these fighters bring along their o w n s u p p o r t i v e audiences (since in fact only a p r o p o r t i o n of the g r o u p takes a really active p a r t in the fighting). This helps explain the few a n o m a l i e s in the p r i o r p a r a g r a p h s , which I have italicized. In one case the audience is fearful, b u t a serious fight occurs nevertheless: this is a p o p u l a r concert w h e r e t w o rival g r o u p s of s k i n h e a d s invade the mosh pit from o p p o s i t e sides, scattering the usual m o s h c r s ; these are g r o u p s of twenty to thirty fighters, ignoring a n d frightening the c r o w d of several h u n d r e d fans. T h e audience does n o t m a t t e r when the fighting g r o u p s are large.

T h u s in the total of eighty-nine cases, there are only t w o real a n o m a l i e s . In one case (italicized earlier) audience intervention fails: this is the inci- d e n t described in c h a p t e r 1, w h e r e t w o preadolescent boys scuffle in and a r o u n d the car as their family a t t e m p t s to leave for an o u t i n g . T h e other a n o m a l y is a m o n g the cases w h e r e there is serious violence a n d a neutral audience, but the g r o u p is small instead of large: three y o u n g w h i t e men, cruising the deserted night-time streets of a small western t o w n , flag d o w n a n o t h e r car, a n d t w o of t h e m beat up the driver, w h o m they accuse of being a d r u g i n f o r m a n t to the police. Family violence does n o t depend on audience effects; n o r a p p a r e n t l y do o n g o i n g personal v e n d e t t a s . 9

T h e audience n o t only influences w h e t h e r a fight will be serious, mild, or a b o r t i v e , b u t it also determines w h e t h e r it is in the fair-fight m o d e . In establishing the p o i n t , I have begged t h e prior question: w h y does an audience t a k e one stance or a n o t h e r ? We are n o t yet in a p o s i t i o n for an answer, b u t w e will r e t u r n t o the p o i n t .

Social limits on fighting c o m e in a p a c k a g e , including n o t only w h a t f i g h t e r s d o t o each other, b u t w h a t the audience will a n d will n o t d o t o

Staging Fair Fights • 205

the fighters, a n d w h a t the fighters can do to the audience. In a staged fair fight, t h e audience has in effect agreed n o t to intervene in t h e fight, at least n o t t o any considerable extent; a n d t h e f i g h t e r s d o n o t a t t a c k t h e audience. T h e r e are degrees of intervention, but these are usually c u s t o m - ary, a n d a l t h o u g h their b o u n d a r i e s are n o t s h a r p they are self-policed by the g r o u p . Audiences n o r m a l l y intervene in a fair fight by cheering o n e side a n d jeering t h e other. As t h e h e a t of t h e fight builds u p , t h e c r o w d m a y b e c o m e m o r e e n t r a i n e d i n it, u n d e r g o i n g vicarious p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h o n e side a n d vilification of t h e other; a n d this m a y lead to violations of t h e limits. J u s t h o w these violations occur a n d are h a n d l e d is revealing. Typically the w o r s t violations occur at crucial m o m e n t s of a fight; b u t even t h e r e t h e c r o w d is divided—a small m i n o r i t y of zealots m a y t h r o w things at their favorite's o p p o n e n t , b u t rarely e n o u g h to i m p e d e the ac- tion; a n d the majority o f the c r o w d a l m o s t always w a n t s the f i g h t t o p r o - ceed on its o w n t e r m s . 1 0

P r o p e r etiquette is n o t always followed, of c o u r s e , a n d a g r e e d - u p o n limitations are sometimes transgressed. L o o k i n g at such instances is a g o o d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l tactic for a sociologist, for violations are always revealing of the m e c h a n i s m t h a t u p h o l d s n o r m a l conformity. Consider first the processes t h a t are set in m o t i o n w h e n audience/fighter b o u n d a r i e s are seriously violated. Small violations are dealt w i t h by t o l e r a n c e or by m i n o r a d j u s t m e n t s , as long as their r e m a i n i n g small conveys a sense t h a t the p e r p e t r a t o r s still have a limit: t h a t is, they h a v e m o v e d the b o u n d a r y , b u t t h e y signal t h a t t h e r e is still a b o u n d a r y , or t h a t the shift is only t e m p o - rary. Large violations, however, are t h o s e t h a t t h r e a t e n the entire framing of the fight, a n d these bring a s t r o n g r e a c t i o n .

An e x a m p l e from s t u d e n t r e p o r t , r e g a r d i n g a 1 9 9 7 event:

T h e f i g h t w a s between t w o high school girls, o n e Asian a n d o n e L a t i n o , on the front l a w n of t h e school. A c r o w d of 150 to 2 0 0 g a t h e r e d to w a t c h , w i t h t h e male friends of each girl at the center of the circle cheer- ing t h e m o n . T h e n a large black male from t h e s u r r o u n d i n g n e i g h b o r - h o o d b r o k e i n t o the circle, a n d p u n c h e d o n e of t h e Asian girl's friends, a small boy of a b o u t 5' 4" a n d 1 2 0 p o u n d s , p e r h a p s half the weight of his assailant.

T h e fight between the girls immediately s t o p p e d a n d the c r o w d surged a t the black m a n , p u s h i n g a n d p u n c h i n g h i m . H e m a n a g e d t o b r e a k t h r o u g h the c r o w d a n d r a n into the street, w i t h the c r o w d following him. Five minutes later, several police cars pulled u p , w i t h the black m a n u n d e r arrest. T h e Asian b o y w a s called to identify his assailant; the students c r o w d e d a r o u n d to get a glimpse. T h e r e were cheers a n d s h o u t s o f self-congratulation: " y e a h , t h a t ' s h i m " " w e got h i m " ; f i n g e r s pointed at the captive, and a few students tried to push by the police

2 0 6 • Chapter 6

to t h r o w a p u n c h at him (no d o u b t feeling quite safe u n d e r the circum- stances, since the officers held their g r o u n d , and s o o n drove off with the arrestee).

T h e audience tacitly agreed to stay out of the initial fight, as well as to help p r o m o t e it; w h e n the fight was interrupted by an outsider, a different m o d e of fighting c a m e into o p e r a t i o n : no longer a staged fair fight, but a moralistic g r o u p attack on the deviant outsider."

A m o r e complex e x a m p l e is the heavyweight prize fight between Mike Tyson a n d Evander Holyfield in 1 9 9 7 . H e r e , several kinds of limits are violated: the n o r m a l p r o c e d u r e s of fair fighting between the fighters, a n d then the fighter/audience b o u n d a r y . Tyson, w h o had the r e p u t a t i o n of a t h u g , high in muscle a n d low in intelligence a n d sophistication, h a d once been considered invincible, but in recent years his career had gone d o w n - hill. N o w he w a s losing a r e m a t c h to a fighter w h o h a d already beaten him once. D u r i n g a clinch in r o u n d t h r e e , Tyson bit off a piece of Holy- field's ear. Holyfield w a s furious. T h e n o r m a l level of anger and aggres- sion of a p u m p e d - u p prize fighter w e n t t h r o u g h the roof. W h a t did he do? H e h o p p e d a r o u n d the ring, gesticulating w i t h his raised a r m s , h o w l - ing w i t h anger. He did n o t close in on Tyson, escalating the violence i n t o a frenzy of b l o w s ; he did n o t a t t e m p t to p u n i s h Tyson physically at all. He p u n i s h e d h i m in a m u c h s t r o n g e r sense: he refused to c o n t i n u e to fight h i m . He applied the u l t i m a t e s a n c t i o n of a fair fight: he excluded t h e offender from m e m b e r s h i p . Holyfield, w h o h a d been w i n n i n g the f i g h t , gave off no sense of b a c k i n g d o w n from his o p p o n e n t ; he gestured t o w a r d h i m repeatedly, b u t w i t h scorn, in high d u d g e o n , keeping his distance as if from s o m e o n e p o l l u t e d . T h e c r o w d a n d t h e officials w e r e also i n d i g n a n t (Los Angeles Times, J u n e 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 ; San Diego Union Tribune, J u n e 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 ) . T h e incident w a s i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y r e g a r d e d as a s c a n d a l , the m o s t serious of Tyson's s c a n d a l - r i d d e n career (more serious, for in- stance, t h a n conviction for r a p e ) .

Violation of the etiquette of fair fighting is n o t a m a t t e r of sheer d a m a g e d o n e or p a i n inflicted. A perfectly fair fight could involve being hit in t h e face a n d eyes, resulting in blindness, b r a i n d a m a g e , excruciatingly c r u s h e d cartilage a n d b o n e , even d e a t h . Beaten fighters t a k e such p u n i s h - m e n t as a m a t t e r of n o r m a l risk. H a v i n g a piece of one's ear bitten off is p r o b a b l y a m i n o r p a i n in c o m p a r i s o n to some of these; b u t it is u n e x - pected, o u t of b o u n d s , a m o r a l violation w h e r e t h e others are n o t . It is this t h a t p r o d u c e s the o u t r a g e . U n d e r n e a t h it, the e m o t i o n a l dynamics m a y well be t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear, so successfully b a n n e d even from very p u n i s h i n g violence by s h a r e d rituals, is n o w being allowed to creep b a c k in. T h u s the aftermath of the 1 9 9 7 Tyson-Holyfield fight w a s also u n u s u a l : T h e c r o w d spilling o u t of t h e a r e n a in a Las Vegas casino

S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s • 2 0 7

became hysterical; scuffles and r u m o r s of gunfire (later found to be u n s u b - stantiated) set off p a n i c k y rushes t h r o u g h the lobbies a n d g a m i n g a r e a s , t u r n i n g over tables a n d hospitalizing forty p e r s o n s w i t h injuries. Police at one p o i n t d r e w guns a n d o r d e r e d p e o p l e to the floor, t h e n closed the ca- sino a n d s u r r o u n d i n g streets for several h o u r s . T h e b r e a k d o w n of n o r m a l order, for a t i m e , w a s c o n t a g i o u s .

T h e audience also sanctions a fighter w h o gives u p , w h o acts blatantly cowardly, or w h o ends the fight w i t h o u t an a p p r o p r i a t e w a y of t a k i n g his p u n i s h m e n t . This is o n e circumstance in w h i c h the audience is considered justified in intervening in the fight: again, they are n o t intervening inside the frame of the fight, b u t intervening to p u n i s h a b r e a k in the frame. It is n o t a b l e t h a t the fighter w h o quits m a y still be stronger, a n d m o r e d a n - g e r o u s , t h a n the m e m b e r s of the audience; b u t on such occasions, it is u n h e a r d of for the fighter to fight back against t h e audience t h a t is at- tacking h i m . He is t o o crestfallen to retaliate; the e m o t i o n a l energy of the situation has flowed a w a y from h i m , a n d he becomes a passive victim of his collective fate.

F I G H T I N G S C H O O L S A N D F I G H T I N G M A N N E R S

H e r o e s , b o t h as icons a n d as real a c t o r s , are p r o d u c t s of social s t r u c t u r e . T h e m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l conditions include an audience, a m e a n s of keeping t r a c k of r e p u t a t i o n a l r a n k i n g s , a n d a stock of ritualized p r o c e d u r e s for staging the fights themselves. As we have seen in the e x a m p l e s at the outset of this chapter, such fights are explicitly a n n o u n c e d a n d scheduled; times a n d places are set, often including an ending time; stakes are a n n o u n c e d , honorific t o k e n s are recognized a n d agreed u p o n ; w e a p o n s a n d tactics m a y be specified or limited. As states became better organized a n d pene- t r a t e d i n t o c o n t r o l of everyday life, staged fights b e c o m e u n i m p o r t a n t as a w a y of carrying o u t serious military conflict; b u t they survive in at least t w o forms: in t h e u n p e n e t r a t e d interstices of social life, w h e r e unofficial c o m m u n i t i e s w o r k o u t their o w n hierarchies; b u t also in officially recog- nized, highly s t r u c t u r e d types of fights, t r e a t e d as e x h i b i t i o n s , t r a i n i n g , or special displays of r a n k .

W h e r e the society has an explicit status g r o u p stratification in t h e We- berian sense, such as a r i s t o c r a t s or gentlemen in c o n t r a s t to c o m m o n e r s , there is often an honorific form of fighting confined to the u p p e r - s t a t u s g r o u p . T h e rituals of f i ght i ng are themselves status m a r k e r s ; t h o s e w h o p e r f o r m t h e m get status recognition from each o t h e r a n d their audiences; lower-status p e r s o n s are refused p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r e b y m a r k i n g the verti- cal b o u n d a r y . W h e n a conflict arises between higher- a n d lower-status p e r s o n s , the lower is n o t a c c o r d e d ritual h o n o r s in fighting, b u t m a y be

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p e r e m p t o r i l y chastised by t h e h i g h - r a n k i n g , or h a n d e d over to underlings to be t h r a s h e d . In the Iliad (Book 2 ) , w h e n a disrespectful c o m m o n e r (Thersites) intrudes i n t o t h e dispute of the Greek chiefs in council, he is s u m m a r i l y beaten w i t h a staff by one of t h e heroes, while the others laugh. In T o k u g a w a J a p a n , a s a m u r a i h a d the privilege of p e r e m p t o r i l y cutting d o w n w i t h his s w o r d a n y c o m m o n e r w h o affronted him; w h e n t w o s a m u - rai clashed, however, they fought a ritual duel (Ikegami 1 9 9 5 ) . In nine- teenth-century F r a n c e , gentlemen w h o h a d been p r o p e r l y challenged fought w i t h s w o r d s or pistols; b u t a m a n considered u n w o r t h y w o u l d be merely beaten w i t h a c a n e , or even kicked a n d t h r o w n o u t by the gentle- m a n ' s a t t e n d a n t s (Nye 1 9 9 3 : 1 7 9 , 2 0 9 ) .

Dueling a n d other forms of single c o m b a t have been carried o u t w i t h a variety of w e a p o n s a n d t echni ques : spears, s w o r d s , knives, pistols, fists, a n d in o t h e r w a y s . These techniques a n d skills w i t h w e a p o n s are typically a m a t t e r for explicit t r a i n i n g , a m o n g the historically earliest kinds of schooling h a v e been fight t r a i n i n g , 1 2 a n d schools for v a r i o u s kinds of fighting or m a r t i a l arts h a v e c o n t i n u e d up to the present, outside the orga- nizational p u r v i e w of m o r e c o n v e n t i o n a l forms of e d u c a t i o n . Schools for teaching fighting techniques are n o t just ancillary to the formalized duel- ing c u l t u r e , b u t often its chief c o m p o n e n t .

Fighting a n d w e a p o n s schools were o n e of the chief places w h e r e the ritual etiquette of single c o m b a t w a s t a u g h t . This can be seen t o d a y in c o n t e m p o r a r y schools of m a r t i a l arts (which are chiefly in the J a p a n e s e , K o r e a n , a n d ultimately Chinese t r a d i t i o n s ) . Pupils d o n a special c o s t u m e ; they w e a r colored belts or o t h e r emblems m a r k i n g their r a n k proficiency; they give deference to others of higher r a n k ; they ceremoniously b o w while h o l d i n g o u t their fists at entry a n d exit p o i n t s of the fighting p r a c - tice: at the front d o o r of the exercise hall; w h e n stepping o n t o or off of the exercise m a t ; w h e n beginning a b o u t or training exercise w i t h a n o t h e r p u p i l , they b o w to each other, a n d again at the end of t h e b o u t . 1 3 T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t effects of these rituals, performed at every session a n d often at n u m e r o u s times d u r i n g it, are to set off the fighting activity as a special, sacred space, s e p a r a t e from the profane w o r l d outside; to limit a n d c o n s t r a i n the fighting to a specific p r o c e d u r e , w i t h i n clearly m a r k e d beginning a n d ending p o i n t s ; a n d t o express m u t u a l h o n o r a n d shared m e m b e r s h i p between those w h o ritually f i g h t each other. T h e f i g h t i n g techniques m a y be t o u t e d as quite deadly: a kick or p u n c h is s u p p o s e d to be able to b r e a k w o o d e n b o a r d s , a n d to kill a h u m a n o p p o n e n t ; in t r a i n - ing fights, the p u n c h e s are designed to c o m e w i t h i n a tiny distance of smashing their target; a n d skilled fighters are s u p p o s e d to evade a n d block these deadly a t t a c k s . T h e deadliness is at the same time an artificial g a m e , k e p t w i t h i n precise b o u n d s . 1 4

S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s • 2 0 9

Etiquette and technique have c o m p a r a b l e p a t t e r n s in other kinds of fighting schools (Nye 1 9 9 3 ; McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 1 1 9 - 5 8 ; T w a i n 1 8 8 0 / 1 9 7 7 : 2 6 - 5 0 ) . T h e rules for fighting w i t h s w o r d s of various kinds (single cut- ting-edged sabers, p o i n t e d r a p i e r s , heavier epees, etc.) included n o t just the techniques o f h o w t o p a r r y defensively a n d m a n e u v e r a r o u n d such defenses offensively, b u t also saluting one a n o t h e r before a n d after a fight; scoring hits a n d p o i n t s (including the famous " t o u c h e " u t t e r e d in g o o d s p o r t s m a n s h i p b y the m a n w h o has been t o u c h e d ) ; t a k i n g b r e a k s a n d starting again; c o u n t i n g w o u n d s a n d deciding w h a t i s a n h o n o r a b l e a m o u n t of b l o o d s h e d . In G e r m a n university dueling clubs, w h i c h flour- ished in t h e nineteenth century, students were p a d d e d up to the chin a n d w o r e protective goggles, a n d aimed at giving—and a b o v e all receiving— a n h o n o r a b l e scar o n t h e face o r h e a d . T h e m e m b e r s h i p e m b l e m w a s n o t t h a t of victor, b u t of ritually injured p a r t i c i p a n t . Boxing a n d other train- ing schools similarly t a u g h t b o t h the a c t u a l techniques of fighting a n d the rules of h o w figh t s start a n d end. H o w m u c h physical d a m a g e c o u n t e d as sufficient to e n d a fight h a s varied greatly over the centuries, b u t t h e basic p a t t e r n of explicitly scheduled, explicitly r u l e - b o u n d e d fighting is c h a r a c - teristic of fighting schools everywhere, a n d t h u s of the kinds of fighting outside w h i c h these schools p r o m o t e . l j

W h e n staged fights are seriously enacted, the code is explicitly a n d re- peatedly a n n o u n c e d . Such fights are a l m o s t w i t h o u t exception carried o u t before audiences; even in t h e p a s t w h e n a quasi-illegal duel w a s carried o u t in seclusion, t h e r e w e r e always s e c o n d s — w h o at first w e r e called " w i t n e s s e s " (McAleer 1 9 9 3 : 2 2 3 ) — a n d these sometimes e x p a n d e d i n t o a considerable e n t o u r a g e . Participants generally stated the rules they will abide by, at the outset of the fight, or at the t i m e w h e n the challenge w a s m a d e a n d accepted. This does n o t m e a n they always ab id ed b y the rules, b u t violation w e r e considered m o r e d i s h o n o r a b l e t h a n w h a t e v e r started the q u a r r e l in the first place (Nye 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e fight schools, a b o v e all, w e r e centered o n reiterating the p r o p e r etiquette; their practice f i g h t s , w h a t e v e r level of c o m p e t e n c e they m a y involve in fighting skill, were always ori- ented t o w a r d following t h e r o u t i n e of p r o p e r beginnings, endings, a n d deference to fellow p a r t i c i p a n t s . 1 6

T h e q u a n t i t a t i v e h i g h p o i n t i n dueling w a s i n E u r o p e i n t h e late nine- t e e n t h century. A s w e shall see i n detail m o m e n t a r i l y , s o m e t w o h u n d r e d to t h r e e h u n d r e d duels a year w e r e f o u g h t in F r a n c e , a n d also in Italy, while in G e r m a n y p e r h a p s a t h i r d as m a n y . But these events w e r e d w a r f e d by t h e p o p u l a r i t y of dueling s c h o o l s , halls, a n d societies. In G e r m a n y , every u n i v e r s i t y h a d its dueling c o r p s w i t h several h u n d r e d m e m b e r s , of w h o m s o m e t o o k p a r t in staged b o u t s several days a w e e k . In F r a n c e , t h e r e w e r e d o z e n s of fencing halls t o t a l i n g t h o u s a n d s of m e m - b e r s , as well as s h o o t i n g societies (Nye 1 9 9 3 : 1 5 7 - 6 6 ) . Paris n e w s p a p e r s

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a n d d e p a r t m e n t stores h a d p r i v a t e fencing halls for their e m p l o y e e s . M e m b e r s w o r k e d o u t o n a r e g u l a r basis, i n p a r t t o p u t i n a n a p p e a r a n c e at a f a s h i o n a b l e social scene. Public fencing e x h i b i t i o n s — c a l l e d "as- saults"—were held weekly, a n d elegant g e n t l e m e n w o u l d h o l d t h e m as evening e n t e r t a i n m e n t s a t their h o m e s . W i n n e r s a n d losers w e r e n o t de- clared in these b o u t s ; t h e a i m w a s a display of c o r r e c t n e s s , a l o n g w i t h a flashy style. All t o l d , t h e a m o u n t of s u c h display fencing m u s t h a v e greatly exceeded t h e n u m b e r of duels.

At times, fighting schools a n d exhibitions h a v e been w h e r e virtually all of the fighting takes place. In T o k u g a w a J a p a n , s a m u r a i schools w e r e w h e r e the Bushido c o d e — t h e " w a y of t h e w a r r i o r " — w a s m o s t fully de- veloped. In t h e p e r i o d of w a r f a r e before this era of pacification, s a m u r a i h a d codes t h a t emphasized chiefly hierarchical loyalty to their m a s t e r s ; n o w as s a m u r a i became a leisured status g r o u p , they shifted to a c o d e of p e r s o n a l h o n o r (Ikegami 1 9 9 5 ) . Sword-fighting became ritualized at just the time w h e n the centralizing state prevented their military use. Leading s w o r d teachers became famous for their writings a b o u t t h e p h i l o s o p h y of Bushido; some infused it w i t h Z e n , others became p r o m i n e n t p h i l o s o - p h e r s w h o developed a cult of Confucian " a n c i e n t l e a r n i n g " (Collins 1 9 9 8 : 3 5 0 - 5 8 ; K a m m e r 1 9 6 9 ) . By no m e a n s did all s a m u r a i discard their military identities; b u t the m a r t i a l art t h a t they n o w practiced w a s m o r e a scholastic enterprise t h a n a practical o n e . S a m u r a i spent far m o r e time at their s w o r d academies t h a n in fighting duels to t h e d e a t h .

This w a s also the case w i t h the chivalric joust in E u r o p e , an exhibition of single c o m b a t by heavily a r m o r e d h o r s e m e n , ch arg in g at each o t h e r w i t h lances along adjacent lanes of p r e p a r e d t r a c k . J o u s t i n g w a s p o p u l a r d u r i n g the fourteenth t h r o u g h sixteenth centuries, a t i m e w h e n armies were becoming c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o m a s s infantries, a n d even h o r s e m e n fought in melees r a t h e r t h a n individually (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 1 6 - 1 8 ; Bloch 1 9 6 1 ) . Indeed, single c o m b a t s h a d never m a d e m u c h difference in real battles, from the time of the Greek city-states o n w a r d ; even the b a r b a r i a n coalitions of the early M i d d l e Ages fought in large g r o u p s ; a n d as we have seen in c h a p t e r 3, m o s t victories o c c u r r e d because o n e side became t a n - gled in its o w n d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n . Chivalry w a s always an artificial con- s t r u c t i o n , nostalgic in its ideology, b u t very c o n t e m p o r a r y in its social a p p e a l : used m o r e to legitimize the status of newly h a r d e n i n g lines of aristocratic r a n k in social relationships, r a t h e r t h a n for fighting on the battlefield. Even private struggles over precedence w e r e carried o u t n o t by single c o m b a t s , b u t by p r i v a t e armies or e n t o u r a g e s of followers m a i n - t a i n e d by e m i n e n t lords (Stone 1 9 6 7 ) .

This is n o t to say t h a t all forms of artificial single c o m b a t were a r c h a - isms; they m i g h t be invented c o m p a r a t i v e l y recently, or w i t h o u t d r a w i n g u p o n class precedents. Boxing became a favorite form of exercise a m o n g

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upper-middle-class males in England and the United States during the late n i n e t e e n t h a n d early t w e n t i e t h centuries (not in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , w h e r e older forms of dueling or fight t r a i n i n g schools still survived). Such gentle- m e n w e r e n o t professional competitive b o x e r s ; t h e latter were always identified w i t h t h e l o w e r classses. 1 7 Like T o k u g a w a s a m u r a i , g e n t l e m a n b o x e r s spent m u c h m o r e time i n practice b o u t s t h a n i n p u b l i c f i s t i c u f f s . Similarly again w i t h k a r a t e , kung-fu, a n d o t h e r m a r t i a l arts s t u d e n t s of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . 1 8 These schools, in fact, were generally n o t very ancient. A i k i d o w a s invented i n J a p a n a t the t u r n o f t h e t w e n t i e t h century; s o w a s k e n d o — p r a c t i c e f i g h t i n g w i t h w o o d e n s w o r d s , a t t h e time w h e n real s w o r d s w e r e replaced in t h e J a p a n e s e a r m y by m o d e r n guns (Draeger 1 9 7 4 ) . Fighting ceremonies b e c o m e m o r e e l a b o r a t e as fighting becomes less of a practical c o n c e r n .

F o r o u r analytical p u r p o s e s , a chief effect of fight t r a i n i n g schools is to o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. T h e y p r o v i d e a p a t h w a y a r o u n d this obstacle to violence because t h e focus of a t t e n t i o n is so m u c h on o t h e r aspects t h a n t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself: on the etiquette, t h e limits of t i m e a n d place, t h e starting a n d s t o p p i n g p o i n t s . A b o v e all, t h e focus is on t h e social m e m b e r s h i p s h a r e d by fighters by virtue of these rituals; a n d on the elite social s t a n d i n g of t h o s e w h o enact t h e ritualism. T h e r e is m u c h m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l c o n c e r n for a p p e a r i n g p r o p e r l y before an audience, a n d t h e r e b y rising a b o v e the audience.

C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear is s w a l l o w e d up in t w o w a y s : first, in the larger r e s o n a n c e of t h e c r o w d a n d its elevation of the fighter (indeed, b o t h fighters simultaneously) i n t o the e m o t i o n a l center of a t t e n t i o n . A n d it is s w a l l o w e d up in the sense of solidarity b e t w e e n the fighters, precisely because t h e y are ensconced inside the same ritualism. N o d o u b t some tension/fear m a y still r e m a i n ; i n b o t h the R a s h a d / D a w s o n a n d t h e f i c - tional Achilles/Hector b o u t s , one side d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y gets the e m o - t i o n a l energy of t h e s i t u a t i o n , the other slides d o w n h i l l into fear or p a r a l y - sis. But even this e m o t i o n a l inequality is an a p p o r t i o n i n g o u t of the c o m m o n charge of EE; a n d this is w h a t gets the o p p o n e n t s p a s t the initial barrier of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension in the first place a n d i n t o the violence. A n d even if d u r i n g the course of t h e fight o n e of the fighters s u r r e n d e r s to tension/fear as the o t h e r m o n o p o l i z e s t h e s i t u a t i o n a l energy, ritual p r o - cedures at the end of t h e fight will pull the loser back i n t o solidarity w i t h t h e winner, a n d i n t o the esteem of the a u d i e n c e .

In the t r a i n i n g school, even this vestige of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear is minimized. T h e e m p h a s i s is on t h e rituals of m e m b e r s h i p , a n d on the artificiality—the make-believe quality—of t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n . It becomes p a l p a b l y a c o n f r o n t a t i o n for the sake of experiencing t h e solidarity of m e m b e r s h i p a n d t h e status of fighters, a hero-elite m a r k e d off from t h e rest of the world by being inside the training enclave.

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D I S P L A Y I N G R I S K A N D M A N I P U L A T I N G D A N G E R I N S W O R D

A N D P I S T O L D U E L S

Dueling w a s tied to fencing schools from t h e o u t s e t of its classic p e r i o d . Individual dueling, as distinct from g r o u p b r a w l s or v e n d e t t a s , began to develop in the sixteenth century in Italy a n d F r a n c e . By the 1 5 9 0 s it w a s b e c o m i n g s o m e t h i n g of a fad in E n g l a n d (Kiernan 1 9 8 8 ; Peltonen 2 0 0 3 ; N y e 1 9 9 3 ; McAleer 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e practice of dueling w a s spread by soldiers, especially mercenaries, b u t it acquired the c o n n o t a t i o n of a practice of courtiers, a n d t h u s of fashionable courtesy a n d m a n n e r s . It w a s associated w i t h the newly literate a n d increasingly centralizing princely c o u r t s , dis- placing the r u r a l castles of feudal lords a n d their p r i v a t e armies.

T h e duels t h a t t a k e place i n S h a k e s p e a r e ' s p l a y s t h u s w e r e r a t h e r a n o v e l t y for their a u d i e n c e , w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e s a m e c o u r t i e r s w h o w e r e t a k i n g up t h e n e w p r a c t i c e . D u e l i n g w a s n o t only a staged fair fight; at first, it w a s q u i t e literally staged. In Romeo and Juliet, t h e p l o t hinges u p o n a r a p i e r duel in w h i c h R o m e o kills Tybalt in revenge for killing his c o u s i n M e r c u t i o , t h e r e b y u p s e t t i n g his love m a t c h w i t h T y b a l t ' s cousin; in fact this is still a t r a n s i t i o n a l p a t t e r n , m i x i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l duel w i t h t h e g r o u p v e n d e t t a . O n c e t h e dueling c o d e w a s firmly established, d e a t h in a duel w a s n o t s o m e t h i n g a n y o n e c o u l d or s h o u l d avenge; a n d i n d e e d t h e duel itself e n d e d w h a t e v e r insult h a d s t a r t e d it. Romeo and Juliet w a s first p e r f o r m e d a b o u t 1 5 9 3 ; b y 1 6 0 1 w h e n Hamlet w a s p r e s e n t e d , t h e rules o f t h e duel t h a t b r i n g t h a t p l a y t o a n e n d a r e closer t o their c a n o n i c a l f o r m . 1 5

Dueling w a s carried o u t w i t h a light s w o r d , n o t t h e heavy battle w e a p o n ; fashion t u r n e d t o the needle-pointed rapier, w h i c h h a d n o cutting edge; it w a s in fact a w e a p o n useless in military c o m b a t , b u t it w a s light a n d easy to c a r r y as p a r t of o n e ' s n o r m a l upper-class attire. A r a p i e r h a d no effect against armor, b u t in civilian life it h a d the p o t e n t i a l for a deep p e n e t r a t i n g w o u n d to a vital o r g a n . It signaled t h a t one w a s always r e a d y for a fight u p o n m o m e n t a r y p r o v o c a t i o n ; this readiness w a s c o n n e c t e d to polite social intercourse, since t h e rules of politeness w e r e just t h o s e w h o s e violation w a s r e g a r d e d as calling for a duel. But dueling w a s forbid- den a t c o u r t s , w h i c h w e r e a t t e m p t i n g t o i m p o s e pacification; a n d t h u s w e a r i n g a rapier w a s chiefly an item of self-presentation; o n e rarely fought on the spot, b u t a r r a n g e d an occasion on w h i c h to fight, safely o u t of view of the a u t h o r i t i e s . 2 0 Sword duels t h u s became fencing m a t c h e s , ac- c o m p a n y i n g a v o g u e of upper-class fencing schools a n d private fencing m a s t e r s , w h i c h w e r e the a b o v e - g r o u n d a n d indeed t h e m o s t typical m a n i - festation of the dueling cul t ur e. T h e first fencing school in England w a s

1 i - r n i - r i v ,-,-plinr -̂,in" irir-MMi:i'-M--rv

Staging Fair Fights • 2 1 3

established in 1 5 7 6 , followed by even m o r e fashionable schools in the 1 5 9 0 s , just as dueling t o o k off (Peltonen 2 0 0 3 : 6 2 ) .

Pistols began t o s u p p l a n t s w o r d s a r o u n d t h e 1 7 4 0 s a n d 1 7 5 0 s , a n d h a d fully displaced t h e m by a r o u n d 1 7 9 0 in E n g l a n d , Ireland, a n d America; in France a n d Italy, fighting w i t h r a p i e r or epee (its n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y version) r e m a i n e d fashionable d o w n to W o r l d War I, a l t h o u g h pistol duels also existed; in G e r m a n y a distinctive form of limited dueling, using sabers (i.e., edged r a t h e r t h a n needle-pointed swords) w a s also popular, b u t pis- tols w e r e preferred in serious cases.

T h e social formalities a n d courtesies of d u e l i n g , established d u r i n g t h e r a p i e r era, c o n t i n u e d a n d indeed w e r e e l a b o r a t e d i n t o the pistol era. P r o p e r e t i q u e t t e included the challenge: v e r b a l insults a n d r e j o i n d e r s , including a f o r m u l a i c "You lie!" (a c h a r g e t h a t did n o t necessarily imply t h e telling of an u n t r u t h ) , a n d s o m e t i m e s a slap on t h e face w i t h o n e ' s g l o v e s — w e a r i n g gloves being p a r t of a g e n t l e m a n ' s p r o p e r a t t i r e . Sec- o n d s w e r e d e s i g n a t e d , w h o t h e n c o n f e r r e d t o a r r a n g e t h e t i m e a n d p l a c e , choice of w e a p o n s a n d p r o c e d u r e s . Seconds also served as witnesses for t h e p r o p e r e n d i n g : if b o t h s h o t s in a pistol duel missed, t h e p r i n c i p a l s usually d e c l a r e d themselves satisfied; if o n e w a s w o u n d e d , he w o u l d be t e n d e d b y a d o c t o r w h o m t h e seconds usually b r o u g h t a l o n g . O n e m i g h t b e killed, b u t this w a s n o t t h e only w a y t h e duel c o u l d e n d . T h e r i t u a l w a s just as m u c h a w a y of b r i n g i n g a q u a r r e l to an end, w i t h relatively m i n i m a l b l o o d s h e d , as of displaying anger a n d getting " s a t i s f a c t i o n " for an insult. In this respect, a pistol duel c o u l d be m o r e forgiving t h a n a s w o r d f i g h t , w h e r e a t a m i n i m u m s o m e w o u n d s w e r e r e q u i r e d , a n d s t o p - p i n g p o i n t s w e r e n o t as clear a n d d r a m a t i c as t h e firing of a s h o t , al- t h o u g h by t h e 1 8 3 0 s the practice e m e r g e d of e n d i n g a s w o r d duel at t h e first d r a w i n g of b l o o d .

Participating in t h e dueling ritual w a s a m a r k of elite status. O n e needed t o k n o w t h e p r o p e r etiquette, a n d (from the late 1700s o n w a r d ) t o have access to a set of dueling pistols. T h e p r o t o c o l followed m a n y p o i n t s of polite society: exchanging calling c a r d s so t h a t one's seconds could m a k e c o n t a c t ; carrying gloves; punctilious (if also sardonic) courtesy of speech. T h e dueling place itself w a s referred to as " t h e field of h o n o r . " Seconds m u s t be gentlemen; a n d t h u s assembling seconds on each side w a s a w a y to ratify m e m b e r s h i p in n e t w o r k s of high status. Seconds served to v o u c h for the elite social r e p u t a t i o n of the principals, a n d to c o n t r o l the violence a n d distinguish it from an unseemly b r a w l of the lower classes. Possibly a challenge m i g h t fail because o n e could n o t p r o d u c e acceptable seconds. An extremely h i g h - r a n k i n g p e r s o n could n o t be challenged, in any case; a great l o r d w o u l d n o t fight w i t h mere gentry; a general w o u l d n o t fight w i t h l o w e r officers (although he m i ght , as in the G e r m a n army, prescribe t h a t subalterns sh o ul d duel), a n d in fact m o s t duels t o o k place a m o n g the

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j u n i o r officers (Peltonen 2 0 0 3 : 8 3 , 2 0 5 ; K i e r n a n 1 9 8 8 : 1 0 3 ; McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 1 1 4 - 1 7 ) . In t h e early years of the United States, General A n d r e w J a c k s o n could t u r n d o w n a challenge from a y o u n g civilian w i t h o u t loss of face (Wyatt-Brown 1 9 8 2 : 3 3 5 - 3 6 ) .

Duels in principle always carried t h e risk of d e a t h . But the statistical p a t t e r n , such as we can estimate it, s h o w s a p a r a d o x i c a l character: in general, the m o r e frequent t h e dueling, t h e less likely it w a s to be deadly or even injurious. In the late nineteenth century, G e r m a n duels w e r e by far t h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s ; b u t even h e r e , the fatality r a t e w a s a b o u t 2 0 percent; t w o - t h i r d s of G e r m a n duels ended in b l o o d s h e d . M o s t of these were pistol duels a m o n g military officers, w h e r e the frequency can be estimated a t a r o u n d ten t o fifteen per year a t the l o w end, u p t o a r o u n d seventy-five per year at t h e high end. For F r a n c e at t h e fin-de-siecle, t h e d e a t h r a t e never exceeded 3 percent, a n d in some years w a s 0.5 percent or below; at the high p o i n t of the 1 8 9 0 s , duels w e r e being fought (usually w i t h swords) at a r a t e of t w o h u n d r e d to t h r e e h u n d r e d p e r year. In Italy, from 1 8 8 0 t o 1 9 0 0 , a l m o s t 4 , 0 0 0 duels were r e c o r d e d (almost always w i t h s w o r d s ) , of w h i c h t w e n t y ended in d e a t h : w h i c h is to say, a b o u t 2 0 0 duels a year of w h i c h o n e or less (0.5 percent) w a s f a t a l . 2 1

In Ireland, we can t r a c e a rise in the p o p u l a r i t y of dueling from the early 1 7 0 0 s , w h e n t h e r e w e r e a b o u t ten to fifteen duels per d e c a d e , to a b o u t ten times as m a n y in t h e 1 7 7 0 s , t h e n falling off again s o m e w h a t t o w a r d 1 8 1 0 . Early o n , w h e n duels were r a r e a n d fought w i t h s w o r d s , 63 to 1 0 0 p e r c e n t of t h e m ended in d e a t h , a n d in t h e r e m a i n d e r s o m e o n e w a s a l m o s t always w o u n d e d . After mid-century, w h e n pistols s u p p l a n t e d s w o r d s , fatalities d r o p p e d t o 3 6 percent, declining further t o 2 2 percent at the end of the century, a n d p r o p o r t i o n s w o u n d e d d r o p p e d as well. T h e p o o r aim of pistol-firing w a s p a r t l y responsible for the decline in casual- ties. But also, a l t h o u g h it w a s hypothetically possible to keep on firing until s o m e o n e w a s hit, t h e p r o p o r t i o n of duels t h a t e n d e d after o n e r o u n d rose from 4 0 percent t o 7 0 percent (calculated from Kelly 1 9 9 5 : 8 0 - 8 3 , 1 1 8 - 2 0 , 2 1 3 - 1 4 ) .

We see a similar historical p a t t e r n elsewhere. In England, duels w e r e just b e c o m i n g institutionalized in the early 1 6 0 0 s ; a b o u t t w e n t y duels per year w e r e k n o w n , a n d fatality rates w e r e a p p a r e n t l y high (Peltonen 2 0 0 3 : 8 2 , 1 8 1 - 8 6 ; 2 0 2 ) . By the 1 6 6 0 s , an e l a b o r a t e etiquette of polite civility a n d its breaches w a s recognized, a n d challenges w e r e frequent; b u t w a y s of evading duels proliferated as well. By the 1 6 7 0 s , duelists w e r e satirized as fops d o i n g m o r e p r e t e n d i n g t h a n fighting—which is to say, w h e n duel- ing, or at least challenges to duels, became w i d e s p r e a d , p r o c e d u r e s for limiting t h e d a m a g e also developed. T h e p a t t e r n w a s r e p e a t e d again a s s w o r d fighting gave w a y to pistol dueling in the mid-eighteenth century: between 1762 a n d 1.821, the fatality rate w a s 40 percent; in the years

Staging Fair Fights • 2 1 5

leading up to t h e a b o l i t i o n of dueling in 1 8 4 0 , fatalities w e r e d o w n to 7 percent a n d w o u n d i n g s t o 1 7 percent (Nye 1 9 9 3 : 2 6 8 , referring t o Simp- son 1 9 8 8 ; K i e r n a n 1 9 8 8 : 143).

O v e r t i m e , dueling became m o r e a n d m o r e subject t o etiquette a n d fair play. In the early decades of the 1 7 0 0 s , in quasi-civilized places like Ire- land, seconds m i g h t still join in t h e fighting; this h a d also been the ten- dency in sixteenth-century Italy a n d early seventeenth-century E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e , w h e r e t h e distinction b e t w e e n g r o u p v e n d e t t a a n d individual duel w a s just being established (Peltonen 2 0 0 3 : 1 7 9 , 1 9 1 , 2 0 3 - 4 ) . B y the late 1 7 0 0 s , seconds h a d b e c o m e punctilious arbiters. I n military c o m b a t at this t i m e , t h e s m o o t h - b a r r e l m u s k e t w a s replaced by the rifled barrel, greatly i m p r o v i n g target accuracy; b u t rifling for pistol barrels w a s re- g a r d e d as u n s p o r t i n g in a dueling w e a p o n , especially in Britain. Similarly the hair-trigger of t h e n e w e r pistols w a s rejected as an unfair a d v a n t a g e (Kiernan 1 9 8 8 : 1 4 3 ) . Duelists stuck to o u t m o d e d w e a p o n s ; o w n i n g a p a i r of dueling pistols w a s b e c o m i n g a fashionable a r c h a i s m , similar to officers w e a r i n g a s w o r d as a badge of h o n o r in an era of m e c h a n i z e d c o m b a t . T h e very sense t h a t the w e a p o n s were o u t of d a t e also sent a message t h a t the fight h a d an element of make-believe.

T h e s a m e p a t t e r n m a y be t r a c e d in France. T h e n u m b e r of duels rose a r o u n d the t i m e of the 1 7 8 9 revolution, as the bourgeois claimed t h e previously aristocratic right to h o n o r a b l e fights. By t h e 1 8 3 0 s , w i t h im- p r o v e d pistol-firing m e c h a n i s m s (percussion caps having replaced older s p a r k - p r o d u c i n g flint-locks), fatalities w e r e a b o u t o n e - t h i r d of the a p - p r o x i m a t e l y eighty duels fought per year. In r e s p o n s e , a dueling c o d e w a s published a n d widely p r o m u l g a t e d in 1 8 3 7 , formalizing pistol as well as s w o r d - d u e l i n g etiquette, a n d p r o v i d i n g m a n y w a y s t o r e d u c e fatalities; i n t h e following y e a r s , d e a t h rates fell to a b o u t six a year, m a k i n g up 8 to 10 percent of t h e duels (Nye 1 9 9 3 : 1 3 5 ; McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 6 4 , 2 4 8 ) . In the T h i r d Republic (from 1 8 7 5 ) , dueling became extremely p o p u l a r as a m a r k of d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Politicians d e b a t i n g in the Assembly, a n d journalists t r a d i n g accusations, w e r e especially likely to settle their dis- p u t e s by duels. But these m e n in public life h a d no career a d v a n t a g e in actually killing a n y o n e , a n d in fact their duels were r a t h e r t a m e : d u r i n g the 1 8 8 0 s , of 108 political duels, there were no fatalities a n d only eleven (10 percent) p r o d u c e d serious injuries; of a b o u t t w o h u n d r e d j o u r n a l i s t s ' duels, there w e r e t w o d e a t h s (1 percent) a n d twelve serious injuries (6 p e r c e n t ) . So-called p r i v a t e duels, mostly concerning sexual affairs, w e r e m o r e d a n g e r o u s , b u t even here the casualty rates were low: 6 percent killed a n d 34 percent badly w o u n d e d o u t of a total of 85 (Nye 1 9 9 3 : 1 8 7 - 2 1 5 ) .

H o w w a s all this m a n a g e d ? H o w , in effect, w a s the risk of casualties adjusted to circumstances? Seconds had a wide range of c o n d i t i o n s to

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c h o o s e a m o n g . First of all, t h e y m i g h t a r r a n g e for a settlement, declaring a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , apology, or o t h e r e x t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . For this r e a s o n , a n older a n d experienced second w a s r e c o m m e n d e d , a n d y o u n g h o t - h e a d s w e r e t o b e avoided; one G e r m a n e x p e r t seconded s o m e f i f t y duels, of w h i c h only five c a m e to a c t u a l fighting, resulting in only t w o serious injuries. 2 2 Duels m i g h t also a b o r t for v a r i o u s p r o c e d u r a l r e a s o n s ; a challenge w a s s u p p o s e d to be delivered w i t h i n t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s after t h e alleged insult, a n d c o u l d be h o n o r a b l y disregarded if it c a m e later; the fight itself w a s to t a k e place w i t h i n a n o t h e r forty-eight h o u r s (usually early the n e x t m o r n i n g ) , a n d again if the deadline w a s missed, t h e fight w a s called off. If one of the duelists failed to a p p e a r w i t h i n fifteen m i n u t e s of the set t i m e , the o t h e r w a s n o t obliged to w a i t . A n d given the s h o r t notice, sometimes duels w e r e fought in heavy r a i n , badly o b s c u r i n g t h e a i m . In places w h e r e duels w e r e illegal, a duel could be evaded by t i p p i n g off t h e police. Alternatively, pistol misfires c o u n t e d as a r o u n d a n d e n d e d t h e m a t c h , unless further r o u n d s h a d been agreed u p o n b y t h e seconds (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 4 9 - 5 6 , 6 6 , 84).

Aside from these contingencies, the seconds could set p r o c e d u r e s t h a t m a d e t h e d a n g e r high or low. In pistol duels, choices involved t h e n u m b e r of shots to be fired, a n d at w h a t distance. T h e m o r e r o u n d s , of c o u r s e , the m o r e danger; o n e r o u n d o f exchanging f i r e w a s s t a n d a r d . C o n t i n u i n g u p t o four r o u n d s w a s considered very b l o o d y - m i n d e d , a l t h o u g h i n o n e duel b e t w e e n G e r m a n officers in 1 8 8 6 , twenty-seven shots w e r e fired, giving s o m e i n d i c a t i o n of p o o r a i m as well as perseverance (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 6 8 ; N y e 1 9 9 3 : 1 9 5 , 2 0 7 ) . T h e distance o f twenty-five paces w a s typical in F r a n c e , fifteen paces in G e r m a n y ; ten paces w a s severe, a n d five paces w a s p o i n t - b l a n k , even w i t h s m o o t h - b o r e pistols. O n the o t h e r h a n d , distances were often set as far as thirty-five paces or m o r e , especially in F r a n c e — o n e w a y i n w h i c h French casualty rates w e r e k e p t l o w . 2 3

T h e distance set also d e p e n d e d on t h e t y p e of dueling p r o c e d u r e (Mc- Aleer 1 9 9 4 : 7 0 - 7 5 ; N y e 1 9 9 3 : 1 9 5 , 2 0 7 , 2 6 9 ) . T h e m o s t p o p u l a r form w a s t h e so-called b a r r i e r duel, w h i c h b e g a n w i t h t h e o p p o n e n t s facing each o t h e r at a distance (e.g., ten or t w e n t y paces) b e h i n d a r e c t a n g u l a r b a r r i e r z o n e , m a r k e d w i t h stakes, usually five, ten, or fifteen paces w i d e . T h u s they began s o m e w h e r e between t h i r t y a n d f i f t y - f i v e y a r d s a p a r t ; these o p e n i n g distances w e r e n o t very d a n g e r o u s , b u t the duelists c o u l d increase the danger. A t t h e s t a r t signal, t h e y began w a l k i n g t o w a r d the barrier, a n d c o u l d fire at will. T h e one w h o fired first c o u l d w i n if he hit a n d disabled his o p p o n e n t ; b u t if he failed to d i s p a t c h h i m , he w o u l d be h o n o r - b o u n d t o s t a n d i n place, while t h e o t h e r h a d one m i n u t e t o a d v a n c e u p t o t h e barrier a n d t a k e careful a i m before h e shot.

A n o t h e r v a r i a n t , the "signal d u e l , " generally p u t the duelists closer b u t gave t h e m little time to aim; they b e g a n w i t h pistols d o w n , until t h e signal

I' •"•«'

S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s • 2 1 7

w a s given. W i t h i n the c o u n t of t h r e e , each w a s r e q u i r e d to raise his g u n , a i m , a n d fire; s h o o t i n g after t h e c o u n t of t h r e e w a s considered d i s h o n o r - able. M o r e o v e r , l a w c o u r t s in G e r m a n y (where dueling w a s illegal b u t tolerated) a n d in F r a n c e (where it w a s legal as long as the rules w e r e followed) placed great emphasis o n w h e t h e r t h e duelist w h o killed s o m e - o n e h a d followed the p r o p e r rules. T h e signal duel gave better chances of surviving by presenting a smaller target, since t h e duelists s t o o d in profile t o e a c h other, a n d afforded s o m e p r o t e c t i o n b y their a d v a n c e d a r m a n d shoulder. In c o n t r a s t , the barrier duel, a l t h o u g h in some way s less danger- o u s , r e q u i r e d the m e n t o s t a n d facing f o r w a r d . A n o t h e r w a y t o reduce the chances of g o o d aim w a s to line up back to back, a n d on signal, w h i r l a n d fire. M o r e d a n g e r could be i n t r o d u c e d in t h e "vise" (aimed) duel, w h i c h allowed b o t h sides a set a m o u n t of time (usually sixty seconds) to a i m a n d fire. This m i g h t t u r n i n t o a p r o l o n g e d s t a r e - d o w n , a real test of nerves; in a duel between H u n g a r i a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s in 1 8 9 3 , the o p p o n e n t s held a b e a d on each other for t h i r t y seconds w i t h o u t firing, t h e n f i n a l l y p u t their pistols d o w n , e m b r a c e d , a n d m a d e u p (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 7 0 ) .

If t h e seconds w a n t e d to m a k e sure t h a t dangers w e r e minimized, they m i g h t d o c t o r the w e a p o n s , since they w e r e in charge of l o a d i n g t h e m : they could use balls m a d e o u t of quicksilver, w h i c h disintegrated in the air, or l o a d very small balls, or r e d u c e t h e charge of p o w d e r (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 6 6 - 6 7 , 1 8 9 ) . R e q u i r i n g old-fashioned s m o o t h - b o r e w e a p o n s n o t only k e p t u p t r a d i t i o n b u t m a d e backstage conniving easier t h a n w i t h m o d e r n w e a p o n s . T h e r e w a s still s o m e risk; r o u n d balls h a d m o r e irregu- lar trajectories t h a n m o d e r n cylindrical bullets for rifled barrels, b u t since they w e r e fired w i t h lower muzzle velocity t h e y also m i g h t lodge in t h e b o d y w h e n a m o d e r n bullet w o u l d p e n e t r a t e cleanly t h r o u g h . Some risk always h a d to be present, if only in the m i n d of the duelists. Seconds w e r e stage-managers of a r a t h e r Goffmanian collective p r e s e n t a t i o n of self; t h e r i t u a l involved a division of labor, w i t h the principals s u p p o s e d to s h o w their a r d e n t c o n c e r n for h o n o r a n d their bravery u n d e r t h r e a t , while the seconds (quite possibly w i t h o u t awareness by t h e principals) m a d e the dangers lower t h a n they a p p e a r e d .

Sword duels also could be hedged a n d limited (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 5 9 - 6 2 ; 1 8 5 ; N y e 1 9 9 3 : 1 9 7 , 2 0 1 - 2 , 2 9 1 ) . I n Germany, sabers m i g h t h a v e b l u n t p o i n t s ; a n d in any case, t h e curved blade m a d e deep rapier-like p e n e t r a - t i o n unlikely. This left slashing, w h i c h generated b l o o d a n d scars b u t gen- erally k e p t i t a t t h a t . N o talking o r t a u n t i n g w a s allowed, a n d a m a n w h o fell or lost his w e a p o n w a s n o t to be a t t a c k e d until he w a s back in fighting p o s i t i o n ; unlike H o l l y w o o d sword-fights, t h e r e w a s n o kicking o r p u n c h - ing w i t h the free h a n d . T h e preferred form w a s for duelists to s t a n d close together, so t h a t m o m e n t u m of s w o r d t h r u s t s was limited (something like

218 • Chapter 6

Figure 6.1 French sword duel with large audience. Top hats are marks of fashion- able society at this time (1901). The duelists, keeping their distance, wear no shirts, in order that first drawing of blood can be easily seen. Seconds stand close by to supervise the action.

clinching in a b o x i n g m a t c h , w h i c h is also a typical tactic in m o d e r n fist- fights). A certain a m o u n t of p r o t e c t i o n w a s possible, such as w r a p p i n g scarves a r o u n d neck or mid-section. Alternatively, duelists m i g h t e x p o s e as m u c h skin as possible, so t h a t any s p o t of b l o o d w o u l d be visible, a n d t h e duel s t o p p e d according to the rule of d r a w i n g first blood. This w a s particularly the case in F r a n c e , w h e r e duelists sometimes m i g h t be set by their seconds to fight w i t h o u t shirts; or at any r a t e in w h i t e shirts on w h i c h the b l o o d w o u l d s t a n d o u t . French duelists generally did n o t w e a r leather g a u n t l e t s , since t h e m o s t likely w o u n d s w e r e t o the h a n d s a n d wrists; these were the usual targets, a n d it w a s considered very severe (and per- h a p s culpable) to aim for t h e mid-section, or even at the t e n d o n s a n d big arteries of the legs. In Germany, however, heavy gauntlets were usually w o r n , since the duelists did n o t w a n t t o end w i t h such slight w o u n d s , a n d the m o r e serious cuts w e r e a badge of honor. T h e bigger the g a u n t l e t s , the m o r e serious the duel. Dueling p r o c e d u r e s could be calibrated r a t h e r finely to the a m o u n t of d a m a g e s o u g h t .

T h e p o i n t o f t h e duel w a s m o r e t o d e m o n s t r a t e o n e ' s s t a t u s - g r o u p m e m - bership t h a n t o establish d o m i n a n c e over o n e ' s o p p o n e n t . T h u s i t w a s less i m p o r t a n t t o w i n t h a n t o display c o u r a g e ; a n h o n o r a b l e defeat w a s better t h a n a d i s h o n o r a b l e victory, indeed in terms of r e p u t a t i o n , it m i g h t be better even t h a n an h o n o r a b l e victory. T h e height of b r a v a d o (at least in E n g l a n d a n d France) w a s to let one's o p p o n e n t fire first, t h e n fire one's

Staging Fair Fights • 219

o w n pistol in the air. Dueling t h u s came close to a form of g a m b l i n g (an- other p a s t i m e of elite circles, especially in the "fast s e t " ) . Some forms of pistol dueling were very m u c h like a c a r d g a m e . Duelists m i g h t d r a w lots over w h o h a d the first shot, m a k i n g the r o u n d into a successive test of nerves first for o n e , t h e n for the other. A m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d form of g a m - bling w a s a version of the barrier duel, w i t h the n o r m a l n o - m a n ' s - l a n d of ten to fifteen paces b e t w e e n the fighters s h r u n k to a single line; if the first o n e to fire missed, his o p p o n e n t could w a l k up to the barrier, a n d if the first firer h a d d a r e d to come so far f o r w a r d , he w o u l d h a v e to let the other, if he w i s h e d , s h o o t h i m p o i n t b l a n k . It a p p e a r s t h a t relatively few t o o k this k i n d of a d v a n t a g e ; the display of b r a v a d o w a s generally e n o u g h to end t h e duel w i t h a w a s t e d s h o t . Even m o r e explicit g a m b l i n g o c c u r r e d in t h e type of duel w h e r e the pistols w e r e p r e p a r e d by an e x t r a p a i r of seconds, o u t of sight from the duelists, a n d only one l o a d e d ; the duelists t h e n selected o n e pistol by lot—neither k n o w i n g if he w e r e the o n e fight- ing w i t h a n u n l o a d e d g u n (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 2 2 9 - 3 0 ) . G a m b l e s a t this high level of danger, however, were generally frowned u p o n ; in p e r i o d s w h e r e dueling w a s m o s t p o p u l a r , low-risk p r o c e d u r e s w e r e preferred.

Dueling practices became t r a d i t i o n a l i z e d a n d conservative. W e a p o n s technologies i m p r o v e d , b u t elite duelists did n o t a d o p t t h e m . C o l t in- vented the revolver in 1 8 3 5 ; it became widely k n o w n after it w a s a d o p t e d by t h e U.S. A r m y after t h e M e x i c a n War of 1 8 4 6 - 4 8 ( C h a m b e r s 1 9 8 4 ) . An old-fashioned pistol h a d to be r e l o a d e d , a s o m e w h a t c u m b r o u s o p e r a - t i o n , after each shot. T h u s a duel of t w o or m o r e r o u n d s w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e same n u m b e r of p a u s e s , m a k i n g it b o t h suspenseful a n d formalistic in the e x t r e m e . A revolver w o u l d h a v e m a d e it possible to c o n t i n u e firing up to six s h o t s , a n d w o u l d h a v e p r o d u c e d a higher level of casualties. But this k i n d of r e p e a t e d firing w a s never allowed in gentlemanly duels; if a revolver h a d to be used, in the absence of a t r a d i t i o n a l dueling pistol, only o n e bullet w a s l o a d e d for each r o u n d . C o w b o y gunfights, of c o u r s e , w e r e a n o t h e r m a t t e r ; they w e r e the f a m o u s gunfights of t h e revolver era, b u t w e r e considered plebeian by the E u r o p e a n dueling culture (McAleer 1 9 9 4 : 6 8 , 7 9 - 8 0 ) .

As pistol dueling w a s on its w a y o u t , lore developed a r o u n d a hybrid form. T h e g a m e of " R u s s i a n r o u l e t t e " was a c o m b i n a t i o n of dueling a n d g a m b l i n g , displaying o n e ' s h o n o r by willingness to risk o n e ' s life w i t h a pistol shot. Russian roulette w a s a w a y of fighting a duel w i t h o u t an o p p o - nent. Both were similar in t h a t a duel typically also involved being subject to only o n e or at m o s t t w o s h o t s , t h a t m o s t of the time w o u l d likely miss or p r o v e non-fatal; and the chances of n o t hitting the one loaded cylinder in a six-shot revolver held to one's head were similarly favorable. D e a t h - defying acts of b r a v a d o were w a y s of gaining s t a t u s , as well as claiming the center of a t t e n t i o n a m o n g o n e ' s aristocratic p e e r s . 2 4 But in fact there

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is no h a r d d o c u m e n t a t i o n outside of literature of R u s s i a n r o u l e t t e actually being played before the early t w e n t i e t h cen tu ry (www.fact-index.eom/r/ r u / r u s s i a n _ r o u l e t t e ) . T h e setting always included R u s s i a n officers, b u t the p r o c e d u r e s varied, a n d t h e details seem to have b e c o m e distorted i n t o a g a m e played w i t h t h a t plebeian w e a p o n , the revolver. W h a t the legend of Russian r o u l e t t e plays up is a s t r u c t u r e underlying b o t h it a n d the duel: t h e o p p o n e n t to be o v e r c o m e is always o n e ' s o w n fears, a n d d o i n g so m a k e s one p a r t of a death-defying o s t e n t a t i o u s elite.

T H E D E C L I N E O F E L I T E D U E L I N G A N D I T S R E P L A C E M E N T B Y T H E G U N F I G H T

Dueling always h a d its o p p o n e n t s ; n o t merely from t h e c h u r c h b u t also from t h e state a t t e m p t i n g t o m o n o p o l i z e violence. T h i s o p p o s i t i o n w a s ineffectual d u r i n g the seventeenth a n d eighteenth centuries, especially in countries w h e r e an aristocratic status g r o u p controlled the high offices of g o v e r n m e n t ; t h u s t h e same p e r s o n s w o u l d officially frown u p o n dueling, b u t privately c o n d o n e it or practice it. D u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century, as dueling h a d shifted over to gun-fighting, it became less elite, a n d eventu- ally became plebeian e n o u g h to be o u t l a w e d .

W h a t f i n a l l y killed dueling, a l t h o u g h a t a n u n e v e n p a c e between vari- ous c o u n t r i e s , w a s the process of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . Until the n i n e t e e n t h century, dueling w a s the p r o v i n c e of gentlemen, a n d of military officers as gentlemen ex officio if n o t by birth. But t h e increasing size of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y armies, a n d the w i d e n i n g base of military r e c r u i t m e n t , e r o d e d this eliteness; initially it w a s t h e s p r e a d of the dueling culture to all officers t h a t began to spoil it as a class distinction. Similarly w i t h civilian duels: these e x p a n d e d e n o r m o u s l y in t h e late n i n e t e e n t h century, especially in t h e French T h i r d R e p u b l i c a n d in the p a r l i a m e n t a r y regime of unified Italy. Politicians, a n d indeed a n y politically active citizen, n o w t o o k u p o n himself the rights of a g e n t l e m a n , including the right to defend his h o n o r in a duel. In Germany, t h e e x p a n d i n g s t u d e n t p o p u l a t i o n s p r e a d t h e p r a c - tice of t h e dueling clubs i n t o the bourgeoisie. At first blush this m i g h t h a v e seemed the i m p o s i t i o n of aristocratic, militaristic values u p o n the larger society; b u t its l o n g - t e r m tendency w a s to m a k e dueling less elite.

T h e process w a s especially noticeable in the A m e r i c a n South in t h e years before the Civil War. In c o n t r a s t to the h a u g h t i n e s s of dueling aristo- crats in E u r o p e , w h i t e S o u t h e r n males claimed d e m o c r a t i c equality, in- cluding the right to challenge a n y o n e as a s t a t e m e n t of o n e ' s h o n o r . In r e a c t i o n , t h e wealthiest a n d m o s t cultivated S o u t h e r n l a n d o w n e r s began to t u r n a w a y from dueling, seeing it as merely an expression of b o i s t e r o u s a n d uncultivated plebeians (Wyatt-Brown 1 9 8 2 : 3 5 1 ) . 2 5 Eventually, t h e

S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s • 2 2 1

dueling club h a d t o o many m e m b e r s ; it lost its cache. Genteel m a n n e r s n o w c a m e to be defined as t h o s e of peaceful society, n o t violent h o n o r . 2 6

T h e last gasp of pistol duels in the United States w a s in the so-called wild West in the years between 1 8 6 5 a n d 1 9 0 0 (Kooistra 1 9 8 9 ; H o l l o n 1 9 7 4 ) . Western gunfighters c o n s t i t u t e d s o m e t h i n g of a r e p u t a t i o n a l elite on t h e frontier, r o m a n t i c i z e d as well as vilified in t h e press. But they w e r e n o t m e m b e r s of t h e u p p e r class, n o r did they practice a genteel life-style. W h e r e a s the older dueling culture h a d existed a m o n g the p r o p e r t i e d elite, gunfighters w e r e n o t t h e w e a l t h y r a n c h e r s , a l t h o u g h they often w o r k e d as a floating p o p u l a t i o n of a r m e d m e n in their e m p l o y . 2 7 T h e r e w e r e occa- sional elements of etiquette in gun-fighting, a n d t h e r e m i g h t be staged fights at designated meeting times; b u t the a p p a r a t u s of formal challenges, seconds, genteel firing in the air, a n d polite t e r m i n a t i o n s w a s p a r e d away. Gunfighters w e r e m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h kill or be killed t h a n w i t h enacting an elite status m e m b e r s h i p . T h e m o s t successful gunfighters w e r e a p p a r - ently t h o s e w h o practiced n o t staged fair f i g h t s b u t w e r e quickest t o t a k e offense a n d f i r e o n t h e o t h e r m a n o n t h e s p o t ; m a n y o f their r e c o r d e d killings were by a m b u s h . T h e gunfighter w a s a t r a n s i t i o n a l p h e n o m e n o n b e t w e e n the elite duelist a n d the m o d e r n b a r - r o o m brawler.

W e s t e r n gun-fighting t o o k place i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l z o n e w h e r e state p e n e t r a t i o n w a s just u n d e r way. T h e lack o f state c o n t r o l a n d p r o t e c t i o n e n c o u r a g e d p r i v a t e forces; indeed, t h e p r i v a t e armies of c a t t l e - r a n c h e r s , l a n d o w n e r s , a n d r a i l r o a d m a g n a t e s involved i n m a k i n g violent claims a n d defending against t h e m p r o d u c e d m u c h m o r e violence t h a n t h e indi- v i d u a l gunfighters ( H o l l o n 1 9 7 4 ) . O u r p i c t u r e is d i s t o r t e d because t h e latter g o t m o s t o f t h e publicity a n d t h e r o m a n t i c r e p u t a t i o n , since t h e y best fit t h e c u l t u r a l i m a g e of t h e h e r o in single c o m b a t . Even a m o n g these f a m o u s individuals, some o f t h e m o s t successful w e r e t h o s e w h o h a d w o r k e d (at s o m e p o i n t in their careers) for g o v e r n m e n t forces, as sheriffs o r U.S. m a r s h a l s . T h e m o s t f a m o u s o f t h e W e s t e r n gunfights, t h e O K C o r r a l f i g h t i n t h e A r i z o n a t e r r i t o r y i n 1 8 8 1 , w a s fought n o t b e t w e e n t w o i n d i v i d u a l heroes i n single c o m b a t , b u t b e t w e e n t w o o r g a n i z e d forces: t h e U.S. m a r s h a l a n d t h r e e deputies, a r m e d w i t h b o t h pistols a n d a s h o t g u n ; a n d five m e n belonging to the p r i v a t e h o u s e h o l d forces of a p r o p e r t y - a g g r a n d i z i n g rancher, a r m e d w i t h pistols a n d rifles (reprint of Tombstone Epitaph, O c t . 1 8 8 1 ) .

G u n s d i s a p p e a r e d from t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y duels or single c o m b a t s ; in- stead, w h e r e the practice of staged fair fights c o n t i n u e d , it w a s w i t h o t h e r w e a p o n s , chiefly fists a n d knives; conversely w h e r e guns were used, it w a s in non-fair fights. T h e ethos of staged fair fights h a s c o n t i n u e d in places t h a t are artificially closed c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h static status hierarchies, such as American high schools a n d o t h e r total institutions. T h e same structures

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t h a t p r o d u c e bullying of the b o t t o m r a n k also p r o d u c e staged fights w i t h i n the elite at the t o p .

H e r e w e m a y s u m m a r i z e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o c c u r fair fights b e t w e e n s t a t u s n o t a b l e s . O n e s u b t y p e occurs i n loose a d h o c c o a l i t i o n s of m i l i t a r y u n i t s t h a t s t a n d in t h e place of states; historically these h a v e existed w h e n t r i b a l u n i t s based o n k i n s h i p ties w e r e s u p e r c e d e d b y larger u n i t s o f v o l u n t e e r m a r a u d e r s , o r o f inter-tribal c o a l i t i o n s , b u t w h e r e n o stable h i e r a r c h y o f m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d h a d c r y s t a l i z e d . 2 8 A d h o c coali- t i o n s of this s o r t p r o d u c e t h e p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of h e r o r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e berserker, t h e ferocious i n d i v i d u a l fighter w h o o v e r a w e s o t h e r s by his heedless aggressiveness a n d his r e p u t a t i o n , v a u n t i n g his c o n t e m p t for r i s k s . Preferred f i g h t s are i n d i v i d u a l o n e s , n o t collective, since these m a x - imize i n d i v i d u a l r e p u t a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e u n i t of o r g a n i z a t i o n is t h e p e r s o n a l following, or r a t h e r a series of h e r o e s w i t h their p e r s o n a l fol- lowings u n i t e d i n t o a t e m p o r a r y c o a l i t i o n (like the G r e e k a r m y at Troy) n o t the c o r p o r a t e v e n g e a n c e u n i t o f t h e clan o r g a n g . H e n c e t h e r e are i n d i v i d u a l fights a m o n g h e r o e s , n o t v e n d e t t a s w i t h their s t r u c t u r e of al- t e r n a t i n g a m b u s h e s .

An a d d i t i o n a l feature of this type of s t r u c t u r e is a division b e t w e e n an aristocratic r a n k , a n d c o m m o n people in t h e rest of the p o p u l a t i o n . T h e heroes confine their staged fair fights to e n c o u n t e r s w i t h each other, a n d derive their highest h o n o r from these fights. 2 9 Ideally, the aristocratic stra- t u m is based on the criterion of being a fighter of high r e p u t a t i o n , b u t in fact also on being a p r o p e r t i e d elite. In reality, a p r o p e r t i e d u p p e r class m a y n o t b e completely m a d e u p o f such f i g h t e r s ; w i t h h e r e d i t a r y p r o p e r t y a n d r a n k t r a n s m i s s i o n , a n d i n m o r e settled c o n d i t i o n s , the gentry m a y b e distinguished m o r e for their m a n n e r s (including their m a n n e r s in fighting) t h a n their p a r t i c u l a r ferociousness a n d effectiveness.

H e r e t h e category of berserker heroes shifts over i n t o a category of polite gentlemanly duelists. H e n c e , a second sub-type of c o n d i t i o n s for staged fair fights: w h e r e loose ad hoc coalitions are s u p p l a n t e d by a s t r o n g state, dueling m a y persist as long as there r e m a i n s a r a n k s t r u c t u r e of aristocratic status g r o u p s s t a n d i n g a b o v e c o m m o n e r s . U n d e r these condi- t i o n s , a dueling e t h o s is k e p t alive, especially t h r o u g h t h e existence of t r a i n i n g schools for fighters, in w h i c h the etiquette is practiced, a n d w h i c h h a v e the c h a r a c t e r of upper-class clubs. In fact, the vast majority of staged fights t a k e place in these schools, relatively rarely as serious fights to the d e a t h as in the outside w o r l d . Staged fair fights of the dueling type disap- p e a r w h e n the a r i s t o c r a t / c o m m o n e r distinction d i s a p p e a r s , a l t h o u g h they m a y p e a k t e m p o r a r i l y d u r i n g the t r a n s i t i o n .

T h e i m p o r t a n c e of the elite fighting school or club for t h e ethos of honorific, staged fair fights is d e m o n s t r a t e d by c o m p a r i n g w h a t h a p p e n e d to such schools in the t w e n t i e t h century, as honorific dueling w i t h w e a p -

Staging Fair Fights • 223

ons d i s a p p e a r e d . Training schools for fighting carried over i n t o t h e t w e n t i - eth century a n d b e y o n d , b u t t r a n s m u t e d i n t o a n e w form: the gym or f i t n e s s center. T h e w e a p o n s d r o p p e d o u t , a n d t r a i n i n g shifted t o the physi- cal b o d y itself: m o d e r n gyms build muscles a n d e n d u r a n c e , a l t h o u g h s o m e t e a c h specific fighting techniques such as b o x i n g a n d Asian m a r t i a l a r t s . C o n t e m p o r a r y Americans r e g a r d this as peaceful a n d i n n o c u o u s . In the p e r i o d of the fitness m o v e m e n t from the 1 9 7 0 s o n w a r d , gyms became increasingly m i d d l e class, non-belligerent, w i t h large p r o p o r t i o n of female p a r t i c i p a n t s ; these gyms h a v e neither political n o r gang c o n n e c t i o n s . G y m s became places n o t for s h o w i n g off or even for social belonging b u t for p r i v a t e self-development, a k i n d of s h a r e d backstage w h e r e one g o t oneself in s h a p e , r a t h e r t h a n a place for frontstage p e r f o r m a n c e . But in E u r o p e , gyms—usually gender segregated—have often been places for r e - c r u i t m e n t of paramilitaries a n d criminal gangs. In the 1 9 2 0 s , G e r m a n paramilitaries w e r e organized a r o u n d athletic a n d exercise m o v e m e n t s . Fitness centers were used as bases for Yugoslav ethnic cleansers in the 1 9 9 0 s , a n d as r a p e centers; R u s s i a n gyms in t h e 1 9 9 0 s w e r e organizing places for criminal gangs; in India, gyms h a v e been bases for t h o s e w h o act as local criminal enforcers a n d w h o periodically lend their services as shock t r o o p s in ethnic disputes (Fritzsche 1 9 9 8 ; K a l d o r 1 9 9 9 ; Tilly 2 0 0 3 : 3 6 - 3 8 ; Katz 1 9 8 8 : 2 7 2 ; M a n n 2 0 0 5 ) . These plebeian gyms did n o t oper- ate by a c o d e of h o n o r , n o r of individual c o m b a t , b u t quite the o p p o s i t e .

H O N O R W I T H O U T F A I R N E S S : V E N D E T T A S A S C H A I N S O F U N B A L A N C E D F I G H T S

Under m o d e r n conditions, the use of guns shifts over to not-fair fights. These fall into t w o further types, w h i c h together m a k e up m o s t m o d e r n gun violence (apart from p r e d a t o r y violence in the course of committing robberies a n d other crimes). On the one h a n d , there are vendettas carried out by groups; on the other, individual quarrels t h a t escalated into shoot- ings. T h e latter are often described as h o n o r confrontations, b u t their dis- tinctive dynamics are better c a p t u r e d if we call t h e m leap-frog escalations.

G u n vendettas are familiar to us in the form of drive-by shootings be- tween rival gangs a n d m o r e broadly reciprocated gang violence (Sanders 1 9 9 4 ; J a n k o w s k i 1 9 9 1 ; Wilkinson 2 0 0 3 ) . Gangs protect their turf, which m a y comprise only a few n e i g h b o r h o o d blocks, by attacking young males from outside w h o enter the area; in vengeance for previous attacks, or to m a k e a statement a n d display their power, they m a k e occasional incursions into a rival's turf. Vendettas are n o t fair fights. An episode does n o t take the form of a one-on-one b o u t in the presence of an audience t h a t m a i n t a i n s p r o c e d u r a l rules. Instead, the aim is to apply overwhelming superiority

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w h e n it is one's t u r n to d o m i n a t e (that is, w h e n one w a n t s to get back at the other side for a previous attack, or w h e n on one's h o m e turf). This unfair a d v a n t a g e is i m p o r t a n t in m a k i n g the violence c o m e off at all, from the p o i n t of view of overcoming confrontational tension/fear. W h e n a gun is used, typically there are a considerable n u m b e r of gang m e m b e r s w h o take p a r t in the incursion or the a m b u s h , even if only o n e of t h e m actually fires the g u n . T h e rest provide m o r a l b a c k u p ; they also represent the collec- tive r a t h e r t h a n individual character of the fight—it is n o t one individual t a k i n g vengeance or establishing h o n o r u p o n a n o t h e r individual, b u t a g r o u p sending a message to a n o t h e r g r o u p . W h o the particular victim is does n o t m a t t e r ; killing a girlfriend or a child connected to the opposing g r o u p is just as meaningful as killing a major gang fighter.

N o r a r e v e n d e t t a episodes usually staged, in t h e sense of being an- n o u n c e d in a d v a n c e , agreed u p o n as to time a n d place, w i t h rules of en- g a g e m e n t . T h e essence of v e n d e t t a tactics is to catch o n e ' s o p p o n e n t off g u a r d a n d at a d i s a d v a n t a g e . W h a t m a k e s for successful killings, a n d t h u s w h a t keeps the v e n d e t t a going, is the reciprocal chain of one-sided a d v a n - tages. Lacking the element of surprise, or o v e r w h e l m i n g local a d v a n t a g e , e n c o u n t e r s a m o n g gangs—like front-on meeting a m o n g a r m i e s — a r e gen- erally standoffs, full of bluster a n d noise b u t little a c t u a l d a m a g e .

T h e following case s h o w s w h e r e guns are fired largely for effect, w i t h s o m e r a t h e r r a n d o m casualties. A g r o u p of y o u n g black m e n a c c o m p a n i e d a friend to a rival h o u s i n g project to see a girl:

W e w a s s m o k i n ' (marijuana), m i n d i n ' o u r o w n business a n d shit. T h e n t h e niggas from the o t h e r side c o m e u p a n d ask m a d q u e s t i o n s , " w h o t h i s ? " y o u k n o w , like " w h o the fuck are y o u ? " A n d I ' m like, y o u k n o w , " w h o t h e fuck are Y O U ? " a n d shit. W h a t t h e hell are y o u , w h a t ' s the p r o b l e m , m a n , w e just chillin'. So, y o u k n o w , w e s t a r t e d w i t h t h e lip a n d shit. A n d one t h i n g led t o a n o t h e r a n d w e w a s f i g h t i n ' a n d every- b o d y s t a r t e d pullin' o u t a n d we s t a r t e d b u s t i n ' each other, a n d I t h i n k n o b o d y got hit. O n e p e r s o n got hit from t h e Brownsville side, 'cause my m a n hit h i m up against the chest. I d i d n ' t get hit. So it w a s a lot of g u n p l a y a n d shit. A n d we s t a r t e d blastin', n o t really paying. . . . W h e n p e o p l e blast I d o n ' t t h i n k they really a i m i n ' at a n y o n e , y o u k n o w , a blast is just a blast. A lot of stray bullets be going everywhere, y o u k n o w . I ' m glad w e got o u t o f t h a t s i t u a t i o n . (Wilkinson 2 0 0 3 : 153)

T h e use of g u n s also t e n d s to limit t h e a m o u n t of fighting: g a n g fights w i t h guns rarely t a k e the form of e x t e n d e d battles, w i t h s h o t s repeatedly fired by b o t h sides. In p a r t this is d u e to n o r m a l tension/fear; in p a r t to the lack of t r a i n i n g in t h e use of g u n s , a n d t h e frequently l o w quality of the w e a p o n s . In c o n t e m p o r a r y gangs, g u n - b u y e r s are often quite i g n o r a n t a b o u t guns; they are often sold p o o r - q u a l i t y or malfunctioning w e a p o n s ,

S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s • 2 2 5

a n d t r e a t the gun m o r e as a fetish t h a n an effective w e a p o n (Venkatesh 2 0 0 6 ) . Usually all t h a t can be m u s t e r e d is o n e g o o d shot. These features all converge on keeping g u n use by gangs in t h e form of v e n d e t t a s , a chain of small-scale s h o o t i n g s .

C o m p a r e d t o s t a g e d fair fights, v e n d e t t a s are d r a w n o u t i n t i m e : e q u a l forces are n o t b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r a t t h e s a m e t i m e a n d p l a c e , b u t t h e r e i s a n a l t e r n a t i o n : ideally, f i r s t o n e side h a s t h e unfair a d v a n t a g e , t h e n t h e other. T h e w h o l e c h a i n m i g h t b a l a n c e over t i m e , b u t a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r m o m e n t o n e side or t h e o t h e r generally feels t h e y h a v e been subjected t o u n f a i r n e s s . A n d s o t h e y h a v e ; a n d s o t h e y t r y t o shift t h e b a l a n c e o f unfairness t o m a k e i t w e i g h a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r side. A l t h o u g h from t h e p o i n t of v i e w of an a b s t r a c t t h e o r i s t , t h e c h a i n m a y seem b a l a n c e d , in t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reality of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , it is p a l p a b l y unfair. T h u s v e n d e t t a s are n o t o r i o u s l y s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g ; w h e r e a s staged fair fights h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r of b r i n g i n g an episode of conflict to m u t u a l l y a c c e p t e d c o n c l u s i o n s . D u e l s e n d w i t h " s a t i s f a c t i o n " of t h e p a r t i e s ; ven- d e t t a episodes d o n o t .

I h a v e just given a list of general c o n d i t i o n s for the occurrence of staged fair fights; here is a c o u n t e r p a r t list of c o n d i t i o n s for v e n d e t t a s . Paralleling the case of individual h e r o fights, t h e r e are t w o subcases: an ancient form a n d its r e a p p e a r a n c e in some m o d e r n enclaves. First, vendetta-like vio- lence occurs w h e r e t h e r e are t r i b a l c o r p o r a t e units w i t h stable, non-shift- ing b o u n d a r i e s , a n d relatively l o w internal h i e r a r c h y — w h a t Black (1998) calls "stable a g g l o m e r a t i o n s . " This m e a n s t h a t individual identities are firmly e m b e d d e d in g r o u p identities; unlike the shifting ad h o c coalitions in w h i c h hero-fighters appear, every m a n sticks w i t h his g r o u p ( t h o u g h w o m e n m i g h t m o v e t h r o u g h m a r r i a g e ) a n d has little o p p o r t u n i t y t o ac- quire a singular r e p u t a t i o n (or to t r a d e on such a r e p u t a t i o n in m a k i n g deals w i t h possible allies). Lack of internal h i e r a r c h y c o n t r i b u t e s to the r e c i p r o c a t i n g v e n d e t t a p a t t e r n because there i s n o c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e t o force individuals to fight very seriously; generalized g r o u p pressure c a n bring t h e m o u t to t h e fighting line, b u t m o s t of t h e m do so w i t h little c o u r a g e or e n t h u s i a s m ; a n d t h e y are quite willing to end t h e fighting in each episode as s o o n as a single victim is t a k e n or given u p . T h e o n e - s h o t v e n d e t t a episode t h u s allows m a x i m a l play for n o r m a l c o w a r d i c e , while keeping up a m i n i m a l facade of c o u r a g e .

V e n d e t t a s t r u c t u r e s arising from t r i b a l c o r p o r a t e u n i t s a r e c h a r a c t e r i s - tic of p r e - s t a t e societies, especially t h o s e h o r t i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m i e s t h a t h a v e stable t e r r i t o r i e s . In t h e s e c o n d s u b t y p e , v e n d e t t a s also occur in relatively m o d e r n times w h e r e b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a t e p e n e t r a t i o n i s p a r t i a l or in a c o n d i t i o n of t r a n s i t i o n . T h e classic a r e a s of v e n d e t t a s h a v e b e e n Sicily, C a l a b r i a , C o r s i c a , a n d Spain in the s e v e n t e e n t h to n i n e t e e n t h or early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . T h e key feature is the existence of relatively

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self-contained p e a s a n t villages, or subsistence farmers o r g a n i z e d chiefly by k i n s h i p ties. T h e s e need n o t be a b o r i g i n a l , b u t c o u l d be f o r m e d by m i g r a t i n g a w a y from s t a t e - p e n e t r a t e d a r e a s : a f a m o u s e x a m p l e is the feud of t h e Hatfield a n d M c C o y families in an e x t r e m e l y isolated r e g i o n o f West Virginia a n d K e n t u c k y b e t w e e n 1 8 6 3 a n d 1 8 9 1 ( w w w . m a t e w a n . c o m / h i s t o r y / t i m e l i n e . h t m ) . A similar s t r u c t u r e underlies m o d e r n u r b a n g a n g v e n d e t t a s : t h e local t e r r i t o r y is t h e city n e i g h b o r h o o d ; t h e gangs a r e n o t h e r e d i t a r y u n i t s like tribes ( a l t h o u g h t h e r e c a n b e a n element of family t r a n s m i s s i o n of a t r a d i t i o n of m e m b e r s h i p [ H o r o w i t z 1 9 8 3 ; J a n k o w s k y 1 9 9 1 ] ) , b u t t h e y are artificially c o n t r i v e d t o act a s c o r p o r a t e v e n g e a n c e u n i t s . 3 0

E P H E M E R A L S I T U A T I O N A L H O N O R A N D L E A P - F R O G E S C A L A T I O N

T O O N E - G U N F I G H T S

T h e o t h e r type of a m a t e u r g u n violence is w h a t I will call leap-frog escala- t i o n s in individual disputes. Often these are referred to as h o n o r disputes or face contests, b u t t h e r u b r i c does n o t sufficiently c a p t u r e its d y n a m i c s . Typical e x a m p l e s are disputes t h a t arise in bars or o t h e r public places, a n d escalate t h r o u g h a rising level of challenges a n d insults (Luckenbill 1 9 7 7 ) . T h e c u l m i n a t i o n is t h a t o n e p e r s o n p r o d u c e s a g u n (in m a n y b a r fights, he leaves t h e b a r a n d r e t u r n s later w i t h it) a n d s h o o t s t h e o t h e r m a n . Superficially these resemble t r a d i t i o n a l h o n o r disputes, a n d m a y t a k e the form of single c o m b a t s . Luckenbill calls t h e m Goffmanian " c h a r - acter c o n t e s t s " or "face c o n t e s t s . " But they differ from duels in i m p o r t a n t respects: These are n o t fair fights, because o n e p e r s o n leap-frogs up the chain of escalation a h e a d of the o t h e r a n d p r o d u c e s a gun, a n d so the f i g h t e r s are n o longer equally m a t c h e d . R a t h e r t h a n gunfights, w e sh o u ld call t h e m one-gun fights. T h e r e is n o t h i n g like the p r o t o c o l of a duel, offering choice of w e a p o n s , allowing each side to s h o o t one shot, a n d ceasing thereafter. In one-gun fights, it is n o t u n u s u a l for the s h o o t e r to fire multiple times. T h e r e is no discussion of formalities such as w h e n or w h e r e t o m e e t . 3 1 T h e r e are n o seconds t o a r r a n g e such m a t t e r s , a n d t h u s also to p r o v i d e social p r e s s u r e to enforce the limitations of the fight pe- riod; no delays, w h i c h could have p r o v i d e d a cooling-off p e r i o d a n d m a d e t h e belligerents m o r e willing to end t h e fight w i t h risky gestures leading to m u t u a l satisfaction. T h e r e is n o t h i n g b u t self-managed, h o t - h e a d e d es- calation on the spot, w i t h the chief breaks in the actions consisting in o n e side leaving to p r o c u r e heavier w e a p o n s .

Leap-frog escalations of this sort m a y be described as including an ele- m e n t of honor, insofar as b o t h sides t a k e themselves as having been in- sulted; b u t the h o n o r is purely p e r s o n a l a n d self-centered. It is n o t the

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h o n o r of m u t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a fair fight, a n d t h e r e b y enacting one's status as m e m b e r of a w e l l - m a n n e r e d elite; it does n o t bind the a n t a g o n i s t s together a n d raise t h e m a b o v e t h e c o m m o n e r s . Leap-frog escalations are the kind of fighting t h a t occurs in d e m o c r a t i c , egalitarian settings, w h e r e t h e r e are n o s t a t u s - g r o u p r a n k i n g s a n d b o u n d a r i e s , a n d i n a n o n y m o u s public situations w h e r e o n e does n o t even h a v e a r e p u t a t i o n circulated in established c o m m u n i t y n e t w o r k s .

Leap-frog escalations are p a r t of w h a t I h a v e called " s i t u a t i o n a l strati- f i c a t i o n " (Collins 2 0 0 4 , c h a p . 7): the m o d e r n public c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h no o n e gives deference to a n y o n e else as belonging to a higher-ranking category, or even recognizes such categories. In such s i t u a t i o n s , o n e can have only a p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n (e.g., as a celebrity, or an individual w h o is well k n o w n in a p a r t i c u l a r o c c u p a t i o n or n e t w o r k ) ; but outside t h a t n e t w o r k , the only w a y to get deference or a t t e n t i o n is to be situationally d o m i n a n t , by being noisy, ebullient, shocking, or belligerent. I h a v e of- fered the following principle (Collins 2 0 0 4 : 2 7 2 - 7 4 ) : formally scheduled, publicized, a n d scripted rituals p r o d u c e a n d reinforce categorical identi- ties; informal i n t e r a c t i o n rituals, w h i c h are u n s c h e d u l e d a n d u n s c r i p t e d , result in p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n s t h a t are e p h e m e r a l , confined to the immedi- ate situation. This fits the c o n t r a s t between dueling a n d leap-frog escala- tions quite nicely. W h a t m a k e s a duel b o t h elite a n d controlled is its sched- uling, its c o m m i t m e n t to p r o t o c o l , a n d its e x p a n s i o n to a public r e a l m consisting of the n e t w o r k of seconds. To c a r r y o u t such p r o c e d u r e s c o n - firms o n e ' s gentry s t a t u s . A leap-frog escalation is a h o t - h e a d e d rush, im- provised on the spot; a l t h o u g h such fights m a y resemble each other, this is n o t because of a d h e r e n c e to a formal script; a n d the result is n o t t h a t one enacts m e m b e r s h i p in an h o n o r e d category, b u t merely acquires some p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n as a h o t - h e a d or a murderer. O n e might argue t h a t the b a r - r o o m fighter becomes at least a s i t u a t i o n a l elite, since he (usually he) d o m i n a t e s the i m m e d i a t e focus of a t t e n t i o n . But even here the identity i s n o t generally a n h o n o r e d o n e ; o t h e r c a r o u s e r s m a y well l o o k d o w n o n the b r a w l e r s as low-lifes. 3 2 At best, the fighter in this situation is c a u g h t up in a t u n n e l of his o w n subjectivity, engaging in situational self-aggran- dizement w i t h o u t m u c h social b a c k u p , m a n u f a c t u r i n g an image of oneself as h o n o r a b l e t h a t is n o t s h a r e d by a n y o n e else.

Even further o u t on the c o n t i n u u m of a n o n y m i t y are disputes t h a t arise in traffic; t h e m o s t f a m o u s of these are called r o a d r a g e , a l t h o u g h t h e r e are similar fights t h a t emerge from foot traffic, in w h i c h p e r s o n s ' o w n bodies (and the parcels a n d a c c o u t r e m e n t s they are carrying) are the vehi- cles t h a t get in each o t h e r ' s w a y . 3 3 In some w a y s these traffic fights are the u l t i m a t e generalization of a n o n y m o u s leap-frog escalations. T h e y are n o t confined to a lower-class or working-class c u l t u r e of m a c h i s m o , n o r to a p a r t i c u l a r ethnic g r o u p , n o r are they particularly male; w o m e n a n d m i d -

228 • Chapter 6

die-class p e r s o n s a p p e a r to be frequent p e r p e t r a t o r s . R o a d rage is t h e ultimate d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of h o n o r ; every driver (and every pedestrian) is equal t o a n y other, a n d r e a d y t o t a k e insult a t having o n e ' s rights a p p a r - ently violated.

As Katz (1999) a n d others (Tilly 2 0 0 3 : 1 5 1 - 5 6 ) h a v e s h o w n , escalation occurs b e y o n d t h e original offense because drivers are generally oblivious to the signals t h a t others give off asking for rectification of t h e offense; the fight escalates to a higher level of dispute over failure to m a k e ritual r e p a i r s . H e r e again such fights m a y end in one-gun fights ( a l t h o u g h s o m e - times t h e vehicle itself is used as a w e a p o n , s m a s h i n g t h e o t h e r or p u s h i n g it off the r o a d ) . These are fights over h o n o r , b u t it is h o n o r k n o w n only to o c c u p a n t s of each car, a n d indeed sometimes only to the driver, w i t h the passengers w o n d e r i n g w h a t all t h e fuss is a b o u t . T h i s is a far cry from the duel: u n s c h e d u l e d , suddenly emergent, w i t h o u t p r o t o c o l , w i t h o u t s o - cial n e t w o r k s as audience a n d c o n t r o l ; it does n o t even result in a n y per- sonal identity, unless one is arrested by the police—Katz n o t e s t h a t drivers often c o m e o u t of an episode of r o a d rage as from a d r e a m , d i s o w n i n g the t e m p o r a r y self t h a t h a d been displayed t h e r e . N o t all r o a d r a g e inci- dents end up in leap-frog violence; the vast majority of t h e m peter o u t at a m u c h l o w e r level—as do m o s t fights. (This is the case in n o t e 33.)

My c o n s t a n t t h e m e has been t h a t fights are difficult. Staged fair fights are o n e of t h e chief w a y s of circumventing c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. Duels did this by enlisting the s u p p o r t of an elite status g r o u p in m o t i - v a t i n g violence, b u t also in formalizing it to a degree t h a t one h a d m a i n l y to display o n e ' s willingness to t a k e a risk of being killed, while t h a t risk itself w a s limited by p r o t o c o l . Vendettas circumvent t h e barrier by going b a c k to a t t a c k i n g t h e w e a k , at least by m a n e u v e r i n g for a t e m p o r a r y situa- t i o n of o u t n u m b e r i n g t h e o p p o n e n t a n d catching t h e m o u t of their t e r r a i n or off their g u a r d ; a n d v e n d e t t a s , w i t h their p a t t e r n of one victim at a t i m e , hit a n d r u n away, leave the general p a t t e r n of fear a n d i n c o m p e t e n c e close to t h e surface.

Ad h o c individual fights of t h e k i n d I h a v e called leap-frog escalations t a k e a n o t h e r p a t h w a y a r o u n d : lacking social s u p p o r t , t h e y revert t o the unfair fight, especially by bringing in a w e a p o n far m o r e deadly t h a n w h a t the o p p o n e n t possesses at t h a t m o m e n t . T h e r e is a symbolic aspect to this as well; the m a n w h o rushes from the b a r after he has c o m e off w o r s e in a r o u n d of insults is likely feeling t h e reality of his c o w a r d i c e in n o t p u r s u - ing the fight on a bodily level. If he gets a g u n , it no d o u b t has s o m e of the qualities of the sacred object of w h a t I h a v e called the g u n cult (Collins 2 0 0 4 : 9 9 - 1 0 1 ) . Its ritualistic qualities, a c q u i r e d in n e t w o r k s w h e r e cultish practices of a d u l a t i n g w e a p o n s give it e m o t i o n a l r e s o n a n c e , p r o v i d e h i m w i t h a vicarious charge of e m o t i o n a l energy; t h e m a n w h o w a s insulted a n d degraded n o w feels superior. His superiority d e p e n d s on the k n o w l -

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edge (or belief) t h a t he has a g u n , and his o p p o n e n t does n o t . It is precisely this unfairness in the possession of ritual w e a p o n s t h a t gives him the cour- age to r e t u r n , o v e r c o m e tension/fear, and carry on the fight. H e r e I am asserting, as elsewhere, t h a t the gun is n o t just a w e a p o n in a practical sense; w h e n soldiers on b o t h sides of a battle have g u n s , they tend to be even m o r e frightened a n d i n c o m p e t e n t . It is the possession of ritual superiority t h a t s u r m o u n t s the barrier and unleashes the violence.

B E H I N D T H E F A C A D E O F H O N O R A N D D I S R E S P E C T

It is c o m m o n to a t t r i b u t e small-scale violence a m o n g males to a c o d e of honor. A similar case is e x p l a n a t i o n by disrespect, except the latter can be broader, including n o t only individual c o m b a t b u t also g r o u p a t t a c k e r s and g r o u p victims, and n o t necessarily in the form of a fair fight. An instance from my files involves a black n e i g h b o r h o o d gang t h a t a t t a c k s t w o black teenagers, dressed in their Sunday best, w h o are outsiders vis- iting their g r a n d p a r e n t s . T h e p e r p e t r a t o r s themselves explain their behav- ior in a huff of righteous justification: " W h o do they think they are, c o m - ing in here, disrespecting u s ? "

Both e x p l a n a t i o n s are e m p a t h i c efforts to get inside the viewpoint of the a t t a c k e r s . A l t h o u g h often o v e r l a p p i n g , the t w o e x p l a n a t i o n s carry some difference in t o n e . Codes of h o n o r are regarded as deep-seated t r a d i - tions, afforded some grudging a d m i r a t i o n from a conservative s t a n d p o i n t or r o m a n t i c nostalgia a b o u t the past. E x p l a n a t i o n by disrespect has a t o n e of altruistic s y m p a t h y w i t h an u n d e r d o g w h o is p u t d o w n by social prejudice a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e , a n d w h o is fighting "in search of r e s p e c t " (in the title of Bourgois's 11995] b o o k ) .

Such efforts at empathy, a l t h o u g h w o r t h y as an ethical s t a n c e , distort b o t h the structural c o n d i t i o n s a n d the situational p h e n o m e n o l o g y of vio- lence. A code of h o n o r is n o t just a m a t t e r of t r a d i t i o n . It is the cultural ideology t h a t is verbalized w h e r e particular social c o n d i t i o n s are present.

A n o t h e r line of e x p l a n a t i o n of fighting u n d e r a code of h o n o r e m p h a - sizes its rationalistic elements. T h e a r g u m e n t , as f o r m u l a t e d by G o u l d (2003) a n d Tilly ( 2 0 0 3 ) , holds t h a t in t h e absence of a state legal system a n d police forces p r o v i d i n g security, t h e only w a y to deter violence is to d e m o n s t r a t e t w o t hi ngs: t h a t one personally c a n n o t b e t a k e n a d v a n t a g e of in a n y w a y ; a n d t h a t one has t h e loyalty a n d s u p p o r t of a g r o u p t h a t w o u l d c a r r y o u t revenge. T h u s it is in one's interest to a d h e r e to a c o d e of h o n o r , s h o w i n g willingness to r e s o r t to violence at the m e r e s t slight; a n d scrupulously t o a d h e r e t o g r o u p obligations t o s u p p o r t o n e a n o t h e r in revenging insult a n d injury to o n e another. T h e first gave one a p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n as s o m e o n e n o t to be messed w i t h ; the second gave the g r o u p

2 3 0 • Chapter 6

a r e p u t a t i o n for solidarity t h a t m a d e it formidable in backing up its indi- vidual m e m b e r s .

T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n h a s a functionalist t o n e . In t h e absence of o t h e r so- cial m e c h a n i s m s for p r o v i d i n g security, it says, an h o n o r c o d e arises to p r o v i d e i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h security. T h e a r g u m e n t i s peculiar because t h e o u t c o m e it allegedly brings a b o u t is u n d e r m i n e d by t h e m e c h a n i s m itself. T o u c h i n e s s a b o u t p e r s o n a l h o n o r , a n d h o n o r - b o u n d vengeance from o n e ' s g r o u p , are s u p p o s e d to b r i n g security. But in fact societies w i t h an h o n o r c u l t u r e are n o t o r i o u s for their level of violence, a n d even m o r e for their pervasive a t m o s p h e r e of t h r e a t a n d insecurity. T h e h y p o t h e t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e is difficult to quantify; we are asked to believe t h a t w i t h o u t t h e h o n o r c o d e , t h e r e w o u l d b e even m o r e violence a n d insecurity t h a n t h e r e is. Empirically, t h o u g h , societies p r a c t i c i n g v e n d e t t a s are at t h e h i g h end of t h e k n o w n scale of violent d e a t h (Keeley 1 9 9 6 ) . If this is t h e best functional a l t e r n a t i v e t h e r e is, it is n o n e t o o successful. T h e security it p r o v i d e s is illusory. We m i g h t further a r g u e t h a t societies w i t h h o n o r codes are u n u s u a l l y violent, because t h e y t e n d t o escalate m i n o r dis- a g r e e m e n t s i n t o violent o n e s , a n d t o m a n u f a c t u r e occasions for t r o u b l e w h e r e n o n e need exist.

A n o t h e r k i n d of empirical p o i n t also tells against the rationalistic expla- n a t i o n of an h o n o r c o d e as p r o v i d i n g informal law a n d order: M a n y late- t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y fights in countries like the United States are a t t r i b u t e d to h o n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n s : altercations in b a r s , for instance, or r o a d rage shootings. These do n o t occur only in places w h e r e there is no state pene- t r a t i o n a n d no formal m e c h a n i s m s for enforcing security, but to a large e x t e n t in places t h a t are n o t at all lawless. M o r e o v e r , these are often a n o n - y m o u s public s i t u a t i o n s , w h e r e the individual has n o r e p u t a t i o n t o u p - h o l d , since there is no m e c h a n i s m for circulating such a r e p u t a t i o n . To fire a g u n i n t o the c a b of a p i c k u p t r u c k on an interstate h i g h w a y in San Diego, after a tail-gating incident over possession of the fast lane, t h e r e b y w o u n d i n g the driver a n d killing a seventeen-year-old girl sitting beside h i m (San Diego Union, M a r c h 8 a n d M a r c h 1 3 , 2 0 0 4 ) can be c o n s t r u e d as an h o n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; b u t it does n o t h i n g to establish the r e p u t a t i o n of a n y o n e as n o t to be messed w i t h ; n o r does it invoke the possibility of g r o u p revenge, since no g r o u p identities are displayed. T h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h h o n o r c o d e violence is s u p p o s e d to be functional are n o t present, b u t t h e b e h a v i o r is.

M y p o i n t i s t h a t so-called h o n o r c o d e violence i s n o t a n a v o i d a n c e p r o c e s s , m o t i v a t e d by fear a n d lack of security, b u t an aggressively p r o - active o n e , m o t i v a t e d by seeking elite s t a t u s . It is n o t a w a y of k e e p i n g up w i t h e v e r y o n e else, a r a t i o n a l i s t i c tit-for-tat e g a l i t a r i a n self-help security e n f o r c e m e n t , b u t an i n e g a l i t a r i a n m o v e to raise oneself a b o v e o t h e r s . I offer t w o sources of evidence:

S t a g i n g F a i r F i g h t s • 2 3 1

O n e is that many fights do n o t occur even where the h o n o r code is s u p - posed to be in place; m a n y slights are n o t t a k e n , m a n y provocations are n o t interpreted as such. G o u l d (2003) describes societies such as nine- teenth-century Corsica, w h e r e the h o n o r culture p u r p o r t e d l y d e m a n d s t h a t family m e m b e r s back each other up in m u r d e r o u s vendettas; b u t in fact his evidence ( 1 2 1 - 3 3 ) shows t h a t the great majority of vendettas do n o t go beyond the m o s t immediate links of p a y b a c k ; m o s t people shirk their al- leged h o n o r obligations to get involved in an extended exchange of m u r - ders. This is in keeping w i t h my general t h e m e : t h a t m o s t people are n o t g o o d at violent confrontations, a n d only w i t h special circumstances are they able to carry t h e m t h r o u g h . 3 4 This fits the p a t t e r n , t o o , t h a t only a small n u m b e r of persons perform virtually all of the violence; this is a p r a c - tical reality, k n o w n to those w h o are in violent situations, a n d it gives rise to a sense of stratification between a violent elite (or at least a blustering, violent-appearing elite) a n d the majority w h o back d o w n from fights. This, I submit, is w h a t we see in situations d o m i n a t e d by the h o n o r code: n o t t h a t everyone lives up to the code, b u t t h a t the c o m m u n i t y is palpably divided into an elite of t o u g h guys a n d t o u g h groups (whether they are called gangs, families, clans, aristocrats, etc.), a n d those w h o are subject to t h e m (whether as c o m m o n e r s , followers, persons u n d e r protection, payers of protection, etc.); a m o n g Wilkinson's (2003) N e w York violent elite, they are called " p u n k s " or " h e r b s . " This stratification is a strong structural correlate of the existence of h o n o r c o d e s . 3 5

T h e second source of evidence is t h a t in h o n o r c o d e s i t u a t i o n s , individu- als often go l o o k i n g for t r o u b l e . T h e y are n o t merely defending themselves against slights, peacefully m i n d i n g their o w n business otherwise. These are precisely t h e scenes or r e c u r r e n t situations w h e r e p e o p l e are hypersen- sitive, a n d w h e r e they d o things t o p r o v o k e o t h e r s , t o drive t h e m t o the edge. T h e typical micro-scenario of h o n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n s revealed in con- t e m p o r a r y e t h n o g r a p h y is w h e r e s o m e o n e uses a repertoire of half-insults, insolent gestures, a n d verbal games to p r o v o k e s o m e o n e else i n t o a fight. T h e r h e t o r i c a n d the i d i o m is t h a t of h o n o r , b u t here t h e h o n o r code is being used provocatively, n o t defensively; it provides an excuse for fight- ing while p u t t i n g the o n u s on the o t h e r for h a v i n g b e h a v e d o u t r a g e o u s l y a n d t h u s deserving t h e violence t h a t f o l l o w s . 3 6

W i l k i n s o n ( 2 0 0 3 : 140) gives an instance:

[W]e w e n t to this p a r t y a n d sometimes I t h o u g h t I w a s the m a n 'cause I s m o k e d w e e d so I t h o u g h t I w a s t h e m a n . So I used to act like a fool, profile, I used to profile h a r d . Going into p a r t i e s , r o c k my s h o u l d e r s , b u m p i n g p e o p l e . A n d after the p a r t y w a s over I got j u m p e d a n d I got s t a b b e d twice. . . . I w a s n ' t b y myself, t h o u g h . Everybody t h a t w a s w i t h m e r a n .

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This fight was not a face c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; the fifteen-year-old w h o h a d d o n e all the b u m p i n g and "profiling h a r d " w a s stabbed in the back by s o m e o n e w h o ran up on him after the party; his c o m p a n i o n s acted ignominiously t o o , r u n n i n g away.

In a n o t h e r case, the interviewee recalls t h a t his father had three h a n d - guns in the h o u s e , which his teenage sons b o r r o w e d a n d lent o u t to their friends (Wilkinson 2 0 0 3 : 5 4 ) :

INT: And w h a t w a s the reason they w a s b o r r o w i n g these g u n s , they h a d beef?

J E R O M E : N o . They just w a n t e d t o hold t h e m .

INT: And w h a t h a p p e n ? . . . they w e n t o u t there d o i n g stupid shit and they got c a u g h t up in the mix?

J E R O M E : Yup. And these is the people t h a t we g r e w up with and stuff, the only friends we h a d , the only friends we knew.

INT: And they all got killed. H o w did t h a t m a k e you feel?

J E R O M E : It had me fucked up 'cause even before we lent them the g u n , it w a s cool. A n d , u m , its like w h e n , after we let t h e m , w h e n we let them hold it, it seemed like. . . . They changed into they w o r l d . I w a s w h a t , I w a s in the, u m , we w a s in the seventh g r a d e . We used to mess with the eighth a n d n i n t h g r a d e r s . It w a s like everybody w a s scared of us 'cause everybody k n e w wc h a d g u n s .

Several r e s p o n d e n t s explicitly linked the d a n g e r o u s n e s s of a neigh- b o r h o o d with looking for t r o u b l e :

INT: H o w w o u l d you describe your n e i g h b o r h o o d on the terms of safety?

O M A R : It's alright, it's alright, you could walk over there and a i n ' t n o b o d y g o n n a mess with you | by y o u , he m e a n t the interviewer, a t o u g h - l o o k i n g y o u n g male of H i s p a n i c origin]. J u s t d o n ' t act up and try to rule shit, rule the street.

INT: So there is a lot of violence?

O M A R : If you look for it you g o n n a find it. (Wilkinson 2 0 0 3 : 5 0 - 5 1 )

T h e r e is no deterrence in this repertoire of p r o v o c a t i o n , no concern for providing future security. W h a t it does accomplish is t w o things: it elevates (or a t t e m p t s to elevate) the p e r p e t r a t o r as a tough guy, one of the elite; here again we see t h a t the code of " h o n o r " is merely a claim to be

Staging Fair Fights • 2 3 3

s u p e r i o r to o t h e r peopl e. A n d it provides a scene of a c t i o n — e x c i t e m e n t , collective effervescence, s i t u a t i o n a l e n t e r t a i n m e n t , w h a t in black street culture is referred to as " s h o w t i m e " (Anderson 1999). T h e street elites b o t h m a k e the scene a n d d o m i n a t e t h e scene.

An h o n o r c o d e is an ideology of stratification t h a t emerges in p a r t i c u l a r kinds of social s t r u c t u r e s ; it is a justification, a moralistic cover t h a t oper- ates to give a veneer of legitimacy to stratification, just like any o t h e r stratification system. In this case, it is the b l a t a n t stratification of the vio- lent over t h e unviolent, of g r o u p s w h o m a k e t o u g h n e s s an organizing principle over t h o s e w h o are n o t so t o u g h . To e x p l a i n this by a m o d e of functionalist sociology is no better t h a n older functionalist theories of stratification t h a t t o o k ideologies of d o m i n a t i o n at face value a n d con- strued t h e m as real c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the collective g o o d .

A similar line of analysis applies to " d i s r e s p e c t " a n d "seeking r e s p e c t . " In c o n t e m p o r a r y times, " d i s r e s p e c t " is a favorite excuse for a t t a c k i n g the w e a k in public s i t u a t i o n s . It is sociologically naive to t a k e such excuses at face value. T h e y are an instance of the m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e t h a t Goffman (1967) a n d others (Scott a n d Lyman 1968) call " a c c o u n t s " : a ritual r e p a i r for a v i o l a t i o n of n o r m a l i n t e r a c t i o n a l flow, a category t h a t includes n o t only excuses b u t also e x p l a n a t i o n s , apologies, admissions of guilt, as well as shifting t h e b l a m e to s o m e o n e else. Some kinds of ac- c o u n t s are m o r e insincere or self-serving t h a n o t h e r s ; all we need to n o t e is t h a t m a k i n g an excuse for being violent implies an admission t h a t t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g t h a t needs excusing. Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.

Fighting for " r e s p e c t " can be a version of b l a m i n g the victim, except t h a t the p e r p e t r a t o r r a t h e r t h a n the analyst m a k e s the self-serving d i a g n o - sis. T h e altruistic middle-class observer, s t a n d i n g outside the struggle over c o n t r o l w h i c h goes on in areas of y o u t h a n d gang violence, is a p r i m e audience for such justifications. J a n k o w s k i ( 1 9 9 1 : 2 5 5 , 2 6 4 - 7 0 ) observes t h a t g a n g m e m b e r s are well a w a r e of s y m p a t h e t i c t r e a t m e n t s in the m a s s m e d i a , a n d of the prevailing discourse a m o n g c o u r t officials a n d o t h e r social service professionals, a n d frame their justifications to fit w h a t will m a k e t h e best imp r es s i on. It is possible t h a t the lower-class slang " t o d i s s " ("he dissed m e " ) is a case of linguistic t r i c k l e - d o w n from social science, i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e t e n d e n c y for m a n y slang expressions t o m o v e u p w a r d from t h e lower class.

As in the case of fair fights staged as single c o m b a t , the b r o a d e r category of fighting justified by " d i s r e s p e c t " aims to establish a social hierarchy. T h e discourse of " r e s p e c t " is found a b o v e all in t h e r e a l m of gangs, cov- ering such offenses as violating a g a n g ' s t er r i to ry (being in t h e w r o n g n e i g h b o r h o o d , for w h a t e v e r r e a s o n ) , as well as c o n v e n t i o n a l challenges w h e n e n c o u n t e r i n g a m e m b e r of a rival g a n g , or s o m e o n e w h o is sus- p e c t e d of belonging to a rival g a n g , or merely s o m e o n e w h o is an outsider.

234 • Chapter 6

O n e m i g h t describe g a n g culture as a culture of respect, or m o r e accu- rately, a culture of looking for w h a t can be called disrespect, in o r d e r to start a fight.

Just such gangs are the ones t h a t a t t e m p t to present themselves as elites, at least in the local area w h e r e they h o l d sway. Katz (1988) describes t h e m as "street elites," ruling over the c o m m o n p e o p l e in their n e i g h b o r h o o d w h o d o n ' t belong t o g a n g s — o r rather, claiming t o rule o r c o n t r o l " w h a t goes on a r o u n d h e r e , " since in fact this is m o s t l y p o s t u r i n g , a n d relatively little in t h e area is u n d e r their c o n t r o l . J a n k o w s k i (1991) describes gang m e m b e r s as "defiant individualists," p e r s o n s w h o are t o o self-willed to give in to o r d i n a r y social c o n t r o l s ; they explicitly reject the prospects of a working-class job a n d a i m to become p a r t of the w e a l t h y a n d powerful, enjoying its luxuries a n d displaying t h e easy use of money, w h i c h is t a k e n as an e m b l e m of success. T h e i r a i m to be u p p e r class, to be sure, is acted o u t by local s t a n d a r d s of w h a t is frequently a p o v e r t y a r e a , so t h e luxuries c o m e m o s t l y in the form of drugs a n d sex, a n d deference is found m a i n l y by lording it over local p e r s o n s w h o are p o o r e r a n d weaker, a n d in ritual challenges to other gangs constituting m u t u a l v a l i d a t i o n of each o t h e r ' s s t a n d i n g . Katz ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 0 - 2 1 ) m a k e s the telling o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t lower- class ethnic gangs c h o o s e n a m e s t h a t are wildly self-aggrandizing: " K i n g s , " " P h a r a o h s , " " V i c e r o y s , " " L o r d s , " e t c . 3 7 T h e y are "defiant indi- vidualists," t o o , in the sense t h a t they are self-centered, a t t e m p t i n g to impose themselves on others to the e x t e n t they can get a w a y w i t h it.

T h e tactic of picking fights by accusations of disrespect is found a m o n g individuals as well as a m o n g gangs. Katz refers to such individuals by the self-adopted v e r n a c u l a r as " b a d a s s " (one of a series of such t e r m s p o r t r a y i n g oneself as " b a d , " deliberately evil; the w h i t e Mafia t e r m w a s " w i s e g u y " ) . O n e could impose a rationalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u p o n such self-presentation: the belligerent s t a r e , t h e cocky b o d y - s t a n c e , the d a r k glasses a n d clothes chosen to express alienation a n d t h r e a t , the cultivating of a r e p u t a t i o n as willing to h u r t a n y o n e at the slightest p r o v o c a t i o n — a l l these could be t a k e n as a strategy to fend off t r o u b l e , to s h o w t h a t one is n o t t o b e messed w i t h . Nevertheless, a b o v e a n d b e y o n d such considera- t i o n s , as K a t z stresses, the chief priority of the " b a d a s s " is to display his d o m i n a n c e over w h o m e v e r he e n c o u n t e r s . T h e violent elite also w a n t s to be in t h e center of illicit action, g a m b l i n g , w h o r i n g , p a r t y i n g precisely because it is w h e r e the center of a t t e n t i o n of c o u n t e r - n o r m a l society is. As Goffman (1967) says, " w h e r e t h e action i s " is the r e a l m of testing o n e ' s c h a r a c t e r by being on the edge, s h o w i n g one's superiority over other p e r s o n s a n d over the banality of o r d i n a r y lifestyles precisely because one takes risks o t h e r s will n o t t a k e , a n d t a k e s t h e m w i t h a p l o m b , s h o w i n g t h a t o n e is a denizen of this w o r l d a n d n o t merely a t o u r i s t in it. " W h e n

Staging Fair Fights • 235

people party all night or for days on end, they d o n ' t have fun, as they might at a children's p a r t y ; they are into the a c t i o n " (Katz 1988: 2 0 0 ) . Goffman's prime e x a m p l e of the world of action is the g a m b l e r ; Goffman- ian face-contests a m o n g street h o o d l u m s are no mere utilitarian m a n e u - vers to assure p r o t e c t i o n , b u t are the same kind of thing as m a k i n g o n e ' s reputation as a riverboat gambler.

T h e w o r l d of " d i s r e s p e c t " fights differs from dueling and o t h e r staged fair fights in its c u r t a i l m e n t of etiquette: the formalities of agreeing w h e n and where to fight, h o w the fight is declared over, a n d the general t o n e of courtesy in following these rules, w h i c h m a r k the p a r t i c i p a n t s off as gen- try. In s h o r t , w h a t differs is precisely w h a t m a k e s some of the fights focus on being fair fights—the display of fairness and respect for the rules is w h a t enacts o n e ' s claim to being in an elite g r o u p . G a n g fights a n d t o u g h - guy tactics also claim elite m e m b e r s h i p , but by a different p a t h w a y : not by respecting self-limiting rules but by defying t h e m , m a k i n g a spectacle of h o w far one is beyond the b o u n d s of propriety. T h e p u r e t o u g h guy is a c o m m u n i t y elite, but he does n o t occupy an institutionalized position; w h a t he lacks is the a p p a r a t u s for scheduled, scripted, and publicly an- n o u n c e d rituals in which he gets d o m i n a n c e . He is constantly improvising, m a k i n g himself a situational elite.

T h e places w h e r e h o n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n s occur gives a clue to the social audience they are appealing t o . Street violence is almost literally in the street. In Wilkinson's date ( 2 0 0 3 : 180) 72 percent of violent events oc- curred on the street or corner, at a d r u g spot, or at a party or club (in t h a t o r d e r ) ; for events involving g u n s , 87 percent occurred in those locales. G u n s w e t e virtually never used in schools (4.3 percent), a n d stores, h o m e s , s p o r t s , and p a r k s were less likely locales. Sanders ( 1 9 9 4 : 54) simi- larly finds West Coast gang violence most frequently in the street, w i t h only a tiny percentage at schools (1.1 percent) a n d recreation centers (1.6 percent). All this is to say t h a t violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s occur in the places t h a t are the stages for action, the g a n g ' s o w n turf, or hot spots t h a t are the action for everyone; in places w h e r e the kind of event going on is of a different sort (schools, athletics, homes) there is little violence. West C o a s t gangs, moreover, keep their violence segregated within their o w n ethnic g r o u p . M e x i c a n - A m e r i c a n gangs fight rivals from different b arrio s; w h e n they engage in robberies, their targets arc generally n o n - g a n g m e m - bers w h o live in their o w n ethnic n e i g h b o r h o o d (Sanders 1 9 9 4 : 1 2 3 , 134). T h e r e is an element of ethnic eliteness in this self-segregation of violence; C h i c a n o gangs tend to act as if blacks, whites, a n d Asians are outside of their universe of h o n o r a n d retaliation, not even w o r t h fighting. 5 8 In this respect it a p p r o a c h e s the dueling culture, organized by ethnic g r o u p s in- stead of by social class.

2 3 6 • Chapter 6

TABLE 6.3 Severity of fights in scheduled and unscheduled situations

Fight Serious Mild Aborts

Scheduled situation 2 1 ( 4 2 % ) 2 2 ( 4 4 % ) 7 ( 1 4 % ) 5 0

Unscheduled situation 5 ( 1 3 % ) 18 ( 4 6 % ) 16 ( 4 1 % ) 39

Total 2 6 4 0 2 3 89

We are finally in a p o s i t i o n to a n s w e r the question t h a t I left dangling earlier: given t h a t audiences h a v e a huge effect on w h e t h e r a fight will be serious, mild, o r a b o r t i v e , h o w can w e explain w h e n t h e audience will t a k e o n e stance o r a n o t h e r ? Audiences t h a t cheer o r otherwise s u p p o r t a n d e n c o u r a g e the c o m b a t a n t s t e n d t o p r o m o t e serious f i g h t s ; 3 ' mildly involved s p e c t a t o r s t e n d to get p r o l o n g e d if often milder fights; uneasy a n d fearful s p e c t a t o r s t e n d to p r o d u c e abortive fights or at least mild ones; a n d spectators w h o intervene m a k e fights either a b o r t or stay at a mild level. N e u t r a l s p e c t a t o r s similarly t e n d to see mild or abortive fights, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n being w h e r e t h e fighters are in big e n o u g h g r o u p s so t h a t they p r o v i d e their o w n a u d i e n c e s , i n w h i c h case t h e e x t e r n a l audience becomes irrelevant.

W h a t m a k e s the audience focused a n d favorable to t h e fight, or t a k e a c o n t r a r y attitude? Prior a n n o u n c e m e n t of a fight d r a w s a s u p p o r t i v e c r o w d , a n d n o d o u b t selects o u t those w h o are n o t s u p p o r t i v e ; other f i g h t s develop spontaneously, b u t in situations w h e r e t h e r e is p r i o r scheduling of a gathering for the p u r p o s e s of c a r o u s i n g , or w h a t in the following c h a p t e r we will consider as " m o r a l h o l i d a y s . " Unscheduled, u n s c r i p t e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n s in o r d i n a r y practical circumstances of daily life are m u c h less likely to give rise to s u p p o r t i v e audiences, a n d hence to carrying t h r o u g h a serious fight. 4 0 A n t a g o n i s t i c c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t occur in t r a n s - p o r t a t i o n situations generally have audiences t h a t are concerned w i t h their o w n p a t h s , a n d they m a y well t r e a t the fight as a cause of a traffic j a m , w h i c h they w a n t to avoid (as in the case of the bicyclist w h o con- fronted a t a x i driver a n d became subjected to t h e pressure of h o n k i n g cars). C r o w d s w h o are assembled merely a d h o c , because they h a p p e n t o be going s o m e w h e r e , are less likely to consist in sizable g r o u p s , a n d are highly unlikely t o k n o w w h o each o t h e r is. I n the o t h e r direction, w h e r e t h e audience already has a n e t w o r k of r e l a t i o n s h i p s , their likelihood of t a k i n g a definitive s t a n d on the fight goes u p ; this is all t h e m o r e so w h e r e the audience h a s a collective identity, either lo n g -term (e.g., as m e m b e r s

Staging Fair Fights • 2 3 7

of a high school), or s i t u a t i o n a l (as p a r t i c i p a n t s in a c a r o u s i n g s i t u a t i o n ) ; similarly w i t h better established g r o u p n e t w o r k s , identities of the fighters are k n o w n , a n d the c r o w d can cheer t h e m o n a s individuals. Scheduling a n d social publicity a b o u t t h e p e r s o n s involved increase t h e possibility of serious violence; episodic a g g l o m e r a t i o n s of p e r s o n s in the same place, w h e r e a n o n y m i t y is high all the w a y a r o u n d , r e d u c e the possibility of sustained violence. A n d this a p p e a r s to be the case, on the evidence, de- spite the r e p u t a t i o n of a n o n y m o u s c r o w d s for being d a n g e r o u s . But fighters need social s u p p o r t to o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension; a c c o r d - ingly, dense social n e t w o r k s are potentially m o r e d a n g e r o u s t h a n sparse.

But this is n o t e n o u g h . T h e audience m a y consist of well-organized n e t w o r k s , but h o w m u c h violence it will s u p p o r t d e p e n d s on a d d i t i o n a l factors. Some c r o w d s , in my d a t a , a t t e m p t e d to m e d i a t e or break up fights, usually w i t h at least m o d e r a t e success against small fights; o t h e r audiences, as in the case of nineteenth-century French duels, m a n i p u l a t e d the s h o w so t h a t the a m o u n t of d a m a g e w a s kept r a t h e r low. Some a u d i - ences p r o m o t e staged fair fights; o t h e r s cheer any kind of fight at all, a n d may join in palpably unfair fights. 4 1 H e r e the o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s already discussed c o m e into play; an elite status g r o u p p r o m o t i n g dueling, or a closed a n d r a n k e d c o m m u n i t y like a high school p r o m o t i n g its o w n well- publicized hierarchy. And fighting schools, of c o u r s e , t u r n every aspect of the fight into a scheduled e n c o u n t e r in a n e t w o r k of collective identity and k n o w n r e p u t a t i o n s ; hence they can fine-tune the a m o u n t of violence to a very high degree.

T H E C U L T U R A L P R E S T I G E O F F A I R A N D U N F A I R F I G H T S

We have seen t h r o u g h o u t t h a t the f u n d a m e n t a l reality of violence is con- frontational tension/fear. T h e vast majority of fights are decidedly n o t brave, c o m p e t e n t , a n d evenly m a t c h e d . H o w did we get the idea t h a t this is w h a t fights are like? Staged fair fights do exist, b u t only w h e r e there are c o n d i t i o n s to s u p p o r t t h e m . But even at those times, m o s t violence is n o t at all fair. Leaving aside the kinds of p a t h w a y s a r o u n d tension/fear t h a t I have been developing in these c h a p t e r s , w h a t o t h e r kind of violence is there? W h e r e t h e r e is an organized s t r u c t u r e of power, it does n o t seek a fair fight, but to w i n , a n d therefore to have an unfair fight. Police do n o t seek a fair fight, b u t to bring o v e r w h e l m i n g force against any resis- t a n c e . Armies a t t e m p t the same, a l t h o u g h n o t always w i t h success against o p p o s i n g armies. Parents d o n ' t have fair fights w i t h children, but seek to enforce discipline. Similarly with organized crime such as the Mafia: they are largely in the enforcement business, a n d hence seek m a x i m a l intimida-

238 • Chapter 6

t i o n . T h e Mafia has their o w n n o t i o n of honor, b u t it is n o t t h e n o t i o n of h o n o r in a fair fight.

Fair fights u s u r p the ar chet ype of w h a t fighting is s u p p o s e d to be a b o u t , chiefly because they are the m o s t d r a m a t i c form. They are w h a t m a k e s up m u c h of the c o n t e n t of literature, d r a m a , p o p u l a r e n t e r t a i n m e n t , as well as informal gossip a b o u t real fights. A staged fair fight, such as a duel, is full of d r a m a t i c elements: it establishes p l o t tension, progresses t h r o u g h several levels of suspense, a n d provides delays so t h a t suspense c a n build; it focuses the audience on just w h a t to expect, including the m o m e n t s of highest d r a m a w h e r e the greatest uncertainties are to be found—magnifying the intensity of uncertainties by m a k i n g t h e m b o u n d e d uncertainties. It m a k e s heroes a n d also tragic h e r o e s ; t h e p l o t c a n be played on a simple level of h e r o beats villain, b u t also on a high literary level w i t h h e r o t a k i n g an inner victory t h o u g h an o u t e r defeat; a n d t h u s a fair-fight story c a n play a m o r a l lesson, even w i t h religious o v e r t o n e s . It m a k e s r o o m for gallantry as well as c o u r a g e a n d skill, a n d t h u s builds up d r a m a t i c leads, heroes in every sense of the t e r m . 4 2

T h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t once s u p p o r t e d the real-life version of fair fights, however, w e r e historically specific, a n d are n o w a l m o s t entirely o u t of d a t e . Even in their day, I have suggested, duels were m o r e image a n d s h o w t h a n reality, a n d m o s t of t h e actual practice of t h e m w a s literally practice s h o w s in t r a i n i n g schools. Ancient berserkers a n d Homeric-style heroes n o d o u b t existed, b u t even t h e n the significant battles w e r e w o n n o t b y t h e m b u t by relatively m o r e organized t r o o p s t h a t engaged in state-build- ing c o n q u e s t s .

In c o n t e m p o r a r y times, o n e aspect of the r h e t o r i c of fair fights contin- ues t o b e used: the n o t i o n t h a t one f i g h t s t o defend h o n o r a n d o v e r c o m e disrespect. T h i s t o o , I h a v e suggested, is mostly self-advertisement a n d self-justification. Individuals w h o practice leap-frog escalation do n o t m a k e up a socially recognized s t r a t u m ; a n d they are n o t engaging in staged fair fights. T h e raisons d'etre of gangs a n d organized crime practice are distinctive forms of violence, b u t for neither is it the staged fair fight.

For gangs, the typical p a t t e r n of violence is t h e v e n d e t t a . In reality, this looks a lot like c o w a r d i c e , ganging up on w e a k or e x p o s e d victims. A n d it is often i n c o m p e t e n t , in the specific sense t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s w h o are aimed a t d o n o t get hit, b u t r a t h e r s o m e o n e else w h o h a p p e n s t o be in the r a t h e r wild line of fire. For the g a n g ' s p u r p o s e s , this k i n d of i n c o m p e t e n c e is n o t necessarily a b a d thing; they are engaged in collective vengeance a n d collective r e p u t a t i o n - b u i l d i n g , so it does n o t m a t t e r if they hit one or a n o t h e r m e m b e r (or friend or relative) of the o p p o s i n g g a n g . It does n o t even m a t t e r if it is some bystander w h o is hit, since this serves as a generalized a t t a c k on the o t h e r ' s c o m m u n i t y a n d s h o w s t h a t the rival

Staging Fair Fights • 239

gang is not capable of defending its territory. Even if n o t t h a t , it s h o w s t h a t o n e ' s g a n g is particularly r o u g h , b a d , s o m e t h i n g to be f e a r e d . 4 3

N o t to say t h a t gangs never engage in staged fair fights. T h e s e occur chiefly a m o n g their o w n m e m b e r s , as initiation rites; or as w a y s of settling disputes, including their o w n a m b i t i o n s over r a n k w i t h i n t h e g r o u p (Jan- k o w s k i 1 9 9 1 : 1 4 1 - 4 8 ) . 4 4 I n these instances, the g r o u p acts a s audience a n d limiter of t h e violence. T h u s staged fair fights are p u t to g o o d use, as far as the o r g a n i z a t i o n is c o n c e r n e d , in keeping up solidarity a n d minimiz- ing d a m a g e to its o w n forces.

O r g a n i z e d crime, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , does n o t engage in staged fights at all. T h e Mafia eliminates m o s t ritualism a r o u n d violence itself. Its fami- lies fight to m o n o p o l i z e territories, b u t they do n o t fight over merely ritual a n d physical incursions i n t o their c o m m u n i t i e s , the w a y g a n g m e m b e r s d o ; they do n o t engage in challenges over " w h e r e ya f r o m " or insult each o t h e r ' s insignia. In p a r t this is because Mafia families a t t e m p t to keep up a cartel structure as a w a y of regularizing business; they are n o t interested i n h o n o r challenges for their o w n sake ( G a m b e t t a 1 9 9 3 ; Katz 1 9 8 8 : 2 5 6 - 6 2 ; Bourgois 1 9 9 5 : 7 0 - 7 6 ; see also references in c h a p t e r 1 1 , n o t e 16). In p a r t it is a difference in the tactics of fighting, a n d a b o v e all t h e p r e l i m i n a r - ies of building up to a fight. T h e Mafia's favorite tactic is deception: k e e p - ing up a p p e a r a n c e s of n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , including friendly sociability w i t h o n e ' s possible e n e m i e s . 4 5

Mafia killings d e p e n d u p o n careful p l a n n i n g , based o n k n o w i n g the r o u t i n e s of o t h e r players, as well as u p - t o - t h e - m i n u t e i n f o r m a t i o n as to w h e r e p e r s o n s are at any o n e time. This is w h a t m a k e s possible t h e s u d d e n a t t a c k , catching one's o p p o n e n t u n a w a r e . Mafia practice of violence hinges on treachery, since it plays on ostensibly friendly or at least n o r m a l relationships in o r d e r to get close to o p p o n e n t s a n d c a t c h t h e m off g u a r d . This is a distinctive w a y of o v e r c o m i n g tension/fear: the a p p e a r a n c e of c o n f r o n t a t i o n is avoided until t h e very last m o m e n t ; t h u s it is n o t socially real for t h e a t t a c k e r either, enabling h i m to m a k e his moves w i t h n o r m a l confidence. Mafia enforcers a n d hired hit-men t h u s a p p e a r to o p e r a t e at a level of violent c o m p e t e n c e t h a t is m u c h higher t h a n t h a t of gangs, a n d indeed of the police.

G a n g s generally c a n n o t m a t c h Mafia c o m p e t e n c e in o v e r c o m i n g ten- sion/fear a n d carrying o u t precise hits on i n t e n d e d t a r g e t s . T h e i r entire style of social intercourse a n d violent i n t e r a c t i o n is different; since gangs are p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h advertising themselves as n e i g h b o r h o o d elites a n d p r o t e c t o r s , bluster a n d o p e n display is their m e t h o d ; t h e Mafia's emphasis on deceptiveness in public a n d on i m p e n e t r a b l e backstage loyal- ties r u n s in a direction t h a t gangs are n o t p r e p a r e d to e m u l a t e . G a n g s hit at o p p o s i n g gangs r a t h e r indiscriminately, in practicing collective ven- geance or i n t i m i d a t i o n ; the Mafia target p a r t i c u l a r individuals in o p p o s -

2 4 0 • Chapter 6

ing o r g a n i z a t i o n s , or indeed in their o w n o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h e n t h e r e is a disciplinary issue or p o w e r struggle. Mafia c o n t r o l tactics are premised on a higher level of individual accuracy in t h e use of violence. In their display of ritual styles of violence, the Mafia comes across as ruthless a n d effective, w h e r e gangs a p p e a r as h o t - h e a d e d a n d i m m a t u r e .

P e r h a p s this explains w h y there has been a shift in recent decades t o - w a r d a r o m a n t i c i z a t i o n of the Mafia. P o p u l a r e n t e r t a i n m e n t becomes less focused on t h e c o w b o y gunfighter, or even on the p r i v a t e detective, b o t h of w h i c h are late versions of t h e individual h e r o . T h e classic films of these genres—High Noon, The Maltese Falcon, Clint E a s t w o o d w e s t e r n s , a n d o t h e r s — a r e a b o u t the heroic individual fighter, keeping up h o n o r at all p e r s o n a l cost. These are historically t r a n s i t i o n a l figures, r o m a n t i c i z e d o u t of all p r o p o r t i o n to their real-life representatives. T h i s is n o t surprising, given t h a t t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d has little of the social structures t h a t s u p p o r t the ethos of staged fair fights, w h i c h is w h e r e heroes are m a n u f a c - t u r e d . A version, of c o u r s e , exists in t h e w o r l d of s p o r t s , b u t explicitly staged for e n t e r t a i n m e n t a n d t h u s p a l p a b l y artificial.

O u r chief c o n t e m p o r a r y ar chet ype for r o m a n t i c i z e d violent reality has b e c o m e the Mafia family. It fills t h e niche vacated by the o u t g o i n g heirs of the duelists, because it h a s an equally compelling d r a m a t i c form. Its s t r u c t u r e is different b u t provides t h e s a m e deep elements of a successful d r a m a : p l o t tension a n d suspense. Since Mafia o r g a n i z a t i o n is c o n c e r n e d a b o v e all w i t h m o n i t o r i n g each other, to m a i n t a i n loyalty as well as to m a k e possible successful d e c e p t i o n w h e n an enemy is to be suddenly hit, it is a w o r l d in w h i c h everyone is c o n s t a n t l y on t h e w a t c h . G a m b e t t a (1993) n o t e s this for Sicily: in c o m m u n i t i e s w h e r e the Mafia is strong, everyone is c o n n e c t e d w i t h it in one w a y or another, w a t c h i n g each o t h e r ' s m o v e m e n t s , r e a d y to r e p o r t on w h e r e p e o p l e a r e . This gives Sicilian vil- lages a t o n e of o m i n o u s alertness a n d silence. O t h e r w i s e i n n o c u o u s activi- ties t a k e on significance, since t h e r e is no telling w h e r e a friend or a n o r - m a l passer-by or w o r k e r m a y t u r n o u t to be a killer; or conversely w h e r e oneself m a y be playing o n e of these n o r m a l roles in o r d e r to get close to s o m e o n e w h o is to be killed. It is a m e t h o d of violence a n d fending off violence t h a t plays up the Goffmanian staging of everyday life, a n d gives it a life-or-death significance.

T h e r e is a n o t h e r side of the Mafia t h a t a d d s to the r o m a n t i c i z a t i o n : b e n e a t h the layers of deception in the o u t e r rings of organized crime net- w o r k s , t h e r e are core g r o u p s ; these are real families, or pseudo-families practicing f i c t i v e k i n s h i p . 4 6 T h e s e , t o o , are readily t u r n e d into entertain- m e n t , b o t h as sentimental depictions of solidarity in e x t e n d e d kinship g r o u p i n g s t h a t h a v e b e c o m e r a r e r in A m e r i c a n life, a n d in satirical or serious t r e a t m e n t s of their real family t r i b u l a t i o n s . Mafia families m a k e for s o a p o p e r a m e l o d r a m a as well as for suspense thrillers. In either di-

Staging Fair Fights • 241

m e n s i o n , they t u r n the o r d i n a r y details of everyday life into s o m e t h i n g of significance, against the b a c k d r o p of potential e r u p t i o n s of v i o l e n c e . 4 7

Fair fights or deceptive trickery, or even the d r a w n - o u t cycles of vendet- tas: these provide ways of using violence as a form of d r a m a t i c entertain- ment, a n d of giving status to the persons w h o can carry them off. Perhaps this is a reason w h y n o t only in e n t e r t a i n m e n t but also in real life, there is an a t t r a c t i o n t o w a r d violence. Against this, the huge mass of ugly vio- lence t h a t we have seen in the forms of f or w ar d panics a n d a t t a c k i n g the weak fade into the b a c k g r o u n d of cultural consciousness.

C H A P T E R 7

Violence as Fun and Entertainment

C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L T E N S I O N a n d fear m a k e m o s t p e o p l e m o s t o f t h e t i m e a v o i d t h e a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e of violence, a n d act i n c o m p e t e n t l y w h e n t h e y are in violent s i t u a t i o n s . We h a v e been t r a c i n g a series of p a t h w a y s a r o u n d this o b s t a c l e , w a y s o f c i r c u m n a v i g a t i n g c o n f r o n t a - t i o n a l tension/fear. T h e r e are t w o m a i n r o u t e s . T h e first r o u t e i s at- t a c k i n g a w e a k victim; this c a n be d o n e in a variety of w a y s , t h e m o s t s p e c t a c u l a r of w h i c h is f o r w a r d p a n i c . T h e second r o u t e is to confine violence in a p r o t e c t e d enclave, staged a n d o r g a n i z e d so t h a t violence is limited or at least p r e d i c t a b l y s h a p e d , a n d t h e social t e n s i o n of c o n f r o n - t a t i o n is displaced by a collective c o n c e r n for s o m e o t h e r a s p e c t of the s i t u a t i o n . T h i s second p a t h w a y splits i n t o s u b p a t h s . T h e p r e v i o u s c h a p - ter dealt w i t h staged fair fights; t h e r e t h e key d i s p l a c e m e n t is t h a t t h e fighters are t r e a t e d as an elite by themselves a n d their a u d i e n c e ; m e m b e r - ship in this elite c o m m u n i t y b e c o m e s t h e o v e r r i d i n g s i t u a t i o n a l c o n c e r n , b i n d i n g f i g h t e r s t o each o t h e r a n d allaying t e n s i o n a n d fear. N e v e r t h e - less, as we h a v e seen in d u e l s , t e n s i o n a n d fear persist a n d cause i n c o m p e - t e n t p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l b r e a c h o f i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t never goes a w a y ; like t h e r e t u r n of t h e r e p r e s s e d , it affects t h e p a t t e r n of violence, even in p r o t e c t e d enclaves. A n o t h e r s u b p a t h w a y is the ven- d e t t a , in w h i c h violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n is limited as a series of r e c i p r o c a l m o v e s s p r e a d o u t i n t i m e . A n d s t a g e d a n d b a l a n c e d f i g h t s c o u l d b r e a k d o w n , lacking social o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d s u p p o r t , i n t o a species of at- t a c k i n g t h e w e a k w i t h m o m e n t a r i l y s u p e r i o r w e a p o n r y .

This c h a p t e r a n d the following e x a m i n e yet a n o t h e r s u b p a t h , r o u t i n e l y c o n s t r u c t e d violence t h a t is t r e a t e d as a celebration, an act of collective enjoyment, a n d t h u s widely legitimated. Some of this violence m a y be considered staged, b u t these are n o t necessarily fair fights; a n d the dy- namic is not t h a t of fighters s h o w i n g off their elite m e m b e r s h i p in front of an a d m i r i n g c r o w d — t h e key feature t h a t brings the concern for fair- ness—but mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the c r o w d itself. M o r a l holidays of loot- ing a n d traditionalized vandalism (such as H a l l o w e e n p r a n k s ) have a t o n e of egalitarian s a t u r n a l i a ; carousing zones create a widely shared a t m o - sphere of ebullience t h a t violence brings to a p e a k . Similarly, the varieties of violence in a n d a r o u n d sports and e n t e r t a i n m e n t events develop as c r o w d s become emotionally e n t r a i n e d in the staging of the s h o w ; and

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 243

players are carried by the m o m e n t u m of artificial conflicts i n t o limited, if technically illegitimate, violence at dr am at i cal l y a p p r o p r i a t e m o m e n t s .

These collectively c o n s t r u c t e d situations are experienced as enclaves s e p a r a t e from o r d i n a r y social life, artificial, n o t quite real; a n d the vio- lence t h a t occurs comes from s h a r e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n of everyone in an ele- vated e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e . In D u r k h e i m i a n t e r m s , this is the violence of collective effervescence a n d its m a s s solidarity. W i t h i n these artificial enclaves, just w h e n a n d h o w does violence occur? In the m i d s t of a wild p a r t y or in the c a r o u s i n g z o n e , a fight does n o t b r e a k o u t every m o m e n t . Even w h e n carousers are quite d r u n k , as we will see, t h e r e are s h a r p limits o n h o w often violence can t a k e place. J u s t w h e n violent incidents h a p p e n needs to be e x a m i n e d by focusing, t h e sociological m i c r o s c o p e m o r e closely on the c o n t o u r s of t h e s i t u a t i o n .

M O R A L H O L I D A Y S

M o r a l h o l i d a y is a classic c o n c e p t in collective behavior. T h e r e is a t e m p o - r a r y b r e a k d o w n in n o r m a l social c o n t r o l s ; police a u t h o r i t i e s are absent, or they are ignored or actively disrespected by the c r o w d . M o s t of t h e time m o s t people follow the c o n v e n t i o n s of public b e h a v i o r t h a t Goffman describes as keeping up c u s t o m a r y d e m e a n o r a n d deference; this m a k e s t h e job of policing a n a r r o w o n e of cracking d o w n on isolated distur- bances. But in a m o r a l h o l i d a y the c r o w d as a w h o l e is galvanized i n t o a collective consciousness in o p p o s i t i o n to these restraints; a u t h o r i t i e s , if present, are o v e r w h e l m e d . A m o r a l h o l i d a y comprises a free zone in t i m e a n d space, an occasion a n d a place w h e r e the feeling prevails t h a t every- day restraints are off; individuals feel p r o t e c t e d by the c r o w d , a n d are e n c o u r a g e d in n o r m a l l y f o r b i d d e n acts. Often t h e r e is an a t m o s p h e r e of celebration, or at least e x h i l a r a t i o n ; it is a h e a d y feeling of entering a special reality, separate a n d e x t r a o r d i n a r y , w h e r e there is little t h o u g h t for t h e future a n d no concern for being called to a c c o u n t . 1

A m o r a l h o l i d a y c a n t e m p o r a r i l y b r e a k d o w n a variety of n o r m a l r e - straints: on violence; on respect for property, allowing looting, v a n d a l i s m , a n d m a t e r i a l destruction; b u t also restraints o n c u s t o m a r y d e m e a n o r , t h u s allowing for s h o u t i n g , n o i s e - m a k i n g , a n d sometimes sexual display. Sometimes it is as simple as violating c u s t o m a r y restraints on public spaces, such as s t a n d i n g in t h e street. N o t everything necessarily breaks d o w n a t o n c e , a n d m o r a l holidays t e n d t o specialize i n p a r t i c u l a r kinds of violations. These a n t i n o m i a n actions usually go t h r o u g h a sequence.

T h e following e x a m p l e s h o w s m u c h o f t h e g a m u t : I n F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 2 , t h e n o w - c u s t o m a r y M a r d i G r a s c e l e b r a t i o n t o o k place a l o n g Philadel- p h i a ' s S o u t h Street, a n enclave o f c o u n t e r - c u l t u r e s h o p s a n d b a r s . A u t o

2 4 4 • C h a p t e r 7

traffic j a m m e d t h e street; p e d e s t r i a n s overflowed t h e s i d e w a l k s a n d w a l k e d a m i d s t t h e c a r s , despite t h e efforts of police b a r r i c a d e s to k e e p t h e m s e p a r a t e . E v e n t u a l l y t h e police gave u p a n d s t o p p e d a l l o w i n g cars o n t o the street. Some m e n c a r r i e d M a r d i G r a s b e a d s a n d offered t o ex- c h a n g e t h e m t o w o m e n i n r e t u r n for flashing their b r e a s t s , b u t a t this p o i n t few w o m e n did s o . (See S h r u m a n d K i l b u r n [1996] o n t h e N e w O r l e a n s v e r s i o n of this ritual.) In early evening t h e c r o w d w a s m o s t l y u n d e r - a g e y o u t h s , w h i l e t h e a d u l t s w e r e inside t h e b a r s d r i n k i n g ; a s t h e c r o w d t o o k over t h e street, p e o p l e from t h e b a r s j o i n e d the t h r o n g . T h e o b s e r v e r s a w t w o fist fights, o n e b e t w e e n t w o girls, t h e o t h e r b e t w e e n t w o guys (I follow t h e t e r m i n o l o g y of t h e college-age o b s e r v e r ) ; e a c h c o m m o t i o n a t t r a c t e d a r u s h of o n l o o k e r s to t h e s p o t , the m o s t active cheering t h e girls' f i g h t a n d yelling obscenities, u n t i l t h e f i g h t w a s b r o k e n u p b y police.

Shortly thereafter a bottle w a s t h r o w n at a police v a n . T h e precedent w a s quickly t a k e n up by a b a r r a g e of b o t t l e - t h r o w i n g . Glass w a s shat- tering; m a n y spectators r a n for cover. Some climbed on p a r k e d cars, over- t u r n e d t r a s h c a n s , a n d climbed up traffic lights a n d street signs. Young males still on t h e street n o w began aggressively accosting w o m e n , offering t h e m beads t o flash; generally frustrated b y t h e w o m e n ' s r e s p o n s e , t h e males became m o r e hostile in their l a n g u a g e a n d gestures. B o t t l e - t h r o w - ing c o n t i n u e d , along w i t h b r e a k i n g car w i n d o w s a n d side m i r r o r s a n d scratching their p a i n t . A r o u n d m i d n i g h t a line of police on h o r s e b a c k formed at the east end of the street a n d p u s h e d t h e c r o w d w e s t w a r d (the direction from w h i c h m o s t of the c r o w d h a d c o m e , since t h e street ends on t h e east at a h i g h w a y a n d river). M u c h of the c r o w d p a n i c k e d a n d r a n to the west; a smaller n u m b e r h u n g b a c k a n d h u r l e d missiles at t h e police. In a b o u t fifteen m i n u t e s , t h e c r o w d w a s dispersed, leaving a street full of b r o k e n glass, t r a s h , a n d d a m a g e d cars ( a d a p t e d from s t u d e n t r e p o r t ) .

T h e w h o l e sequence t o o k s o m e six h o u r s . T h e sheer density of the c r o w d (estimated a t 4 0 , 0 0 0 ) g r a d u a l l y o v e r t o o k n o r m a l traffic p a t t e r n s , a n d d e m o n s t r a t e d the ineffectiveness of the police. T h e c r o w d became an audience for staged, isolated fair fights, a n d objected w h e n this form of e n t e r t a i n m e n t w a s b r o k e n u p . T h e f i r s t t h r o w n bottle w a s a catalyst for m a n y o t h e r s ; a t this p o i n t t h e police w i t h d r e w , a n d the c r o w d settled into a t t a c k i n g p a r k e d cars a n d store w i n d o w s — b u t n o t the bars, which were p a r t of the staging of this c a r o u s i n g / o n e ; and there w a s s o m e merely e x u b e r a n t , " c r a z y " behavior of scaling traffic lights a n d street signs. T h e M a r d i G r a s beads-for-sexual-display ritual w a s increasingly a t t e m p t e d once the free z o n e w a s fully established, b u t w i t h o u t much c o o p e r a t i o n from the w o m e n in this scene of violence; this led to m o r e a n t i n o m i a n o u t b u r s t s , b u t generally restrained s h o r t of physical assault. Finally the police r e a p p e a r e d with superior force, resulting in one last flurry of con-

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 245

c e n t r a t e d resistance, which dispersed in a few minutes as the s u r r o u n d i n g c r o w d d i s a p p e a r e d .

A m o r a l holiday is uncontrolled by a u t h o r i t i e s , but it is n o t a situation of sheer c h a o s . It is n o t a H o b b e s i a n free-for-all a m o n g the m e m b e r s of the c r o w d within the zone; to the contrary, the c r o w d is quite strongly- focused a n d e n t r a i n e d in p a r t i c u l a r kinds of behavior. T h e Philadelphia M a r d i G r a s c r o w d c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h r o w i n g bottles a n d d a m a g i n g cars; it did n o t set fires or loot s h o p s . Some persons invoked the t r a d i t i o n a l N e w O r l e a n s - s t y l e M a r d i G r a s t h e m e of ritual sexual display, b u t even this w a s of a limited sort, soliciting shows of breasts a n d n o t genitals, a n d sexual violence w a s generally ruled o u t . G o m p a r e the N e w Year's celebration t h a t I observed in Las Vegas at the break of the year 2 0 0 0 : the c r o w d built up excitement for several h o u r s by jovially accosting strangers, and as the m o m e n t struck, cheering, hugging, kissing. H e r e the m o r a l holiday w a s r a t h e r limited, in p a r t by w e l l - k n o w n t r a d i t i o n s , in p a r t by t a k i n g place in a c a r o u s i n g zone w h e r e g a m b l i n g provided m a n y with an u n a c c u s t o m e d plunge beyond the n o r m a l . As in the Philadelphia instance, a few y o u n g men celebrated by acts of b r a v a d o , climbing light- ing fixtures, a n d one w a s electrocuted by a sign h a n g i n g over the street w h e r e the c r o w d w a s thickest. T h e behavior might be regarded as sense- less a n d tragic, but sociologically it reveals a n o t h e r feature of m o r a l holi- days: a few m e m b e r s of the c r o w d actively t a k e the lead in p u s h i n g for excitement; spectacular risk-taking is one way to do so.

L O O T I N G A N D D E S T R U C T I O N A S P A R T I C I P A T I O N SUSTAINERS

L o o t i n g a n d d e s t r o y i n g p r o p e r t y is a relatively mild form of violence t h a t arises w i t h i n m o r a l h o l i d a y s w h e n a u t h o r i t y has b r o k e n d o w n . M o r e e x t r e m e violence also m a y h a p p e n , a n d this is usually w h a t is r e g a r d e d as defining a s t a t e of r i o t (an a p p r o x i m a t e lay t e r m for a m o r a l h o l i d a y ) . But as we shall see, w h a t we m i g h t call violence t o w a r d p r o p e r t y — t h a t is, l o o t i n g a n d o t h e r p r o p e r t y d e s t r u c t i o n — i s crucial for the large seg- m e n t of the c r o w d w h o are n o t o t h e r w i s e violent; a n d t h a t s e g m e n t is crucial for d e t e r m i n i n g h o w long the m o r a l h o l i d a y will k e e p g o i n g , a n d t h u s for s u s t a i n i n g the frame w i t h i n which m o r e serious violence can be carried o u t .

I will c o n c e n t r a t e here on the kind of m o r a l holiday in which an identi- fiable g r o u p defies the police on their h o m e n e i g h b o r h o o d or turf; a n d put aside for n o w the subtype of riot in which an ethnic or o t h e r g r o u p invades the h o m e turf of an enemy g r o u p . T h e former type, colloquially referred to as a g h e t t o uprising or riot, a n d which we m i g h t call a h o m e turf protest, has been the c o m m o n version of the looting riot in the United

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States since the 1 9 6 0 s ; t h e latter type, t h e territorial incursion riot, is m o r e typical of deadly ethnic conflict a r o u n d the w o r l d ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 ) . R i o t s m a y occur w i t h i n a larger c o n t e x t , such as the civil rights conflicts of the 1 9 6 0 s , o r t h e R o d n e y King trial verdict i n 1 9 9 2 ; a n d such c o n t e x t p r o - vides a r h e t o r i c for justifying the violence, a n d for m o t i v a t i n g its initial o u t b r e a k . These contexts h a v e been extensively e x a m i n e d (Kerner C o m - mission 1 9 6 8 ; Baldassare 1 9 9 4 ; H a l l e a n d Rafter 2 0 0 3 ) ; w h a t I wish to c o n c e n t r a t e on here is the actual sequence a n d process by w h i c h looting occurs once a s i t u a t i o n of m o r a l h o l i d a y is established.

First m u s t come overt defiance or a t t a c k on the police, establishing t h e assembled c r o w d as a quasi-military entity at t h a t m o m e n t , a n d signaling the successful raising of the regime of local normalcy. In a racially charged situation, a t t a c k s on t h e police m a y go a l o n g w i t h a t t a c k s on m e m b e r s of t h e o p p o s i n g racial g r o u p w h o h a p p e n t o b e i n the area (e.g., t h e w h i t e t r u c k e r in a black n e i g h b o r h o o d w h o w a s pulled o u t of his cab a n d beaten in the street at t h e beginning of the 1 9 9 2 L.A. riot). Nevertheless, fighting w i t h ethnic outsiders, a n d indeed w i t h the police, is n o t the m a i n activity t h a t t h e m a s s of p a r t i c i p a n t s in a g h e t t o uprising t a k e s p a r t in. This is a r e a s o n to consider such riots separately from ethnic turf-invasion riots, w h i c h are m o r e directly oriented t o w a r d seeking o u t enemy p e r s o n s t o a t t a c k (their p r o p e r t y m a y also be a t t a c k e d , b u t t h a t is secondary), w h e r e a s in g h e t t o uprising, looting is a key feature.

Fighting w i t h the police generally t a k e s t h e form of t h r o w i n g things (bottles, cement blocks, stones) at their cars; this b o t h mobilizes a c r o w d a n d sets in m o t i o n a process of p r o p e r t y destruction. Pelting t h e enemy, m u c h m o r e so t h a n firing guns or using explosives, is an activity t h a t is easy to engage in; it has a d r a m a t i c quality, full of s m a s h i n g s o u n d s , a n d it leaves visible signs—a litter of glass, b r o k e n a n d jaggedly cracked w i n - d o w s , crunched-in vehicles—that are b o t h a n o p e n b r e a k w i t h normalcy, a n d yet n o t as e x t r e m e as b l o o d y h u m a n b o d i e s . 2 W h e n the first acts of driving o u t authority, the acts t h a t establish a m o r a l holiday, are d r a m a t i c physical d e s t r u c t i o n — p r o p e r t y d e s t r u c t i o n m o r e t h a n h u m a n casual- ties—they set the p a t t e r n t h a t leads to w i d e n i n g the target to w h a t e v e r public or institutional p r o p e r t y is visible.

L o o t i n g m a y start o u t targeting a p a r t i c u l a r ethnic g r o u p , b u t if a free zone lasts for m a n y h o u r s or days, t h e r e is a tendency for all stores a n d m a r k e t s in the area to become targets. W h a t e v e r is d a m a g e d is b r e a c h e d as far as social restraint is concerned; a storefront t h a t is s m a s h e d becomes an invitation to enter, w h o e v e r it m a y h a v e been once r e g a r d e d as belong- ing t o . Setting fires furthers this process, since they t e n d to s p r e a d from specific targets (such as the hated ethnic g r o u p ) to adjacent buildings, t u r n i n g everything into a p a r t of the free zone (Tilly 2 0 0 3 : 1 4 3 - 4 8 ) .

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 2 4 7

L o o t i n g develops in a s p o n t a n e o u s form of o r g a n i z a t i o n similar to o t h e r aspects of c r o w d violence: a small elite at the front, followed by a larger g r o u p of s u p p o r t e r s a n d half-committed o n l o o k e r s . H a n n e r z ( 1 9 6 9 : 173) observed t h a t s o m e individuals play t h e p a r t of looting lead- ers, w h o t a k e the initiative in b r e a k i n g i n t o stores; they are even r a t h e r altruistic in the t e m p o r a r y c o m m u n i t y of the street c r o w d , n o t engaging i n looting themselves, b u t m o v i n g a h e a d t o o p e n u p places t o loot s o others can follow. T h e y seem to be a w a r e t h a t m u c h of the c r o w d will n o t engage in frontline violence, even against physical objects, b u t only will t a k e p a r t once s o m e o n e else h a s t a k e n the earlier step of establishing a free zone a n d a looting situation. L o o t i n g leaders are facilitators, some- t h i n g like n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers in a n o n - h i e r a r c h i c , completely vol- untary, e p h e m e r a l army.

Setting fires m i g h t be r e g a r d e d as an e m o t i o n a l expression of anger against an enemy. But it is m o r e t h a n t h a t . "When t h e r i o t is an uprising in o n e ' s o w n n e i g h b o r h o o d , a r s o n is r a t h e r u n r e a s o n a b l e , since it rarely stays c o n t a i n e d in those p a r t i c u l a r buildings identified as enemy p r o p - erty. 3 Nevertheless, destruction of o n e ' s o w n p r o p e r t y is n o t u n u s u a l in p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s of collective events, especially c a r o u s i n g (I will later dis- cuss "wild p a r t i e s " ) . In b o t h cases, d e s t r u c t i o n is a w a y of generating a center of a t t e n t i o n a n d its a t t e n d a n t collective effervescence; there is n o t h - ing t h a t d e m a n d s a t t e n t i o n m o r e urgently t h a n a fire, especially w h e n it is close by. T h e p h r a s e often r e p e a t e d a n d q u o t e d from black g h e t t o insurrections in the 1 9 6 0 s , " b u r n , baby, b u r n ! " (and echoing t h r e a t s from militant political leaders " t h e fire n e x t t i m e " ) , w a s politically inflamma- tory, incendiary r h e t o r i c ; the fires, t o o , were largely a form of r h e t o r i c , a theatrical gesture of the m o s t d r a m a t i c sort. T h e i r m a i n effect, b e y o n d the limited destruction they caused to the enemy, w a s to d e m a n d atten- tion: from the w o r l d outside, b u t a b o v e all from n e a r b y residents w h o could n o w n o t help b u t t a k e their s t a n d , o n e w a y o r the other, i n the n o w - established m o r a l holiday. 4

If fires are the device for assembling p e o p l e for witness to the m o r a l holiday, looting is the device for building mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n . L o o t i n g gives large n u m b e r s of p e o p l e s o m e t h i n g to d o ; it is an act of defiance against authority, a n d t h u s joins t h e m i n t o the m o r a l holiday. L o o t i n g is relatively risk-free, a n d even free of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear, since looters (at least t h e rank-and-file, as o p p o s e d to the looting elite) do n o t generally confront any p e r s o n s , b u t only p r o p e r t y t h a t h a s already been violated. It is a b a n a l p o i n t , b u t insufficiently a p p r e c i a t e d , t h a t rioters m u s t h a v e s o m e t h i n g to d o , otherwise the riot peters o u t . If the c r o w d stops gathering, the e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e t h a t sustains the m o r a l h o l i d a y e v a p o r a t e s ; the police c a n r e t u r n , n o r m a l c y is established; the m o m e n t u m is lost. O n c e s t o p p e d , the riot c a n n o t be started again.

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R i o t s t h a t go on for a p a r t i c u l a r l y long t i m e , accordingly, m u s t be t h o s e in w h i c h t h e r e is a p a r t i c u l a r l y large a m o u n t of l o o t i n g or p r o p e r t y d e s t r u c t i o n , over a w i d e s p r e a d a r e a . Very p r o l o n g e d r i o t s — b e y o n d t h e c u s t o m a r y o n e t o t w o d a y s — o c c u r w h e r e t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a o f loot- ing o r d e s t r u c t i o n keeps shifting, s o t h a t n e w p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n b e r e - c r u i t e d , a n d n e w t a r g e t s for l o o t i n g a n d a r s o n (and, i n s o m e cases, m a s - sacres) c a n t a k e place.

For e x a m p l e , in 1830 English farm w o r k e r s , disgruntled over layoffs a n d w a g e cuts, b u r n e d b a r n s a n d farmhouses from late August t h r o u g h mid-December, w i t h t h e bulk of the activity in the t w o m o n t h s of O c t o b e r a n d N o v e m b e r (Tilly 2 0 0 3 : 1 7 8 - 8 7 ) . This w a s called the "Swing rebel- l i o n , " after the mythical avenger C a p t a i n Swing; the n a m e implied the t h r e a t of hanging enemies b u t in fact m o s t violence w a s limited to arson, except for peak p e r i o d confrontations w i t h authorities. W h e n deterred by organized forces, rebels m o v e d on to the n e x t parish, recruiting n e w p a r t i - cipants a n d f i n d i n g n e w targets. T h e r e w a s n o centralized organization, a n d violence w a s confined to a few adjacent places each day. T h e mo v e- m e n t began w i t h furtive a r s o n , a n d , in late N o v e m b e r after the height of s h o w d o w n , w h e n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s were o v e r a w e d b y the g o v e r n m e n t , the m o v e m e n t petered o u t again in a r s o n . T h e process illustrates t h a t arson is easier to perform a n d spreads m o r e widely t h a n direct c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 5

L o o t i n g w a s central to t h e American mega-riots t h a t w e n t on for a p e r i o d of four to five days: t h e N e w a r k riot in J u n e 1 9 6 7 ; the D e t r o i t riot i n July 1 9 6 7 (Kerner C o m m i s s i o n 1 9 6 8 ; H a l l e a n d Rafter 2 0 0 3 ; Tilly 2 0 0 3 : 1 4 5 - 4 9 ) . These h a d a n u n u s u a l l y large a m o u n t o f violence (twenty- six a n d forty-three d e a t h s , respectively, a l o n g w i t h 1,500 a n d 2 , 0 0 0 in- jured) a n d involved sniper-style g u n battles against massive police a n d military forces. H e r e looting played its p a r t in spreading a n d sustaining the rioting. T h e first t w o days of t h e D e t r o i t riot consisted a l m o s t entirely of looting a n d b u r n i n g , as police avoided intervening until t r o o p s arrived; w h e n the t r o o p s w e n t i n t o a c t i o n , t h e n e x t t w o days w e r e t a k e n u p w i t h gunfire. Thereafter t h e riot petered o u t , while t r o o p s p a t r o l l e d the area for an a d d i t i o n a l six days. T w o - t h i r d s of t h e 7 , 2 0 0 p e r s o n s arrested were accused of looting. T h e N e w a r k riot began m o r e politically, following a traffic arrest of a black t a x i driver, w h e n r u m o r s of police atrocities s p r e a d a m o n g o t h e r t a x i drivers. T h e N e w a r k riot diffused i n t o n e a r b y N e w Jersey cities of Plainfield, Jersey City, a n d E n g l e w o o d (i.e., as far as t w e n t y miles a w a y in several directions). As a d r a m a t i c event, these w e r e n o t really s e p a r a t e riots. A l t h o u g h their beginnings lagged o n e to three days after the beginning of t h e N e w a r k riot, all c a m e to an end on the same day. In these outlying a r e a s , r i o t activity consisted largely of looting; in the core a r e a , t h e r e w a s b o t h massive looting a n d massive violence in fighting w i t h police a n d military forces.

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 249

T h e 1 9 6 0 s A m e r i c a n race riots followed a similar geographical p a t t e r n of diffusion as t h e 1 8 3 0 English r u r a l a r s o n s . A riot in o n e city t e n d e d to set off riots w i t h i n the following w e e k in n e a r b y smaller cites, w i t h t h e chances of a riot declining w i t h greater distance (Myers 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h i s w a s especially i m p o r t a n t for riots t h a t w e r e n o t given m u c h n a t i o n a l n e w s coverage. Riots diffused in concentric circles a r o u n d the initial riot, espe- cially if the riot s t a r t e d in a city w i t h a TV s t a t i o n . In the era before m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , all this w o u l d h a v e been d o n e by p e r s o n a l n e t w o r k s . R e p e a t e d chains of rioters, m o v i n g to n e a r b y regions b u t n o t farther, s h a p e d the diffusion of the 1 8 3 0 Swing Rebellion; itinerants s p r e a d t h e ne ws along canals a n d m a r k e t h i g h w a y s , a n d farm w o r k e r s c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h t h o s e in a n e i g h b o r i n g p a r i s h , t h e n r e t u r n e d h o m e (Tilly 2 0 0 3 ) . In b o t h p e r i o d s , the rebellion w a s k e p t u p b y m o v i n g t o n e w areas r a t h e r t h a n b u r n i n g a n d looting t h e s a m e area over again.

An implication is t h a t a b u r n t - o u t area c a n n o t r e p e a t riots for a consid- erable length of t i m e — a t least n o t at a high degree of severity—until it recovers so t h a t t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g to b u r n a n d loot. R i o t s , like forest fires, t a k e a n u m b e r of years to recover a n d build up fuel (both literally a n d emotionally) for the n e x t o u t b u r s t . In t h e s h o r t r u n , a big riot p r e - empts s u b s e q u e n t big riots in the same place; even w i t h external precipi- t a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , only small riots are possible, if any. 6

M a s s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in l o o t i n g is a key device for m a k i n g a r i o t last, indeed for building it up into a n o t a b l e event, getting it political a t t e n t i o n in t h e enemy c a m p or in the eyes of the w i d e r p u b l i c . T h e looters t h e m - selves generally lack a political ideology; politicized black civil rights a c - tivists in t h e 1 9 6 0 s riots w e r e often disgusted w i t h t h e looting a n d the a t t i t u d e of t h e l o o t e r s . Tilly (2003) t h u s categorized these riots as only m a r g i n a l l y racial p r o t e s t s t h a t degenerated into o p p o r t u n i s t i c a l l y seeking p r i v a t e g a i n . 7 But this is to o m i t the p a r t t h a t looting, a l o n g w i t h a r s o n , p l a y in the dynamics of riots: looting is a mass-recruiter a n d a m o m e n t u m - sustainer. W i t h o u t it, if the r i o t t o o k n o t h i n g b u t the form of violent con- frontations against t h e police, t h e riot could easily be dealt w i t h by police w i t h d r a w i n g until the c r o w d b e c a m e b o r e d , drifted away, a n d disassem- bled; or it could be p u t d o w n by p u t t i n g in o v e r w h e l m i n g force against the inevitably small g r o u p t h a t w o u l d actively confront it. L o o t e r s are t h e foot-soldiers of a riot; better p u t , they are t h e half-hearted h a n g i n g - b a c k , the 85 percent w h o never fire their g u n s . L o o t i n g is a brilliant tactical i n v e n t i o n — s o to speak, because no o n e invented it—since it takes the relatively useless p a r t of the s u p p o r t e r s a n d o n l o o k e r s of an insurrection a n d t u r n s t h e m i n t o activists of sorts, keeping alive the e m o t i o n a l a t m o - sphere t h a t is w h e r e a m o r a l h o l i d a y lives or dies.

L o o t e r s pointedly disrespect n o r m a l p r o p e r t y rights; b u t a r e m a r k a b l e p a t t e r n is t h a t looters generally do n o t l o o t from each other. E a c h loots

2 5 0 • Chapter 7

w h a t he or she c a n , b u t looters rarely fight over w h a t g o o d s they can t a k e , n o r r o b o n e a n o t h e r as they c a r r y t h e g o o d s away. O n e sees this, for e x a m p l e , in a series of p h o t o s of the 1 9 9 2 Los Angeles r i o t set off u p o n t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t of not-guilty verdicts in t h e R o d n e y King beating trial. In these, as in o t h e r looting riots, looters t a k e the p o s t u r e s of w h a t Goff- m a n calls n o r m a l "civil d i s a t t e n t i o n , " m a i n t a i n i n g p e d e s t r i a n traffic t h a t a t t e m p t s to k e e p o u t of each o t h e r ' s way, even in a s o m e w h a t c r o w d e d a n d frenzied situation. In p a r t the lack of struggle a m o n g looters m a y be because the items t h a t are looted are n o t of great value to t h e m . In the L.A. riot p h o t o s (Los Angeles Times, M a y 1 2 , 1 9 9 2 ) , we see, for e x a m p l e , a m a n w h o s e a r m s are overflowing w i t h p a c k a g e s of tissues a n d p a p e r n a p k i n s from a grocery store; a small H i s p a n i c boy w i t h his father, exiting a s p o r t i n g g o o d s store carrying several boxes of ladies' " T h i g h M a s t e r " exercise e q u i p m e n t ; a y o u n g black m a n c o m i n g o u t of t h e b r o k e n w i n d o w of a b e a u t y supply s h o p carrying a p a c k a g e d h a i r dryer. Interviews w i t h looters in 1 9 6 0 s g h e t t o riots generally found their looting w a s non-utili- t a r i a n ; some looters said later they did n o t need the g o o d s or c o u l d afford t o b u y t h e m ; s o m e rationalized t h a t the stores o w e d t h e m for p a s t griev- ances (Dynes a n d Q u a r a n t e l l i 1 9 6 8 ; Q u a r a n t e l l i a n d Dynes 1 9 6 8 , 1 9 7 0 ; Tilly 2 0 0 3 : 1 4 8 ) . T h e looters w e r e engaged in an act of m a s s solidarity. Possessing any p a r t i c u l a r g o o d s w a s n o t the p o i n t , hence t h e r e is a k i n d of " a l t r u i s m " a m o n g looters t h a t keeps t h e m from being selfish w i t h each other. L o o t i n g is largely D u r k h e i m i a n ritualism d o n e for the sake of t h e activity itself, a n d as a symbolic expression of m e m b e r s h i p ; the objects stolen can be nearly w o r t h l e s s in every o t h e r respect, b u t they represent o n e ' s p a r t n e r s h i p in b r e a k i n g the law. Post-looting interviews s h o w a con- siderable n u m b e r of otherwise respectable p e r s o n s (married, e m p l o y e d , c h u r c h - g o e r s , m e m b e r s of w h a t A n d e r s o n [1999] calls the decent, n o n - street p a r t of t h e ghetto) t a k i n g p a r t in t h e looting; t h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d e m o t i o n a l a t t r a c t i o n or social m a g n e t i s m of joining in t h e collective effer- vescence. T h e s e c o n d - o r d e r p r o b l e m o f " w h o g u a r d s the g u a r d i a n s " i n r a t i o n a l / u t i l i t a r i a n t h e o r y is strikingly a b s e n t here; if we ask, " w h o loots from the l o o t e r s " once law a n d o r d e r is gone, the a n s w e r is virtually no o n e — t h e m o r a l h o l i d a y h a s its o w n form of social solidarity. T h e break- d o w n of external a u t h o r i t y in a m o r a l h o l i d a y does n o t p r o m o t e a free- for-all of u n r e s t r a i n e d violence. 8

T h e best detail available on the sequential d y n a m i c s of looting comes, n o t from a p r o t e s t riot, b u t from the b l a c k o u t of t h e electric grid in N e w York City for one night in July 1 9 7 7 (Curvin a n d P o r t e r 1 9 7 9 ) . This loot- ing h a d m o r e utilitarian aspects t h a n o t h e r s , since it did n o t s t a r t w i t h an a t m o s p h e r e of heightened racial a n t a g o n i s m , n o r in an escalating con- frontation with police. 9 F r o m h o u r - b y - h o u r arrest d a t a , as well as inter- views, we find three waves of looters. T h e first w a v e were professional

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 251

criminals, typically m e n in their twenties; w i t h i n t h e first h o u r of the b l a c k o u t (which s t a r t e d at 9:30 p . m . ) , they b r o k e i n t o jewelry a n d elec- t r o n i c g o o d s stores a n d t o o k t h e m o s t valuable items. T h e second w a v e consisted heavily of y o u t h gangs l o o k i n g for fun a n d excitement as well a s plunder, a p p e a r i n g o n the scene a r o u n d 1 1 p . m . (They did n o t , h o w - ever, fight w i t h each other, b u t joined t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y of the free zone.) T h e t h i r d w a v e were o r d i n a r y residents of all social classes, v e n t u r - ing o u t into t h e scene of a c t i o n , beginning after m i d n i g h t a n d lasting i n t o the daylight h o u r s of t h e following d a y until petering o u t in the after- n o o n . 1 0 H e r e curiosity t u r n e d i n t o a m a g n e t i c a t t r a c t i o n t o t a k e p a r t i n the looting. T h e t h i r d w a v e resembled t h e looters i n o t h e r r i o t s , s w e p t u p in the e m o t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i n g , looting objects of little value to themselves. O n e looter, for e x a m p l e , t o o k a side of beef from a grocery s t o r e , t h e n a b a n d o n e d it on the sidewalk.

A m a r r i e d m a n , e m p l o y e d as a salesman, a n d w i t h a d a u g h t e r in p a r o - chial school, r e p o r t e d t h a t the urge to l o o t c a m e over h i m in the midst of the c h a o s .

"I d o n ' t k n o w ; I felt I w a n t e d to s n a t c h s o m e t h i n g while I w a s o u t there. . . . I h a p p e n e d t o b e o n the scene w h e n they just began t o b r e a k i n t o a store. T h i n g s s t a r t e d flying o u t , a n d I h a p p e n e d to get my h a n d s full of the stuff. A n d I w a s s t a n d i n g on the c o r n e r talking, w h e n sud- denly a police car pulls u p , a n d they got m e . " He w a s in possession of ten pairs of w o m e n ' s slacks a n d seven blouses; he t o l d t h e interviewer later t h a t he d i d n ' t i n t e n d to give t h e m to his wife, a n d he w a s n ' t sure w h a t h e w a s going t o d o w i t h t h e m . (Curvin a n d P o r t e r 1 9 7 9 : 15)

This looting-riot w a s initiated by p e r s o n s w i t h ostensibly utilitarian motives. Nevertheless, t h e effect of this w a v e of well-calculated r o b b e r y w a s to create a m o r a l h o l i d a y w i t h m a n y features of a c o m m u n i t y of t e m p o r a r y solidarity. G r o u p s of m e n formed, consisting at least in p a r t of strangers to o n e another, w h o collectively a t t a c k e d t h e iron protective grills over the closed store fronts; ten to t w e n t y m e n w o u l d m a s s their weight to pull d o w n the grills, sometimes t a k i n g ten minutes or m o r e of hard e x e r t i o n , and t a k i n g rest breaks t o g e t h e r to c o o r d i n a t e their next assault.

T h e later wave of looters, t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the breaches m a d e by the activists w h o preceded t h e m , displayed the usual p a t t e r n of non-utili- t a r i a n , symbolic-emotional p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the looting. Aside from the p r o p e r t y d e s t r u c t i o n , there w a s little violence. Looters did n o t fight with store o w n e r s w h o h a p p e n e d to be present; even a token s h o w of o p p o s i - tion by store personnel w a s enough to deter m o s t of the looters. This could be explained by the feeling (expressed by some looters) t h a t there

2 5 2 • Chapter 7

w a s no need to t r o u b l e oneself w i t h resistance, since t h e r e w e r e plenty of o t h e r places o p e n to loot; b u t it also s h o w s t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/ fear w a s s t r o n g . A n t a g o n i s m to an " e n e m y " w a s n o t a driving force (again, very m u c h in c o n t r a s t to territorial incursion riots), even t h o u g h t h e s t o r e - o w n e r s were m o s t l y w h i t e a n d lived outside t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d . T h e police, a l t h o u g h highly o u t n u m b e r e d , were rarely assaulted, a n d w h e n they m a d e arrests m e t w i t h little resistance.

T h e e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e m i x e d e x h i l a r a t i o n a n d fear. It w a s near- t o t a l d a r k n e s s , p u n c t u a t e d by police cars speeding a l o n g t h e streets w i t h sirens wailing, c r o w d s r u s h i n g a b o u t , sometimes h o o t i n g a n d yelling; p o - lice firing guns in the air in an effort to scare off looters—this h a d little d e t e r r e n t effect, since looters s o o n realized the police were n o t s h o o t i n g to hit t h e m . C r o w d s sometimes t u r n e d i n t o p o c k e t s of frenzy, while o t h e r places were festive or a m i a b l e in m o o d . A twenty-one-year-old black m a n recalled he w a s o u t playing basketball:

W h e n the lights w e n t o u t , everybody s t a r t e d s c r e a m i n ' , y o u k n o w . . . . At first really I w a s yelling just to be fancy, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. [Then s o m e o n e suggested a c o m m e r c i a l street to loot.] Everybody from all over w a s d o w n there. E v e r y b o d y w a s just w a l k i n ' a n d t a l k i n ' . We w e n t into this gift s h o p a n d they just s t a r t e d getting shit a n d t h e n they b r o k e . . . . Excited, excitement y o u k n o w ; I w a s u p . I w a s c h a r g e d , y o u k n o w , w i t h the excitement o f the m o m e n t . T h e lights w a s o u t , y o u k n o w ; we w a s going to see w h a t we can d o . Like, I w a s really charged u p — W e just j u m p e d into the m o o d , y o u k n o w ? Like they say, w h e n y o u ' r e R o m a n , d o w h a t the R o m a n s d o . W e just w e n t crazy. (Curvin a n d P o r t e r 1 9 7 9 : 1 8 8 )

A n o t h e r r e m a r k a b l e feature of restraint in p a r t i c u l a r kinds of looting situations is sexual. O n e m i g h t expect t h a t if all rules are off, individuals w o u l d t a k e w h a t e v e r selfish pleasures they could; a n d in c h a o t i c c r o w d s , m a n y strangers w o u l d b e e n c o u n t e r e d w h o could b e sexually victimized w i t h impunity. Tilly (2003) characterizes m a n y riots as starting w i t h m o r a l o u t r a g e against a u t h o r i t i e s o r racial injustice, b u t t u r n i n g i n t o o p - p o r t u n i s t i c p u r s u i t of private gain u n d e r the cover of the b r e a k d o w n of authority. But this is n o t w h a t h a p p e n s in the sexual sphere, at least n o t in t h e m o r a l holidays of g h e t t o p r o t e s t riots. T h e c r o w d of looters do n o t engage in r a p i n g or even sexually g r o p i n g the w o m e n in their c r o w d . In the A m e r i c a n race riots of the 1 9 6 0 s , a n d in the 1 9 9 2 L.A. riot, there w e r e virtually no indications of r a p e s .

T h e r e a r e , however, k i n d s of riots in w h i c h the s i t u a t i o n is decidedly the o p p o s i t e . In ethnic turf-invasion riots, t h e r e m a y be r a t h e r systematic rapes of w o m e n of the targeted enemy; br eak in g into houses of the ethnic enemy can involve b o t h looting and r a p i n g ( H o r o w i t z 2 0 0 1 ; Kaldor 1999). W h a t m a k e s the difference between riots in which sexual restraint

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is t h e n o r m , a n d those in w h i c h sexual violence is featured along w i t h o t h e r forms of attack? R i o t s on o n e ' s h o m e turf, w i t h o u t m e m b e r s of t h e enemy g r o u p present, place m o s t of their energy in a t t a c k i n g i n a n i m a t e targets; invading enemy turf t o a t t a c k p e r s o n s provides m o r e occasions for r a p e . A n o t h e r c o n d i t i o n is t h a t r a p e s occur in riots w h e r e the a t t a c k e r s a n d looters are exclusively m e n . In riots w h e r e w o m e n join in the looting, they d o s o w i t h i m p u n i t y from sexual c o e r c i o n . 1 1 T h e m o r a l h o l i d a y con- stricts t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e g r o u p d o w n to an enclave of local solidar- ity—or indeed p e r h a p s e x p a n d s into an enclave of solidarity in w h a t w a s otherwise an a n o m i c n e i g h b o r h o o d ; the D u r k h e i m i a n collective efferves- cence gives a sense of security for themselves, even if they are in a n o r m a l l y crime-ridden area. As long as t h e y t a k e p a r t in t h e ritual activities of the g r o u p , p a r t i c i p a n t s are bodily safe. A m o r a l h o l i d a y is a h o l i d a y from some m o r a l s , b u t it strongly institutes o t h e r m o r a l s .

T i i L W I L D PARTY A S E L I T E P O T L A T C H

W h a t makes a "wild p a r t y " ? This is a m e t a p h o r , of c o u r s e , one of a family of m e t a p h o r s including such terms as "a b l a s t , " "a b l o w - o u t , " "a b a s h , " "a r i o t . " Persons w h o t a k e the leading p a r t acquire the r e p u t a t i o n of "a wild a n d crazy guy," "hell-raiser," " d e v i l - m a y - c a r e , " "a p i s t o l , " "a p a r t y a n i m a l . " W h a t these terms imply is a high level of collective effervescence, and a s t r o n g sense of a n t i n o m i a n i s m , breaking the b o u n d s of normalcy.

T h e easiest w a y to escalate a party or festival into a m e m o r a b l e ca- r o u s i n g is by d e s t r u c t i o n of p r o p e r t y . T h i s is s o m e t h i n g like looting in a m o r a l holiday. It differs in t h a t l o o t i n g (at least in h o m e - t u r f riots) is a form of rebellion from b e l o w agai ns t w h a t are r e g a r d e d as at least t o k e n t a r g e t s of enemy g r o u p s . M a t e r i a l d e s t r u c t i o n at a wild party, however, is generally d e s t r o y i n g o n e ' s o w n p r o p e r t y . A wild p a r t y of this s o r t is an elite p o t l a t c h .

T h e archetype comes from the festivals of Indian tribes of the Pacific N o r t h w e s t coast, an area rich in p r o d u c t s of the sea a n d forest (Kan 1 9 8 6 ; Ringel 1979). Fur-trading in the nineteenth century m a d e these tribes wealthy by local s t a n d a r d s . Their festivals were organized by invitations from one local chief to another, in which the host w o u l d s h o w off his wealth by giving it a w a y lavishly to the guests; the latter were under pres- sure to reciprocate by an equally lavish party. Warring clans might hold p o t l a t c h e s as peace ceremonies, and gestures of ritual hostility were often p r o m i n e n t . C o m p e t i t i o n over status display escalated; blankets, c o p p e r sheets, Western t r a d i n g g o o d s (such as sewing machines) and other trea- sures were n o t only given a w a y b u t smashed up in front of the guests, or t h r o w n into the sea, in g r a n d gestures of disdain for mere property. Tribes

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w e r e sharply stratified b e t w e e n aristocrats a n d c o m m o n e r s ; only t h e aris- t o c r a t s could o w n slaves a n d c o p p e r sheets. T h e high p o i n t of a p o t l a t c h w a s reached in killing slaves in a ceremonial execution. Slaves a n d co p p ers w e r e n o t used for utilitarian p u r p o s e s , a n d slaves w e r e acquired just be- fore t h e p o t l a t c h for t h e p u r p o s e of sacrificing t h e m in front of one's guests. T h e crucial test in a reciprocal p o t l a t c h w a s w h e t h e r t h e n e x t h o s t could sacrifice honorific possessions of equal or greater value.

In a d d i t i o n to these forms of violent d e s t r u c t i o n of valuable a n d espe- cially status-giving p r o p e r t y , p o t l a t c h e s h a d d a n c i n g a n d eating contests. H o s t s tried to give the impression of an endless supply of food, a n d forced it on the guests, w h o w e r e expected to overeat a n d v o m i t . If n o b o d y v o m - ited, it reflected largely u p o n the hosts a n d their hospitality.

We s h o u l d envision a p o t l a t c h as a large, noisy party, full of b o a s t i n g a n d ebullient pride. A p o t l a t c h w a s elite, because it could be given only by t h e wealthiest m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y ; a n d since o n e lost status by a t t e n d i n g w i t h o u t being able to give a similar p a r t y in r e t u r n , guests t o o h a d to be of high s t a t u s , or at least aspire to it (a p o i n t emphasized in the classic analysis of M a u s s [ 1 9 2 5 / 1 9 6 7 ] ) . Potlatches w e r e competitive, a n d h a d overtones of violent t h r e a t ; b u t fights between guests a n d hosts were r a r e , a n d t h e c o m p e t i t i o n of o s t e n t a t i o u s d e s t r u c t i o n of o n e ' s w e a l t h held t h e center of a t t e n t i o n .

C o m p a r e the behavior of w e a l t h y O x f o r d students in t h e years a r o u n d 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 0 . 1 2 Their college r o o m s were p r i v a t e suites, w h e r e they w e r e w a i t e d u p o n b y servants; prestigious sociability a m o n g t h e p o p u l a r m e n involved h o s t i n g l u n c h e o n s a n d dinners in o n e ' s r o o m s , or sometimes in a hired hall. In such all-male schools, w i t h r a r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to associate w i t h y o u n g w o m e n , s o m e t h i n g like a r a t i n g - a n d - d a t i n g c o m p l e x usually found i n h e t e r o s e x u a l c o u r t i n g w a s o r c h e s t r a t e d b y the y o u n g m e n t h e m - selves. It also resembled r o u n d s of party-giving by middle-aged hostesses of the higher classes. Students vied for invitations, or for guests w h o h a d r e p u t a t i o n s as aristocratic, stylish, sophisticated, n o t a b l e in athletics, or just p l a i n lively a n d fun. T h e a t m o s p h e r e w a s o n e of mildly flaunting authority, cutting classes, br eaki ng curfews, a n d d r i n k i n g . Social striving a n d rivalry m u s t h a v e given a feeling of ebullience to the y o u n g m e n w h o w e r e a d m i t t e d i n t o the m o s t sought-after gatherings; a n d their ritualistic dinners (which featured d r i n k i n g games aimed at getting p a r t i c u l a r indi- viduals very d r u n k ) sometimes c u l m i n a t e d in r i o t o u s destruction. D r u n k e n students w o u l d build a bonfire in t h e center of a college q u a d , piling on n o t only stolen firewood b u t also college furniture; college a u - thorities w h o v e n t u r e d t o p u t d o w n the b r e a c h o f o r d e r were jeered a n d sometimes pelted. A u t h o r i t i e s usually confined their intervention to fines levied in t h e aftermath; these fines w e n t to college treasuries, w h e r e they served to stock t h e w i n e for equally elite b u t m o r e discretely p r i v a t e din- ners by t h e college Fellows (i.e., the b a c h e l o r faculty residing in college).

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T h u s t h e u n d e r g r a d u a t e s ' flamboyant c a r o u s i n g w a s recycled i n t o a m o r e genteel c a r o u s i n g by their teachers.

In earlier centuries, university students w e r e even wilder (Midgley 1996). Students w e n t to t o w n taverns for d r i n k i n g a n d sometimes h a d full-scale t o w n - a n d - g o w n fights against t h e locals. Students evaded the college p r o c t o r s (guards hired by college authorities to enforce discipline) a n d sometimes fought w i t h t h e m . An O x f o r d " r a g " of the 1 7 0 0 s involved d r u n k e n vomiting in t h e streets, mild v a n d a l i s m , fighting, a n d sexual as- saults of local w o m e n . O t h e r r i o t o u s occasions arose o u t of c o u n t r y s i d e expeditions by unserious s t u d e n t s , including d r u n k e n foot races w i t h n e i g h b o r h o o d girls in deshabille. T h e r i o t o u s " b l o o d s " or "high-livers" typically were d r a w n from the aristocracy, w h o h a d special privileges a n d immunities n o t s h a r e d by p o o r e r students grinding at their studies for careers chiefly as clergymen. T h e hierarchy of rich a n d c o m p a r a t i v e l y poor, of elite a n d m o d e s t class b a c k g r o u n d , w a s e n h a n c e d by the situa- t i o n a l stratification between high-spirited carousers a n d t h e duller sorts in the b a c k g r o u n d . O x f o r d " r a g s , " like the early-twentieth-century college bonfires, w e r e implicitly displays of w e a l t h a n d s t a t u s , conspicuously flaunting an insouciant disregard for costs, c o n v e n t i o n s , a n d serious p u r - poses. Young " b l o o d s " frequently w e n t t h r o u g h their allowances, con- t r a c t e d debts from lavish entertaining or the furnishing of their r o o m s , as well as from g a m b l i n g , a n d w e r e sent d o w n (i.e., expelled) from college. All this w a s just w h a t t h e lower-status students c o u l d n o t afford t o d o . Nevertheless, the lower-ranking were a necessary b a c k d r o p for the ca- r o u s i n g elite, s o m e o n e to be impressed a n d scorned by their escapades. By c o n t r a s t , r i o t o u s c a r o u s i n g of this sort w a s n o t m u c h carried on w h e n t h e aristocratic elite w a s g a t h e r e d on their private estates, w h e r e the audi- ence consisted of servants a n d d e p e n d e n t w o r k e r s a n d t r a d e s p e o p l e ; there needed to be an audience close e n o u g h in s t a t u s , a n d an a t m o s p h e r e of status c o m p e t i t i o n , for c a r o u s i n g to be an effective display of c o n t e m p t for o r d i n a r y proprieties. Strongly institutionalized social r a n k s lead to sedate a n d r a t h e r dull p a r t i e s ; it is w h e r e t h e r e is o n g o i n g situational strat- ification, t h e sheer m o m e n t a r y attention-gaining of a noisy display of u n - inhibited fun, t h a t c a r o u s i n g becomes destructive.

A c u r r e n t e x a m p l e c o m e s from a s t u d e n t r e p o r t on a g r o u p of A m e r i - c a n college u n d e r g r a d u a t e m a l e s w h o s h a r e a r e n t e d h o u s e . A big a t h - lete, w h e n h e i s d r u n k , s t a r t s s m a s h i n g u p t h e s t a i r c a s e b a l u s t r a d e . O n e of his h o u s e m a t e s is hit by a piece of flying w o o d , a n d angrily t h r e a t e n s t o fight. T h e g r o u p g a t h e r s a r o u n d a n d t u r n s t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t o a j o k e , w i t h e v e r y o n e joining in t h e fun of d e s t r o y i n g t h e b a l u s t r a d e . T h e y all h a v e t o p a y t h e l a n d l o r d for t h e d a m a g e , b u t the i n c i d e n t i s r e m e m b e r e d as a n o t a b l e o c c a s i o n . 1 3 T h i s is t h e p o t l a t c h p a t t e r n , d e s t r o y i n g o n e ' s o w n living e n v i r o n m e n t . 1 4

2 5 6 • Chapter 7

Elite-potlatch type of c a r o u s i n g is generally confined to p r o p e r t y de- struction. Sheer ebullience, even w i t h t h e motives of status display as an a n t i n o m i a n elite, a n d inside t h e p r o t e c t i o n of a t e m p o r a r y m o r a l holiday, r e m a i n s w i t h i n highly conventionalized limits. C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/ fear does its w o r k , even h e r e . Destroying p r o p e r t y is usually e n o u g h to keep u p the m o o d o f excitement a n d b o u n d a r y - b r e a k i n g . H o w t h e n does violence occur in c a r o u s i n g situations?

C A R O U S I N G Z O N E S A N D B O U N D A R Y E X C L U S I O N V I O L E N C E

M o s t wild parties are n o t violent. But e x a m i n i n g these parties has given us a clue to parties t h a t are. T h e m o s t successful p a r t y generates its o w n t e m p o r a r y stratification, a s i t u a t i o n a l elite of t h o s e w h o are in t h e center of t h e action, followed by a p e n u m b r a of t h o s e w h o are striving to t a k e p a r t , a n d a fringe of those w h o are excluded. It is contested stratification a r o u n d the b o u n d a r i e s o f c a r o u s i n g occasions t h a t p r o d u c e s m u c h ca- r o u s i n g violence.

T h e r e are t h r e e m a i n p a t h w a y s : a u t h o r i t i e s ' i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d ensuing counter-escalation, gate-crashing violence, a n d end-resisting violence.

A large p r o p o r t i o n of fights at parties or h o l i d a y street c r o w d s occur w h e n police arrive, a t t e m p t i n g to reduce t h e noise, force a c r o w d o u t of the street, or deter unlawful d r i n k e r s . 1 5 T h i s leads to violence w h e r e the police forces are no m a t c h for the size a n d e m o t i o n a l e n t h u s i a s m of t h e c r o w d ; the carousers h a v e resources t h a t allow t h e m t o counter-escalate against t h e police, a n d an initially small a m o u n t of police violence m a y be m e t by a m u c h w i d e r front of violence or at least t h r e a t e n i n g gestures. T h e c r o w d ' s r e a c t i o n a t this p o i n t , including t h r o w i n g bottles a n d over- t u r n i n g cars a n d o t h e r forms of v a n d a l i s m , is largely a f o r m of bluster, q u a s i - t h r e a t s of p e r s o n a l violence acted o u t w i t h o u t m u c h direct confron- t a t i o n . As in o t h e r riots a n d battles, a small n u m b e r of activists can start a p h a s e of escalation, w h i c h becomes general in p a r t t h r o u g h the sheer c h a o s of p e o p l e r u n n i n g a b o u t (seeking shelter, a m o n g o t h e r reasons); this in t u r n t e n d s to m a k e the police strike o u t indiscriminately against w h o e v e r is m o v i n g a r o u n d in t h e c a r o u s i n g z o n e . T h e process escalates feelings of anger on b o t h sides, a n d e x p a n d s the a m o u n t of violence— a l t h o u g h as we h a v e seen w i t h all fighting, it is mostly i n c o m p e t e n t a n d misdirected violence. T h e very fact t h a t m o s t p e o p l e live t h r o u g h such a s i t u a t i o n , w i t h a lot of excitement b u t n o t t o o m u c h c h a n c e of p e r s o n a l d a m a g e , is one r e a s o n w h y big c a r o u s i n g scenes r e m a i n p o p u l a r w i t h their veterans; m o s t people live to tell the tale, a n d find it a valuable piece of cultural capital in the c o n v e r s a t i o n a l circuits of s u b s e q u e n t parties.

A carousing z o n e is a place w h e r e the ritualism of generating a n t i n o - m i a n excitement prevails a n d m a y even be institutionalized. It can consist

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 257

of just the place w h e r e a p a r t y is going on, or m o r e widely a region w h e r e revelers a n d fun-seckers g o , such as an area of bars, clubs, a n d possibly- erotic e n t e r t a i n m e n t a n d (at the time w h e n it was m o r e illicit) g a m b l i n g . C a r o u s i n g zones are also zones in time, open for action on a schedule such as weekend nights, or p a r t i c u l a r holidays. W h e n it is fully in o p e r a t i o n , a c a r o u s i n g zone is a p o c k e t of emotional high pressure or collective e m o - tional energy; a t t e m p t s to interfere with carousing rituals, or even just to enter the zone (if one is an i n a p p r o p r i a t e person in the eyes of the c a r o u s - ers), constitute a pressure against its b o u n d a r y . T h e c a r o u s i n g z o n e , at the height of its p o w e r (which is chiefly e m o t i o n a l p o w e r ) , fights to defend its o w n existence, so to speak. But carousing zones are collective enact- m e n t s ; like o t h e r rituals, the e m o t i o n a l e n t h u s i a s m of carousing e x h a u s t s itself over a period of h o u r s (usually four to six h o u r s , in my cases); t h u s c a r o u s i n g t h a t can lead to enthusiastic battles if a u t h o r i t i e s intervene at its height will easily dissipate if the intervention occurs when the enthusi- asm is already ebbing and people are drifting away.

A hypothesis: police are m o r e likely to p r o v o k e violence if they try to break up a p a r t y in which the energy level is high, w h e r e people are having a good time, than if they break up a less successful p a r t y scene.

In an extreme instance, intervention t u r n s into m u r d e r : T w o N e w Jersey police officers investigated a c o m p l a i n t of noise at a roadside t a v e r n . W h a t they intruded u p o n was a celebration by t w o a r m e d r o b b e r s w h o h a d just r o b b e d a Brooklyn b o o k i e of a large a m o u n t of money. T h e y were drink- ing heavily a n d firing shots in horseplay. T h e r o b b e r s no d o u b t had a practical interest in escaping, but their i m m e d i a t e reaction w a s an e l a b o - rate ritual of h u m i l i a t i o n : the officers were held at g u n p o i n t , pistol- w h i p p e d , forced to strip to their u n d e r w e a r and kneel d o w n , and finally shot in the head (Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e c a r o u s i n g m o o d was being i n t e r r u p t e d at its height; the response w a s itself an exten- sion of the c a r o u s i n g : previous gun-play t u r n e d into further playing with g u n s , sadistic but ebullient. W h e n the c a r o u s i n g m o o d had passed, the r o b b e r s acted differently.Two days later one of the r o b b e r s w a s killed in a s h o o t - o u t with police, and the other s u r r e n d e r e d .

A second p a t h w a y to violence is w h e r e individuals or small g r o u p s at- t e m p t to force their w a y into a carousing scene but are excluded. Unlike a u t h o r i t i e s trying to break up a party, this is a case of w o u l d - b e c a r o u s e r s trying to join in.

A g r o u p of middle-class y o u n g men are having a p a r t y in an a p a r t m e n t ; they all k n o w o n e a n o t h e r a n d are sitting d o w n talking. T h r e e guys arrive looking for the r o o m m a t e of the p a r t y host; he isn't here, b u t they decide to w a i t . T h e party is no d o u b t rather boring and the intruders do n o t enter into the c o n v e r s a t i o n . O n e of t h e m , a M a r i n e , asks the host for a needle to give himself a t a t t o o . T h e host refuses, saying he w o u l d

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 2 5 7

of just the place w h e r e a p a r t y is going on, or m o r e widely a region w h e r e revelers and fun-seekers g o , such as an area of bars, clubs, a n d possibly erotic e n t e r t a i n m e n t a n d (at the time w h e n it w a s m o r e illicit) g a m b l i n g . C a r o u s i n g zones are also zones in time, o p e n for action on a schedule such as weekend nights, or particular holidays. W h e n it is fully in o p e r a t i o n , a c a r o u s i n g zone is a pocket of e m o t i o n a l high pressure or collective e m o - tional energy; a t t e m p t s to interfere with c a r o u s i n g rituals, or even just to enter the zone (if one is an i n a p p r o p r i a t e person in the eyes of the c a r o u s - ers), constitute a pressure against its b o u n d a r y . T h e c a r o u s i n g z o n e , at the height of its p o w e r (which is chiefly e m o t i o n a l p o w e r ) , fights to defend its o w n existence, so to speak. But c a r o u s i n g zones arc collective enact- m e n t s ; like o t h e r rituals, the e m o t i o n a l e n t h u s i a s m of c a r o u s i n g e x h a u s t s itself over a period of h o u r s (usually four to six h o u r s , in my cases); thus carousing t h a t can lead to enthusiastic battles if a u t h o r i t i e s intervene at its height will easily dissipate if the intervention occurs w h e n the enthusi- asm is already ebbing a n d people are drifting away.

A hypothesis: police are m o r e likely to p r o v o k e violence if they try to break up a party in which the energy level is high, w h e r e people are having a good time, t h a n if they break up a less successful p a r t y scene.

In an extreme instance, intervention t u r n s into m u r d e r : T w o N e w Jersey police officers investigated a c o m p l a i n t of noise at a roadside t a v e r n . W h a t they intruded upon was a celebration by t w o a r m e d r o b b e r s w h o had just robbed a Brooklyn b o o k i e of a large a m o u n t of money. They were drink- ing heavily and firing shots in horseplay. T h e r o b b e r s no d o u b t had a practical interest in escaping, but their i m m e d i a t e reaction w a s an e l a b o - rate ritual of h u m i l i a t i o n : the officers were held at g u n p o i n t , pistol- w h i p p e d , forced to strip to their u n d e r w e a r and kneel d o w n , a n d finally shot in the head (Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 1 1, 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e c a r o u s i n g m o o d w a s being i n t e r r u p t e d at its height; the response was itself an exten- sion of the c a r o u s i n g : previous gun-play t u r n e d into further playing with g u n s , sadistic but ebullient. When the c a r o u s i n g m o o d had passed, the r o b b e r s acted differently.Two days later one of the r o b b e r s w a s killed in a s h o o t - o u t with police, and the other s u r r e n d e r e d .

A second p a t h w a y to violence is where individuals or small g r o u p s at- t e m p t to force their w a y into a carousing scene but are excluded. Unlike a u t h o r i t i e s trying to break up a party, this is a case of w o u l d - b e carouscrs trying to join in.

A g r o u p of middle-class y o u n g men are having a p a r t y in an a p a r t m e n t ; they all k n o w o n e a n o t h e r a n d are sitting d o w n talking. T h r e e guys arrive looking for the r o o m m a t e of the p a r t y host; he isn't here, but they decide to wait. T h e party is no d o u b t r a t h e r boring a n d the intruders do not enter into the c o n v e r s a t i o n . O n e of t h e m , a M a r i n e , asks the host for a needle to give himself a t a t t o o . T h e host refuses, saying he w o u l d

2 5 8 • Chapter 7

n o t allow t h a t in his a p a r t m e n t . (This suggests a cultural difference in social class; the i n t r u d e r p r o b a b l y k n e w h e w a s stirring s o m e t h i n g u p , a n d the h o s t resists.) T h e M a r i n e persisted in asking for a needle, the h o s t persisted in refusing; the a r g u m e n t escalated, w i t h the i n t r u d e r s t a n d i n g u p a n d yelling t h a t h e w a s a M a r i n e a n d d e m a n d e d respect. (The incident t o o k place in J a n u a r y 2 0 0 2 , at the time of the United States w a r in Afghanistan.) T h e h o s t r e s p o n d s by s t a n d i n g up a n d reply- ing, "Listen, it d o e s n ' t m a t t e r to me w h o y o u are, b u t this is my a p a r t - m e n t a n d y o u h a v e t o leave. I d o n ' t w a n t t o f i g h t y o u , just leave!" H e says this in a l o u d voice b u t in a relatively flat t o n e , as if to s t a n d his g r o u n d b u t n o t t o escalate further.

T h e t w o s t a n d facing each other, backs a r c h e d a n d chests puffed. T h e y r e p e a t themselves for several m i n u t e s , a typical standoff. This comes t o a n end w h e n the h o s t t u r n s his back t o sit d o w n o n the c o u c h , b r e a k i n g eye c o n t a c t . T h e M a r i n e , p e r h a p s feeling frustrated in starting a fight—and also feeling a m o m e n t a r y a d v a n t a g e — p u n c h e s the h o s t in t h e shoulder. T h e s u d d e n release of tension precipitates the violence. T h e h o s t ' s t w o closest friends n o w j u m p i n t o the action, a s d o the M a - rine's t w o c o m p a n i o n s ; the h o s t is p u s h e d o n t o the sofa while the others engage i n g r a p p l i n g , p u n c h i n g , a n d kicking. N o t m u c h d a m a g e i s d o n e , a n d there is some accidental hitting of one's o w n side.

O t h e r m e n n o w pull the fighters apart. T h e t w o groups of three n o w confront each other again but from opposite sides of the couch, yelling their positions repeatedly: the M a r i n e refusing to leave a n d the host de- claring it was his a p a r t m e n t . Finally a young w o m a n gets in the midst of the confrontation, tells the intruders she is tired a n d w a n t s to go to bed; after m a n y repetitions, they leave. T h e police h a d been called at the begin- ning of the fight, but they never arrive, (adapted from student report)

Such fights raise an analytical q u e s t i o n , in t h a t the p a r t y is a zone of solidarity, indeed heightened a n d d e m o n s t r a t i v e solidarity. W h y sh o u ld solidarity, a desire for friendly inclusion, lead to violence? W h y go w h e r e one is n o t w a n t e d , a n d expect to be favorably received? A display of vio- lence is h a r d l y calculated to m a k e one m o r e w e l c o m e . T h e key is t h a t c a r o u s i n g solidarity is stratifying; the b o u n d a r y sends t h e message of infe- riority a n d rejection. T h i s is so even w h e r e the partiers are of a higher social class, politer, m o r e restrained, a n d less p r o n e to violence t h a n the l o w e r - r a n k i n g i n t r u d e r s . It m a y n o t be a very g o o d p a r t y from the latter's p o i n t of view, b u t they are on t h e outside l o o k i n g in a n d h a v e n ' t a clear sense of w h a t they are trying to get i n t o . Boundary-exclusion violence a l m o s t always is s t a r t e d by the intruder, r e s p o n d i n g to the status insult.

Exclusion from parties a n d c a r o u s i n g scenes, of course, is quite c o m - m o n , indeed u s u a l . W h a t t h e n m a k e s the difference in those instances w h e r e it is violently contested? H i g h school sociable elites, as we h a v e

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 2 5 9

seen, typically have their territories—lunch tables, after-school hang- o u t s — a n d they easily defend t h e m against less p o p u l a r kids by collective jeering. H e r e the status hierarchy is so widely k n o w n , a n d the e m o t i o n a l energy so c o n c e n t r a t e d in the elite, t h a t i n t r u d e r s are easily humiliated; m o s t lower-ranking kids do n o t try to i n t r u d e , even w h e r e they are physi- cally t o u g h e r a n d stronger. W h e n it does h a p p e n , crashing parties of the p o p u l a r high school c r o w d can lead t o f i g h t s (Milner 2 0 0 4 : 7 2 - 7 3 ) . M u c h gate-crashing violence occurs in a n o n y m o u s scenes, w h e r e the p a r t y is large, or the i n t r u d e r comes from a r e m o t e p a r t of t h e social n e t w o r k (in the previous instance, a friend of an absent r o o m m a t e ) .

W e see the same p a t t e r n a t a cast p a r t y for m e m b e r s o f a n M T V reality show. T w o off-duty policemen, t o g e t h e r w i t h a friend, having h e a r d a b o u t the p a r t y while in the process of p r o v i d i n g security for t h e television s h o o t , s h o w e d u p a t 9:30 p . m . a n d began p o u n d i n g o n t h e d o o r de- m a n d i n g a d m i t t a n c e . A n o n - d u t y officer told t h e m t o disperse; w h e r e - u p o n w o r d s were e x c h a n g e d , a n d the officer w a s p u n c h e d in t h e face (Philadelphia Inquirer, M a y 1 0 , 2 0 0 4 ) .

A c o n d i t i o n for gate-crashing violence is t h a t stratification is n o t clearly institutionalized or widely visible: an a t m o s p h e r e of superficial egalitari- a n i s m , i n w h i c h t h e r e are n o class distinctions a n d n o recognized hierar- chy of g r o u p prestige. This is w h a t m o t i v a t e s action-seekers, like y o u t h s on w e e k e n d evenings, to m a k e their w a y into w h a t e v e r p a r t y they h e a r is h a p p e n i n g , a n d t o f i g h t w h e n they are n o t a d m i t t e d . T h e sheer absence of stratification is n o t sufficient; it is the absence of repetitive, institution- alized a n d n o r m a l i z e d stratification, c o m b i n e d w i t h the situational strati- fication of p a r t y i n g itself, the prestige of being in a scene of effervescence.

T h e egalitarianism in m a n n e r s a n d in visible markers such as styles of dress, t h a t characterizes y o u t h culture since the late twentieth century, is one of the causes of carousing violence. C o m p a r a t i v e d a t a is lacking, but a hypothesis is t h a t in earlier generations there w a s m u c h less gate-crashing violence, because gate-crashing (when practiced) w a s m u c h m o r e a m a t t e r of deferential a t t e m p t s at clandestine assimilation, a n d detection w o u l d lead to humiliation a n d easily enforced exclusion r a t h e r t h a n violent expos- tulation by the gate-crasher. It is the egalitarianism, the sense of " I ' m just as good as a n y b o d y else," t h a t leads to righteous anger by those e x c l u d e d . 1 6

E N D - R E S I S T I N G V I O L E N C E

Some violence occurs, n o t in o r d e r to force o n e ' s w a y into a c a r o u s i n g scene, b u t by refusal to let a c a r o u s e c o m e to an end:

I w a s over at my friend's place just sitting a r o u n d d r i n k i n g whiskey w i t h him a n d a n o t h e r guy. This o t h e r d u d e c a m e over, a n d we began

2 6 0 • Chapter 7

s h o o t i n g dice for half dollars. After a b o u t an h o u r or so of s h o o t i n g dice, I started feeling the whiskey a n d decided t h a t I better be leaving. I told them t h a t I had to g o , a n d 1 picked up my dice a n d put t h e m in my p o c k e t . Then X j u m p e d up a n d said, " W h a t did you pick up those dice for?" I said, "Because I'm finished s h o o t i n g , a n d I'm going to split." He said, "You c a n ' t quit n o w ; you have to give me a chance to win back some of my m o n e y . " I c o u l d n ' t u n d e r s t a n d him c o m i n g d o w n on me with t h a t because 1 h a d n ' t w o n t h a t much money. I said, " H e y , m a n , I'm tired of s h o o t i n g , a n d I've got to be s o m e w h e r e n o w . "

T h e n he got right up in my face a n d said, " Y o u ' r e n o t quitting yet, motherfucker." I said, " T h e hell if I'm n o t ; I told you t h a t I'm tired of p l a y i n g . " He stared at me w i t h his eyes p o p p i n g o u t of his head like he w a s crazy a n d said, "You dirty, n o - g o o d fucking ass p u n k . " I k n e w the d r u n k e n fool w a s n ' t in his right state of m i n d , a n d I got scared because I k n e w he carried a gun a n d d i d n ' t care w h a t he did. I heard t h a t he had killed a d u d e some time back.

I said, " M a n , will you get the fuck o u t of my face?" But t h a t just sent him into a rage. He started swinging his a r m s side to side a n d calling me a m o t h e r f u c k i n g p u n k , a n d he spit in my face. I called him a dirty motherfucker, a n d he shoved me. I figured then t h a t he w a s n ' t going to be w a s t i n g m o r e time on m e , a n d w h e n he w e n t into his c o a t I t h o u g h t t h a t he w a s reaching for his piece. I k n e w then t h a t I had to act quick, so I pulled o u t my pistol a n d s h o t the crazy d a m n fool before he could s h o o t m e . (Athens 1 9 8 0 : 3 0 - 3 1 )

In a n o t h e r instance, t w o men become friendly w i t h a n o t h e r m a n at a b a r ; after the bar closes, they are invited to his a p a r t m e n t to c o n t i n u e drinking. They buy several six packs of beer, a n d t a k e a c a b to his a p a r t - m e n t . After the beer is g o n e , the host tells t h e m they have to leave. T h e visitors arc e n r a g e d — i n p a r t because they have no t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , but also because the festive m o o d is a b r u p t l y closing d o w n . They get into an a r g u m e n t , which escalates to a shoving m a t c h ; one of the visitors hits the host with a p u n c h , hits him over the head w i t h a l a m p , k n o c k s him d o w n a n d s t o m p s him in the face. He is later arrested for aggravated assault (Athens 1 9 8 0 : 3 7 - 3 8 ) .

End-resisting violence can also occur n o t just a m o n g h a r d e n e d action- seekers a n d in casual a n o n y m o u s settings, b u t a m o n g friends. H e r e the violence is usually m o r e limited:

In one instance (from s t u d e n t r e p o r t ) , a g r o u p of high school students on the weekend after their senior p r o m go to a m o u n t a i n resort, w h e r e they rent six nearby houses. They spend their time with music, d a n c i n g , h o t t u b s , w a t c h i n g movies a n d h a n g i n g o u t ; the m o o d is friendly a n d happy. On the last night, a g r o u p of boys in one of the houses has a toga

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party, w i t h a great deal of d r i n k i n g a n d n o i s e - m a k i n g . A g r o u p of girls four houses away, hearing a r o w d y g r o u p of boys a p p r o a c h i n g from t h e party, lock t h e d o o r s a n d w i n d o w s t o keep t h e m o u t . This enrages the boys, w h o s h o u t a t t h e m t h r o u g h the glass d o o r s , calling t h e m " b a d friends" a n d " d i s l o y a l . " O n e of the girls is outside in her car; t h e boys s u r r o u n d her, p o u n d i n g o n the car w i n d o w s a n d r o c k i n g t h e car back a n d forth. O n e of the t o g a boys gets i n t o the h o u s e , w h e r e he ceremoniously smashes the furniture, m o s t n o t a b l y t w o ceramic elephants from the m a n - tel w h i c h h e t h r o w s t o the g r o u n d .

As the noise escalates, t w o o t h e r boys s h o w up to confront the t o g a g r o u p a n d defend t h e girls. This leads to a r e n e w e d escalation; five of the t o g a boys, lead by a 6 foot 4 inch athlete, a t t a c k the t w o (who are m u c h smaller) while a n o t h e r eight or nine toga boys cheer t h e m on. T h e beating b r e a k s off as t h e g r o u p r a m p a g e s into t h e h o u s e , b r e a k i n g objects a n d bringing the girls to t e a r s . T h e t o g a g r o u p t h e n leaves, still yelling, l o o k i n g for m o r e p a r t y i n g elsewhere. Several h o u r s later, at a b o u t 4 a.m., the g r o u p r e t u r n s a n d t h r o w s things against the w i n d o w s for half an hour. T h e p a r t y w i n d s d o w n in a m i x t u r e of fun a n d anger.

F R U S T R A T E D C A R O U S I N G A N D S T I R R I N G U P E F F E R V E S C E N C E

A certain a m o u n t of fighting occurs inside c a r o u s i n g scenes, n o t so m u c h because people are having a g o o d t i m e , b u t because the scene does n o t meet e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e e x t e r n a l elements of festivity are present: a c r o w d of p e o p l e , the excitement of bodies j a m m e d in one place, l o u d noise from b a c k g r o u n d music or just from trying to be h e a r d over o t h e r s ' voices. But t h e r e is n o t m u c h laughing or sense of fun; p e r s o n s stuck in the c r o w d can be b o r e d a n d keyed up at the same time. A n n o y a n c e s w i t h the jostling c r o w d c a n t u r n i n t o a fight, w h i c h simultaneously releases t e n s i o n a n d raises the level of a c t i o n .

An instance from a s t u d e n t r e p o r t : A r a t h e r average-seeming college frat p a r t y is going o n . A large n u m b e r of freshman boys are s t a n d i n g a r o u n d , n o t talking m u c h , f i l l i n g the void w i t h r a p i d drinking. H e n c e t h e r e is a large c r o w d a r o u n d the beer keg, pressing to fill their c u p s . O n e of the frat boys is shoved f o r w a r d by t h e jostling c r o w d , k n o c k i n g into a large football player w h o is filling his c u p a n d spills his beer. He pushes the frat boy b a c k violently i n t o the c r o w d , w h e r e u p o n the latter b o u n d s back a n d the t w o scuffle over the keg. Several other big fraternity boys c o m e t o their b r o t h e r ' s aid a n d d r a g t h e football player outside.

A few m i n u t e s later, the athlete r e t u r n s w i t h a g r o u p of his t e a m m a t e s . T h i s leads to a standoff at the front d o o r ; insults a n d t h r e a t s go on for some m i n u t e s , finally ending w h e n s o m e o n e inside yells t h e police h a d

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been called a n d w o u l d b e arriving s o o n . (This t u r n e d o u t n o t t o b e true.) After the t h r e a t h a d ended, all the b r o t h e r s w h o h a d been involved in any degree w e n t on at length describing their deeds, b o a s t i n g a n d exaggerat- ing. Everyone w a s talking a b o u t it. T h e b r a w l supplied the previously missing t o p i c of c o n v e r s a t i o n , creating a focus of c o m m o n a t t e n t i o n , a n d raising the level of collective effervescence far a b o v e t h e initial, r a t h e r p a t h e t i c level.

This i s n o t t o say t h a t the individuals w h o s t a r t e d t h e b r a w l h a d con- scious intentions of livening up the party. T h e initiation w a s r a n d o m a n d accidental. Likely they w e r e merely p a r t of a large g r o u p t h a t felt t e n s i o n c o m p o u n d e d by e x p e c t a t i o n of p a r t y a c t i o n — w h a t e v e r t h a t vaguely de- fined entity m i g h t be—plus a sense of frustration arising from c o m p a r a - tive b o r e d o m a n d frustration w i t h t h e sheer physical press of the c r o w d . T h e m i x t u r e c a n p r o d u c e pleasure i n t h e f i g h t — e v e n t h o u g h t h e usual indicators of tension/fear are still present, w i t h the fight being brief a n d i n c o m p e t e n t , the standoff easily b r o k e n u p , a n d m u c h m o r e bluster t h a n violence. T h e post-fight circulation of excited c o n v e r s a t i o n in the c r o w d is actually the m o s t i m p o r t a n t aspect, since it is w h a t defines the fight as a p l e a s u r a b l e t h i n g , n o t so m u c h by explicit labeling as by casting an e m o t i o n a l a u r a over it retrospectively.

Fights often arise in situations of this s o r t , w h e r e t h e o u t c o m e is n o t necessarily to m a k e the experience i n t o a p l e a s u r a b l e o n e . Several s t u d e n t r e p o r t s detail public festivals w h e r e large c r o w d s of p e o p l e press one a n - o t h e r on the streets. In a street carnival in L o n d o n , for instance, the c r o w d is so tightly p a c k e d they can barely m o v e . Despite p r i o r e x p e c t a t i o n s of a g o o d time, the i m m e d i a t e reality is t h a t o n e can do n o t h i n g b u t shove a n d be shoved along w i t h t h e c r o w d . A fight b r e a k s o u t b e t w e e n t w o m e n , one black a n d o n e w h i t e ; they are so closely locked t o g e t h e r t h a t they can do little d a m a g e to each other; n o r can police get t h r o u g h to b r e a k t h e m u p , a n d the c r o w d i s t o o p a c k e d t o intervene. I t a p p e a r s the m e n are isolates, alone w i t h o u t s u p p o r t e r s to join in or indeed friends to h o l d t h e m back, i n c o n t r a s t t o m o s t m e m b e r s o f c r o w d s , w h o a t t e n d w i t h their friends. T h u s it m a y be t h a t these are individuals w h o are especially frustrated in e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t the carnival will bring a s h a r p rise in ordi- n a r y social ebullience. My collection of r e p o r t s c o n t a i n s several instances of this sort, in w h i c h the fight m a k e s no o n e happy.

Fights of this s o r t are sometimes cheered by s p e c t a t o r s , w h o t a k e it as a form of e n t e r t a i n m e n t . In these instances, t h e fighters m a y be frustrated b u t the c r o w d benefits by t a k i n g t h e m as a focal p o i n t for collective action as a c o o r d i n a t e d m a s s of spectators; their fighting enables the c r o w d to t u r n from a mere traffic j a m of small g r o u p s at cross-purposes i n t o a larger e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t , raising their collective spirit.

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P A R A D O X : W H Y D O E S M O S T I N T O X I C A T I O N NOT L E A D T O V I O L E N C E ?

C a r o u s i n g a n d violence m i g h t a p p e a r to be linked by a simple a n d obvious p a t h : d r u n k e n n e s s . 1 7 T h e r e is considerable evidence t h a t i n t o x i c a t i o n leads to violence (e.g., P a r k e r a n d A u e r h a h n 1 9 9 8 ) . A m e r i c a n victim sur- veys s h o w t h a t over o n e - q u a r t e r of victims of criminal assault t h o u g h t their assailants w e r e u n d e r the influence of alcohol, a figure b o r n e o u t by urinalysis of p e r s o n s arrested for violent crimes. T h e p a t t e r n of alcohol use is found b o t h in homicides a n d t h r o u g h toxicology of h o micid e vic- t i m s , indicating t h a t b o t h sides of a fight are often escalated t h r o u g h alco- h o l . But there is s o m e t h i n g p a r a d o x i c a l in the p a t t e r n : as we shall see, the vast majority of d r u n k e n experiences do n o t lead to violence. We will need a situational m e c h a n i s m to explain w h e n they d o .

W h e n d r u n k s are violent, h o w does this h a p p e n ? P a r k e r ( 1 9 9 3 ; P a r k e r a n d R e b h u n 1995) p r o p o s e s t h a t c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s c o m b i n e w i t h al- c o h o l to disinhibit violence selectively. 1 8 T h e c o m b i n a t i o n includes a dis- p u t e a n d e n c o u r a g e m e n t from b y s t a n d e r s . O r d i n a r i l y individuals con- sciously decide n o t to use violence to solve a d i s p u t e , b u t alcohol disinhibits this kind of self-constraint.

E t h n o g r a p h i e s of d r u n k e n parties give a b u n d a n t e x a m p l e s . A s t u d e n t r e p o r t (by a female) describes a fraternity p a r t y at a S o u t h e r n college in w h i c h t h e steady d r i n k i n g of beer led to increasingly u n i n h i b i t e d b e h a v i o r

In a n o t h e r instance (from a s t u d e n t r e p o r t ) , a large audience at a street festival is w a i t i n g impatiently for a b a n d to begin to play. T h e y express their restlessness in o u t b u r s t s of r h y t h m i c clapping a n d h o o t i n g . T h e n they are distracted w h e n a d r u n k e n , homeless m a n begins u r i n a t i n g in the midst of the c r o w d ; other people p u s h back in the crush to get a w a y from h i m , as he sits in t h e m i d s t of a p o o l of his urine. As the c r o w d focused on h i m , p a l p a b l y tense, a bottle is t h r o w n , t h e n a s h o w e r of missiles. He starts t o t h r o w t h e m back, m a k i n g t h e c r o w d yell a t h i m ; t h r e e large m e n r u s h a t h i m a n d kick h i m , f i n a l l y t h r o w i n g h i m aside. T h e music f i n a l l y starts a n d the c r o w d t u r n s its a t t e n t i o n to the stage, suddenly happy.

T h e r e is no a u t o m a t i c , functional feedback l o o p w h e r e b y a frustrated, w o u l d - b e c a r o u s i n g c r o w d can create effervescence by starting a fight; sometimes it h a p p e n s t h a t the c r o w d becomes focused a n d entertained; sometimes this fails to occur a n d the c r o w d is merely increasingly a n n o y e d or frightened. At this p o i n t , detail is lacking as to w h a t switches t h e course of action in o n e direction or the other. T h i s w o u l d be a crucial extension of a processual t h e o r y of violence, since as we h a v e seen in c h a p t e r 6, t h e a t t i t u d e of the c r o w d has a s t r o n g effect u p o n the confinement or escala- tion of violence.

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as the evening w o r e o n . W h e n the y o u n g w o m e n first arrived, their hosts acted courteously, holding d o o r s for t h e m , attentively asking t h e m if they w o u l d like m o r e drinks or snacks. As the d r i n k i n g progressed, the frater- nity b r o t h e r s ' a t t e n t i o n s became m o r e b l a t a n t . A typical line: " H e y girl. W h a t ' s your name? Linda? Linda, Linda, let-me-in-da! I'm Dave. You enjoying yourself? Did you get some of Pi D e l t a ' s beer? Likin' it? W a n t some more? You let me k n o w if you w a n t some m o r e ! " After his sixth drink, a s t u d e n t w h o had started o u t as shy cornered one of the w o m e n against a wall, removed her sweater a n d fondled her breasts. W o m e n t o o lost their inhibitions; a friend of the r e p o r t e r w h o began the p a r t y in the role of protectress ("Hey, Linda. You let me k n o w if any idiot guys are bothering y o u ! " — a l t h o u g h this could have been a version of bluster a n d a claim to k n o w her w a y a r o u n d ) eventually ended up d a n c i n g on t o p of a table, twirling her sweater over her head a n d s h o u t i n g " W a h o o ! Look at m e ! " T h e table b r o k e , as did some lamps t h a t were k n o c k e d over, lend- ing an air of potlatch to the proceedings.

T h i s p a r t y featured o n e fight, late in the evening. T w o men w h o h a d paid n o a t t e n t i o n t o each o t h e r previously b e c a m e e m b r o i l e d , a p p a r e n t l y r a n d o m l y , in an e x c h a n g e of a n g r y obscenities. " W h o you callin' a wuss? You c a l l i n ' me a wuss? W h a t e v e r m a n ! Y O U the w u s s ! " T h e reply w a s in t h e s a m e vein: " Y O U are the w u s s . You are! If y o u a r e n ' t , t h e n w h y d o n ' t y o u show me w h a t y o u ' r e m a d e of, y o u little fuckface?" A circle o f s p e c t a t o r s g a t h e r e d a r o u n d , excitedly a w a i t i n g t h e a c t i o n . T h e t w o m e n w r e s t l e d each o t h e r d o w n t o t h e floor, while t h e c r o w d c h e e r e d o n w h o e v e r w a s m o m e n t a r i l y o n t o p . T h e f i g h t w e n t o n for several m i n u t e s w i t h n e i t h e r side w i n n i n g . T h e fighters c a m e to a standstill, lying e n t a n - gled o n t h e floor l o o k i n g e x h a u s t e d . T h e c r o w d lost interest a n d drifted away. " W u s s , " the t w o m u t t e r e d a t e a c h other. Eventually e a c h w a s p i c k e d u p b y a friend a n d h e l p e d h o m e t o clean u p t h e b l o o d i e d n o s e s , s c r a p e s , a n d s c r a t c h e s .

T h e incidents of the p a r t y have a repetitive m i c r o - r h y t h m . T h e brawlers m i r r o r a n d r e p e a t each other, a n d themselves, in their series of accusa- t i o n s . T h e b a c k g r o u n d music is loud, accentuated beats of r a p lyrics, m o r e significant for p u n c t u a t e d e x c l a m a t i o n s ( " W h o be chillin' in da house t o n i g h t ? " ) t h a n for literal sense. T h e c o n v e r s a t i o n ("Linda, L i n d a , let-me- in-da!") is m o r e i n c a n t a t i o n t h a n s u b s t a n c e . All this is highly characteris- tic of d r u n k e n behavior, w h i c h progressively reduces d o w n to the simplest aspects of interaction rituals.

A l t h o u g h the c o n n e c t i o n between i n t o x i c a t i o n a n d violence seems obvi- o u s , it is a very p a r t i a l p i c t u r e . A large p r o p o r t i o n of violence is n o t caused by alcohol, a n d indeed i n t o x i c a t i o n can be antithetical to effective vio- lence. A n d as we shall see shortly, in t h o s e p a r t i c u l a r kinds of circum-

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stances w h e r e d r i n k i n g is m o s t often connected to violence, the p r o b l e m of sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable gives a very misleading picture.

Consider the a r r a y of kinds of violence in this b o o k . Military violence is n o t necessarily connected with d r u n k e n n e s s ; soldiers sometimes drink before battle, but it does n o t h i n g to improve their firing aim; on the w h o l e , calmer a n d soberer t r o o p s are better fighters t h a n d r u n k e n o n e s . Police violence occurs with e m o t i o n a l i n t o x i c a t i o n , not drinking. In m o s t politi- cal a n d ethnic d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , riots, a n d massacres, the p a r t i c i p a n t s are sober, including the leading activists; the exceptions are riots by festive, holiday c r o w d s , b u t these are generally the less destructive and homicidal c r o w d s . " T h e w o r s t kind of mass violence, f or ward panics, do n o t depend u p o n intoxication.

D r i n k i n g is involved in m a n y reports of domestic a b u s e ; in British d a t a , the p r o p o r t i o n is 44 percent (Richardson et al. 2 0 0 3 ) . These r e p o r t s are chiefly a b o u t d r u n k e n abuse of spouses; abuse of children, the elderly, and h a n d i c a p p e d seem relatively u n c o n n e c t e d with alcohol. T h e selective p a t t e r n suggests s o m e t h i n g closer to a carousing situation with a sexual element; this is especially a p p a r e n t in the cases (in c h a p t e r 4) w h e r e a h u s b a n d treats a b u s e as a form of a m u s e m e n t in private d r i n k i n g situa- tions. Some spousal abuse t h u s takes the form of frustrated c a r o u s i n g . O t h e r forms of a t t a c k i n g the weak are generally w i t h o u t i n t o x i c a t i o n : bullying a l m o s t never is (given its institutional settings); muggings and h o l d u p s a p p a r e n t l y hardly ever—since here the p r e m i u m is u p o n effective violence and e m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l of the situation, qualities t h a t i n t o x i c a t i o n tends to u n d e r m i n e . Some staged fair fights do occur a m o n g d r i n k e r s ; challenges to duels m a y have been issued in these circumstances, a l t h o u g h the duel itself w a s generally fought sober. Vendettas, with their trickery and careful p l a n n i n g , seems to be carried o u t mostly sober. Successful gunfighters very likely are the soberest ones; w h a t I have called "leapfrog e s c a l a t i o n " to one-gun fights, on the other h a n d , seem to occur often by escalation of d r u n k e n disputes in carousing situations.

This is c o n g r u e n t with the statistics; a b o u t t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of o r d i n a r y criminal violence is n o t associated with intoxication (the obverse of the o n e - q u a r t e r figure cited earlier). It is in particular kinds of settings t h a t the intoxication/violence link is found.

Consider n o w the p r o b l e m of sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable. It is easy to s h o w t h a t the a m o u n t of drinking is far greater than the a m o u n t of violence. In the late 1990s, 105 million persons ages twelve a n d over h a d d r u n k some alcohol in the past m o n t h (i.e., a b o u t 47 percent of the U.S. p o p u l a t i o n ) ; forty-five million had engaged in binge d r i n k i n g (five or m o r e d r i n k s on one occasion; 20 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n ) ; a n d twelve million were heavy d r i n k e r s (five or m o r e d r i n k s on at least five different days in the past m o n t h ; 5.5 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n ) ( 1 9 9 9 N a t i o n a l

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H o u s e h o l d Survey of D r u g Abuse; U.S. D e p t . of H e a l t h a n d H u m a n Ser- vices, N a t i o n a l Institute of Alcohol A b u s e a n d Alcoholism; w w w . n i a a .gov/databases). T h e r e w e r e 1 5 , 5 0 0 m u r d e r s in 1999, of w h i c h a b o u t four t h o u s a n d are a t t r i b u t e d to alcohol (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime R e p o r t s 1 9 9 9 ; www.fbi.gov/ucr). T h e r e were a b o u t 1,474,000 r e p o r t e d victims of a g g r a v a t e d assault in 1 9 9 9 ; 4 , 6 2 0 , 0 0 0 vic- tims of simple assault (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization 1 9 9 9 ; www.ojp.usdog.gov/bjs).

If we t a k e just t h e binge d r i n k e r s , a s s u m i n g for simplicity t h a t t h e y are r e s p o n s i b l e for all t h e a l c o h o l - r e l a t e d violence, t h e chances that they will kill someone during the year is about one in eleven thousand. Seri- ous assaults c a n be p i n n e d on 3.3 percent of binge drinkers during the year, a n d 10.3 percent are involved in a simple assault (i.e., a relatively h a r m l e s s f i g h t ) .

A n d given t h a t these drinkers g o o n m o r e t h a n one binge d u r i n g t h e year, t h e chances of any particular drunken episode turning violent falls to one in 366 for serious assault (0.3 percent) and 1 in 117 episodes for simple assault (0.9 percent). Even if we assume all the violence is d o n e by heavy drinkers (those w h o binge repeatedly d u r i n g the m o n t h ) , m o s t of their episodes of d r i n k i n g are harmless; the chance of any one binge re- sulting in a serious fight is one in 488 binges (0.2 percent); a mild fight occurs in 1 in 156 binges (0.6 percent).,10 Even these l o w r a t i o s are unreal- istically high estimates, since my calculation ignored the p r o p o r t i o n of violence p r o d u c e d b y p e o p l e w h o are n o t d r u n k .

T h e p a t t e r n is similar in E n g l a n d a n d Wales. T h e British C r i m e Survey asked victims of violence if their a t t a c k e r s w e r e i n t o x i c a t e d ; they found 2 8 5 , 0 0 0 victims of d r u n k e n w o u n d i n g s (the equivalent of a g g r a v a t e d as- sault) a n d 8 5 5 , 0 0 0 victims of d r u n k e n c o m m o n assaults (simple assault) in 1 9 9 9 . D a t a on binge d r i n k i n g is available only for t h e 18 to 24 age g r o u p ; this is the heaviest d r i n k i n g g r o u p , in w h i c h 48 percent of males r e p o r t e d being very d r u n k at least once a m o n t h . T h a t age c o h o r t c o m - prised 2 , 1 6 9 , 0 0 0 males, giving a t o t a l of at least 1 2 , 4 9 3 , 0 0 0 binge events for the year. If we m a k e the extreme, a s s u m p t i o n t h a t all serious a n d m i n o r assaults were c o m m i t t e d by binge drinkers in this age g r o u p , nevertheless only a m i n o r i t y of violent incidents are a c c o u n t e d for by d r u n k e n n e s s : 2.3 percent of drunken episodes lead to woundings, and 6.8 percent to common assaults. These percentages are higher t h a n the A m e r i c a n d a t a ; b u t the d e n o m i n a t o r is estimated in an extremely conservative manner. It is likely t h a t there w e r e m a n y m o r e binges, since a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n o f these y o u n g m e n binged m o r e t h a n once p e r m o n t h , a n d some males y o u n g e r t h a n eighteen o r older t h a n twenty-four also binged. T h u s the t o t a l n u m b e r of binges could be several times higher, a n d the percentage of d r u n k e n incidents leading to violence c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y lower (calcu-

V i o l e n c e a s Fun a n d F . n t c r t a i n m e n t • 2 6 7

lated from 2 0 0 0 British C r i m e Survey, Table A; R i c h a r d s o n et al. 2 0 0 3 ; Budd 2 0 0 3 ; all available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/bcsl/html a n d www.statistics.gov.uk).

If we go looking for d r u n k e n violence—that is, sampling on the depen- dent variable—we will find it. In these British studies 22 percent of the youthful binge-drinking males said t h a t d u r i n g the p a s t year they h a d taken p a r t in a g r o u p fight in a public place, as c o m p a r e d to 6 percent of "regular d r i n k e r s " w h o were less often intoxicated. (Keep in mind t h a t the d a t a does n o t say they got into a fight in these p r o p o r t i o n s on the occasions when they were d r u n k , but r a t h e r t h a t they had a fight on at least o n e such occasion during the year.) Of the binge d r i n k e r s , 56 percent said they h a d gotten into a heated a r g u m e n t during or after d rin k in g , a n d 35 percent h a d gotten into a fight u n d e r those circumstances (for regular d r i n k e r s , 30 percent were in heated a r g u m e n t s a n d 12 percent in fights) (Richardson et al. 2 0 0 3 , Tables 1 a n d 3). But notice t h a t even here, only a minority were getting into fights; as I have argued elsewhere, it is a lot easier to engage in angry talk than actually to fight. N o t i c e t o o t h a t w o m e n , a l t h o u g h they get very d r u n k less often t h a n men (31 percent of young British w o m e n do this m o n t h l y ) , have quite low levels of fighting when d r u n k — o n l y 2 percent h a d joined a g r o u p fight, a n d 11 percent had any kind of fight; b u t these w o m e n get into heated a r g u m e n t s a l m o s t as m u c h as the men (41 percent). T h e step from an a r g u m e n t to a fight is far from a u t o m a t i c .

W h y do so few occasions in w h i c h people are d r u n k lead to violence? T h e r e are at least three reasons.

First, fight situations sometimes develop, then a b o r t . Student r e p o r t s describe several versions. After midnight on a S a t u r d a y night a b o u t t w e n t y y o u n g males are d r i n k i n g beer in front of a college fraternity. T w o men, built like heavy, m u s c u l a r athletes, c o m e o u t of a frat h o u s e , then move in opposite directions d o w n the sidewalk until they are a b o u t ten feet a p a r t . They s t a n d back to back a n d remove their shirts. T h e c r o w d is m u r m u r i n g with excitement. It is said one m a n accused the o t h e r of spitting at him. O n e or t w o friends g a t h e r a r o u n d each o n e , talking in low voices. T h e observer saw o n e ' s face: he is biting his lip a n d saying n o t h i n g to those in his corner. T h e o t h e r m a n ' s face is n o t immediately visible; when the observer circles a r o u n d , he is found to be crossing his a r m s w i t h b r o w s furrowed. T h e c r o w d is eager for a fight, a n d s o m e of them talk excitedly a b o u t past fights they have seen a n d h o w this o n e w o u l d m a t c h up w i t h them in viciousness. But after three or four minutes o n e m a n puts his shirt back on a n d goes back inside the frat house; the other follows shortly. T h e c r o w d m u r m u r s unhappily for a m o m e n t a n d then m a n y of them return to the house as well.

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A n o t h e r form of abortive fight is illustrated in a nightclub in Philadel- phia frequented by college-age K o r e a n - A m e r i c a n s . O n e y o u n g m a n gets into a p u s h i n g match with a n o t h e r ; their friends hold them back, while they engage in cursing a n d t h r e a t e n i n g one another. O n e guy pulls free, t h r o w s a p u n c h t h a t does no d a m a g e , a n d is restrained again. Shortly a f t e r w a r d , one of the g r o u p w h o s u r r o u n d e d the p u n c h e r takes offense at an innocent inquiry m a d e by an individual u n a t t a c h e d to either g r o u p ; again there is an exchange of insults, an offer to fight, which is b r o k e n up by friends on each side. This is the same p a t t e r n found at dances in small Irish t o w n s (Fox 1 9 7 7 , described in c h a p t e r 6): the action consists a l m o s t entirely in bluster a n d in struggling w i t h o n e ' s o w n friends, w h o restrain the fighters from actually d o i n g a n y t h i n g .

It is difficult to k n o w at this point w h a t p r o p o r t i o n of d r u n k e n disputes a b o r t in these w a y s ; it is surely m u c h larger t h a n the n u m b e r of fights. T h e r e is a hazy borderline; a p u n c h may actually be t h r o w n , but often misses or does so little d a m a g e t h a t it is n o t c o u n t e d as a real fight. T h e lore of b a r - r o o m fights (as I heard it in the 1970s) w a s t h a t most fights are o n e - p u n c h fights. O n e w o u l d expect t h a t m a n y of these in-between fights do n o t m a k e it into the victimization surveys. W h a t is m o r e im- p o r t a n t to know, a n d is as yet poorly u n d e r s t o o d , are the c o n d i t i o n s a n d the processes t h a t cause fights to a b o r t . 2 1

A second reason w h y d r u n k e n n e s s fails to p r o d u c e violence is t h a t heavy d r i n k i n g m a k e s o n e slow, p o n d e r o u s , a n d clumsy. 2 2 Very d r u n k e n persons tend to lose their balance a n d fall d o w n . This is one reason w h y fights at d r u n k e n parties tend to consist of shoving a n d then grappling, with both sides falling d o w n ; like wrestling m a t c h e s (but carried o u t by persons w h o do n o t k n o w the techniques of wrestlers) this limits the d a m - age, since p u n c h e s c a n n o t be freely t h r o w n . This scuffling also disguises the likely fact t h a t the fighters lack g o o d balance, timing, a n d c o o r d i n a - tion in their d r u n k e n c o n d i t i o n . They also tend to lose audience encour- a g e m e n t in a few m i n u t e s , since the fight is n o t very spectacular a n d soon t u r n s into a dull stalemate. This is the ideal type, so to speak, of a fight t h a t stays confined to a "fair fight," o n e - o n - o n e ; such fights do little d a m a g e . If the fight becomes organized as a g r o u p beating on an isolated individual, they are usually in better position to keep their feet a n d do m o r e d a m a g e with full-scale kicks a n d p u n c h e s . It is n o t clear if this is just the result of superior n u m b e r s ; or w h e t h e r a g r o u p of this sort is usually reasonably sober, so they do n o t fall d o w n a n d trip each other.

In c o n t r a s t , the m o s t serious a n d skilled practitioners of violence avoid alcohol a n d drugs w h e n they are w o r k i n g ; this includes military snipers (Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 2 1 6 ) , professional h i t m e n (Fisher 2 0 0 2 ) , a r m e d r o b b e r s (Wilkinson 2 0 0 3 : 2 0 2 ) , a n d b u r g l a r s . 2 3 A black teenage t h u g describes h o w he beat a long-standing o p p o n e n t :

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 269

So I seen h i m the n e x t w e e k s , right. . . . I got a couple of peoples w i t h m e . I got like t h r e e fellows w i t h m e . So t h e n e x t t h i n g , we at a p a r t y a n d shit. . . . I d i d n ' t d r i n k n o t h i n g t h a t night. E v e r y b o d y s t a r t e d drink- ing t h e m o s t . He gets happily d r u n k a n d everything. So t h e n e x t t h i n g y o u k n o w — I got a h o o d i e . H e c o u l d n ' t see m e . . . . I p u t o n m y h a t , m y gloves, a n d everything. R a n u p from behind w i t h m y t h r e e boys. M y t w o boys g r a b b e d his a r m s . I just r a n u p t h r o u g h h i m a n d just cut h i m . Slashed h i m in t h e neck. I d o n ' t k n o w if he lived or died. He w a s d r u n k . H e t h o u g h t everything w a s all forgotten. Little d o h e k n o w i n his sleep is t h e kiss of d e a t h . (Wilkinson 2 0 0 3 : 2 1 3 ) 2 4

At a lesser level of violence, t o o , it m a y well be t h a t the p e r s o n s w h o get i n t o successful fights in c a r o u s i n g zones are t h o s e w h o are relatively m o r e sober; being less d r u n k w o u l d be a s t r o n g a d v a n t a g e if the parties are n o t equally m a t c h e d in alcohol c o n s u m e d . 2 5 This is a r a t h e r sophisti- cated tactic, p e r h a p s n o t very w i d e s p r e a d . T h e r e is a s u b - s u b c u l t u r e inside the p u n k c u l t u r e , called " s t r a i g h t - e d g e r s , " y o u n g males w h o are mili- tantly o p p o s e d to d r i n k i n g a n d d r u g s . T h e i r chief thrills, besides p u n k music itself a n d m o s h i n g , are fighting w i t h o t h e r p e r s o n s in t h e y o u t h scene w h o are d r u n k or high. T h e r a t i o n a l e for straight-edging is to keep o n e ' s b o d y purer, a n d also the recognition t h a t sobriety m a k e s one a better fighter. 2 6

But d r u n k s m a i n l y f i g h t w i t h e a c h other, a n d o n t h e s a m e level o f d r u n k e n n e s s . T h e p e r s o n s at highest risk of b e i n g victims of d r u n k e n violence h a v e t h e s a m e profile as t h e m o s t frequent p e r p e t r a t o r s — i n Brit- ish d a t a , y o u n g single males w h o d r i n k frequently a t p u b s a n d n i g h t clubs (Budd 2 0 0 3 ) . O n t h e w h o l e , t h e clumsiness i n d u c e d b y d r i n k i n g p r o b a b l y inhibits m a n y fights from getting g o i n g , even to mild levels of ineffectual scuffling.

D r u n k e n n e s s does n o t easily o v e r c o m e n o r m a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n - sion/fear. D r u n k s m a y b e disinhibited e n o u g h o r m a d e belligerent e n o u g h b y t h e c a r o u s i n g a t m o s p h e r e a n d t h e a l c o h o l t o s t a r t a possible c o n f r o n t a t i o n . But a large p r o p o r t i o n of d r u n k s a b o r t t h e fight at t h a t p o i n t ; m i c r o - e v i d e n c e of t h e k i n d n o t e d a b o v e s h o w s a lot of a n x i e t y a n d u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o g o further. H e r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear persists d u r i n g t h e d r u n k e n e p i s o d e . I f t h e f i g h t actually b r e a k s o u t , usually w i t h a n a u d i e n c e ' s e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t , tension/fear i s a p p a r e n t l y s u r m o u n t e d ; b u t t h e a m o u n t of a l c o h o l necessary to r e a c h this p o i n t likely h a s a c o u n t e r - b a l a n c i n g effect of m a k i n g t h e fighters less c o m p e t e n t , a n d t h u s limiting t h e fight from t h a t d i r e c t i o n . In this case, tension/fear is r e d u c e d b u t t h e s a m e o u t c o m e i s r e a c h e d : b o t h tension/fear a n d h e a v y d r i n k i n g m a k e f i g h t e r s i n c o m p e t e n t . T h i s i s parallel t o military, police, a n d g r o u p fighting u n d e r t h e influence of tension/fear; d r u n k e n fights—where they

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go b e y o n d s h o v i n g m a t c h e s — g e n e r a l l y involve a lot of wild swinging a n d h i t t i n g (parallel t o w i l d a n d i n a c c u r a t e fire), a n d a c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o - p o r t i o n of t h e d a m a g e m a y be t h e e q u i v a l e n t of friendly fire on o n e ' s o w n s u p p o r t e r s , o r hitting b y s t a n d e r s .

T H E O N E - F I G H T - P E K - V E N U E L I M I T A T I O N

A third cause of the relatively limited p r o p o r t i o n of d r u n k e n episodes t h a t are violent m a y be the m o s t i m p o r t a n t . T h i s is a situational p a t t e r n : it o p e r a t e s t h r o u g h the s t r u c t u r e of a t t e n t i o n and e m o t i o n a l charge in the g r o u p , rather than t h r o u g h individual motives per se. T h e p a t t e r n is: only one fight per g a t h e r i n g . In my collection of fight e t h n o g r a p h i e s , it is typi- cal t h a t there is only one fight at a p a r t y . 2 7 It c a p t u r e s attention for a time, building up excitement, tension, a n d sometimes enthusiasm in the g r o u p . O n c e t h a t g r o u p has lost its interest a n d shifts its attention away, the spell is b r o k e n . In the e m o t i o n a l dynamics of the gathering, often the fight episode (including an a b o r t i v e one) is enough to give the evening a dra- matic s t r u c t u r e ; after the d e n o u e m e n t of the d r a m a , things wind d o w n . This a p p e a r s to be true of a b o r t i v e fights as well, a n d of those instances of the "let me at h i m ! " variety restrained by s u p p o r t e r s . For d r a m a t i c p u r p o s e s a little violence goes a long w a y ; and c r o w d s ' e m o t i o n s are easily shaped by the simple plot t a k e n to its conclusion.

But w h y should a prior fight keep other individuals on the scene from f i g h t i n g , w h o arc equally d r u n k , uninhibited, o r action-seeking? M y argu- m e n t is t h a t once a fight has taken its d r a m a t i c c o u r s e , other persons present are relatively de-energized from further fighting. They m a y be buzzed with conversation a b o u t the fight t h a t did (or indeed did not) occur; but t h a t is a different focus of a t t e n t i o n , putting p a r t i c i p a n t s in an audience r a t h e r t h a n in a p a r t i c i p a n t m o d e , or in the position of satisfied b r a g g a r t s if they can claim to have been connected to the fight in some way. A fight, as it were, constructs a r o u n d itself a sphere of s t a t u s , like the m a n a of the tribal n o t a b l e or magician; just being close to a fight is enough to m a k e one into an excited conversationalist, talking a b o u t h o w close one got to the action, a n d exhibiting o n e ' s inside i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e r e is a s o r t of magical contagiousness from the fighters to its p r i m a r y wit- nesses t h a t spreads out t h r o u g h a chain of listeners a n d gossipers, all shar- ing in the energy from the center of a t t e n t i o n . A single such center of magnetic resonance is enough to define a party as a d r a m a t i c unit; a n d having formed once, it generally reorganizes the e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e so t h a t a n o t h e r such event c a n n o t h a p p e n again, until the first o n e dissipates.

This is the ideal type. Consider n o w the variations a n d exceptions. My collection of cases includes some w h e r e one fight is chained to the next; a shoving match at a fraternity beer keg results in ejection of one p a r t i s a n ,

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 271

w h o r e t u r n s later w i t h b a c k u p . Such second f i g h t s m a y o r m a y n o t c o m e off; my collection s h o w s several in w h i c h it a b o r t s or fizzles o u t . Either way, it is t a k e n by t h e audience as all one episode, all o n e n a r r a t i v e . We d o n o t f i n d t w o such narratives holding the a t t e n t i o n space a t the same party. In other instances, a scuffle can give rise to an aftershock or p e r i p h - eral w a v e ; in the K o r e a n - A m e r i c a n n i g h t c l u b , o n e near-fight is restrained, a n d s o o n after o n e of the s e c o n d a r y p a r t i c i p a n t s t h r e a t e n s to s t a r t a fight w i t h a t h i r d p a r t y w h o intrudes t o o closely—that is, i n t o the h o t center of action a r o u n d t h e first w o u l d - b e fighter. But this t o o is o n e c o n t i n u o u s center of a t t e n t i o n ; the episodes are close t o g e t h e r in t i m e , a n d overlap in personnel; moreover, b o t h p a r t s of t h e e p i s o d e — b o t h scenes in the play— are m u c h the same, abortive r a t h e r t h a n full-scale. We m i g h t hypothesize t h a t abortive fights m a y be especially likely to h a v e this k i n d of spill-over, since t h e r e is lingering tension after the first of such linked episodes. Yet the second episode is likely to feel r a t h e r old h a t , t h e r e b y ratifying the declining energy for t h e fight action.

In one s t u d e n t e t h n o g r a p h y , a fight b r e a k s o u t in a bar, a n d a b y s t a n d e r w h o a t t e m p t s to b r e a k it up is t a k e n by the b o u n c e r for one of the b r a w l - ers a n d is expelled, a l o n g w i t h his friends; later the g r o u p r e t u r n s to the bar a n d fights w i t h the b o u n c e r s a n d kitchen w o r k e r s . H e r e one fight is directly chained on the other; it is the same flow of a t t e n t i o n a n d n a r r a t i v e of grievance.

All this is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the sheer n u m b e r s of p e r s o n s assembled. In big c r o w d scenes (in my e t h n o g r a p h i c collection, the Philadelphia M a r d i G r a s , sports victory p a r a d e s , street festivals), there are sometimes r e p o r t s of t w o or m o r e fights w i t h distinct casts of c h a r a c t e r s . All five of my cases of this sort h a p p e n e d in large c r o w d s . 2 8 As a rule of t h u m b , we might estimate t h a t a fight for every o n e t h o u s a n d p e r s o n s or so in a c r o w d is w h a t the e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n space can h a n d l e . A p u n k r o c k musician, w h o has p e r f o r m e d at several h u n d r e d concerts a n d clubs over a p e r i o d of t h r e e years, a n d h a s observed m a n y o t h e r such venues, r e p o r t s t h a t in her experience there is a m a x i m u m of o n e fight per venue p e r evening, w i t h the following exception: It is possible to h a v e m o r e fights in very large c r o w d s (on the o r d e r of 1,000s), w h e r e n o t everyone can see w h a t is h a p p e n i n g , a n d each fight creates its o w n " s t a g e . " T h e " v e n u e , " t h e n , is s h o r t h a n d for an a t t e n t i o n space t h a t is s e p a r a t e because of the physical ecology of the setting or limitations on visibility in a c r o w d .

T h e h o u s e p a r t i e s a t w h i c h f i g h t s occur, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are m e d i u m - s i z e d affairs, at t h e u p p e r limit s o m e t h i n g o n t h e o r d e r o f fifty t o t w o h u n d r e d bodies c r a m m e d i n t o a space (which m a y b e a r o u n d 4 0 0 to 1,000 s q u a r e feet). In these s i t u a t i o n s , o n e fight p e r evening seems p l e n t y to give a buzz s h a r e d by t h e entire a s s e m b l a g e . But these p a r t y c r o w d s generally consist of a c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n of p e r s o n s w h o are

2 7 2 • Chapter 7

u n k n o w n t o e a c h o t h e r (i.e., familiarity m a y b e confined t o g r o u p s o f t e n to thirty, or even smaller posses of visitors); t h e a u d i e n c e as a w h o l e does n o t consist of a c o m m u n i t y t h a t c a n s p r e a d gossip a n d r e p u t a t i o n s a r o u n d ; a n d its solidarity in a p h a s e of fight-viewing e x c i t e m e n t is e p h e m e r a l . T h e e x p e r i e n c e of w i t n e s s i n g a fight in their m i d s t m a y in- crease t h e c o n n e c t e d n e s s of everyone p r e s e n t , since they s h a r e a c o m m o n buzz a n d t o p i c o f c o n v e r s a t i o n . T h e s e are s o m e m e c h a n i s m s b y w h i c h o n e fight p e r evening is t h e u s u a l m a x i m u m at a p a r t y , even if t h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e t u r n o v e r o f p e r s o n s . T h i s a w a i t s testing w i t h b e t t e r obser- v a t i o n a l d a t a ; it m a y be t h e case t h a t a high p e r c e n t a g e of t u r n o v e r w o u l d a l l o w t w o f i g h t s i n t h e s a m e evening, a l t h o u g h I h a v e n o instances o f this (i.e., t w o s e p a r a t e f i g h t s a t t h e s a m e party, n o t c h a i n e d episodes of t h e s o r t just discussed). Fights in n i g h t clubs a n d o t h e r e n t e r t a i n m e n t venues seem to follow a similar d i s t r i b u t i o n . 2 9

T h e one-fight-per-venue principle applies to o t h e r kinds of fights be- sides c a r o u s i n g . Fights a m o n g black high school girls also seem to follow this p a t t e r n (Nikki J o n e s , p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , N o v . 2 0 0 3 ; see also Jones 2 0 0 4 ) . O n e fight at a school (whether between a pair of girls, or t w o groups) a p p e a r s t o b e the m a x i m u m per day. These are relatively closed r e p u t a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t i e s , so new s of the fight travels widely; this news circulation n e t w o r k , a n d the assembling a n d post-assembly activi- ties of the a u d i e n c e , w o r k s to fill up a t t e n t i o n space w i t h one fight at a t i m e , w h i c h is to say in one d r a m a t i c episode. It is w o r t h investigating w h e t h e r fights in such settings also t a k e up a longer p e r i o d of a t t e n t i o n , lasting several days or a week; especially w h e n t h e r e are r e c r i m i n a t i o n s a n d t h r e a t s or r e t a l i a t i o n s , a single chain of fights—or just the chain of d r a m a s u r r o u n d i n g a fight—may squeeze o u t o t h e r possible fights.

In closer detail, we c a n see h o w one fight p r e e m p t s another. A b r a w l in a Los Angeles high school between black a n d H i s p a n i c s t u d e n t s , involving 100 o u t of 2 , 4 0 0 students in the school, is set off w h e n t w o black girls are fighting in the lunch r o o m , a n d a H i s p a n i c g r o u p pelts t h e m a n d calls t h e m n a m e s (Los Angeles Times, April 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 ) . T h e fight inside o n e ethnic g r o u p stops a n d is superceded by a bigger fight a l o n g ethnic lines. We also see here w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n a fight w h i c h is staged a n d limited in front of an a u d i e n c e — t w o black girls carrying o u t their o w n d r a m a for their o w n r e p u t a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y — i s i n t e r r u p t e d by outsiders. T h e black high school c o m m u n i t y — o r at least its violent fraction—is af- fronted en masse because its o w n ritual b o u n d a r i e s h a v e been violated. It is likely also t h a t the H i s p a n i c cluster w h o first i n t e r v e n e d — p a r t of an 80 percent majority in this s c h o o l — b e g a n jeering at the black fighters in a m o o d of scorn a n d p e r h a p s a m u s e m e n t , for p r e e m p t i n g their o w n atten- t i o n s p a c e . 3 0 In effect this began as a struggle over w h o w a s to c o n t r o l the d r a m a t i c a t t e n t i o n space of the l u n c h r o o m .

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E t h n o g r a p h i c detail from a s t u d e n t r e p o r t s h o w s the obverse case, w h e r e one side in t h e larger c o n f r o n t a t i o n , by b reak in g up i n t o fighting a m o n g themselves, can p r e e m p t a b e t w e e n - g r o u p fight. A teenage p a r t y is w i n d i n g d o w n late in the evening. A g r o u p of older students a t t e m p t to c r a s h t h e party, b u t they are confronted across t h e front l a w n by a little k n o t of five y o u n g e r s t u d e n t s , w i t h the girls s t a n d i n g apprehensively in the b a c k g r o u n d . T h e defensive g r o u p huddles a n d decides they w a n t t o use the p o c k e t knife t h a t o n e of t h e m carries; b u t he does n o t w a n t to give it u p . T h e largest b o y in his g r o u p argues w i t h h i m angrily, t h e n chokes h i m by the neck until he t e m p o r a r i l y loses consciousness. Both g r o u p s of a n t a g o n i s t s t h e n disperse, t h e older leaving, the y o u n g e r m o v i n g t o t h e b a c k y a r d w i t h o u t the knife. T h e mini-fight inside the h o m e t e a m takes up the entire a t t e n t i o n space, defusing the larger c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

In s u m , I p r o p o s e t h a t a l a w of small n u m b e r s governs fights in c a r o u s - ing s i t u a t i o n s , p e r h a p s in violent situations generally. This resembles the l a w of small n u m b e r s in an intellectual a t t e n t i o n space, w h i c h limits the n u m b e r of n o t a b l e positions to between t h r e e a n d six (which is to say, topics of intellectual disagreement divide t h e core n e t w o r k s i n t o t h a t n u m - ber of recognized positions or factions) (Collins 1 9 9 8 ) . A general t h e o r y of a t t e n t i o n spaces has been scarcely developed; it is clear from c o m p a r i n g intellectual a t t e n t i o n spaces a n d carousing fight a t t e n t i o n spaces t h a t they differ considerably in the precise form of their l a w of small n u m b e r s : t h r e e to six factions a m o n g intellectuals in a given specialty, b u t o n e fight (i.e., t w o factions) in a fight zone. I will p u r s u e the analogy at greater length in c h a p t e r 1 1 . T h e p o i n t I wish to emphasize here is t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of the field limits the a m o u n t of e m o t i o n a l energy individuals w i t h i n it feel. T h e fight itself benefits (if t h a t is the right w o r d ) from the audience's limited b u t c o n c e n t r a t e d focus of a t t e n t i o n ; b u t t h e s a m e focus de- energizes other possible fights.

A n d all this h a p p e n s regardless of h o w d r u n k t h e p e r s o n s present a r e . O n e m i g h t expect, in the a b s t r a c t , t h a t if d r i n k i n g increases the c h a n c e of violence, assembling a large n u m b e r of d r u n k s in o n e place w o u l d give rise to m a n y fights, simultaneously or successively. But such fighting of everyone-against-everyone, a free-for-all in the classic imagery, is virtually u n k n o w n in real life (as we have n o t e d already in c h a p t e r 1); later in the c o m p a n i o n v o l u m e , I will argue t h a t one-fight-at-a-time is typical on m o s t scales of violence on up t h r o u g h war, a n d c o n s t r a i n s h o w it can h a p p e n . H e a v y d r i n k i n g does n o t shift t h e l a w of small n u m b e r s . Indeed, if d r u n k e n p e r s o n s are highly susceptible t o simple e m o t i o n a l m o o d s , w e w o u l d expect t h e m t o c o n f o r m t o the p a t t e r n especially s t r o n g l y . 3 1

This i s the key t o explaining t h e p a r a d o x t h a t i n t o x i c a t i o n s e l d o m causes violence. This is so even in just those places w h e r e the cult of anti- n o m i a n excitement in t h e form of violence is strongest. Even a concerted

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effort at m a k i n g c a r o u s i n g venues into potential fight scenes—the mes- sages sent by demeanor, testiness a b o u t trivial deference, a cult of heavy drinking, the narrative culture of talking a b o u t fights—does n o t m a k e fights c o m e off a n y w h e r e nearly as often as the cultural facade w o u l d suggest. T h e c a r o u s i n g c u l t u r e , including its d r u n k e n version, is chiefly engaged in staging an a t m o s p h e r e of exciting violence r a t h e r t h a n the thing itself. W h e n it does h a p p e n , one fight per venue is enough to satisfy the d r a m a t i c s of the occasion.

F I G H T I N G A S A C T I O N A N D F U N

So far, we have seen t h a t the audience sometimes regards fighting as fun; w h e n do the fighters regard it as fun? By no m e a n s all cases in c a r o u s i n g venues are of this sort; m a n y seem m o t i v a t e d m o r e by lack of fun, by frustration or exclusion.

An u n u s u a l e t h n o g r a p h i c study t h a t gives an inside perspective on g r o u p s w h o do seek o u t fights is the research of Curtis J a c k s o n - J a c o b s ( 2 0 0 3 ; J a c k s o n - J a c o b s a n d G a r o t 2 0 0 3 ) . T h e subject is a loose-knit g r o u p of a b o u t eighty-five y o u n g men (and a few w o m e n ) in their late teens a n d twenties w h o attend weekend parties a n d bars in a big Arizona city. M a n y of t h e m c o m e from s u b u r b a n upper-middle-class b a c k g r o u n d s , some arc educated in universities a n d professional schools; but m a n y are school d r o p - o u t s or have checkered e d u c a t i o n a l careers. T h e g r o u p as a w h o l e is alienated from middle-class respectability, a n d are a s h a m e d of their w h i t e , affluent class b a c k g r o u n d , which they regard as " u n - h i p a n d un- c o o l " ; experiences in the unrcspectable w o r l d of jail, r e h a b centers, a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t offices give t h e m p r i d e , a kind of reverse social climbing. They c h o o s e to live in p o o r ethnic n e i g h b o r h o o d s , avoiding c o n v e n t i o n a l collegiate scenes. It is these houses—small single-story dwellings w i t h un- k e m p t y a r d s inside a chain-link fence—that are the venues for weekend parties a n d for seeking fights.

T h e parties are relatively a n o n y m o u s , since m o s t people arrive by hear- ing a b o u t them t h r o u g h several n e t w o r k links of a c q u a i n t a n c e s ; peak c r o w d s ranged from thirty to one h u n d r e d or m o r e . T h e fight-seeking g r o u p used these scenes to a t t e m p t to p r o v o k e fights:

You k n o w h o w sometimes you b u m p into s o m e o n e at a bar kinda h a r d , b u t you try to m a k e it seem like it's n o t clear w h e t h e r you m e a n t to h u r t him or were just trying to get by? I did t h a t to this guy. And a couple steps later I t u r n e d a r o u n d a n d he w a s looking back at m e . So I gave him this " c o m e on o u t s i d e " kind of smile. He never c a m e o u t t h o u g h . (Jackson-Jacobs a n d G a r o t 2 0 0 3 )

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Staring, m a k i n g hostile jokes, a n d p r o v o k i n g quarrels were other w a y s to stir things u p . Fights might be o n c - o n - o n e , b u t m o r e frequently whole g r o u p s jumped in. Unusually, in this fight-seeking g r o u p , individuals w o u l d seek o u t bigger o p p o n e n t s , or p r o v o k e a fight with a larger g r o u p . In o n e instance, a man with t w o c o m p a n i o n s picked a fight with a g r o u p of twelve, w h o rolled on him, a n d on his friends w h o eventually joined in. M e m b e r s fought for the sake of fighting r a t h e r t h a n for the sake of w i n n i n g ; an h o n o r a b l e beating w a s a cause for considerable bragging. They s o u g h t o u t o p p o n e n t s w h o f i t categories t h a t m a d e them fearful a n d d r a m a t i c o p p o n e n t s : "big g u y s , " " b l a c k g u y s , " " g a n g s t e r s , " " b i k e r s , " " s k i n h e a d s , " a n d " a t h l e t e s " (Jackson-Jacobs 2 0 0 3 ) .

H e r e we see a very different p a t t e r n t h a n fighting in gangs or in the lower-class black street code: these persons fight to keep up a r e p u t a t i o n , to intimidate o t h e r s ; as we shall see in c h a p t e r 9, street code performances are mostly bluster, designed to keep off challenges; w h e n fights occur, w e a k e r or at least suitable o p p o n e n t s are chosen if possible, a n d the con- cern is to w i n . T h e Arizona fight-seeking g r o u p , for all their d o w n w a r d l y oriented stance, m a i n t a i n s a version of upper-middle-class reflexivity and i n w a r d n e s s of values, by setting up d r a m a t i c situations in which they lose physically, but claim a moral victory. In all their activities they emphasize an u n d e r d o g t h e m e ; in c o n t r a s t , gang m e m b e r s p r o m o t e themselves as an invincible elite (with considerable pretence, of course). T h e upper-middle- class fight-seekers w h o brag a b o u t their defeats and bodily injuries resem- ble G e r m a n dueling fraternity m e m b e r s , for w h o m the p o i n t of the duel is n o t to win b u t to acquire h o n o r a b l e scars from the o p p o n e n t ' s s w o r d .

T h e fight-seeking culture of this g r o u p is sustained largely by w h a t Jack- son-Jacobs calls " n a r r a t i v e gratifications." They do m u c h talking a b o u t fights, speculating as to w h e t h e r a fight will happen at u p c o m i n g parties; after a fight actually occurs, they spend great lengths of time recounting it. In one instance, the g r o u p g a t h e r e d the day after a fight—in which the chief p r o t a g o n i s t w a s s t o m p e d by a g r o u p of o p p o n e n t s and ended up covered in b l o o d — a n d spent the next thirty-six h o u r s talking a b o u t it. T h e n a r r a t i n g is a central feature of the p a r t y scenes themselves. In the midst of a noisy p a r t y with the s o u n d s of r a p or p u n k music reverberating, m e m b e r s laugh boisterously while telling exaggerated stories of their fights, sometimes acting them o u t in p a n t o m i m e complete with blows a n d grimaces. O n e could say they fight for the sake of the narrative t h a t it allows them to perform. And indeed, narratives a b o u t fights are much m o r e c o m m o n t h a n the f i g h t s themselves.

T h e narrative is also p a r t of the micro-sequencing t h a t leads up to fights. T h e places w h e r e stories a b o u t fighting are told are often the same scenes w h e r e the fights take place. W h a t m a k e s up the " s c e n e , " the action, is a c o m b i n a t i o n of s e m i - a n o n y m o u s p a r t y c r o w d s , d r i n k i n g a n d story-

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telling, a n d t h e tension/excitement of checking o u t strangers, sometimes c u l m i n a t i n g i n challenging t h e m , a n d i n f i g h t i n g . T h e l o u d r a p a n d p u n k music is a n o t h e r p a r t of the t o t a l p a c k a g e of stage-setting; the n a r r a t i n g , r h y t h m s , bodily p o s t u r i n g , a n d the p u n c t u a t i o n w i t h fights are all p a r t of the same staged event.

But this is Goffmanian stage-setting in the sense of s h o w a n d p r e t e n c e . Fights are n o t easy to start, even in these settings; indeed, quite possibly because t h e stagey n a r r a t i v e a n d t h e scene of o m n i p r e s e n t , i m p e r s o n a l bluster takes the center of a t t e n t i o n , establishing an e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t in itself. T h e m e t h o d s for starting a fight are s t a n d a r d a n d easy to enact— b u m p i n g , aggressive eye c o n t a c t , vocal challenges—and the c r o w d e d con- ditions m a k e s p o t e n t i a l e n c o u n t e r s u b i q u i t o u s . Nevertheless, f i g h t s d o n o t h a p p e n every night t h a t m e m b e r s go o u t l o o k i n g for o n e ; over a p e r i o d of t i m e , this m a k e s t h e m frustrated, a n d hence a d d s to their e u p h o r i a w h e n they m a n a g e to pull o n e off. W h y are fights r a r e , despite the ostensi- ble convergence of all p a r t y features on facilitating them? O n e r e a s o n is t h a t a fight occurs only by m u t u a l consent: the o t h e r side h a s to see the challenging gesture a n d react to it in t h e a p p r o p r i a t e way. These gestures are sometimes subtle, w i t h an effort to keep t h e m from being b l a t a n t ; m u c h of the time they are n o t picked u p , p e r h a p s deliberately i g n o r e d . T h e gesturing isn't e n o u g h ; t h e r e m u s t b e a n e m o t i o n a l d y n a m i c t h a t ener- gizes some p e r s o n s to go further. Despite the a p p e a r a n c e of a field of a b u n d a n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the m o s t c o m m o n o u t c o m e i s n o t h i n g .

T h e r e is also t h e p a t t e r n , r a t h e r typical in violent g r o u p s of all sorts, t h a t the fight-seeking g r o u p is stratified. Some are particularly aggressive; o t h e r s follow a n d join in; still others stay in the b a c k g r o u n d . These latter t a g along w i t h their friends at p a r t y venues w h e r e violence is a possibility; b u t these individuals rarely have f o u g h t — p e r h a p s only one or t w o inci- dents in their lives; generally they have g o t t e n embroiled merely by staying on the scene w h e n a fight breaks o u t , since in these settings a n y o n e w h o does n o t flee m a y be r e g a r d e d as a fair target. T h e g r o u p as a w h o l e , including its h a r d e s t f i g h t e r s , does n o t t a k e t h e m t o task, o r p u t a n y obli- g a t i o n on t h e m to fight (this is the role t h a t J a c k s o n - J a c o b s t o o k as an observer). H o w d o they c o n t i n u e t o b e acceptable m e m b e r s o f the g r o u p ? A p p a r e n t l y it is because they are p a r t of t h e n a r r a t i v e c o m p o n e n t ; they are interested audiences for fight-stories, a n d they circulate the culture capital of the g r o u p , s p r e a d i n g the r e p u t a t i o n s of its leading m e m b e r s , a n d keeping up an ethos of a n t i n o m i a n a c t i o n t h a t is t h e g r o u p ' s hall- m a r k . T h e fight n a r r a t i v e is t h e leading r i t u a l of the g r o u p ; occasional fights are needed in o r d e r to feed materials into t h e n a r r a t i v e r i t u a l , b u t c o n s t a n t fights are unnecessary. Too m a n y fights m i g h t well o v e r w h e l m the g r o u p ' s narrative consciousness; there is likely a " l a w of small n u m - b e r s " o p e r a t i n g in this a t t e n t i o n space as w e l l . ' 2

Violence as Fun and Entertainment • 277

Fighting for fun also existed in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Ireland (Conley 1 9 9 9 ) . On festive occasions such as fairs a n d m a r k e t s , large-scale brawls often b r o k e o u t , usually between e x t e n d e d family g r o u p s . T h e r e w a s a recognized ritual for challenging to a fight: a m a n w o u l d wheel a r o u n d in the c r o w d , sometimes calling o u t n a m e s : " H e r e is C o n n o r s a n d Dela- hanty. Is there any M a d d e n will c o m e before u s ? " Taking off one's c o a t w a s a further sign of willingness to fight. Fights were tolerated a n d indeed s u p p o r t e d by the c o m m u n i t y , as long as the p r o p e r rituals w e r e followed. W e a p o n s h a d to be confined to fists, sticks, a n d stones; knives were con- sidered unfair a n d their use w a s heavily p u n i s h e d by a u t h o r i t i e s . But h o - micides w e r e rarely p u n i s h e d if the victim h a d engaged in fighting gestures or w o r d s ; even b y s t a n d e r d e a t h s a n d injuries (including children) were lightly p u n i s h e d or excused, since the prevailing a t t i t u d e w a s t h a t being in t h e presence of fights m e a n t assuming u n a v o i d a b l e risks; a n d children were often involved in fights, t o o , w i t h no clear b o u n d a r y d r a w n between older a n d y o u n g e r o n e s . Irish recreational b r a w l i n g suggests a form of p r o t o - a t h l e t i c s , in places w h e r e formal t e a m sports h a d n o t yet been orga- nized. It is a w a y of staging o n e ' s o w n excitement, using s o m e of t h e s a m e d r a m a t i c resources t h a t elsewhere w o u l d b e c o m e developed as organized s p o r t s , a n d v a r i o u s forms of staged fighting by its fans.

M O C K F I G H T S A N D M O S H P I T S

T h e clearest cases of fighting for fun are m o c k fights: fights t h a t are explic- itly playful, like children's r o u g h - h o u s i n g , or t h e playful a r m - p u n c h i n g o r i m i t a t i o n boxing-style s p a r r i n g t h a t y o u n g m e n engage i n o n occasions of ebullience. These m o c k fights are often a c c o m p a n i e d by laughter, jok- ing, or squeals of delight; a l t h o u g h this m a y occur m o r e on one side t h a n another, a n d one side can have m u c h m o r e fun. Usually t h e r e is a m o r e - or-less clear b o u n d a r y between fun a n d w h e n the fight t u r n s s e r i o u s — t h a t is, w h e n it is no longer fun. This suggests t h a t " r e a l " fighting has a distinctive quality, easily recognized; no d o u b t this is the a r o u s a l of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear, w h i c h poses a challenge to get t h r o u g h a n d calls for a different e m o t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n in d o i n g so.

Sometimes play-fighting disguises itself as serious. This occurs chiefly in settings w h e r e a n t i n o m i a n displays are prestigious, a n d fighting has cachet as e n t e r t a i n m e n t ; while at the same time t h e r e are inhibitions against e m b r a c i n g all-out violence. A g o o d e x a m p l e is the m o s h p i t . 3 3

T h i s is an area of varying size opened up by an a u d i e n c e s t a n d i n g in front of a b a n d , for a small n u m b e r of slam-dancers or m o s h e r s — u s u a l l y on the o r d e r of t w e n t y o u t of an audience of t h r e e h u n d r e d , a l t h o u g h t h e figures can r u n larger or smaller. Slam-dancing (almost always by males)

2 7 8 • Chapter 7

consists of r u n n i n g into t h e other d a n c e r s , p u s h i n g a n d flailing, b o u n c i n g like bumper-cars off each o t h e r a n d t h e h u m a n wall of s p e c t a t o r s . A pit forms s p o n t a n e o u s l y w h e n t w o o r t h r e e people begin t o crash i n t o each o t h e r to t h e beat of t h e music; others give t h e m space a n d form a circle a r o u n d t h e m . It is pretend-fighting; d e m e a n o r s are t o u g h a n d angry-look- ing, n o t laughing a n d h u m o r o u s . Nevertheless, t h e r e are tacit u n d e r s t a n d - ings: n o hitting t o o h a r d , n o f i s t s , n o kicking; w h e n s o m e o n e falls d o w n , the others quickly pick h i m u p . T h e edge of the s u r r o u n d i n g c r o w d p a r t i c - ipates in the same way, g o o d - n a t u r e d l y a b s o r b i n g bodily impacts a n d steering out-of-control dancers b a c k i n t o t h e pit. T h e h u m a n circle a r o u n d the m o s h pit is an integral p a r t of it, focusing a t t e n t i o n , cheering t h e d a n c e r s , a n d m o v i n g t o the r h y t h m o f the music. O n e observer n o t e d t h a t the m o s h pit d e p e n d s on t h e circle, a n d disintegrates if o n e side of the pit is left o p e n ; in o n e instance, w h e n a block of s p e c t a t o r s w a l k e d a w a y to get beer, t h e slam-dancing c e a s e d . 3 4

T h e central feature of slam-dancing is c o o r d i n a t i n g the pseudo-violence w i t h the musical beat. T h u s m o s h i n g stops b e t w e e n songs. T h e d a n c i n g usually occurs d u r i n g the " m o s h " p a r t of a song, w h e n the music is espe- cially h a r s h , l o u d , a n d v i o l e n t - s o u n d i n g . It is w h e n the m o s h e r s do n o t keep the beat t h a t it t u r n s into serious fighting. T h e pit collectively defends itself against this t u r n of events. An observer r e c o u n t e d an instance in w h i c h a " p r e p p i e " outsider (i.e., w e a r i n g clothes associated w i t h t h a t form of high school status g r o u p ) entered a concert m o s h pit, a n d immedi- ately distinguished himself by n o t s l a m m i n g to the beat, a n d a p p e a r e d to b e trying t o h u r t o t h e r s . T h e o t h e r m o s h e r s m a i n t a i n e d the beat, while the lead m o s h e r c a m e a n d forcibly r e m o v e d the violator. In small m o s h pits, a leader or rule-enforcer t e n d s to emerge s p o n t a n e o u s l y ; this is n o t one of the initiators of t h e pit, n o r t h e m o s t violent dancer, b u t typically t h e biggest male; he usually dances m o r e slowly t h a n the others ( a l t h o u g h still keeping the b e a t ) , a n d takes it u p o n himself to keep smaller m o s h e r s from getting t r a m p l e d , a n d helps the fallen to their feet or ushers t h e m o u t of t h e p i t . 3 5

C o n d i t i o n s t h a t sustain the pit are visible w h e n the pit b r e a k s d o w n . Pits are easier to sustain w h e n they are relatively small ( a b o u t eight feet in diameter); in large c r o w d s they m a y g r o w to fifteen feet in d i a m e t e r or m o r e , b u t these are m o r e likely t o b r e a k d o w n i n t o serious violence. This m a y be the result of large pits occurring in very large concerts; b u t if the p r o x i m a t e feature t h a t sustains the m o s h pit is its tight i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h the s u r r o u n d i n g audience, it follows t h a t the circle h a s the strongest sense of its unity a n d its role in sustaining the m o s h i n g w h e n it is c o m p a c t e n o u g h so t h a t its m e m b e r s can see each o t h e r a n d m o v e t o g e t h e r in the same r h y t h m . O t h e r w a y s i n w h i c h m o s h pits b r e a k d o w n are w h e n out- siders intervene, w h e t h e r these be police or external g r o u p s with a preex-

Violence as Fun and Hntcrtainment • 2 7 9

isting (and hence rival) social identity, such as s k i n h e a d gangs. These fit the p a t t e r n described earlier as b o u n d a r y exclusion violence at the edges of a carousing / o n e . On the w h o l e , however, security g u a r d s , a l t h o u g h they may arrest t r o u b l e - m a k e r s in the c r o w d , leave the m o s h pit a l o n e . It w o r k s best—and indeed only exists—when it is self-regulating.

Slam-dancing is the rare instance of a free-for-all, each participant strik- ing o u t in all directions; this in itself is an indicator t h a t it is only play- fighting, like a water-fight or snowball fight. W h e n it escalates into real fighting, it t u r n s into the s t a n d a r d two-sided m o d e . Participants are clearly a w a r e of the b o u n d a r i e s . Real fights do occur a r o u n d mosh pits from time to time; there are several instances in s t u d e n t r e p o r t s . In o n e case, t w o large gangs of skinheads attend a p u n k concert; they g a t h e r at o p p o s i t e sides of the mosh pit, a n d eventually invade the floor, meeting at the middle for a two-sided fight; the m o s h e r s , w h o are apprehensive a b o u t this menace, s t o p slam-dancing a n d flee the area. In a n o t h e r case, a small posse of fight-seeking t o u g h s a t t e n d a p u n k concert; they join the slam-dancing, but m o r e roughly, using their fists. But the moshers refuse to fight with t h e m ; frustrated, t w o of the posse have a fist-fight with each other. Such fights are clearly s e p a r a t e from the slam-dancing. In some instances, the b a n d stops playing when fighting h a p p e n s .

In effect, m o s h i n g is a ritual of solidarity, featuring all the interaction ritual ingredients: bodily assembly, r h y t h m i c c n t r a i n m e n t in a m u t u a l focus of a t t e n t i o n , building to high levels of collective effervescence. T h e p a t t e r n e d violence of s l a m m i n g body against body u n d e r shared c o n t r o l generates a high level of e n t r a i n m e n t — n o t merely by getting into the same m i c r o - r h y t h m , as in most IRs, but by bodily t o u c h i n g ; a female musician gives her opinion t h a t it is "an excuse for men to t o u c h each other." N o r - mally the e n t r a i n m e n t of prolonged body touching is sexual; in slam- d a n c i n g , any sexual c o n n o t a t i o n is consciously negated by the violent t o n e , similar to the forearm bashes, mock p u n c h e s , a n d butt-slaps t h a t express solidarity a m o n g athletes.

M o s h e r s do get h u r t ; m a n y leave the pit w i t h bruises, scratches, and cuts, which they s h o w off p r o u d l y — o n e asked his girlfriend if she t h o u g h t it m a d e him look t o u g h . Websites exist w h e r e m o s h e r s post their pit inju- ries, to c o m p a r e t h e m with o t h e r s . It w o u l d be m o r e a c c u r a t e to say t h a t injuries are badges of m e m b e r s h i p . M o s h e r s regard themselves as an elite g r o u p , a n d s o m e describe fellow moshers as "family," a l t h o u g h m o s t of those in the pit at any one time are a n o n y m o u s to each o t h e r . 3 6 M o s h e r s arc clearly distinguished from o t h e r types of y o u t h s ; they are n o t athletes, n o r particularly muscular, a l t h o u g h some m a y be big; n o r do they usually belong to factions such as s k i n h e a d s , w h o flaunt violence as a general d e m e a n o r in all s i t u a t i o n s . Their identity is usually a r o u n d the music it- self, chiefly p u n k , t h a t includes as well a clothing style: this is the g r o u p

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t h a t b e g a n (in the late 1970s) the fad of b o d y piercing, along w i t h hair dyed in bright colors a n d cut into raohawks a n d other e x t r e m e styles, a n d the w e a r i n g of steel-studded leather straps a n d similar items. It is a cul- t u r a l m o v e m e n t of disaffected middle-class y o u t h ; originating in p a r t as o n e of the counter-cultures in high schools t h a t were mobilized in the late decades of the t w e n t i e t h cent ur y in o p p o s i t i o n to the jocks-cheerleaders- a n d - p r e p p i e s w h o d o m i n a t e d high school sociability (Milner 2 0 0 4 ) . Its rebellion has been successful insofar as it creates a separate enclave, w i t h its alternate c u l t u r a l s t a n d a r d of prestige, a n d its gatherings w h e r e m e m - bers e m a n a t e their o w n collective effervescence. It is a y o u t h culture seg- m e n t t h a t showily rejects middle-class respectability, w i t h o u t going all the w a y to lower-class gang-style street cu ltu re. H e n c e its central ritual is carefully controlled pseudo-violence, distinguished from respectable a n d violent g r o u p s alike.

In conclusion, let us p u t this d e v e l o p m e n t in historical c o n t e x t . T h e s u r r o u n d i n g audience focuses their a t t e n t i o n u p o n the m o s h e r s , w h o be- come t h e D u r k h e i m i a n sacred object at t h e center of t h e g r o u p ' s a t t e n t i o n space. T h i s is o n e of a series of shifts in the center of a t t e n t i o n in public e n t e r t a i n m e n t events. Before t h e 1 9 5 0 s or 1 9 6 0 s , b a n d s existed primarily s o t h a t male/female couples could d a n c e t o t h e m . D a n c e r s p a i d m o r e at- t e n t i o n to each other, a n d secondarily to w h o else w a s on the d a n c e floor, t h a n t o the b a n d ; i n the dance etiquette t h a t prevailed until the r o c k n ' r o l l revolution of the 1 9 5 0 s , t h e r e w a s a status hierarchy as to w h o w a s d a n c - ing a n d w h o w a s n o t (low status "wall-flowers"), a n d w h o w o u l d cut i n o n w h o m (marking the m o s t p o p u l a r d a n c e p a r t n e r s ) . Even quite famous b a n d s of the swing b a n d era were t r e a t e d merely as hired help w h o m a d e the d a n c i n g possible, receiving their a t t e n t i o n m a i n l y in polite a p p l a u s e at the end of each dance t u n e . 3 7

As b a n d s rose in status d u r i n g the 1 9 6 0 s , couples d a n c i n g died o u t . Audiences clustered a r o u n d the stage to get as close to famous b a n d s as possible; o r a t t e n d e d huge o u t d o o r concerts w h e r e m o s t sat o n the g r o u n d or in d i s t a n t seats. At m o s t , a m i n o r i t y of individuals m i g h t s t a n d a n d d a n c e alone in their place, d a n c i n g consisting a l m o s t entirely of b o d y s w a y i n g a n d a r m m o v e m e n t s , b u t w i t h o u t m o v i n g from place t o place (which necessarily m a k e s dancers p a y a t t e n t i o n to each other in o r d e r to avoid collisions). These solo dancers were n o t t h e centers of a t t e n t i o n for the audience, a n d they all d a n c e d facing the b a n d . (In c o n t r a s t , d u r i n g the jitterbug era of the 1 9 4 0 s , especially g o o d d a n c e couples w o u l d be given the entire f l o o r , while the audience g a t h e r e d a r o u n d t h e m a n d a p p l a u d e d . ) A l t h o u g h r e c o r d s of p o p u l a r b a n d s w e r e sold from t h e 1 9 2 0 s o n w a r d , it w a s i n the 1 9 6 0 s a n d thereafter t h a t b a n d s a n d their star musicians be- c a m e k n o w n a b o v e all as m e d i a figures, d o m i n a t i n g their audiences in money, honor, a n d in the situational a t t e n t i o n space.

Violence as lain and Entertainment • 281

Slam-dancers a n d m o s h pits, a p p e a r i n g a r o u n d 1 9 8 0 , revived dancing at concerts as a p r i m a r y center of a t t e n t i o n . They used the a p p e a r a n c e of violence as a sure-fire attention-getter, t r u m p i n g the h a n d s ' rise to cen- trality. As we have seen t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k , violence is the most p o w e r - ful way to focus a t t e n t i o n of h u m a n beings; w h e t h e r one favors it or opposes it, one c a n n o t ignore violence in one's immediate vicinity. T h a t slam-dancing is only pseudo-violence docs n o t alter this fact; indeed, vio- lence in general is chiefly d r a m a t i c show, a n d bluster is a major p a r t of all violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Mosh pits are a brilliant tactical invention, since they nicely calculate the level of violence for o p t i m u m effect in creat- ing g r o u p solidarity, extending it to the i m m e d i a t e ring of audience, a n d using it to r e c a p t u r e the center of a t t e n t i o n a w a y from the b a n d .

M o s h i n g is also p a r t of a n o t h e r status revolt, within high-school status r a n k i n g s (described by Milner | 2 0 0 4 J ; and discussed in c h a p t e r 5 regard- ing bullying). O n e side-effect of the rise of p o p u l a r musicians to media stars, a n d the displacement of couples d a n c i n g by musical p e r f o r m a n c e w a t c h i n g , w a s to m a k e music concerts into an alternative gathering place to school athletic events, a n d to school dances and parties. These latter were the arenas d o m i n a t e d by the traditional school elites, the jocks a n d p o p u l a r party-goers and stars of the dating m a r k e t . As p o p u l a r music c o n s u m p t i o n became the central identifying p o i n t of y o u t h cultures, it also came to s u p p o r t greater pluralism in s t u d e n t status hierarchies; p u n k and o t h e r alternative culture g r o u p s acquired their o w n venues where they could generate their o w n collective effervescence, d o m i n a t i n g in their o w n emotional attention spaces. M o s h e r s became the leading edge of punk culture, the attention-getters within their chief cultural rituals and gathering places. N o t surprisingly, there is s t r o n g a n t a g o n i s m between m o s h e r s and jocks, their chief c o u n t e r p a r t s in the use of controlled vio- lence in the c o n v e n t i o n a l y o u t h c u l t u r e . 3 8

These are sophisticated d e v e l o p m e n t s . We might call it the revolt of the audience in an era of e n t e r t a i n e r s ' d o m i n a t i o n . It is a differentiation of sophisticated in-groups claiming elite status within y o u t h culture, a n d within p o p u l a r e n t e r t a i n m e n t culture generally. In the following chapter, we will see similar d e v e l o p m e n t s in the realm of s p o r t s .

C H A P T E R 8

Sports Violence

IN A N A T I O N A L BASKETBALL A S S O C I A T I O N g a m e in 1 9 9 7 , Dennis R o d m a n deliberately kicked a c a m e r a m a n in the groin while s t u m b l i n g off the c o u r t struggling for a r e b o u n d u n d e r the basket. T h e kick occurred during a tense m o m e n t in the game,with the score tied 7 1 - 7 1 between the de- fending c h a m p i o n C h i c a g o Bulls and the M i n n e s o t a T i m b e r w o l v e s , w h o had just rallied to m a k e up an eleven-point deficit on their h o m e c o u r t . Play was stopped for seven minutes while the c a m e r a m a n w a s taken off on a stretcher. T h e delay cost the Timberwolves their m o m e n t u m ; the Bulls pulled a h e a d again to win 1 1 2 - 1 0 2 , for their eighth win in a row. R o d m a n w a s k n o w n as a defensive specialist, and the violence b r o k e o u t as he m a d e an e x t r e m e effort to break up a scoring spree by the other t e a m . R o d m a n was backed up in c o m m e n t s by players and coaches on his t e a m after the g a m e ; a l t h o u g h hitting a helpless bystander w a s a b l a t a n t violation of s p o r t s m a n s h i p , t e a m m a t e s accused the c a m e r a m a n of faking the injury. " W h e n y o u ' r e t h a t close to the g a m e , y o u ' v e got to be willing to get out of the w a y , " said Bulls star Scottie Pippen. " T h i s is o u r c o u r t " (San Diego Union, J a n . 1 6 , 1 9 9 7 ) . In o n e sense the fight w a s e x t r a n e o u s to the g a m e , since there w a s no c o n f r o n t a t i o n between o p p o s i n g players. But like player violence it h a p p e n e d at the most likely p o i n t in the action, and it became the t u r n i n g - p o i n t of the g a m e .

T h e r e are at least three different kinds of sports violence. First, w h a t causes players to fight with each o t h e r d u r i n g a game? This is best a n - swered by asking when in a g a m e do fights break o u t . We shall see t h a t just w h a t produces m a x i m a l d r a m a in the game is also w h a t p r o d u c e s player violence. Second, w h a t explains s p e c t a t o r violence? Spectators be- c o m e engrossed in the same d r a m a t i c time-flow of events, hence t h e r e is a close relation between spectator-versus-player violence a n d player-versus- player violence. T h i r d is off-site violence by spectators or fans: w h e n do they fight against each other, or against i n a n i m a t e objects or the police? An e x t r e m e extension of off-site violence is s p o r t s hooligan violence, which becomes totally disconnected from the r h y t h m s of the g a m e ; yet even here, the d r a m a t i c structure of w h a t h a p p e n s in the arena helps ex- plain violence outside it.

My m e t h o d t h r o u g h o u t this chapter, wherever possible, is direct obser- vation of the details of a c t i o n . T h e emphasis is n o t on the b a c k g r o u n d

Sports Violence • 283

characteristics of players or fans, b u t on t h e a c t u a l flow of events in t h e e m o t i o n s of lived time. I d r a w on my o w n obse rv atio n s of g a m e s , largely from television, a n d from interviewing experienced fans of p a r t i c u l a r kinds of s p o r t s . My generalizations d r a w also on a n ews clipping file of incidents of sports violence over the years 1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 4 , a n d on p h o t o - g r a p h s of those incidents. Sports in recent years is the best r e c o r d e d of all forms of action, a n d t h u s it is possible to see t h e time sequence of conflict better here t h a n in m o s t other kinds of violence.

S P O R T S A S D R A M A T I C A L L Y C O N T R I V E D C O N F L I C T S

Sports are deliberately contrived for p r o d u c i n g exciting a n d entertaining contests. W h a t h a p p e n s during a g a m e is s p o n t a n e o u s a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e in details. But the kinds of things t h a t can h a p p e n are s t r u c t u r e d by p r o c e - dures selected in a d v a n c e . A game is the m o s t highly staged of all conflicts; the conflict form itself has been chosen because of the d r a m a it p r o d u c e s . Rules h a v e been f o r m u l a t e d a n d r e f o r m u l a t e d to c h a n n e l the action in p a r t i c u l a r p a t h w a y s ; these conscious choices are usually m a d e t o p r o m o t e m o r e d r a m a t i c action in the g a m e . T h e height of t h e pitcher's m o u n d is l o w e r e d a n d the strike z o n e r e d u c e d t o bring m o r e hitting i n baseball g a m e s ; football games i n t r o d u c e f o r w a r d passes; basketball games a d d 3 - p o i n t shots a n d n a r r o w the z o n e in w h i c h defenders can s t a n d to block the b a s k e t . 1 Sports are real life, a n d this m a k e s t h e m engrossing; b u t real life at its m o s t deliberately a n d artificially organized a n d c o n t r o l l e d . It is larger t h a n life, conflict in its purified forms, better focused a n d therefore m o r e dramatical l y satisfying t h a n in o r d i n a r y events.

At t h e center of s p o r t s is its e m o t i o n a l a p p e a l . Spectators follow t h e action a b o v e all for the experience of d r a m a t i c m o m e n t s : the surge to go a h e a d in the scoring; the defensive rally to fend off an a t t a c k ; the d r a m a of catching up after having fallen behind; the last-minute t r i u m p h . O n e ' s favorite does n o t always prevail, of course; on average, half the games will be lost. But even a losing effort can be dr am atically satisfying, e n o u g h to k e e p spectators c o m i n g back for m o r e , if t h e r e are e n o u g h d r a m a t i c m o m e n t s along the way. T h e basic elements of d r a m a are simple a n d re- petitive, but they can be varied in m a n y w a y s . Particular sports have their o w n p a t t e r n s in the timing of d r a m a t i c m o m e n t s ; baseball with its long rallies of a sequence of players getting on base, building tension t h a t m a y or m a y not go over the brink into scoring runs; soccer w i t h its long contin- uous pressure a n d sudden release in a rare goal; the intermediate targets in American football with its 4 d o w n s to go 10 y a r d s a n d a n o t h e r c h a n c e to keep moving the ball t o w a r d the goal line; the series of n erv e-wrack in g

2 8 4 • C h a p t e r 8

t i m e - o u t s n e a r the end of a close basketball g a m e as t e a m s struggle for a crucial shot, block, or steal.

A literary n a r r a t i v e depends on plot tension; archetypally a p r o t a g o n i s t has a p r o b l e m , launches o u t on a search to solve it, e n c o u n t e r s obstacles, acquires h e l p , goes t h r o u g h setbacks a n d deceptions, a n d finally meets the chief obstacle h e a d on (classically delineated in P r o p p 1 9 2 8 / 1 9 6 8 ; cf. Elias a n d D u n n i n g 1 9 8 6 ) . I n a d v e n t u r e s , r o m a n c e s , a n d comedies, the h e r o finally w i n s ; in m o r e c o m p l e x d r a m a s , t h e r e m a y be a tragic failure, losing the external goal b u t gaining a m o r a l victory by having fought well, m a k i n g a heroic sacrifice, or by gaining inner insight. Sports rarely h a v e the m o s t c o m p l e x of these d r a m a t i c r e s o l u t i o n s , b u t they are propelled by t h e basic shape of d r a m a t i c n a r r a t i v e .

To enjoy the g a m e fully, one needs to go t h r o u g h these m o m e n t s of suspense in real time; merely to w a t c h t a p e d replays or to r e a d a b o u t the o u t c o m e in t h e new s is to miss m o s t of the e m o t i o n a l experience. W i t h o u t the tension b u i l d u p , t h e r e is little of t h e surging joy of t r i u m p h , a n d the l e t d o w n of failure is the price p e o p l e willingly p a y for the c h a n c e of having t h o s e m o m e n t s . M o r e o v e r , t h e e m o t i o n a l experience is a collective o n e ; it is the r e v e r b e r a t e d s o u n d s a n d m u t u a l l y e n t r a i n e d gestures of the c r o w d t h a t m a k e s it fun to be in the s t a n d s w a t c h i n g one's t e a m ' s rally—even if it d o e s n ' t ultimately c o m e off—and t h a t m a k e s t h e m o m e n t s of t r i u m p h an experience for lifetime m e m o r i e s . T h a t is w h y spectators will p a c k a s t a d i u m for an eagerly anticipated g a m e , even t h o u g h their seats m a y be poor, a n d on the w h o l e they w o u l d h a v e a better view on TV. W h a t the fan experiences is n o t the sights of the g a m e itself so m u c h as the d r a m a t i c sequence of e m o t i o n s , amplified by the presence of a like-minded c r o w d .

T h e r e are a d d i t i o n a l sources of excitement besides the s h o r t - r u n ten- sions of the g a m e action. A n t i c i p a t i o n a n d tension c a n build up from a series of games or m a t c h e s , a n d from t h e s t a n d i n g of t e a m s in a league playing for the season c h a m p i o n s h i p or from their p o s i t i o n in a t o u r n a - m e n t . In s o m e sports (chiefly A m e r i c a n ones), s e c o n d a r y goals are elabo- r a t e d by r e c o r d - k e e p i n g , so t h a t individual players c a n w i n b a t t i n g or scoring c h a m p i o n s h i p s a n d get their n a m e s in the r e c o r d b o o k s in v a r i o u s w a y s , a p a r t from w h e t h e r the t e a m w i n s or loses. 2 A g a m e m a y also fea- t u r e some e x t r a o r d i n a r y m o m e n t s of skill display—a s h o r t s t o p m a k i n g a spectacular fielding play, a basketball player's flying d u n k — b u t these are u n p r e d i c t a b l e , n o t framed by a b u i l d u p of p r i o r tension; they are enjoy- able for the c r o w d b u t off to the side of the d r a m a of conflict. T h e r e are also the d r a m a t i c aspects of individual player's histories: n e w c o m e r s a n d aging veterans; injuries a n d recoveries; players m o v i n g from t e a m to t e a m a n d recasting old rivalries; q u a r r e l s w i t h t e a m m a t e s , coaches, a n d offi- cials. K n o w l e d g e a b l e fans p a r t i c i p a t e in an o n g o i n g serial m e l o d r a m a , a real-life s o a p o p e r a ; this m a t e r i a l m a k e s b o t h for a c o n t i n u o u s flow of

S p o r t s V i o l e n c e • 2 H 5

news copy a n d for c o n v e r s a t i o n a l capital for sociable ties a m o n g fans. This is w h y long familiarity w i t h the stories of the players m a k e s the experience of a sports event m u c h thicker in meanings t h a n it does for an outsider, w h o will likely find the same events uninteresting. For this rea- son, fans often find sports in o t h e r countries boring.

Spectators a t t e n d for the collective effervescence, the flow of d r a m a t i c e m o t i o n s building up tension into g r o u p energy and solidarity. Players enact these e m o t i o n a l surges in a m o r e c o m p l e x way. In t e a m s p o r t s , they share collective e m o t i o n s w i t h their t e a m m a t e s , a n d successful perfor- m a n c e depends on e m o t i o n a l resonances t h a t keep the t e a m c o o r d i n a t e d as well as energetic; these t w o features together are colloquially referred to as " m o m e n t u m " or " c h e m i s t r y " (Adler 1984). Players also are in- volved in an e m o t i o n a l interaction with their o p p o n e n t s , w h e t h e r in indi- vidual contests or t e a m s p o r t s . Play consists in a contest of skill and effort, but most i m p o r t a n t l y in m o m e n t - b y - m o m e n t challenges as to w h o will become emotionally d o m i n a n t . It is a struggle over e m o t i o n a l energy (EE) in the technical sense of interaction ritual theory; the player or t e a m w h o gains EE wins at the point w h e r e the o p p o n e n t loses EE. These are the e m o t i o n a l t u r n i n g points of a g a m e .

These three kinds of e m o t i o n a l dynamics—collective effervescence in buildups of d r a m a t i c tension in the audience; the degree of e m o t i o n a l resonance within a t e a m ; EE contests between o p p o n e n t s — m a k e up the b a c k g r o u n d for o u t b u r s t s of sports violence.'

G A M E D Y N A M I C S A N D PLAYER V I O L E N C E

When does violence h a p p e n ? Below I will try to pin d o w n the m o m e n t s during the g a m e when it is most likely. Consider here a b r o a d e r c o m p a r i - son: w h a t are the features of sports that m a k e s violence m o r e frequent, a n d (not necessarily correlated) m o r e severe?

Some violence is p a r t of the game itself. Boxers hit each other; American football players block a n d tackle with as much force as possible; ice hockey players body check. Injuries frequently h a p p e n within the rules of the g a m e . We reserve the term " s p o r t s violence" for violence t h a t h a p p e n s outside the rules; typically it brings play to a s t o p . T h e r e are overlaps, and s o m e violence on the field of play is quasi-recognized by the rules; there are penalties for fouls, unnecessary roughness, a n d illicit hits. These m a k e up a c o n t i n u u m from legitimate player force, to fouls, to g a m e - i n t e r r u p t i n g fights; emotional escalation goes up the c o n t i n u u m .

Sports may be divided into three main types: staged c o m b a t s , in which there is both offense and defense situations; parallel contests, in which c o m p e t i t o r s strive to o u t d o each o t h e r t o w a r d a goal; a n d skill exhibi-

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t i o n s , w h e r e c o m p e t i t o r s w i n by impressing a p a n e l of judges. Sports vio- lence is m o s t frequent in staged c o m b a t s , or r a t h e r in a subset of t h e m . Considering w h y this is so will s h o w us t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of the e n c o u n t e r i s m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n dispositional a n d b a c k g r o u n d e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t are often invoked to a c c o u n t for sports violence.

M a s c u l i n i t y is often p u t f o r w a r d as an e x p l a n a t i o n of violence, w h e t h e r in the form of a cultural code of aggression a n d d o m i n a n c e , or in the physiology of t e s t o s t e r o n e a n d b u l k e d - u p muscles. But a m o n g the m o s t m u s c u l a r a n d masculine-looking of athletes are track-and-field p e r f o r m - ers in s h o t p u t , discus, a n d h a m m e r t h r o w ; yet fights are a l m o s t u n h e a r d of at such c o m p e t i t i o n s . T h i s is also t h e case w i t h weight-lifters, the s p o r t w i t h the greatest emphasis u p o n sheer muscles. These are parallel c o m p e - titions, w i t h no direct c o n f r o n t a t i o n of offense a n d defense; the form of the encounter, h o w e v e r tense a n d competitive, does n o t p r o m o t e t h e dra- m a t i c form of violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 4 Still further from such confronta- tions are contests of skill exhibition, such as gymnasts; male g y m n a s t s are very m u s c u l a r b u t the s t r u c t u r e of their e n c o u n t e r s are n o n - c o n f r o n t a - t i o n a l . This is a r e a s o n w h y m e n w h o engage in similar exhibitions (whether they are organized as competitive s p o r t s , such as ice d a n c i n g , or are considered musical e n t e r t a i n m e n t , such as ballet) t e n d to be r e g a r d e d as n o t very masculine, even t h o u g h they display a very high level of strength a n d b o d y c o o r d i n a t i o n .

Sports w i t h b o t h offense a n d defense situations are especially d r a m a t i c , in t h a t they t e n d to build up tensions t h r o u g h a series of episodes, a n d allow for b o t h s u d d e n a n d creeping reversals of d o m i n a n c e . Players at- t e m p t b o t h t o execute their offense, a n d t o block their o p p o n e n t s . T h e r e is the tension a n d d r a m a of fending off t h r e a t s a n d t h w a r t i n g the jugger- n a u t ; a n d the e m o t i o n a l t r i u m p h of finally b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h a s t r o n g defense; there can be bitter e m o t i o n s over having o n e ' s skill disrupted a n d t e a m flow b r o k e n d o w n . T h e clash of offense a n d defense t h r o u g h a series of such episodes is m o s t likely to p r o d u c e e m o t i o n a l t u r n i n g p o i n t s .

Sports t h a t t a k e the form of staged c o m b a t s h a v e the m o s t frequent violence, b u t this in itself is n o t e n o u g h . T h e sports t h a t are closest to real fights are b o x i n g a n d wrestling. But these rarely lead to e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r fighting; as we h a v e seen in c h a p t e r 6 in t h e case of the Holyfield/Tyson ear-biting incident, severe escalation of violence b e y o n d the rules t e n d s to disrupt the fight entirely. Fighting is so completely i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the s p o r t itself t h a t t h e r e is no w a y to m a k e a d r a m a t i c s t a t e m e n t by escalating t h e fighting. In other s p o r t s , player fights are way s of s h o w i n g t h a t the mock-fight t h a t constitutes the g a m e has n o w escalated i n t o a real fight; the d r a m a t i c f o r m of b o x i n g , w h i c h p r e t e n d s to be a real fight, precludes t h i s , or at any r a t e leaves little d r a m a t i c resources for framing o n e ' s dis- p u t e a n d one's anger a s a b o v e a n d b e y o n d the n o r m a l . 5

Sports Violence • 2 8 7

Figure 8.1 Masculine athlete in unviolent sport: pole-vault champion ( 2 0 0 4 ) . Reuters.

Wrestling is even m o r e e x t r e m e in avoiding extra curricular violence. 6

Skilled wrestlers o p e r a t e at close r a n g e , w h e r e m o r e violent moves of kick- ing a n d p u n c h i n g are virtually impossible to m o u n t with any force; the s t a n d a r d wrestling moves involve t a k i n g d o w n the o p p o n e n t t o the g r o u n d a n d then leveraging the o t h e r into a defenseless position on his back. Even relatively unskilled wrestlers generally k n o w h o w to tie up the o p p o n e n t a n d to stall; such a m a t c h tends to t u r n into a m u s c u l a r e n d u r - ance contest. T h e d r a m a t i c form here is r a t h e r simple, a n d instead of building up to peak m o m e n t s of tension, tends to wind d o w n into a g r a d - ual e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d o m i n a n c e , or near-stalemate. Highly skilled wres- tlers can m a k e s u d d e n a t t a c k s a n d escapes; but the m o m e n t a r y result of each such move is generally to m a k e the o p p o n e n t m o r e harmless. T h u s wrestling, as the form of s p o r t fighting t h a t involves the m o s t direct a n d p r o l o n g e d muscle-on-musclc c o n f r o n t a t i o n , is caged by its very form into confining fighting to the m a i n lines of the event.

Player violence is m o s t frequent in offensive/defensive c o m b a t s orga- nized as teams r a t h e r t h a n individuals, even t h o u g h the fights themselves are generally between individuals. This fits the general p a t t e r n t h a t vio- lence d e p e n d s u p o n g r o u p s u p p o r t . T h e r e are t w o main features t h a t

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Figure 8.2 Boxers' pre-fight stare-down (2001). AP/World Wide Photos.

p r e d i c t violence: t h e extent to w h i c h violent m o v e s , efforts, or t h r e a t s are i n c o r p o r a t e d into the g a m e action itself; a n d the e x t e n t to w h i c h players are p r o t e c t e d from being h u r t .

Systematic d a t a on player violence is c o m p a r a t i v e l y r a r e . 7 In the a b - sence of o t h e r direct o b s e r v a t i o n a l c o u n t s of fights d u r i n g g a m e s , I offer t h e following from my o w n checking of news r e p o r t s a n d televised games, a n d from questioning experienced fans: H o c k e y fights occur at a r a t e of

Sports Violence • 289

a b o u t one per g a m e (in professional hockey). F o o t b a l l players' fights occur once or twice per w e e k e n d (totaling a b o u t fifteen games) in the professional season, b u t m o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d in tense games near t h e e n d of the s e a s o n . 8 Baseball fights occur a b o u t once a w e e k , o u t of ninety professional g a m e s . Basketball fights are r a r e , b e l o w 1 percent of t h e g a m e s . 9 Soccer player fights a p p e a r to be very r a r e .

H o w is this o r d e r i n g to be explained? In s o m e games, direct bodily i m p e d a n c e of o p p o n e n t s is the m a i n form

of a c t i o n . In A m e r i c a n football, violence is the n o r m a l play itself, t h e bodily collisions of tackling, blocking, a n d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h tacklers. H o c k e y involves b o d y checking, a n d s l a m m i n g speeding skaters i n t o t h e b o a r d s ; basketball includes a certain a m o u n t of p u s h i n g a n d g r a p p l i n g for p o s i t i o n , as well as the possibility of charging or blocking in the m o v e - m e n t of players on t h e w a y to t h e basket or in scrambling for the ball. Baseball has some legitimate forms of r u n n i n g into or blocking a player, n o t a b l y in close plays at h o m e plate b e t w e e n the catcher applying a tag a n d an o n c o m i n g runner. It seems obvious t h a t n o r m a l playing violence w o u l d c a r r y over into angry fights, w h i c h stop the play of t h e g a m e , or t h a t t h e tensions a n d frustrations of n o r m a l playing violence b r e a k o u t in e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r violence. Nevertheless, a l t h o u g h b o d y c o n t a c t sports of this kind are the m a i n locus of player violence, this is n o t e n o u g h to ex- plain either the frequency w i t h w h i c h different kinds of sports have vio- lence, or the p a r t i c u l a r m o m e n t s w h e n violence b r e a k s o u t .

G a m e s w i t h i m p e d a n c e of the o p p o n e n t ' s scoring efforts structurally p r o m o t e fights. G a m e s w i t h o u t i m p e d a n c e t h u s a l m o s t never have fights. But i m p e d a n c e m a y arise obliquely in the same locations w h e r e it is for- mally absent. Golf is a parallel contest in w h i c h the players, small n u m - bers of w h o m are playing t o g e t h e r on t h e s a m e h o l e , are n o t physically separated b u t are very peaceful. Fights do sometimes h a p p e n on golf courses; the only ones I h a v e personally witnessed, h e a r d , or r e a d a b o u t , have o c c u r r e d n o t b e t w e e n golfers w h o are c o m p e t i n g w i t h each other, b u t in n o n - t o u r n a m e n t situations w h e r e golfers become angry at those in front of t h e m for slow play; they will sometimes t r y to hit the slow players w i t h a ball, or physically confront t h e m . This is an instance of i m p e d a n c e , w h i c h occurs in the c o n t e x t of a g a m e b u t separate from the actual c o m p e - tition itself. This s h o w s t h a t golfers are generally peaceful, n o t because they are m o r e polite a n d upper-middle-class t h a n other athletes, b u t be- cause the d r a m a t i c s t r u c t u r e of tensions in the g a m e is n o t organized to p r o d u c e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h o n e ' s c o m p e t i t o r s .

Similarly, tennis players, a l t h o u g h in a s p o r t t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the polite u p p e r classes, are n o t a b o v e angry o u t b u r s t s (and a m o n g female as well as male players). Tennis is a form of offensive-defensive c o m b a t , w i t h players directly i m p e d i n g each o t h e r ' s scoring efforts. But

2 9 0 • Chapter 8

the players are physically separated by a net, and the form of the action is to keep the ball away from the o p p o n e n t rather t h a n forcefully hitting at him or her. T h e tension of sudden efforts and reversals of m o v e m e n t a n d the d r a m a t i c failures in losing a point can lead to emotional out- bursts; but these are directed at referees rather t h a n o p p o n e n t s (Baltzell 1 9 9 5 ) . Anger is n o t enough to p r o d u c e a fight.

Rules have been m a n i p u l a t e d so as to t a k e into a c c o u n t violence t h a t gets o u t of h a n d . In football, there are penalties for unnecessary r o u g h n e s s ; clipping or hitting a player from behind or in vulnerable p a r t s like the knees; hitting especially vulnerable or non-violent players such as the q u a r t e r b a c k ; impeding a pass receiver or pass defender w h o has not yet c a u g h t the ball; and so forth. These penalties in varying degrees affect the possibility of w i n n i n g the g a m e ; however, since b o t h teams tend to c o m m i t penalties (and penalties for violent play are treated in the same w a y as penalties for o t h e r violations such as off-sides), there is a tendency for penalties to balance o u t a m o n g both t e a m s , a n d there is no over- w h e l m i n g incentive for players to avoid violence penalties. Similarly, in hockey there arc a variety of penalties including those for forms of vio- lence t h a t are beyond the rules: high-sticking, h o o k i n g the o p p o n e n t with o n e ' s stick, as well as especially violent body checks. M o r e serious fighting is itself penalized as a n o r m a l , expectable violation t h a t occurs frequently in the course of a g a m e . T h e penalties (sitting for a certain n u m b e r of minutes in the penalty box) affect the chances of w i n n i n g , but are i n c o r p o - rated into b o t h offensive a n d defensive strategies ( " p o w e r p l a y s " when the o t h e r side is s h o r t - h a n d e d because of penalties, but also tactics for killing a p o w e r p l a y ) . 1 0 In basketball, rough play is penalized by penalty shots; given the high rate of scoring, these do n o t usually give enough points in any o n e occasion to m a k e a big difference in w i n n i n g the g a m e , a l t h o u g h they might do so in the aggregate or at crucial m o m e n t s . Penal- ties are so frequent on both sides t h a t they are n o r m a l i z e d a n d i n c o r p o - rated into the flow a n d tactics of the g a m e ; the g a m e includes a range of play t h a t is, strictly speaking, illegal but expectable, a n o t h e r arena of risk a n d c o m p e t i t i o n t h a t g o o d players a n d t e a m s m u s t be proficient at. A p e n u m b r a of controlled violence s u r r o u n d s the main play of the g a m e . Penalties allow for a form of protected violence, k e p t within b o u n d s that are implicitly u n d e r s t o o d by everyone involved; penalties are way s of m a k i n g violence possible, o v e r c o m i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear by so- cially organizing the violence in a limited form.

T h e influence of penalty regimes can be seen by c o m p a r i n g games t h a t have quite severe penalties. Soccer is n o r m a l l y a low-scoring g a m e , be- cause of the presence of a goalie (as c o m p a r e d to games with an open goal and p r o h i b i t i o n s on goal-tending) a n d off-sides rules that favor the defense. R a t h e r d r a c o n i a n rules against tackling by body c o n t a c t set up

Sports Violence • 29 J

unimpeded penalty kicks on goal t h a t often decide a g a m e ; moreover, since players w h o are sent off the field for penalties c a n n o t be replaced, the offending team is very d i s a d v a n t a g e d by playing s h o r t - h a n d e d . Severe penalties of this sort deter borderline violence within the g a m e ; a n d this sets an a t m o s p h e r e in which e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r fights are rare.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of frequent mild penalties d o e s n o t itself p r e d i c t very well the level of player violence. H o c k e y , football, a n d b a s k e t b a l l all h a v e penalty s t r u c t u r e s t h a t n o r m a l i z e violence beyond the rules; but h o c k e y has very frequent fights, football m o d e r a t e l y fre- q u e n t , a n d b a s k e t b a l l very infrequent fights a m o n g p l a y e r s . In a d d i t i o n , b a s e b a l l , which does n o t have m u c h in the way of a n o r m a l i z i n g penalty s t r u c t u r e for r o u g h play (but instead a c o m p a r a t i v e l y severe rule on fighting—expulsion from the g a m e , s o m e t i m e s w i t h fines a n d s u s p e n s i o n from future g a m e s — i n this last respect similar to soccer), also has r a t h e r frequent fights of a distinctive k i n d . A n o t h e r c o n d i t i o n for fighting m u s t be i n v o k e d .

This is the extent to which players are protected from being h u r t if a fight breaks o u t .

H o c k e y players w e a r heavy p a d d i n g , including helmets and gloves; al- t h o u g h they carry sticks, which can o p e r a t e as w e a p o n s , these are virtu- ally never used in a fight itself, a l t h o u g h h o o k i n g or high-sticking might be a p r o v o c a t i o n to a fight. Typically in a hockey fight players d r o p their sticks a n d pummel each o t h e r w i t h gloves o n . T h e e q u i p m e n t operates both to p r o t e c t them against a t t a c k s a n d to limit the d a m a g e they can do to each o t h e r during a fight." Moreover, the fighters arc usually s o o n s u r r o u n d e d by other players, w h o scuffle and p u s h but generally limit the space in which fighters can maneuver, constricting w h a t g o o d blows can be g o t t e n off. Fighters on skates do n o t have g o o d footing a n d are n o t in a position to carry o u t an effective b o x i n g m a t c h .

Football players are heavily p a d d e d a n d w e a r helmets with face-guards. Football players fairly often get into fist fights, b u t these do little d a m a g e , since the fist is a p o o r w e a p o n against such p r o t e c t i o n ; thus fights are less d a m a g i n g than w h a t can be normally d o n e during play, w h e r e most inju- ries occur. 1 2 T h e most d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n carried by a football player is his helmet, which is used as an effective striking w e a p o n for spearing an o p p o n e n t with a full-body lunge. But this can be d o n e only while a play is going on. T h e r e is also a certain a m o u n t of p u n c h i n g , even biting and gouging in pile-ups, out of sight of the referees a n d the a u d i e n c e . 1 5 But although some players have r e p u t a t i o n s playing dirty behind-the-scenes, this a p p e a r s to be a self-contained arena t h a t does n o t spill over into o t h e r kinds of m o r e publicly visible a n d therefore m o r e d r a m a t i c violence. It is m i n o r violence c o m p a r e d to the o r d i n a r y violence of the g a m e .

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Basketball is played w i t h o u t protective e q u i p m e n t . W h e n r a r e fights a m o n g players b r e a k o u t , they usually t a k e the form of p o s t u r i n g a n d gesturing, a n d solid p u n c h e s are rarely t h r o w n . T h u s o n e of the t w o m o s t p r o t e c t e d games (hockey) has the m o s t fights, the least p r o t e c t e d (basket- ball) has the fewest a m o n g c o m b a t s p o r t s . O t h e r u n p r o t e c t e d g a m e s , like soccer, also h a v e l o w violence, a l t h o u g h we h a v e seen multiple r e a s o n s for w h y player violence is k e p t l o w . 1 4

F o o t b a l l , by my estimate, has s o m e w h a t fewer fights t h a n hockey, al- t h o u g h still at the m e d i u m - h i g h end of the r a n g e . Both sports are a p p r o x i - mately equally p r o t e c t e d from physical injury by e q u i p m e n t , a n d b o t h regularize violent violations u n d e r p e n a l t y rules ( a l t h o u g h o n e could argue t h a t h o c k e y fights are m o r e regularized). But football players have m o r e o p p o r t u n i t y to fight, legitimately, in the course of play itself; r o u g h checking is only p a r t of the game of hockey, b u t blocking, tackling, or b r e a k i n g tackles h a p p e n s for a l m o s t all players on every play in football. T h e vast majority of football injuries h a p p e n d u r i n g play, n o t d u r i n g fights; if a player is angry e n o u g h to w a n t to injure an o p p o n e n t , the m o s t effective w a y to do so is to c o n t i n u e w i t h the g a m e . F o o t b a l l has the m o s t r o o m for legitimately d e m o n s t r a t i v e violence d u r i n g the course of the g a m e ; a l t h o u g h t h e r e are p e r h a p s the greatest a b u n d a n c e of g a m e situa- tions from w h i c h violence could overflow, it is m o r e d ramatically satis- fying to c a r r y o u t the strongest violence w i t h i n the rules.

T h e p a t t e r n is as follows: the m o r e p r o t e c t e d the p a r t i c i p a n t s , the m o r e frequent the fight. H o c k e y players, like football players in an e x t r a c u r r i c u - lar scuffle, are in the p o s i t i o n of children scuffling w i t h each o t h e r n e a r adults w h o can b r e a k i t u p ; they are bigger a n d stronger, b u t t h e d a m a g e they can do is limited b o t h by their p a d d i n g a n d their social s u r r o u n d i n g s . It is the same p a t t e r n t h a t a p p e a r s in the c o n t r a s t between G e r m a n s t u d e n t duelists in t h e Mensur, literally m e a s u r i n g each o t h e r ' s mettle for a fight while p a d d e d from w a i s t to neck, in protective goggles a n d using shallow u n p o i n t e d s w o r d s ; a n d , on the other h a n d , French duelists w i t h m u c h less b o d y p r o t e c t i o n b u t keeping their distance in s w o r d a n d pistol fights; the G e r m a n students h a c k a w a y energetically a n d at length to p r o d u c e a few h o n o r a b l e scars; the French m a k e their duels a display of bluster b u t sta- tistically m a n a g e to avoid m o s t injuries. H o c k e y a n d football players closely resemble the b u n d l e d - u p G e r m a n students playing a p r o l o n g e d g a m e of mild p u n i s h m e n t ; m o s t other players of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l games resemble French duelists.

C o m p a r i s o n w i t h baseball s h o w s t h a t p r o t e c t i o n can b e social r a t h e r t h a n p h y s i c a l . 1 3 Baseball is n o t a b o d y c o n t a c t s p o r t (with a few excep- tions), so one m i g h t expect a l o w level of fights on t h a t score. A n d its players are generally u n p r o t e c t e d by e q u i p m e n t ; they w e a r gloves on de- fense, b u t these are usually discarded d u r i n g a fight. Batters w e a r helmets, a l t h o u g h these do n o t p r o t e c t the face, a n d sometimes e l b o w a n d shin

Sports Violence • 2 9 3

Figure 8.3 Limiting the scuffle by use of protective equipment (July 2 0 0 4 ) . Reuters.

g u a r d s , b u t these have little relevance to fights. O n l y the catcher, w i t h c h e s t g u a r d , shin g u a r d s , a n d face m a s k , is heavily p r o t e c t e d (against his o w n pitcher, chiefly). 1 6

A l m o s t all baseball fights begin after a pitcher hits a b a t t e r w i t h a pitch; in the following inning (usually), the o p p o s i n g pitcher retaliates by hitting a b a t t e r on the o p p o s i n g t e a m , w h o t h e n angrily s h o u t s at, insults, or a t t a c k s the pitcher w i t h his fists. T h e rest of b o t h t e a m s t h e n r u n o n t o the field, including t h e reserve players. Usually t h e r e is little violence; other m e m b e r s of b o t h t e a m s g r a b each other, a n d m a y wrestle the m o s t excited fighters to t h e g r o u n d , w h e r e p u m m e l i n g w i t h fists is little effective.

T h e r e is m o r e of a melee in a baseball fight t h a n in other sports fights; basketball fights h a v e few melees b u t m o r e of an individual face-off;1 7

football a n d h o c k e y fights are generally restricted to t h o s e already on the

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field and usually just to those closest to the a c t i o n . T h i s difference in team p a r t i c i p a t i o n results from the fact t h a t baseball pitcher-retaliation fights are an explicit code (although forbidden by the formal rules, very similar to dueling in relation to formal law); all m e m b e r s of the team are expected to m a k e at least a token s h o w of solidarity. 1 8 Bench players will indicate t h a t they ran o n t o the field because everybody else did, and they felt ex- pected to do so t o o ; while on the field, m u c h of the action consisted in a m i x t u r e of g r a b b i n g o p p o s i n g players—as a hostile gesture, b u t also as a defensive m o v e to keep them from g r a b b i n g and k n o c k i n g d o w n o n e ' s o w n players—and g r a b b i n g one's o w n players to restrain t h e m from get- ting further into the fight, ostensibly to avoid penalties for fighting.

Leaving aside the ostensible m o t i v a t i o n s a n d justifications, the m i c r o - sociological process of a baseball fight is t h a t a few angry p r i n c i p a l s carry o u t a ritual r e t a l i a t i o n a n d h o n o r defense; o t h e r players w h o are closely c o n n e c t e d to t h e m join in w i t h s o m e degree of anger, b u t also to restrain t h e m ; o t h e r players bodily m a s s together, as if o n e huge ritual of body c o n t a c t , mixing solidarity a n d hostility. Players are rarely h u r t d u r i n g such melees; a n d the most d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n — t h e b a t t e r ' s bat— is virtually never used in such a fight, b u t is a l w a y s discarded just before the fight begins. 1 '' In g e n e r a l , baseball lies in an a n o m a l o u s position a m o n g o t h e r g a m e s in degree of d a n g e r ; getting s t r u c k by a pitch can s o m e t i m e s cause death or cr i ppl i ng injury, a n d t h e r e are s o m e o t h e r r o u g h plays in b a s e - r u n n i n g (especially w h e n a c a t c h e r blocks a r u n n e r at h o m e p l a t e ; also w h e n a r u n n e r b r e a k s up a d o u b l e play at second base by u p e n d i n g the fielder), but the level of bodily hitting is m u c h m o r e i n t e r m i t t e n t t h a n in football or hockey. R o u g h b a s e - r u n n i n g plays rarely lead to fights, in c o m p a r i s o n to a hit by p i t c h , n o r are they r e t a l i a t e d for by hitting by pitch. Partly this is because close b a s e - r u n n i n g plays h a p - pen only occasionally a n d at u n p r e d i c t a b l e t i m e s , w h e r e a s the pitcher c a n at any t i m e deliberately t h r o w at a batter, just as a duel can be sched- uled at will. Highly m o t i v a t e d violence needs to be d r a m a t i c violence; a n d d r a m a t i c staging t a k e s tension b u i l d u p t o a n a p p r o p r i a t e , well- a n t i c i p a t e d m o m e n t .

H e r e again the exception or historical v a r i a n t helps confirm the rule. Base-running w a s much m o r e violent in the period before 1920, when a t t e n t i o n shifted to the h o m e run a n d hence to the hitter-pitcher confron- t a t i o n . Prior to a rule c h a n g e in 1 8 9 7 , stolen bases included e x t r a bases taken on a t e a m m a t e ' s hit. In the next t w o years, the new stolen base record w a s established at seventy-seven for the season. In the seven-year period between 1909 and 1 9 1 5 , heated c o m p e t i t i o n built up a m o n g half a dozen players w h o c a m e near to br eaki n g the record, several of w h o m successively raised the record to 81 (Eddie Collins), 83 (Ty C o b b ) , 88 (Clyde M i l a n ) , a n d f i n a l l y 9 6 ( C o b b again) ( T h o r n e t al. 2 0 0 1 : 5 4 3 , 5 4 7 ) . I t w a s d u r i n g this time t h a t C o b b a c q u i r e d the r e p u t a t i o n for s h a r p e n i n g

Sports Violence • 2 9 5

Figure 8.4 A ritual team brawl. Note the few players with angry expressions (chiefly the pitcher) and the discarded bat ( 2 0 0 4 ) . AP/World Wide Photos.

his spikes t o b l o o d y defensive p l a y e r s w i t h his violent h i g h slides. T h e r e p u t a t i o n w a s i n p a r t bluster, a n i m a g e a n d s t r a t e g y o f i n t i m i d a t i o n ; C o b b also perfected t e c h n i q u e s of guile a n d t i m i n g by carefully o b s e r v - ing t h e m o v e s of o p p o s i n g p i t c h e r s . Rival base-stealers d e v e l o p e d simi- lar strategies a n d t e c h n i q u e s . After this p e r i o d of c o m p e t i t i o n , t h e rec- c o r d r e m a i n e d s t a b l e until 1 9 6 2 ; b a s e - s t e a l i n g w a s n o l o n g e r a n object o f r a p t a t t e n t i o n ; t h e yearly t o t a l s o f C o b b a n d t h e o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s d r o p p e d off considerably, a n d f i g h t s c e n t e r i n g o n b a s e - r u n n i n g v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d . 2 0

A t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t will illustrate the t h e o r y to this p o i n t . Soccer is a g a m e w i t h very l o w e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r fighting, for a h e a d - t o - h e a d m u t u a l i m p e d a n c e s p o r t of offense versus defense. But soccer could be c h a n g e d i n t o a high-fight g a m e , similar to h o c k e y or A m e r i c a n football, by m a k i n g t w o modifications: players w e a r i n g m o r e p a d d i n g (such as light-weight synthetic b o d y a r m o r ) so they are less vulnerable to being h u r t ; a n d c h a n g - ing t h e p e n a l t y s t r u c t u r e s o t h a t r o u g h play does n o t c o u n t s o m u c h i n the d r a m a t i c a c t i o n of w i n n i n g or losing the g a m e . This could be d o n e by a d o p t i n g football- or hockey-type p e n a l t y rules, in w h i c h r o u g h players are sent off for only s h o r t p e r i o d s (thereby lessening the a m o u n t of time t h a t t h e t e a m w o u l d h a v e t o play s h o r t - h a n d e d ) , o r allowing su b stitu tio n s if players are ejected from t h e g a m e . T h i s m e n t a l exercise sh o u ld s h o w t h a t it is these kinds of s t r u c t u r a l features t h a t d e t e r m i n e on-field player violence, r a t h e r t h a n s o m e t h i n g intrinsic to t h e ethos of p a r t i c u l a r g a m e s .

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W I N N I N G B Y P R A C T I C A L S K I L L S F O R P R O D U C I N G E M O T I O N A L E N E R G Y D O M I N A N C E

Sports as staged c o m b a t s are u n u s u a l l y p r o l o n g e d face-to-face struggles, c o m p a r e d to the usual brevity of real-life fights. Techniques of w i n n i n g a g a m e are applied on each play; they are a m a t t e r of establishing d o m i - n a n c e over the p e r s o n right in front of y o u — m o m e n t a r i l y physically, a n d in a longer time-frame emotionally. F o o t b a l l linemen charge a h e a d while defenders p u s h back; w i n n i n g this contest h a p p e n s in surges of m o m e n - t u m as o n e t e a m imposes its will on the other. T h e struggle is over e m o - tional energy ( E E ) d o m i n a n c e , just as it is in the climax of military battles, w h e r e t h e w i n n i n g side becomes energized i n t o a frenzied a t t a c k while the o t h e r side gets c a u g h t in confusion a n d paralyzing passivity; just as it is in a r m e d robberies w h e r e the r o b b e r tries to get the j u m p on a victim. T h e difference in s p o r t , a p a r t from the restrictions on violence, is t h a t the struggle for d o m i n a n c e is usually stretched o u t a n d visibly displayed for the sake of s p e c t a t o r s . W h e r e h o l d u p artists seize the j u m p s u d d e n l y a n d soldiers go i n t o an o u t b u r s t of f o r w a r d p a n i c after a p e r i o d of tension, athletes often go t h r o u g h p r o l o n g e d efforts yielding t e m p o r a r y a n d p a r - tial d o m i n a n c e at best, occasionally building up to spectacular a n d deci- sive m o m e n t u m - s w i n g s .

E E i s collective i n several senses. I t s p r e a d s t h r o u g h t h e t e a m , w h o be- c o m e high or l o w on EE as a unit. M o r e precisely, some segments of the t e a m m a y h a v e m o r e collectively s h a r e d e m o t i o n t h a n other players; t e a m s v a r y in e m o t i o n a l cohesiveness, b o t h high a n d l o w ; a n d it varies over time: T h e inner history of each g a m e played is t h e sequence of e m o - t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d its level. Collective e m o t i o n can be b o t h g o o d a n d b a d : collective confidence a n d initiative, or collective depression or frustration; a t t h e l o w end, this t u r n s into q u a r r e l i n g a m o n g t e a m m a t e s . 2 1

T h e r e is simultaneously a reciprocal i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o p p o n e n t s so t h a t one side gains EE at the expense of the o t h e r side losing it. It is often n o t e d at such m o m e n t s t h a t the defense is getting tired o u t , allegedly from being on the field a long time; b u t this c a n n o t be simply physical tiredness, since the o p p o s i n g offense is on the field for the same a m o u n t of time. T h e physical tiredness is a manifestation of losing E E ; the bodies of the yielding defenders are losing their e m o t i o n a l c h a r g e . A n o t h e r w a y to say it is t h a t they are being e m o t i o n a l l y b e a t e n in a fight, p e r h a p s all the m o r e so because the fight is restricted r a t h e r t h a n all-out violence. Sports tactics a i m t o destroy the o p p o n e n t emotionally r a t h e r t h a n physically.

Players' techniques for blocking a n d fighting t h r o u g h blocks, for k n o c k i n g the o t h e r player d o w n , for causing h i m to miss a catch or a r u n n i n g m a n , are w h a t w i n s the g a m e as well as the little segments w i t h i n

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it. These are techniques of a violent contest in t w o senses: b o t h to c o n t r o l the o p p o s i n g player physically so t h a t the play can be executed or stymied; a n d to establish EE d o m i n a n c e , charging oneself up further a n d t a k i n g a w a y the o t h e r ' s E E . 2 2

Such conflicts can spill over r a t h e r n a t u r a l l y from violence-within-the- rules i n t o e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r violence or player fighting in the sense we are using the term here. In football, the most effective violence h a p p e n s within n o r m a l play, a n d hence fights are largely expressions of the e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e t h a t has already been established. In o t h e r s p o r t s , n o tab ly baseball, fights can be d r a m a t i c high points a n d t u r n i n g points of the g a m e .

In baseball, the chief h e a d - t o - h e a d battle is between pitcher a n d batter. Part of this struggle is a guessing g a m e : the b a t t e r tries to anticipate w h a t kind of pitch will be t h r o w n , its speed a n d location, while the pitcher varies his pitch selection to try to m a k e the batter guess w r o n g . 2 ' T h e r e is also an aspect of sheer physical c o n t r o l of the batter: a pitcher with o v e r p o w e r i n g speed can freeze a b a t t e r ' s swing, or m a k e him look a w k - w a r d in trying to catch up with it. W h a t m a k e s pitch speed o v e r p o w e r i n g is n o t purely a m a t t e r of h o w high over 90 m p h it is t h r o w n ; it is often a m a t t e r of the r h y t h m s built up t h r o u g h a series of pitches; especially in strike-outs, a pitcher m a k e s the batter fall into his d o m i n a n t r h y t h m .

Sports c o m m e n t a t o r s conventionally use terms like " t h e pitcher is in his r h y t h m " w h e n he is m a k i n g an effective series of pitches for a strike- o u t , and also getting one batter after a n o t h e r for a series of o u t s . This raises an issue: if the pitcher establishes a r h y t h m , w h y d o e s n ' t the batter k n o w w h a t pitch is c o m i n g , a n d adjust to it? Nevertheless, he plays the passive role. T h e r e are parallels in other areas (discussed in Collins 2 0 0 4 : 1 2 2 - 2 4 ) . In s w i m m i n g a n d o t h e r races, habitually w i n n i n g c o m p e t i t o r s establish a pace t h a t the others must adjust t o . If we think of the race t h r o u g h the technical details of interaction ritual theory, the d o m i n a n t person is the o n e w h o m a k e s him/herself the focus of a t t e n t i o n — t h e win- ner focuses on the goal, the loser focuses on the winner. Chambliss (1989) emphasizes especially the cognitive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s m a d e by w i n n e r a n d losers. There is also an e m o t i o n a l aspect, which he refers to as " t h e m u n - danity of excellence"—the w i n n e r is calmer a n d m o r e detached, focusing on performing the micro-detailed techniques t h a t s/he has confidence will bring victory; the loser has m o r e anxiety, feeling t h a t there is a mysterious p o w e r t h a t s u p e r i o r athletes have t h a t s/he does not share. T h e w i n n e r ' s t e c h n i q u e includes, p e r h a p s a b o v e all, m e t h o d s for setting the r h y t h m and m a k i n g the o t h e r c o m p e t i t o r s a d a p t to it.

T h e r e is further evidence in a n o t h e r area of micro-sociology: the fine- grained r h y t h m s of c o n v e r s a t i o n a l speech. In high-solidarity interaction, conversationalists fall into the same t e m p o r a l r h y t h m . In some interac-

298 • Chapter 8

t i o n s , t h e r e is a struggle over w h o sets the c o n v e r s a t i o n a l r h y t h m ; t a p e - r e c o r d e d d a t a s h o w s instances b o t h of the struggle at these m o m e n t s a n d of the emergence of one speaker as d o m i n a n t over t h e other, w h o gives in a n d lets the o t h e r set the r h y t h m (Collins 2 0 0 4 ) . This is a n a l o g o u s to the pitcher w h o achieves r h y t h m i c d o m i n a n c e over a batter.

T h e r e are also m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , reflexive w a y s of pitching, d i s r u p t i n g t h e b a t t e r ' s swing by c h a n g e - u p s t h a t are slower t h a n they a p p e a r ; as well as curves t h r o w n in v a r i o u s directions as they cross the plate. Pitching is partly deception; p a r t l y sheer physical d o m i n a n c e t h r o u g h speed; a n d partly a form of explicit i n t i m i d a t i o n . Pitchers t h r o w inside, b o t h to catch the inner c o r n e r of the p l a t e (especially if a b a t t e r has a w e a k n e s s there) a n d to back the player u p , m a k i n g it m o r e difficult for h i m to hit the n e x t pitch o n the outside. T h e b r u s h - b a c k pitch, t h r o w n directly a t t h e b a t t e r so he has to j u m p or fall a w a y to avoid being hit, is a s t a n d a r d t e c h n i q u e for all these p u r p o s e s . On t o p of t h i s , it also c a n h a v e an i n t i m i d a t i n g effect, changing EE d o m i n a n c e between t h a t b a t t e r a n d t h a t p i t c h e r . 2 4

Batters are in a Goffmanian face contest w i t h the pitcher; to let oneself a p p e a r i n t i m i d a t e d is to give an a d v a n t a g e to the pitcher, a n d controlling one's external expression m a y be an a t t e m p t at c o n t r o l l i n g one's interior e m o t i o n s as well. A b a t t e r w h o has been b r u s h e d back, k n o c k e d d o w n , or hit by a pitch m a y b e c o m e angry precisely because he feels a bit of fear t h a t he c a n n o t c o n t r o l ; it is better to m a s k this by anger, to k e e p up a d r a m a t i c front by m a k i n g a gesture (usually ineffective) of i n t i m i d a t i n g the pitcher in r e t u r n . 2 5

Aggressive pitching is largely a form of bluster r a t h e r t h a n actual vio- lence, a l t h o u g h occasionally batters do get h u r t ; it is t h e t h r e a t of violence m o r e t h a n its a c t u a l occurrence; its success comes w h e n it gives EE d o m i - n a n c e , w i t h physical d o m i n a n c e c o m i n g in its t r a i n in the form of a bat- t e r ' s p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e . Baseball f i g h t s a l m o s t a l w a y s s t a r t w h e n the bat- ter escalates in reply to t h e p i t c h e r ' s bluster. But in fact the pitcher is usually just as angry as t h e batter, sometimes m o r e so (see t h e facial ex- pressions a n d gestures in figure 8.4), s h o w i n g t h a t fear of getting h u r t is n o t essential to the anger.

Escalation does n o t h a p p e n all the time. As u s u a l , we r u n a s t r a y by sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable. A l t h o u g h it is t r u e t h a t m o s t baseball fights s t a r t because of p i t c h e r s ' conflicts w i t h b a t t e r s , if we c o u n t incidents of bean-balls, we find they are m u c h m o r e frequent t h a n fights. In an eight-day p e r i o d , for e x a m p l e , t h e r e w e r e sixty-four incidents of hit by pitch in 105 g a m e s , b u t only t w o fights (forty-two games h a d at least one HBP, a n d t w e n t y - t w o games h a d multiple incidents); t h a t is, 4 0 percent of games h a d an incident, b u t only 3 percent of these resulted in a fight (calculated from San Diego Union-Tribune a n d Los Angeles Times, Aug.

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2 5 - S e p t . 3, 2 0 0 4 ) . It takes additional d r a m a t i c elements to t u r n an inci- dent into a fight.

In hockey, most of the action consists in passing a n d d i s r u p t i n g passing, and in fighting for the loose p u c k . Such fights arc especially vehement in the c o r n e r s behind the goal; dcfenscmcn consider these their special turf, a n d incursions by the offense have to be especially aggressive, b o t h to have a chance of w i n n i n g the practical fight over the puck and to meet the high level of e m o t i o n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n . O n e hockey player explained:

I k n o w a lot of times a guy will go into the corner. T h a t ' s w h e r e you find o u t if the guy is going to c o m e back at you or challenge you or a n y t h i n g . You see w h a t he can t a k e . [Interviewer question: So the cor- ners are i m p o r t a n t ? ! Sure, you go in a n d really rap him h ard with the e l b o w and let him have it in the head m a y b e a n d the n e x t time you w o n ' t have any p r o b l e m s with the guy. M a y b e he'll c o m e in the c o r n e r but n o t as hard as he did the first time, he's t a k i n g a chance of getting a n o t h e r elbow in the m o u t h . M a y b e you get a penalty, but you t a k e him o u t of the play, t h a t ' s a g o o d penalty. . . . I'll give 'em an elbow a n d , you k n o w , hit guys dirty. N o w I w o u l d n ' t hit a guy in the head with a stick, but you get ' e m solid with a g o o d check. This is your j o b , a n d you w a t c h , he w o n ' t c o m e back into the c o r n e r t o o quick.

T h e guy you've got to w o r r y a b o u t is the guy w h o t u r n s a r o u n d a n d really hits y o u back, b a n g , right in the nose, and the guy w h o keeps going into the c o r n e r to dig it o u t . T h e n e x t time y o u ' r e t h i n k i n g , he's got you going. You've got to respect him because you k n o w he'll take- it a n d give it b a c k . He d o e s n ' t back away. (Faulkner I 9 7 6 : 9 8 - 9 9 )

T h e borderline between n o r m a l play a n d fouls is itself p a r t of players' consciousness of the g a m e . Players distinguish between g o o d fouls a n d stupid fouls; good fouls n o t only serve a p u r p o s e in the g a m e , but also are precisely the fouls t h a t are delivered m o s t aggressively a n d send the message of d o m i n a t i o n . " C h e a p s h o t s " are looked d o w n upon because they are not violent e n o u g h . T h e hockey player e l a b o r a t e s :

To intimidate a guy y o u ' v e got to r a p him, c h e a p penalties are no good really, a h o o k i n g penalty is a c h e a p penalty, t r i p p i n g , holding is a c h e a p penalty. A g o o d penalty is charging provided you hit the guy and he knows he's been hit. If you trip the guy, it w o n ' t h u r t h i m , it d o e s n ' t even b o t h e r him, he w o n ' t c a r e . Tripping is really stupid, the only time you'll trip a guy is if he gets behind you or if you miss the puck a n d hit his feet. These are stupid because you h a v e n ' t really d o n e your job. This m e a n s the guy's beaten you a n d you have to slow him d o w n so you can h o o k him or hold him. If you can intimidate him he w o n ' t get in this position in the first place. (Faulkner 1 9 7 6 : 99)

300 • Chapter 8

T h e course of a g a m e , as welt as longer stretches of players' careers, depends on the cumulative effect of these contests for e m o t i o n a l d o mi- n a n c e . "It's a k n o w n fact t h a t there are certain guys on certain teams t h a t if you nail 'em once or twice, if you s h o w 'em y o u ' r e going to take c h a r g e , well, they c a n ' t t a k e the hitting a n d so they've got to respect you. They'll be looking, so you can kill their g a m e " (Faulkner 1 9 7 6 : 99).

This is not simply a m a t t e r of masculine identity; in hockey testing the o p p o n e n t ' s aggressiveness is a key p a r t of the g a m e . Lack of aggressive- ness m a k e s one perform badly, a n d will be t a k e n a d v a n t a g e of by o p p o - nents in n o r m a l play. T h e hockey player c o n t i n u e s ,

I k n o w we've got a couple of guys on o u r t e a m , well you k n o w he's scared. H e ' s just scared. You can tell him n o t to w o r r y t h a t if a n y t h i n g h a p p e n s d o n ' t w o r r y a b o u t it, the guys will back you u p . But this guy is just scared, you'll m a k e a pass to him a n d he'll let the pass go off his stick, he'll m a k e a stupid play, he'll m o v e a w a y from the t r o u b l e . Last week we got the puck o u t to him across the blue line and their de- fensemen came in to t a k e him out of the play and o u r guy just let the puck go off his stick. So this guy on the o t h e r t e a m got it a n d w e n t in to m a k e a shot on net. N o w d a m n , t h a t ' s really b a d . My defense p a r t n e r a n d myself were on the bench a n d he said, " L o o k at t h a t g o d d a m n e d c h i c k e n . " And you just look at t h a t type of thing a n d it m a k e s you m a d . This guy better c h a n g e his a t t i t u d e or everybody will tell him. (Faulkner 1976: 101)

F a u l k n e r notes t h a t the experience of being called u p o n by others to p r o t e c t them seems to increase a player's sense of confidence in his o w n skills. Ritualistic fights give EE to the entire sports p e r f o r m a n c e . Fighting is n o t just encapsulated as separate activity, or expression of masculinity a p a r t from the process of w i n n i n g the g a m e :

If the o t h e r t e a m k n o w s that w h e n one of your players is in t r o u b l e the whole team will back him u p , then we all have confidence. This is why some teams are feared, like with S., everyone is there. Someone will p u t a stick in to stop a p u n c h , if a guy is trying to t h r o w a sucker punch from behind. As a team they're t o u g h e r because they back each other up all the way. You never let your t e a m m a t e s get beat because it can swing a whole g a m e a r o u n d . A guy w o r k s your t e a m m a t e over pretty bad, t h a t gives the rest of them a lift a n d if we d o n ' t go o u t a n d chal- lenge him a n d straighten him o u t w e ' r e dead. (Faulkner 1 9 7 6 : 105)

Violence in hockey acts as a high-intensity interaction ritual, riveting collective attention a n d p r o d u c i n g e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t . It is a c o m m o n cliche to c o m p l a i n t h a t fights in hockey are m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n the g a m e ; this is not strictly t r u e (since goal scoring a n d saves are the a p e x of

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the game), b u t fights are often the m o m e n t s t h a t are m o s t successful in stirring up collective energy. This can be t h e result of e n t r a i n m e n t b o t h a m o n g t e a m m a t e s a n d between t h e m a n d fans.

A n o t h e r player r e p o r t s ,

T h e first thing t h a t comes into my h e a d is the cheering every time s o m e - b o d y gets hit into the b o a r d s a n d a fight b r e a k s o u t ; everyone s t a n d s up a n d cheers t h a t kind of t h i n g , a n d w h e n they see b l o o d . A lot of fans c a m e to see t h a t a n d they got b o r e d if t h e r e w a s n ' t s o m e kind of vio- lence going o n . I n m y p e r s o n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h t h e m a n d h o w they react to the g a m e , it w a s e n o u g h for me to see t h a t they w a n t e d to see t h a t violence t h i n g , a n d it does p r o m o t e it. I m e a n , w h e n the c r o w d is b e h i n d y o u a n d cheer w h e n you k n o c k p e o p l e i n t o the b o a r d s I'm n o t going t o lie, i t gets y o u f i r e d u p a n d w a n t t o m a k e y o u d o m o r e b a n g i n g of guys i n t o the b o a r d s , a n d lots of times, if it takes t h a t to get the t e a m fired u p , t h e n t h a t ' s w h a t y o u ' r e going to d o . It always helps to get the fans behind y o u they definitely h a v e a role in p r o m o t i n g violence in t h e s p o r t . (Pappas, M c H e n r y , a n d C a t l e t t 2 0 0 4 : 302)

Violent techniques are just p a r t of the techniques of a h o c k e y t e a m ; some players specialize as scorers, a n d these (along w i t h goalies) seem to be rarely involved in fights, or even in r o u g h p l a y . 2 6 O t h e r players are k n o w n as the " h e a v i e s , " a n d these in t u r n fall into subtypes. Some are r e g a r d e d a s " p o l i c e m e n , " w h o intimidate o p p o n e n t s , r e s p o n d t o their aggression, a n d readily join in fights to back up e m b a t t l e d t e a m m a t e s . Some of t h e m regard their role as p r o t e c t i n g the fast-skating a n d slick stick-handling scorers. A " g o o d p o l i c e m a n " is oriented to t h e g a m e , a n d avoids penalties in crucial s i t u a t i o n s . O t h e r s , w h o fight t o o recklessly, e a r n the r e p u t a t i o n as " g o o n s " ; they are disliked by o p p o n e n t s for hits b e y o n d the n o r m a l level of i n t i m i d a t i o n , b u t also by t e a m m a t e s for in- volving t h e m in m o r e g r o u p fights t h a n necessary. This division of l a b o r s h o w s again t h a t h o c k e y violence comes n o t simply from a generalized c o m m i t m e n t to masculinity, or even to p r o d u c i n g violence for the fans; b u t r a t h e r from p a r t i c u l a r techniques c o n c e n t r a t e d at p a r t i c u l a r places in the game (cf. P a p p a s et al. 2 0 0 4 ; Weinstein, Smith, a n d Wiesenthal 1 9 9 5 ; Smith 1 9 7 9 ) . Every t e a m needs one or t w o " p o l i c e m e n , " b u t it is n o t necessary for every player to be o n e . 2 7 Even m o r e t h a n scorers, goalies are t r e a t e d as high-skill specialists w h o are n o t expected to fight. If they are hit in front of the goal by e n c r o a c h i n g o p p o n e n t s , their defensemen g a t h e r a r o u n d protectively, a n d m a y fight on their behalf. In r a r e instances, w h e n a full-scale melee occurs between t e a m s , the t w o goalies will s q u a r e off at center ice, against each other, t r a d i n g t o k e n p u n c h e s . T h u s even in an all-out fight, the specialized o r g a n i z a t i o n of the t e a m s in t e r m s of violence is m a i n t a i n e d .

3 0 2 • Chapter 8

T H E T I M I N G O F PLAYER V I O L E N C E : L O S E R - F R U S T R A T I O N F I G H T S

A N D T U R N I N G - P O I N T F I G H T S

N o w w e are c o n c e r n e d , n o t w i t h n o r m a l l y violent o r i n t i m i d a t i n g g a m e a c t i o n b u t t h e p o i n t s at w h i c h it t u r n s i n t o specifically b r a c k e t e d fights. W h e n do fights in this sense h a p p e n d u r i n g a game?

O n e type of player fight arises from frustration. F r u s t r a t e d fighting oc- curs late in a g a m e . This h a p p e n s m o s t noticeably in football, a r o u n d just the time w h e n o n e t e a m recognizes t h a t it h a s lost t h e possibility of w i n - ning the g a m e . T h e fight is a w a y of staving off a d m i t t i n g being d o m i - n a t e d ; it is a last gasp of resistance, at the last m o m e n t w h e n the players are still struggling h a r d . Such frustration fights are usually ineffective as violence (as football fights n o r m a l l y are), a n d never seem to t u r n t h e m o - m e n t u m a r o u n d . 2 8

A second type of player violence changes the e m o t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n so dramatically t h a t it determines the o u t c o m e of t h e g a m e . T u r n i n g - p o i n t fights occur after t h e t e n s i o n of the contest h a s been going on for some t i m e , a n d t h u s usually in t h e last t h i r d or q u a r t e r of the g a m e .

August 10, 2001: A big bench-clearing b r a w l in baseball g a m e . This one is u n u s u a l because the initiator is really angry, a b a t t e r w h o t h r o w s his batting helmet a t the pitcher; wrestles h i m t o t h e g r o u n d , a n d p u n c h e s h i m while he is on t h e g r o u n d ; as b o t h benches r u s h the field, o t h e r players t r a d e p u n c h e s t o o , a n d the instigator keeps p u r s u i n g the pitcher, tackles h i m again near h o m e p l a t e as he is trying to get away, again p u n c h i n g h i m on t h e g r o u n d . T h e m a n a g e r of t h e t e a m on receiving side of the helmet- t h r o w i n g calls it " t h e m o s t vicious t h i n g I've ever s e e n . " T h e b r a w l stops play for 12 m i n u t e s , a n d the instigator plus o n e c o a c h on each side are t h r o w n o u t of g a m e . T h e fight is u n u s u a l in the a m o u n t of p u n c h e s t h r o w n , a l t h o u g h there is also t h e usual milling a r o u n d , p u s h i n g each o t h e r at a r m s length, a n d a n g r y s h o u t i n g (Los Angeles Times, A u g . 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 ) .

T h e i m m e d i a t e lead-up t o t h e f i g h t : M i k e Sweeney, K a n s a s City R o y a l s ' f i r s t b a s e m a n a n d clean-up hitter, c o m p l a i n s t h a t t h e D e t r o i t Tiger's pitcher, Jeff Weaver, is leaving the w h i t e resin b a g on t o p of the m o u n d so t h a t it distracts the h i t t e r ' s vision. U p o n his second c o m p l a i n t to the u m p i r e , t h e pitcher says s o m e t h i n g , q u o t e d by Sweeney a f t e r w a r d in an interview: " H e said, 'You (expletive expletive), (expletive) y o u . [i.e., some- thing like 'You fucking asshole, fuck y o u . ' ] F o r m e , I w i s h it never h a p - p e n e d , b u t in t h e same b r e a t h , he called me o u t . " Weaver is 6 ft. 5, a big m a c h o guy. Sweeney is t h e clean-up hitter, a fairly big m u s c u l a r guy, t o o (6 ft. 1, over 2 0 0 p o u n d s ) . Sweeney h a d a r e p u t a t i o n as m i l d - m a n n e r e d ,

Sports Violence • 3 0 3

a c c o r d i n g to press r e p o r t s — s o it's n o t personality. Instead there is the b u i l d - u p of tension in several kinds of interaction ritual c h a i n s .

First are the long-term frustrations a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s . B o t h t e a m s , ear- lier highly r e g a r d e d , are having very b a d seasons, at the p o i n t in mid- August w h e r e it's clear t h a t they are just fighting to stay o u t of the cellar. KC is in last place in the A m e r i c a n League central division, nineteen a n d a half games back; D e t r o i t is just a h e a d of t h e m in f o u r t h place, fifteen a n d a half games b a c k . But D e t r o i t is sliding; KC has been gaining g r o u n d on t h e m a n d sees a chance of c a t c h i n g up in this h e a d - t o - h e a d series, of w h i c h this is the first g a m e . M o r e o v e r , KC is playing at h o m e , w i t h the c r o w d of 2 2 , 0 0 0 behind t h e m .

Second, the tension builds up in the g a m e . It s t a r t e d badly for K C : D e t r o i t j u m p e d a h e a d in t o p of the first inning, the first four batters all hitting singles a n d scoring t w o r u n s . K C c o m e s back w i t h one r u n i n b o t t o m of first, w h i c h Sweeney drove in w i t h a sacrifice fly; b u t thereafter the D e t r o i t pitcher settles d o w n a n d allows n o hits a n d n o w a l k s i n the n e x t four a n d t w o - t h i r d s innings. K C pitching settles d o w n , t o o , allowing no m o r e r u n s . So w h e n Sweeney comes to b a t in the b o t t o m of the sixth, the g a m e is tense: they've been o n e r u n b a c k for five innings (over an h o u r ) . Finally after t w o o u t s , the Royals get a b a s e - r u n n e r on w i t h a d o u - ble, p u t t i n g a m a n in scoring p o s i t i o n . Sweeney feels all t h e pressure on h i m to tie the g a m e ; he also has the e x p e c t a t i o n — t h e E E — t o do so. Both in l o n g - r u n EE: he is leading the t e a m in RBIs (82), a n d in b a t t i n g average (.311). A n d his s h o r t - t e r m IR chain is u p : he drove in the t e a m ' s only r u n w i t h a sacrifice in his first at b a t . But he still d o e s n ' t h a v e a hit for the g a m e . Weaver, on the o t h e r h a n d , is D e t r o i t ' s best pitcher (at this p o i n t , 10 W 10 L); he's been cruising since the first inning, until giving up a d o u b l e w i t h t w o o u t s . It's c r u n c h time for h i m , t o o . H e a p p a r e n t l y tries to upset the batter by playing w i t h t h e resin bag; a n d deliberately t a u n t s h i m w h e n Sweeney c o m p l a i n s .

T h e n comes the fight, u n u s u a l l y p r o l o n g e d anger on the p a r t of t h e batter, a n d p r o l o n g e d chasing a n d p u n c h i n g of the pitcher ( a l t h o u g h p u n c h i n g s o m e o n e while b o t h are on g r o u n d , in wrestling p o s i t i o n , isn't very d a n g e r o u s ) . N o t e t h a t the pitcher, a l t h o u g h he p r o v o k e d the fight by t a u n t i n g , a n d is the bigger m a n w i t h a m o r e m a c h o r e p u t a t i o n , is passive; tries to get a w a y ; is wrestled to the g r o u n d several times; d o e s n ' t hit back.

T h i r d , a switch occurs in EE d o m i n a n c e . After the fight, Sweeney is ejected from the g a m e ; the pitcher stays in. But Sweeney has w o n t h e f i g h t , m a k i n g the pitcher back d o w n , m a n h a n d l i n g h i m a n d e m o t i o n a l l y d o m i n a t i n g him d u r i n g the f i g h t . T h e angrier p e r s o n , charged u p w i t h EE, w i n s the fight. T h e n t h e p i t c h e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e b r e a k s d o w n : Weaver w a l k s t h e n e x t b a t t e r (having w a l k e d n o one i n the g a m e u p t o t h a t p o i n t ) ; t h e n he gives up a single, w h i c h scores a r u n a n d ties the g a m e (losing his

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p o t e n t i a l victory); t h e n he t h r o w s a wild pitch to n e x t batter, w h i c h ad- vances the r u n n e r s to second a n d t h i r d ; t h e n he hits t h e b a t t e r w i t h a pitch, l o a d i n g the bases.

T h e n t h e entire t e a m ' s EE gives way. W e a v e r is t a k e n o u t for a reliever, w h o gets t h e n e x t b a t t e r to hit a r o u t i n e fly ball; b u t t h e D e t r o i t center fielder b o b b l e s it for an error, a l l o w i n g t h r e e r u n s to score. T h e reliever w a l k s the n e x t b a t t e r ; t h e following b a t t e r hits a d o u b l e t o drive i n t w o m o r e r u n s . T h i s m o m e n t u m s w i n g results in six r u n s scoring, all after t h e f i g h t ( w h e n D e t r o i t n e e d e d only t o get o n e o u t , b u t failed t o d o s o for six s t r a i g h t b a t t e r s , only t w o o f w h o m g o t hits). D u r i n g all t h i s , from the f i g h t o n w a r d , t h e h o m e c r o w d h a s been r o a r i n g (and h a d been b u i l d i n g up spirit since t h e d o u b l e just before Sweeney c a m e u p ) . After t h e c r o w d settles d o w n , D e t r o i t c o m e s b a c k for o n e r u n i n the t o p o f t h e seventh, b u t t h e rest of t h e g a m e is r o u t i n e , a n d KC w i n s , 7 to 3. In the following t w o d a y s , K C c o n t i n u e s o n a roll a n d defeats D e t r o i t twice t o s w e e p the series.

W i n n i n g the t u r n i n g - p o i n t fight is crucial for w i n n i n g the g a m e ; b o t h are a b o u t establishing e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e . Conversely, f i g h t s m a y b r e a k o u t w h e n the g a m e is on the line, b u t if the fight is a s t a l e m a t e , the m o m e n t u m is n o t b r o k e n .

An e x a m p l e from football: Of four N F L first-round playoff games tele- vised o n J a n u a r y 5 , 2 0 0 3 , only one h a d f i g h t s d u r i n g g a m e . T h i s w a s the h a r d e s t - f o u g h t g a m e (two o t h e r s w e r e b l o w o u t s ; the t h i r d h a d one m o m e n t u m swing as the trailing t e a m c a m e from behind to w i n ) .

San Francisco 4 9 e r s versus N e w York G i a n t s . First q u a r t e r swings back a n d forth, each scoring t w o t o u c h d o w n s , 1 4 - 1 4 . Second q u a r t e r a n d m o s t of third q u a r t e r d o m i n a n c e swings to G i a n t s , w h o o p e n up a 3 8 - 1 4 lead— scoring on four consecutive drives while SF could neither s t o p t h e m on defense n o r m o v e on offense. G i a n t s c o n t r o l m o m e n t u m for a t o t a l of fourteen m i n u t e s playing t i m e , b u t it seems m u c h longer in real time since it also includes the half-time break. T h e n m o m e n t u m swings again: SF m o u n t s t w o drives, scoring t o u c h d o w n s a n d t w o - p o i n t conversions, while Giants c a n ' t m o v e the ball; t h e score is c u t to 3 8 - 3 0 . T h e n SF drives again, b u t can only kick a field goal as the defense stiffens, leaving the score 3 8 - 33 w i t h u n d e r eight m i n u t e s to g o . SF has n o w d o m i n a t e d for eleven m i n u t e s until s t o p p e d . D u r i n g these t h r e e drives, the Giants defense looks very tired, p a n t i n g , o u t of b r e a t h , while SF performs a n o - h u d d l e fast- paced offense. Of c o u r s e , b o t h o p p o s i n g offense a n d defense p a r t i c i p a t e in same n u m b e r of plays a n d m a k e just as m u c h physical effort; the a p p a r e n t tiredness is an e m o t i o n a l l e t - d o w n , a loss of EE.

H a v i n g f i n a l l y b r o k e n the 4 9 e r s ' m o m e n t u m , the Giants m o v e the ball for five m i n u t e s b u t c a n n o t score. SF gets the ball back w i t h three m i n u t e s to g o , a n d m o u n t s a drive. D u r i n g this last drive, only o n e NY player—

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defensive safety S h a u n Williams—hustles to m a k e plays, a n d t e m p o r a r i l y saves a t o u c h d o w n . T h e n SF scores on a p a s s , to go a h e a d 3 9 - 3 8 ; star receiver Terrell O w e n s , a very tall, d o m i n a n t receiver, k n o w n for s h o w i n g off while celebrating his t o u c h d o w n s , t a u n t s the Giants safety, w h o p u n c h e s h i m furiously. Both players are called for fouls; this is especially i r r a t i o n a l for the G i a n t s , since they will get the ball back on the kickoff, a n d a fifteen-yard p e n a l t y on their o p p o n e n t w o u l d m o v e t h e m close to field goal r a n g e . But the penalties offset, so t h e r e is no effect.

SF tries for a t w o - p o i n t conversion, w h i c h if successful w o u l d give t h e m a t h r e e - p o i n t lead, so t h a t a G i a n t s ' field goal w o u l d do no m o r e t h a n tie t h e m . But the Giants intercept the pass, a n d try to r u n the ball back o u t (which is against t h e rules, since the defense c a n ' t a d v a n c e on an e x t r a p o i n t t r y ) . O w e n s comes over a n d hits the G i a n t s ball carrier (a defensive back) o u t of b o u n d s — a n o t h e r flagrant foul; b u t the Giants retaliate, in fact, twice: a n o t h e r of the Giants defensive backs hits O w e n s ; plus the same G i a n t s safety w h o got the previous foul (Shaun Williams) p u n c h e s a big SF l i n e m a n (a h u n d r e d p o u n d s bigger t h a n himself) w h o h a d inter- vened in the first fight. T h e same set of players c a n ' t s t o p fighting w i t h each other. So again it's off-setting fouls—again SF gives t h e o t h e r side a penalty b r e a k , b u t t h e o t h e r side c a n ' t t a k e a d v a n t a g e of it because of retaliation. Giants t h e n m o v e the ball d o w n the field rapidly; a n o t h e r brief fight b r e a k s out; t h e n G i a n t s try for a field goal, w h i c h they miss as time r u n s o u t . 4 9 e r s w i n .

W h a t we see is an extremely h a r d - f o u g h t g a m e ; m o m e n t u m swings very strongly first to G i a n t s , t h e n to SF; the m o s t effective defensive player in trying to b r e a k the m o m e n t u m swing starts a fight in response to b o a s t i n g by the SF p e r f o r m a n c e leader after he finally scores to t a k e the lead; t h e n the SF star angrily a t t a c k s after their i n s u r a n c e play has been foiled, a n d t h e N Y defensive leader c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s . T h e individuals w i t h the highest EE a n d m o s t p e r s o n a l d o m i n a n c e initiate the fighting a n d keep it going w i t h retaliation. T h e fighters are those w h o h a v e p u t in the m o s t effort to shift the m o m e n t u m swings of the g a m e . 2 9 But no one w i n s these fights. T h e f i g h t s d o n o t c h a n g e the m o m e n t u m , b u t only confirm it. T h e t e a m in EE decline also fades o u t in their last-ditch effort to w i n .

Tension can build up over a series of g a m e s , c o m p o u n d e d o u t of t e a m rivalries, the pressures of elimination t o u r n a m e n t s , a n d a c c u m u l a t i n g in- cidents of in-game i n t i m i d a t i o n . 3 0 T h e fights t h a t result can become the d r a m a t i c centerpiece of the action. This is m o s t n o t a b l e in professional baseball a n d basketball playoff series, w h e r e t e a m s a n d their fans store up e m o t i o n a l m e m o r i e s of previous c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , a n d w i n n i n g or losing a fight t e n d s to determine the following sequence of action on the field, for a w h o l e series of g a m e s . 3 1

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Figure 8.5 Male and female players display identical gestures of domination (2004). Left: AP/World Wide Photos. Right: © McClatchy-Tribune Information Services. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with permission.

T u r n i n g p o i n t s can also occur in t h e k i n d s of n o n - c o n t a c t s p o r t s t h a t involve no fights b u t e m o t i o n a l tests of d o m i n a n c e . In the W i m b l e d o n tennis c h a m p i o n s h i p i n 2 0 0 4 , M a r i a S h a r a p o v a battled the p r i o r c h a m - p i o n Serena Williams in a exchange of t w e n t y - o n e volleys at b r e a k p o i n t in her first service g a m e of the second set (having w o n the first set already). Finally, S h a r a p o v a hit a f o r e h a n d deep in the corner, a n d Williams slipped a n d fell. S h a r a p o v a gave Williams a h a r d stare a n d p u m p e d her fist, while Williams lay on the g r o u n d , an expression of a g o n y on her face. Shara- p o v a w e n t o n t o ace the n e x t serve a n d t o t a k e t h e rest o f t h e m a t c h easily (San Diego Union-Tribune, July 4, 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e loser is beaten b o t h physically a n d emotionally, at t h e t u r n i n g p o i n t , while the w i n n e r goes on from t h a t p o i n t d e m o n s t r a b l y a n d self-consciously full of confidence. Battles for d o m i n a n c e are n o t gender-specific, b u t are s h a p e d by the dra- m a t i c sequence of the g a m e . We see this also in p h o t o s of w o m e n pitchers in Softball games m a k i n g t h e same gestures t h a t m e n pitchers do after r e c o r d i n g a crucial strike-out: j a w t h r u s t f o r w a r d , fist p u n c h i n g the air.

Basketball fights often h a p p e n in a c l i m a x of frustration w h e n a t e a m blows a lead a n d loses m o m e n t u m . T h i s m a y t a k e t h e form of especially r o u g h play r a t h e r t h a n a frame-breaking fight. In the final g a m e of the

S p o r t s V i o l e n c e • 3 0 7

2 0 0 4 N B A Eastern Conference c h a m p i o n s h i p , the I n d i a n a Pacers h a d led by fourteen p o i n t s in t h e first half, b u t the D e t r o i t Pistons slowly c a u g h t up a n d tied the score w i t h just u n d e r four m i n u t e s to play. T h e Pacers' best defender, R o n Artest, t h e n k n o c k e d d o w n the Pistons' best scorer, R i c h a r d H a m i l t o n — a m u c h smaller m a n — w i t h a forearm shiver to the jaw. H a m i l t o n picked himself u p , m a d e t h e t w o p e n a l t y s h o t s , a n d his t e a m never trailed again, going on to w i n t h e series (and eventually the N B A c h a m p i o n s h i p ) . T h e t e a m t h a t w o n t h e fight physically did n o t w i n it dramatically, a n d w a s e m o t i o n a l l y k n o c k e d o u t of the g a m e (Los Angeles Times, J u n e 2, 2 0 0 4 ) .

F u r t h e r light is cast on the dynamics of player fights by asking w h e n they do not occur. After all, only a m i n o r i t y of games h a v e frustrated game-losing violence, or t u r n i n g - p o i n t violence, a l t h o u g h m o s t games have a p o i n t at w h i c h a t e a m becomes a w a r e it has lost. I h a v e argued for the s t r u c t u r a l principle of one fight per venue or d r a m a t i c sequence. T h e same p a t t e r n of filling the e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n space predicts w h e n fights will n o t h a p p e n . After the b u i l d u p to a d r a m a t i c climax, further fights b e c o m e e m o t i o n a l l y superfluous. Based on this principle, I predicted suc- cessfully t h a t after the d r a m a t i c A m e r i c a n League c h a m p i o n s h i p series b e t w e e n t h e Yankees a n d t h e R e d Sox i n 2 0 0 4 , c o m i n g t o a n e m o t i o n a l c l i m a x in the s i x t h - g a m e collision between Yankees star Alex R o d r i q u e z a n d R e d Sox pitcher B r o n s o n A r r o y o , 3 2 there w o u l d be no further fights, either in the r e m a i n i n g seventh g a m e or in t h e following W o r l d Series.

S P E C T A T O R S ' G A M E - D E P E N D E N T V I O L E N C E

Spectator violence takes several forms: fans can invade the field, or t h r o w things at the players from a distance; players m i g h t fight w i t h s p e c t a t o r s , a l t h o u g h this is ra rer ; a n d fans can fight w i t h each o t h e r d u r i n g the g a m e .

This last form of fan-on-fan violence has n o t been m u c h s t u d i e d . 3 3 Some s t a d i u m s are k n o w n for sections of t h e s t a n d s w h e r e fights are c o m m o n ; for i n s t a n c e , the c h e a p , upper-level seats of Philadelphia's old Veterans Stadium (demolished in 2 0 0 4 ) were k n o w n as places w h e r e r o w d y y o u n g m e n t h r e w things a n d engaged in fisticuffs, especially against fans of an o p p o s i n g t e a m w h o v e n t u r e d into the area. It is unclear h o w such fights relate to the r h y t h m of the g a m e a c t i o n . Stadiums k n o w n for r o w d y fans of this k i n d are chiefly in the big cities of the N o r t h e a s t (notably Boston, N e w York, a n d Philadelphia, a n d especially in professional football a n d baseball games); West C o a s t fans of the same s p o r t s are m u c h less violent, a n d also do m u c h less r o u g h cheering a n d jeering. A p a t t e r n consistent w i t h my observati on s is t h a t fans at t h e r o w d y s t a d i u m s are m u c h m o r e likely to consist in g r o u p s of y o u n g m e n , w h e r e a s West C o a s t a n d M i d -

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western c r o w d s have a higher p r o p o r t i o n of w o m e n a n d family g r o u p s . This is the same p a t t e r n t h a t has been suggested to a c c o u n t for the differ- ence in violence b e t w e e n N o r t h A m e r i c a n h o c k e y a n d football spectators ( p r e d o m i n a n t l y middle-class, college-educated, and almost half female), as c o m p a r e d to E u r o p e a n soccer matches (whose fans arc largely w o r k - ing-class males between ages seventeen a n d twenty) (Roberts a n d Benja- min 2 0 0 0 ) . It is n o t clear w h e n a n d h o w often s p e c t a t o r s get into small- scale fights unrelated to t e a m partisanship—possibly very little, if team- identity sides p r e e m p t the violent attention space.

M o s t of w h a t is k n o w n a b o u t s p e c t a t o r violence concerns large-scale c r o w d d i s t u r b a n c e s . O n e study, which listed all the episodes of collective violence at games reported in T o r o n t o n e w s p a p e r s d u r i n g one year, found t h a t of the twenty-seven incidents of c r o w d violence, 74 percent were ignited by player violence (Smith 1 9 7 8 ) . For e x a m p l e , d u r i n g a H o c k e y Association J u n i o r g a m e , a cross-checking incident sparked a fight t h a t eventually included m o s t players from b o t h t e a m s , several h u n d r e d spec- t a t o r s , and twenty city policemen. In a professional hockey g a m e between Buffalo a n d Cleveland, players b r a w l e d , t o u c h i n g off a p a r o x y s m of chair- t h r o w i n g by s p e c t a t o r s , w h e r e u p o n players, sticks flailing, w e n t into the s t a n d s to fight with the fans. In a T o r o n t o soccer g a m e between Yugosla- via Z a g r e b a n d the Greek All-Stars, many of the 1 3 , 0 0 0 spectators in- vaded the field after eighteen minutes of the second half. T h e score w a s tied 1-1 at the time. T h e Yugoslav goalkeeper tripped a Greek player as he w a s racing for the goal. T h e referee a w a r d e d a penalty kick and the goalkeeper protested. T h e r e w a s a shoving match a n d then fans raced to the field. T h e spectators started kicking at the players (note t h a t fans mirrored the players' actions) w h o returned the b l o w s . This fight is framed by ethnic divisions between both players and rival fans. But it also h a p p e n e d at the t u r n i n g p o i n t of the g a m e , since the penalty kick might well have resulted in victory or defeat: at a tense m o m e n t , with the score tied, m o r e t h a n halfway t h r o u g h the g a m e . T h e players b r o k e the frame- w o r k of the g a m e by fighting with the referee, w h e r e u p o n the fans joined. T h e battle ended only w i t h massive police intervention.

Fans are subject to the same r h y t h m s of d r a m a t i c tension as players; indeed, it is chiefly to experience these tensions a n d to express their e m o - tions collectively, thereby t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e m into the additional feeling of collective effervescence and g r o u p solidarity, t h a t fans are attracted to a t t e n d i n g a g a m e in person. T h u s it is not surprising t h a t fans get into fights at a b o u t the same m o m e n t s t h a t players get into fights." 4 This is also t r u e across different s p o r t s : psychological testing has s h o w n t h a t fans' belligerence increases after (and p r e s u m a b l y during) football and hockey g a m e s , b u t n o t after a t t e n d i n g gymnastics or s w i m m i n g meets (Goldstein and A r m s , 1 9 7 1 ; A r m s , Russell, and Sandilands 1979). Fans go with the

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e m o t i o n a l flow of the episodes contrived by the p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of g a m e . D r a m a t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e violence is t h a t w h i c h is an extension of the g a m e action; fans b e c o m e aggressive only w h e r e t h e violence is perceived as i n t e n t i o n a l (Zillman, Bryant, a n d Sapolsky 1 9 7 9 ) ; w h e n an injury is seen as accidental, fans are n o t aggressive, a n d m a y even shift frames to a p p l a u d an injured o p p o s i n g player.

W h e n players a n d fans directly fight each other, one or the o t h e r m u s t i n t r u d e into the o t h e r ' s space. A m a s s of fans sometimes invades the play- ing field, a l t h o u g h often they are m o r e intent on disrupting the g a m e a n d bringing it to an end—either in victory or in disgust—or a t t a c k i n g the officials. W h e n just o n e or t w o isolated fans invade the field, however, the players are likely to m e e t t h e m w i t h violence (for w h i c h they receive the general s u p p o r t of t h e fans [see n o t e 11 in c h a p t e r 6]).

Players are the violent elite c o m p a r e d to the fans, a n d m o s t of the seri- ous player-versus-fan violence occurs w h e n players a t t a c k , m o s t typically by invading the s t a n d s in response to jeering. But jeering is a fairly n o r m a l o c c u r r e n c e , indeed p a r t of the a p p e a l of being a fan w h e r e hostile displays c a n b e m a d e w i t h i m p u n i t y a n d even w i t h c r o w d s u p p o r t ; a n d s o the times w h e n players r e s p o n d w i t h violence m u s t intersect w i t h some spe- cial t e n s i o n on the p a r t of the players. In c h a p t e r 3, we s a w Ty C o b b invading the stands d u r i n g the tension of his record-seeking hitting a n d base-stealing season. In o t h e r instances, the tension comes from the spe- cial d r a m a t i c s of the t e a m c o n t e s t . 3 5

Teams " h a v e a history w i t h each o t h e r " because of the d r a m a t i c inci- dents of conflict they h a v e been t h r o u g h ; a n d this history is well k n o w n to the fans, indeed celebrated by t h e m as p a r t of t h e appeal of a t t e n d i n g a n u p c o m i n g g a m e . F a n s are d r a m a - s e e k e r s ; w h e t h e r the d r a m a h a p p e n s to be violent or n o t is s o m e w h a t incidental. Earlier we m e t a key bit of history between the I n d i a n a Pacers a n d the D e t r o i t Pistons in the on-floor violence t h a t w a s the t u r n i n g p o i n t of t h e E a s t e r n Conference c h a m p i o n - ship. T h e n e x t time the t w o t e a m s m e t during t h e following season, t h e Pacers m a d e up for their defeat by leading all the w a y in a b l o w o u t . R o n Artest, the Pacers player w h o h a d delivered the climactic (and counter- productive) b l o w in the c h a m p i o n s h i p g a m e , also started the s u b s e q u e n t b r a w l w h e n he delivered a h a r d foul on the P i s t o n s ' biggest player just at the end of the g a m e ; w i t h forty-five seconds to go a n d a fifteen-point lead, the foul w a s pointless except to p u n c t u a t e the sense of p a y b a c k . T h e Pistons player a p p a r e n t l y t o o k it as an insult, a n d shoved Artest in the h e a d , leading to a little melee of players from b o t h t e a m s on the floor. Artest, as if t a u n t i n g t h e rivals, lay d o w n on t h e scorer's t a b l e by t h e sidelines—invading t h e officials' turf, b u t also s h o w i n g off his safe h a v e n as his irate victim w a s held back from a t t a c k i n g h i m . T h e n — s i n c e the g a m e w a s being played in D e t r o i t ' s h o m e a r e n a — t h e D e t r o i t fans got i n t o

3 1 0 • C h a p t e r s

t h e act, in keeping w i t h t h e typical p a t t e r n of fan fighting e n t r a i n e d from player fighting. In the m i d s t of noisy jeering, one fan, a p p a r e n t l y t e m p t e d by the seeming passive p o s t u r e of Artest lying on the t a b l e , d u m p e d a c u p of iced d r i n k on him. Artest n o w j u m p e d i n t o t h e s t a n d s , a l o n g w i t h a s u p p o r t i n g t e a m m a t e , a n d e x c h a n g e d p u n c h e s w i t h t w o fans; the f i g h t spilled b a c k o n t o t h e floor, a n d Artest p u n c h e d a fan w e a r i n g a Pistons jersey (i.e., acting o u t his fantasy identification) w h o accosted h i m , a n d w a s tackled b y a n o t h e r fan w h o i n t u r n w a s p u n c h e d b y a n o t h e r t e a m - m a t e . T h e b r a w l ended w i t h the Pacers players retreating from t h e floor, pelted by t h e fans w h o r e m a i n e d in the safety of t h e s t a n d s . T h e r e m a i n d e r of the g a m e w a s called off (Philadelphia Inquirer, N o v . 2 1 , 2 0 0 4 ) .

T h e fight received great a t t e n t i o n in the m e d i a , a n d w a s universally c o n d e m n e d as especially shocking; several Pacers players received lengthy suspensions from the league. But in fact every element in the fight fits the general p a t t e r n s of sports violence. Efforts by the m o s t vociferous fans to t a k e p a r t in, as closely as possible, t h e d r a m a t i c conflict are w h a t b r o u g h t a b o u t the player's r e t a l i a t o r y violence, in this case a n d in all o t h e r cases of player-fan violence k n o w n to m e . Nevertheless, the universal r e a c t i o n of officials a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s p o i n t s up a f u n d a m e n t a l structure of sports d r a m a s : they are per f or m ances for t h e benefit of spectators w h o wish to indulge their e m o t i o n a l experience of p r o t e c t e d fantasy conflict. T h e b o r d e r l i n e b e t w e e n s p e c t a t o r s ' turf a n d p l a y e r s ' turf is the f r a m e w o r k of t h e w h o l e display; p l a y e r s ' violence, b o t h w i t h i n a n d w i t h o u t the rules of the g a m e , is to be confined to each other; s p e c t a t o r s ' for the m o s t p a r t fantasy violence against players is indulged to a degree; b u t the real vio- lence of t h e p l a y e r s — w h o , after all, are m u c h better at it t h a n a n y o n e else—must be k e p t inside the a r e n a a n d n o t directed at the s p e c t a t o r s .

T h e s t r u c t u r e of i n v o l v e m e n t is different for p l a y e r s t h a n for specta- t o r s , so it is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e i r style of fighting is q u i t e different. Player fights generally h a v e t h e f o r m of s y m m e t r i c a l fair fights; t w o play- ers scuffle o r t r a d e p u n c h e s , t w o t e a m s mill a r o u n d o n t h e f i e l d . But s p e c t a t o r violence t e n d s t o b e e x t r e m e l y o n e - s i d e d , a t t a c k i n g t h e w e a k : local fans p e l t i n g or p u m m e l i n g a small n u m b e r of visiting fans, or at- t a c k i n g t h e visiting t e a m , or s o m e t i m e s a t t a c k i n g t h e security forces if t h e latter are o u t n u m b e r e d .

Players' fights are very m u c h like staged fair fights, similar to t h o s e of duelists. Keeping the fight b a l a n c e d b e t w e e n b o t h sides is p a r t of the ethos of being an elite. Spectators, however, are n o t elite; they act like riot c r o w d s in a t t a c k i n g the w e a k , vastly o u t n u m b e r i n g the o p p o s i n g team when they jeer and sometimes physically a t t a c k . Fans a n d players are both emotionally a n d symbolically involved in the same conflict; b u t they o p e r a t e on t w o quite different status levels: fans as shameless a n d igno- miniously tribalistic p a r t i s a n s ; 3 6 players as heroes in evenly m a t c h e d con- tests under honorific t r a d i t i o n s . Fans in their m o m e n t s of enthusiasm

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abase themselves before the players like the most primitive religious fanat- ics in the presence of their cult objects. Fans also act like w o u l d - b e c a r o u s - ers on the outskirts of a well-publicized party. Players react to fans' incur- sions of their turf, like an elite repelling b o u n d a r y incursions by plebeians. Just a s a r i s t o c r a t s , w h o settle their o w n disputes b y t h e h o n o r c o d e , b u t p e r e m p t o r i l y b e a t an offending lower-status p e r s o n w i t h a stick, athletes mete o u t d e g r a d i n g p u n i s h m e n t s t o t h o s e w h o i n t r u d e o n their t e r r a i n . We shall see some consequences of this disparity in status between players a n d fans in the creation of m o r e sophisticated forms of fans' violence.

O E F S I T E F A N S ' V I O L E N C E : C E L E B R A T I O N A N D D E F E A T R I O T S

M o s t of the violence t h a t h a p p e n s in a sports arena is related to the r h y t h m s of confrontation on the field. T h e r e are three main kinds of fan violence t h a t h a p p e n independently, over a n d a b o v e the d r a m a of g a m e events. T h e m o s t e x t r e m e disconnect is football hooligan violence, which 1 will leave for the end. T h e r e are also several forms of s p e c t a t o r violence t h a t begin at the s t a d i u m or in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h game events, but spill over into offsite violence a n d develop an i n d e p e n d e n t course of their o w n . These include political violence a n d celebration a n d defeat riots.

Political violence at games is mobilized in p a r t by e x t r a n e o u s conflicts, for which the g a m e presents an o p p o r t u n i t y to confront a n a t i o n a l or ethnic o p p o n e n t up close instead of at a r e m o t e distance. But the b u i l d u p of contention a r o u n d the g a m e itself can also m a k e political rivalries stronger a n d m o r e salient t h a n they usually are.

For instance, a soccer game was held in Sarajevo in 2 0 0 2 between Bos- nia a n d Yugoslavia, for the first time since they had fought a war, in 1 9 9 2 , w h i c h w a s n o t o r i o u s for ethnic cleansing atrocities. T h e g a m e was held in the Bosnian capital, w h e r e the h o m e c r o w d consisted of a b o u t ten t h o u - sand Bosnians, plus s u p p o r t e r s of the Yugoslav t e a m , a g r o u p of a b o u t three h u n d r e d m a d e up mostly of local Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian fans s t a m p e d their feet during the Yugoslav a n t h e m ; Yugoslav s u p p o r t e r s re- s p o n d e d by m o o n i n g during the Bosnian a n t h e m . Several h u n d r e d police k e p t the t w o g r o u p s a p a r t . A c h a n t i n g contest followed, with the Yugo- slav s u p p o r t e r s c h a n t i n g " T h i s is Serbia," a n d " K a r a d z i k , K a r a d z i k , " the n a m e of the m o s t w a n t e d war-crimes suspect. Bosnian fans r e s p o n d e d by c h a n t i n g "Allab-u-akbar," the t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic war-cry " G o d is g r e a t . " T h e Yugoslav t e a m w e n t o n t o win the g a m e 2 - 0 . Police protected the Yugoslav fans as they left the s t a d i u m ; w h e r e u p o n a b u t t w o h u n d r e d Bos- nian fans a t t a c k e d the police outside the s t a d i u m ; six fans a n d nineteen officers were injured, a n d eight fans were arrested (San Diego Union- Tribune, Aug. 2 3 , 2 0 0 2 ) .

312 • Chapter 8

H e r e t h e p r e t e n d - c o m b a t o f t h e g a m e o p e r a t e d t o recall a n d r e i n v i g o - r a t e earlier political violence. Sports r i o t s w i t h political a n d n a t i o n a l i s t t h e m e s can also hinge u p o n g a m e e v e n t s . D u r i n g t h e 2 0 0 2 W o r l d C u p , R u s s i a n soccer fans, w h o w e r e w a t c h i n g t h e g a m e w i t h J a p a n o n a big screen in a c e n t r a l M o s c o w s q u a r e , r i o t e d after J a p a n scored t h e o n e goal o f t h e g a m e . Russia h a d w o n their p r e v i o u s g a m e , a n d w e r e origi- nally m u c h m o r e highly r e g a r d e d t h a t J a p a n , s o e x p e c t a t i o n s w e r e d a s h e d . A b o u t eight t h o u s a n d fans, m o s t l y t e e n a g e r s a n d y o u n g m e n , r a n t h r o u g h t h e streets c h a n t i n g " F o r w a r d , R u s s i a ! " s o m e o f t h e m w r a p p e d i n t h e R u s s i a n t r i c o l o r f l a g . T h e y b r o k e s h o p w i n d o w s over a n a r e a o f a mile, j u m p e d u p a n d d o w n o n c a r s , s m a s h i n g their w i n d o w s , a n d o v e r t u r n e d a b o u t a d o z e n of t h e m ; seven cars w e r e set on fire. Five J a p a n e s e classical m u s i c s t u d e n t s , w h o w e r e a t t e n d i n g a n e a r b y m u s i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n , w e r e a t t a c k e d b y t h e fans. T h e r i o t e r s also t h r e w bottles a n d fought a m o n g themselves a s well a s w i t h police; o n e m a n w a s killed, a n d a b o u t fifty w e r e h o s p i t a l i z e d , i n c l u d i n g t w e n t y police (San Diego Union-Tribune, J u n e 1 0 , 2 0 0 2 ) . In this case, t h e t i m i n g of t h e o p p o n e n t ' s score sets off t h e violence, w h i c h s p r e a d s q u i t e far, h i t t i n g b o t h J a p a n e s e a n d o t h e r t a r g e t s .

T h e 2 0 0 2 M o s c o w riot is b o t h a political riot a n d a defeat r i o t , t h e c o u n t e r p a r t to a victory celebration r i o t . As we will see, celebration riots can be just as destructive as defeat riots; a n d celebration riots are m u c h m o r e frequent. Losing a game is generally e m o t i o n a l l y deflating, a n d the c r o w d lacks t h e ebullience a n d the t r a d i t i o n a l rituals (such as tearing d o w n goal p o s t s ) , w h i c h c a n segue from a victory celebration into a de- structive riot. Defeat riots r e q u i r e an a d d i t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m . O n e clue is t h a t defeat riots seem t o b e m o r e c o m m o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i o n t h a n domestically, a n d w h e r e sports rivalries are highly politicized. Defeat riots d e p e n d m o r e o n features e x t r a n e o u s t o the g a m e , since the e m o t i o n a l flow of t h e g a m e itself will generally de-energize the defeated a n d energize t h e victors.

Victory-celebration violence is a version of c a r o u s i n g . 3 7 T h e fans' cele- b r a t i o n is an e x t e n s i o n of t h e celebrating t h a t players themselves do after an e m o t i o n a l victory. Both players a n d fans engage in solidarity behav- iors—yelling together, hugging, j u m p i n g a r o u n d to let off a d r e n a l i n — a n d in a n t i n o m i a n rituals t h a t m a r k the specialness of the occasion. W i n n i n g football t e a m s celebrate by p o u r i n g a barrel of liquid on their coach; this is a version of playful violence a n d a u t h o r i t y role reversal, w h i c h t h e c o a c h is expected to t a k e in g o o d h u m o r . A c h a m p i o n s h i p t e a m in Ameri- c a n professional sports generally opens bottles of c h a m p a g n e in the locker r o o m , w h i c h they do n o t d r i n k b u t p o u r over each other. This is similar to a wild party, b u t w i t h r a t h e r restricted destruction.

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F a n s h a v e a different set of o p t i o n s ; they rarely can get close to t h e players t o express bodily solidarity w i t h t h e m ; instead, they s t o r m t h e basketball c o u r t or invade the field. T h e t r a d i t i o n a l football victory ritual w a s to tear d o w n the goal p o s t s at t h e end of the g a m e . (This began w i t h college games at the t u r n of t h e t w e n t i e t h century, w h e n goal posts w e r e m a d e of w o o d ; t h e m e t a l goal posts of recent decades h a s m a d e this m o r e difficult, a l t h o u g h it is sometimes a t t e m p t e d ) . Fans are a t t r a c t e d into the center of the i n t e r a c t i o n ritual, w h e r e they m a k e c o n t a c t w i t h physical objects i m b u e d w i t h magical significance: tearing up pieces of the turf, the basketball floor, or the chairs to t a k e h o m e as souvenirs is a w a y of acquiring a sacred object a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g its mana. Victory celebration violence c o m b i n e s the p o t l a t c h , as in a m e m o r a b l y wild party, w i t h the a t t e m p t at getting i n t o the center of t h e a c t i o n .

But fans are n o t p a r t of t h e elite at t h e center; a n d t h e y are often p r e v e n t e d from getting even these t o k e n s of s y m b o l i c c o n t a c t . In r e c e n t y e a r s , s t a d i u m officials e m p l o y l a r g e n u m b e r s of security g u a r d s a n d police in an effort to k e e p fans off t h e field at all t i m e s . T h i s is o n e r e a s o n w h y victory c e l e b r a t i o n s e x p a n d a w a y from t r a d i t i o n a l p o t l a t c h - l i k e limited d e s t r u c t i o n at t h e s p o r t i n g site, a n d i n t o full-scale riots offsite. T h i s implies t h a t offsite r i o t s increase as field security goes u p ; t h e h y - p o t h e s i s is testable b o t h over t i m e a n d b e t w e e n events t h a t h a v e different levels of security.

In t h e following e x a m p l e , t h e victorious t e a m is a w a y from h o m e , a n d the celebration riot takes place a t the h o m e c a m p u s . Detail o n the time- sequence of violence a n d social c o n t r o l moves are especially useful here:

In April 2 0 0 3 , t h e University of M i n n e s o t a h o c k e y t e a m w a s playing in Buffalo, N.Y., for its second straight c h a m p i o n s h i p . Back in M i n n e a p o - lis, beer kegs w e r e set o u t on fraternity l a w n s in a n t i c i p a t i o n of a celebra- t i o n in public space. W h e n new s of t h e victory c a m e at 8:30 p . m . , p e o p l e started p o u r i n g o u t of fraternities, sororities, a n d a p a r t m e n t s , g r o w i n g to a c r o w d of a b o u t a t h o u s a n d peopl e. W i t h i n t w e n t y m i n u t e s , a bonfire w a s started in a street intersection (i.e., in a safe spot, a w a y from build- ings) w i t h a m a t t r e s s , a p a r k bench, a n d t r a s h receptacle. Firefighters quickly d o u s e d the blaze—which is to say, they p u t o u t the celebration. F a n s t h e n set fires in four other locations, in g a r b a g e cans a n d d u m p - sters—again, b u r n i n g t r a s h . At the street c o r n e r w h e r e the original fire h a d been set, a traffic signal w a s b r o k e n off, a n d s o m e o n e h u n g on the c r o s s b e a m over the street, r o c k i n g it, trying to bring it d o w n . A police officer said the c r o w d w a s "cheering t h e m on like it w a s some sort of sports c o n t e s t " — t h a t is, a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the g a m e experience.

Police were o u t n u m b e r e d one t h o u s a n d t o t w o a t this p o i n t . T h e c r o w d w a s heaving beer bottles at t h e m , a n d they r e t r e a t e d to their s q u a d cars. Eventually a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d officers w e r e called in. B o t h sides esca-

3 1 4 • C h a p t e r s

lated. M o t o r i s t s c a u g h t i n the c r o w d w e r e having their cars p u m m e l e d . Fire engines w e r e n o w having t r o u b l e getting t o the f i r e s t h a t w e r e being ignited at nearly every intersection.

T w o r o w s of fifteen officers, s t a n d i n g s h o u l d e r to s h o u l d e r a n d side- w a l k t o sidewalk, w a l k e d d o w n t h e street t o confront t h e c r o w d . Over a loudspeaker, an officer o r d e r e d t h e c r o w d to disperse. Students were slow to r e s p o n d . " G e t t i n g o u t in the m i d d l e of the street d o e s n ' t h a p p e n t h a t often," a s o p h o m o r e w o m a n t o l d a reporter. " W h a t ' s w r o n g w i t h t h a t ? "

T h e c r o w d r e m a i n e d unruly. People t h r e w bottles, a n d some t h r e w lighted kindling at the police. Police began m a c i n g the c r o w d , w h i c h b a c k e d off, splitting up a n d h e a d i n g in t h r e e directions. It t o o k a b o u t fifteen minutes for police to clear the intersection, a n d t h e n firefighters drove in to p u t o u t the fire. Police stayed to h o l d the intersection.

In the m e a n t i m e , smaller c r o w d s w e r e setting n e w fires at o t h e r intersec- t i o n s . M o r e police s q u a d s w e r e b r o u g h t i n a n d cleared t h e intersections o n e by o n e . A r o u n d 10:30 p . m . , police a d v a n c e d on a c r o w d of a b o u t t h r e e h u n d r e d t o four h u n d r e d . T h e c r o w d w a s shrinking, t h o u g h enthusi- astic. "People were c h a n t i n g 'U-S-A! U-S-A!' " a witness said; s o m e o n e yelled, " I t ' s just like B a g h d a d ! " H e r e they b o r r o w e d slogans from i n t e r n a - t i o n a l sports events, n o t a b l y t h e m e m o r y of the U.S. upset victory over the USSR in O l y m p i c h o c k e y in 1 9 8 0 ; a n d the recent victory of U.S. forces in I r a q in M a r c h 2 0 0 3 . As I will argue later, all sorts of emotionally m e m o - r a b l e symbols are pressed i n t o service in the i m m e d i a t e m o m e n t .

A c r o w d of y o u t h s cheered as they flipped over a car in a p a r k i n g lot. Someone set some n e w s p a p e r racks on fire, a l o n g w i t h a dumpster, a n d t h e n the o v e r t u r n e d car. M a n y of t h e p e o p l e in t h e c r o w d w e r e on cell p h o n e s , talking a b o u t w h a t they were seeing. A witness h e a r d s o m e o n e say, " M a n , y o u g o t to see t h i s , it's incredible!" N a r r a t i v e gratification blends w i t h the action itself.

Elsewhere, a p a r k i n g lot b o o t h w a s b u r n i n g a n d s o m e o n e h a d o p e n e d a fire h y d r a n t , flooding t h e street. Police used launchers to fire chemical spray into the c r o w d , driving a considerable p o r t i o n of the c r o w d to r u n from the area.

A b o u t 11 p . m , some in the c r o w d tried to kick in t h e d o o r s of the university Sports Pavilion. A fire blazed in a t r a s h receptacle. Some fans even tried t o light the b u s h e s . T h e police used m a c e again, a n d t h e c r o w d r a n off.

Shortly before m i d n i g h t , a fire t r u c k w a s p e l t e d w i t h b o t t l e s , s h a t - t e r i n g t h e w i n d s h i e l d . T h e last f i r e s w e r e p u t o u t a r o u n d 1 a.m.; t h e r i o t h a d been g o i n g on for five h o u r s . A t o t a l of sixty-five fires h a d b e e n set i n t h e university n e i g h b o r h o o d , cars w e r e o v e r t u r n e d a n d b u r n e d , o n e s t o r e l o o t e d , w i n d o w s s m a s h e d , a n d street signs t o r n d o w n . I n k e e p i n g w i t h the c e l e b r a t o r y m o o d , t h e l o o t i n g t o o k place at a l i q u o r s t o r e . By

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the time police got t h e r e , the w i n d o w s h a d been s m a s h e d and the looters h a d fled; s o m e o n e h a d t h r o w n a bike rack t h r o u g h t h e w i n d o w . Bystand- ers said l o o t e r s were c o m i n g o u t w i t h cases of beer on their h e a d s . " T h e y pretty m u c h cleaned o u t the v o d k a , " said the s t o r e - o w n e r . " C h e a p stuff, expensive stuff, they w e r e n ' t c h o o s y " (Minneapolis Star-Tribune, April 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ) .

T h e riot ended when the fires s t o p p e d ; there were a long sequence of fires building from the original few, spreading over a wider area as police forces grew stronger a n d m o r e aggressive. T h e activity of the riot, besides the ebullient s h o u t i n g of the c r o w d (which seemed to peak within the first t w o h o u r s ) , consisted chiefly in finding new places to set fires. M o s t of these followed the same p a t t e r n , b u r n i n g t r a s h and c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s t e . T h e r e was no a t t e m p t to burn buildings (although some were menaced by fires later in the evening w h e n the police had driven the fans out of the open spaces of the street intersections). T h e fires were the main vehicle for keeping the moral holiday going. We find the usual p a t t e r n of a rela- tively small p r o p o r t i o n of activists: peak c r o w d s reached a b o u t one t h o u - sand o u t of some thirty-nine t h o u s a n d students at the university c a m p u s , a n d s o m e of those present were spectators r a t h e r t h a n p a r t i c i p a n t s .

To a considerable extent, celebration riots a t t a c k i n g a u t h o r i t y h a p p e n because of a lack of traditional potlatch-like festive destruction in a re- stricted setting, like old-fashioned goal-post smashing a n d bonfires. This lack of an institutionalized venue for moderately destructive moral holi- day is one ingredient. It c o m b i n e s with heightened a t t e n t i o n t h r o u g h the mass media on the t e a m ' s o w n celebration. Such riots resemble b o u n d a r y - exclusion fights t h a t occur at parties; blocking enthusiasts from getting into a prestigious carousing scene generates anger c o m b i n e d with ebul- lience, the formula for an energetic b r a w l .

O F F S I T E V I O L E N C E A S S O P H I S T I C A T E D T E C H N I Q U E : S O C C E R H O O L I G A N S

T h e offsite violence of English a n d E u r o p e a n football h o o l i g a n s is a spe- cial case, the m o s t sophisticated form of sports v i o l e n c e . , s I call it " s o p h i s - t i c a t e d " because it is deliberately contrived for the sake of having a good time in the excitement of fighting. H o o l i g a n violence usually gets orga- nized in conjunction with a soccer m a t c h , especially w h e n fans are travel- ing a w a y from h o m e to a n o t h e r city, or better yet, a n o t h e r country. But the violence does n o t depend upon the events of the g a m e in any way; it can h a p p e n the day before the g a m e , or any time a r o u n d the period w h e n fans are assembled; the g a m e itself serves only to get them mobilized and bring t h e m together. Football hooligans consciously seek the e m o t i o n a l thrills of a fight, with all the legitimating overtones a n d symbolic rcso-

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n a n c e t h a t a sports contest p r o v i d e s ; b u t they e m a n c i p a t e themselves from the fate of the t e a m . T h e y avoid the d o w n e r of losing a big g a m e , or the u n c e r t a i n t y of a big victory celebration. Instead, they deliberately a n d regularly schedule violence, u n d e r their o w n c o n t r o l ; a n d they a c c u m u l a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l tactics by w h i c h a satisfying fight c a n be carried o u t . As n o t e d , fans are u n e q u a l to players; the latter are the elite, while the specta- tors follow t h e m emotionally; fans get their collective effervescence as the players develop t h e d r a m a t i c conflict of the g a m e . W h e n players fight their honorific duels a n d v e n d e t t a s , fans follow a l o n g w i t h vicarious excite- m e n t , or a t t e m p t to join the violence b u t do so in t h e m u c h less h o n o r a b l e fashion of a t t a c k i n g the w e a k . Sports are contrived to generate m o m e n t s of e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t a n d collective solidarity a m o n g the fans; hooli- g a n violence is contrived to provide the e n t r a i n m e n t a n d solidarity of fights, w i t h o u t being s u b o r d i n a t e to the players. This violence emulates the c o m b a t s t r u c t u r e of the g a m e , w i t h the h o o l i g a n s raised i n t o heroes in their o w n right, u s u r p i n g the place of the athletes.

Soccer h o o l i g a n s are often explained as manifestations of class con- sciousness a n d hostility in highly class-stratified British society. But hooli- gans are n o t from t h e p o o r e s t p a r t of the w o r k i n g class, b u t often from its elite s e g m e n t ; 3 9 a n d s o m e m e m b e r s of football firms are white-collar w o r k e r s or small-business o w n e r s , a t t r a c t e d by t h e energy a n d excitement (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 3 1 , 1 1 8 , 2 1 6 ; D u n n i n g e t al. 1 9 8 8 ) ; they f i n d the t e m p o r a r y status of elite in the w o r l d of fans to be superior to t h e duller pleasures of middle-class life. H o o l i g a n violence is a case w h e r e d e p r i v a t i o n does n o t explain violence, b u t t h e positive a t t r a c t i o n s of violence d o ; a n d this i n t u r n d e p e n d s o n s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t can b e m a n i p u l a t e d b y those w h o have a c c u m u l a t e d the requisite t e c h n i q u e s .

W h a t are these techniques? First, a capacity to m a n e u v e r t h r o u g h streets a n d public a r e a s , b o t h t o avoid the police a n d t o meet the enemy in a favorable place a n d circumstances. These techniques are like an a r m y u n i t m a n e u v e r i n g in units of c o m p a n y (200) or even b a t t a l i o n (1,000) or regimental size (in exceptional c r o w d s of 4 , 0 0 0 ) . But o r g a n i z a t i o n is virtually ad h o c . T h e r e is no formal chain of c o m m a n d , a n d no club- h o u s e s , treasuries, elections, or w r i t t e n r e c o r d s ; there are some informal bases such as p u b s (with p u b - o w n e r s p r o m i n e n t a m o n g the m o s t active h o o l i g a n s ) , a n d a few quasi-illicit businesses in travel a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d ticket t o u t i n g p r o v i d e logistics, a n d also some of the l e a d e r s . 4 0 T h e r e are informal leaders in t h e core firms of s u p p o r t e r s of a p a r t i c u l a r soccer t e a m ; these are w e l l - k n o w n individuals, often flamboyantly dressed, w h o are in the center of the action w h e n h o o l i g a n violence is s h a p i n g up or u n d e r w a y . Buford ( 1 9 9 3 : 2 9 - 3 0 , 8 1 - 9 3 , 1 1 9 - 2 0 ) , a p a r t i c i p a n t - o b s e r v e r w i t h the M a n c h e s t e r United s u p p o r t e r s a n d o t h e r English h o o l i g a n s for five years during the 1 9 8 0 s , found t h a t each leader h a d his personal fol-

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l o w i n g , a little firm of as m a n y as t h i r t y or forty, m o s t l y y o u t h s ages fifteen a n d sixteen or even younger, eager to p r o v e themselves; these started m a n y fights, a n d acted as s u b - l i e u t e n a n t s . Such a leader w o u l d jog t h r o u g h the streets of an Italian city, s h o w i n g t h e w a y to several h u n d r e d s u p p o r t e r s , evading the massed Italian police w h o were set o u t t o restrain the English invaders, s u r r o u n d e d by half a dozen y o u t h s w h o conveyed orders to split up or r e g r o u p , until finally t h e c r o w d of s u p p o r t e r s f o u n d suitable victims—a frightened g r o u p of Italian fans (not fighters b u t fami- lies) on buses, or small g r o u p s of Italian y o u t h s on an e m p t y street. A leader a t times w o u l d tell s u p p o r t e r s w h e n t h e time w a s o r w a s n o t right for a c t i o n , "helping the police, directing traffic, or p u s h i n g a w a y s u p p o r t - ers w h o w e r e blocking t h e streets a n d r e p r i m a n d i n g those w h o h a d b r o - k e n bottles or w e r e behaving in disorderly f a s h i o n " (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 6 8 ) .

Experienced h o o l i g a n s also h a v e widely distributed tactical k n o w l e d g e a p a r t from such leaders: h o w to t a k e t h e speed of a t r o t t i n g w a l k - r u n , w h e n the action is n o t yet begun b u t is being watchfully anticipated a n d s o u g h t out; w h e n t o g r o u p t o g e t h e r a n d m o v e as a p h a l a n x ; w h e n to s p r e a d o u t . W h e n police m e t t h e m i n s t r o n g f o r m a t i o n s , h o o l i g a n s w o u l d d r o p back into civilized demeanor, slipping t h r o u g h police lines, " n o t w a l k i n g t o o fast, everyone m a i n t a i n i n g t h e I - a m - o n - m y - o w n - a n d - n o t - a b o u t - t o - s t a r t - t r o u b l e l o o k " (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 1 9 8 ; also 9 2 - 9 3 ) . Since this could h a p p e n immediately after a riot, police w e r e n o t necessarily t a k e n in, b u t their o w n inclination t o avoid further c o n f r o n t a t i o n generally m o - tivated t h e m t o g o along w i t h this Goffmanian p e r f o r m a n c e . H o o l i g a n s are sophisticated a b o u t the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear of police, a n d deliberately t a k e a d v a n t a g e of it. T h e y k n o w the a u t h o r i t i e s will n o t use m u c h force on t h e m , if n o t c a u g h t in t h e m i d s t of a riot, a n d they t u r n violence on a n d off w i t h considerable care.

T e m p o r a r y leaders can also emerge o u t of the situation; individuals w h o t a k e the initiative i n spreading t h e w o r d — a m a r c h u p the street t o t a k e place at 6 p . m . , pass it o n — o r w h o are the first to step off the side- w a l k in the eyes of the w a i t i n g police lines, expecting others to follow (which sometimes h a p p e n s a n d sometimes n o t — i n w h i c h case the w o u l d - b e leader looks a r o u n d nervously a n d t h e n steps b a c k into t h e c r o w d trying t o look inconspicuous) (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 2 8 2 - 8 9 ) . Leaders facilitate t h e m a n e u v e r i n g of the c r o w d , b u t the c r o w d m o o d is crucial in e m p o w - ering leaders, for shorter or longer p e r i o d s of time.

Tactics a n d s t r a t a g e m s w e r e used n o t only ag ain st t h e police b u t also against o p p o s i n g f i r m s . W h e n M a n U ' s rival West H a m w a s k n o w n t o be a r r i v i n g on a t r a i n for a m a t c h , a p l a n w a s h a t c h e d to b u r s t t h r o u g h t h e s t a t i o n e n t r a n c e a t just t h e r i g h t m o m e n t a n d a t t a c k t h e West H a m firm as it c a m e off t h e t r a i n .

3 1 8 • Chapter 8

There were a t h o u s a n d people, milling a r o u n d "casually," h a n d s in their pockets, looking at the g r o u n d . T h e idea w a s to look like you were not a m e m b e r of a c r o w d , t h a t you just h a p p e n e d to find yourself on High Street—at the time t h a t a t h o u s a n d other people h a p p e n e d to have done the same. . . . A n o t h e r m i n u t e a n d the supporters drifted into the middle of the street. T h e r e w a s still the studied casual look, but it c o u l d n ' t be maintained. As the clusters of people came together, a c r o w d w a s being formed, a n d as it w a s in the middle of the H i g h Street, it w a s conspicuous a n d intrusive. . . . T h e c r o w d w a s starting to move; it h a d started off in the direction of the station. It proceeded in a measured way, n o t h i n g frantic, at the pace of a steady w a l k . I could see the confidence felt then by everyone, believing n o w t h a t they w e r e actually going to pull this thing off. T h e pace accelerated—gradually. It increased a little m o r e . Someone started to chant, "Kill, kill, kill." T h e c h a n t w a s whispered at first, as t h o u g h it were being said reluctantly. T h e n it w a s picked up by the others. T h e p a c e quickened to a jog, a n d then a faster jog, a n d then a r u n . An old w o m a n w a s k n o c k e d over, a n d t w o shopping bags of food spilled on to the p a v e m e n t . T h e r e were still no police. Halfway up the r a m p , the g r o u p w a s going at full spring: a t h o u s a n d people, r u n n i n g h a r d , c h a n t i n g loudly: "KILL, KILL, KILL." (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 1 2 1 - 2 3 )

In this instance, the M a n U firm h a d been o u t m a n e u v e r e d ; police w i t h dogs w e r e inside the s t a t i o n , w a i t i n g to c a t c h the firm in full f o r m a t i o n ; a n d the West H a m f i r m , d i s e m b a r k i n g their t r a i n a t just t h a t m o m e n t , h a d the satisfaction of following police t h r o u g h the local c r o w d , w h i c h w a s in full flight. T h i s w a s r e g a r d e d as a humiliating defeat by the M a n - chester firm, described as allowing their rivals to " t a k e t h e city."

Sometimes a firm carries o u t a successful m a n e u v e r : M a n U's firm cir- cling t h r o u g h the streets of L o n d o n , guided by one of their leaders w i t h his little lieutenants, being followed by Chelsea s u p p o r t e r s , b u t t h e n l o o p - ing back u p o n t h e m t o t a k e t h e m from t h e rear (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 2 0 1 - 3 ) . Sometimes an " a g g r o " w a s a r r a n g e d by cell p h o n e calls a m o n g o p p o s i n g leaders, finding a meeting g r o u n d o u t of sight of police mobilized to p r e - v e n t just t h a t (especially a m o n g Belgian h o o l i g a n s : Van Limbergen et al. 1 9 8 9 ) . A chief characteristic of h o o l i g a n violence is t h e extent to w h i c h it is p r e m e d i t a t e d — n o t only anticipated b u t p l a n n e d , a l t h o u g h w i t h a degree of i m p r o v i s a t i o n on the fly. O n e researcher refers to it as "violence b y a p p o i n t m e n t " (Johnstone 2 0 0 0 ) .

A n o t h e r set of sophisticated techniques involves k n o w i n g w h a t the s u p - p o r t e r s can get a w a y w i t h . Traveling t o g e t h e r on a t r a i n or bus to an a w a y m a t c h , s u p p o r t e r s vandalize the cars, t h r o w bottles o u t o f w i n d o w s , t a u n t a n d t h r e a t e n any respectable middle-class p e r s o n s w h o are t r a p p e d i n w i t h t h e m (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 1 3 - 1 5 , 6 2 - 6 6 ) . Police are usually c o n c e r n e d t o speed t h e m t h r o u g h , get t h e m o u t o f their o w n a r e a , a n d hence d o n o t

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intervene in this sort of vandalism a n d r o w d i n e s s . Firms k n o w the a d v a n - tages of a p p e a r i n g in n u m b e r s , o v e r w h e l m i n g ticket-takers a n d food servers. T h e t e r m " o n the j i b " w a s used b y M a n c h e s t e r United s u p p o r t e r s to refer to traveling in this fashion w i t h o u t paying, t a k i n g food in restau- r a n t s a n d t h e n leaving; s o m e v e t e r a n s u p p o r t e r s refer to themselves as "inter-city j i b b e r s . " H u n d r e d s of lads w o u l d m o b a food s t a n d at a t r a i n s t a t i o n , filling their p o c k e t s w i t h food a n d d r i n k for t h e t r i p ; t h e very c h a o s of the scene—from the p o i n t of the view of the o v e r w h e l m e d atten- d a n t — w a s exploited, as the lads t h r e w food t h r o u g h the air, " a m i d c h a n t s of ' F o o d fight! F o o d fight!'—they split u p , some going to the left, others t o t h e right, everybody d i s a p p e a r i n g " (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 6 4 ) . They m a k e t h e trip for free, it a p p e a r s , n o t because they c a n n o t afford it—Buford d o c u - m e n t s t h a t m o s t s u p p o r t e r s h a v e jobs a n d considerable m o n e y — b u t o u t of t h e fun of jibbing for its o w n s a k e . 4 1 It is a m i n o r f o r m of c r o w d vio- lence, a version of a m o r a l h o l i d a y b u t deliberately contrived by a g r o u p t h a t has m a d e a t r a d i t i o n a n d a technique of d o i n g so.

Elias a n d D u n n i n g (1986) describe football violence as m o t i v a t e d by a " q u e s t for e x c i t e m e n t " in u n e x c i t i n g , pacified societies t h a t have u n d e r - gone the civilizing process of recent c e n t u r i e s . 4 2 T h e e x p l a n a t i o n is t o o w i d e for its target. Staged excitement is t h e a i m of virtually all institutions of m o d e r n s p o r t s ; b u t deliberately o r c h e s t r a t e d offsite violence t a k e s b o t h the deliberation a n d the excitement to a higher pitch.

G r o u p leaders are b o t h tactical leaders a n d excitement leaders:

S a m m y t h e n t u r n e d a n d s t a r t e d r u n n i n g b a c k w a r d . H e a p p e a r e d t o b e m e a s u r i n g the g r o u p , t a k i n g in its size. T h e energy, he said, still r u n n i n g b a c k w a r d , speaking to no o n e in particular, the energy is very high. He w a s alert, vital, m o v i n g constantly, l o o k i n g in all directions. He w a s h o l d i n g o u t his h a n d s , w i t h his fingers o u t s t r e t c h e d . Feel the energy, he said. . . .

E v e r y b o d y crossed the street, decisively, w i t h o u t a w o r d being s p o - k e n . A c h a n t b r o k e o u t — " U n i t e d , U n i t e d , U n i t e d " — a n d S a m m y w a v e d his h a n d s up a n d d o w n , as if trying to b a t d o w n the flames of a fire, urging p e o p l e to be quiet. A little later t h e r e w a s a n o t h e r o n e - w o r d c h a n t . This t i m e it w a s " E n g l a n d . " They c o u l d n ' t help themselves. T h e y w a n t e d s o b a d l y t o act like n o r m a l football s u p p o r t e r s — t h e y w a n t e d t o sing a n d b e h a v e rudely a n d carry o n d o i n g the same r u d e things t h a t t h e y h a d been d o i n g all d a y l o n g — a n d they h a d t o b e r e m i n d e d t h a t t h e y c o u l d n ' t . . . .

At one m o m e n t , a cluster of police c a m e r u s h i n g t o w a r d us, a n d Sammy, having s p o t t e d t h e m , w h i s p e r e d a n e w c o m m a n d , hissing t h a t we were to disperse, a n d the m e m b e r s of the g r o u p split u p — s o m e crossing the street, s o m e carrying on d o w n the center of it, some falling b e h i n d — u n t i l they got p a s t the policemen, w h e r e u p o n Sammy t u r n e d

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a r o u n d , r u n n i n g b a c k w a r d again, a n d o r d e r e d everyone t o r e g r o u p : a n d the little o n e s , like trained d o g s , herded the m e m b e r s of the g r o u p back together. . . .

Sammy must have been leading his g r o u p a r o u n d the s t a d i u m , h o p - ing to find Italian s u p p o r t e r s along the way. W h e n he t u r n e d to run b a c k w a r d , he must have been w a t c h i n g the effect his g r o u p of t w o h u n d r e d w a l k - r u n n i n g Frankenstcins was having on the Italian lads, w h o spotted the English rushing by a n d started following t h e m , curi- ous, attracted by the p r o s p e c t of a fight or simply by the c h a r i s m a of the g r o u p itself, unable to resist tagging along to see w h a t might h a p - pen. And then Sammy, having judged the m o m e n t to be right, suddenly s t o p p e d , and a b a n d o n i n g all pretence of invisibility, s h o u t e d : " S t o p . " Everyone s t o p p e d . " T u r n . " Everyone t u r n e d . (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 8 1 - 8 5 )

W h a t followed was a melee. In the usual p a t t e r n of c r o w d fights, it b r o k e up into little clusters of unequal forces; Buford w a t c h e d a young Italian boy, isolated, k n o c k e d d o w n a n d t h e n kicked repeatedly by a g r o u p of English hooligans t h a t grew in size from t w o to six to eight, rushing in on the easy target.

Sammy w a s t r a n s p o r t e d . Me w a s s n a p p i n g his fingers a n d jogging in place, his legs p u m p i n g up a n d d o w n , and he was repeating the p h r a s e , It's going off, it's going off. Everyone a r o u n d him w a s excited. . . . T h e r e w a s an intense energy a b o u t it; it was impossible n o t to feel some of the thrill. S o m e b o d y near me said he w a s happy. He said t h a t he was very, very happy, t h a t he could n o t r e m e m b e r ever being so happy. (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 8 7 - 8 8 )

A few m o m e n t s later the g r o u p c a u g h t up with an Italian family, a m a n with his wife a n d t w o sons a t t e m p t i n g to get into their car a n d escape. T h e English hooligans hit the Italian man across the face with a heavy metal bar, k n o c k i n g him to the g r o u n d ; o t h e r s t r a m p l e d him, sometimes s t o p p i n g in their forward rush to kick him.

T h e e m o t i o n a l high comes from the p o w e r of the c r o w d , having created a m o r a l holiday, thereby controlling the space immediately a r o u n d it. This sense of p o w e r is not necessarily violent; it occurs in the sheer logistics of m o v e m e n t as a consciously united g r o u p :

T h e g r o u p crossed a street, a major intersection. It h a d long a b a n d o n e d the pretence of invisibility and had reverted to the a r r o g a n t identity of the violent c r o w d , w a l k i n g , w i t h o u t hesitation, straight into the con- gested traffic, across the h o o d s of cars, k n o w i n g they w o u l d s t o p . (Bu- ford 1 9 9 3 : 8 9 )

And a n o t h e r occasion, this time in L o n d o n , as M a n c h e s t e r s u p p o r t e r s leave their gathering place:

Sports Violence • 321

T h e p u b is evacuated, glass b r e a k i n g as pints of beer are simply d r o p p e d , a n d a crush of p e o p l e i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y fills up the small street o u t s i d e , a p r e p o s t e r o u s n u m b e r in a p r e p o s t e r o u s h u r r y — n o one w a n t - ing to be left b e h i n d — a n d t h e n t u r n s i n t o t h e m a i n E u s t o n R o a d , spreading o u t , c u r b to c u r b , blocking traffic in b o t h directions, every- o n e organized a n d u n i t e d a n d feeling the high energy a n d jubilant au- t h o r i t y of suddenly being a c r o w d .

T h e y avoid t h e U n d e r g r o u n d a t E u s t o n Station (too m a n y police) a n d m a r c h to the n e x t o n e , E u s t o n S q u a r e , entering it as o n e — p l a c a r d s , p o s t e r s , stools being picked up a n d swept along en r o u t e , no b a r r i c a d e or turnstile as an i m p e d i m e n t — e v e r y o n e c h a n t i n g now, the g r o u p ' s eu- p h o r i a building, no one buying a ticket, no one being s t o p p e d or chal- lenged. (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 194)

T h e y have successfully gone t h r o u g h the tipping p o i n t , feeling the energy a n d jubilation. T h e violence they p r o d u c e , it sh o u ld be n o t e d , is ecstatic only w h e n it occurs in the c o n t e x t of t h e mobilized c r o w d ; individual fights t h a t they m a y be in at o t h e r times h a v e n o n e of t h e same p a n a c h e .

T h e experience of going t h r o u g h the b a r r i e r into a m o r a l holiday, a m o r a l h o l i d a y controlled by the h o o l i g a n s themselves w i t h their sophisti- cated tactics, is the a p e x experience.

A c r o w d is forming, a n d the effect is of s o m e t h i n g c o m i n g alive. I can see m o r e people joining u p , a t t r a c t e d by the familiar, powerful m a g n e - tism of n u m b e r s , b u t they d o n ' t seem like a d d i t i o n s : they d o n ' t seem to c o m e from the o u t s i d e , b u t from w i t h i n the c r o w d itself. You c a n feel it g r o w i n g . . . . We are free, the faces are saying. We have g o t p a s t t h e police, t h e faces believe. We c a n n o t be s t o p p e d now. . . . T h e p a c e picks u p . I c a n feel the pressure to go faster, an implicit imperative, c o m i n g from no o n e in particular, c o m i n g from everyone, a s h a r e d in- stinct for the h e a t a n d the strength of feeling, k n o w i n g t h a t the faster t h e g r o u p goes the m o r e c o h e r e n t it b e c o m e s , the m o r e powerful, the m o r e intense the sensations. T h e casual stroll becomes a brisk w a l k a n d t h e n a jog. Everyone is jogging in f o r m a t i o n , tightly c o m p r e s s e d , silent.

I am enjoying this [the respectable upper-middle-class observer re- p o r t s ] . I am excited by it. Something is going to h a p p e n : the c r o w d has an a p p e t i t e , a n d the appetite will h a v e to be fed; t h e r e is a craving for release. A c r o w d , already so c o m m i t t e d , is n o t going to disperse easily. I t h a s m o m e n t u m , u n s t o p p a b l e m o m e n t u m . (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 )

T h e experience is like the surge of d r u g i n t o x i c a t i o n , especially t h e high m o m e n t w h e n a d r u g hits the b l o o d s t r e a m a n d the consciousness:

T h i s is the w a y they t a l k a b o u t it. They t a l k a b o u t t h e crack, the buzz, a n d the fix. They t a l k a b o u t having to h a v e it, of being u n a b l e to forget it w h e n they d o , of n o t w a n t i n g to forget it—ever. T h e y talk a b o u t

3 2 2 • Chapter 8

being sustained by it, telling a n d retelling w h a t h a p p e n e d a n d w h a t it felt like. They talk a b o u t it with the pride of the privileged, of those w h o have h a d , seen, felt, been t h r o u g h s o m e t h i n g t h a t other people have n o t . T h e y talk a b o u t it in the w a y t h a t a n o t h e r generation talked a b o u t drugs or drink or b o t h , except t h a t they also use both drugs a n d drink. O n e lad, a p u b l i c a n , talks a b o u t it as t h o u g h it were a chemical thing or a h o r m o n a l spray or some kind of intoxicating gas—once it's in the air, once an act of violence has been c o m m i t t e d , other acts will follow inevitably. . . . I realized later t h a t I w a s on a druggy high, in a state of a d r e n a l i n e e u p h o r i a . And for the first time I am able to under- stand the w o r d s they use to describe it. T h a t c r o w d violence w a s their d r u g . (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 2 0 4 - 0 5 )

D r u g users often describe the peak pleasure as the m o m e n t they inject themselves with heroin, the inhaling of the cocaine or the s m o k e of mari- j u a n a (Becker 1 9 5 3 , 1 9 6 7 ; Weinberg 1 9 9 7 ) . H e r e 1 w a n t to emphasize t h a t the most exhilarating m o m e n t for the hooligan c r o w d is w h e n it crosses a threshold and explodes into the m o r a l holiday zone they have created. They consciously focus on the violence, but much of this comes later, after the zone is established. A close look s h o w s t h a t violence to which is a t t r i b u t e d this kind of d r u g - i n t o x i c a t i n g quality is e m b e d d e d in a larger social process. T h e violence is at the peak of collective a t t e n t i o n , b u t it is largely a symbol of the wider process of a n t i n o m i a n collective effervescence, a n d the distinctive solidarity of a g r o u p t h a t has mastered the technique of deliberately creating m o r a l holidays.

T h e g r o u p , w h e n it takes over a public space, is rude and o b n o x i o u s . This is deliberate a n t i n o m i a n i s m , aimed at shocking b y s t a n d e r s , and in- cludes d r i n k i n g a n d pissing in public s q u a r e s , s h o u t i n g a n d c h a n t i n g (Bu- ford 1 9 9 3 : 5 2 ) . Swigging on wines bottles all day long before a m a t c h may be n o t so m u c h an effort to get d r u n k , as d r u n k e n n e s s is the price they pay for keeping up a gesture of public r o w d i n e s s , while the violence is not yet a r r a n g e d to go off.

T h e actual violence of the hooligans mostly takes the form of a t t a c k i n g the w e a k . 4 ' Buford's specific examples all have the pattern of a larger g r o u p of hooligans beating at length on an isolated victim; sometimes these are o p p o s i n g t o u g h s , sometimes mere t o k e n s of the o p p o s i n g side (such as the family s u p p o r t e r s of Italian t e a m s ) . T h e sophisticated m a n e u - vering of the firms is aimed at creating just such a tactical a d v a n t a g e . W h e n sizable n u m b e r s of o p p o s i n g firms meet (which h a p p e n s chiefly when the English firms invade each o t h e r ' s h o m e turf at the time of a g a m e ) , they usually confine themselves to ritual t a u n t s and b o t t l e - t h r o w - ing from a distance, but back a w a y from a full-scale fight. A n o t h e r partici- p a n t observer n o t e s ,

Sports Violence • 323

Figure 8.6 Soccer hooligans gang up on isolated fans of opposing team (Munich, 2001). AP/World Wide Photos.

W h a t a l m o s t always h a p p e n s in football h o o l i g a n i s m is t h a t the bigger firm w i n s — a n d the other o n e r u n s a w a y ; a n d significantly, it is a l l o w e d to r u n a w a y (thereby minimising injuries). However, this fact, a l t h o u g h constantly recognized, is t h e n also c o n s t a n t l y concealed so t h a t each g r o u p can t a k e m a x i m u m h o n o r from each incident of violence. T h e bigger g r o u p conceals the fact of its n u m e r i c a l superiority from itself in its r e m e m b r a n c e of t h e fight, while the smaller g r o u p can emphasize exactly t h e m i s m a t c h so as to t a k e h o n o r even from a defeat. T h u s , t h e r e is an ideal w h i c h is c o n s t a n t l y evaded in practice a n d one of t h e r e a s o n s is t h a t a fight b e t w e e n t w o serious, evenly m a t c h e d firms w o u l d result in extremely serious injury. I am n o t saying t h a t such fights never h a p p e n — t h e y d o — b u t m o r e often fights are quickly resolved by the numerically a d v a n t a g e d firm " r u n n i n g " the other o n e . T h e b r u t e fact of t h e effectiveness of n u m b e r s is recognised b u t also conveniently ef- faced in action. A n d the ideal of the numerically o u t n u m b e r e d h o n o r - able firm defeating their equals is always d r a w n u p o n . ( A n t h o n y King, p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , N o v . 2 0 0 0 ) 4 4

In reality t h e fighting, a l t h o u g h very m u c h the center of a t t e n t i o n as firms m a n e u v e r for w h e n " I t ' s going to go off," a n d as they discuss events a f t e r w a r d , is a relatively small p a r t of their activities. King sums u p :

3 2 4 • Chapter 8

A l t h o u g h the h i g h p o i n t of the h o o l i g a n ' s existence, fighting itself con- stitutes a negligible length of time in the lives of these fans. F o r all the discussions of violence, c o n f r o n t a t i o n s like the fight in the V e l o d r o m e (a brief b r a w l in the Marseille stadium) are a l m o s t invariably quick a n d indecisive. By c o n t r a s t , discussions of fights are lengthy. T h e i m b a l a n c e between t h e time spent actually fighting a n d the time spent talking a b o u t it suggests t h a t the c o n v e n t i o n a l analytic o r i e n t a t i o n to h o o l i - g a n i s m might be inverted. (King 2 0 0 1 : 570)

T h e chief ritual of the h o o l i g a n s is g a t h e r i n g in p u b s , w h e r e they build solidarity a n d g o o d cheer n a r r a t i n g p a s t fights. Peripheral m e m b e r s of the g r o u p , t h o s e n o t actually present at a fight, become carriers of the collec- tive m e m o r y of the g r o u p ; t h e n a r r a t i o n also affirms t h e stratification of their o w n r a n k s between storied individuals (often n o t distinguished from the storytellers) a n d audiences. E x p e d i t i o n s a b r o a d are especially valued, b u t only if t h e r e has been a n o t a b l e incident. H a v i n g been t h e r e m a k e s o n e a celebrity (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 1 1 3 - 1 4 ) . Violence is a valuable c o m m o d i t y to the g r o u p , b u t only because it can be n a r r a t e d in the c o n t e x t of the g r o u p : in fact, d o u b l y situated, in t h e c o n t e n t of the n a r r a t i v e as a high p o i n t in the life of the firm; a n d also in the ritual of its telling a n d retelling, w h i c h brings the s u p p o r t e r s t o g e t h e r as a larger entity t h a n the core activ- ists. N a r r a t i v e s of violence are the crucial cultural capital t h a t circulates in the firm. As King argues, the firm exists in the consciousness of its m e m b e r s as an o n g o i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n of collective m e m o r y . Its n a r r a t i v e s h a v e a mythical quality; only the high p o i n t s are singled o u t , a n d these are skewed to m a k e one's side l o o k heroic, suppressing the tactical realities of the one-sided assaults on easy victims a n d the furtive escapes from stronger forces. Like t h e party-fighters described by J a c k s o n - J a c o b s (2003) this fighting is chiefly for the sake of the n a r r a t i v e gratification.

A little violence goes a long way. T h e little incident in Marseille w a s e n o u g h to m a k e the w h o l e t r i p meaningful for the English fans; a n d vio- lence as d r a m a is a nicely available resource, since it can a l m o s t always be p r o d u c e d in sufficient a m o u n t s , a n d t h u s is m o r e reliably available t h a n football victories.

T H E D R A M A T I C L O C A L C O N S T R U C T I O N O F A N T A G O N I S T I C I D E N T I T I E S

I h a v e been arguing t h a t the situational techniques of the h o o l i g a n g r o u p s are the key to their behavior, a n d t h e source of its a t t r a c t i o n . A w i d e s p r e a d line of e x p l a n a t i o n , to the contrary, emphasizes features of the cultural b a c k g r o u n d : a culture of aggressive masculinity, g r o u n d e d in t h e m a - c h i s m o of p a t r i a r c h a l societies; n a t i o n a l i s m ; regionalism (e.g., D u n n i n g

S p o r t s V i o l e n c e • 3 2 5

et al. 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e r e is a b u n d a n t evidence to s u p p o r t these descriptions. H o o l i g a n s themselves, a highly vocal g r o u p , craft their challenges a n d insults in just these i d i o m s . T h e y sing a n d c h a n t p a t r i o t i c songs a n d insult foreign nationalities. On an individual level, a favorite p u t - d o w n is to call a m a n a " c u n t " (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 2 8 1 ) .

iNevertheless, the insults are highly s i t u a t i o n a l . An e x a m p l e : On a bus arriving for a match in Italy, the s u p p o r t e r s c h a n t " E n g l a n d "

over and over again.

Another, m o r e sophisticated [song] w a s based on the t u n e of " T h e Bat- tle H y m n of the R e p u b l i c . " Its w o r d s were:

Glory, glory, M a n United Glory, glory, M a n United Glory, glory, M a n United Your t r o o p s are m a r c h i n g on! o n ! on!

Each " o n " was g r u n t e d a bit m o r e emphatically t h a n the one before, a c c o m p a n i e d by a gesture involving the familiar u p t u r n e d t w o fingers. T h e r e w a s an especially simple t u n e , "Fuck the P o p e " — s i m p l e because the w o r d s consisted exclusively of the following: Puck the Pope. . . .

[One man | . . . had reversed himself into a position in which the opened w i n d o w by his seat w a s filled by his suddenly exposed a n d very large b u t t o c k s — h i s t r o u s e r s , this time, deliberately gathered a r o u n d his knees, the cheeks of his b u t t o c k s clasped firmly in each hand and spread a p a r t . Just behind him a fellow w a s ur i nat i ng t h r o u g h his w i n d o w . Peo- ple were s t a n d i n g on the seats, jerking their fists up a n d d o w n , while screaming profanities at pedestrians, police, c h i l d r e n — a n y and all Ital- ians. (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 43)

In s h o r t , a g a m u t of ritual obscenities, shaped to the situation at h a n d , escalated o u t of team cheers and patriotic c h a n t s .

N a t i o n a l songs and c h a n t s are b r o u g h t o u t w h e n the English arc travel- ing a b r o a d , o m i t t e d w h e n t h e y are challenging a rival t e a m at h o m e . 4 5

Despite the use of sexist epithets to insult m e n they do n o t like, the hooli- gans of t h e 1 9 8 0 s w e r e a r d e n t admirers of M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r a n d t h e q u e e n — p r e s u m a b l y because these could be used to assert English solidar- ity a n d superiority, a n d t o p u t d o w n respectable e d u c a t e d liberals a n d leftists; a l t h o u g h in Italy they c h a n t Fuck the Pope! at h o m e they defend the Catholic c h u r c h , o u t of hostility to t h e Anglican establishment (Bu- ford 1 9 9 3 : 9 5 ) . T h e p a t t e r n is m u c h like t h a t analyzed by Katz (1999) in his study of freeway r o a d rage: curses are b r o u g h t to one's lips because they fit the p a r t i c u l a r t a r g e t one is confronting at the m o m e n t ; they need n o t be based on deeply held beliefs, a n d the r e p e r t o i r e can be inconsistent a n d c o n t r a d i c t o r y from occasion to occasion.

3 2 6 • Chapter 8

Curses a n d insults are d r a w n from a larger cultural r e p e r t o i r e , b u t it is the situation t h a t gives t h e m life. T h e impression of n a t i o n a l i s m , sexism, or o t h e r prejudice is m o r e staged effect t h a n cause; it is the collective techniques of c o n s t r u c t i n g m o r a l holidays t h a t m a k e s such insults a useful p a r t of the r e p e r t o i r e , a n d brings t h e m to the forefront.

We can be m o r e specific. N a r r a t i v e gratification is the key experience, to w h i c h fighting is a necessary b u t limited ingredient. A n d n a r r a t i v e blends over into vocal action of the k i n d illustrated a b o v e (chanting "fuck the P o p e ! " blends over into telling stories a b o u t h o w w e "fucked the Ital- i a n s , " a n a r r a t i v e in large p a r t a b o u t vocal action). It is easy to get the impression t h a t the c o n t e n t of w h a t they say at these m o m e n t s is the m o t i v e for w h y they say it. This confuses speech act a n d c o n t e n t . To avoid falling into this t r a p (natural e n o u g h in o r d i n a r y discourse, a n d in ordi- n a r y political talk, w h i c h is its extension), let us look at the m i c r o - i n t e r a c - t i o n a l circumstances of vocal action of this k i n d .

T h e g r o u p engages in v e h e m e n t c h a n t i n g at p a r t i c u l a r times, as a ritual of b o t h solidarity a n d verbal aggression. Buford's o b s e r v a t i o n a l detail suggests a p a t t e r n w h e n c h a n t i n g a n d singing h a p p e n , a n d w h e n n o t . T h e s e h a p p e n w h e n the s u p p o r t e r s t h r o w off their cover a n d a n n o u n c e themselves as a c r o w d in action; b u t before the violence has " g o n e off." But w h e n the h o o l i g a n s are actually fighting—six to eight of t h e m kicking a lone Italian boy on the g r o u n d — n o one says a n y t h i n g ; t h e r e is only the s o u n d of the kicks, softly m u t e d t h u d s or gritty c r u n c h e s , d e p e n d i n g on w h i c h p a r t of the b o d y w a s hit (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 8 4 - 8 6 ) . This speechlessness m a y well indicate a r e t u r n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension, s h o w i n g t h a t the ebullience is n o t in the fighting itself b u t in the verbal ritual t h a t s u r r o u n d s it before a n d after.

King ( 2 0 0 3 ; esp. c h a p . 1 1 , " R a c i s m i n the N e w E u r o p e " ) m a k e s a use- ful distinction between o r g a n i c a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l racism. T h e former is deep-seated, preexisting in the larger society. I n s t r u m e n t a l racism is often a p p a r e n t in the c h a n t s of fans in football m a t c h e s . F o r e x a m p l e , Italian fans call black players on foreign t e a m s African m o n k e y s a n d t a u n t t h e m b y t h r o w i n g b a n a n a s o n the pitch. Spanish fans w h o h a d c h a n t e d racist epithets at black players on a visiting English t e a m w e r e n o t , a c c o r d i n g to King, c o m m i t t e d racists b u t defended themselves as merely joking a n d using a verbal tactic to upset their o p p o n e n t s . Racial insults are even gen- eralized as a w a y to insult o p p o n e n t s of the s a m e race w h o are s u p p o r t e r s of rival t e a m s . N o r t h Italian fans insult w h i t e fans from the s o u t h by yelling t h a t Africa begins at R o m e ; Liverpool fans c h a n t " I ' d r a t h e r be a Paki [Pakistanian] t h a n a Scouse [nickname for rival f a n s ] . " In these ver- bal tactics they d r a w u p o n a b a c k g r o u n d c o n v e n t i o n of racial hierarchy, w h i c h their i n s t r u m e n t a l behavior unconsciously reinforces.

Sports Violence • 3 2 7

I suggest a stronger thesis: the experiences a n d practices of being a foot- ball fan create or at least e x p a n d the a m o u n t of racial a n t a g o n i s m in the larger society. N o t only is racial t a u n t i n g a tactic for distracting o p p o s i n g players; the culture of fans is an a c c u m u l a t e d r e p e r t o i r e of techniques for t a k i n g p a r t i n the d r a m a o f the g a m e , a n d a d d i n g a n i n d e p e n d e n t d r a m a on their o w n initiative by mock-conflicts enacted in jeering o p p o n e n t s . T h e m a i n a t t r a c t i o n of a n y sports event is the o p p o r t u n i t y to t a k e p a r t in m o m e n t s of collective e m o t i o n a l experience in a conflict motif, w i t h o u t m o s t of the dangers a n d costs of real conflict. Racial t a u n t i n g is one of those techniques.

T h e a r g u m e n t can be stated in a t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t : if football were abolished, the a m o u n t of racism w o u l d d e c l i n e . 4 6 There are independent, preexisting sources for racial/ethnic antagonisms in society; b u t these m a y well be m i n o r (judging from the marginality a n d weakness of right-wing m o v e m e n t s in earlier decades). T h e expansion of football popularity in E u r o p e , a n d its repertoire of game-based fan expressions of mock-conflict, has e x p a n d e d the a m o u n t of racial antagonism, spilling over outside the g r o u n d s as well. T h e link from inside-grounds expressive c h a n t i n g to vio- lence beyond the game sites is m a d e by g r o u p s of football hooligans or their imitators, seeking to e x p a n d the solidarity a n d d r a m a of the game into a similar experience they can use in other spheres of life.

An issue n o t yet a n s w e r e d in the c o m p a r a t i v e sociology of sports is w h y t h e g r o w i n g p o p u l a r i t y of soccer football has fostered racial t a u n t i n g , w h e r e a s in A m e r i c a n mass s p e c t a t o r sports racial t a u n t i n g is virtually n o n e x i s t e n t . T h e r e is a well-developed t r a d i t i o n of mock-jeering d u r i n g a n d a r o u n d games, a n d some s t a d i u m s h a v e t r a d i t i o n s of fighting w i t h o p p o s i n g fans. But racial jeers are widely t a b o o ; t e a m solidarity is the precise limit of a n t a g o n i s m s . (I c a n ' t imagine an American fan, even a very violent o n e , yelling s o m e t h i n g like " I ' d r a t h e r be a nigger t h a n a Yankees fan.") An e x p l a n a t i o n m a y be t h a t A m e r i c a n sports have been the leading edge of racial integration, from the time of the first black baseball players in w h i t e leagues in the 1 9 4 0 s , t h r o u g h the time of the 1 9 6 0 s civil rights struggles, a n d c o n t i n u e to u p h o l d t h a t role very self-consciously. In Ameri- can football a n d basketball, the majority of the players have been black since the time these sports came to d o m i n a t e m a s s media p o p u l a r i t y in the 1 9 6 0 s . T a u n t i n g of black players w h o integrated baseball lasted only during the first few years a n d w a s widely c o n d e m n e d . It w a s n o t t a k e n as a m o d e of jeering the o p p o s i n g t e a m , a n d t h u s as an a m b i g u o u s l y joking form of i n s t r u m e n t a l racism, b u t as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d racial a n t a g o - nism u n c o n n e c t e d to fan loyalties. W h e t h e r or n o t sports have en- twined w i t h larger social m o v e m e n t s such as civil rights m a y explain the i n t e r n a t i o n a l divergence; a l t h o u g h it is also related to differences in the w a y fans are organized. American teams lack hooligan firms; such firms

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are a crucial link, the lack of w h i c h keeps the p o t e n t i a l for fans' o p p o n e n t - t a u n t i n g rituals from generalizing to larger social conflicts a n d spilling over o u t s i d e the sports g r o u n d s into m o v e m e n t s in t h e larger society.

R E V O L T O F T H E A U D I E N C E I N T H E E R A O F E N T E R T A I N E R S ' D O M I N A T I O N

Consider the h i s t o r y of h o o l i g a n i s m as a history of techniques for s p o r t s - like ebullience a n d collective effervescence, progressively e m a n c i p a t e d from the g a m e itself.

Violence at soccer games goes back to the early t w e n t i e t h cen tu ry a n d even earlier. It has been f o u n d w o r l d w i d e ; some of t h e m o s t violent riots have o c c u r r e d far o u t s i d e t h e orbit of British h o o l i g a n s , such as in t h e Soviet U n i o n in 1 9 8 2 , w h e n sixty-nine w e r e killed, or in Lima, Peru, in 1 9 6 4 w h e n a b o u t t h r e e h u n d r e d w e r e killed a n d five h u n d r e d injured at a m a t c h against A r g e n t i n a ( D u n n i n g 1999: 132). A w a r w a s set off in 1 9 6 9 , w h e n H o n d u r a s expelled several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d S a l v a d o r a n p e a s a n t s w h o h a d i m m i g r a t e d in recent decades; t h e flashpoint w a s a soc- cer g a m e between t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s , ending in a riot t h a t t u r n e d i n t o a five-day w a r i n w h i c h t w o t h o u s a n d died (Kapuscinski 1 9 9 2 ) . But o u r analytical criterion is n o t just the n u m b e r of casualties; this does n o t tell u s w h a t k i n d o f social p a t t e r n w a s operative. T h e H o n d u r a s / E l Salvador soccer w a r w a s n o t h o o l i g a n violence, b u t t h e k i n d of political violence t h a t we h a v e e x a m i n e d in a previous section, w h e r e celebration a n d defeat riots w e r e convenient m e c h a n i s m s for mobilizing conflicts e x t r a n e o u s to the g a m e itself. It m a y be the case t h a t such riots (and wars) are especially likely to h a p p e n in a u t h o r i t a r i a n societies w h e r e sports is virtually the only mobilizing a r e n a available. Its c o n t r a s t is w h a t we are c o n c e r n e d w i t h h e r e , the d e v e l o p m e n t of sports violence in d e m o c r a t i c societies via t h e social o r g a n i z a t i o n of h o o l i g a n firms, deliberately using their t e c h n o l - ogy for creating m o r a l holidays: c u l m i n a t i n g in " r i o t on d e m a n d " emanci- p a t e d from t h e g a m e itself. M o s t of t h e early violence w a s s p o n t a n e o u s a n d u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d fan b e h a v i o r of the sort we have already e x a m i n e d : on-field incursions, a n d spill-overs of g a m e e m o t i o n s into off-field cele- b r a t i o n a n d defeat riots.

Soccer leagues began in E n g l a n d in the 1 8 6 0 s , a n d like o t h e r s p o r t s , w e r e a p r o v i n c e of t h e u p p e r a n d m i d d l e classes; by the late 1880s soccer h a d professionalized a n d a c q u i r e d an audience of working-class m e n . C r o w d sizes g r e w a n d w i t h t h e m incidents of c r o w d violence. M o s t of these incidents t o o k place in the g r o u n d s (i.e., the s t a d i u m s ) ; since there w e r e m i n i m a l barriers b e t w e e n t h e s p e c t a t o r area a n d t h e playing area, chiefly these w e r e m a s s incursions o n t o t h e field of p l a y . 4 7

Sports Violence • 3 2 9

An accidental feature of the configuration of British s t a d i u m s m a y have been crucial in developing the special k i n d of a p p e a l of c r o w d e n t h u s i a s m a n d fan violence. In the classic p e r i o d of soccer violence, s p e c t a t o r s — especially those w h o were the r o u g h s u p p o r t e r s — w e r e c r o w d e d i n t o sloped terraces at the s t a d i u m . Early terraces w e r e merely e a r t h e n m o u n d s ; later they became m a d e of concrete, w i t h bench-like seats. H o w - ever, n o one sat d o w n ; b o t h because the c u s t o m w a s t o s t a n d , a n d because, w i t h t h e g r o w t h of h o o l i g a n i s m , police w o u l d p a c k as m a n y p e o p l e as possible into o n e of these terraces, s u r r o u n d e d by chain-link fences a n d o t h e r barriers, a n d lock t h e m in. T h e strategy w a s t o keep the h o o l i g a n s (and especially s u p p o r t e r s of the visiting team) segregated from the rest of the c r o w d , a n d to usher t h e m in a n d o u t of the s t a d i u m at an o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t w h e n they could n o t confront locals. This strategy h a d several u n i n t e n d e d consequences. In inhibiting ritualistic onsite violence, it con- t r i b u t e d to the d e v e l o p m e n t of strategies for generating offsite violence, s e p a r a t e d from the g a m e — t h e technical i n n o v a t i o n of English h o o l i g a n s for c o n s t r u c t i n g m o r a l holidays on d e m a n d .

A n o t h e r consequence w a s t o increase the solidarity a n d the e m o t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t of the c r o w d s in the terraces. These locked-in cages w e r e colloquially referred t o a s " p e n s " a n d " p i t s " ; inside t h e m , p e o p l e w e r e pressed together, p a l p a b l y swaying their bodies in r h y t h m in a high inten- sity interaction ritual:

It is n o t u n c o m m o n , in any s p o r t , to see s p e c t a t o r s behaving in a w a y t h a t w o u l d be uncharacteristic of t h e m in a n y o t h e r c o n t e x t : e m b r a c i n g , s h o u t i n g , swearing, kissing, d a n c i n g in jubilation. It is t h e thrill of the s p o r t , a n d expressing t h e thrill is as i m p o r t a n t as witnessing it. But t h e r e is no s p o r t in w h i c h the act of being a s p e c t a t o r is as constantly physical as w a t c h i n g a g a m e of English football on the terraces. . . . You could feel, a n d y o u h a d no choice b u t to feel, every i m p o r t a n t m o m e n t of p l a y — t h r o u g h the c r o w d . A s h o t on goal w a s a felt experi- ence. W i t h each effort, the c r o w d a u d i b l y d r e w in its b r e a t h , a n d t h e n , after a n o t h e r athletic save, exhaled w i t h equal e x a g g e r a t i o n . A n d each time t h e people a r o u n d me e x p a n d e d , their rib cages noticeably inflat- ing, a n d w e were pressed m o r e closely together. T h e y h a d tensed u p — their a r m muscles flexed slightly a n d their bodies stiffened, or they m i g h t stretch their necks f o r w a r d , trying to determine in the s t r a n g e , shadowless electronic night-light if this s h o t w a s the s h o t t h a t w o u l d result in a goal. You could feel the a n t i c i p a t i o n of the c r o w d on all sides of y o u r b o d y as a series of sensations. (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 1 6 4 - 6 6 )

N o t everyone in the terraces w a s a h o o l i g a n ; this w a s an elite m i n o r i t y of activists, w h o were m o s t likely to be massed in their o w n terrace w h e n traveling to an a w a y g a m e , especially on the C o n t i n e n t . But the experience

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of the terraces w a s the historical b r e e d i n g - g r o u n d s of the collective soli- darity experience; raised t o a n u n u s u a l p i t c h — c o m p a r e d t o o t h e r sports spectator experience—it w a s t h e n further t r a n s f o r m e d w h e n t a k e n a s the goal, the experience to be contrived offsite by the sophisticated techniques of m a n e u v e r t h a t g r e w up in the 1 9 6 0 s .

We have virtually e x p e r i m e n t a l confirmation of the i m p o r t a n c e of these local configurations in creating c r o w d experience, by seeing w h a t h a p - p e n e d w h e n they c h a n g e d . D u r i n g the 1 9 9 0 s , English s t a d i u m s c h a n g e d over to American-style area seating: s e p a r a t e seats, w i t h arm-rests (which also served as b o d y s e p a r a t o r s ) , were i n t r o d u c e d w h e r e economically p o s - sible. W h e r e a s classically police w o u l d h erd s p e c t a t o r s in hurriedly, a n d fans could often avoid ticket t a k e r s , or p a i d cash at the gate w i t h o u t r e - ceiving a ticket to a specific seat, policies were enforced to m a k e all en- t r a n t s have a p a p e r ticket, p a i d in a d v a n c e , w i t h a n u m b e r e d seat. G a m e s w e r e increasingly m a r k e t e d to respectable family audiences (Buford 1 9 9 3 : 2 5 0 - 5 2 ; A n t h o n y King, p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , N o v . 2 0 0 0 ) . C r u d e r forms of single-seater s t a d i u m s , however, c o n t i n u e to exist; King (2001) describes a fairly t r a d i t i o n a l cage-like t e r r a c e in Marseille, w h e r e t h e seats w e r e n u m b e r e d but the fans ignored t h e m a n d s t o o d all over.

This is p a r t of the puzzle. Early particularities of t h e experience in Brit- ish s t a d i u m s created a distinctive k i n d of c r o w d e m o t i o n a l buzz, w h i c h later became e m a n c i p a t e d from the s t a d i u m a n d the g a m e . An intermedi- ate step o c c u r r e d in the 1 9 6 0 s , w h e n police a t t e m p t e d to reduce fighting a m o n g rival fans inside the s t a d i u m by segregating t h e m in different ter- races. This h a d t h e u n i n t e n d e d effect of increasing the violence, in several w a y s : First, by generating greater h o m o g e n e i t y a n d solidarity w i t h i n the m o s t r a b i d fans in a t e r r a c e , indeed all the m o r e so t h a t they w e r e locked in d u r i n g t h e g a m e . Second, by creating territorial targets, so t h a t fans could t r y to s t o r m the seating area of o p p o s i n g fans, before or d u r i n g the g a m e . T h e fans were b e c o m i n g m o r e like a n auxiliary " B - t e a m " t o t h e on-field players' " A - t e a m " ; they h a d their o w n goal t o invade, n o t b y kicking a soccer ball i n t o it, b u t by physically i n t r u d i n g w i t h their massed bodies or by t h r o w i n g missiles i n t o it. A n d t h i r d , stricter police m e a s u r e s m o t i v a t e d fans t o t a k e their c o n f r o n t a t i o n s outside t h e g r o u n d s . This p a t - t e r n of escalation a n d counter-escalation in the tactics between police a n d fans t u r n i n g i n t o better-organized h o o l i g a n firms has been n o t e d by En- glish sociologists a n d others ( D u n n i n g et al. 1 9 8 8 ; Van Limbergen et al. 1 9 8 9 ) ; it parallels, b u t in a m u c h m o r e drastic way, the p a t t e r n I h a v e n o t e d a b o v e in w h i c h A m e r i c a n security forces p r e v e n t i n g onsite victory celebrations t e n d t o displace t h e m into m o r e violent celebrations outside.

O n e m o r e p a t h w a y t o w a r d the sophisticated techniques of soccer hooli- gans c a m e in the area of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . T h e earliest instances of fighting a r o u n d soccer games at the t u r n of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y involved g r o u p s

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of fans w h o traveled collectively to games in so-called b r a k e clubs in hired m o t o r t r a n s p o r t ( D u n n i n g e t al. 1 9 8 8 : 1 1 5 , 1 4 0 , 1 6 7 - 7 9 ) . T h e f i r s t o u t - b r e a k s of w h a t l o o k like m o d e r n soccer h o o l i g a n s w e r e r e p o r t s in the 1 9 5 0 s of fans w r e c k i n g t r a i n s . T h e chief venues for fights b e t w e e n fans began to be t r a i n s t a t i o n s . By the late 1 9 6 0 s a n d i n t o the 1 9 7 0 s , the full a p p a r a t u s of techniques w a s in place: jibbing; c o o r d i n a t e d traveling de- signed to evade t h e police; o r g a n i z a t i o n involving leaflets distributed be- fore h a n d a n n o u n c i n g fights to be held at p a r t i c u l a r m a t c h e s . As police t o o k notice a n d m a s s e d their o w n forces a t a p p r o p r i a t e times a n d places, h o o l i g a n s shifted increasingly to seek fights by incursions i n t o the h o m e territories of rival fans. T h e t e r r i t o r y h a d n o w e x p a n d e d , n o t just from t a k i n g t h e visiting " e n d " o f the s t a d i u m , b u t " t a k i n g t h e m a n o r , " i n t r u d - ing i n t o the t o w n itself, a n d " r u n n i n g " t h e o p p o n e n t s w h e r e they could be m a n e u v e r e d into a p o s i t i o n of w e a k n e s s .

English-style soccer h o o l i g a n i s m is a social technology, invented to e m a n c i p a t e s t a d i u m excitement from the g a m e itself. T h e t e c h n o l o g y s p r e a d t o the C o n t i n e n t (notably H o l l a n d a n d G e r m a n y ) a n d elsewhere. Belgian h a r d - c o r e h o o l i g a n s deliberately i m p o r t e d English techniques in the 1 9 8 0 s , going so far as to visit E n g l a n d for t h e p u r p o s e of observing a n d bringing b a c k their m o s t sophisticated refinements, as well as bor- r o w i n g English songs a n d slogans (Van Limbergen et al. 1 9 8 9 ) .

T h e p u r p o s e of these techniques w a s twofold: First a n d m o s t obviously, the experience of t h e " b u z z , " the excitement of collective solidarity a n d d r a m a t i c t e n s i o n a n d release t h a t are the technical achievement of m o d e r n s p o r t s , b u t t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a p o r t a b l e technique t h a t can be used on d e m a n d , a w a y from the g a m e itself. Second, the raising of t h e status of the fans to co-equals w i t h the players, a n d indeed p e r h a p s even b e y o n d t h e m — t h e soccer t e a m m i g h t lose or p e r f o r m in a m e d i o c r e way, b u t the firm could " t a k e the m a n o r " or repel its rivals, in either case arriving at a higher level of n a r r a t i v e gratification t h a n t h e t e a m itself, a n d displacing it from t h e center of ritual a t t e n t i o n . F a n s , we h a v e seen in previous sec- t i o n s , have a r a t h e r i g n o m i n i o u s existence, if viewed w i t h any degree of objectivity—though of course all t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e fan experience col- l a b o r a t e t o m a k e t h e m lack any v a n t a g e p o i n t outside themselves t o see w h a t they l o o k like. T h e y are subservient to the players in the m o s t grovel- ing way, d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e m for their e m o t i o n a l well-being a n d r h y t h m s of a t t e n t i o n ; in the m o s t intense m o m e n t s of f a n h o o d , as we see in t h e previous p h o t o s , they are bodily controlled, r a p t , in single-minded w o r s h i p of their sacred objects.

T h e invention of t h e social technologies of h o o l i g a n g r o u p s emanci- p a t e d fans from this subservience. N o t only did it give t h e m b a c k their a u t o n o m y in time a n d space, b u t it raised their h o n o r in t h e realm of conflict, in a p r o f o u n d way. Fans in the t h r o e s of the g a m e experience are

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r e d u c e d to the m o s t primitive level of tribal m o r a l i t y : they h a v e no honor, a t t a c k i n g the w e a k in the weight of n u m b e r s , tens of t h o u s a n d s massed in a s t a d i u m raising their voices a n d inclining their bodies in m o c k w a r - fare against the visiting t e a m of a dozen or s o . 4 8 Players, in c o n t r a s t , are heroes; they fight equally m a t c h e d t e a m s . H o o l i g a n s cut themselves loose from t h e fan-player hierarchical r e l a t i o n s h i p , a n d enter into the h o r i - z o n t a l relationship of h e r o - g a n g versus h e r o - g a n g . Of course t h e r e is m u c h s h a m a n d illusion in this; in reality, they seek o u t fights only w h e r e they h a v e a large a d v a n t a g e in n u m b e r s , a n d r e t r e a t or refuse battle w h e n the o d d s are a n y t h i n g close to even. But their n a r r a t i v e rituals cover all this u p ; in their ritual subjectivity, they are h e r o e s . 4 9 T h e B-team displaces the A - t e a m .

Of c o u r s e this is n o t strictly t r u e in all respects. H o o l i g a n gangs have e m a n c i p a t e d the d r a m a of conflict, as far as their subjective a n d e m o t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n in it is c o n c e r n e d , from the events a n d personalities of the g a m e itself. But they h a v e n o t e m a n c i p a t e d themselves from their t e a m s as far as the o r g a n i z a t i o n of their fighting in time a n d space. T h e y still organize these activities a r o u n d t h e schedules of m a t c h e s between o p p o s - ing t e a m s ; these are the occasions on w h i c h they will m a k e incursions i n t o rival turf, or defend their o w n . They r e m a i n parasitical on t h e formal league o r g a n i z a t i o n . This is inescapable, insofar as the h o o l i g a n firms are based on a loose a n d informal o r g a n i z a t i o n ; it is this o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t m a k e s it possible to c o n s t r u c t their chief techniques, blending in a n d o u t of n o r m a l c r o w d s , evading police authorities. T h e y c a n get a l o n g w i t h o u t formal s t r u c t u r e , w i t h o u t p e r m a n e n t h e a d q u a r t e r s , treasuries, officers, a n d all the rest, the social m o v e m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t even t h e loosest political m o v e m e n t needs, because they can rely u p o n t h e league schedul- ing to p r o v i d e the m o s t basic c o o r d i n a t i o n . T h e scheduling of football m a t c h e s serves as a c o n v e n i e n t w a y of bringing the g r o u p together, so t h a t it can practice its t e c h n i q u e s .

Social techniques for creating violence are historically situated, rising a n d falling, c h a n g i n g along the way. T h e y are p a r t of a w i d e r r a n g e of techniques t h a t constitutes m o d e r n p o p u l a r cu ltu re. Ultimately it is n o t sheer physical violence t h a t is sought, b u t the collective excitement. M o d - ern sports are the o n g o i n g d e v e l o p m e n t of ritual t e c h n o l o g y for blending D u r k h e i m i a n solidarity w i t h the d r a m a t i c tension of contrived p l o t lines on the field of a c t i o n , w i t h just e n o u g h o p e n - e n d e d n e s s to keep up the e m o t i o n a l edge. Sports h o o l i g a n s further m a n i p u l a t e the social focus of a t t e n t i o n so as to m a k e oneself into the h e r o s t r a t u m of the show.

H e r e we m a y n o t e a p a r a l l e l b e t w e e n t h e c o n c l u d i n g topics of this c h a p t e r a n d c h a p t e r 7. T h e r e I n o t e d the i n v e n t i o n of t h e m o s h pit at p o p u l a r c o n c e r t s w a s a w a y of t a k i n g b a c k t h e center of a t t e n t i o n from t h e b a n d ; a c o u n t e r - m o v e by the a u d i e n c e from its position of passivity

Sports Violence • 333

a n d subservience t o t h e s t a r m u s i c a l p e r f o r m e r s , i n t o t h e center o f t h e e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n s p a c e . T h i s t o o i s w h a t English soccer h o o l i g a n s i n v e n t e d w i t h their social t e c h n o l o g y o f m o v i n g t h e g a m e s p e c t a t o r e x p e - rience o u t of t h e s t a n d s a n d i n t o a s p h e r e w h i c h t h e y themselves c o u l d c o n t r o l , t u r n i n g the e b b a n d flow of d r a m a t i c m o m e n t s of t h e g a m e i n t o " r i o t o n d e m a n d . " 5 0

In t h e long-term view, m o s h e r s a n d soccer h o o l i g a n s display the same evolution of social t e c h n i q u e s . Both are forms of the revolt of t h e audience in an era of mass c o m m e r c i a l e n t e r t a i n m e n t . I am n o t suggesting t h a t they are here to stay, certainly n o t in their present forms. They bear some r e s e m b l a n c e , nevertheless, to the futuristic dystopias envisioned by w r i t - ers a n d filmmakers of the m i d - t w e n t i e t h century: roving gangs of violent thrill-seekers like t h o s e t h a t p o p u l a t e d Blade Runner, Clockwork Orange, a n d Barbarella, descendents of t h e futuristic fears of A l d o u s H u x l e y a n d o t h e r s . W h a t all this suggests is t h a t mere m a t e r i a l c o m f o r t does n o t give rise to social peace; the a d v a n c e of technologies of leisure c o n s u m p t i o n h a v e b r o u g h t p r e d o m i n a n c e of the e n t e r t a i n m e n t economy, a n d w i t h it an increasing recognition of the arts of h o w to contrive experiences for their o w n sake.

We h a v e b e c o m e m o r e sophisticated, m o r e reflexive, capable of at least tacitly recognizing w h e n a form of behavior is e m b e d d e d in another, as a distinctive r e a l m of artificial reality. Social centers of a t t e n t i o n are always a form of stratification in their o w n right; in the p a s t fifty years, t h e y have become increasingly m a t t e r s of s i t u a t i o n a l stratification, severed from other forms of e c o n o m i c a n d political stratification, a n d from l o n g - s t a n d - ing hierarchies of social respectability; sheer s i t u a t i o n a l status severed from class a n d power. But they are n o t severed from their o w n i m m e d i a t e social base: the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l conditions of m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e m e a n s of d o m i n a n c e of the i m m e d i a t e attention space. Musical e n t e r t a i n m e n t , especially of the noisy a n d heavily r h y t h m i c kind, together with the d r a m a of athletic events, have become the chief organized technologies for c o m - pelling social a t t e n t i o n . By s t a n d i n g in the spotlight b r o a d c a s t by these technologies, the stars of e n t e r t a i n m e n t (including sports-as-cntertain- ment) have become the situational d o m i n a n t s wherever they appear, at- tracting attention from everyone exposed to t h e m . R e m a r k a b l y , even as this n e w form of status stratification has a p p e a r e d , new social t e c h n o l o - gies have developed a r o u n d their periphery; the very fans w h o are most subservient to t h e m because m o s t engrossed in t h e m , have created m e a n s of status revolt, t a k i n g back the center of a t t e n t i o n . Historically e p h e m - eral as these may be, they point t o w a r d a larger t r e n d .

C o n t r i v i n g d r a m a in games leads to further inventions contriving d r a m a in offsite violence; just as the techniques of loud r h y t h m i c musical e n t r a i n m e n t have led to side-inventions of actions t h a t speak louder t h a n

3 3 4 • Chapter 8

music in the pseudo-violence of the m o s h pit. This suggests t h a t m o r e social technologies of excitement m a y be invented in the future, w i t h or w i t h o u t a d m i x t u r e s of violence.

T h e r e is b o t h g o o d n e w s a n d b a d new s in this. T h e g o o d n e w s is t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g p r i m o r d i a l a b o u t the things t h a t people fight a b o u t . They are n o t long-lasting or d e e p - r o o t e d social identities a n d a n t a g o n i s m s ; the strength of such identities are p r o d u c t s of just h o w intense t h e r i t u a l tech- nology is t h a t situationally p r o d u c e s t h e m . T h e b a d n ews is t h a t we are capable of creating n e w causes for violence, h o w e v e r e p h e m e r a l they m a y be. P e r h a p s t h e silver lining here is a fact t h a t we have seen over a n d again in this b o o k : m o s t violence is bluff a n d bluster, m u c h s h o w a n d display c o m p a r e d to a c t u a l s u b s t a n c e . T h e social t e c h n o l o g y of the staged event m a y preserve us yet, h o w e v e r m u c h it m a y scare us.

PART I I I

Dynamics and Structure of Violent Situations

C I I A P T H R 9

H o w Fights Start, or N o t

T o T H I S P O I N T , I h a v e discussed h o w people f i g h t ; I have n o t yet a n s w e r e d the question of w h y they fight. I have purposely avoided giving emphasis or p r i o r i t y to this q u e s t i o n . Answers generally h a v e been theories a b o u t p r i m e motives, p o s t u l a t i n g o n e or a n o t h e r basic interest or overriding concern: for honor, for m a t e r i a l gain, for the g r o u p , for power, for m a s c u - line identity, to p r o p a g a t e one's genes, to satisfy cultural imperatives. As a n analytical strategy, this seems t o m e the w r o n g w a y t o explain w h o f i g h t s w h o m , w h e n , a n d how.

First, w h a t e v e r the motive or interest t h a t individuals or g r o u p s m i g h t h a v e for fighting, the overriding empirical reality is t h a t m o s t of the time they d o n o t f i g h t . T h e y p r e t e n d t o get along; they c o m p r o m i s e ; they p u t up a peaceful facade a n d m a n e u v e r behind the scenes; they bluff, bluster, insult, a n d gossip, m o r e often at a distance t h a n to their o p p o n e n t ' s face. W h e n they d o actually c o m e t o violence, t h e determining c o n d i t i o n s are overwhelmingly in their s h o r t - t e r m i n t e r a c t i o n . A t h e o r y of motives for fighting explains little, because h a v i n g motives is a long w a y from actually c o m m i t t i n g violence on their behalf.

Second, inferring motives is often a d u b i o u s business. F r e u d i a n , M a r x - ian, a n d other such theories are n o t o r i o u s for interpreting w h a t e v e r h a p - pens in terms of their chosen m o t i v e . Let us reverse the gestalt; begin w i t h the situational process. M o t i v e s t e n d to emerge as the conflict heats u p ; once the s i t u a t i o n has escalated, the p e r s o n s involved start to form an idea of w h a t they are fighting a b o u t . In deeply e n t r a i n i n g violence, the p e r p e t r a t o r s often have little clear idea of w h y they keep on doing w h a t they are doing. T h e f i g h t i n g a n d the motive become s t r u c t u r e d a n d articu- lated simultaneously as p a r t of the same process. If we follow p a r t i c i p a n t s over t i m e , w h a t they say t e n d s to w a n d e r a n d shift. M o t i v e s are a category of folk cognition used by p a r t i c i p a n t s for explaining events to themselves, a n d by outsiders such as new s r e p o r t e r s , lawyers, a n d officials for the p u r p o s e of settling on a public a c c o u n t of w h y an incident of violence h a p p e n e d ; it is p a r t of the process of closure, of socially defining p a s t reality in o r d e r to declare it finished. M u l t i p l e , shifting a c c o u n t s of w h a t the conflict is a b o u t are p a r t of the t e x t u r e of the action itself, n o t s o m e - t h i n g t h a t s t a n d s behind it a n d guides it like a p u p p e t e e r pulling the strings (see Fuchs 2 0 0 1 for a general f o r m u l a t i o n ) .

3 3 8 • C h a p t e r 9

In the preceding c h a p t e r s , I cut in at the p o i n t w h e r e a conflict is already well a d v a n c e d , on the b r i n k of violence, a n d t h e n w a t c h e d h o w it plays itself o u t . In this chapter, I will p u r s u e this further b a c k , l o o k i n g explicitly at the early stages of conflict, w i t h an eye to w h a t keeps the interaction stuck t h e r e , as well as w h a t m a k e s it—exceptionally—move d o w n i n t o the tunnel of violence.

N O R M A L L I M I T E D A C R I M O N Y : G R I P I N G , W H I N I N G ,

A R G U I N G , Q U A R R E L I N G

Let us begin w i t h situations of regularized acrimo n y : the small-scale grip- ing a n d q u a r r e l i n g of everyday life. T h e r e is a folk t h e o r y t h a t m i n o r q u a r r e l i n g builds u p , festers, a n d accum ul ates until it finally e x p l o d e s . 1

T h e folk t h e o r y is grossly u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of w h a t n o r m a l l y h a p p e n s . After violence b r e a k s o u t , it is often possible to p u t t o g e t h e r a n a r r a t i v e t h a t retrospectively a t t r i b u t e s the violence to this g r a d u a l b u i l d u p of fes- tering, boiling, heating tension/pressure; b u t m o s t of t h e time q u a r r e l i n g is n o r m a l , regularized, limited. M o s t of the time it stays on the near side of the invisible wall, the b a r r i e r of tension/fear t h a t m a k e s violence diffi- cult to c a r r y o u t . T h e folk t h e o r y assumes t h a t violence is easy, a n d t h a t all it takes is a sufficient b u i l d u p of steam to b l o w t h e t o p off. We h a v e seen, to t h e contrary, t h a t violence is socially difficult, a n d it is m u c h m o r e c o m m o n t o c a r r y o u t social rituals t h a t p r e t e n d t o f i g h t but confine i t t o conventionalized gesturing.

This gesturing takes t w o forms. O n e is verbal a c r i m o n y ; the second is blustering a n d b o a s t i n g . Verbal a c r i m o n y is the polite middle-class form of face-to-face conflict; it ranges from c a l m t h r o u g h edgy a n d sarcastic (i.e., sending hostile messages in the paralinguistic channel) up t h r o u g h v e h e m e n t e m o t i o n a l o u t b u r s t s . But even these o u t b u r s t s — l o u d s h o u t i n g m a t c h e s , s t o m p i n g o u t , a n n o u n c i n g t h e br eak in g off of a r e l a t i o n s h i p — are n o t in themselves violent. We h a v e no survey of t h e incidence of vari- ous kinds of q u a r r e l s , b u t it seems a fair estimate t h a t , in the first place, only a m i n o r i t y of q u a r r e l s lead to high degrees of anger; a n d in the second place, only a m i n o r i t y of angry q u a r r e l s lead further into violence. W h a t I shall e x a m i n e is w h a t k i n d s of interactional dynamics t e n d to keep m o s t quarrels n o r m a l i z e d a n d limited; a n d w h a t are the special circumstances t h a t t a k e s o m e of t h e m over t h e u l t i m a t e limit i n t o a c t u a l violence. 2

T h e o t h e r t y p e of g e s t u r i n g t h a t acts as a s u b s t i t u t e for violence is b o a s t a n d bluster. A g a i n , s p e a k i n g very schematically, this is the o p p o s i t e of polite middle-class q u a r r e l i n g ; its a r c h e t y p e is m a s c u l i n e , i n d e e d m a c h o , w o r k i n g - c l a s s / l o w e r - c l a s s y o u t h ; o r historically, t h e r e a l m o f w a r r i o r s , specialists in fighting. It m i g h t seem o b v i o u s t h a t b o a s t i n g

How Fights Start, or Not • 339

leads to violence because it is p a r t of the c u l t u r e of t h o s e w h o h a b i t u a l l y fight. But this is i g n o r i n g t h e dirty little secret of v i o l e n c e — t h e b a r r i e r o f tension/fear t h a t m a k e s f i g h t i n g i n c o m p e t e n t w h e n i t h a p p e n s , a n d p r o d u c e s m u c h m o r e g e s t u r e t h a n real f i g h t . T h u s i n s t e a d o f defining the m a c h o c u l t u r e as a c u l t u r e of violence, it is m o r e a c c u r a t e , a n d m o r e revealing, to t h i n k of it as a c u l t u r e of b o a s t i n g a n d m a k i n g claims a b o u t violence. T h e c u l t u r e of m a c h i s m o , of t h e t o u g h g u y s , t h e a c t i o n scene, is m a i n l y t h e activity of staging an i m p r e s s i o n of violence, r a t h e r t h a n t h e violence itself.

T h i s sets u p o u r analytical p r o b l e m . T h e w o r l d o f b o a s t i n g a n d b lu ster is a repetitive set of s i t u a t i o n s ; m u c h of t h e t i m e these h a v e their o w n e q u i l i b r i u m , staying w i t h i n their o w n limits, b u t s o m e t i m e s t h e y spill over t h o s e limits. M u c h o f t h e t i m e the t o u g h guys c a r r y o u t their r i t u a l s , telling stories a b o u t violence, b o a s t i n g a b o u t themselves in aggressive w a y s , p l a y i n g aggressive verbal a n d n o n v e r b a l g a m e s w i t h each other. Some of t h e t i m e this make-believe violence escalates, spills over, a n d b e c o m e r e a l violence. U n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s does this h a p p e n ? T h e in- t e r m e d i a t e step is t h e z o n e of bluster: m a k i n g t h r e a t e n i n g gestures, espe- cially t h e m i x t u r e of v e r b a l a n d p a r a l i n g u i s t i c gestures in cursing a n d i n s u l t i n g . T h i s m i g h t seem t o be t h e i m m i n e n t b r i n k o f violence, a n d i n d e e d it c a n be an a c t u a l a c c o m p a n i m e n t of violence. But b lu ster is also a c o m m o n w a y of staying at t h e b r i n k , or just b a c k from t h e b r i n k : a n d m a n y w o u l d - b e f i g h t s p e t e r o u t b e c a u s e a n e q u i l i b r i u m i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e r i t u a l of blustering at o n e a n o t h e r .

T h e r i t u a l staging of belligerence is a G o f f m a n i a n f r o n t s t a g e , w h o s e b a c k s t a g e is t h e feeling of using t h e p e r f o r m a n c e as a s u b s t i t u t e for vio- lence. T h e staging p r o c e s s sets up a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n insiders a n d o u t s i d e r s , t h o s e w h o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t staging i s being d o n e , a n d t h o s e w h o are t a k e n in by t h e staging; t h e simplest v e r s i o n is t h e stratification b e t w e e n t h e t o u g h guys w i t h their bluster a n d t h o s e w h o are i n t i m i d a t e d by it. T h i s staging is w h a t Elijah A n d e r s o n calls t h e " c o d e of t h e s t r e e t . "

T h e baseline for t h e n o r m a l limited a c r i m o n y of e v e r y d a y i n t e r a c t i o n is described by G o f f m a n (1967) as " f a c e - w o r k , " a r i t u a l p r o c e s s of or- derly a c c o m m o d a t i n g t o o n e a n o t h e r . I n d i v i d u a l s t r y t o m a i n t a i n their o w n face, their claim t o b e w h a t t h e y p u t themselves f o r w a r d a s being (at least i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n ) , a n d they h e l p o t h e r s d o t h e s a m e . C o n v e r s a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n a n d o t h e r aspects of face-to-face e n c o u n t e r s are a c o o p e r a - tive g a m e , in w h i c h e a c h allows t h e o t h e r to m a i n t a i n their illusion of being t h e idealized p e r s o n t h a t t h e y display for t h e o ccasio n . P a r t i c i p a n t s claim to be v a r i o u s t h i n g s : relatively high in social s t a t u s , m o r a l l y p r o p e r , a s o p h i s t i c a t e d insider, on friendly t e r m s w i t h t h e p e r s o n t h e y are t a l k i n g t o , g o o d - h u m o r e d a n d at-ease w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r just p l a i n c o m p e t e n t social i n t e r a c t a n t s . W h a t e v e r it is t h e y are c l a i m i n g , t h e y t e n d

340 • Chapter 9

t o avoid w a y s i n w h i c h these claims b r e a k d o w n , b o t h o n their o w n p a r t a n d o n t h e p a r t o f t h e o t h e r ; t h e y use a n d p e r m i t v a g u e claims a n d half- t r u t h s , o v e r l o o k lapses, a n d act tactfully s o t h a t b l a t a n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d pretenses are p a p e r e d over as s m o o t h l y as p o s s i b l e . W h e r e a b l a t a n t failure c o m e s to the surface a n d is explicitly a c k n o w l e d g e d , r i t u a l r e p a i r s are usually set i n m o t i o n , s o t h a t excuses are m a d e a n d a c c e p t e d ; r a t h e r t h a n d r a w i n g o u t these e m b a r r a s s i n g m o m e n t s , everyone generally tries to get p a s t t h e m as quickly as possible so as to r e s u m e t h e s m o o t h surface of a p p e a r a n c e s .

Goffman's analysis is d r a w n from t h e polite m i d d l e a n d u p p e r classes of British a n d A m e r i c a n society a r o u n d the m i d - t w e n t i e t h century, a n d it is n o t clear just h o w far it applies, historically, cross-culturally, a n d across categories of age, social class, a n d ethnicity. At any r a t e , we m a y say t h a t it is a s t a n d a r d for " b e i n g on one's g o o d b e h a v i o r " for these o t h e r g r o u p s in c o n t e m p o r a r y Western societies, a n d a p p a r e n t l y m o r e widely. 3 We m a y t a k e it as a baseline against w h i c h to ask the question: given ritual con- straints t h a t severely limit acrimony, h o w does conflict arise a n d become expressed in situations subject to these kinds of a c c o m m o d a t i v e pres- sures? Goffman himself suggests t w o p a t h w a y s .

First, playing w i t h i n the rules of t h e polite g a m e , one can engage in "aggressive use of face w o r k . " Recognizing o t h e r s ' t e n d e n c y to accept apologies, one m a y see w h a t offenses one can get a w a y w i t h ; given o t h e r s ' a t t e m p t s n o t t o h u r t feelings, one m a y p o i n t e d l y act h u r t a n d p r o v o k e a t t e m p t s at remedy (drawing this o u t at length is sometimes referred to as "guilt t r i p p i n g " ) . Criticism of o t h e r p e r s o n s , a n d especially of their situational claims t o b e m o r e t h a n they c a n p r o v e t o be, can b e slyly m a d e by indirect allusions, while keeping up a n o n v e r b a l a u r a of politeness a n d friendliness. "Points m a d e by allusion to social-class status are sometimes called s n u b s ; t h o s e m a d e by allusions to m o r a l respectability are some- times called digs; in either case o n e deals w i t h a capacity at w h a t is some- times called ' b i t c h i n e s s ' " (Goffman 1 9 6 7 : 2 5 ) . T h e aggressive g a m e can become two-sided, w h e n the victim of a p u t - d o w n m a n a g e s to m o u n t a clever a n d a p p o s i t e c o m e b a c k ; this has t h e a d d i t i o n a l effect of s h o w i n g t h a t the verbal aggressor w a s n o t as g o o d at the interactional g a m e as he or she claimed to be, t h u s b l o w i n g a hole in this p e r s o n ' s situational self- p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d n o t just setting t h e g a m e back at even b u t a w a r d i n g e x t r a p o i n t s to the counter-attacker. As Goffman n o t e s , these games w o r k best w h e n t h e r e is an a u d i e n c e , w h i c h in effect acts as referee a n d score- keeper—all surreptitiously behind the pose of polite civility.

T h e second p a t h w a y to conflict is w h e r e ritual repairs are i n c o m p e - tently carried o u t or n o t accepted. T h e g a m e is basically c o o p e r a t i v e , a n d t h a t requires t h e willingness of everyone to accept tactful remedies for offenses. Perfunctory apologies a n d excuses are usually t a k e n at face value, b u t if the p e r s o n w h o feels offended does n o t accept t h e m , the only

How Fights Start, or Not • 3 4 1

alternative is to " m a k e a scene." This m e a n s to insist explicitly on t h e offense a n d d e m a n d a r e m e d i a l action t h a t is m o r e humiliating t h a n it w o u l d h a v e been if it h a d been allowed to be carried o u t tacitly. But in d o i n g so the offended p e r s o n is b r e a k i n g the c o n v e n t i o n a l surface of p o - liteness a n d tact, revealing oneself as n o t a g o o d i n t e r a c t a n t ; a n d t h u s h o w e v e r m u c h t h e interactional whistle-blower m a y h a v e been seen as in t h e right as to the u n d e r l y i n g offense, he or she becomes situationally in the w r o n g over their r e m e d y for it. T h e balance of forces shifts a bit t o - w a r d the offender, w h o m a y feel e m b o l d e n e d to resist further ritual h u m i l - iation; t h e offended p e r s o n n o w h a s few alternatives b u t a n angry a n d p e r h a p s violent o u t b u r s t , or to w i t h d r a w from the e n c o u n t e r "in a huff." In polite a d u l t middle-class e n c o u n t e r s , the loss of face from escalating to physical violence is severe; 4 hence t h e m a i n r e t a l i a t i o n t h a t m o s t people are willing to risk are angry w i t h d r a w a l s a n d b r e a k i n g off relationships. An accomplished player of t h e g a m e of aggressive facework (in Goffman's day called a needier) m a y play on the perceived e m o t i o n a l b r e a k i n g p o i n t of his or her i n t e r l o c u t o r s , p u s h i n g o p p o n e n t s i n t o an o u t b u r s t t h a t de- stroys their r e p u t a t i o n .

In settings w h e r e polite Goffmanian ritual o r d e r holds sway, expressing anger is generally r a t h e r far from a c t u a l fighting, a n d sometimes antitheti- cal to it. In a d m i n i s t r a t i v e politics, a seemingly friendly, affable d e m e a n o r is de rigueur in all situations, a b o v e all in conflictual ones. A s t a n d a r d tactic of lawyers a n d debaters is to t r y to get their o p p o n e n t angry, a n d t h e n to use t h e fact t h a t they are a n g r y as a proof t h a t their a r g u m e n t s are e m o t i o n a l r a t h e r t h a n r a t i o n a l a n d n o t w o r t h listening t o . Persons w h o get c a u g h t in this tactic t e n d to become still further e n r a g e d , because it t a k e s their o w n c o m m i t m e n t , the fact t h a t they strongly believe in w h a t they are saying, a n d twists it into a w e a p o n against themselves. T h e law- yer's trick is to bring a b o u t a b r e a k d o w n in s i t u a t i o n a l self-presentation as a c o m p e t e n t i n t e r a c t a n t , a n d use t h a t to focus a t t e n t i o n a w a y from t h e s u b s t a n c e of w h a t is being a r g u e d . Such legal or o t h e r institutional gatherings, of c o u r s e , are ultra-polite, front-stage situations w h e r e all t u r n s for utterances are strictly controlled by a formal p r o t o c o l ; if violence occurs, it is a s c a n d a l o u s b r e a c h t h a t calls for severe p u n i s h m e n t a n d m o r e or less de facto loss of o n e ' s case. This limitation on use of violence is e x t r e m e b u t otherwise typical of interactions in the p a r t of society t h a t claims " p r o p e r " or polite s t a t u s .

T h e baseline of social interaction is a c c o m m o d a t i v e . Researchers in c o n v e r s a t i o n analysis, p e r f o r m i n g detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of c o n v e r s a t i o n s r e c o r d e d in n a t u r a l settings, c o n c l u d e t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n has a preference for a g r e e m e n t (Heritage 1 9 8 4 ; Boden 1 9 9 0 ) ; it is d e m o n s t r a b l y easier for a n audience t o cheer t h a n t o b o o ( C l a y m a n 1 9 9 3 ) . H o w , t h e n , i s n o r m a l a c r i m o n y carried out? We will e x a m i n e four k i n d s , in r o u g h l y ascending o r d e r of intensity.

3 4 2 • Chapter 9

1. Griping is the type of negative conversation carried out a b o u t third parties, persons w h o are n o t present. This is a practice of c o m p l a i n - ing, telling h o r r o r stories or s a r d o n i c a c c o u n t s of w h a t o t h e r per- sons have d o n e . H e r e is a case w h e r e verbal aggression does n o t necessarily or generally lead to conflict, let alone violence.

Griping can be a form of e n t e r t a i n m e n t , filling up the conversa- tion with things to talk a b o u t , w h i c h have a certain a m o u n t of dra- matic interest. We see this in the sequence of topics in middle-class social gatherings such as dinner parties. Usually the conversation at the beginning is affable, g o o d - h u m o r e d expressions of interest in the o t h e r persons present, setting the t o n e of the e n c o u n t e r as a festive occasion. Later shop-talk tends to t a k e over, sometimes c o u n t e r a c t e d by recognition t h a t this is excluding p e o p l e , a n d t h u s interspersed by general topics of shared conversation such as food, r e s t a u r a n t s , travels, a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t . Usually late in the sequence, the talk settles o n t o politics (if those present are on the same side of the s p e c t r u m ) , which mostly takes the form of stereotyped c o m - plaints a b o u t the stupidity a n d o u t r a g e o u s n e s s of the behavior of o p p o s i n g politicians. Political talk usually w i n d s d o w n the evening, because it is an easy filler, d r a w i n g on shared e m o t i o n s a n d n o t requiring m u c h t h o u g h t , since p a r t i c i p a n t s are satisfied to repeat w e l l - k n o w n formulas of abuse of the rival political p a r t y as applied to the details of the news. Political griping is an easy w a y of keeping up the c o n v e r s a t i o n a l ritual, especially when p a r t i c i p a n t s at a social gathering do n o t really like each other very m u c h or do n o t have m u c h c o n v e r s a t i o n a l resources to share t h a t are festive or fun. (A testable hypothesis: the more enjoyable the party, the less time p e o - ple spend talking a b o u t politics or other forms of complaining.) This kind of c o m p l a i n i n g a b o u t generalized targets does n o t p r o - duce much p e r s o n a l solidarity, since it remains frontstage and in- vokes no very tight ties a m o n g the persons w h o share in the com- plaining. In c o n t r a s t , gossip and especially malicious gossip can be highly e n t e r t a i n i n g , since it casts the gossiper in the light of an in- sider a n d witticist, a n d the hearer as privileged audience; this is espe- cially the case w h e r e the gossip takes places within a n d a b o u t a elite g r o u p such as high society or literary circles ( C a p o t e 1986; A r t h u r 2 0 0 2 : 1.59-85).

T h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t s t h a t are a b o u t p e r s o n a l t a r g e t s — o n e ' s boss or employees; one's o r g a n i z a t i o n ; o n e ' s a c q u a i n t a n c e s and friends—are implicitly backstage; the fact t h a t c o m p l a i n t s are n o t intended to be heard by their targets implies a sense of intimacy a m o n g those w h o c a r r y o u t the c o n v e r s a t i o n . This is a v a r i a n t on the principle t h a t conflict with outsiders generates solidarity in the

How Fights Start, or Not • 343

g r o u p . H e n c e it is possible to play up conflicts, or even to m a n u f a c - t u r e t h e m , in o r d e r to increase o n e ' s local solidarity; this can be o n e of the situationally arising motives for creating malicious gossip. H e r e again t h e conflict is n o t so m u c h a preexisting m o t i v a t i o n a l force as a social c o n s t r u c t i o n .

2. Whining is a t e r m for complaining in the second person, within the immediate interaction itself. This is low-key complaining, designed to stay within limits so t h a t it does n o t t h r e a t e n the interaction. It easily becomes chronic mild conflict, as o p p o s e d to acute conflict, w h i c h is rarer. W h i n i n g has an emotional t o n e of mild, w h i m p e r i n g pain; it is an expression (indeed a staging) of weakness. A whiner does n o t t h r e a t e n to escalate to anger or violent attack, but leaves this to the interlocutor; a n d in fact w h i n i n g tends to p r o v o k e some kind of attack, since, as we have seen, attacking the w e a k is the m o s t c o m m o n dynamic of fighting. W h i n i n g is repetitive a n d thus frustrat- ing a n d annoying to the person w h i n e d at, w h i c h is one e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y t h e whinee m a y eventually escalate a counter-attack.

These counter-attacks are usually mild, feeding into the cycle t h a t keeps the w h i n i n g going. T h e whiner m a y c o u n t on being attacked; consciously or m o r e likely unconsciously, whining is a move to break up the situation a n d to m a k e oneself the center of attention. It is a version of an u n d e r h a n d e d Goffmanian ploy to m a k e the other a b a n - d o n the n o r m a l flow of staged interaction; " t o get their g o a t " by repeating small, relatively unobtrusive moves until they retaliate w i t h an angry b l o w u p , m a k i n g t h e m bear the o n u s of having destroyed the situation. Small children often play this o u t w i t h their p a r e n t s . 5

3. A higher stage of n o r m a l a c r i m o n y is arguing, explicit verbal con- flict. It m a y be explicitly e n c a p s u l a t e d to a p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c , a n d t h u s c a n be carried on relatively g o o d - n a t u r e d l y ; p e o p l e "agree to d i s a g r e e . " Some a r g u i n g is deliberately staged as a s t a n d a r d form of e n t e r t a i n m e n t ; casual or convivial gatherings a m o n g males are often filled w i t h d e b a t i n g a b o u t t h e merits of sports t e a m s , the rela- tive greatness of athletes, a n d the like.

4. A r g u i n g can escalate i n t o serious quarreling: verbal a r g u m e n t t h a t is seriously m e a n t , usually concerning t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of the arguers themselves. Verbal m a r k e r s like "You always . . . " o r " W h y d o y o u always . . . " stake a claim on a level of generality, w h i c h explicitly rules o u t framing the dispute as encapsulated a n d s i t u a t i o n a l . Q u a r - reling is generally repetitive; it is usually a version of a p r o t e c t e d , limited fight, w i t h tacit agreements on w h a t kinds of tactics m a y be

Chapter 9

used. Typically these are various kinds of Goffmanian aggressive face-work, sometimes c u l m i n a t i n g in angry b l o w u p s ; insofar as the cycle repeats itself, each b l o w u p is h a n d l e d , s o o n e r or later, w i t h a Goffmanian ritual r e p a i r (apologies, reconciliations, or just a tacit a g r e e m e n t t o ignore w h a t h a p p e n e d a n d r e t u r n t o n o r m a l l y staged i n t e r a c t i o n ) . 6 Repetitive q u a r r e l i n g is a d o m e s t i c version of a h o c k e y g a m e , i n w h i c h violations a n d p u n i s h m e n t s h a v e become i n c o r p o - r a t e d i n t o the expected flow of the g a m e .

T h e typical p a t t e r n is for persons to be nicer to strangers in con- versations t h a n to family m e m b e r s . Burchler, Weiss, a n d Vincent (1975) d e m o n s t r a t e d this by c o m p a r i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n s in a medical w a i t i n g r o o m . T h e s t r e n g t h o f c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e social b o n d , o r the security of an institutionalized r e l a t i o n s h i p , allows m i n o r con- flicts routinely a n d repetitively enacted (Coser 1 9 5 6 ) . Q u a r r e l i n g is n o t necessarily a m a t t e r of building up r e s e n t m e n t s ; repetitive q u a r r e l i n g is n o t so m u c h " p e n t - u p " b u t flows r a t h e r freely just because it is n o t very costly. Q u a r r e l i n g does n o t necessarily involve deep disagreements or jealousies; it can be p a r t of the e x p e c t a b l e , routinized flow, a w a y of filling up c o n v e r s a t i o n a n d avoiding bor- ing m o m e n t s . 7 In relationships t h a t h a v e a stable balance of power, domestic q u a r r e l i n g is the equivalent of e n c a p s u l a t e d a r g u m e n t s a b o u t s p o r t s , b u t raised to a higher level of e m o t i o n a n d carried o u t for higher stakes, t h u s m a k i n g it a m o r e exciting g a m e . T h u s q u a r r e l i n g is a central activity—indeed, the central activity, in "love/ h a t e " r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h i c h generally have a self-conscious image as especially d r a m a t i c a n d " t e m p e s t u o u s . "

Analyzing video recordings of m a r t i a l counseling sessions a n d o t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s a m o n g couples, Scheff a n d Retzinger ( 1 9 9 1 ; Retzinger 1991) s h o w t h e detailed sequence of moves in repetitive q u a r r e l s a m o n g couples. They f i n d m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l p a t t e r n s t h a t b r e a k the n o r m a l flow a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n of i n t e r a c t i o n a l solidarity. This o n g o i n g level of tension Scheff (1990) describes as the e m o t i o n of s h a m e , a negative feeling a b o u t o n e ' s self t h a t comes from n o t having o n e ' s sense of self validated in the i n t e r a c t i o n . W h a t Scheff calls s h a m e can be r e g a r d e d , in terms of interaction ritual theory, as b r o k e n a t t u n e m e n t , a failed interaction r i t u a l . Shame t h a t is n o t a c k n o w l e d g e d , b r o u g h t into overt social consciousness, a n d re- paired by r e s t o r i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n , Scheff t e r m s " b y p a s s e d s h a m e " ; it can be b a n i s h e d from consciousness, by an internal l o o p of being a s h a m e d of being a s h a m e d . Its manifestations still exist, however, evidenced in fine-grained p a t t e r n s of tension in postures a n d speech. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d tension of s h a m e , especially as intensified by s h a m e a b o u t s h a m e , becomes t r a n s f o r m e d into rage w h e n it finally

H o w F i g h t s S t a r t , o r N o t • 345

bursts o u t in verbal action. Shamed p e r s o n s c o n t i n u e to break inter- actional a t t u n e m e n t in subtle or not-so-subtle w a y s , using Goffman- ian aggressive face w o r k . This in t u r n generates further s h a m e on t h e p a r t of the other. T h e q u a r r e l goes on as a r e t a l i a t o r y cycle of s h a m i n g each other, c o m p l e m e n t e d by internal cycles w i t h i n each p a r t i c i p a n t of repressing or bypassing recognition of s h a m e a n d let- ting it build up i n t o r a g e .

A l t h o u g h m a r i t a l disputes a n d similar ongoing quarrels a m o n g intimates (close friends, or p a r e n t s a n d children) go t h r o u g h this p a t - tern of repeated quarrels, p u n c t u a t e d by o u t b u r s t s of anger, they t e n d to stabilize at t h a t level: angry o u t b u r s t s are as hostile as it gets, w i t h o u t escalating further into violence, a n d after an o u t b u r s t the m o o d subsides again into a n o r m a l r o u t i n e of partial a t t u n e m e n t a n d disruptive d i s a t t u n e m e n t . T h e p o i n t I w a n t to emphasize is t h a t the mechanisms in Scheff's t h e o r y t h a t explain the repetitive quarreling do n o t explain those occasions w h e n violence h a p p e n s ; m o s t of the time violence does n o t occur, a n d it takes special situational features for t h a t to h a p p e n . This is w h a t we are seeking in this chapter.

Escalating q u a r r e l s is o n e w a y to get to the b r i n k of violence. Anticlimactically, I b r e a k off the sequence h e r e . We m u s t retrace o u r steps, t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f o n e o t h e r p a t h t h a t leads t o this p o i n t .

B O A S T I N G A N D B L U S T E R I N G

Boasting is generally outside polite middle-class c o n v e r s a t i o n a l r i t u a l . N o t t h a t s o m e t h i n g of t h e sort d o e s n ' t t a k e place t h e r e in a surreptitious form; t h e polite m a n n e r is to get o t h e r p e o p l e to do y o u r b o a s t i n g for y o u , so t h a t one can gracefully d e m u r a n d display one's m o d e s t y . 8

S t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c r o w i n g a n d pride a b o u t o n e ' s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s is gener- ally k e p t to private, backstage s i t u a t i o n s , a kind of shameful display of egotism t h a t is allowed in front of intimates; p a r e n t s p r o v i d e such an audience for the pridefulness of their children. But even in these situa- t i o n s , b o a s t i n g is s u p p o s e d to be limited to pride a n d joy in a c t u a l a c c o m - p l i s h m e n t s , n o t generalized claims a b o u t oneself or specific p u t - d o w n s of rivals as grossly inferior. H e r e again the polite Goffmanian style provides a baseline against w h i c h we see w h a t is involved in social milieux w h e r e b o a s t i n g is overt.

Boasting is characteristic of masculine c o m p a n y , a n d of y o u t h ; in con- t e m p o r a r y times, m o r e typically in the lower classes t h a n the m i d d l e a n d higher; b u t historically, p r o m i n e n t in w a r r i o r societies such as t h e Vikings, w h e r e stereotyped b o a s t i n g r i t u a l w a s a p a r t of festive e n t e r t a i n m e n t as well as a p r e l i m i n a r y to battles (Bailey a n d I v a n o v a 1 9 9 8 ; Einarsson 1 9 3 4 ;

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R o b i n s o n 1 9 1 2 ) . Even in these g r o u p s , b o a s t i n g is situational; it occurs on a p p r o p r i a t e occasions b u t n o t every m i n u t e of t h e day. W h e r e a s b o a s t i n g sometimes escalates into violence, middle-class Goffmanian politeness is organized in such a w a y as to avoid any overt m o v e s t o w a r d fighting— indeed, b o a s t i n g m a y h a v e become t a b o o in polite society precisely for this r e a s o n .

B o a s t i n g c o m e s in t w o f o r m s : as a general a s s e r t i o n of o n e ' s s t a t u s in t h e w o r l d , a n d b o a s t i n g in t h e face of an i m m e d i a t e rival. T h e latter is m o r e o b v i o u s l y a challenge a n d a p r o v o c a t i o n ; b u t in their effect on t h e i n t e r a c t i o n t h e r e m a y be little difference b e t w e e n t h e t w o . It is a q u e s t i o n for r e s e a r c h w h e t h e r i m p e r s o n a l b o a s t i n g o r p e r s o n a l b o a s t i n g i s m o r e likely to lead to violence. To say "I am t h e g r e a t e s t " is n o t so different from saying " I a m g r e a t e r t h a n y o u , " since the latter s t a t e m e n t i s implied in t h e former, a l t h o u g h t h e former is less direct a n d t h e challenge is t h e r e b y easier t o o v e r l o o k . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e m a n n e r o f b o a s t i n g i s m u c h t h e s a m e : a s t r o n g l y expressed claim for being t h e center of a t t e n - t i o n , a n d t h u s to d o m i n a t e t h e a t t e n t i o n of o t h e r s . A generalized claim m a y b e c o n t r o v e r t e d b y s o m e o n e p r e s e n t , w h e t h e r sarcastically o r bluntly, just o u t of t h e feeling t h a t t h e b o a s t e r is m a k i n g t o o m u c h of himself as a m a t t e r of c o n v e r s a t i o n , n o t because t h e h e a r e r t h i n k s t h e s t a t e m e n t is u n t r u e .

But m u c h b o a s t i n g t a k e s place in a t o n e of ebullient g o o d h u m o r . It often is a staple of carousing situations, festive gatherings of a masculine g r o u p , especially in t h e c o n t e x t s u r r o u n d i n g real or m o c k - c o n t e s t s such as athletic events. Boasting is p a r t of the e n t e r t a i n m e n t . Individual boast- ing, t o o , m a y be accepted in g o o d spirit, as a display of verbal facility, a m u s i n g h y p e r b o l e a n d i m p r o m p t u figures of speech, a b o v e all w h e n t h e r e is an audience present. H e r e assertive b o a s t i n g s h o w s the same struc- t u r e as Goffmanian aggressive use of f a c e w o r k in polite middle-class con- versation, w h e r e t o p p i n g a subtly aggressive r e m a r k is recognized as a form of verbal artistry. But t h e r e is a major difference in the consequences if t h e loser in a b o a s t i n g contest does n o t t a k e it in g o o d grace: w h e r e a s t h e polite conversationalist has to accept being t o p p e d , or c a n t r y for no m o r e t h a n further verbal digs, the loser in a b o a s t i n g m a t c h can t a k e it as a serious challenge to his dignity a n d retaliate by escalating to violence.

A contest of b o a s t i n g shades over i n t o insults, w h i c h m a y still be t a k e n as e n t e r t a i n i n g a n d in g o o d h u m o r if they are cleverly w o r d e d . 9 Past a certain b o r d e r l i n e , insults a n d boasts t u r n i n t o bluster. Instead of general- ized a n d h y p o t h e t i c a l , verbal struggle over d o m i n a t i n g t h e a t t e n t i o n space t h r e a t e n s to t u r n i n t o a violent struggle. T h e p e r s o n w h o escalates to vio- lence always w i n s at least a m o m e n t a r y victory: he successfully claims a t t e n t i o n a n d generally wipes a w a y all other topics of c o n v e r s a t i o n . This victory may be short-lived and its costs ( wh eth er physical or social) may

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be severe; b u t it is an incentive t h a t m a n y will t a k e in an otherwise losing s i t u a t i o n .

Bluster is the final step before violence. It is an expression of p o i n t e d t h r e a t , anger directed at an i m m e d i a t e o p p o n e n t . It m a y be the first step in the fight, a m o v e to i n t i m i d a t e , to force t h e o p p o n e n t to waver, to gain an a d v a n t a g e , an o p p o r t u n i t y in w h i c h to strike. But bluster also can be a m o v e t h a t forestalls a n d substitutes for violence. It is an a t t e m p t to scare the enemy s o t h a t h e will b a c k d o w n a n d b a c k a w a y from f i g h t i n g ; a n d a staged p r e s e n t a t i o n of oneself, t h a t m a k e s o n e look braver a n d m o r e c o m p e t e n t at fighting t h a n o n e actually is.

This is m o s t a p p a r e n t in military c o m b a t , w h e r e a g o o d deal of the fighting situation consists in p o s t u r i n g ( G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 ) , firing m o r e for the sake of the noise t h a n seriously aiming at t h e enemy. S.L.A. M a r s h a l l (1947) emphasizes t h a t soldiers k e e p up m o r a l e a n d solidarity in their o w n g r o u p by s h o u t i n g loudly back a n d forth; yelling can also be directed at the enemy to frighten t h e m . T r a d i t i o n a l societies have their t r a d i t i o n a l battle cries, from t h e yelping a n d i m i t a t i o n of a n i m a l s o u n d s in tribal c o m b a t to the u l u l a t i o n s or long r h y t h m i c trilling cries by w h i c h A r a b w o m e n e n c o u r a g e fighters. 1 0 Vocal i n t i m i d a t i o n w a s effectively practiced by J a p a n e s e t r o o p s in jungle w a r f a r e in W o r l d W a r II; t h e w h o o p i n g "rebel yell" w a s a tactic of C o n f e d e r a t e armies in Civil W a r battles w h e r e the armies w e r e often h i d d e n from each o t h e r in t h e w o o d s . Ulysses S. G r a n t ( 1 8 8 5 / 1 9 9 0 : 55-56) describes an incident in Texas d u r i n g the M e x - ican w a r : traveling w i t h a few riders t h r o u g h a region of tall grass, he w a s d i s t u r b e d by the noise of w h a t seemed to be a large g r o u p of wolves r e a d y t o a t t a c k ; i t t u r n e d o u t t o b e only t w o wolves, w h o became silenced a n d t u r n e d tail as they were finally a p p r o a c h e d . T h e essence of bluster is to magnify the size of a t h r e a t from a safe distance.

As we have seen, the s o u n d of shattering glass m a k e s a d r a m a t i c impres- sion. But it is chiefly used as a form of bluster. British victim surveys s h o w t h a t a l t h o u g h 10 percent of alcohol-related assaults involved t h r e a t e n i n g s o m e o n e w i t h a bottle or glass, in virtually n o n e of these incidents w a s s o m e o n e actually hit w i t h it (Budd 2 0 0 3 : 17).

T h e aggressive use of bluster is sometimes found in situations of racial or class i n t i m i d a t i o n : This can be observed on the streets of large cities like Philadelphia, on the fringes of w h i t e middle-class areas; such e x a m p l e s are analyzed in A n d e r s o n ( 1 9 9 0 ) . T h e following incident is from my o w n o b s e r v a t i o n s :

A r o u g h l y dressed black m a n is m o v i n g restlessly back a n d forth on t h e sidewalk outside a convenience store, s h o u t i n g a n d cursing loudly, scaring m o s t passersby i n t o crossing to the o t h e r side of the street or m a k i n g a w i d e b e r t h a r o u n d him. But t h e situation is stable since it

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goes o n for m a n y m i n u t e s w i t h o u t any further m o v e t o w a r d violence. Police r e p o r t s included no incidents in t h a t area t h a t a f t e r n o o n .

In a n o t h e r o b s e r v a t i o n , the line of c o n f r o n t a t i o n is class r a t h e r t h a n racial:

A w h i t e homeless m a n is s t a n d i n g on the sidewalk across from Ritten- h o u s e Square, s h a k i n g his fist a n d cursing t o w a r d the s q u a r e ; b u t n o t crossing the street. T h i s is a s q u a r e in t h e m i d s t of the upper-middle class residential district, frequently p a t r o l l e d by police a n d strictly p r o - hibiting p a n h a n d l e r s , a l t h o u g h they can be found on adjacent c o m m e r - cial streets. T h e r e is a display of p a l p a b l e unease on the p a r t of beggars w h o a p p r o a c h this forbidden zone; it is a p p a r e n t l y n o t just a m a t t e r of fear of the police if t h e y enter m o r e deeply i n t o these alien zones, b u t is a case similar to t h a t of t r i b a l w a r f a r e in w h i c h the bravest w a r r i o r s will only briefly cross t h e enemy line, t h e n t u r n a n d r u n b a c k , as if stretching a r u b b e r b a n d . As a s p o n t a n e o u s e x p e r i m e n t , I crossed the street directly a t the c o r n e r w h e r e t h e homeless m a n w a s cursing a n d gesturing a n d w a l k e d slowly up to h i m — i n w h a t I believe w a s an ex- pressionless m a n n e r , b u t w i t h o u t indicating fear or i n t i m i d a t i o n . ("We w e r e b o t h of a b o u t e q u a l size: s o m e w h e r e in the r a n g e of 6 ft. tall, nearly 2 0 0 p o u n d s ; his age could h a v e been in the 4 0 s , p r o b a b l y ten or fifteen years y o u n g e r t h a n myself at t h a t time.) As I g o t near h i m (and w i t h o u t ever m a k i n g eye c o n t a c t ) , he s t o p p e d cursing a n d gesturing; it w a s bluster, n o t an a c t u a l invitation to a fight.

Q u i t e possibly t h e m a n w a s mentally ill; b u t t h a t does n o t alter the analysis; even mentally ill p e r s o n s shape their behavior by interacting in s i t u a t i o n s .

W h a t determines w h e t h e r bluster leads o n w a r d t o violence, a n d w h e n is it t a k e n as a sufficient display of o n e ' s situational presence so t h a t it is no longer necessary to fight? T h e issue can be e x a m i n e d in d e p t h in the case of t h e " c o d e of the s t r e e t " in black inner-city poverty a r e a s .

T H E C O D E O F T H E STREET: I N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z E D B L U S T E R A N D T H R E A T

A c c o r d i n g to Elijah A n d e r s o n (1999), t h e street c o d e arises because of the lack of reliable police p r o t e c t i o n , together w i t h t h e feeling t h a t t h e police are prejudiced against everyone in the g h e t t o a n d are as likely to arrest t h e c o m p l a i n i n g p a r t y as t h e p e r p e t r a t o r . Accordingly, each individual tries to d e m o n s t r a t e his ability to t a k e care of himself, to p r o v i d e his o w n p r o t e c t i o n by displaying his willingness to use violence. This p r o p e n s i t y is reinforced by l o n g - s t a n d i n g c o n d i t i o n s of p o v e r t y a n d racial discrimina- t i o n t h a t foster a n alienated a n d distrustful a t t i t u d e t o w a r d m a i n s t r e a m w h i t e society.

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Nevertheless, as A n d e r s o n indicates, a majority of people in these essen- tially unpoliced areas w a n t to lead n o r m a l lives, w i t h regular j o b s , family responsibilities, a n d c o m m u n i t y respectability. I n t h e local i d i o m , m o s t p e o p l e are " d e c e n t , " only a m i n o r i t y are h a r d - c o r e " s t r e e t , " alienated from m a i n s t r e a m values a n d c o m m i t t e d to an o p p o s i t i o n a l w a y of life. But for self-protection, m o s t " d e c e n t " p e o p l e will " g o for s t r e e t " w h e n the s i t u a t i o n seems to call for it: "I can get i g n o r a n t t o o . " Idiomatically, " k n o w i n g w h a t t i m e it i s " is a w a y of expressing the ability to code- switch, k n o w i n g in w h a t situations it is useful to switch from decent to street styles. H a r d - c o r e street p e r s o n s , t o o , o n occasion m a y switch back to t h e " d e c e n t " code; for e x a m p l e , this sometimes h a p p e n s if a street individual is alone in t h e presence of a large g r o u p of m e n of the decent t y p e , w h o are respected, a m o n g other r e a s o n s , because they h a v e also d e m o n s t r a t e d their ability to code-switch in the o p p o s i t e direction (An- d e r s o n 1 9 7 8 ) .

T h e c o d e of the street is a Goffmanian staged p r e s e n t a t i o n of self, albeit a version t h a t sharply inverts o n e aspect of the Goffmanian facework t h a t I h a v e e m p h a s i z e d so far, the m a i n t e n a n c e of a front of civility a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n . For the m o s t p a r t , the street code is frontstage, t h e decent self is b a c k s t a g e . Some p e r s o n s , however, b e c o m e entirely c o m m i t - ted to the code-staging, c a u g h t up in it so t h a t t h e r e seems to be no o t h e r self. T h e r e are instances of being c a u g h t up in a frontstage self in m a n y o t h e r r e a l m s of social life besides street-oriented individuals; for e x a m p l e , it is characteristic of u p p e r - m i d d l e a n d upper-class p e r s o n s w h o prefer their staged public p e r s o n a , since it is a s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h they get p o w e r a n d deference; in c o n t r a s t , working-class p e r s o n s t e n d to prefer their b a c k s t a g e self, since they get m o r e e m o t i o n a l gratification in being free from formal situations in w h i c h they are s u b o r d i n a t e d (Rubin 1 9 7 6 ; Col- lins 2 0 0 4 : 1 1 2 - 1 5 ) . In an analytical sense, the c o m m i t t e d street-oriented individuals are similar to upper-middle-class w o r k a h o l i c s , or to socialite "social butterflies," in t h a t all of t h e m prefer their frontstage selves, since this is w h e r e they get t h e m o s t deference, a n d the m o s t e m o t i o n a l energy.

T h i s is n o t to say t h a t people w h o identify strongly w i t h their frontstage selves, a n d w h o keep up a virtually n o n s t o p p e r f o r m a n c e of the street self, d o n o t h a v e t o engage i n staging w o r k . For s o m e individuals, t h e street code is a superficial self, p e r f o r m e d p a r t - t i m e a n d w i t h varying degrees of distaste a n d unwillingness; for others it has b e c o m e so attractive, or has cut off alternative p e r f o r m a n c e s so t h a t it is all t h a t o n e h a s , a n d it is p e r f o r m e d w i t h considerable c o m m i t m e n t (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 1 0 5 ) . N e v e r - theless, for p e r s o n s all along the c o n t i n u u m of c o m m i t m e n t , it is still a p e r f o r m a n c e for an audience, a n d hence m u s t deal w i t h the usual Goff- m a n i a n difficulties a n d techniques of social p e r f o r m a n c e . In the case of the p e r f o r m a n c e of a violent self, one of t h o s e difficulties is h o w to sur- m o u n t the n o r m a l condition of tension/fear in violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; the

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street c o d e is especially theatrical, stagey, because this especially s t r o n g difficulty has to be o v e r c o m e .

Let us n o w e x a m i n e t h e several c o m p o n e n t s of h o w the street code is staged.

First, the c o d e involves presenting oneself w i t h a distinctive visual a p - p e a r a n c e t h r o u g h clothing style, g r o o m i n g , a n d accessories. T h e typical style of the 1 9 9 0 s , for males, included baggy p a n t s , or p a n t s w o r n exag- geratedly l o w o n t h e hips, u n t i e d sneakers, a n d ball caps t u r n e d a r o u n d b a c k w a r d . 1 1 T h e s e are items of a n t i n o m i a n self-presentation. T h e y t a k e their m e a n i n g because they p o i n t e d l y reverse c o n v e n t i o n a l styles of de- m e a n o r ; they are m e m b e r s h i p m a r k e r s of a g r o u p flouting the symbols of t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l g r o u p a n d t h e r e b y signaling a defiant a t t i t u d e t o w a r d its values. T h e y are m e m b e r s h i p m a r k e r s in a counter-culture, an expres- sion of rejection of w h i t e m a i n s t r e a m society. They also imply a symbolic rejection of " d e c e n t " black society for a d h e r i n g to w h i t e lifestyle, referred to as " g o i n g for w h i t e . " 1 2

A n o t h e r c o m p o n e n t of bodily d e m e a n o r , however, is n o t a n t i n o m i a n at all, b u t a display of status claims. T h i s is expressed by w e a r i n g expensive athletic suits a n d shoes, a n d prestigious b r a n d n a m e items. T h e r e is a s u b - tle message here as well; in an area of pervasive poverty, w e a r i n g expen- sive c l o t h e s — a n d even m o r e so, jewelry—implies y o u h a v e o v e r c o m e p o v - erty by " s t r e e t " m e a n s ; o s t e n t a t i o u s w e a l t h comes m o s t often from the d r u g business, b u t single items of clothing such as jackets can be stolen from o t h e r s , a n d a " d e c e n t " p e r s o n w e a r i n g such an item m a y be a t t a c k e d for t h a t r e a s o n . T h u s there is an element of visual b o a s t i n g in w e a r i n g such clothes.

A second element of the c o d e is a style of t a l k . P a r t of this is a special- ized v o c a b u l a r y a n d i d i o m , parallel to t h a t of a n y g r o u p t h a t m a r k s itself off as distinctive. Equally i m p o r t a n t is t h e paralinguistic style, n o t w h a t is said but h o w one talks. T h e street style is generally loud a n d a c c o m p a - nied by exaggerated gestures. T h e e m p h a s i s is on vocally t a k i n g the initia- tive and thus t a k i n g c o m m a n d of the s i t u a t i o n . This leads to verbal spar- ring, with an emphasis of quick repartee, n o t letting a n o t h e r p e r s o n ' s verbal move go unchallenged. Some of the speech action includes verbal aggressiveness: teasing, joking, and boasting. This is a c o n t i n u u m of chal- lenge, r a n g i n g from playful h u m o r up to explicit hostile boasts a n d in- sults. T h e middle of this c o n t i n u u m includes w h a t black athletes refer to as " t r a s h t a l k i n g . "

These forms of talking m a k e up an o n g o i n g claim to d o m i n a t e the inter- actional space, or at least to keep up with the level of challenge a n d avoid being d o m i n a t e d . In Goffmanian t e r m s , an aggressive talking style is a frontstage p r e s e n t a t i o n of self; in A n d e r s o n ' s analysis, it is an a t t e m p t to

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avoid violence by b o a s t i n g a n d bluster, projecting an image of confidence in o n e ' s ability to fight well.

N o t i c e an a d d i t i o n a l implication of verbal staging of the street c o d e . Some violence is avoided, n o t by deterrence b u t by s h o w i n g m e m b e r s h i p . T h e display of symbols s h o w s t h a t one belongs to the g r o u p — i n this case, the g r o u p t h a t adheres to the c o d e . They are m a r k s of solidarity; a n d this in itself sometimes inhibits violence. A n d e r s o n gives an e x a m p l e (personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n , O c t . 2 0 0 2 ) :

In a racially mixed middle-class area on the edge of the poverty z o n e , an integrated g r o u p w a s having a street p a r t y for local families, a n d the end of the street w a s blocked off to cars. A car carrying t w o drug- dealers, displaying the street style, drove their car past the barrier and proceeded slowly up the street, a p p a r e n t l y looking for an address; by their actions a n d postures they were expressing c o n t e m p t a n d mild hos- tility t o w a r d the middle-class scene they h a d p e n e t r a t e d . M o s t of the local people shrank from any c o n f r o n t a t i o n . However, one black m a n , a resident of the block, a p p r o a c h e d the d r u g dealers a n d spoke to t h e m , using the idiom of the street code. His message w a s scolding, telling t h e m they s h o u l d n ' t be d i s r u p t i n g the family-oriented block p a r t y w i t h their car; the d r u g dealers t o o k the r e b u k e , n o t by escalating into a fight, but backing d o w n apologetically.

In A n d e r s o n ' s analysis, the local resident w a s able to establish m e m b e r - ship with the d r u g dealers by speaking in the street code; but he m o d u l a t e d his message so t h a t the c o n t e n t of w h a t he said did not lead to an escala- tion of insults and a struggle over c o n t r o l of the situation, but to redefin- ing the situation as o n e in which aggressive action w a s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e verbal p a r t of the street code is m a d e up of b o t h messages of solidarity and specific messages a b o u t d o m i n a n c e a n d t h r e a t ; invoking the first can reduce chances of violence, while invoking the latter increases t h e m .

T h e r e is also a subtle, tacit form of m e m b e r s h i p being tested in talk. It is a test as to w h e t h e r one recognizes w h a t kind of g a m e is being played at t h a t m o m e n t . T h e insider can tell the difference between w h a t is a serious t h r e a t , a n d w h a t is staged front or bluster; w h e n insults are an entertaining g a m e , a n d when they are a challenge to d o m i n a t e or being d o m i n a t e d . T h u s , if the g a m e is played well by all persons present, m e m - bership is confirmed and violence is avoided. T h e r e is also the danger t h a t the test will n o t be passed; the g a m e of e n t e r t a i n i n g insults may go badly, either because one person fails to keep up with the repartee a n d is m a d e to look like an easy victim, or an interloper, or b o t h — t h u s m a k i n g him a target for violence; or because the person w h o fails in the verbal g a m e refuses to t a k e verbal defeat a n d escalates to violence on his o w n initia-

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t i v e . 1 3 T h e verbal ritual has an e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t at w h i c h it inhibits vio- lence, b u t it is a d a n g e r o u s g a m e t h a t can m o v e to violence if it fails.

T h e t h i r d aspect of t h e street c o d e is to present oneself as explicitly willing to use violence; in its strongest form, it is a p e r f o r m a n c e of the t h r e a t h e r e - a n d - n o w . This m a y be very direct; at t h e first sign of challenge, o n e immediately goes on t h e offensive. A n d e r s o n ( 1 9 9 9 : 8 0 - 8 4 ) gives an e x a m p l e of a fifteen-year-old, Tyree, w h o has m o v e d i n t o a n e w n e i g h b o r - h o o d ; as an outsider, he is accosted by the local g r o u p of teenagers a n d b e a t e n up (since they o u t n u m b e r h i m t w e n t y to one). To get some respect b a c k , the n e x t time he sees one of this g r o u p alone, Tyree immediately a t t a c k s h i m . Both f i g h t s are limited a n d ritualistic; w h e n t h e g r o u p f i r s t e n c o u n t e r s Tyree, w h o m they r e g a r d as an interloper in the n e i g h b o r - h o o d , they "roll o n h i m , " w i t h m o s t o f t h e g r o u p r o t a t i n g s o everyone c a n get in a p u n c h . T h i s is distinguished from "messing s o m e o n e u p , " causing serious injury t h a t w o u l d send the victim to the h o s p i t a l . Simi- larly, Tyree retaliates against an individual g r o u p m e m b e r by p u n c h i n g h i m a few times a n d b l o o d y i n g his n o s e . T h e fight ends w i t h a verbal a c k n o w l e d g m e n t a n d q u a s i b o a s t : "You g o t me t h a t t i m e , b u t I'll be b a c k ! " To w h i c h Tyree r e s p o n d s w i t h a b o a s t : "Yeah, y o u a n d y o ' m a m a " (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 84).

T h e r e are b o t h stronger a n d milder versions of the display of willing- ness to use violence. T h e a c t u a l d a m a g e i n t e n d e d can be m o r e serious, including t h e use of w e a p o n s . Or the display m a y merely t a k e t h e form of s h o w i n g signs of being t o u g h : building up o n e ' s muscles so t h a t o n e looks imposing; p u t t i n g on a t h r e a t e n i n g d e m e a n o r ; displaying w e a p o n s ; blustering a n d cursing directed either at s o m e o n e in particular, or just at the general e n v i r o n m e n t . A g o o d deal of this is Goffmanian staging; it is n o t so m u c h a w a y of l o o k i n g for a fight as of getting d o m i n a n c e over the s i t u a t i o n , a n d t h u s s i t u a t i o n a l respect, w i t h o u t actually having t o f i g h t . But the same devices t h a t can be used to avoid fighting can also, if t a k e n the w r o n g way, lead t o escalation into a c t u a l violence.

I n w h a t w a y s , t h e n , does displaying t h e street c o d e c o n t r o l a n d limit violence, a n d w h e n does it cause violence? We m i g h t expect t h a t staging the street c o d e limits violence; in A n d e r s o n ' s a r g u m e n t , it is usually a pretense of violence a n d a display of o n e ' s capacity to p r o t e c t oneself, designed to deter violence. Displaying the code also indicates m e m b e r - ship, so t h a t there is no cause to fight s o m e o n e as an outsider. An a d d i - t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n comes from o u r general analysis of violence: t e n s i o n a n d fear are t h e c o m m o n h u m a n feelings in hostile c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , m a k - ing the actual p e r f o r m a n c e of violence difficult. T h u s the street c o d e , as a socially institutionalized w a y of presenting a s h o w of aggressiveness, m i g h t be expected to stabilize behavior at just t h a t p o i n t w h e r e it stops s h o r t of a c t u a l violence. But this also m e a n s t h a t the street c o d e , as a

How Fights Start, or Not • 3 5 3

g r a d u a t e d c o n t i n u u m of degrees of aggressiveness a n d t h r e a t , also allows for a considerable a m o u n t of mild violence; it falls u n d e r the general p a t - tern t h a t socially limited a n d controlled violence allows violence to go on longer a n d m o r e chronically t h a n violence in situations w h e r e it is n o t c h a n n e l e d by mild a n d p r o t e c t e d forms.

C o n s i d e r n o w four different kinds of fighting in the inner-city g h e t t o , r a n g i n g from relatively limited a n d c o n t r o l l e d , to serious a n d o u t of c o n t r o l :

Gang fights. Especially a m o n g teenagers, these fights are c h r o n i c b u t limited in several respects. G a n g fights are directed against m e m b e r s of o t h e r gangs, or against o t h e r y o u n g males of the same age as t h e g a n g m e m b e r s , w h o are r e g a r d e d as interlopers in the n e i g h b o r h o o d or terri- tory. Teen gangs typically do n o t a t t a c k a d u l t s ; A n d e r s o n ( 1 9 9 9 : 83) indi- cates t h a t older w o m e n in the n e i g h b o r h o o d m a y r e g a r d it as safe because the g r o u p s of y o u t h s are n o t hostile to t h e m , a n d even p r o t e c t t h e m . By the s a m e t o k e n , children b e l o w t h e gang age are n o t a t t a c k e d , a l t h o u g h they m a y fight each other. Fighting is t h u s segregated by age g r o u p ; a n d generally also by gender.

In p a r t this is because fighting has a ritualistic significance as tests of m e m b e r s h i p a n d g r o u p b o u n d a r i e s . Entering into a gang typically in- volves fighting as an initiation rite. A n d e r s o n ' s a c c o u n t of Tyree's experi- ence s h o w s him going t h r o u g h a series of fights of this sort: first a r o u g h " i n t r o d u c t i o n " ritual of being rolled on by the w h o l e g a n g , m a k i n g every- one formally a w a r e of each o t h e r ; then some small individual fights as Tyree tries to establish respect; finally he is allowed a full-fledged, formal test of entry, in w h i c h he explicitly negotiates to fight one of the g r o u p while the others w a t c h (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 8 5 - 8 7 ) . He is required to fight an older a n d bigger y o u t h , six inches taller a n d forty p o u n d s heavier, for a b o u t t w e n t y m i n u t e s ; as expected by everyone, he loses the fight, but he gains respect by c o n t i n u i n g to s c r a p a n d by inflicting some d a m a g e on his stronger o p p o n e n t . As the result of this fight, he is t a k e n into the gang.

Fights of this sort are limited in several respects. Except w h e r e an o u t - sider is "rolled o n " by the entire g r o u p , these are set up as o n e - o n - o n e fights with others staying o u t . And there are rough guidelines or rules as to w h a t kind of blows are allowed a n d disallowed; these are fights with fists, n o t with w e a p o n s ; scratching a n d biting may be a l l o w e d , but n o t eye g o u g i n g or blows to the genitals. O n c e an individual is a m e m b e r of the g a n g , he m a y c o n t i n u e to have fights, including with his close friends a n d allies, over p a r t i c u l a r a n n o y a n c e s a n d incidents of disrespect; these are supposed to be fair fights, with rules such as " n o hitting in the face," " y o u got to use just y o u r h a n d s , " a n d " n o d o u b l e - t e a m i n g " (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 8 9 - 9 0 ) . A n d e r s o n describes a fight of this sort t h a t goes on for a b o u t twenty m i n u t e s ; this is far longer than intense, unlimited fights, a n d

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it is m a d e possible because t h e fighters limit the a m o u n t of serious fighting included in it: " M a l i k a n d Tyree d a n c e a n d spar, huffing a n d puffing, d o d g i n g a n d feinting. To t h e onlooker, it a p p e a r s to be a g a m e , for real b l o w s seem h a r d l y to be e x c h a n g e d . " I n a d v e r t e n t violations of t h e agreed- u p o n rules, such as a slap to t h e face, are quickly followed by an apology, to avert a r a p i d escalation to m o r e serious violence. Successfully per- forming this k i n d of ritual, A n d e r s o n p o i n t s o u t , strengthens t h e p e r s o n a l b o n d s of those w h o have gone t h r o u g h it; they h a v e s h o w n they can settle their differences, display their t o u g h n e s s , a n d keep the fighting at a ritual- istic equilibrium.

This kind of ritualistic fighting t h a t limits the d a m a g e d o n e a p p e a r s to be m o s t characteristic of gangs t h a t are institutionalized as relatively e n d u r i n g g r o u p s . But t h e r e are also ad h o c g r o u p s of allies t h a t m a y get mobilized in p a r t i c u l a r situations to p r o t e c t one of their m e m b e r s . Rela- tives, n e i g h b o r s , a n d friends m a y rally a r o u n d , especially on their front p o r c h or in front of their h o u s e , to p r o t e c t one of their o w n from a t h r e a t (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 4 1 - 4 2 ) . These a d h o c g r o u p s m a y well b e m o r e danger- ous a n d unlimited in their violence, w h e n they h a p p e n to use it, t h a n gangs t h a t h a v e institutionalized the m e t h o d s a n d occasions of fighting. An e x a m p l e t o o k place in s u m m e r 2 0 0 2 in the Chicago South Side w h e n a v a n driven by a d r u n k e n driver accidentally r a n i n t o a family g r o u p p a r t y i n g on their d o o r s t e p (Los Angeles Times, A u g . 2 - 5 , 2 0 0 2 ) . A twenty-six-year-old w o m a n w a s c a u g h t u n d e r t h e v a n a n d badly injured, a l o n g w i t h t w o o t h e r w o m e n . T h r e e relatives o f t h e t r a p p e d w o m a n , all m e n in their forties, a l o n g w i t h four y o u n g e r m e n a n d teenagers, pulled t h e t w o o c c u p a n t s o f t h e v a n o u t a n d s t o m p e d a n d kicked t h e m repeat- edly, as well as beating t h e m w i t h a concrete block. Both victims of the a t t a c k died. T h e case a t t r a c t e d considerable media a t t e n t i o n , in p a r t be- cause news stories described a c r o w d of a b o u t one h u n d r e d o n l o o k e r s w h o w a t c h e d the a t t a c k b u t did n o t intervene t o s t o p it. This outsider v i e w p o i n t fails to c a t c h the d y n a m i c s of the situation: in the c o n t e x t of t h e street c o d e , the violent i n t r u s i o n by the v a n into the family g r o u p w a s t a k e n as an assault to be m e t by a g r o u p c o u n t e r - a t t a c k ; the w o m e n hit by the v a n w e r e avenged by their relatives a n d friends, w h o no d o u b t felt a t the m o m e n t t h a t their g r o u p ' s r e p u t a t i o n w a s a t stak e, a s well a s the life of o n e of their family. T h e c o u n t e r - a t t a c k also h a s the c h a r a c t e r of a f o r w a r d p a n i c , as t h e s i t u a t i o n of s u d d e n shock is t u r n e d i n t o o n e w h e r e o v e r w h e l m i n g a d v a n t a g e is on one side; clearly t h e c o u n t e r - a t t a c k e r s be- c o m e e n t r a i n e d in their o w n repetitive m o t i o n s , engaging in overkill, w i t h o n e m a n (a forty-four-year-old b r o t h e r of t h e victim) described as s t o m p - ing a n d kicking b o t h victims " u n t i l h e w a s o u t o f b r e a t h . " T h e u n r e - strained violence of a f o r w a r d p a n i c is always shocking to everyone o b - serving from a distance. T h e analytical p o i n t , however, is t h a t the

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u n r e s t r a i n e d violence is m o r e characteristic of g r o u p s t h a t lack ritualized p r o c e d u r e s for carrying o u t r o u t i n e violence. This c o m p a r i s o n brings o u t w a y s in w h i c h the c h r o n i c violence of gangs, w i t h all its ritualized p r o c e - d u r e s , is generally m o r e restrained t h a n t h e violence of t h o s e situationally mobilized g r o u p s t h a t w e are p r o n e t o call " m o b s . "

Individual fights over reputation. Such fights arise w h e r e the street c o d e of aggressive gesture a n d a t t e m p t s at situational d o m i n a n c e brings a b o u t escalation r a t h e r t h a n equilibrium. T h e c o d e is essentially p o s t u r i n g , b u t it carries t h e d a n g e r t h a t t h e p o s t u r i n g will n o t be accepted; it is a type of Goffmanian p e r f o r m a n c e p r o b l e m w h e r e the p e r f o r m e r fails to find the signs from t h e audience t h a t his p e r f o r m a n c e is being accepted. H e n c e t h e v a r i o u s m i n o r w ays in w h i c h being " d i s s e d , " disrespected, can lead to fights. In m a n y such fights, it is n o t necessary to w i n the fight; all o n e has to s h o w is t h a t o n e is willing to fight, to inflict a n d , if necessary, t a k e s o m e physical d a m a g e . This restores or establishes m e m b e r s h i p in a c o m m u n i t y of t o u g h guys. Such fights are often tacitly limited, in w a y s like t h o s e in w h i c h gang fights are limited, to reestablishing ritual e q u i l i b r i u m in the m u t u a l self-presentation of bluster t h a t m a k e s up t h e street c o d e .

A d h e r e n t s of the c o d e m a y also a t t a c k those w h o are perceived as cul- t u r a l outsiders, a s " s t r a i g h t . " H e r e again the i m m e d i a t e r a t i o n a l e t e n d s to be a m a t t e r of feeling disrespected; a p e r s o n w h o is doing well in school, w h o dresses in a c o n v e n t i o n a l w a y rejecting the local style, a n d t h e r e b y identifying w i t h t h e m i d d l e class, m a y end u p being a t t a c k e d , a n d the a t t a c k e r or a t t a c k e r s will justify their action as m o r a l l y p r o p e r as " w h o does he t h i n k he i s , " or " t h a t will s h o w h i m for going for w h i t e " (Ander- son 1999: 9 3 - 9 5 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 ) . Girls are a t t a c k e d by o t h e r girls, w i t h similar r a t i o n a l e , if they are t a k e n as p r e s e n t i n g themselves as superior in school achievement, or just because they are prettier (in w h i c h case t h e violence m a y t r y to disfigure t h e m by scratching or by pulling o u t their h a i r ) . 1 4 Such a t t a c k s h a v e a h i d d e n underside b e y o n d the overt r a t i o n a l e of claiming to feel disrespected. As we h a v e seen, fighting is n o t easy to mobilize, a n d one w a y in w h i c h to build up the confidence to fight is to c h o o s e an easy victim; individuals w h o are c o n v e n t i o n a l , n o t displaying the gestures a n d signs of the street c o d e , are t a k e n as easy targets.

As n o t e d , we s h o u l d n o t t a k e t o o literally the claim t h a t fights in the p o v e r t y z o n e occur because of lack of r e s p e c t . 1 5 T h e claim to h a v e been " d i s s e d " is a justification, a situational ideology. Some p e r s o n s aggres- sively seek o u t occasions to be t o u c h y over disrespect; the same p e r s o n , in o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s , lets a gesture or action go by, in g o o d Goffmanian fashion, to k e e p up the flow of the s i t u a t i o n . T h e difference often h a s to do w i t h w h e t h e r t h e r e is an a p p r o p r i a t e t a r g e t present, s o m e o n e w h o is w e a k e n o u g h to be safely a t t a c k e d , or s o m e o n e w h o is an a p p r o p r i a t e r e p u t a t i o n - b u i l d e r w h e n o n e is on a c a m p a i g n to increase one's respect.

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Respect is n o t a question of o n e ' s generalized status before an a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n of Society, b u t in t h e eyes of p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s w h o are re- g a r d e d as significant; m a k i n g o n e ' s w a y i n t o a gang m a k e s one t o u c h y a b o u t disrespect from certain p e r s o n s b u t n o t o t h e r s , w h o s e o p i n i o n s d o n o t c o u n t . Fighting for respect is really fighting for r e p u t a t i o n : the former w a y of p u t t i n g it m a k e s it s o u n d m o r e legitimate t h a n t h e latter.

Individuals w h o code-switch, p u t t i n g on a front of t h e street c o d e , r u n a danger w h e n going u p against s o m e o n e w h o i s m u c h m o r e h a r d - c o r e street. A n d e r s o n (personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n , Nov. 2 0 0 2 ; for c o n t e x t see A n d e r s o n 1978) gives an e x a m p l e from field research in C h i c a g o in the 1 9 7 0 s :

T w o m e n are involved in a dice g a m e outside a l i q u o r store; o n e of t h e m , T J , is a " r e g u l a r " (in A n d e r s o n 1 9 9 9 his o r i e n t a t i o n w o u l d be called " d e c e n t " ) ; t h e other, Stick, is a " h o o d l u m " (in A n d e r s o n ' s later terminology, h a r d - c o r e street). T h e t w o get i n t o a n a r g u m e n t over w h o w o n the p o i n t . TJ, w h o is already v e n t u r i n g i n t o the region of the street code by playing dice w i t h a h o o d l u m , slaps Stick's face. T h e n , as if realizing w h a t he has d o n e , he t u r n s a n d r u n s . Stick is furious to h a v e been slapped by a "regular." He s h o u t s at the c r o w d : " H e stole m e ! " Stick chases after TJ, cuts his face w i t h a knife; t h e n still angry, he steals T J ' s wallet, a n d finally b u r n s it, as if m e r e injury a n d r o b b e r y are n o t e n o u g h to exorcise the insult. He acts as if he has been violated in his status as a h o o d l u m , a n d m u s t engage in a ritual of o s t e n t a t i o u s destruc- tiveness to get his status b a c k . T h e victim m a k e s it easy to do so, t u r n i n g the s i t u a t i o n i n t o a t t a c k i n g the w e a k .

Yet a n o t h e r type of a t t a c k is related in a r o u n d - a b o u t w a y to m a n e u v e r - ing for respect in the local hierarchy. As we have seen, p a r t of the visual display of m e m b e r s h i p involves w e a r i n g expensive, locally fashionable clothes. S o m e o n e w h o is t o o p o o r to afford these items will n o t only feel disrespected b u t will be disrespected by their o w n i m m e d i a t e peers, w h o m a y jeer a t t h e m for their p o o r clothes. Persons w h o h a p p e n t o b e w e a r i n g prestigious clothes o r athletic shoes, b u t w h o are situationally w e a k — because t h e y are n o t p a r t of the street culture a n d its g a n g alliances—are p r i m e targets for stealing their clothes or i n t i m i d a t i n g t h e m i n t o giving t h e m up (by " l o a n i n g " t h e m ) . W h a t is going on here is a Goffmanian backstage activity, getting the materials t o g e t h e r w i t h w h i c h to present one's frontstage. T h i s t o o generates a limited a m o u n t of violence.

So far I h a v e been listing k i n d s of fights t h a t involve efforts to m a i n t a i n m e m b e r s h i p , to be p a r t of t h e g r o u p on a p a r w i t h o t h e r s . Some individu- als aim higher t h a n this; they w a n t n o t just t o h o l d their o w n b u t t o d o m i - n a t e others a n d be recognized as one of t h e d o m i n a n t s , t h e t r u e t o u g h guys. T h e reasons w h y a p a r t i c u l a r individual will t a k e this p a t h m a y well

How Fights Start, or Not • 357

be m o r e emergent t h a n pr edi s pos i t i onal , arising from a chain of o p p o r t u - nities t h a t o p e n s up in t h a t direction. An individual w h o finds success in s i t u a t i o n a l i n t i m i d a t i o n by w o r d a n d gesture, a n d in the fights t h a t sometimes ensue, will feel a t t r a c t e d to try for greater success in t h a t direc- t i o n . In t e r m s of i n t e r a c t i o n ritual theory, they find their payoffs in e m o - t i o n a l energy are greatest in these kinds of situations, a n d t h u s are at- t r a c t e d by a species of e m o t i o n a l m a g n e t i s m t o w a r d situations in w h i c h their e m o t i o n a l energy c o n t i n u e s to rise. This m a y also h a v e an effect of b u r n i n g their bridges back to the " d e c e n t " w o r l d ; w h a t starts o u t as a s i t u a t i o n a l defensiveness of p e r f o r m i n g the street c o d e , can shift over i n t o a deeper p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t . Because t h e y are o u t s t a n d i n g l y successful in t h e interactions enacting the street c o d e , they are n o t just " g o i n g for s t r e e t " b u t feel t h a t they are street—they w a n t all situations to be street s i t u a t i o n s , because these are the situations in w h i c h they shine.

To do so involves r e p u t a t i o n - b u i l d i n g . This is a m a t t e r of going up t h e hierarchy, starting w i t h average o r m i n i m a l m e m b e r s h i p , a n d p r o c e e d i n g o n w a r d to higher levels of r e p u t a t i o n for t o u g h n e s s . Ambitiously seeking r e p u t a t i o n necessarily involves having m o r e fights, a l t h o u g h this does n o t m e a n fighting all the time. At the l o w e r r a n k s , one picks easy targets: outsiders t o the street c o d e , o r n e w c o m e r s t o the locale w h o are being h a z e d a n d initiated into the g r o u p . T h e t a r g e t s , however, c a n n o t b e t o o easy. M a l e s do n o t get r e p u t a t i o n by a t t a c k i n g females; cross-gender fights do h a p p e n , b u t these typically t a k e place in p r i v a t e , in t h e h o m e , in rela- t i o n s h i p s w h e r e sexual p r o p e r t y or h o u s e h o l d a u t h o r i t y is being enforced. But these c a r r y no weight in the h i e r a r c h y of the street. Similarly, a l t h o u g h females do n o t d o m i n a t e the street g r o u p , they can h a v e a parallel hierar- chy; girls will f i g h t other girls, a d u l t w o m e n f i g h t o t h e r w o m e n ; w h e n muggings t a k e place, older w o m e n in the black c o m m u n i t y are generally e x e m p t from a t t a c k s by males, b u t m a y get m u g g e d by gangs of girls. T h u s t h e status hierarchy of t o u g h n e s s limits violence in a n o t h e r respect: only p e r s o n s in a p a r t i c u l a r status are n o r m a l l y targets for violence by p a r t i c u l a r a t t a c k e r s .

Getting i n t o the higher levels of the h i e r a r c h y involves t a k i n g on per- sons w h o are themselves k n o w n t o b e extremely t o u g h : because they are especially r e a d y to fight, because they w i n their fights, a n d because they are willing to escalate t h e a m o u n t of violence by using w e a p o n s . In m o v - ing up t h e hierarchy, o n e m a y try to establish a r e p u t a t i o n for being s o m e - o n e w h o m it is d a n g e r o u s to cross in any respect, s o m e o n e w h o can be set off into a high level of violence by very m i n o r p r o v o c a t i o n s . T h u s o n e m a y build a r e p u t a t i o n — w h e t h e r as a conscious strategy, or by inadver- tently drifting d o w n this p a t h w a y — b y acting " c r a z y . " 1 6 This h a s the effect t h a t m a n y people will defer to h i m , giving h i m t h e victory in the bluster a n d t h r e a t of o r d i n a r y street c o d e i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e m a n w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n

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as " c r a z y " does n o t necessarily have to act crazy very often, o n c e he has established the r e p u t a t i o n , since m o s t p e o p l e , especially those only mildly c o m m i t t e d or e m b e d d e d in the street c o d e , will defer to him.

Clearly, the hierarchy of d o m i n a n c e w i t h i n the street w o r l d p r o m o t e s violence, at a higher level of incidence a n d destructiveness t h a n the ground-level of mere m e m b e r s h i p , getting by as sufficiently t o u g h to be accepted. Yet even w i t h i n the higher r u n g s of the r e p u t a t i o n a l hierarchy, t h e code still o p e r a t e s situationally. A deft e n a c t m e n t of the c o d e m a y h e a d off violence a n d still bring r e p u t a t i o n , as we see in the following e x a m p l e (Anderson 2 0 0 1 , p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) :

A m a n w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n as a killer is sitting in a night s p o t at a table w i t h a sexy-looking w o m a n , w i t h w h o m he has an intense r e l a t i o n s h i p . He gets up to go to t h e toilet; in the m e a n t i m e a second m a n , also w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n as a killer, sits d o w n a n d starts talking to the w o m a n . T h e first t o u g h guy r e t u r n s a n d d e m a n d s , in a t h r e a t e n i n g way, to k n o w w h a t ' s going on. T h e second t o u g h guy s t a n d s a n d says, " I d i d n ' t t h i n k she w a s y o u r kind of w o m a n . " First t o u g h guy pushes o p e n his jacket so t h a t everyone c a n see the b u t t of his gun; a n d says: " I ' m letting y o u live—for n o w . " H e t h e n roughly grabs t h e w o m a n b y the a r m , says " c o m e on bitch, w e ' r e getting o u t of h e r e , " a n d leaves.

T h e e n c o u n t e r is a deliberate challenge, a n d each m a n escalates it at each m o v e . They h a v e b o t h s h o w n they are t o u g h , c o u r a g e o u s , willing t o fight; b u t they also s h o w t h a t they are g o o d at verbal r e p a r t e e . Tough guy n u m b e r t w o gets credit for his b l a t a n t m o v e a n d p u t d o w n of s o m e o n e w i t h a very high r e p u t a t i o n for d a n g e r o u s n e s s ; t o u g h guy n u m b e r o n e c o u n t e r s w i t h a d r a m a t i c m o v e t h a t b o t h escalates a n d equilibrates the s i t u a t i o n . F u r t h e r evidence t h a t this is t h e case comes from t h e aftermath; m o n t h s later, the t w o m e n still h a d n o t fought. T h e story of their e n c o u n - ter circulated widely; the fact t h a t they h a v e carried it off enhances b o t h their r e p u t a t i o n s . T h e y w e r e n o t faking it; their p r i o r r e p u t a t i o n s p r o v e t h a t they could have killed s o m e o n e . But they also h a d keenly judged on a tacit level just w h a t t h e y could d o , t h a t w o u l d be b o t h p r o v o c a t i v e a n d satisfactory to their a u d i e n c e . In this case, t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n is so dramatically a p p r o p r i a t e , so fitting as a coup de theatre, t h a t a n y further fighting w o u l d be an a n t i c l i m a x . To k e e p up a high level of r e p u t a t i o n , o n e m u s t t a k e on others at a high level; the t o p level t o u g h guys need each other, to be at t h e t o p . T h e code allows t h e m a r e p e r t o i r e by w h i c h they c a n express this; as a d r a m a t i c gesture, t h e insults a n d t h r e a t s c a n w o r k even better t h a n a c t u a l violence.

Drug business violence and stickups. C o n n e c t e d to the street c o d e are t w o o t h e r forms of violence. These are serious, often deadly, a n d n o t re- g a r d e d a s e n t e r t a i n i n g . T h e y d o n o t a t t r a c t enthusiastic audiences, a n d

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typically are carried o u t in as much privacy as possible. D r u g business violence occurs because t h e activities of an illegal business are n o t regu- lated by law, a n d t h e r e is no w a y to t a k e disputes to settlement by t h e official forms of lawsuits a n d c o u r t enforcement. Violence occurs in sev- eral forms of the self-regulation of business: turf w a r s , c o m p e t i t i o n for customers in a p a r t i c u l a r location; deals gone b a d , w h i c h is to say t r a n s a c - tions in w h i c h o n e p a r t y or the o t h e r w a s dissatisfied w i t h the quality or delivery of g o o d s or p a y m e n t ; enforcement of discipline in a business hierarchy, such as higher level distributors m a k i n g sure t h a t lower level dealers pass a l o n g the m o n e y they have collected, or t h a t they do n o t steal drugs they have been consigned (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 1 1 4 - 1 9 ) .

D r u g business violence is in a sense w i t h i n the c o d e , as a form of intimi- d a t i o n in the absence of legitimate state a u t h o r i t y to settle disputes. D r u g violence occurs in a quasi-predictable way, as p a r t of the o p e r a t i o n of an illegal o r g a n i z a t i o n . Stickups, however, t h r e a t e n unpredictably. A r m e d r o b b e r s o p e r a t e alone, or at m o s t in small g r o u p s of t w o or t h r e e (one of these m a y be a w o m a n w h o acts mainly as l o o k o u t or driver); r o b b e r i e s are m o r e clandestine t h a n o t h e r forms of violence, involve m o r e deception a n d p l a n n i n g , a n d sharing o u t t h e loot a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s ; all these are r e a s o n s to keep the n u m b e r of r o b b e r s small. T h i s also m e a n s t h a t r o b b e r s have m u c h less social s u p p o r t ; they are n o t looked up t o , even w i t h i n the street c o m m u n i t y , the w a y successful d r u g dealers are.

T h e t w o forms of illegal activity t e n d to clash; the best targets for r o b - bers, inside the p o v e r t y c o m m u n i t y , are d r u g dealers, since they h a v e t h e m o s t money. A n d t h e r o b b e r y of a dealer, especially after he has sold his drugs b u t before he has p a i d off his supplier, creates ramifications up the chain. T h e dealer w h o has been r o b b e d a n d c a n n o t p a y n o w will b e s u b - ject t o violent s a n c t i o n from those t o w h o m h e owes money, a n d s o o n t h r o u g h o u t the circuit of d r u g cash ( a l t h o u g h p r o b a b l y w i t h diminishing effects higher up as the a m o u n t of m o n e y missing because of any one stickup becomes p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y less). A r m e d r o b b e r s in one sense m i g h t be t h o u g h t of as t h e t o u g h e s t of t h e t o u g h , p r e d a t o r s w h o prey u p o n the o t h e r elite of the street c o d e , the d r u g dealers. But r o b b e r s are n o t ac- c o r d e d r e p u t a t i o n in the same sense; the c o m m o n t e r m for t h e m , " s t i c k u p b o y s " (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 1 3 0 , 81), indicates c o n t e m p t , given t h a t the t e r m " b o y " is avoided in the black c o m m u n i t y for its historical c o n n o t a t i o n s of racist condescension.

In a sense, b o t h d r u g business violence a n d stickups are e n c o u r a g e d by the street c o d e , since it socially legitimates a n d celebrates an a n t i n o m i a n a t t i t u d e , a n d provides techniques of situational self-assertion a n d intimi- d a t i o n . D r u g violence a n d stickups can use the c o d e display as a device for getting c o m p l i a n c e ; victims w h o k n o w the c o d e c a n recognize the w a r n i n g signs early a n d give up their valuables, h e a d i n g off further vio-

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lence (Anderson 1 9 9 9 : 1 2 6 - 2 8 ) . These are i n s t r u m e n t a l uses of t h e code on t h e p a r t of t h e aggressors, going considerably b e y o n d t h e merely defen- sive Goffmanian front t h a t " d e c e n t " people p u t o n , or the m e m b e r s h i p ritual violence involved in y o u t h g a n g s . 1 7 T h e d r u g business is n o t merely g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p , b u t an alternative status hierarchy; as in all hierar- chies, t h e r e is relatively less r o o m as one ascends, a n d hence m o r e p r o s - pects for using the code violently to m a k e o n e ' s way, or even just to fend off rivals. Stickups, however, p u s h the c o d e to its edge, a n d even o u t s i d e the b o u n d s of the c o m m u n i t y . Even in a c o m m u n i t y organized on an anti- n o m i a n stance against the straight w o r l d , it is possible to go t o o far. To do so is to risk isolation a n d loss of status.

In general, t h e n , the street c o d e is institutionalized bluster, a n d at a lesser degree of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , institutionalized b o a s t i n g . It stabilizes in- t e r a c t i o n at a level t h a t is a l m o s t violent, by polite middle-class Goffman- ian s t a n d a r d s . Sometimes it goes over the edge, b u t in a relatively limited way, considering t h a t t h e stance is to project a great deal of p o t e n t i a l violence. T h e street code is a s t r o n g e x a m p l e of h o w bluster c a n s u b s t i t u t e for violence. At the s a m e t i m e , as a form of Goffmanian staging t h a t stays at the edge, there are occasions in w h i c h the staging is d o n e badly, or d o n e t o o well, a n d w h a t starts as a d r a m a t i c s h o w becomes t h e real t h i n g .

PATHWAYS I N T O T H E T U N N E L O F V I O L E N C E

R e t u r n n o w from the special case of the street c o d e to t h e m o r e general m o d e l of s i t u a t i o n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d contingencies of escalation. In p r e - vious c h a p t e r s , I used t h e m e t a p h o r of a t u n n e l of violence; in t h o s e con- t e x t s , this w a s chiefly the situation t h a t I called " f o r w a r d p a n i c , " in w h i c h t e n s i o n a n d fear suddenly t u r n i n t o one-sided w e a k n e s s , creating a n e m o - t i o n a l v a c u u m into w h i c h the n o w - v i c t o r i o u s side r u s h e s . T h e ensuing frenzy of repetitive a t t a c k , atrocity, a n d overkill is like a t u n n e l into w h i c h the aggressors h a v e fallen, e n t r a i n e d by their o w n e m o t i o n a l r e s o n a n c e w i t h the reciprocal e m o t i o n s a n d gestures of the fallen, s t r e n g t h egged on by w e a k n e s s . Eventually the p e r p e t r a t o r s emerge from the t u n n e l , s o m e - times n o t recognizing themselves i n w h a t they h a d d o n e while they w e r e inside it.

Let us n o w generalize the a p p l i c a t i o n of the m e t a p h o r . All situations of violence in full-bore r h y t h m are like being in a t u n n e l ; at this p o i n t the d y n a m i c s of the fight h a v e t a k e n over, the actors c a u g h t up in t h e m until the fight w i n d s d o w n of its o w n a c c o r d . T h e f o r w a r d p a n i c type of asym- metrical e n t r a i n m e n t of t h e m o m e n t a r i l y d o m i n a n t a n d the passive de- feated is t h e m o s t spectacular version, the deep pit inside the t u n n e l of violence. But t h e r e are o t h e r kinds of things t h a t can h a p p e n in the t u n n e l

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besides the s t r o n g p u m m e l i n g the w e a k ; violence can be briefer a n d m o r e restrained; given e n o u g h social s u p p o r t , t h e t u n n e l m a y c o n t a i n a fair fight, w i t h t h e wall of s p e c t a t o r s a l m o s t literally p r o v i d i n g the t u n n e l . A n d t h e r e can be w a y s in w h i c h the t u n n e l stretches o u t in t i m e , from one situation to another, as in a serial killing, w h e r e w h a t h a p p e n s inside is n o longer t h e c o n c e n t r a t e d tensions a n d e n t r a i n m e n t s o f h o t e m o t i o n a l r u s h b u t an e m o t i o n a l zone t h a t is m o r e rarified, cooler yet outside t h e e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e of everyday experience.

W h a t I w a n t t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n here i s n o t w h a t h a p p e n s inside t h e t u n n e l , b u t t h e p r o c e s s of e n t r y a n d exit. A f o r w a r d p a n i c , w h i c h we h a v e seen so often in m i l i t a r y a n d police violence, is o n e p a t h w a y i n t o t h e t u n n e l of frenzied violence. It h a s t h e specific c h a r a c t e r of b u i l t - u p t e n s i o n a n d release by t h e s u d d e n w e a k n e s s of o n e side. But t h e r e are o t h e r p a t h w a y s w h i c h lead u p t o t h e b r i n k o f t h e t u n n e l , a n d s o m e t i m e s over it; t h e r e s u l t i n g stay i n t h e t u n n e l m a y n o t b e very l o n g , a n d i t m a y n o t h a v e m u c h of t h e c h a r a c t e r of one-sided piling o n ; t h e t u n n e l itself c a n b e c o m e frightening, o r a t least repelling, a n d s o o n p o p s its i n h a b i - t a n t s b a c k o u t s i d e .

T h e r e are long p a t h w a y s a n d s h o r t p a t h w a y s i n t o the t u n n e l . As I h a v e e m p h a s i z e d t h r o u g h o u t , t h e s h o r t p a t h w a y s are crucial; even t h e long p a t h w a y s t o w a r d violence generally h a v e to cross t h r o u g h one of the s h o r t p a t h w a y s to get t h e r e . Let us leave the long p a t h w a y s for a n o t h e r place a n d focus in on t h e details of situational p r o c e s s . 1 8 A c o n f r o n t a t i o n is u n d e r w a y ; w h e n will it t u r n violent, a n d w h e n will it stabilize or recede? In t h e o r d i n a r y a c r i m o n y of everyday life, such situations form t w o m a i n types o f p a t h w a y s : q u a r r e l i n g t h a t becomes h e a t e d a r g u m e n t ; a n d t h e m o r e ebullient p a t h w a y of b o a s t i n g leading to insult a n d bluster. Let us t a k e these in t u r n .

O n e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l feature of a r g u m e n t s as they b e c o m e h e a t e d is t h a t t h e y violate t h e t u r n - t a k i n g ritual of n o r m a l talk. O r d i n a r y , high- solidarity t a l k is finely a t t u n e d in t h e r h y t h m of a l t e r n a t i n g t u r n s to speak; one speaker m o n i t o r s the o t h e r ' s speaking r h y t h m (and bodily m o v e - ments) so as to c o m e in at t h e end of t h e o t h e r ' s u t t e r a n c e , keeping up a flow t h a t is very m u c h like singing t o g e t h e r (Sacks et al. 1 9 7 4 ; see further evidence a n d analysis i n Collins 2 0 0 4 ) . High-solidarity talk has " n o g a p , no o v e r l a p " ; it avoids e m b a r r a s s i n g p a u s e s , as well as clashes over w h o h a s t h e floor, t h a t is, t h e a t t e n t i o n of the audience as t h e speaker of t h e m o m e n t . Escalated a r g u m e n t s involve clashes, n o t just in w h a t is said, b u t t h e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e of conversing; speakers t r y to talk over t h e other, refuse to give t h e o t h e r a c h a n c e to talk, or a t t e m p t to b r e a k i n t o their u t t e r a n c e s (see t r a n s c r i p t s in Schegloff [ 1 9 9 2 ] , a n d analyses in G r i m s h a w [19901).

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In heated a r g u m e n t , cognitive disagreement becomes s u p p l e m e n t e d , a n d eventually o v e r w h e l m e d , by an increasingly physical struggle to con- trol the speaking a n d hearing situation itself. A r g u m e n t s become louder because loudness is a m o v e to c o n t r o l the c o n v e r s a t i o n a l space, a n d esca- lates as each talker increases his or her loudness against the other. Utter- ances become s h a r p , s t a c c a t o , a n d e m p h a t i c , shaped for their d r a m a t i c effectiveness in being h e a r d ; hence the cognitive c o n t e n t of a r g u m e n t s t e n d s to degenerate into slogans, stereotyped expressions, a n d cursing— not because this is all t h a t the speaker necessarily believes or w a n t s to convey, b u t because the process of staging o n e ' s p o i n t of view is reduced to the effectiveness of the m o s t d r a m a t i c a p p e a l s for a t t e n t i o n . Angry talking is an emergent interactional process, n o t a m a t t e r of individual intentions; people often find themselves raising their voices a n d speaking in a nastier t o n e t h a n they intended, a n d even against their conscious d e t e r m i n a t i o n n o t to get into a dispute.

T h e very difficulty of n a v i g a t i n g the n a r r o w i n g d r a m a t u r g i c a l c o n - s t r a i n t s of the s i t u a t i o n can s o m e t i m e s lead to s n a t c h i n g a form of vic- t o r y from the j a w s of defeat. A s p e a k e r in an a r g u m e n t w h o can c o m b i n e s o m e r e m n a n t of intelligent e x p r e s s i o n of their p o i n t w i t h a p i t h y a n d d r a m a t i c w a y of e x p r e s s i n g it will likely c a r r y off a d r a m a t i c victory, especially if t h e r e is a w i d e r a u d i e n c e to a p p r e c i a t e it. Episodes of angry a r g u m e n t t h u s m a y c o m e t o a n end because a d r a m a t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e closing is f o u n d , b r i n g i n g the episode to a c l i m a x w i t h o u t further escala- t i o n to violence.

M o r e frequently, it comes to an end because one or b o t h p a r t i c i p a n t s w i t h d r a w s "in a huff," which is to say w i t h a d r a m a t i c s h o w of anger a n d c o n t e m p t for the entire scene of a r g u m e n t . Usually t h e r e is tacit a g r e e m e n t t h a t the o t h e r will be allowed this "huff" p o s t u r e , instead of p u r s u i n g him or her to c o n t i n u e the a r g u m e n t . A third possibility is t h a t the a r g u m e n t stays stuck at a repetitive level, a n d eventually falls a p a r t o u t of a feeling of b o r e d o m . I will say m o r e on this later, since this is a key m o m e n t as to w h e t h e r verbal conflicts will escalate to violence. T h e fourth p a t h w a y is for the a r g u m e n t to t u r n into violence; this is often a micro-escalation g r o w i n g directly o u t of the t u r n - t a k i n g struggle, the a t t e m p t to talk over the o t h e r p e r s o n . T h e struggle to get the floor be- comes increasingly loud, emotionally intense; muscles strain in the effort to get oneself h e a r d , a n d to m a k e the other o n e cede a place to be heard; and this strain goes over the t o p , into a blow.

Blustering, t o o , can follow the same four m i c r o - p a t h w a y s flowing into or away from the t u n n e l of violence. Someone m a y lose to a perfectly delivered insult, victory being decided by an appreciative audience. Some- one m a y break off the encounter, leaving the scene; this is similar to leav- ing an a r g u m e n t in a huff, except t h a t a huff implies the moral o n u s is on

How Fights Start, or Not • 363

the one w h o b r o k e up the n o r m a l scene of civility a n d the n o r m a l ties of social r e l a t i o n s h i p ; w h e r e a s the p e r s o n w h o leaves a scene of bluster h a s given in to just w h a t the blusterer usually i n t e n d s : it is a victory of t h e situation d o m i n a t o r over t h e situationally d o m i n a t e d . T h i r d is stabiliza- t i o n t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n , w h i c h w e n o w p r o c e e d t o illustrate. F o u r t h i s further escalation i n t o violence, w h i c h comes a b o u t t h r o u g h failure of the other t h r e e p a t h s .

At first experience, all bluster seems alike: c o a r s e , frightening, ugly, u n - c o u t h . We m u s t focus in quite carefully on its m i c r o - p a t t e r n s if we are to see h o w blustering m a y stabilize a n d eventually de-escalate w i t h o u t a fight. As n o t e d , bluster c a n g r o w o u t of an entertaining or carousing situa- t i o n of b o a s t i n g a n d playful self-assertion. At t h e stage of bluster, insults are n o longer m e a n t t o b e h u m o r o u s . T h e emphasis o n being w i t t y disap- p e a r s . Insults t e n d to become stereotyped, a n d are r e p e a t e d over a n d over. This m e a n s t h a t if blustering goes on long e n o u g h , it becomes b o r i n g ; it loses interest. Audiences fade a w a y (an e x a m p l e of this is in my o w n b e h a v i o r a n d t h a t of o t h e r observers of the Somerville street fight de- scribed in c h a p t e r 2 ) ; eventually the p e r f o r m e r s themselves no longer find m u c h energy in their c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a n d let it lapse i n t o m u t t e r s .

An e x a m p l e from a s t u d e n t r e p o r t :

T w o teenage boys outside a high school, in an a r e a w h e r e students a w a i t rides t o t a k e t h e m h o m e , start s h o u t i n g a t each other. They a p - p r o a c h t o a r m ' s length a n d shove a t each other, b a c k a n d forth. T h i s goes on for several m i n u t e s , while other students w a t c h anxiously from a safe distance. (That is to say, t h e r e is no high-solidarity c r o w d egging t h e m o n , b u t a scattered collection of individuals w a t c h i n g a p p r e h e n - sively.) Eventually t h e t w o boys back a w a y from each other, a n d go off in o p p o s i t e directions.

Likely t h e r e are m a n y m o r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s of this k i n d t h a n of full- scale fights. A n o t h e r e x a m p l e (from a s o u t h e r n California police r e p o r t ) :

D u r i n g t h e m i d d l e of a s c h o o l day, a g a n g of black t e e n a g e r s enters t h e g r o u n d s of a h i g h s c h o o l (not their o w n s c h o o l ) , a n d sends a girl inside t o call o u t a p a r t i c u l a r b o y t h e y are seeking. H e c o m e s o u t , followed by his s u p p o r t e r s . T h e t w o g r o u p s s t a n d at a d i s t a n c e , flash- ing g a n g h a n d - s i g n s at each other. A girl, s t a n d i n g to t h e r e a r of t h e i n v a d i n g g r o u p , h o l d s a b a c k p a c k w i t h g u n s in it; from t i m e to t i m e s o m e o f t h e boys o p e n t h e b a g t o reveal t h e g u n s . O n t h e o t h e r side, g a n g m e m b e r s raise their shirts t o reveal pistols t u c k e d i n their w a i s t - b a n d s . T h e a c t i o n is all on t h e level of t a u n t i n g , s h o w i n g signs of g a n g m e m b e r s h i p as a f o r m of i n v a d i n g s o m e o n e else's turf, a n d m a k i n g t h r e a t e n i n g gestures; n o f i g h t o c c u r s , a n d eventually a s c h o o l j a n i t o r

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i n t e r v e n e s , a n d calls a p a t r o l m a n . A l t h o u g h t h e g a n g m e m b e r s are a r m e d , t h e y d o n o t f i g h t i t o u t w i t h t h e j a n i t o r o r t h e p a t r o l m a n , b u t f l e e ; these a r e o u t s i d e r s , n o t p a r t o f t h e s h o w t h e y a r e e n a c t i n g , hence n o t socially a p p r o p r i a t e t a r g e t s .

C o n f r o n t a t i o n s b e t w e e n equals, w e m a y expect, t e n d t o stabilize a t t h e level of bluster. On the level of micro-detail, the longer the insulting a n d shoving goes o n , the less likely a fight is to actually t a k e place (I o w e this o b s e r v a t i o n to L u k e A n d e r s o n ) . Conversely, it is w h e n t h e r e is a r a p i d escalation t h r o u g h the blustering p h a s e t h a t f i g h t s h a p p e n . This m a y b e described in t e r m s of the d y n a m i c s of e m o t i o n s in t h e situation: n o t the e m o t i o n s of t h e s e p a r a t e individuals, b u t the e m o t i o n a l p a t t e r n of i n t e r a c - t i o n in w h i c h they are e n t r a i n e d . Q u a r r e l i n g or b o a s t i n g are w a y s of as- serting d o m i n a n c e in the a t t e n t i o n space of the i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n . These verbal actions escalate to the e x t e n t t h a t they are resisted; b o t h sides need t o p u t m o r e energy into contesting t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n a l t u r n s a n d d r a w i n g the a t t e n t i o n of the g a t h e r i n g to their self-assertion. T h e stage of bluster is w h e r e this t u r n s into an explicit t h r e a t of force, challenging t h e o t h e r to b a c k d o w n . T h e p u t - u p - o r - s h u t - u p p h a s e is r e a c h e d in o n e m i c r o - m o v e ; if t h e challenge is accepted, t h e n the fight h a p p e n s . 1 9 Striking the first b l o w is just o n e m o r e escalation in the degree of energy already p u t i n t o d o m i - n a t i n g the s i t u a t i o n . If t h e blustering c o n t i n u e s b e y o n d the first m o v e , it is a l r e a d y a tacit sign t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s d o n ' t really w a n t to fight; a n d they h a v e available to themselves a tactic of c o n t i n u i n g to bluster until it becomes b o r i n g , letting t h e conflict w i n d d o w n .

T h e c o n t e n t of insults is n o t very significant, c o m p a r e d to these situa- t i o n a l d y n a m i c s . N a i v e o u t s i d e r s , r e a d i n g a c c o u n t s of fights t h a t are set off by an insulting m e n t i o n of the p e r s o n ' s mother, m a y r e g a r d this as an i n d i c a t i o n of the sacredness of the m o t h e r in lower-class black c u l t u r e . But t h e r e are n u m e r o u s instances in w h i c h an insulting reference to s o m e o n e ' s m o t h e r is n o t t a k e n as g r o u n d s for escalation, since t h e situation is n o t right for it. (An e x a m p l e is given a b o v e on p. 3 5 2 from A n d e r s o n 1 9 9 9 : 84). D e p e n d i n g on c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n y verbal u t t e r a n c e c a n be t a k e n as a p r o v o c a t i o n to violence, or as h u m o r o u s , or as a h u m d r u m u t t e r a n c e to be d i s r e g a r d e d . 2 0

On t h e level of micro-detail, t h e r e is similarity b e t w e e n the escalation of quarreling a n d of blustering. H e a t e d q u a r r e l s b r e a k t h e t u r n - t a k i n g r h y t h m , w i t h p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t e m p t i n g to talk over each other, resulting in a contest of l o u d n e s s ; b u t the c o n t e n t becomes repetitive, a n d if t h e inten- sity can be stabilized, the b o r i n g c h a r a c t e r of w h a t is said eventually leads t o e m o t i o n a l de-escalation a n d a p a t h a w a y from f i g h t i n g . Insults, t o o , can become repetitive a n d boring and thereby de-escalating; b u t t h a t de- pends upon the absence of paralinguistic escalation. T h u s we m a y expect

How Fights Start, or Not • 365

Figure 9.1 Angry confrontation, momentarily stabilized by repetitious gesturing (Jerusalem, October 2000). Reuters.

t h a t insult contests r e m a i n encapsulated in a level of ritual equality as long as they respect the t u r n - t a k i n g rule; each allows the o t h e r a speaking t u r n in which to utter o n e ' s insult, w h e r e if b o t h try to insult at the same time, talking over the other, in effect trying to s h o u t the o t h e r d o w n a n d o u t of the verbal interaction space, the fight will turn violent.

Evidence for several of these processes can be found in the well-docu- mented quarrels a m o n g literary figures (Arthur 2 0 0 2 ) . For the m o s t p a r t these are carried o u t i n p r i n t , denigrating each o t h e r ' s w o r k a n d some- times p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r ; sometimes they are circulated in dense p e r s o n a l n e t w o r k s of w r i t e r s a n d their followers. M o s t such q u a r r e l s develop a m o n g w r i t e r s w h o are aiming for the s a m e literary niche; a s T r u m a n C a p o t e suggested t o G o r e Vidal i n 1 9 4 5 w h e n b o t h w e r e b u r s t i n g i n t o r e p u t a t i o n in the N e w York literary scene, t h e r e is r o o m for only o n e enfant terrible at a time (Arthur 2 0 0 2 : 1 6 0 ) . Particularly bitter q u a r r e l s g r o w up w h e r e one of the writers h a s been a p r o t e g e of the other, learning a style a n d being i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the h e a r t of t h e literary e s t a b l i s h m e n t from a n already-situated m e n t o r ; t h e n the p r o t e g e g r o w s u p , acquires his o w n r e p u t a t i o n , a n d eclipses the m e n t o r . In such cases, professional jealousy over exploiting the same stylistic niche is c o m p o u n d e d by a sense o f b e t r a y a l , o n o n e side, a n d t h e need t o b r e a k a w a y i n t o a n a u t o n o m o u s literary personality on the other. In such competitive fields, b r e a k s are

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inevitable, a n d they become manifested at the micro-level in q u a r r e l s , w h e t h e r at close r a n g e , or m o r e likely in print, since t h a t is w h e r e literary r e p u t a t i o n s live.

M o s t such q u a r r e l s stay merely verbal. Occasionally they escalate to violence. T h e process may be observed in the quarrel between T h e o d o r e Dreiser a n d Sinclair Lewis, which c a m e to a head in 1 9 3 1 . D u r i n g the 1 9 1 0 s , Lewis had been s o m e t h i n g of a protege of Dreiser. T h e older m a n had w r i t t e n the first great American naturalistic novel, Sister Carrie, in 1 9 0 0 , b u t it h a d been w i t h d r a w n from publication because of moralistic censorship; Dreiser subsequently m a d e a living editing c o n v e n t i o n a l la- dies' magazines, the same milieu in which Lewis got his start in publish- ing, a n d w h e r e they became a c q u a i n t e d . Dreiser's r e p u t a t i o n gradually built up a m o n g elite intellectuals, a n d y o u n g e r writers like Lewis t o o k him as a model for naturalistic exposes of o r d i n a r y American life. In the 1920s, Lewis published a series of best-selling novels, exposing small- t o w n life in Main Street (1920) a n d m a k i n g Babbitt (1922) a h o u s e h o l d w o r d for shallow boosterism; eventually Dreiser published his long- a w a i t e d masterpiece, An American Tragedy ( 1 9 2 5 ) , which did well w i t h the intellectuals but n o t with the public. N o w Lewis w a s in a position to p a t r o n i z e his old p a t r o n , offering to p r o m o t e his b o o k , a n d extending aid to him on a E u r o p e a n t r i p . Dreiser t o o k all this as his d u e , a t t e m p t i n g to seduce Lewis's wife (a n e w s p a p e r foreign c o r r e s p o n d e n t ) , a n d blithely plagiarizing her writings for his o w n b o o k on travels in the Soviet U n i o n .

In 1 9 3 0 , the N o b e l Prize for literature w a s expected to be given to an American; Dreiser w a s the leading c a n d i d a t e of the intellectuals, but Lewis w o n . Publicly Lewis c o n t i n u e d to offer h o m a g e to Dreiser as his greater predecessor. Privately their relationship r a n k l e d . It burst into the o p e n at a b a n q u e t of N e w York intellectuals in 1 9 3 1 . Dreiser, as usual the p r i m a d o n n a , arrived late; waiting for him, the others indulged in heavy drinking. W h e n the speech-making began, Lewis briefly a n n o u n c e d t h a t he did n o t wish to speak in the presence of a m a n w h o had plagiarized his wife a n d had been telling others privately t h a t Dreiser did n o t deserve the N o b e l Prize.

After dinner, Dreiser called Lewis aside into a private r o o m , berated him for his s t a t e m e n t , a n d d e m a n d e d t h a t he "say it again or t a k e it b a c k " (Arthur 2 0 0 2 : 6 8 - 6 9 ) . Lewis said it again, a n d Dreiser slapped him across the face. " A n d I asked him if he w a n t e d to say it again. He said it again. So I smacked him again. And I said, ' D o you w a n t to say it a g a i n ? ' At this point a third m a n entered the r o o m , to hear Lewis say ' T h e o d o r e , you are a liar a n d a thief.' T h e third m a n g r a b b e d Lewis a n d suggested t h a t Dreiser leave. Lewis said again, '1 still say you are a liar a n d a thief.' ' D o you w a n t me to hit you a g a i n ? ' Dreiser d e m a n d e d . 'If you d o , I'll t u r n the o t h e r cheek.' Dreiser said, 'Aw, Lewis, you shit!' T h e third m a n

How Fights Start, or Not • 3 6 7

w a s p u s h i n g Dreiser t h r o u g h the d o o r w h e n h e t u r n e d a n d s h o u t e d , 'I'll meet y o u any t i m e , a n y w h e r e . This thing isn't settled!' Lewis followed, m u t t e r i n g s o m e t h i n g . Dreiser said, 'Lewis, w h y d o n ' t y o u p e d d l e y o u r p a p e r s s o m e w h e r e e l s e ? ' "

T h e scene is G o f f m a n i a n . Lewis h a s been m a i n t a i n i n g a publicly staged p e r f o r m a n c e of r e s p e c t for his old m e n t o r , while b a c k s t a g e he h a s been c o m p l a i n i n g a b o u t his behavior. H e f i n a l l y lets his b a c k s t a g e o p i n i o n s o u t in a p u b l i c g a t h e r i n g , a s h o c k i n g b r e a k in f r a m e . T h e occa- sion for t h e frame b r e a k is nevertheless highly a p p r o p r i a t e : it is a g a t h e r - ing of all t h o s e m o s t closely interested in t h e r e p u t a t i o n a l struggle, a g a t h e r i n g of their literary p e e r s ; a n d it is a festive, c a r o u s i n g o c c a s i o n , w i t h the i c o n o c l a s m of a d r i n k i n g p a r t y d u r i n g P r o h i b i t i o n ; a n d t h e r e is a k i n d of p r o f e s s i o n a l i n v e s t m e n t in i c o n o c l a s m , since this g e n e r a t i o n of w r i t e r s get their fame in t h e m o v e m e n t of n a t u r a l i s m , displaying t h e s o r d i d side of life. Lewis himself h a s a r e p u t a t i o n as an iconoclastic speaker, a n d h e does n o t d i s a p p o i n t .

Dreiser seeks a ritual repair, retiring first into private; b u t his blunt d e m a n d for an a p o l o g y is also an escalation, leaving no w a y o u t . Lewis n o w c a n save face only by repeating his c h a r g e , a n d Dreiser retaliates w i t h a ritualistic slap in t h e face. If this h a d been eighty years earlier, it m i g h t have led to a duel; b u t these m e n are self-conscious m o d e r n i s t s . In fact their fight settles into a standoff, repeating the same w o r d s a n d ac- t i o n s . Finally a t h i r d p a r t y intervenes, a n d grabs Lewis, w h o t u r n s o u t t o be n o t s t e a m e d up for a fight b u t " l i m p a n d u n r e s i s t i n g " (Arthur 2 0 0 2 : 6 9 ) . Dreiser, on his w a y o u t , formulaically offers a further challenge to meet again, b u t the fight m o o d peters o u t i n t o an e x c h a n g e of b a n a l in- sults. In the event, they h a d found a w a y to avoid any further fighting. Dreiser w a s pleased w i t h the publicity t h a t followed the f i g h t ; Lewis, w h o w a s already basking in public c o n t r o v e r s y because of his iconoclastic b o o k s , t o o k t h e incident in stride a n d w e n t back to m a k i n g s t a t e m e n t s of a d m i r a t i o n for Dreiser's w o r k .

W h y d i d n ' t t h e f i g h t escalate? A t t h e t i m e , Dreiser w a s s i x t y - o n e y e a r s - o l d , b u t at 6 feet 1 inch a n d over 2 0 0 p o u n d s , he w a s bigger a n d s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e tall, slender Lewis (age forty-six); this helps e x p l a i n D r e i s e r ' s willingness to escalate to a b l o w — a l t h o u g h n o t a very serious o n e — a n d w i t h Lewis k e e p i n g his r e s p o n s e m e r e l y v e r b a l . T h e s t a n d a r d devices for a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n are used: r e p e a t i n g the s a m e w o r d s a n d gestures; letting t h i r d p a r t i e s b r e a k it u p ; m a k i n g v a g u e challenges for further c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . B o t h m e n save face; n o t h i n g m u c h h a p p e n s ; t h e u p r o a r of p u b l i c i t y leaves everything as it w a s privately, if n o t on t h e Goffman- ian f r o n t s t a g e .

We h a v e seen a n u m b e r of w a y s t h a t p a t h w a y s up to the brink of t h e t u n n e l g o n o further, a n d t u r n back. W h e n d o p a r t i c i p a n t s t a k e the fourth

3 6 8 • Chapter 9

p a t h , i n t o violence itself? T h e t h e o r y developed in this b o o k is t h a t con- frontations bring tension a n d fear, w h i c h inhibits effective violence; e m o - tional tension gets released i n t o violent a t t a c k only w h e r e there is a w e a k victim, or w h e r e the conflict is hedged r o u n d w i t h social s u p p o r t s to m a k e it a staged fight fought w i t h i n socially enforced limits. T h u s bluster is likely to lead o n w a r d to a fight in one of these t w o circumstances: First, if one side feels m u c h stronger t h a n the other, at least at t h a t m o m e n t , the stronger l a u n c h e s an a t t a c k . T h e bluster itself m a y p r o v i d e the test of w h o is w e a k e r ; w a v e r i n g or cringing in t h e face of bluster, or r e t r e a t i n g from it, is one thing t h a t can trigger an a t t a c k . 2 1 Second, if t h e r e is a highly interested a u d i e n c e , witnessing the b u i l d u p of b o a s t a n d bluster, the scene is set for a fight, a n d the principals m a y n o t be able to back o u t of it if they wished. T h e influence of t h e a u d i e n c e is all the m o r e powerful w h e n at least one of t h e individuals in the c o n f r o n t a t i o n is well k n o w n p e r s o n - ally to the audience; this gives the a c t o r a stake in m a i n t a i n i n g or losing his r e p u t a t i o n , p u t t i n g costs of b a c k i n g a w a y from the fight in any m a n n e r except one t h a t is d r a m a t i c a l l y pleasing to the a u d i e n c e . T h u s we w o u l d expect c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h o u t audiences, or ones in w h i c h the audiences themselves are a n o n y m o u s , to have the least likelihood of escalating to sustained v i o l e n c e . 2 2

M u c h of the time these c o n d i t i o n s are lacking. T h e c o n t e s t a n t s are t o o evenly m a t c h e d , or feel only slight edges, n o t e n o u g h to give t h e m confi- dence in carrying on to an o p e n a n d p r o l o n g e d break. Recall t h e conclu- sions of c h a p t e r 2, t h a t the reluctance to fight found so widely in military c o m b a t is n o t just fear of being h u r t , b u t a generalized social tension arising from n o n s o l i d a r y i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e r e is an u n d e r l y i n g a p p r e h e n s i o n of being the loser in a s i t u a t i o n a l contest, t h a t is, of losing s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n bodily p a i n s . It is n o t just a m a t t e r of fighting or n o t fighting, b u t of l o o k i n g well in t h e process of d o i n g it.

This i n t e r a c t i o n a l touchiness, w h i c h m o s t of t h e time keeps us from going very far from the c o n v e n t i o n a l flow of reciprocated gestures in m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n , is also the source of just t h o s e slights t h a t we t a k e from o t h e r people's m i c r o - b e h a v i o r s a n d t h a t a r o u s e u s t o a t least t h r e a t e n a n escalated conflict. People c o m e to the b r i n k of violence because of breaks in the flow of m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n ; these are Goffmanian violations, b r o a d l y speaking, a l t h o u g h the specific c o n t e n t s of w h a t p e o p l e t a k e as interac- t i o n a l failures ranges far b e y o n d t h o s e middle-class c o n v e n t i o n s of m i d - t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y politeness t h a t Goffman f i r s t w r o t e a b o u t . W h a t leads up to the brink is n o t the c o n t e n t of the q u a r r e l or t h e n a t u r e of the insult, b u t the fine-grained micro-details of h o w the c o n f r o n t a t i o n is m a n a g e d from the p o i n t at w h i c h it h a s b e c o m e a conscious m a t t e r of dispute. T h u s it also sometimes h a p p e n s — i n d e e d , m a y well h a p p e n m o s t of t h e t i m e — t h a t a n t a g o n i s t s find w ays of altering the r h y t h m a n d focus of their hostile

How Fights Start, or Not • 3 6 9

b a c k - a n d - f o r t h ; p e r h a p s n o t using the s t a n d a r d Goffmanian ritual re- p a i r s , b u t on a tacit paralinguistic level, settle themselves b a c k i n t o a situa- t i o n a l equilibrium. Even after the Goffmanian challenge a n d apology, or the polite o v e r l o o k i n g , h a v e failed to w o r k , t h e r e are processes of m i c r o - de-escalation t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n , loss of cognitive c o n t e n t , a n d deflation of anger into b o r e d o m .

T h e o t h e r c o n d i t i o n for proceeding to violence is the audience encour- aging or even enforcing a fight. But this c o n d i t i o n , t o o , is often lacking; audiences are frequently very u n e a s y in the n e a r presence of t h r e a t e n e d violence—heated quarrels a n d bluster; they usually d o n o t h a v e the cour- age t o intervene b u t they s h r i n k a w a y w h e r e t h e y can, n o t s u p p o r t i n g b u t a b h o r r i n g t h e p r o s p e c t of a fight. To be sure, blusterers m a y stage their action just for t h e s a k e of c o w i n g an audience, b u t this is collusion, a form of limited violence r a t h e r t h a n all-out a t t a c k , n o t a descent into the t u n n e l b u t a faking of it for t h e sake of the impression.

We are used to spectacular stories of violence, a n d a m o n g these are a c c o u n t s of c r o w d s t h a t egg on individuals to fight. But such audiences h a v e special c o n d i t i o n s : they are found particularly w h e r e b o t h t h e larger c o m m u n i t y a n d p a r t i c u l a r a n t a g o n i s t s are in fairly dense n e t w o r k s of rela- t i o n s h i p s , s o t h a t individuals are k n o w n b y n a m e a n d h a v e r e p u t a t i o n s to be m a d e , defended, or lost. This is one of t h e s t r u c t u r a l features of t h e inner-city n e i g h b o r h o o d s w h e r e t h e c o d e of the street is f o u n d . T h e r e is a similar p a t t e r n of t h e goldfish b o w l of audience a n d individual r e p u t a - t i o n in high schools a n d in p r i s o n s , w h i c h is to say, in t o t a l institutions stratified between an underclass of inmates or c o m p u l s o r y pupils, a n d a staff t h a t has formal c h a r g e of t h e m . H e r e the fighting t h a t t h e underclass engages in a m o n g themselves o p e r a t e s n o t just for private p u r p o s e s , b u t as an act of rebellion against t h e authorities w h o p r o h i b i t it. H e r e is n o t only a r e p u t a t i o n a l goldfish b o w l , b u t an a n t i n o m i a n status system in w h i c h one gains s o m e r e p u t a t i o n by fighting even if one loses. But these are c o m p l e x a n d special circumstances, n o t found everywhere. O n the w h o l e , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t foster escalation from everyday conflict into violence are relatively r a r e .

M o s t o f the t i m e , p e o p l e f i n d w a y s t o confine violence, t o back d o w n from t h e brink. S h o r t - t e r m m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s c a n trigger vio- lence, b u t it is n o t usually a hair-trigger. M u c h m o r e often, t h e m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l trigger misfires.

C H A P T E R 1 0

The Violent Few

V I O L E N C E ALWAYS surges up in the form of a small p r o p o r t i o n of people w h o are actively violent, a n d a n even smaller p r o p o r t i o n w h o are c o m p e - tently violent. S u r r o u n d i n g t h e m usually is a larger n u m b e r of t h e e m o - tionally involved. Sometimes these are ostensibly p a r t of the same t e a m , the same rioters, the same military or police force, the same gang, the same fans or c a r o u s e r s , a larger g r o u p t h a t we can call the n o m i n a l l y violent. Sometimes t h e r e are further layers of a u d i e n c e , s u p p o r t i v e or merely c u r i o u s , a n d finally accidental b y s t a n d e r s . A n d there can be layers of o p p o n e n t s a n d victims on the o t h e r side, possibly w i t h their o w n s u p - p o r t e r s , back r o w s , a n d so forth. All these t o g e t h e r m a k e up a social scene, a s t r u c t u r e p e r v a d e d w i t h c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l e m o t i o n s ; the violent few are those w h o use this e m o t i o n a l field to their a d v a n t a g e .

S M A L L N U M B E R S O F T H E A C T I V E L Y A N D C O M P E T E N T L Y V I O L E N T

Let us briefly review the d a t a of the previous c h a p t e r s . T h e starting p o i n t w a s the f i n d i n g t h a t i n W o r l d War I I only 1 5 t o 2 5

percent of frontline t r o o p s were d o i n g all or m o s t of the firing in battle; a n d this is consistent w i t h p h o t o g r a p h i c evidence for m o s t t w e n t i e t h - cen tury w a r s . In some previous historical p e r i o d s , w i t h better organiza- tional c o n t r o l i n massed infantry f o r m a t i o n s , the p r o p o r t i o n f i r i n g w a s higher, a l t h o u g h c o m p e t e n c e in hitting their targets w a s low; in ancient a n d tribal war, on the o t h e r h a n d , the active fighters w e r e often very few. After the K o r e a n war, Western armies c h a n g e d their t r a i n i n g m e t h o d s to ensure a higher r a t e of fire, b u t c o m p e t e n c e in firing r e m a i n e d low, as m e a s u r e d by t h e level of w a s t e d a m m u n i t i o n . D a t a from the V i e t n a m w a r s h o w s infantry t r o o p s divided i n t o t h r e e categories: a small p r o p o r t i o n ( a r o u n d 1 0 percent) w h o a l m o s t never f i r e d ; a b o u t 4 5 percent w h o s o m e - times f i r e d , sometimes n o t ; a n d a n o t h e r 4 5 percent w h o virtually always fired. T h e p r o p o r t i o n s of high-firers w e r e higher a m o n g volunteers, lower a m o n g draftees; a m o n g less enthusiastic t r o o p s only a b o u t o n e - q u a r t e r were in the high-firing g r o u p — n o t so different from S.L.A. M a r s h a l l ' s findings. Even after the t r a i n i n g reforms, t h e r e r e m a i n a highly aggressive m i n o r i t y a n d a mass of o r d i n a r y soldiers d o i n g just e n o u g h to m a i n t a i n

T h e V i o l e n t F e w • 3 7 1

p a r t i c i p a t i o n . A n d the m o s t actively violent are n o t necessarily g o o d at hitting the enemy; the c o m p e t e n t l y violent are a smaller fraction still.

F o r police violence, we c a n distinguish several levels of violence: r o u t i n e force to s u b d u e suspects; high levels of force including those t h a t are called "excessive"; a n d s h o o t i n g s . N a t i o n a l l y , a b o u t 0.2 to 0.3 percent of all police s h o o t a n y o n e d u r i n g a year, a b o u t o n e - t h i r d fatally (Fyfe 1 9 8 8 ; Geller 1 9 8 6 ) . 1 Shootings as well as other k i n d s of police violence are m o r e c o m m o n in big cities w i t h high levels of crime a n d gang activity. In the Los Angeles Police D e p a r t m e n t , 7.8 percent of all officers h a d ever been involved in s h o o t i n g ; 0.2 percent h a d fired in t h r e e or m o r e s h o o t i n g s ( C h r i s t o p h e r 1 9 9 1 : 3 6 - 4 0 ) . Use of r o u t i n e force w a s fairly w i d e s p r e a d ; 70 percent of the LAPD h a d been involved in at least one use-of-force r e p o r t , generally involving physical tactics to restrain a n d t a k e suspects i n t o custody. T h i s is " n o r m a l " a n d " l e g i t i m a t e " force, b u t it is concen- t r a t e d : the t o p 5 percent of officers p r o d u c e d 20 percent of the force inci- dents; the t o p 10 percent of the cops p r o d u c e d 33 percent of t h e incidents. Similarly, r e p o r t s alleging use of excessive force or i m p r o p e r tactics in- volved 21 percent of the p o l i c e . 2 This highly violent elite c o n t a i n e d further stratification: 2 . 2 percent of the entire L A P D h a d four or m o r e such alle- gations in their r e c o r d s ; 0.5 percent h a d six or m o r e . T h i s last g r o u p , t h e " c o w b o y c o p s " of t h e d e p a r t m e n t , w e r e also m o r e active in r o u t i n e force; they averaged thirteen force r e p o r t s of all k i n d s , as c o m p a r e d to 4 . 2 force r e p o r t s for all t h e officers w h o h a d used a n y k i n d of force. T h i s w a s a b o u t once a year for t h e average c o p w h o used a n y force at all, s o m e w h a t less t h a n t h a t for the entire police force; w h e r e a s t h e " c o w b o y s " h a d a b o u t t h r e e or four incidents p e r year. T h e c o w b o y s w e r e also m o r e violent w h e n it h a p p e n e d ; 58 percent of their force r e p o r t s alleged excessive force, w h e r e a s for the average force-using c o p , the p r o p o r t i o n of excessive force allegations w a s 14 p e r c e n t .

O t h e r researchers estimate similar p a t t e r n s . Toch (1980) indicated t h a t a small n u m b e r of t h e O a k l a n d police force p r o d u c e d m o s t of the police violence. Bas v a n S t o k k o m , studying D u t c h police in A m s t e r d a m , states t h a t a small p r o p o r t i o n of officers were n a m e d in t h e majority of citizen c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t r o u g h o r aggressive b e h a v i o r (personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n , Sept. 2 0 0 4 ; see also v a n S t o k k o m [ 2 0 0 4 ] ; a n d c h a p t e r 14 in Geller a n d Toch [1996]).

On the o t h e r side of the law, violence is also c o n c e n t r a t e d . C o h o r t stud- ies following up all y o u n g males from b i r t h h a v e found a high-crime seg- m e n t of 15 percent at m o s t t h a t c o m m i t t e d as m u c h as 84 percent of t h e violent crime (Wolfgang et al. 1 9 7 2 ; Collins 1 9 7 7 ) . N o t all crime is vio- lent, of c o u r s e , b u t it follows a similar p a t t e r n in w h i c h 6 to 8 percent of male juveniles a n d y o u n g adults c o m m i t 60 to 70 p e r c e n t of all crimes in their age g r o u p . 3

372 • Chapter 10

Studies of prisoners display a fractal repetition of the larger p a t t e r n , a criminal elite within the p o p u l a t i o n of criminal activists. Blumstein et all (1986) found a p y r a m i d of criminals serving time for a r m e d robbery a n d b u r g l a r y : 4 the b o t t o m 50 percent c o m m i t t e d five crimes or less per year (once every ten weeks or less); the t o p 10 percent r o b b e d or burglarized m o r e t h a n once a week; the t o p 5 percent c o m m i t t e d 3 0 0 or m o r e crimes per year, or a l m o s t every day. At the a p e x w a s a small g r o u p characterized as "violent p r e d a t o r s , " w h o c o m m i t t e d a b o u t three crimes every t w o days (Chaiken a n d C h a i k e n 1 9 8 2 ) . A n o t h e r prison study found 25 percent were career criminals, w h o c o m m i t t e d 60 percent of the robberies, bur- glaries, a n d a u t o thefts (Peterson et at. 1980). A study t h a t followed juve- nile offenders up to their thirties described three tiers: (1) a career criminal elite of a b o u t 3 percent, w h o sustained a high rate of crime t h r o u g h o u t ; (2) a criminal middle class, so to speak, comprising a n o t h e r 26 percent w h o kept up an intermediate level of crime; a n d (3) a majority of less c o m m i t t e d criminals (71 percent) w h o d r o p p e d o u t of crime over the years (Laub et al. 1.998). In these studies, the m o r e c o m m i t t e d and active criminals are also the most violent ones. Persistent violence m a r k s off an elite within the larger criminal milieu.

Criminal p o p u l a t i o n s are a subset, nested inside the larger p o p u l a t i o n . Putting the t w o kinds of research together, we see t h a t 25 to 40 percent of criminals c o m m i t (or at least are convicted for) the large majority of serious crimes; multiplying these figures by the 20 to 40 percent of the male p o p u l a t i o n w h o are arrested (Farrington 2 0 0 1 ; Blumstein et al. 1 9 8 6 ; Wolfgang et al. 1 9 7 2 ; Polk et al. 1 9 8 1 ; W i k s t r o m 1985), we can infer t h a t 5 to 15 percent of all males c o m m i t m o s t of the serious c r i m e . 5

T h e outer limits of the criminal p o p u l a t i o n is the largest p r o p o r t i o n of persons w h o have any kind of brush with the law (again we c o u n t only males). In a different kind of study, relying on q u e s t i o n n a i r e self-reports r a t h e r than police r e c o r d s , a n d asking a b o u t criminal activity w h e t h e r or n o t it had been c a u g h t , 36 percent of black teens and 25 percent of white teens said they had c o m m i t t e d one or m o r e violent offenses (Elliott 1 9 9 4 ) .

C o m i n g at this from a n o t h e r angle, the p r o p o r t i o n s of their age g r o u p s w h o belong to gangs is in fact much lower than the p o p u l a r image. N a - tionally, t h e r e were a b o u t 7 3 0 , 0 0 0 gang m e m b e r s in 2 0 0 3 ; this w o u l d be 11.5 percent of black a n d H i s p a n i c males ages 15 to 2 4 , a m a x i m u m estimate since some gangs are of other ethnicities. 6 For historical c o m p a r i - son, in 1920s C h i c a g o , a b o u t 10 percent of boys ages ten to twenty-four were in gangs; of the i m m i g r a n t p o p u l a t i o n , a b o u t 13 p e r c e n t . 7 Some of these n u m b e r s in particular ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s are quite high (30 percent of southern California blacks and H i s p a n i c s in the early 2 0 0 0 s ; 40 percent of Italians in Chicago in the 1920s), a l t h o u g h never reaching a majority even of the male youth g r o u p . Some of the earlier gangs were only mildly

The Violent Few • 373

delinquent; not heavily a r m e d , and engaged in relatively little violence. C o n t e m p o r a r y gangs do m o r e killing; but sheer m e m b e r s h i p in a g a n g does n o t itself mean t h a t most gang m e m b e r s perform m u c h violence most of the time. T h e r e were a b o u t 16,500 m u r d e r s in 2 0 0 3 ; if half of these were d o n e by gangs, only one o u t of eighty-eight g a n g m e m b e r s (1.1 per- cent) w o u l d c o m m i t a m u r d e r d u r i n g the year. G a n g s typically use fighting as a rite of passage; and there are sometimes fights to c h a n g e o n e ' s posi- tion in the pecking o r d e r (Anderson 1999; J a n k o w s k i 1 9 9 1 ) . No good data exists on h o w often gang m e m b e r s fight; but it a p p e a r s to be special- ized within the g a n g itself.s T h u s , even within an ostentatiously violent milieu, only a few percent are in the m u r d e r o u s elite.

Even the o u t e r limits of the quasi-criminal p o p u l a t i o n is n o t a majority in any of these studies; it gets nearest to it in samples of working-class c o m m u n i t i e s , or in the American black p o p u l a t i o n in the late t w e n t i e t h - century. T h e violent segment c o m p r i s i n g all degrees of activism a n d c o m - petence is s u r r o u n d e d by 60 to 80 percent of the male p o p u l a t i o n w h o c o m m i t no m o r e t h a n trivial violations of the law.

To p i n p o i n t the violent elite within the total p o p u l a t i o n , we can use the figure of the t o p 10 percent of prisoners w h o were exceedingly active in violent crimes, or the 3 percent of persistent career criminals from their juvenile years o n w a r d ; t h a t gives us an estimate of s o m e w h e r e between 0.6 to 1.2 percent of all males at the low end, and 2 to 4 percent at the high end, w h o are specialists in persistent violence. T h e low figure is a r o u n d t h e same p r o p o r t i o n as c o m p e t e n t killers on the official side of the law: mili- tary snipers, or ace pilots. T h e high figure is s o m e w h e r e a r o u n d the level for violent police.

For the o t h e r types of violence in this b o o k , only s o m e allow us to e s t i m a t e the p r o p o r t i o n of p e r p e t r a t o r s . In s c h o o l s , bullies vary from 7 to 17 percent of the b o y s , 2 to 5 p e r c e n t of girls (data in c h a p . 5, p p . 1 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 7 3 ) . Staged f i g h t s a m o n g heroes are necessarily limited t o a n elite. In a r i s t o c r a t i c societies, the military aristocracy, usually m a r k e d o u t with privileged m a r k e r s such as w e a r i n g s w o r d s , w a s a r o u n d 2 to 5 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n (I.enski 1 9 6 6 ) . T h e r a t e of dueling from the early s e v e n t e e n t h t h r o u g h the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s in v a r i o u s E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s p e a k e d a t 2 0 0 - 3 0 0 per year, with m o r e typical f i g u r e s a r o u n d t w e n t y duels or less; the p e a k w o u l d be only o n e per 6 0 , 0 0 0 of the a d u l t male p o p u l a t i o n , a n d even in p a r t i c u l a r l y h o n o r - p r o n e g r o u p s such as G e r m a n officers, t h e rate of ten to seventy-five duels per year involved at m o s t 0.8 p e r c e n t of the t o t a l officer c o r p s . 9 Within the d u e l i n g g r o u p , t h e r e w a s a tiny elite of c h r o n i c duelists, s o m e of w h o m fought several d o z e n times.

For c a r o u s e r s , we have seen in c h a p t e r 7 t h a t at most 10.3 percent of binge drinkers are involved in a simple assault d u r i n g the year, a n d 3.3

374 • Chapter 10

percent in a serious assault. It m a y well be t h a t the best p a r t y fighters are light drinkers or a b s t a i n e r s , b u t e t h n o g r a p h i e s suggest t h a t these fighters are an even r a r e r g r o u p of specialists. A m o n g athletes, the widest partici- p a t i o n in fighting is a m o n g baseball players, since the entire t e a m is obli- g a t e d by c u s t o m to c o m e o u t on the field d u r i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; b u t few t a k e an active p a r t in actual fighting; judging from suspensions a n d fines for fighting, t h e serious fighters are rarely m o r e t h a n t w o or t h r e e of a twenty-five-man t e a m plus the t e n - m a n coaching staff (i.e., 10 percent m a x i m u m ) . In A m e r i c a n football, a m a x i m u m of 5 to 10 p e r c e n t of play- ers from a forty-five-man s q u a d m i g h t fight d u r i n g a g a m e . In basketball the p r o p o r t i o n is lower, in h o c k e y higher, a l t h o u g h the latter s p o r t explic- itly has o n e or t w o " e n f o r c e r s " on the s q u a d , or a b o u t 6 to 12 percent of the t e a m . A soccer t e a m similarly m a y h a v e one enforcer a m o n g t h e defen- sive players (9 percent of t h e players on t h e field).

Exceptions to small numbers. T h e o n e area in w h i c h the p a t t e r n does n o t h o l d involves children. As we h a v e seen in c h a p t e r 5, p. 1 8 7 , 80 per- cent of small children a t t a c k their siblings; 85 to 95 percent of p a r e n t s physically p u n i s h their small children, a n d 50 percent their teenagers (judging from victimization rates). On the other h a n d , the types of d o m e s - tic violence t h a t t a k e place between adults are w i t h i n the n o r m a l range of small n u m b e r s : c o m m o n couple violence occurs in 16 percent of cou- ples per year; m o r e e x t r e m e a b u s e in 6 percent. T h e former is generally t w o - s i d e d scuffling between p a r t n e r s of b o t h sexes; the latter is over- whelmingly a p r o p o r t i o n of males.

N o t i c e , t o o , t h a t small children are frequently b u t n o t c o m p e t e n t l y vio- lent, t h u s preserving the small n u m b e r s p a t t e r n in a n o t h e r respect. This fits w i t h a n o t h e r exceptional p a t t e r n . As I h a v e n o t e d in c h a p t e r seven, adults a n d older teenagers a l m o s t always confine themselves to o n e fight per venue, w i t h the rest forming an audience or joining o n e of the sides. But children m a y h a v e multiple fights going on at t h e same t i m e or in brief succession, as in an u n r u l y c l a s s r o o m , 1 0 w i t h o u t the c o n t i n u i t y be- t w e e n the line-ups t h a t characterizes sequential a d u l t f i g h t s a n d m a k e s t h e m c o n t i n u a t i o n s of a single o n g o i n g dispute. Altogether, children are a lot less limited by the usual a d u l t restrictions on violence; s o m e research- ers r e g a r d this as p r i m a l violence t h a t is eventually socialized o u t of m o s t children as they g r o w u p , leaving the violent few as the unsocialized few (Tremblay et al. 2 0 0 4 ) . But this w a y of looking at it o v e r l o o k s the p o i n t t h a t c o m p e t e n t violence is a m a t t e r of i n t e r a c t i o n a l techniques t h a t are developed over time. Kids do n o t start o u t as skilled snipers, ace pilots, h i t m e n , or c o w b o y c o p s . W h a t children develop as they g r o w u p , I sug- gest, is greater sensitivity to the larger g r o u p a r o u n d t h e m . For m a n y people this inhibits violence—more precisely, it de-energizes it—while for others it provides a niche t h a t increases violence, a n d especially high- activity a n d high-competence violence.

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C O N F R O N T A T I O N L E A D E R S A N D A C T I O N - S E E K E R S : P O L I C E

To explain h o w s o m e p e r s o n s are actively violent, a n d even fewer are c o m p e t e n t l y violent, we need to grasp the implications of the p o i n t t h a t violent incidents are r a r e . O u r best d a t a c o n c e r n t h e police.

O b s e r v a t i o n a l r e p o r t s of ride-along researchers enable us to sample sit- u a t i o n s w h e r e police violence m i g h t h a p p e n . In high-crime big-city neigh- b o r h o o d s , police use force in 5 to 8 percent of their e n c o u n t e r s w i t h sus- pected offenders; m o s t of t h e t i m e this consisted in g r a b b i n g a n d restraining; excessive force w a s used less t h a n 2 percent of the time. W h e n arrests w e r e m a d e , police used force 22 percent of t h e time. Figures w e r e even lower in l o w - a c t i o n s u b u r b s , small t o w n s , a n d r u r a l areas (Friedrich 1 9 8 0 ; S h e r m a n 1 9 8 0 ; Black 1 9 8 0 ; Reiss 1 9 7 1 ; Bayley a n d Garofalo 1 9 8 9 ; W o r d e n 1 9 9 6 ; G a r n e r e t al. 1 9 9 6 ; Alpert a n d D u n h a m 2 0 0 4 ) .

These are l o w n u m b e r s . O u r image of violence is based on the m o s t d r a m a t i c instances; as we h a v e seen t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k , violence is n o t an easy or a u t o m a t i c p r o c e s s , a n d it t a k e s a lot to trigger it. Police violence in this respect is like o t h e r kinds of violence. W h e n e v e r we are able to look across a r a n g e of situations a n d avoid s a m p l i n g on the d e p e n d e n t variable, we find t h a t m o s t of the time m o s t p e o p l e avoid violence.

W h y is police violence infrequent? M o s t of t h e t i m e p e o p l e defer a n d c o m p l y w i t h t h e police, even w h e n being a r r e s t e d . F o r c e is m o s t likely to o c c u r w h e n t h e suspect t h r e a t e n s or a t t a c k s t h e officer (or is perceived as d o i n g s u c h ) , or a t t e m p t s to flee; it also o c c u r s w h e n p e r s o n s a n s w e r b a c k w i t h v e r b a l a b u s e o r d i s o b e y officers' c o m m a n d s (Friedrich 1 9 8 0 ) . Physical resistance is by far t h e m o s t likely factor to lead to police vio- lence. H o l d i n g resistance c o n s t a n t , t h e s u s p e c t ' s d e m e a n o r — t h e degree of insolence versus c o m p l i a n c e or deference to t h e p o l i c e — f u r t h e r deter- mines v i o l e n c e . 1 1

T h e s i t u a t i o n a l n a t u r e of police violence is u n d e r s c o r e d by t h e fact t h a t a variety of b a c k g r o u n d a n d a t t i t u d i n a l differences a m o n g police are u n c o r r e l a t e d w i t h w h o i s high o r l o w i n violence. R i d e - a l o n g d a t a a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e p o r t s s h o w e d n o r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e officer's r a c e , e d u c a t i o n , p r i o r m i l i t a r y service, o r civil service test r a t i n g s ; n o r w a s t h e r e a difference in a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d their r o l e as police (Friedrich 1 9 8 0 ; Croft 1 9 8 5 ; W o r d e n 1 9 9 6 ; Gellen a n d Toch 1 9 9 6 ) . T h e C h r i s t o p h e r C o m m i s s i o n f o u n d high-violence officers h a d positive p e r f o r m a n c e eval- u a t i o n s . Toch (1980) f o u n d t h e chief p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of vio- l e n c e - p r o n e cops is t h a t t h e y are e x t r o v e r t s , energetic, even " f o r t h c o m - ing, intelligent, a n d c h a r m i n g . "

T h i s is similar to m i l i t a r y p a t t e r n s . In t h e w a k e of S.L.A. M a r s h a l l ' s findings, a n u m b e r of studies t r i e d to distinguish t h e best fighters from t h e rest ( n o t a b l y R o b e r t E g b e r t ' s research i n K o r e a , s u m m a r i z e d i n

3 7 6 • Chapter 10

G l e n n 2 0 0 0 a : 1 3 9 ) . T h e m o s t active f i g h t e r s w e r e m o r e d o m i n a n t , p h y s i - cally bigger a n d heavier, m o r e p r o a c t i v e ( " d o e r s " ) ; o t h e r soldiers p r e - ferred t o b e a r o u n d t h e m , b o t h for sociability a n d d u r i n g c o m b a t . T h i s is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a p i c t u r e of elite fighters getting m u c h social s u p p o r t , as the center of g r o u p a t t e n t i o n ; getting e m o t i o n a l energy also from d o m - inating others (non-violently as well as violently). Active firers also tested as m o r e intelligent a n d as h a v i n g m o r e military k n o w l e d g e ; like action- oriented c o p s , they are strongly c o m m i t t e d to the professional lore of their j o b . H i g h l y r a t e d c o m b a t soldiers, far from being afraid of injury, were relatively confident t h a t they w o u l d n o t be h u r t ; like the ace fighter pilots we consider later, they expected to be successful in c o m b a t , to prevail over the enemy (Clum a n d M a h a n 1 9 7 1 ; consistent w i t h Stouffer e t al. vol. 2 , 1 9 4 9 ) . This confidence is the e m o t i o n a l energy specific to the interactional field of fighting.

T h e p a t t e r n h a n g s t o g e t h e r i n a n o t h e r w a y a s well. T h e m o s t violent police receive g o o d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e p o r t s ; they are well-liked by o t h e r c o p s . T h i s is n o t only because they are often high-energy e x t r o v e r t s (al- t h o u g h t h a t a p p e a r s to be t r u e t o o ) ; they are the informal leaders of t h e police. This fits a basic principle of s m a l l - g r o u p research: the p o p u l a r m e m b e r s of the g r o u p are those w h o m o s t closely express its values a n d are best a t w h a t t h e g r o u p i s a t t e m p t i n g t o d o ( H o m a n s 1 9 5 0 ) . Studies of police r o u t i n e s h o w t h a t an officer always a t t e m p t s to assert c o n t r o l of the s i t u a t i o n , from the o u t s e t of any e n c o u n t e r w i t h suspects a n d , indeed, o r d i n a r y citizens in general (Rubinstein 1 9 7 3 ) . Alpert a n d D u n h a m (2004) call it an " a u t h o r i t y m a i n t e n a n c e r i t u a l . "

In their i n t e r a c t i o n a l lore, to be a g o o d c o p is to be in charge of the situation; if necessary to err on t h e side of aggressiveness r a t h e r t h a n to let the o t h e r side establish s i t u a t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e . All the m o r e so w h e r e police deal w i t h suspects w h o challenge their c o n t r o l . As these situations edge into the z o n e of violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n , police are in t h e same general c o n d i t i o n as we h a v e analyzed t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k : they h a v e to deal w i t h c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. It is n o t surprising t h a t only a small percentage of police are violent, since it is generally t h e case t h a t only a small n u m b e r of p e r s o n s o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. Like being a g o o d soldier, being a g o o d c o p is tested in co mb at-lik e c o n f r o n t a - t i o n , a l t h o u g h for police these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are at m u c h closer r a n g e t h a n for m o s t soldiers, a n d in m u c h smaller g r o u p s , w i t h o u t as m u c h o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b a c k u p a n d c o m p u l s i o n t o k e e p t h e m p e r f o r m i n g . Police w h o are g o o d at this, like t h e soldiers w h o fire their w e a p o n s m o s t often a n d aggressively a n d t a k e the lead in c o m b a t , are l o o k e d up to by the o t h e r c o p s , o r t r o o p s .

T h e r e are s o m e indications t h a t police w h o are older (in their thirties a n d forties r a t h e r t h a n twenties) a n d have higher r a n k a n d m o r e experi-

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ence are the most violent (Alpert a n d D u n h a m 2 0 0 4 : 7 0 , 8 1 , 84). This is n o t youthful ebullience, but a p p e a r s to be p a r t of the style of those w h o are m o s t c o m m i t t e d to the profession. Alpert and D u n h a m (2004) p r o v i d e d a t a from use-of-force r e p o r t s t h a t s h o w the sequence of moves m a d e by police a n d suspects in response to each other. As an e n c o u n t e r begins, police expect to receive deference for their mere presence and verbal c o m - m a n d s . If suspects resist these early moves verbally, by hostile stares or expressions, or m o r e seriously by a t t e m p t s to evade searches a n d h a n d - cuffing or by r u n n i n g away, police counter-escalate t h r o u g h their o w n increasingly aggressive tactics. They raise their voices; g r a b , p u s h , shove, a n d twist a r m s ; at a higher level they s u b d u e the suspect with c h o k e h o l d s , fists, a n d kicks. Suspects can escalate t o o , with increasingly activeness a n d aggressiveness, up to the level w h e r e they brandish guns or o t h e r w e a p - o n s , or a t t e m p t to r u n the officer over with a car. Police counter-escalate still further, with clubs, tasers, stun g u n s , a n d finally with deadly force. Alpert a n d D u n h a m ' s chief finding is t h a t the level of escalation on both sides (what they call the Force Factor) is reciprocal a n d closely correlated; cops and suspects are rarely m o r e t h a n one force level a w a y from w h a t the o t h e r side has just d o n e . M o s t violent e n c o u n t e r s t a k e three to five reciprocated pairs of moves (Alpert a n d D u n h a m 2 0 0 4 : 94): the fact t h a t a suspect was calm a n d c o o p e r a t i v e in the first r o u n d does n o t preclude an escalation later, a n d suspects w h o used guns or o t h e r w e a p o n s are m o r e likely to do it in the second or third r o u n d . T h e oldest a n d m o s t experienced cops tended to deal w i t h resisting suspects by either the low- est or highest levels of force. W h e r e younger officers m o r e often used m e d i u m levels of force, the older ones stayed longer at the level of merely verbal c o m m a n d s and forceful d e m e a n o r ; or else they j u m p e d to high levels of force such as i n t e r m e d i a t e and deadly w e a p o n s (Alpert a n d D u n - h a m 2 0 0 4 : 1 4 1 , 165). T h e i r technique w a s less to scuffle with suspects, b u t r a t h e r to talk them d o w n or to use the o v e r w h e l m i n g a d v a n t a g e of their p o w e r s .

T h e inner culture of the police comes from the centrality of confronta- tions in their w o r k . Police (at least in the big-city police forces heavily studied by sociologists) do n o t like to associate with outsiders in their leisure time, a n d are suspicious of t h e m as well as of their o w n d e p a r t m e n - tal superiors (Wcstley 1 9 7 0 ; Skolnick 1966). We can interpret this to mean t h a t officers are used to d o m i n a t i n g everyone they encounter, and hence they avoid off-duty situations where this is not possible. This o n g o - ing self-segregation of the police from those w h o m they p a t r o l keeps up a degree of p o l a r i z a t i o n and cultural isolation.

In p a r t this effort to assert control at every point in the e n c o u n t e r flows from the fact t h a t the police are a small minority in m o s t situations; they are like a tiny military p a t r o l in the midst of a large n u m b e r of potential

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enemies; hence their effort to establish s i t u a t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e from the o u t s e t , t o avoid s h o w i n g w e a k n e s s , w h i c h could leave t h e m vulnerable t o being o v e r w h e l m e d . This is the special t e n s i o n of police w o r k .

T h e police ideal is to d o m i n a t e in every p h a s e of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . But in fact only a small n u m b e r of t h e m reach high levels of violence w i t h any frequency. M a i n t a i n i n g a u t h o r i t y is the baseline of police violence, b u t it does n o t explain w h y s o m e officers are s o m u c h m o r e e x t r e m e a b o u t this t h a n o t h e r s . T h e violent m i n o r i t y o f police, t h e " c o w b o y c o p s , " are n o t only t h o s e w h o react violently w h e n t h r e a t or defiance comes their way. T h e y are action-seekers; they volunteer for t h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s a n d excit- ing activities, such as d r u g busts a n d raids to serve arrest w a r r a n t s . 1 2 Some officers repeatedly find t h a t violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s c o m e their w a y ; they find themselves in situations w h e r e suspects flee or t h r e a t e n t h e m ; s o m e - times they are s h o t at or hit by suspects. These risks do n o t c o m e entirely at r a n d o m ; to volunteer to t a k e the lead as p o i n t m a n in entering a h o m e in search of a suspect is n o t only to expect d a n g e r b u t to seek it o u t .

Klinger's (2004) interviews w i t h police on their experiences in s h o o t - ings cast light on why, a l t h o u g h s h o o t i n g s are r a r e events, a small subset of officers t e n d to be repeatedly involved in t h e m . These are the officers w h o volunteer for d a n g e r o u s duty, or w h o m o v e t o w a r d the scene of action wherever possible. O n e officer d u r i n g a career of some t w e n t y years h a d been i n t w o dozen d a n g e r o u s e n c o u n t e r s , having w o r k e d b o t h i n narcotics a n d o n h u n d r e d s o f SWAT m i s s i o n s . 1 3 H e r e m a r k e d , " I liked t o chase p e o p l e w h e n they r a n . I always kind of got a kick o u t of it, just to see if I c o u l d c a t c h t h e m " (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 1 8 4 ) . 1 4

A n o t h e r officer described t a k i n g t h e lead in entering an attic w h e r e a h o m e - i n v a s i o n r o b b e r w a s hiding:

I k n o w [the SWAT t e a m leader] w a s a little bit n e r v o u s a b o u t sending Paul a n d me up i n t o t h a t attic. But I w a s n ' t w o r r i e d . W h e n I first h e a r d t h e guy w a s n ' t g o n n a give u p , t h a t he p l a n n e d to t a k e a couple of us w i t h h i m , I figured it w a s n ' t going to be a n y different t h a n any o t h e r barricaded-subject call-up. J u s t same ole, same ole. In fact, I w a s look- ing f o r w a r d to going in to find h i m . It's a h u n t - o r - b e - h u n t e d type of deal. You need to t h i n k of w h a t he's d o i n g , t h i n k like he's t h i n k i n g , listen carefully, a n d p a y a t t e n t i o n to y o u r n o s e . A lot of times w h e n we go i n t o a r o o m w h e r e suspects are hiding, I can smell these guys. Their a d r e n a l i n ' s going, t h e y ' r e sweating, so if y o u ' r e paying a t t e n t i o n , y o u can smell ' e m . . . . You g o t t a t h i n k of all t h e p o t e n t i a l hiding places. . . . So my m i n d w a s n o t on fear at all. T h a t w a s the last thing in it. It w a s on all my t r a i n i n g , all my intuition, just d o i n g my job a n d t h i n k i n g , " W h e r e is this son of a bitch? W h e r e ' s he a t ? " (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 )

T h e search e n d e d w i t h t h e officer a n d his t w o p a r t n e r s s h o o t i n g t w e n t y - o n e r o u n d s i n t o a m a n h i d d e n in a roll of insulation.

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T h e m o s t p r o a c t i v e police are n o t necessarily seeking violence, b u t t h e y are seeking action, a n d they t h i n k positively a b o u t using violence if it comes to t h a t . T h e y are self-consciously an elite w h o r e g a r d themselves as better at their job t h a n o t h e r police. A n o t h e r officer q u o t e s a colleague w h o t o l d h i m , " ' I ' m g o n n a tell y o u this off the r e c o r d 'cuz I d o n ' t w a n t to see y o u dismayed by this j o b , b u t d o n ' t expect o u t of y o u r peers w h a t y o u expect o u t of yourself.' . . . . T h e n once I got in t h e academy, I s a w t h a t t h e r e w e r e p e o p l e in my class w h o d i d n ' t really h a v e a grasp on real- ity, w h o h a d n o idea w h a t they were getting themselves i n t o . T h e n w e also h a d people w h o got i n t o it for p a y c h e c k s . . . . T h e r e w e r e several o t h e r p e o p l e w h o t h o u g h t the w a y I did, so t h e r e w a s a g r o u p of us t h a t were really serious, really i n t e n s e " (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 5 0 ) . Both t h e elite a n d the non-elite cops k n o w w h o each o t h e r are. In the LAPD at t h e t i m e of the C h r i s t o p h e r C o m m i s s i o n , the m o s t action-oriented police o n the spe- cial s q u a d s w e r e famed t h r o u g h o u t t h e force. Police psychologists distin- guish t w o categories: " T h e first g r o u p m a y be t h o u g h t of as slackers by their peers because they p u r p o s e l y avoid h o t situations; the second g r o u p is t h o u g h t of as a d r e n a l i n junkies because they race from h o t call to h o t c a l l " (Artwohl a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 : 1 2 7 ) . 1 5

O n e off-duty p o l i c e m a n w a s p a g e d by the SWAT t e a m to the scene w h e r e a w o m a n h a d called police after her boyfriend h a d b e a t e n her (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 1 4 7 - 5 2 ) . H e recollected,

I a l r e a d y h a d the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t h e ' d fired at officers, a n d I w a s k i n d of confused a b o u t w h y they were letting this guy w a l k a r o u n d w i t h a rifle after h e ' s a l r e a d y s h o t at some p a t r o l c o p s . I w a s w o n d e r i n g , " W h y a r e n ' t they s h o o t i n g ? " . . . T h e a t m o s p h e r e at t h e scene w a s very s t r a n g e . T h e r e w e r e police cars all over the place, w i t h their emergency lights o n , s o m a n y t h a t I h a d t o s t o p a b o u t t h r e e h u n d r e d y a r d s d o w n t h e street from w h e r e the g u n m a n w a s . Police officers w e r e all over the place, the n e w s m e d i a w a s already t h e r e , a n d t h e r e m u s t have been f i f t y s p e c t a t o r s s t a n d i n g a r o u n d w h e r e I pulled my car u p . . . .

T h e officer found a p a t r o l m a n w i t h a s e m i - a u t o m a t i c assault rifle (the civilian version of the military's M - 1 6 ) , but the latter told him he d i d n ' t k n o w h o w to use it.

He told m e , "I c a n ' t figure o u t h o w to w o r k the sights on this g u n . " I said, "Jesus C h r i s t ! " a n d told him a n d the other officers they were t o o close, t h a t we needed to move the perimeter back a n d let the snipers c o n t a i n the s i t u a t i o n . I looked u p , a n d the guy w a s s t a n d i n g right w h e r e Jeff [another SWAT m e m b e r ] told me he h a d a clear view, a n d I c o u l d n ' t u n d e r s t a n d w h y he w a s n ' t s h o o t i n g . . . .

I still h a d n ' t h e a r d a shot, so I decided to d r o p this guy. . . . Before I pulled the trigger, I started w o n d e r i n g a b o u t my decision again. I said

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to myself, "Pete, m a y b e y o u ' r e missing s o m e t h i n g here, because no o n e else is s h o o t i n g , You just told Jeff to d r o p the guy, but he d i d n ' t . M a y b e I'm missing s o m e t h i n g here. D o n ' t s h o o t so quickly." . . . I told the guy to give u p , but he just s t o o d right there a n d d i d n ' t fucking move. As I w a s aiming my gun at h i m , I was t h i n k i n g all kinds of stuff. . . . When I stopped myself from s h o o t i n g him the first time, I started going t h r o u g h my mental check list. . . . " W h a t justification do I have to s h o o t him w h e n f i f t y o t h e r cops are s t a n d i n g a r o u n d and they're n o t ? "

T h e officer's t h o u g h t s then t u r n t o technical m a t t e r s , c o m p a r i n g w h a t kind of gun he has with the suspect's w e a p o n , a n d deciding w h e t h e r to leave it on full a u t o m a t i c or shift to s e m i - a u t o m a t i c . He calculates the distance at which his w e a p o n is sighted, a n d decides to aim a few inches a b o v e the suspect's belly b u t t o n since his bullet should hit four-to-six inches higher t h a n his p o i n t of a i m .

T h e suspect begins cursing at the officers, d e m a n d i n g they turn their spotlights off of him a n d t h r e a t e n i n g to kill s o m e o n e if they do n o t . T h e officers t u r n the lights off. A p p a r e n t l y this is the d o u b l e sticking p o i n t for the SWAT officer; the suspect has d e m o n s t r a t e d his d o m i n a n c e over the s i t u a t i o n , the m o s t basic affront to the police; in a d d i t i o n , he begins to w r a p his rifle sling a r o u n d his h a n d , as if p r e p a r i n g it for firing. " W h e n I saw him do t h a t , I said to myself, 'This has gone far e n o u g h . ' "

T h e officer then shot w h a t he believed w a s a burst of four or five r o u n d s ; in fact nine r o u n d s hit the suspect. He then a d v a n c e s , even t h o u g h correct policy was to be c a u t i o u s : "I started w a l k i n g up on him as s o o n as he hit the g r o u n d . I p r o b a b l y should have stayed behind the cover of the p a t r o l car for a little longer and evaluating things before m o v i n g u p , b u t I d i d n ' t . . . . At t h a t p o i n t , I realized t h a t I had killed him a n d I said to myself, 'Pete, y o u ' v e been involved in a n o t h e r s h o o t i n g ' " (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 1 4 7 - 5 2 ) .

T h i s officer provides a g o o d p o r t r a i t of the violent few a m o n g the p o - lice. He self-consciously takes charge in a potentially violent s i t u a t i o n . He has the strongest emphasis on his a r m s a n d t e c h n i q u e ; he is in the small g r o u p t h a t assiduously spends time p r e p a r i n g at the s h o o t i n g range, con- cerned a b o u t their w e a p o n s , even practicing m a r t i a l a r t s . He is also the m o s t mentally a t t u n e d to p o t e n t i a l violence, frequently r e p e a t i n g statistics a n d stories a b o u t cops w h o h a v e been shot, a n d mentally asserting t h a t it will n o t h a p p e n to h i m because he will be better t h a n his o p p o n e n t . 1 6

He r e g a r d s himself as m o r e conscious of t h e ever-present d a n g e r t h a n other, less-prepared police. But he deals w i t h danger n o t by avoiding it, but by seeking it o u t . 1 7 Such cops are a p r o t o t y p e for the violent elite in o t h e r arenas as well.

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W H O W I N S ?

We c o m e n o w to the elite of the elite: n o t only the m o s t actively violent b u t t h e truly c o m p e t e n t l y violent. I will argue t h a t their c o m p e t e n c e is n o t just a m a t t e r of having t h e best eyesight or the quickest reflexes, b u t a social c o m p e t e n c e in d o m i n a t i o n . T h a t m e a n s the techniques of the vio- lent elite are a b o v e all in their distinctive m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l tactics for over- c o m i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear.

Military Snipers: Concealed and Absorbed in Technique

T h e sniper is chiefly a p h e n o m e n o n of t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y w a r s . Until m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century, s m o o t h - b o r e muzzle-loading m u s k e t s were t o o inac- c u r a t e a n d t o o c u m b e r s o m e in r e l o a d i n g to be used w i t h a n y effectiveness except in m a s s e d r a n k s . T h e i r a c c u r a t e r a n g e of aimed fire w a s o n e h u n - dred y a r d s , a n d battles w e r e often fought o u t as close as t h i r t y y a r d s or less (Pegler 2 0 0 1 : 5; Griffith 1 9 8 9 : 1 4 6 - 5 0 ) . By 1 9 0 0 , industrial i m p r o v e - m e n t s b r o u g h t spiral-grooved rifles w i t h percussion-fired breech-loaded cartridges to all t h e major armies; these rifles could reach targets at o n e t h o u s a n d o r even t w o t h o u s a n d y a r d s , b u t only w i t h telescopes c o u l d s h o o t e r s see m u c h of the t a r g e t b e y o n d t h r e e h u n d r e d y a r d s . T r o o p s be- c a m e divided into a mass of infantry w i t h relatively p o o r a i m o p e r a t i n g at close r a n g e s , a n d a small n u m b e r of snipers.

T h e p r o p o r t i o n of snipers has always been relatively small, on the o r d e r of 1 p e r c e n t or less of infantry t r o o p s , w i t h highs of slightly over 2 p e r c e n t (Pegler 2 0 0 1 ) . W h y these n u m b e r s are so small can be considered in sev- eral w a y s . Snipers needed specialized e q u i p m e n t (scopes, special rifles, a n d a m m u n i t i o n ) , w h i c h armies are n o t generally eager to p r o v i d e , in p a r t because of c o m p l i c a t i n g logistics p r o b l e m s , in p a r t because of expense. P e r h a p s m o r e impor t ant l y, officers (as well as regular t r o o p s ) l o o k e d a s k a n c e at snipers, considering t h e m n o t quite p a l a t a b l e k i n d s of fighters, even t h o u g h their superior effectiveness w a s well k n o w n . W h a t e v e r t h e m i x of practical, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , a n d ideological r e a s o n s , different armies all converged on a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same p r o p o r t i o n s of snipers.

T h e effectiveness of snipers t e n d s to be heroized by l o o k i n g at t h e very t o p o f t h e distribut i on. T h e all-time t o p sniper t o t a l s — o v e r 5 0 0 a n d 4 0 0 kills, respectively—were set by t w o Finnish snipers d u r i n g t h e R u s s i a n invasion of Finland in 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 0 , virtually invisible w e a r i n g w i n t e r w h i t e camouflage a n d m o v i n g on skis inside Russian lines. T h e t o p W o r l d W a r I sniper w a s a C a n a d i a n credited w i t h 3 7 6 kills on t h e w e s t e r n front. I n W o r l d W a r II, t h e t o p t w o G e r m a n snipers each h a d over 3 0 0 kills, b o t h o n the eastern front; the t o p R u s s i a n w a s a w o m a n w h o h a d 3 0 9 .

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O t h e r t o p snipers i n p a r t i c u l a r armies w e r e lower; t h e t o p A m e r i c a n sniper in V i e t n a m h a d 1 1 3 . In general a n y t h i n g over forty kills has been considered n o t e w o r t h y (Pegler 2 0 0 1 : 3 1 , 5 7 ; 2 0 0 4 : 1 3 9 - 4 0 , 1 6 7 , 1 7 6 - 7 8 ; G r o s s m a n 1 9 9 5 : 1 0 9 ) .

T h e r a t e for average snipers w a s quite a bit lower. In W o r l d War I, t h e elite South African s h a r p s h o o t e r s unit of t w e n t y - f o u r m e n (recruited from big-game hunters) killed 125 G e r m a n s each on the average; s p r e a d over t w o a n d a half years, this w a s four per m o n t h . O t h e r sniper units in vari- ous armies averaged between o n e kill per m o n t h a n d one per three m o n t h s . T h e entire c o n t i n g e n t of Russian w o m e n snipers killed an aver- age of eight each d u r i n g the length of W o r l d War II (calculated from Pegler 2 0 0 1 : 2 4 , 2 9 ; 2 0 0 4 : 1 4 0 - 4 2 , 1 7 8 ; Keegan 1 9 9 7 : 1 6 2 - 6 3 ) . T h e very p e a k - killing s n i p e r s — 3 0 0 - 5 0 0 kills—are the t o p o n e o r t w o individuals i n a n entire a r m y of millions of t r o o p s ; even t h o s e w i t h a h u n d r e d kills are a handful at m o s t . T h e i r kill totals are similar to those of the very t o p ace pilots. These p e a k t o t a l s d e p e n d u p o n several c o n d i t i o n s b e y o n d the sheer m o t i v a t i o n a n d ability of the killer; also necessary is a p r o l o n g e d p e r i o d of c o m b a t w i t h m a n y accessible t a r g e t s .

A better w a y t h a n t o t a l kills for assessing the skill of this killing elite is their firing accuracy. It is sometimes asserted t h a t a sniper averages one kill per 1.3 r o u n d s fired, c o m p a r e d to 7 , 0 0 0 r o u n d s of small a r m s fire for o r d i n a r y infantry in W o r l d War I a n d 2 5 , 0 0 0 r o u n d s in V i e t n a m ( H a y 1 9 7 4 ) ; a n d military sniper schools in recent decades a d o p t the doctrine of o n e shot, one kill. This is an ideal t h a t has evolved historically, w i t h t h e i m p r o v e m e n t of e q u i p m e n t , especially of highly a c c u r a t e scopes. Again the n a r r a t i v e s c o n c e n t r a t e on the successes: o n e sniper in V i e t n a m hit fourteen e n e m y sentries in fourteen shots; an A u s t r a l i a n (a former k a n g a r o o h u n t e r ) i n N e w Guinea s h o t twelve a d v a n c i n g J a p a n e s e w i t h twelve shots w i t h i n f i f t e e n m i n u t e s — a case w h e r e t h e targets w e r e u n u s u - ally e x p o s e d , at relatively close r a n g e . O n l y occasionally does a c o m b a t n a r r a t i v e tell of misses: an A m e r i c a n , going i n t o his initial sniping action in the Pacific in W o r l d War II, hit t w o of five s h o t s . A U.S. sniper in Viet- n a m r e p o r t e d a t t e m p t i n g a difficult s h o t at 1,300 m e t e r s , missing five times, hitting on the sixth. In N o r t h e r n Ireland, t w o British snipers fired at an IRA a m b u s h at 1,200 y a r d s , hitting ten of eighty-three shots (Pegler 2 0 0 1 : 4 8 ; 2 0 0 4 : 2 8 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 4 , 2 8 6 ) .

W h a t the " o n e shot, o n e k i l l " ideal implies is o p t i m u m c o n d i t i o n s : the ability to hit a p e r s o n in the h e a d at 4 0 0 y a r d s , a n d in t h e b o d y at 6 0 0 to 8 0 0 y a r d s . T h e ideal has risen w i t h the e q u i p m e n t . In W o r l d W a r I, accu- racy o f f i r e i n t r e n c h w a r f a r e w a s rarely m o r e t h a n 3 0 0 t o 4 0 0 y a r d s , a n d m o s t hits w e r e u n d e r 2 0 0 y a r d s . In W o r l d War II, i m p r o v e d scopes were theoretically a c c u r a t e t o 8 0 0 y a r d s , b u t m o s t snipers o p e r a t e d w i t h i n 4 0 0 y a r d s , a n d even the best rarely hit b e y o n d 6 0 0 y a r d s , t h o u g h occasional

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hits were celebrated out to 1,000 yards (Pegler 2 0 0 1 : 2 2 - 3 1 ) . High-tech e q u i p m e n t at the end of the century b r o u g h t occasional record-setting hits at 1,500 meters or even farther in the 1 9 9 1 Gulf w a r and the 2 0 0 2 Afghanistan war. But the o n e - s h o t s t a n d a r d is an ideal for a very elite g r o u p o p e r a t i n g within w h a t are considered a p p r o p r i a t e ranges o u t t o 6 0 0 meters, w i t h high magnification scopes.

T h e r e are n u m e r o u s limitations and obstacles t h a t are n o t held against the ideal. W e a p o n s sometimes malfunction, or become fouled from use, dirt, and m o i s t u r e . Scopes fog u p . W i n d c o n d i t i o n s b l o w shots off course; heat mirages, especially in deserts, m a k e distance estimation inaccurate; extreme cold changes ballistics. Jungle or heavily w o o d e d terrain cuts d o w n the range of visibility. T h u s high-accuracy as well as high-kill totals depend on relatively o p t i m u m c o n d i t i o n s , especially open t e r r a i n , c r o p fields, or d a m a g e d buildings providing hiding posts as well as allowing snipers to get within m o d e r a t e distances of enemy fixed positions. H e n c e the greatest o p p o r t u n i t i e s for snipers were in trench w a r f a r e , and in rela- tively static u r b a n battles such as the eastern front in World War II.

Success as a sniper d e p e n d s on m o r e techniques t h a n s h o o t i n g accuracy. Snipers often take up positions in n o - m a n ' s - l a n d or near the enemy lines; this requires finding or c o n s t r u c t i n g suitable hiding places, a n d c a m o u - flaging themselves t h o r o u g h l y against tiny tell-tale signs of m o v e m e n t , b r e a t h , s m o k e , or glints of light from guns and e q u i p m e n t . Like m o s t successful violence, snipers m a k e most of their kills against t e m p o r a r i l y defenseless or oblivious targets, s h o o t i n g primarily at officers, artillery, a n d m a c h i n e - g u n o p e r a t o r s . Because of their s u d d e n a n d clandestine at- t a c k s , snipers are t h e m o s t feared a n d h a t e d of enemies. W h e n c a p t u r e d , they are a l m o s t w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n executed on the spot; a l t h o u g h this is in violation of t h e rules of war, the act of sniping itself tends to be r e g a r d e d as itself at least a violation in spirit (Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 1 7 - 2 0 , 2 3 9 ) . 1 8 In con- trast, artillery t r o o p s , w h o cause t h e m o s t casualties, are r e g a r d e d w i t h no special animosity.

Snipers t e n d to be disliked even by their fellow t r o o p s , or at least are r e g a r d e d w i t h uneasiness. A British sniper officer in W o r l d W a r I n o t e d t h a t i n f a n t r y m e n did n o t like to mingle w i t h the snipers "for t h e r e w a s s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e m t h a t set t h e m a p a r t from o r d i n a r y m e n a n d m a d e t h e soldiers u n c o m f o r t a b l e " (quoted i n Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 2 0 - 2 1 ) . W o r l d W a r II soldiers sometimes jeered at t h e m . U.S. snipers in V i e t n a m were m e t w i t h t h e c o m m e n t , " H e r e comes M u r d e r I n c o r p o r a t e d . " T h e a t t i t u d e c o n t i n u e d even w i t h the high-tech feats of late-twentieth-century snipers; t h e sniper section of a British b a t t a l i o n in t h e late 1 9 8 0 s w a s k n o w n as " t h e Leper C o l o n y " (Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 2 1 - 2 3 ) . In p a r t t h e lack of solidarity c a m e from t h e distinctiveness a n d privileges of snipers; generally they w e r e free of o r d i n a r y duties a n d fatigues; they h a d u n u s u a l freedom to

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m o v e a b o u t a n d c h o o s e their o w n time a n d place of action; they t e n d e d to w e a r idiosyncratic u n i f o r m s , m a d e even m o r e bizarre b y their predilec- t i o n for e x t r e m e forms of camouflage. But m o s t of all they w e r e e m o t i o n - ally distant; generally less sociable, m o r e reserved t h a n o t h e r t r o o p s ; a n d their cool a b s o r p t i o n in their craft gave t h e m the r e p u t a t i o n of cold- b l o o d e d killers.

N o t only w e r e t r o o p s cool o r hostile t o snipers. T r a d i t i o n a l officers a t the beginnings of the w o r l d w a r s w e r e initially u n c o n v i n c e d of the need of snipers, a n d sniper forces were built up only w i t h reluctance. Officers t o o r e g a r d e d snipers as outside the n o r m a l tactics a n d m o d e of h o n o r of battle, w h e r e t r o o p s faced each o t h e r w i t h at least a certain degree of d a n g e r to themselves in r e t u r n for their a t t e m p t i n g to t a k e t h e lives of t h e enemy. As it t u r n e d o u t , snipers t e n d e d to t a k e high casualties t o o ; b u t the m o d e of c o n f r o n t a t i o n — s h o o t i n g from t h e m o s t e x t r e m e c o n c e a l m e n t possible, avoiding t h e m o m e n t o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a n equally danger- ous enemy—felt like a violation of military honor. It is n o t surprising t h a t sniper t r a i n i n g a n d w e a p o n r y , hastily improvised after t h e beginning of each war, w a s speedily s h u t d o w n a t each w a r ' s end.

Sniping is indeed a cool a n d calculating business. Successful snipers are p a t i e n t a n d slow; w o r k i n g their w a y f o r w a r d o r b a c k w a r d i n t o the p r o p e r v a n t a g e p o i n t a n d place of c o n c e a l m e n t , usually t a k i n g very few s h o t s a day. In p a r t this w a s a safety p r e c a u t i o n , to avoid giving a w a y the location of their hiding place; b u t t h e clandestine a p p r o a c h is also an offensive m o v e , w a i t i n g t o f i n d a n accessible target a n d t o t a k e t h e best possible s h o t at h i m . T h i s is w h y high n u m b e r s of kills per d a y by a sniper are r a r e ; m o s t snipers w a i t for a m o n t h or m o r e for their kill. But s o m e snipers do score m u c h higher t h a n o t h e r s , even on the same front; these ultra- elite killers are n o t only clandestine b u t also aggressive in seeking o u t t a r g e t s . T h e average sniper, on the o t h e r h a n d , has plenty of o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o p a s s u p s h o t s , ostensibly for technical r e a s o n s .

Snipers are selected n o t merely because they are g o o d s h o t s , a l t h o u g h t h a t is generally w h a t gets t h e m initially i n t o sniper t r a i n i n g . O n e estimate i s t h a t 2 5 p e r c e n t w a s h o u t a s u n s u i t a b l e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e t o p m a r k s m e n on s h o o t i n g r a n g e s are n o t always successful in sniping live targets in c o m b a t s i t u a t i o n s , w h e r e it is necessary to find o n e ' s o w n target a n d a p - p r o a c h w i t h i n s h o o t i n g r a n g e . In this respect they are like ace fighter pi- l o t s , w h o see p o t e n t i a l targets w h e r e others do n o t . T h e difference be- t w e e n g o o d shots a n d snipers is often described as a m a t t e r of t e m p e r a m e n t ; h o t h e a d s , c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a n d belligerent p e r s o n s d o n o t m a k e g o o d snipers (Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 1 2 1 , 1 2 1 , 2 4 3 , 3 0 3 ) .

H o w t h e n d o they d o it? Snipers, a l t h o u g h isolated from other t r o o p s , are n o t w i t h o u t social s u p p o r t ; m o s t o p e r a t e i n t w o - o r th ree-p erso n t e a m s , a l t h o u g h some o p e r a t e solo. Usually one acts as telescopic s p o t t e r for the p r i m a r y sniper; a t h i r d m a y carry c o n v e n t i o n a l a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s

The Violent Few • 385

a n d a c t as a g u a r d . In effect this m a k e s sniping a g r o u p - o p e r a t e d w e a p o n , the type t h a t S . L . A . M a r s h a l l ( 1 9 4 7 ) f o u n d h a d the highest firing level.

L i k e all v i o l e n c e , sniping m u s t o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. T h e sniper has t h e special a d v a n t a g e o f s h o o t i n g a t the longest d i s t a n c e o f any small a r m s . Usually t h e t a r g e t i s a t 3 0 0 t o 4 0 0 y a r d s . A t this dis- t a n c e o n e c a n pick o u t the legs of a s t a n d i n g m a n , but the head is barely visible o n the t o r s o . A t 1 5 0 y a r d s — v e r y c l o s e d i s t a n c e f o r a s n i p e r — t h e line of p e o p l e ' s eyes are visible; at eighty yards the face is clearly visible, and the eyes are distinct p o i n t s . F a r t h e r o u t , a t 6 0 0 y a r d s , c o l o r s o f c l o t h - ing are n o t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e e x c e p t f o r w h i t e ; a t 8 0 0 t o 1 , 0 0 0 y a r d s a b o d y of t r o o p s is visible as a l o w l i n e . 1 9 T h i s m e a n s t h a t snipers fire at d i s t a n c e s a t w h i c h the usual signs o f f a c e - t o - f a c e c o n f r o n t a t i o n , including the o p p o - n e n t ' s e m o t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s , a r e n o t visible.

S n i p e r s g e n e r a l l y use s c o p e s , w i t h m a g n i f i c a t i o n o f b e t w e e n 3 a n d 1 0 , a n d this usually m a k e s t h e f a c e v i s i b l e , i f n o t t h e e y e s . B u t even w i t h t h e s c o p e , t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l p s y c h o l o g y i s d i f f e r e n t t h a n n o r m a l ; t h e r e i s n o r e c i p r o c i t y , s i n c e t h e e n e m y d o e s n o t see t h e s n i p e r ' s f a c e o r e y e s , o r i n d e e d see t h e s n i p e r a t a l l . T h e b a s i c f e a t u r e s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n — t h e t e n d e n c y t o b e c o m e e n t r a i n e d i n a c o m m o n f o c u s o f a t t e n t i o n a n d a s h a r e d m o o d — a r e l a c k i n g . F i r i n g w i t h a s c o p e b r i n g s o u t , like a c o n - t r o l l e d e x p e r i m e n t , t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l d e t a i l s t h a t n o r m a l l y m a k e t h e c o n - f r o n t a t i o n difficult. I t i s n o t j u s t seeing t h e o t h e r ' s eyes t h a t m a k e s f o r i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t , b u t m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t b o t h see e a c h o t h e r ' s e y e s .

T h e c o r e o f the sniper's t e c h n i q u e , even m o r e than s h o o t i n g ability, is invisibility. Snipers use c o n c e a l m e n t n o t merely as a defense a g a i n s t r e t a l i a t i o n , but as an o f f e n s i v e w e a p o n ; it is a w a y of m a k i n g the i n t e r a c - tion a s y m m e t r i c a l . T h u s the k e y item in the sniper's s o c i a l identity is o n e ' s a b i l i t y a t c o n c e a l m e n t a n d c a m o u f l a g e . I n this respect they are s i m i l a r t o p r o f e s s i o n a l h i t m e n , a n d to t e r r o r i s t s . It is this e m p h a s i s on c o n c e a l m e n t t h a t gives t h e m a r e p u t a t i o n o f being " c o w a r d l y " o r a t least n o t q u i t e h o n o r a b l e , f r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f o t h e r s o l d i e r s .

In a d d i t i o n , t h e s n i p e r ' s a t t e n t i o n is n o t on the c o n f r o n t a t i o n in t h e s a m e w a y t h a t individuals in a fight or b a t t l e are c a u g h t up in t h e c o n f l i c t . Instead of a c o n t e s t of wills, h o s t i l i t i e s , a n d f e a r s , with its urges to a c t i o n in flight or fight, t h e sniper sets his o w n ti me f r a m e , s l o w l y a n d p a t i e n t l y w a i t i n g f o r a n o p p o r t u n i t y . W h a t e v e r t e n s i o n h e has tends t o b e s w a l - l o w e d up in f o c u s i n g upon t h e t e c h n i c a l details of getting t h e p r o p e r dis- t a n c e , w i n d speed, e l e v a t i o n , a n d o t h e r f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e s h o t ; instead of f o c u s i n g on the e n e m y as a h u m a n being or even as an o p p o n e n t , he or she f o c u s e s on a d j u s t i n g his or her s i g h t s . Snipers d e s c r i b e their o w n e x p e r i e n c e chiefly in t e r m s of recalling the t e c h n i c a l details f r o m t r a i n i n g s c h o o l , a n d applying their t e c h n i q u e s with a s much c a r e a s p o s s i b l e . T h i s o b s e s s i o n with o n e ' s o w n t e c h n i q u e r e m o v e s the s i t u a t i o n f r o m the e m o -

386 • Chapter 10

•llLJdL 21 KM

Figure 10.1 Visibility of targets at various distances: 1942 Soviet sniping manual.

tions of killing, i n t o a quiet z o n e w h e r e it is a l m o s t entirely d e p e r s o n a l - ized. Pegler ( 2 0 0 4 : 316) q u o t e s a British sniper in I r a q in 2 0 0 3 : "I k n e w I only h a d o n e s h o t a n d h a d to get the angle exactly right. It w a s h o t a n d w i n d w a s b l o w i n g strongly a n d steadily from left to r i g h t as we crept up to a v a n t a g e p o i n t a b o u t 860 meters from the t a r g e t . I s a w I h a d a clear s h o t a t m y m a n . . . his h e a d a n d chest were e x p o s e d . M y t r a i n i n g t h e n t o o k over a n d I g o t i n t o t h e perfect sniping p o s i t i o n . I w a s c o n c e n t r a t i n g so h a r d t h a t I d i d n ' t h a v e time to t h i n k a b o u t h i m as a p e r s o n or t h e fact t h a t I w a s just a b o u t to kill him. He w a s just a d i s t a n t shape magnified ten times in the telescopic l e n s . "

cewwe 2000 «

1000-« - 2000 *

400 - A-<000 M

' i 0 0 - | | - 400 H

The Violent Few • 387

Snipers' deliberation is the o p p o s i t e end of the c o n t i n u u m from face c o n f r o n t a t i o n s at close r a n g e . As the following e x a m p l e s h o w s , violence can be completely neutralized w h e n fighters c o m e into c o n f r o n t a t i o n so a b r u p t l y t h a t there is no p r e p a r a t i o n on either side for t h e killing m o d e : In t h e 1 9 4 4 c a m p a i g n in the dense bocage h e d g e r o w s of N o r m a n d y , " o n e astonished GI w a l k e d a r o u n d a b e n d into an equally a m a z e d G e r m a n . N e i t h e r h a d the ability t o s h o o t a n d they could h a v e reached o u t a n d t o u c h e d o n e another. T h e GI yelled ' S h o o ! Get the hell o u t of h e r e ! ' a n d the G e r m a n t o o k off" (quoted in Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 2 5 3 ) .

A similar s i t u a t i o n is described by a p o l i c e m a n , in this case c o m p o u n d e d by the diminished hearing t h a t comes in the h e a t of violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n :

My p a r t n e r a n d I h a d chased a b a n k r o b b e r into an e m p t y lot over- g r o w n w i t h trees a n d b u s h e s . Stan r a n t o w a r d a long hedge as I r a n alongside it in the o t h e r direction to cut off the suspect w h e n he got flushed o u t . W h e n I r o u n d e d the corner, I h e a r d the s h o t . It w a s n ' t a loud b a n g , like at t h e r a n g e . It w a s just a little p o p . In fact, I r e m e m b e r t h i n k i n g as I p u s h e d t h r o u g h the limbs of a huge tree t h a t it c o u l d n ' t be a shot, it h a d to be s o m e t h i n g else. T h e n I c a m e face to face w i t h t h e suspect. H e h a d been p u s h i n g t h r o u g h the tree b r a n c h e s t o o , c o m - ing t o w a r d m e , his pistol p o i n t e d right at my face. We b o t h froze.

A l t h o u g h we c o u l d n ' t h a v e s t o o d t h e r e for m o r e t h a n a second, I r e m e m b e r the m o m e n t very clearly. We were a b o u t five or six feet a p a r t a n d his face l o o k e d as surprised as mine p r o b a b l y did. I r e m e m b e r he h a d a tie-died T-shirt on a n d he w a s big a n d bushy-haired. T h e n we b a c k e d a w a y from each o t h e r a n d the b r a n c h e s fell back a n d blocked m y view. ( A r t w o h l a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 : 4 0 - 4 1 )

I t t u r n e d o u t t h a t the p o l i c e m a n ' s p a r t n e r h a d indeed been shot; neverthe- less, the r o b b e r w a s t o o startled to pull the trigger again in the s u d d e n close-up c o n f r o n t a t i o n . M i n u t e s later, the t w o h a d a n o t h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n , n o w from t h i r t y y a r d s a w a y ; this time b o t h p o i n t e d their g u n s , a n d the c o p got his s h o t off first. 2 0

It is situations of this s o r t t h a t snipers' i n t e r a c t i o n a l technique is de- signed to avoid. Their skill at a v o i d a n c e , while aggressively seeking o u t t a r g e t s , is w h a t determines their success.

Fighter Pilot Aces: Aggressively Imposing Momentum

Some of the strongest evidence for the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of effective violence in a small elite is t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of fighter pilots. W o r l d W a r I invented the category of t h e fighter ace, a pilot w h o s h o t d o w n five or m o r e enemy aircraft. Fighter pilot p e r f o r m a n c e became a t o p i c of avid reco rd -k eep in g .

388 • Chapter 10

A m o n g A m e r i c a n fighter pilots, less t h a n 1 percent b e c a m e aces from W o r l d W a r I t h r o u g h the K o r e a n w a r ; b u t they typically a c c o u n t e d for b e t w e e n 37 a n d 68 percent of t h e enemy aircraft destroyed (EAD) in air- to-air fighting. T h e majority of pilots h a d no kills at a l l . 2 1 T h e result c a m e from a c o m b i n a t i o n of pilots firing i n a c c u r a t e l y — t h e l o w c o m p e t e n c e p a t t e r n — o r n o t f i r i n g a t a l l — M a r s h a l l ' s l o w f i r i n g r a t i o . I n the K o r e a n war, half of A m e r i c a n fighter pilots "never fired their g u n s , a n d of t h o s e w h o h a d f i r e d , only 1 0 p e r c e n t h a d ever hit a n y t h i n g " (Bourke 1 9 9 9 : 6 2 ) . T o p pilots w e r e n o t merely g o o d shooters b u t those w h o w e r e the m o s t aggressive in seeking o u t e n e m y t a r g e t s . 2 2

Similarly in o t h e r air forces. In the British R o y a l Air Force in W o r l d W a r II, 5 percent of t h e pilots a c c o u n t e d for 60 percent of t h e air victories; t h o s e credited w i t h ten or m o r e victories m a d e up 0.2 percent of the mili- t a r y pilots. J a p a n e s e pilots in W o r l d W a r II w h o h a d t w e n t y or m o r e kills w e r e well b e l o w 0.5 percent of all pilots. In the Soviet air force, at m o s t 0.3 percent h a d t w e n t y o r m o r e victories. T h e criterion for w h a t w a s c o u n t e d as an ace varied in different air forces, d e p e n d i n g on h o w high t h e kill r e c o r d s r e a c h e d . 2 3

In a class by themselves w e r e W o r l d W a r II G e r m a n pilots. T h e t o p t w o pilots h a d over 3 0 0 kills; a n o t h e r t h i r t e e n h a d 2 0 0 plus (www.au.af.mil/ au/awc/awcgate/aces/aces.htm). As we will see, these extremely high n u m - bers were due to special c o n d i t i o n s on the eastern front.

W e h a v e n o i n f o r m a t i o n c o m p a r a b l e t o t h a t o f snipers o n the f i r i n g accuracy of p i l o t s , b u t we c a n get s o m e averages of planes shot d o w n per sortie, or per m o n t h in c o m b a t . T h e highest success r a t e s were for t o p G e r m a n aces in W o r l d W a r II. O t t o Kittel flew 5 8 3 missions a n d s h o t d o w n 2 6 7 p l a n e s , a r a t i o of 46 percent of his missions. O t h e r t o p pilots w i t h over 2 0 0 kills h a d success ratios from 22 to 44 percent of their sor- ties. Erich H a r t m a n n , the t o p ace of all W o r l d W a r II pilots w i t h 3 5 2 kills, also h a d t h e m o s t missions—over 1,400—for a success r a t e of a b o u t 25 p e r c e n t . 2 4 A t o p J a p a n e s e pilot, S a b u r o Sakai, h a d 64 kills in a b o u t 2 0 0 c o m b a t missions, or 32 p e r c e n t (Caidi.n et al. 2 0 0 4 ) . Even u n d e r the m o s t favorable c o n d i t i o n s , t h e b a t t i n g average for fighter pilots is like t h a t of baseball hitters, w i t h a n y t h i n g a b o v e .400 as e p o c h - m a k i n g .

In o t h e r t h e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n , p e a k success levels w e r e lower. M a j o r R i c h a r d Bong, flying in the Pacific in W o r l d W a r II, b r o k e the U.S. r e c o r d w i t h twenty-eight kills in 1 4 2 missions, a r a t i o of o n e kill per five sorties or 20 percent of the time (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 1 1 3 ) . T h e t o p R A F ace in W o r l d W a r II (J. E. J o h n s o n ) h a d thirty-eight kills over fifty-four m o n t h s c o m b a t flying, averaging a b o u t one kill per m o n t h (Daily Telegraph, Feb. 1, 2 0 0 1 ) . I n W o r l d W a r I , t h e t o p ace w a s t h e G e r m a n M a n f r e d v o n R i c h t h o - fen w i t h eighty kills in t w e n t y m o n t h s ( a b o u t 1 per week); the t o p U.S.

The Violent Few • 389

ace, Eddie Rickenbacker, h a d twenty-four kills in s o m e w h a t over a year ( a b o u t t w o per m o n t h ) (Gilbert 1 9 9 4 : 2 9 0 - 9 1 , 4 1 5 ; G u r n e y 1 9 6 5 ) . 2 5

As a baseline for average p i l o t s , U.S. N a v y fighters in W o r l d W a r II flew 1 4 6 , 4 6 5 sorties, a r a t i o of 6.3 percent per enemy aircraft destroyed in aerial c o m b a t . 2 6 We can also calculate the accuracy of an air force in re- verse, since the losses of one side are t h e successes of the o t h e r side. In the E u r o p e a n t h e a t e r in W o r l d W a r II, t h e R A F flew 1,695,000 fighter p l a n e sorties a n d lost 0.6 percent per sortie; A m e r i c a n fighters lost 0.8 percent p e r sortie (Keegan 1 9 9 7 : 1 3 9 ) . Given t h a t s o m e of the losses were to anti- aircraft g r o u n d fire, we c a n estimate the c h a n c e of a G e r m a n pilot s h o o t - ing d o w n the planes t h a t w e r e his targets in a n y p a r t i c u l a r sortie w o u l d be 1 percent or less in air-to-air c o m b a t . A n d this w a s a r g u a b l y t h e t o p air force in the war. T h e Luftwaffe g o t m o s t of its air victories against the inferior Soviet air force. T h i s s h o w s in t h e aggregate w h a t I a r g u e later on the individual level: o n e g o o d air force against a n o t h e r g o o d air force results in a relatively l o w kill level.

Unlike snipers, aces w e r e given w i d e publicity in the n ews m e d i a a n d covered w i t h h o n o r s in the military c o m m u n i t y . D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I, e n e m y pilots recognized each o t h e r ' s aces. W h e n v o n Richthofen, the t o p G e r m a n ace, w a s finally s h o t d o w n in 1 9 1 7 , he w a s buried w i t h full mili- t a r y h o n o r s behind the British lines; a n d British pilots d r o p p e d w r e a t h s on t h e funeral inside G e r m a n lines for a n o t h e r famous G e r m a n ace (Gur- ney 1 9 6 5 : 6 5 , 7 5 ) . I n W o r l d War II, b o t h J a p a n e s e a n d G e r m a n forces k n e w the n a m e s of A m e r i c a n aces a n d t r e a t e d t h e m h o n o r a b l y as prison- ers of war, a fate very unlike t h a t of snipers w h o were h a t e d in all armies a n d were generally executed immediately w h e n c a p t u r e d .

Fighter p i l o t s quickly b e c a m e r e g a r d e d a s t h e ideal h e r o i c w a r r i o r . T h e r e w a s g r e a t e n t h u s i a s m a m o n g civilian pilots t o join i n b o t h o f t h e w o r l d w a r s , b e g i n n i n g a s v o l u n t e e r s for t h e F r e n c h a n d British air forces before t h e U n i t e d States officially d e c l a r e d w a r . In t h e r e g u l a r military, f i g h t e r pilots disliked a d m i n i s t r a t i v e desk j o b s , a n d s o m e t i m e s violated r e g u l a t i o n s t o s n e a k o u t a n d fly. T h e i r m o t i v a t i o n for joining w a s n o t political or p a t r i o t i c , b u t chiefly getting i n t o t h e center of h e r o i c a c t i o n . Pilots i n W o r l d W a r I a n d u p t h r o u g h t h e 1 9 3 0 s w e r e often s t u n t pilots o r r a c i n g c a r d r i v e r s , w h o m a d e their living b y p u b l i c e x h i b i t i o n s . W o r l d W a r I units w e r e called "flying c i r c u s e s " w i t h s o m e justification. C o m - b a t s , w h i c h t o o k place at a l t i t u d e s b e l o w a few t h o u s a n d feet, w e r e s o m e t i m e s a n n o u n c e d a n d s c h e d u l e d w i t h g r o u n d a u d i e n c e s a s s e m b l e d . F a r from seeking disguise, s o m e p i l o t s p a i n t e d their p l a n e s in b r i g h t col- o r s ; v o n R i c h t h o f e n ' s s q u a d r o n w a s b r i g h t red (hence his n i c k n a m e t h e " R e d B a r o n " ) . By W o r l d W a r II, A m e r i c a n pilots h a d evolved a r i t u a l u p o n r e t u r n i n g t o b a s e , p e r f o r m i n g o n e b a r r e l roll before l a n d i n g for each enemy p l a n e s h o t d o w n . T h e e q u i v a l e n t i n the Luftwaffe w a s t o

3 9 0 • Chapter 10

Figure 1 0 . 2 American pilots in World War I with flying top hat emblem.

w a g g l e t h e p l a n e ' s w i n g s t h e requisite n u m b e r o f times ( G u r n e y 1 9 5 8 ; w w w . a c e p i l o t s . c o m / i n d e x . h t m l # t o p ) . T h i s w a s a c r o b a t i c showing-off i n t h e s a m e vein as t h e a c r o b a t i c flying tactics t h a t w e r e r e g a r d e d as t h e key t o c o m b a t victory.

W h y w e r e aces highly h o n o r e d for killing in single c o m b a t while snipers w e r e generally reviled? Both s h o t their targets from a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same distance—in W o r l d W a r II, usually w i t h i n 3 0 0 y a r d s ; from t h e slower-moving small planes of W o r l d War I, even closer. But w h e r e a s snip- ers t o o k their time to set up a s h o t w i t h g o o d visibility t h r o u g h a telescope, fighter pilots m a n e u v e r e d to catch their enemy briefly from r e a r or side angle; t h o u g h fighters sometimes could see the enemy pilot they never confronted face to face (since t w o planes flying t o w a r d each o t h e r w o u l d pass at very high speeds). Fighters r e g a r d e d the p l a n e as the object of the " k i l l , " n o t the pilot; enemy pilots were allowed to eject a n d w e r e n o t s h o t at while p a r a c h u t i n g . 2 7 A n d pilots w h o dueled skillfully m i g h t be locked t o g e t h e r for m i n u t e s as they flew loops a n d dives to evade the o t h e r on their tail—hence t h e t e r m "dogfight." T h i s w o u l d have p r o d u c e d a s t r o n g a n d s o m e w h a t playful if a n t a g o n i s t i c e n t r a i n m e n t b e t w e e n the enemies.

These i n t e r a c t i o n a l structures t u r n e d aerial c o m b a t i n t o the equivalent of a limited fight a m o n g m e m b e r s of an honorific elite. T h e title of " a c e " w a s closely g u a r d e d to exclude those w h o were n o t fully elite; in W o r l d W a r II, g u n n e r s o n b o m b e r crews sometimes s h o t d o w n e n o u g h enemy planes to qualify as aces, b u t w i t h very few exceptions they w e r e n o t g r a n t e d t h e title. B o m b e r g u n n e r s w e r e enlisted m e n , n o t officers, w h e r e a s

The Violent Few • 391

virtually all pilots w e r e given t h e r a n k o f c o m m i s s i o n e d officer, w h i c h c a r r i e d the c o n n o t a t i o n o f " g e n t l e m a n . " 2 8 T h e o b v e r s e c a s e , w h i c h p r o v e s the general rule, i s the f a c t t h a t J a p a n e s e pilots had n o system o f " a c e s " ( M e r s k y 1 9 9 3 ) . Pilots w e r e m o s t l y l o w - r a n k i n g enlisted m e n . N o official r e c o r d s w e r e kept n o r a w a r d s given; at best a very h i g h - p e r f o r m i n g G e k i - t s u i - O ( " s h o o t - d o w n k i n g " ) might b e p o s t h u m o u s l y p r o m o t e d t o o f f i c e r s t a t u s . T h e best pilots w e r e navy petty o f f i c e r s , w h o s p o t t e d e n e m y p l a n e s in t h e sky a n d signaled a t t a c k , leaving their n o m i n a l l y s u p e r i o r officers to f o l l o w . It is likely t h a t c o m p l a i n t s f r o m e m b a r r a s s e d officers w e r e the r e a s o n for the o r d e r given in 1 9 4 3 f o r b i d d i n g k e e p i n g individual r e c o r d s , a l t h o u g h the official r e a s o n w a s t o p r o m o t e t e a m w o r k . N e v e r t h e l e s s , J a p - anese pilots k e p t individual l o g s , a n d t h e i r f i g h t e r p l a n e s h a d " s c o r e - b o a r d s " p a i n t e d o n their tails a n d fuselages, a f o r m o f local b r a g g i n g . T h e t o p t h r e e J a p a n e s e pilots a p p a r e n t l y h a d r e c o r d s o f eighty, seventy, a n d sixty kills e a c h .

T h e h o n o r i f i c a n d s p o r t - l i k e e t h o s o f f i g h t e r bat t les i s s h o w n i n t h e p r o - liferating social c o n s t r u c t i o n o f r e c o r d s . Aerial c o m b a t s began a s a n c i l l a r y to o t h e r military a c t i v i t i e s , b u t they s o o n b e c a m e glorified in t h e m s e l v e s . In W o r l d W a r I, small p l a n e s w e r e used for battlefield r e c o n n a i s s a n c e (sup- p l e m e n t i n g b a l l o o n s , w h i c h had been used since the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h c e n - t u r y ) . E n e m y b a l l o o n s w e r e an initial target f o r fighters, b u t they did n o t b e c o m e c o u n t e d t o w a r d a c e t o t a l s ; b a l l o o n s w e r e p r o t e c t e d b y a n t i - a i r c r a f t g r o u n d f i r e r a t h e r t h a n their o w n g u n s , a n d a s s t a t i o n a r y t a r g e t s they l a c k e d the d r a m a t i c s o f c o m b a t a m o n g planes o f a s i m i l a r t y p e . T h u s evolved t h e s o - c a l l e d dogfight a m o n g rival r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e s , largely as an end in itself, a n d with huge s u r r o u n d i n g publicity. S o m e pilots b e - c a m e s o obsessed w i t h getting p r o p e r credit for t h e i r kills t h a t they w o u l d land i m m e d i a t e l y a t t h e n e a r e s t b a l l o o n o b s e r v e r a n d p r e s e n t b l a n k f o r m s f o r a certifying signature ( G u r n e y 1 9 5 8 : 3 4 ) . I n W o r l d W a r II, A m e r i c a n planes added gun c a m e r a s t o r e c o r d the e v e n t .

I n W o r l d W a r II, f i g h t e r pilots w e r e used for m o r e s u b s t a n t i v e t a s k s : providing p r o t e c t i o n f o r b o m b e r s o v e r e n e m y t e r r i t o r y ; a t t a c k i n g e n e m y b o m b e r s ; i n n a v a l c o m b a t , a t t a c k i n g e n e m y ships a n d especially c a r r i e r s ; a t t a c k i n g h a r b o r s ; defending air b a s e s ; o c c a s i o n a l l y providing c o m b a t g r o u n d s u p p o r t a g a i n s t p o s i t i o n s a n d t r o o p m o v e m e n t s . S o m e venues (such as battles o v e r h a r b o r s i m p o r t a n t in military logistics) b e c a m e regu- lar m e e t i n g places f o r f i g h t e r dogfights, a n d h e n c e places w h e r e a c e t o t a l s were r a c k e d u p . B u t m o s t o f these t a r g e t s w e r e e x c l u d e d f r o m a c e t o t a l s a n d o t h e r r e c o r d s ; t h e h o n o r i f i c ideal w a s t o s h o o t d o w n a n o t h e r f i g h t e r plane w h o h a d a n e q u a l c h a n c e o f s h o o t i n g d o w n y o u r s . E n e m y b o m b e r s destroyed in the air w e r e generally included in t h e r e c o r d t o t a l s , but o t h e r t a r g e t s w e r e n o t . T h e r e w e r e n o h o n o r i f i c r e c o r d s f o r d e s t r o y i n g e n e m y ships, even t h o u g h this w a s the biggest c o n t r i b u t i o n o f f i g h t e r p l a n e s t o

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w i n n i n g t h e Pacific war. It w a s controversial w h e t h e r to c o u n t as EAD planes t h a t w e r e destroyed on the g r o u n d (i.e., while at their bases); such statistics w e r e k e p t separately (and m a d e up a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of enemy aircraft destroyed), b u t generally were n o t c o u n t e d t o w a r d " a c e " t o t a l s . T h e deciding issue w a s n o t t h e a m o u n t of danger; strafing planes o n t h e g r o u n d usually e x p o s e d the a t t a c k e r t o heavy anti-aircraft f i r e , a n d such fire in general a c c o u n t e d for the largest p r o p o r t i o n of planes l o s t . 2 9

But this lacked the d r a m a t i c s t r u c t u r e of t h e duel a n d the m y t h o l o g y of m a n - t o - m a n f i g h t .

T h e official justification of h o n o r i n g fighter p i l o t s w a s t h a t t h e y saved lives of o t h e r t r o o p s , especially t h o s e of b o m b e r c r e w s . But this utilitar- i a n a r g u m e n t did n o t e x p l a i n t h e d y n a m i c s o f h o n o r s given a n d t h e w a y r e c o r d s w e r e c r e a t e d . As the n u m b e r of aces r o s e in t h e massive airforces of W o r l d W a r II, t h e r e w a s a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of v a r i o u s k i n d s of r e c o r d s . In the A m e r i c a n a n d British militaries, b e c o m i n g an ace w i t h five kills r e m a i n e d t h e p r i m a r y h o n o r . Pilots also b e c a m e h o n o r e d for t h e highest n u m b e r of kills in e a c h c o m b a t theater. S q u a d r o n s vied for t h e title of t h e m o s t t o t a l kills. I n d i v i d u a l s w e r e c e l e b r a t e d for achieving t h e f i r s t kill in a c o m b a t t h e a t e r ; b e c o m i n g t h e first ace in t h e t h e a t e r ; achieving t h e first jet kill. R e c o r d s w e r e established a n d progressively raised for t h e largest n u m b e r of kills in o n e c o m b a t sortie. T h e s e r e c o r d s w e r e t a k e n seriously n o t only b y t h e p i l o t s themselves b u t b y t h e military o r g a - n i z a t i o n , w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d " v i c t o r y b o a r d s " t o verify a n d preserve r e c o r d s . Pilots w h o established significant r e c o r d s (such a s b r e a k i n g the r e c o r d for kills in a p a r t i c u l a r c o m b a t t h e a t e r ) w e r e generally p u l l e d o u t o f c o m b a t a n d assigned t o t r a i n i n g a n d p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s d u t i e s . 3 0 This w a s a c e r e m o n i a l , n o t a r a t i o n a l u t i l i t a r i a n m o v e , since it m e a n t t a k i n g t h e d e m o n s t r a b l y best p i l o t s o u t o f c o m b a t w h e r e they c o u l d h a v e t h e m o s t effect. T o p aces h a d b e c o m e h u m a n t r e a s u r e s , t o o i m p o r t a n t t o risk i n m e r e m u n d a n e c o m b a t . T h e Luftwaffe, w h i c h h a d p i o n e e r e d r e c o r d s in W o r l d W a r I, h a d a different p r o b l e m of r e c o r d inflation. So m a n y e n e m y p l a n e s w e r e s h o t d o w n o n t h e R u s s i a n front t h a t s t a n d a r d s h a d to be drastically raised. Early in the war, twenty-five or fifty victories w e r e r e w a r d e d w i t h t h e K i n g ' s C r o s s . B y late 1 9 4 3 , Erich H a r t m a n n n e e d e d 1 4 8 for t h e m e d a l . Eventually his t o t a l s r o s e so h i g h (to 3 5 2 ) t h a t m e d a l s w e r e piled o n m e d a l s , a n d special n e w a w a r d s w e r e c r e a t e d for h i m a n d his h i g h - p e r f o r m i n g p e e r s . 3 1

Dogfights give us u n u s u a l l y detailed i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e process by w h i c h an air battle w a s w o n . Particular air s q u a d r o n s as well as entire air c o r p s h a d high or l o w p a t t e r n s of p e r f o r m a n c e , s h o w i n g it w a s n o t just a m a t t e r of individual p i l o t s ' qualities. In W o r l d W a r I, t h e r e w e r e n o t a b l e flying units in all armies; in World War II, G e r m a n , American, and British

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Figure 10.3 Ace scoreboards: The pilot is not a Nazi, but an American ace showing off his victories with symbols of the planes he has shot down (1945).

units were especially victorious. Five main factors are responsible for a high level of victories.

1. Sometimes military forces had superior planes over their local o p p o - nents. G e r m a n planes were greatly s u p e r i o r to Soviet planes, al- t h o u g h n o t to American and British planes. Planes might be superior in speed, m a x i m a l altitude, range from base, diving ability, or all- a r o u n d maneuverability; some were better built and able to survive enemy fire. But success was n o t straight technological d e t e r m i n i s m . Planes were often better in s o m e features a n d w e a k e r in o t h e r s . J a p - anese planes, for e x a m p l e , were highly m a n e u v e r a b l e , and their pi- lots were often better at a c r o b a t i c battle tactics; nevertheless, they t e n d e d to lose heavily to American p i l o t s , 3 2 since the J a p a n e s e em- phasized highly c o o r d i n a t e d g r o u p m a n e u v e r s a n d engaged in less

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Figure 10.4 Korean war pilots show off their squadron's collective scoreboard of enemy kills.

i m p r o v i s a t i o n . Pilots a n d their c o m m a n d e r s learned t o play t o the s t r o n g p o i n t s of their planes, designing tactics t h a t m a s k e d their w e a k p o i n t s against enemy p l a n e s .

2. Sheer a b u n d a n c e of targets a n d length of time in c o m b a t d e t e r m i n e d the u p p e r limit on ace r e c o r d s set by different air f o r c e s . 3 3 T h e Luft- waffe h a d at least 6 2 7 pilots w i t h t w e n t y or m o r e kills; the Soviets f i f t y - t h r e e p i l o t s , t h e U.S. t h i r t y - o n e , United K i n g d o m twenty-six, J a p a n twenty-five. These figures reflected t h e sheer masses of planes o n t h e eastern front. G e r m a n pilots n o t only h a d better planes a n d better t r a i n i n g , b u t their bases w e r e n e a r t h e front w h e r e they c o u l d fly as often as t w o or t h r e e sorties a day (Overy 1 9 9 5 : 2 1 2 - 2 0 ) . R u s s i a n planes w e r e used in h u g e n u m b e r s ( 1 7 , 8 0 0 in t h e offensives of s u m m e r 1 9 4 4 ) , largely as flying artillery in massive t a n k battles. This left t h e m v u l n e r a b l e to the superior air-to-air capabilities of t h e Luftwaffe. We s h o u l d n o t e also t h a t several air forces h a d no policy of r o t a t i n g pilots o u t of c o m b a t except w h e n w o u n d e d ; Ger- m a n , Soviet, a n d J a p a n e s e h a d a "fly 'til y o u d i e " policy of a l m o s t

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c o n t i n u o u s service. T h u s the highest scoring J a p a n e s e pilot (eighty kills), Tetsuzo I w a m o t o , began f l y i n g i n t h e C h i n a w a r i n 1 9 3 8 a n d c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h 1 9 4 5 . H i s t o t a l of eighty kills w a s far a b o v e the level of t h e t o p U.S. pilot in t h e Pacific (forty kills), a m o n g o t h e r r e a s o n s because there w e r e m a n y m o r e U.S. planes for the J a p a n e s e t o s h o o t a t t h a n vice versa (Mersky 1 9 9 3 ; Sakaida 1 9 8 5 ; O k u m i y a et al. 1 9 7 3 ) .

3. Ace pilots m i g h t be those w i t h p a r t i c u l a r l y g o o d flying skills. T h i s w a s very m u c h on display in W o r l d W a r I, as fighters chased each o t h e r a t l o w altitudes a n d close r a n g e , m a k i n g r a p i d t u r n s , rolls, a n d dives. Sometimes a kill could be m a d e by d r a w i n g o n e ' s o p p o n e n t (especially o n e w h o h a d g o t t e n a d a n g e r o u s p o s i t i o n on o n e ' s tail) to follow into a dive t h a t pulled o u t just before hitting t h e g r o u n d , while luring t h e less skilled o p p o n e n t i n t o a crash; this w a s like a g a m e of " c h i c k e n " played by car racers. But m a n y dogfights a m o n g skilled pilots e n d e d w i t h no kill; they c o n t i n u e d evasive m a n e u v e r s until o n e side e x h a u s t e d their a m m u n i t i o n (because m o s t shots missed) o r fuel a n d h a d t o g o h o m e . O n the w h o l e , m o s t kills w e r e m a d e by ace pilots against inferior o p p o n e n t s . H e n c e the higher level of G e r m a n success against t h e Soviet air force, w h i c h p u s h e d pilots i n t o c o m b a t w i t h i n a d e q u a t e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g (Overy 1 9 8 0 ) .

4. C o n t r a r y to the ideology of heroic individual c o m b a t , aerial c o m b a t victories were often t h e result of t e a m w o r k . In W o r l d W a r I, tactics w e r e developed such as the "Lufbery circle," in w h i c h a g r o u p of planes circled, each covering the vulnerable space b e h i n d the n e x t . In W o r l d W a r II, a defensive p a t t e r n over air bases or s u p p o r t i n g massive b o m b i n g raids w a s " t h a t c h i n g , " a criss-cross p a t t e r n of lay- ers allowing no u n p r o t e c t e d air space in w h i c h e n e m y fighters could i n t r u d e . T e a m w o r k w a s also stressed at t h e level of s m a l l - g r o u p for- m a t i o n s : pilots always flew in p a i r s of w i n g m e n giving m u t u a l s u p - p o r t ; one or m o r e planes were assigned to fly a b o v e a n d b e h i n d as l o o k o u t a n d cover for the o t h e r s ; s q u a d r o n s assigned lead a n d b a c k u p roles. T h e t o p W o r l d War I G e r m a n ace, v o n Richthofen, w a s killed, n o t by any of t h e Western aces, b u t by an otherwise u n k n o w n C a n a d i a n pilot w h o w a s flying t o p cover a n d c a u g h t v o n Richthofen u n a w a r e s while h e w a s chasing a n isolated British p l a n e a w a y from t h e m a i n battle g r o u p s (Gurney 1 9 6 5 : 7 5 ) . I n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e relatively isolated p o s i t i o n of snipers, pilots h a d intense social s u p p o r t on the battlefield, as well as at their h o m e base before a n d after c o m b a t ; this e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t m a d e aerial killing a joy- o u s event, a n d s h a p e d the status distinction b e t w e e n aces a n d snip- ers as p o p u l a r a n d u n p o p u l a r killer elites, respectively.

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M o r e c o m p l e x tactics w e r e used by s q u a d r o n s , such as sending isolated planes to lure or decoy the enemy, while the m a i n force h i d a b o v e in cloud cover or in the direction of t h e glare of the sun. These tactics led to guessing games on b o t h sides; bluffs m i g h t be used to disguise a w e a k n e s s . T h e overall effect of these complexities w a s to m a k e pilots less aggressive; a n d less confident or energized pilots could use tactics to avoid serious c o m b a t . A distinctive feature of t h e aces a n d record-setters w a s their willingness to forego these kinds of relatively safe tactics a n d also to t a k e a d v a n t a g e psychologically of those w h o relied o n t h e m .

5 . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor i n w i n n i n g w a s t h e local s t r u c t u r e o f t h e aerial c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself—the m o m e n t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n t h e sky. M o s t aces m a d e their kills in s h o r t b u r s t s of a c t i o n , often w i t h m u l t i p l e vi ct i m s . Some aces g o t m o s t of their kills in o n e day. M o r e o v e r , several p i l o t s from t h e s a m e s q u a d r o n w o u l d h a v e a v i c t o r i o u s d a y a t t h e s a m e t i m e ; o n e force w o u l d c o m e o u t o f c o m - b a t w i t h o u t their p l a n e s even being h i t , w h i l e t h e e n e m y side w o u l d suffer n u m e r o u s p l a n e s d o w n e d . T h e s e one-sided battles r e s e m b l e t h e decisive l a n d b a t t l e s , i n w h i c h o n e a r m y d i s i n t e g r a t e d o r g a n i z a - t i o n a l l y a n d t h e n suffered h u g e casualties t h a t t h e o t h e r side in- flicted w i t h i m p u n i t y . Big aerial victories r e s e m b l e f o r w a r d p a n i c s , or at least a s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h o n e side h a s all the m o m e n t u m a n d t h e o t h e r side i s passive. G u r n e y ( 1 9 5 8 ) , t h e specialist w h o studied t h e r e c o r d m o s t extensively, c o n c l u d e d t h a t aces w e r e t h e m o s t aggressive p i l o t s , a n d t h a t t h e y d o m i n a t e d w h e r e t h e e n e m y w a s m o s t defensive. M o m e n t u m versus passivity w a s t h e key, even w h e r e t h e a t t a c k i n g force w a s o u t n u m b e r e d . T h i s i s p l a u s i b l e be- c a u s e f i g h t e r p i l o t s a n d b o m b e r g u n n e r s , like o t h e r f i g h t e r s , t e n d t o miss their t a r g e t s far m o r e often t h a n they hit t h e m ; t h e a d v a n - t a g e s of aggressiveness ( and in e x a c e r b a t i n g t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g dis- a d v a n t a g e s of passiveness) m a d e o n e side better able to z e r o in psychologically on their t a r g e t s , w h i l e the o t h e r side b e c a m e less able t o defend o r even t o t a k e evasive a c t i o n .

Top aces all gave m u c h the same a c c o u n t of their w i n n i n g style:

A t t a c k ! N e v e r be on t h e defensive. S h o o t the e n e m y d o w n before he can s h o o t y o u d o w n . You are better t h a n he is, b u t d o n ' t give h i m a chance. H e m a y get i n a lucky s h o t b u t y o u ' r e invincible. M o v e t o w a r d a n y d o t i n the sky t h a t r e m o t e l y resembles a n a i r p l a n e . M o v e t o a t t a c k , w i t h switches on a n d t h e sight ready. If it's n o t a ship or if it's a friendly o n e y o u ' l l be r e a d y anyway, a n d y o u r a r r o g a n t luck will last longer. (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 136)

T h e V i o l e n t F e w • 3 9 7

A n o t h e r ace, with twenty-seven kills, said:

If I were to pick o u t the most valuable personal traits of a fighter pilot, aggressiveness w o u l d rate high on the list. Time a n d again, I have seen aggressive action, even from a d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s position, completely r o u t a powerful N i p f o r m a t i o n . And conversely, have seen flights lose their a d v a n t a g e t h r o u g h hesitation. Obviously, aggression can be car- ried to the point of foolhardiness. However, this sort of action is never so foolish as p o k i n g a r o u n d looking for an ideal setup a n d ending up being jumped yourself. (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 118)

According to another, with t w e n t y - t w o kills:

A n o t h e r characteristic of the younger [ J a p a n e s e | pilots is their lack of alertness. In m a n y instances we have engaged enemy fighters a n d they m a d e no effort to evade o u r initial a t t a c k , evidently because they d i d n ' t see us. . . . In o r d e r to effectively a t t a c k the J a p , you must see him first. . . . You c a n n o t w a i t to decide w h a t he is going to d o ; you must plan y o u r attack as you go into action. If y o u r a t t a c k is s u d d e n a n d aggressive, the enemy will be at a d i s a d v a n t a g e regardless of his n u m - bers a n d position. D o n ' t wait; a t t a c k immediately a n d pick your targets with the intent to destroy. (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 119)

T h e second highest American ace, with thirty-eight kills, noted "Ag- gressiveness is the key to success. . . . T h e enemy on the defensive gives you the a d v a n t a g e , as he is trying to evade y o u , and n o t to s h o o t you d o w n . . . . Go in close, and then when you think you are too close, go in closer. At m i n i m u m range y o u r s h o t s c o u n t and there is less chance of missing your t a r g e t " (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 116).

Getting in close w a s a technique for o v e r c o m i n g the n o r m a l i n c o m p e - tence of firing caused by confrontational tension; the best pilots got so close t h a t they could n o t miss. As we will see, professional h i t m e n use the same technique.

G e r m a n aces h a d similar tactics. H a r t m a n n had discovered a blind spot in the Russian a n t i - t a n k fighter-bombers, which he exploited by diving low a n d c o m i n g up u n d e r n e a t h them with his s u p e r i o r speed; he preferred to get in very close, less t h a n 100 y a r d s , before firing a burst a b o u t 1.5 seconds long before his speed carried him past. A l t h o u g h the Soviet planes were a r m o r e d and carried rear-gunners, this tactic aimed at the vulnerable oil r a d i a t o r u n d e r n e a t h . His m e t h o d was always to w a i t "until the enemy aircraft filled the w i n d s c r e e n " — n o t shying a w a y by t a k i n g a hasty shot at the first o p p o r t u n i t y ( w w w . a c e p i l o t s . c o m / i n d e x . h t m l # t o p ; Toliver a n d C o n s t a b l e 1 9 7 1 ; Sims 1 9 7 2 ) .

These were techniques t h a t developed with time, n o t from sheer instinct or talent. G e r h a r d B a r k h o r n , the s e c o n d - r a n k i n g ace with 301 kills, had

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no kills at all in his first 1 2 0 sorties, w h i c h included the Battle of Britain in September 1 9 4 0 . H a r t m a n n , the record-holder, h a d only t w o kills in his first five m o n t h s , b u t eventually sustained a peak rate of twenty-six kills per m o n t h . 3 4

W i n n i n g techniques involved getting into the flow of very fast-moving s i t u a t i o n s . M o s t aerial battles were extremely short; s o m e s h o r t e r t h a n one m i n u t e , others lasting seven m i n u t e s , or fifteen. Exceptional circum- stances might last as long as an hour, as w h e n seven U.S. fighters followed a convoy of forty J a p a n e s e b o m b e r escorts w h o t o o k a passively defensive f o r m a t i o n ; the smaller pack of aggressive American planes h arried them a l o n g the edges, picking off those w h o w a v e r e d or straggled outside their s u p p o r t i n g f o r m a t i o n ; the American c o m m a n d e r alone m a d e nine kills, setting a new single e n g a g e m e n t record (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 7 7 - 7 8 ) . Aces es- tablished their r e p u t a t i o n s in one-sided battles.

Nevertheless, it virtually never h a p p e n e d t h a t all of the e n e m y ' s planes were destroyed in an air battle. Even in very one-sided victories, the losses of the defeated were limited. This h a p p e n s because there are relatively few highly energized aggressors in the situation; a handful of pilots racking up their ace t o t a l s , b a t t e n i n g on the m a s s availability of enemy planes; but the majority of pilots of the victorious side c o n t i n u e d to have no kills. T h e defeated side m i g h t be psychologically beaten, u n a b l e to defend t h e m - selves a n d fleeing the scene of battle, but the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a t t a c k e r s in a small violent elite allowed m a n y of them to escape. This is a n o t h e r aspect of the situational law of small n u m b e r s in effective violence. Be- cause of the i n c o m p e t e n c e of m o s t violence, c o m b a t is survivable by many, or even a majority. This is w h a t allows w a r s to go on; indeed, w h a t sustains the practice of violence generally.

All indications are t h a t aces' kills were chiefly the w e a k e r pilots on the o t h e r side—less experienced, less skilled at m a n e u v e r i n g , a b o v e all lack- ing in e m o t i o n a l energy. O n c e again, we see the fighters with high e m o - tional energy battening on the w e a k . T h i s fits w i t h the attitudes expressed by ace pilots prior to battle: they did n o t expect to be killed; t h e r e w a s n o n e of the leaving of last-minute messages for loved o n e s , the e a r m a r k i n g of m e m e n t o s to be sent h o m e in case of d e a t h , a l t h o u g h these rituals were c o m m o n a m o n g g r o u n d forces before a major a t t a c k , a n d a m o n g b o m b e r crews before a raid over a heavily defended target (Gurney 1 9 5 8 : 135— 3 6 ) . T o p fighter pilots believed they w o u l d win in c o m b a t , a n d t h a t they w o u l d die only as the result of accident. As we have seen, accidents are relatively frequent in military flying (and 9 percent of t o p aces died t h a t way, sometimes after the end of w a r : calculated from G u r n e y 1 9 5 8 : 2 5 9 - 69); but this w a s a ritual dividing line between m u n d a n e a n d sacred/hon- orific forms of danger; a m i d s t the latter, aces believed themselves sur-

The Violent Few • 399

r o u n d e d by a m a g i c h a l o t h a t kept t h e m safe a n d v i c t o r i o u s . T o p fighter pilots c o n s t r u c t e d a social e n c l a v e in w h i c h they w e r e c o n f i d e n t l y e m p o w - e r e d , a l t h o u g h i t h a d b o r d e r s t h a t t h e y w e r e usually c a r e f u l t o stay w i t h i n .

I N T H E Z O N E VERSUS T H E G L A Z E O F C O M B A T : M I C R O - S I T U A T I O N A L T E C H N I Q U E S O F I N T E R A C T I O N A L D O M I N A N C E

T h e s e c o n d - b y - s e c o n d p h e n o m e n o l o g y of being in a v i o l e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s a d i s t o r t i o n o f n o r m a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . F o r s o m e a n t a g o n i s t s , the d i s t o r - t i o n s o f their s t r e a m o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s are f a v o r a b l e , e n a b l i n g t h e m t o d o m i n a t e ; for o t h e r p e r s o n s , t h e d i s t o r t i o n s a r e d i s a b l i n g . C o m m o n dis- t o r t i o n s are tunnel vision and t i m e - s l o w i n g . O n e b e c o m e s h y p e r c o n c c n - t r a t e d , f o c u s i n g intensely o n t h e p o i n t o f danger, d e f o c u s i n g everything else as i r r e l e v a n t .

O n e of a pair of c o p s describes a b a r r i c a d e d h o s t a g e - t a k e r c o m i n g out f r o m c o v e r :

W h e n he s t a r t e d t o w a r d us, it w a s a l m o s t like it w a s in s l o w m o t i o n , a n d everything w e n t i n t o a tight f o c u s . . . . W h e n he m a d e his m o v e , my w h o l e b o d y tensed up. I d o n ' t r e m e m b e r having a n y feeling f r o m m y c h e s t d o w n . E v e r y t h i n g w a s f o c u s e d f o r w a r d t o w a t c h a n d r e a c t t o m y t a r g e t . T a l k a b o u t a n a d r e n a l i n e r u s h ! E v e r y t h i n g t i g h t e n e d u p , a n d all my senses w e r e directed f o r w a r d at the m a n running at us w i t h a g u n . My vision w a s f o c u s e d on his t o r s o a n d the gun. I c o u l d n ' t tell you w h a t his left h a n d w a s d o i n g . I have no i d e a . I w a s w a t c h i n g the gun. T h e gun w a s c o m i n g d o w n i n f r o n t o f his c h e s t a r e a , a n d t h a t ' s w h e n I did my first s h o t s .

I d i d n ' t h e a r a t h i n g , n o t o n e t h i n g . Alan [his p a r t n e r ] fired o n e r o u n d w h e n I s h o t my first pair, but I d i d n ' t h e a r him s h o o t . He s h o t t w o m o r e r o u n d s when I fired the s e c o n d t i m e , but I d i d n ' t h e a r a n y of t h o s e r o u n d s , either. We s t o p p e d s h o o t i n g w h e n he [the suspect] hit the floor a n d slid i n t o m e . T h e n I w a s on my feet s t a n d i n g o v e r t h e guy. I d o n ' t even r e m e m b e r p u s h i n g m y s e l f up. All I k n o w is the n e x t thing I k n e w I w a s s t a n d i n g on t w o feet l o o k i n g d o w n at t h e guy. I d o n ' t k n o w h o w I g o t t h e r e , w h e t h e r I pushed up with my h a n d s , or w h e t h e r I pulled my k n e e s up u n d e r n e a t h . I d o n ' t k n o w , b u t o n c e I w a s u p , I w a s h e a r i n g t h i n g s a g a i n , b e c a u s e I c o u l d h e a r b r a s s [discarded shells] c l i n k i n g on t h e tile floor. T i m e h a d a l s o r e t u r n e d to n o r m a l by t h e n , b e c a u s e it h a d s l o w e d d o w n during t h e s h o o t i n g . T h a t started a s s o o n a s h e s t a r t e d t o w a r d us. Even t h o u g h I k n e w he w a s r u n n i n g at us, it l o o k e d like he w a s m o v i n g in s l o w m o t i o n . D a m n e d e s t thing I ever saw. (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 1 5 5 )

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A l t h o u g h a gun going off in an enclosed space can be painfully loud, it is very c o m m o n for police to hear the s o u n d s of their o w n gun as only a distant, muffled noise; often they do n o t hear the s o u n d s of o t h e r s ' guns a r o u n d them at all. This is tunnel vision in the a u d i t o r y sense. W h e t h e r this heightened focus is good or bad for the c o m b a t a n t remains to be seen. It strengthens o n e ' s a t t e n t i o n to the m o s t relevant point, g o o d in a situation t h a t is n o t t o o c o m p l e x a n d w h e r e the danger does n o t shift a r o u n d . In some instances, t h o u g h , this n a r r o w e d focus also m e a n s t h a t o n e c o p loses t r a c k of w h a t the o t h e r s are doing; in the following cases they get unconsciously e n t r a i n e d in each o t h e r ' s fire, resulting in over- firing or hitting the w r o n g target:

At the end of a car chase of an escaping bank robber, t h r e e cops a p p r o a c h :

Tony scrambled o u t of his car with his s h o t g u n . In the second or t w o t h a t it t o o k him to get out a n d move w i t h i n 10 feet of the suspect's door, the h o l d u p m a n w a s o u t a n d moving slowly t o w a r d the rear fender. He held a Beretta along his thigh. " T h e guy w a s l o o k i n g at s o m e o n e I c o u l d n ' t see [later determined to be a n o t h e r officer just o u t of Tony's sightj a n d the guy kept repeating in a d e m a n d i n g t o n e , " j u s t do it, just do it." T h e n he looked at me a n d started backing up t o w a r d his open door. He b r o u g h t his g u n up to his h e a d . Again he said, "Just do it."

Tony w a s s t a n d i n g between six and nine feet from the suspect. "I w a s n ' t t h i n k i n g in terms of cover. I k n e w t h a t we were here until s o m e - one s h o o t s . I repeatedly told the guy t h a t it w a s over." Due to Tony's tunnel vision, he w a s n o t a w a r e t h a t Officer Grcggor w a s to his left, p o i n t i n g a s h o t g u n at the m a n , a n d a n o t h e r officer w a s to the left of Greggor, pointing his h a n d g u n .

If the suspect heard Tony's order, he d i d n ' t s h o w it. Witnesses later said t h a t the suspect s w u n g his Beretta t o w a r d Tony, b u t Tony only r e m e m b e r s the m a n ' s elbow d r o p p i n g and his wrest bending. Tony fired.

"I saw the pellets hit, b u t on his right s i d e , " Tony says. "Since I was s t a n d i n g in front of h i m , I c o u l d n ' t u n d e r s t a n d h o w my shot hit him in the side. I looked d o w n a n d saw t h a t the spent shell h a d n ' t fully ejected, so I s h o o k it o u t a n d p u m p e d a n o t h e r r o u n d in."

Tony h a d n o t heard G r e g g o r ' s shotgun e x p l o d e or the o t h e r officer fire his h a n d g u n . " M y tunnel vision m a d e everything smaller," Tony says. "You could have been s t a n d i n g right next to me and I w o u l d n ' t have seen y o u . " It was G r e g g o r ' s s h o t g u n pellets t h a t struck the suspect in his right side. Tony's pellets center p u n c h e d the suspect's a b d o m e n , t h o u g h Tony had only seen G r e g g o r ' s hits.

The Violent Few • 4 0 1

Figure 10.5 Police shootout at close range ( 1 9 9 7 ) . AP/World Wide Photos.

After the s h o o t i n g Tony has an o v e r w h e l m i n g a d r e n a l i n e rush. "I went to the car p h o n e a n d p u n c h e d in my h o m e number. 1 got the re- c o r d e r b u t I k n e w my boys were h o m e , p r o b a b l y still sleeping. 1 screamed for s o m e o n e to pick it up a n d I k e p t screaming until it a w o k e my boys d o w n s t a i r s . W h e n they a n s w e r e d , 1 screamed at them w h a t h a d just h a p p e n e d a n d t h a t I w a n t e d to see t h e m . " (Artwohl and Chris- tensen 1 9 9 7 : 1 4 4 - 4 5 )

In this case, the officer performs his p a r t even t h o u g h he has no sense of w h a t his p a r t n e r s are d o i n g or t h a t they are even there. Luckily for them they arc lined up in such a way t h a t they c a n n o t hit each o t h e r with cross-fire; t u n n e l vision of this sort is doubtless responsible for m a n y friendly fire hits. In a n o t h e r case, the same c o m b i n a t i o n results in a hos- tage being hit:

I charged up the stairs, Clancy and T h o m p s o n on my right. We moved d o w n the n a r r o w , d a r k hall, which w a s barely illuminated by the fil- tered light from a d o w n s t a i r s hallway, a n d into J e r e m y ' s [the twelve- year-old hostage] r o o m . We could m a k e o u t N o r t h [the hostage-taker] seated on the edge of the bed, holding Jeremy between his legs in a o n e - arm c h o k e hold. T h e boy w a s completely shielding N o r t h ' s body, a n d the w a y he w a s h o l d i n g the knife at the boy's t h r o a t m a d e it look as if the knife w a s sticking in his neck.

W i t h his a r m up a n d w r a p p e d a r o u n d the little boy's neck like a chicken w i n g , I h a d a perfect shot. I decided to do it. My eyes, already straining in the dim light, z o o m e d right in on his flannel shirt, like I w a s

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l o o k i n g t h r o u g h b i n o c u l a r s . I d o u b l e t a p p e d twice [fired t w o r o u n d s , p a u s e d , fired t w o m o r e ] into his chest. As bizarre as it s o u n d s , I c o u l d actually see t h e r o u n d s going in. I c o u l d see his shirt flap a r o u n d a n d I could see t h e r o u n d s going into his chest. T h e n w h e n I pulled b a c k , I c o u l d h e a r o t h e r shots going off. T h i s confused me because I t h o u g h t I w a s the only one f i r i n g . But m y p a r t n e r s were also s h o o t i n g , r o u n d after r o u n d .

W h e n I l o o k e d at t h e bed, N o r t h w a s riddled w i t h holes. But J e r e m y w a s s l u m p e d over, t o o . (Artwohl a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 : 1 0 5 - 6 )

T h e h o s t a g e - t a k e r w a s dead; the little b o y died a few h o u r s later in t h e h o s p i t a l .

M o s t police i n s h o o t o u t s h a d diminished s o u n d a n d t u n n e l vision—88 percent a n d 82 percent, respectively. Smaller p r o p o r t i o n s — 6 5 percent a n d 63 p e r c e n t , respectively—experienced heightened visual clarity a n d time slowing ( A r t w o h l a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 : 4 9 ) . T h e latter p h e n o m e n a are conducive to a higher level of c o m p e t e n t p e r f o r m a n c e . Shootings, in fact, t e n d to go very fast, a few seconds at m o s t . Time seems to slow d o w n w h e n the s h o o t e r perceives a great deal of detail, seeing t h e scene w i t h special sharpness. In real t i m e , violent action is m o v i n g very fast; it a p - p e a r s slow because t h e perceiver is t a k i n g so m u c h in. O n e ' s b r a i n is n o t necessarily m o v i n g faster, b u t o n e establishes a clear gestalt of w h a t is going on; everything is c o m p r e h e n d e d because it all falls i n t o its place in the image. In o n e ' s subjective sensibilities, t h e s i t u a t i o n has a clear form.

In t h e following instance, a cop is executing an arrest w a r r a n t on a m a n w h o h a d been selling sawed-off s h o t g u n s to an u n d e r c o v e r officer:

As I stepped t h r o u g h the d o o r w a y a n d into the b e d r o o m , my a t t e n t i o n w a s d r a w n t o some c o m m o t i o n i n this b a t h r o o m t h a t w a s t o m y left, b u t I c a u g h t some m o v e m e n t in my p e r i p h e r a l vision off to my right. As I shifted my a t t e n t i o n t h a t way, I s a w this guy pulling a s h o t g u n d o w n off this wall r a c k a n d t u r n i n g t o his right, t o w a r d m e . T h e bed- r o o m w a s only a b o u t eight by nine feet—we're talking real small—so h e w a s only m a y b e t w o y a r d s from m e . W h e n I f i r s t s a w h i m , t h e barrel of the s h o t g u n w a s p o i n t e d up at a b o u t a forty-five-degree angle. As t h e guy c o m p l e t e d his t u r n , he l o w e r e d the barrel a n d b r o u g h t the stock u p t o his shoulder, s o t h a t t h e s h o t g u n w a s p o i n t e d right a t m e .

A s I w a s w a t c h i n g the s h o t g u n c o m e a r o u n d o n m e , m y m i n d w e n t i n t o this m o d e of incredibly clear t h i n k i n g , just like it did in my first s h o o t i n g . I k n o w I c o u l d get shot. I k n e w it w o u l d p r o b a b l y h u r t like c r a p because I w a s really close to it a n d it w a s a 12-gauge, b u t I w a s n ' t scared. It w a s weird—just real clear, cold, calculating t h i n k i n g . I k n e w t h a t t h e possibility existed for me to get s h o t a n d die, a n d I k n e w I needed to p r o t e c t myself from t h a t , b u t I w a s n ' t scared.

The Violent Few • 4 0 3

I w a s focused on the g u n , a n d the first thing I s a w on it w a s the adjustable c h o k e m o u n t e d on the end of the barrel. I said to myself, Look at that action. So I followed the barrel d o w n to the action, a n d t h a t ' s w h e n I saw t h a t it w a s a R e m i n g t o n . I actually t h o u g h t , That's a Remington 1100. T h e n I said to myself, See where his finger is on the trigger. So I w e n t to his h a n d . I saw the finger on the trigger, a n d I t h o u g h t , This is going to hurt like hell, but you gotta keep going. So I w a s t h i n k i n g t h a t I w a s going to s h o o t , but I w a s also t h i n k i n g , Sidestep the barrel and try to give yourself some more time. So I started to side- step as I b r o u g h t my gun u p . T h e n I t h o u g h t , Here we go again, looked t h r o u g h the sights of my M P - 5 , a n d fired.

As I started to pull the trigger, I w a s t h i n k i n g , How do I need to shoot this guy? It w a s really weird. I w a n t e d to keep the r o u n d s on center m a s s , a n d I'd t r a i n e d to fire t w o - r o u n d bursts, b u t this guy h a d a friggin' shotgun at p o i n t - b l a n k range on m e . I w a s t h i n k i n g , Do I just need to hose him till he goes down, or do I need to give him two-shot burst, two-shot burst, two-shot burst? I knew I c o u l d n ' t c o n t r o l the M P - 5 on full auto—especially trying to move s id eway s—an d I w a s w o r - ried a b o u t misses because of the o t h e r officers on the scene. So all t h a t w a s going t h r o u g h my mind as I started pulling the trigger, a n d I t h o u g h t , No auto. Two-shot bursts. I ended up firing t w o t w o - s h o t b u r s t s , a n d the guy w e n t d o w n in a h e a p o n t o a pile of clothes on the floor. He d i d n ' t get a s h o t off. . . .

Bill—the t e a m leader—stepped in behind m e . He looked at the kid a n d me. I told him, "I still got guys behind m e ! " because my back w a s n o w to the b a t h r o o m door, w h e r e I heard the people w h e n I first stepped into the b e d r o o m . I could still hear t h e m m o v i n g a r o u n d in t h e r e , a n d I t h o u g h t , God, do they have guns too? Bill w a s s t a n d i n g t h e r e , looking at m e , so I yelled at him, "Behind m e , behind m e ! " T h e n he t u r n e d , w e n t into the b a t h r o o m , stepped in there, a n d got the t w o people w h o were in there. (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 1 6 4 - 6 5 )

Unlike the o t h e r cases just q u o t e d , this officer is completely a w a r e of w h o else is on the scene, b o t h his fellow officers w h o m he w a n t s to p r o t e c t from the possibility of full a u t o m a t i c fire getting o u t of c o n t r o l , a n d the suspects in the b a t h r o o m behind his back. He has a full gestalt of the scene, b o t h in space a n d in time, as we see in the detail w i t h which he focuses on his o p p o n e n t ' s gun a n d his o w n firing p r o c e d u r e .

This kind of time-slowing, with the f o r m a t i o n of a comprehensive ge- stalt of the scene, a p p e a r s to be characteristic of the most c o m p e t e n t m e m - bers of the violent elite. It exists a m o n g professional h i t m e n (e.g., Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 61) a n d a m o n g a r m e d r o b b e r s : "I felt d e t a c h e d w h e n I w e n t in . . . switched off . . . very c o l d , " o n e said. A n o t h e r : " D u r i n g the robbery, I

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w a s calm. I h a d t u n n e l vision. I h a d heightened awareness of the sur- r o u n d i n g s a n d intense c o n c e n t r a t i o n " ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 6 8 ) . A p p a r e n t l y ace fighter pilots are like this as well. T h e small n u m b e r of highly c o m p e t e n t c o m b a t firing soldiers also a p p e a r to have this quality.

T i m e - s l o w i n g has been r e p o r t e d m o s t extensively in a t h l e t e s at the peak of their p e r f o r m a n c e . T h i s t o o is an a r e n a of fast-moving, a n t a g o - nistic c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Baseball hitters in the midst of a hitting streak say they can pick up the trajectory of the ball r i g h t o u t of the p i t c h e r ' s h a n d , a n d w a t c h t h e r o t a t i o n of an i n c o m i n g pitch; s o m e say the ball looks bigger. Instead of r e a c t i n g in a rush to w h a t the pitcher is d o i n g , they see it in a p a t t e r n , hold themselves b a c k , a n d strike at the p r o p e r m o - m e n t . T h e c o m p e t e n t q u a r t e r b a c k i s t h e o n e for w h o m the action slows d o w n in front of him a n d he sees the m o v e m e n t s of pass receivers, defen- sive b a c k s , a n d o n c o m i n g pass r u s h e r s as p a t t e r n e d gestalts t h a t he rec- ognizes a n d m a n i p u l a t e s . 3 -

Athletes refer to this state of mind at the peak of p e r f o r m a n c e as being "in the z o n e . " T h e violent elite are those w h o are in the zone in their o w n a r e n a s of action. W h a t it takes to get in the z o n e differs from o n e type of violence to a n o t h e r ; the ace pilot operates within a fast-moving gestalt in multiple d i m e n s i o n s of space t h a t resembles to some degree the actions of the football q u a r t e r b a c k , but these do n o t a p p e a r to be t r a n s f e r a b l e . 5 6

T h e police officer in a p o i n t - b l a n k s h o o t - o u t has a different zone of high c o m p e t e n c e , the sniper yet a different o n e .

In c o n t r a s t to being in the z o n e — t h e experience of the most c o m p e t e n t military elite—most soldiers in c o m b a t are in an e m o t i o n a l and perceptual state nearer the o t h e r end of the s p e c t r u m . Clausewitz s p o k e of the fog of w a r ; others have written a b o u t the "glaze of c o m b a t " (Glenn 2 0 0 0 a ) . Especially at the peak of violence, and w h e n there is m o v e m e n t a w a y from fixed positions, everything is confusing; people move in a blur; it is unclear w h e r e the enemy is, or w h e r e he is m o v i n g , or h o w m a n y there are a n d which direction is the greatest threat at the m o m e n t . T h e r e is a m o r a s s of bits of i n f o r m a t i o n , but no clear perception; the average soldier c a n n o t form it into a clear gestalt.

T h e glaze of c o m b a t is the experience of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension, raised to a high degree at the m o m e n t of actual violence. As we h a v e seen t h r o u g h o u t the b o o k , m o s t people are debilitated in o n e degree or a n o t h e r by c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension; only a few under favorable social circum- stances overcome it enough to perform active violence, a n d fewer still are truly c o m p e t e n t . Some completely freeze up; others passively follow w h a t e v e r activists arc nearby; some become c a u g h t up in frenzied hot p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; a few perform coolly a n d effectively. Within the same g r o u p in a violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n , people are p a r t i t i o n e d into these various roles.

The Violent Few • 405

W i n n i n g o u t in a violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n is n o t merely being in the zone; it is being in the z o n e in r e l a t i o n to others w h o are n o t in t h e zone. We m a y call it being cool in t h e midst of o t h e r p e o p l e ' s h o t e m o t i o n s . T h e s e h o t e m o t i o n s include anger, b u t t h e r e are o t h e r s : they c o u l d also be fear, excitement, a n d joyful ebullience. T h e center of the struggle is this interac- tional process. T h e violent elite are t h o s e w h o h a v e perfected cool tech- niques for t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of targets w h o are c a u g h t in the glaze of c o m b a t . But it is n o t always merely a t t a c k i n g the preexisting w e a k . T h e struggle in violent m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n is to p u s h o n e ' s o p p o n e n t into t h e glaze of c o m b a t , while settling oneself i n t o possession of the zone.

O n e w a y of d o i n g this is m a n i p u l a t i n g victims' e m o t i o n s . T h e violent elite practice techniques for getting the o t h e r p e r s o n off g u a r d . A r m e d r o b b e r s a t t e m p t t o "get the j u m p " o n t h e victim b y striking a t the m o m e n t they are just locking a door, or c o m i n g from light into d a r k or vice versa (see c h a p t e r 5). Assassins (political as well as professional) often strike w h e n t h e victim h a s just c o m e i n t o a r o o m ; 3 7 this n o t only minimizes c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d the tension t h a t arises from it, b u t also frames the situa- t i o n psychologically as one in w h i c h t h e victim c a n form no gestalt of w h a t is the scene a n d w h a t is h a p p e n i n g ; he is c a u g h t up in the m o m e n t u m established by the attacker. T h i s is w h a t the skilled baseball pitcher does, w h e n he freezes the batter with an u n a n t i c i p a t e d strike.

A technique used in m o r e complicated situations d e p e n d s on being able to form a gestalt of w h o are the w e a k e s t a n d strongest targets on o n e ' s o p p o n e n t ' s side, a n d using this to t h r o w them into confusion. Some very t o p snipers used this technique w h e n they had lost their cover a n d a large n u m b e r of t r o o p s were a d v a n c i n g rapidly on t h e sniper's p o s i t i o n . A Ger- m a n sniper on the Russian front w o u l d stand and s h o o t at the rear wave of the a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s , not at those in the front row. These were the m o s t easily terrified soldiers, a n d w h e n they were hit, their screams caused the others to a b o r t the a t t a c k . In a n o t h e r instance, " [ H ] e w a i t e d until three or four a t t a c k i n g waves h a d begun to a d v a n c e , then he started to p u t as m a n y r o u n d s as possible into the s t o m a c h s of the last w a v e . T h e startling cries of the w o u n d e d a n d the fact t h a t the attack w a s being de- moralised from the rear unnerved the front r a n k s . T h e a t t a c k s started to falter. T h a t w a s the m o m e n t he started to t a k e the front r a n k into his reticle [crosshairs]. Enemies nearer t h a n 50 meters were hit w i t h head or h e a r t s h o t s — m e n further back were s h o t in the t r u n k to create as m a n y w o u n d e d as p o s s i b l e . " 3 8 T h e tactic of this G e r m a n sniper is r e m a r k a b l y similar to the m o s t famous American w a r h e r o ' s p e r f o r m a n c e in 1 9 1 8 , Sergeant Alvin York, w h o successfully sniped at a line of m a c h i n e - g u n n e r s at 3 0 0 yards. He w a s spotted a n d charged by a s q u a d of G e r m a n infantry; York calmly shot all ten, starting with the one in the rear, reloading a n d killing the leader w h e n he w a s only ten yards a w a y (Pegler 2 0 0 4 : 145).

406 • Chapter 10

T h e a t t a c k i n g G e r m a n s w e r e n o t able t o s h o o t h i m while they w e r e o n the r u n ; they w e r e in a h o t frenzy, c o m p o u n d e d p e r h a p s by fear a n d anger, m a d e w o r s e b y t h e cool t e c h n i q u e o f their o p p o n e n t w h o deliberately built u p their e m o t i o n a l w e a k n e s s .

Yet a n o t h e r m a n i p u l a t i o n in the h e a t of conflict consists in g o a d i n g the o p p o n e n t i n t o a display of anger, a n d t h e n using his frenzy against h i m . This is often d o n e in insult contests a m o n g t o u g h y o u t h , w h e r e a w e a k fighter is g o a d e d i n t o a t t a c k i n g a s t r o n g a n d cool o n e ; m u c h t h e same technique w a s used b y s w o r d duelists g o o d a t evading charges a n d m a k - ing c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s . It is similar to the military tactic on t h e larger scale of luring a h e a d l o n g a t t a c k , t h e n hitting it from t h e flank w i t h reserves held in hiding. H e r e the m a n i p u l a t i o n of o p p o n e n t ' s e m o t i o n s blends w i t h staying cool in the m i d s t of h o t e m o t i o n s , except t h a t it h a s an a d d e d level of self-conscious t e c h n i q u e . F o o t b a l l t e a m s deliberately design plays for w h e n their o p p o n e n t s are over-charged w i t h a d r e n a l i n , in the e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t a defense will over-pursue a n d b e c o m e v u l n e r a b l e to a deceptive play t h a t cuts b a c k in the o t h e r direction.

Conflict d o m i n a n c e is n o t just a m a t t e r of h a v i n g p r a c t i c e d a t e c h n i q u e so well t h a t o n e h a s p e r m a n e n t l y l e a r n e d it; it is n o t like r i d i n g a bicycle, w h i c h o n e never forgets even if o u t of p r a c t i c e . Every conflict is a struggle b e t w e e n w h o will be in t h e z o n e , a n d w h o will be in the glaze of c o m b a t . We c a n see this fluctuation, s o m e t i m e s even w i t h i n a few s e c o n d s . Even c o m p e t e n t soldiers m a y fluctuate b e t w e e n m o m e n t s of e m o t i o n a l l y over- c h a r g e d wild f i r i n g a n d c a l m c o m p e t e n c e . I n o n e incident o n G u a d a l c a - n a l i n 1 9 4 2 , a s a J a p a n e s e a t t a c k e r b e g a n t o r u n away, the U.S. M a r i n e sergeant " w a s n e r v o u s . H e f i r e d several s h o t s , w o r k i n g his b o l t fast a n d missed. He inserted a n o t h e r clip of cartridges a n d fired o n e of t h e m . But t h e n the J a p h a d s u n k d o w n i n t o cover a g a i n . I t w a s a little d i s a p p o i n t - i n g — b u t only for the m o m e n t . He s t a r t e d to get up a g a i n . . . w h e n Sgt A n g u s , n o w q u i t e c a l m , t o o k careful a i m a n d let o n e s h o t g o . T h e J a p s a n k as if the g r o u n d h a d been jerked o u t from u n d e r h i m . It w a s a n e a t s h o t — a b o u t 2 0 0 y a r d s " ( 2 0 0 4 : 2 1 7 ) . N o t i c e t h a t o f a small g r o u p , p r o b a b l y s q u a d size, only o n e w a s s h o o t i n g , t h e o t h e r s w a t c h i n g their leader s h o o t . T h i s is the u s u a l stratification of e m o t i o n a l energy in c o m - b a t . But the leader is first h o t , active b u t i n c o m p e t e n t ; t h e n he switches t o cool a n d effective. T h e key a p p e a r s t o b e t h e s h o r t b r e a k i n t h e a c t i o n , w h e n t h e J a p a n e s e soldier w i t h d r a w s i n t o cover; this enables t h e sergeant to establish a n e w gestalt: p r o b a b l y , t h e e n e m y afraid a n d himself in c o m m a n d .

Performing coolly in the midst of o p p o n e n t s ' glaze of c o m b a t is always relative to w h a t is going on in t h e i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n . This a c c o u n t s for w h y a t e a m m a y be b e a t e n badly in a c h a m p i o n s h i p g a m e . 3 9 To get to t h e c h a m p i o n s h i p the t e a m m u s t h a v e p e r f o r m e d extremely well t h r o u g h the season; in o t h e r w o r d s , it had s h o w n m a n y times t h a t it could perform in

The Violent Few • 4 0 7

the z o n e while p u t t i n g their o p p o n e n t s into a glaze. But this capacity to form a gestalt in w h i c h they c o n t r o l their confused o p p o n e n t s is brittle; it is a social c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t c a n rapidly shift. 4 0 A t e a m t h a t relies m o s t strongly on its superiority in p u t t i n g o p p o n e n t s at an e m o t i o n a l d i s a d v a n - tage (as c o m p a r e d to grinding o u t relatively n a r r o w victories) m a y be especially v u l n e r a b l e , w h e n they lose their edge, to falling badly i n t o the glaze themselves.

Sports are artificial social c o n s t r u c t i o n s in just the respect t h a t they c h a n n e l the m o s t highly c o m p e t e n t c o m p e t i t o r s into eventually m a t c h i n g up against each other. In real-life violence, such m a t c h u p s are generally avoided. Even so, c o m p e t e n c e t h a t d e p e n d s on being in the zone while o t h e r s are in the glaze of c o m b a t is ah intrinsically relative thing. T h i s is o n e of the r e a s o n s w h y t h e r e is a ceiling on h o w m a n y p e r s o n s at any o n e time can be in the violent elite.

W e s h o u l d n o t d r a w a n absolute distinction between h o t a n d cold tech- niques as far as their effectiveness in w i n n i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . True, t h e r e is p r o b a b l y a c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n cool techniques a n d highly c o m p e t e n t violence—those best able to hit their targets, m a k e their kill, w i n the fight o r the g a m e . T h o s e w h o engage i n h o t violence are m o r e likely t o b e t h e actively violent t h a n the c o m p e t e n t l y violent, the m i d d l e - r a n k i n g r a t h e r t h a n t h e highest, the soldiers w h o f i r e often b u t d o n ' t hit a n y t h i n g , t h e noisy activists in a r i ot i ng c r o w d .

But it w o u l d n o t be the right formula to claim t h a t victory always con- sists in cool violence prevailing over h o t violence. T h e r e are t w o m a i n c o m p l i c a t i o n s . First, s o m e fights a n d battles hinge on accidents: falling d o w n , traffic j a m s of bodies or vehicles, lucky or unlucky hits, friendly fire; i n c o m p e t e n t violence is often u n p r e d i c t a b l e w h e n m a n y small inci- dents are c o m p o u n d e d a n d c o n c a t e n a t e d . A n d second, t h e r e are success- ful forms of h o t violence. T h e m o s t spectacular is a f o r w a r d p a n i c , w h i c h is a w i n n i n g r u s h u p o n a suddenly defenseless enemy w h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n has c r u m b l e d . It m a y well be t h a t m o s t battles a n d large-scale fights are w o n by these sorts of c o n d i t i o n s a n d n o t by coolly executed techniques. On a smaller scale, individual or very small g r o u p fights are sometimes w o n by w h o e v e r m u s t e r s the m o s t sheer physical energy; in simple situa- tions w i t h o u t r o o m t o maneuver, the stronger a n d m o s t energized b y anger, e n t h u s i a s m , or d e s p e r a t i o n m a y o v e r w h e l m a cooler o p p o n e n t .

W e l a c k g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n o n h o w often f i g h t s t a k e these v a r i o u s f o r m s . I w o u l d h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t t h e m o s t frequent s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h h o t violence prevails is w h e n t h e actively violent s e g m e n t a t t a c k s t h e merely n o m i n a l l y violent; h o t violence i s d o m i n a n t w h e n i t a t t a c k s n o t cool violence b u t t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e c o n t i n u u m , t h o s e w h o are deeply c a u g h t i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear. T h u s t h e ability t o m u s t e r anger, bluster, ebullience, a n d frenzied e x e r t i o n will d o m i n a t e a m a t c h u p

408 • Chapter 10

Figure 10.6 Winning by emotional dominance: faces of basketball rebounders (2006). © McClatchy-Tribune Information Services. All Rights Reserved. Reprint- ed with permission.

against the e m o t i o n a l l y w e a k , t h o s e w h o are r e n d e r e d passive by their h o t e m o t i o n s , especially fear.

Some persons o p e r a t e mainly in emotionally hot scenes, such as angry bar fights or g a n g turf street c o r n e r fights. I Iere, the fight is between t w o (or more) h o t fighters; I conjecture t h a t the winner is the relatively coolest, the one most able to slow d o w n subjective time and formulate a gestalt of the entire s i t u a t i o n . T h e key to w i n n i n g may still be in k n o w i n g when to t h r o w a punch or bull rush an o p p o n e n t , r a t h e r t h a n to m a n e u v e r for

The Violent Few • 409

an o p p o r t u n i t y or t a k e careful a i m . It is always an i n t e r a c t i o n a l playing f i e l d , w h a t e v e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r e m o t i o n s present. T h e victor pushes the loser i n t o the glaze of c o m b a t . Sometimes the e m o t i o n a l d o m i n a n t s do not have to p u s h their o p p o n e n t s far, since they are already deep in con- frontational tension/fear; at others times both sides m a y start o u t in the zone and have to push the o t h e r o n e o u t of it—failure to do so w o u l d , of c o u r s e , bring a s t a l e m a t e , which is one way t h a t fights s t o p . Victory con- sists in m a n i p u l a t i n g the glaze of c o m b a t to o n e ' s a d v a n t a g e . Winners d o n ' t have to be deeply in the z o n e , just m o r e in the zone t h a n losers.

T H E 9/11 C O C K P I T F I G H T

As an a p p e n d i x , consider the fight t h a t t o o k place in the cockpit of United Airlines flight 93 on September 1 I, 2 0 0 1 . An a u d i o recording gives the micro-sequence of s o u n d s m a d e by the four a l - Q a e d a hijackers, w h o in- tended to crash the jet into the P e n t a g o n , and some of the thirty-three passengers w h o rushed the cockpit. W o r d s in italics are s p o k e n by the hijackers in Fnglish; w o r d s in bold italics are translated from Arabic. O t h e r w o r d s arc p r e s u m a b l y the passengers' (text in Philadelphia In- quirer, April 1 3 , 2 0 0 6 , p. A 1 0 ) .

9.58.50 S O U N D S O F G R U N T I N G A N D S H O U T I N G (first a t t e m p t t o break d o w n the d o o r )

9 . 5 8 . 5 5 In the cockpit. 9 . 5 8 . 5 7 In the cockpit. 9 . 5 8 . 5 7 They want to get in here. Hold, hold from the inside.

Hold from the inside. Hold. 9 . 5 9 . 0 4 Hold the door. 9 . 5 9 . 0 9 Stop him. 9 . 5 9 . 1 1 Sit down. 9 . 5 9 . 1 3 Sit down. 9 . 5 9 . 1 5 Sit down. 9 . 5 9 . 1 7 What? 9 . 5 9 . 1 8 There are some guys. All those guys. 9.59.20 Let's get t h e m . 9 . 5 9 . 2 5 Sit down 9 . 5 9 . 3 0 L O U D C R A S H (sounds of metal against metal, glass

breaking, plastic cracking. Passengers a p p a r e n t l y use ser- vice c a r t to r a m cockpit door. Second attempt.)

U N I N T E L L I G I B L E S H O U T I N G .

9 . 5 9 . 4 2 Trust in Allah, and in him.

410 • Chapter 10

9 . 5 9 . 4 5 Sit down. 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 6 There is nothing. 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 7 Is that it? Shall we finish it off? 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 8 No. Not yet. 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 9 When they all come, we finish it off. 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 1 There is nothing. 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 3 (unintelligible shouting) 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 4 Ahh. 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 5 I'm injured. 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 6 (unintelligible shouting) 1 0 . 0 0 . 2 1 Ahh. 1 0 . 0 0 . 2 2 Oh Allah. Oh Allah. Oh Gracious. 1 0 . 0 0 . 2 5 In the cockpit. If we d o n ' t , we die. 1 0 . 0 0 . 2 6 L O U D C R A S H o f m e t a l , glass, a n d plastic r a m m e d t o g e t h e r

h a r d ( a n o t h e r assault w i t h t h e service cart. T h i r d attempt.)

1 0 . 0 0 . 2 9 Up, down. Up, down. (Hijacker pilot pushes steering y o k e f o r w a r d a n d back, i n a t t e m p t t o t h r o w passengers t o floor. Plane's stall a l a r m s o u n d s briefly.)

1 0 . 0 0 . 2 9 In t h e cockpit. 1 0 . 0 0 . 3 3 T h e cockpit. 1 0 . 0 0 . 3 7 Up, down. Saeed, up, down. 1 0 . 0 0 . 4 2 Roll it 1 0 . 0 0 . 5 9 Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest. 1 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 (unintelligible) 1 0 . 0 1 . 0 8 Is that it? I mean, shall we pull it down ? 1 0 . 0 1 . 0 9 Yes, put it in, and pull it down. 1 0 . 0 1 . 1 0 C A C O P H O N Y O F N E W V O I C E S S H O U T I N G

(unintelligible) 1 0 . 0 1 . 1 1 Saeed. 1 0 . 0 1 . 1 2 . . . engine . . . 1 0 . 0 1 . 1 3 (unintelligible) 1 0 . 0 1 . 1 6 Cut off the oxygen. 1 0 . 0 1 . 1 8 Cut off the oxygen. Cutoff the oxygen. Cutoff the oxygen. 1 0 . 0 0 . 4 1 Up, down. Up, down. 1 0 . 0 0 . 4 1 What? 1 0 . 0 0 . 4 2 Up, down. 1 0 . 0 1 . 5 9 Shut them off. 1 0 . 0 2 . 0 3 Shut them off. 1 0 . 0 2 . 1 4 G o . 1 0 . 0 2 . 1 4 G o . 1 0 . 0 2 . 1 5 M o v e . 1 0 . 0 2 . 1 6 M o v e .

T h e V i o l e n t F e w • 41 1

1 0 . 0 2 . 1 7 T u r n it u p . 1 0 . 0 2 . 1 8 Down, down. 1 0 . 0 2 . 2 3 Pull it down. Pull it down. 10.02.25 Down. Push, push, push, push, push. 1 0 . 0 2 . 3 3 Hey. Hey. Give it to me. Give it to me. 1 0 . 0 2 . 3 5 Give it to me. Give it to me. Give it to me. 10.02.37 Give it to me. Give it to me. Give it to me. 1 0 . 0 2 . 4 0 (unintelligible) 1 0 . 0 3 . 0 2 Allah is the greatest. 10.03.03 Allah is the greatest. 1 0 . 0 3 . 0 4 Allah is the greatest. 1 0 . 0 3 . 0 6 Allah is the greatest. 1 0 . 0 3 . 0 6 Allah is the greatest. 10.03.07 N o . 1 0 . 0 3 . 0 9 Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest. 1 0 . 0 3 . 0 9 Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest. P L A N E R O L L S

B E L L Y U P , C R A S H E S .

In the four minutes and t w e n t y seconds from the first assault on the d o o r until the plane crashes, there are m a n y repetitive utterances. C o n - frontational tension and fear are p a l p a b l e , especially on the side of the hijackers, no d o u b t because they are m o r e clearly recorded. T h a t is one source of the repetitiveness; but it is also a way of dealing with confronta- tional tension/fear.

T h e a t t a c k i n g passengers are h a r d to hear on the t a p e , but they repeat the p h r a s e " t h e c o c k p i t " five times, twice in a two-second interval as they m o u n t their first a t t a c k . They c h a n t it again three times in the eight sec- o n d s starting at 1 0 . 0 0 . 2 5 just before they m o u n t their third and last effort to smash d o w n the cockpit d o o r : "In the cockpit. If we d o n ' t , we d i e . " These are r h y t h m i c repetitions, getting themselves together for the g r o u p effort. T h e r e are o t h e r e x h o r t a t i o n s — " L e t ' s get t h e m . " "Roll i t . " — b u t even these t e n d to be repeated in pairs in a second or less: " G o . " " G o . " " M o v e . " " M o v e . "

T h e hijackers defending the cockpit m a k e three kinds of u t t e r a n c e s , also very repetitive. First, they tell the passengers, in English over the speaker system, to "Sit d o w n . " This c o n t i n u e s the strategy t h a t they h a d used thirty minutes earlier, upon taking over the plane, of calming the passengers by p r e t e n d i n g to land them s o m e w h e r e as hostages. But this strategic talk t u r n s into an i n c a n t a t i o n : repeated every t w o seconds start- ing at 9 . 5 9 . 1 1 ; the last effort is at 9 . 5 9 . 4 5 , even after the second a t t e m p t to break d o w n the door, this time with a loud and a p p a r e n t l y frightening crash of a metal cart, when it is clear t h a t the strategy isn't w o r k i n g .

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Second, the hijackers s h o u t instructions to each other, mostly in Ara- bic—to h o l d t h e door, w h e t h e r to "finish it off" (presumably by crashing t h e p l a n e ) , t o jolt the p l a n e ' s tail u p a n d d o w n t o t h r o w the passengers on the floor, to cut off the oxygen. But these instructions are very repetitive t o o : " U p , d o w n " is r e p e a t e d eight times; " C u t off t h e o x y g e n " is r e p e a t e d four times in t w o seconds. "Give it to m e " is r e p e a t e d eight times in four seconds. Practical discourse is b e c o m i n g an e m o t i o n a l i n c a n t a t i o n , t o o .

T h i r d , formulaic religious p h r a s e s . These start a t tense m o m e n t s , a n d b e c o m e m o r e repetitive as the crisis intensifies. " T r u s t in Allah, a n d in h i m " is u t t e r e d just after t h e second assault on the d o o r (the frightening crash of t h e c a r t ) . " O h Allah. Oh Allah. Oh G r a c i o u s " is h e a r d just as the a t t a c k e r s rush the d o o r for the third time. "Allah is the g r e a t e s t " is repeated nine times, in different voices, in the last seven seconds before the final crash.

Conflict talk in general is highly repetitive. As we have seen in chapter 9, heated arguments consist n o t in trying to c o m m u n i c a t e with one's o p p o - nent but in trying to talk him d o w n , ignoring t u r n - t a k i n g a n d not allowing the o p p o n e n t the floor. Since at this point in the a r g u m e n t the content doesn't m a t t e r — n o one is listening to w h a t their o p p o n e n t is saying—loud repetition is the best way to hold the floor. Verbal repetitiveness carries over in actual violence. It becomes an emotional technique, aimed not at the o p p o n e n t but at building one's o w n energy and solidarity, an incanta- tion of self-entrainment. In the 9/11 cockpit fight, both sides use this crude emotional technique: it is a struggle of opposing self-cntrainmcnts.

C H A P T E R 1 1

Violence as Dominance in Emotional Attention Space

WE N O W R E A C H A P A R A D O X . If only a small n u m b e r o u t of a n o m i n a l l y engaged fighting force do all the violence, w h y n o t get rid of the rest? W h y n o t p a r e d o w n t h e army, t h e g a n g , o r o t h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l o r g a n i - z a t i o n , to those w h o are actively violent, or better yet, t h e small m i n o r i t y w h o are c o m p e t e n t l y violent? W h y n o t h a v e a n air force consisting only of aces, or any a r m y only of snipers a n d o t h e r elite t r o o p s ? Such a r r a n g e - m e n t s are virtually impossible, for s t r u c t u r a l r e a s o n s . Violence is n o t gen- erated by isolated individuals b u t by an entire e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n space.

W H A T D O E S T H E R E S T O F T H E C R O W D D O ?

T h e best w a y to a p p r o a c h this is to e x a m i n e c r o w d s d u r i n g r i o t s . Using visual evidence, we can see b o t h the small n u m b e r s p a t t e r n of those w h o are violent, a n d t h e w a y they relate t o the larger c r o w d .

M y generalizations d r a w o n new s p h o t o clippings collected between 1 9 8 9 a n d 2 0 0 5 , a l o n g w i t h published p h o t o collections (Crespo 2 0 0 2 ; Allen 2 0 0 0 ) , plus a smaller n u m b e r of video recordings from television newscasts. In principle, video clips might seem preferable; b u t t h e y are generally no longer t h a n t h r e e to five seconds of c o n t i n u o u s action. H e n c e t h e r e is relatively little difference b e t w e e n videos a n d still p h o t o s . R a w video footage is drastically edited by new s directors to s h o w the high p o i n t s of the story. In reality, t h e m i n u t e - b y - m i n u t e action of a d e m o n s t r a - t i o n is highly repetitive. W h e n it t u r n s i n t o a c t u a l fighting—a r i o t — t h e action becomes very s p r e a d o u t , a n d m o s t of w h a t one sees d u r i n g contin- u o u s o b s e r v a t i o n is p e o p l e s t a n d i n g a r o u n d , s o m e r u n n i n g across o p e n spaces, plus usually m o r e s t a t i o n a r y or slowly m o v i n g f o r m a t i o n s of secu- rity forces. M o m e n t s of violence in a riot are scattered in time a n d space, p u n c t u a t i n g scenes t h a t are mostly b o r i n g for outside observers, a l t h o u g h exciting, frightening, or frustrating for p a r t i c i p a n t s . M o s t people w h o are present are merely n o m i n a l l y violent. This surprisingly u n d r a m a t i c c h a r - acter of r a w videos of riots becomes clear w h e n o n e views a c t u a l footage of a r i o t a n d speaks w i t h c a m e r a o p e r a t o r s a b o u t their experience. 1 To m a k e a sustained, c o n t i n u o u s l y d r a m a t i c video of violent m a s s confronta-

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t i o n , o n e w o u l d need a large n u m b e r of c a m e r a o p e r a t o r s p o s t e d in differ- ent l o c a t i o n s , a n d do considerable editing a n d cutting pieces together. T h e result w o u l d distort the reality of the riot precisely in privileging the vio- lent m o m e n t s a n d eliding the e m p t y spaces a n d d r a w n - o u t times. Violence is stratified in time a n d space just as it is in p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; these features are p a r t of the same social process.

These visual scenes fall i n t o four categories: standoffs, w h e n o p p o s i n g g r o u p s confront each o t h e r b u t violence h a s n o t yet begun; attacks; re- treats; a n d victories, w h e n one side at least locally d o m i n a t e s t h e other. These types differ greatly in h o w densely the c r o w d is assembled. Stand- offs are generally dense; it is virtually only these t h a t give the expected picture of a m o b , a large e m o t i o n a l l y a r o u s e d g r o u p acting in c o n c e r t . 2 It is because the g r o u p r e m a i n s unviolent t h a t it is able to keep up its high level of c o o r d i n a t i o n .

W h e n actual fighting breaks o u t , in a t t a c k s a n d r e t r e a t s , t h e scene b r e a k s u p . R i o t s are quite a lot like S.L.A. M a r s h a l l ' s description of the e m p t y battlefield, except t h a t the o p p o n e n t s are visible, n o t h i d d e n from sight. T h e difference in c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l distance is because the w e a p o n s used are r o c k s a n d slingshots, sticks, as well as fists a n d feet, r a t h e r t h a n g u n s , for the m o s t p a r t ; t e a r gas a n d s m o k e canisters can create a very literal equivalent of t h e fog of war. T h e distances b e t w e e n the enemy forces are n o t h u n d r e d s of y a r d s or m o r e as in military c o m b a t , b u t a few feet o u t to a few dozen y a r d s for the frontline activists; 50 to 150 y a r d s for n o m i n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d observers a safe distance behind; a n d a m i d - g r o u p in b e t w e e n . T h e split between the violent few a n d the rest of the c r o w d is often clearly m a r k e d o u t in space, all the m o r e so as the level of violence increases.

In a typical attack scene (see figure 11.1), we see three Palestinian boys, y o u n g teenagers, in a city street t h r o w i n g r o c k s at Israeli soldiers while a n o t h e r o n e i s picking u p r o c k s , a s t w o m o r e boys r u n t o w a r d t h e m from a b o u t t w e n t y feet back. In the m i d d l e distance a b o u t fifty y a r d s b a c k , a c l u m p of seven others h o l d their g r o u n d or m o v e cautiously f o r w a r d . Still farther up the street, at a b o u t 150 y a r d s , a n o t h e r t h i r t y w a t c h at a safe distance, while t w o are visible r u n n i n g up the street a w a y from the action. T h e visible activists are four o u t of forty-five, a r o u n d 10 percent; at least t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e c r o w d k e e p m a x i m a l distance (June 5 , 2 0 0 3 , Agence France-Presse p h o t o ) .

In a p h o t o of a soccer r i o t in M o s c o w (see figure 11.2), after the Russian t e a m h a d lost to J a p a n in a televised m a t c h , we see a cluster of eight y o u n g m e n kicking at a car, while one j u m p s up a n d d o w n on the roof; on t h e o t h e r side of t h e s q u a r e are eighty s p e c t a t o r s , m o s t of t h e m on t h e side- w a l k against a building eighty y a r d s away. Again the active a t t a c k e r s m a k e up a b o u t 10 percent of the c r o w d (June 1 0 , 2 0 0 2 , Associated Press).

D o m i n a n c e i n A t t e n t i o n S p a c e • 4 1 5

Figure 11.1. Multiple layers of a riot: front line, near supporters, middle, back (Palestine, 2003). Musa Al-Shaer/Getty Images.

A n o t h e r p h o t o (not s h o w n ) s h o w s a Palestinian y o u n g m a n in an o p e n field hurling a s m o k i n g t e a r gas canister b a c k at Israeli soldiers; he is s u r r o u n d e d by t h r e e others nearby, while fifteen o n l o o k e r s are against a r o w of trees in t h e b a c k g r o u n d , a n d t h r e e others r e t r e a t from the fore- g r o u n d (Dec. 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 R e u t e r s p h o t o ) . A b o u t one-fourth are m o m e n - tarily in the front line, t h o u g h only o n e p e r s o n is currently active.

Shifting the scene to N o r t h e r n Ireland, a cluster of seven P r o t e s t a n t mid-teenagers confront a British soldier; t h e one in front is t h r o w i n g a r o c k , while t h e o t h e r six s t a n d i n t w o r o w s behind h i m , several w i t h h a n d s in p o c k e t s , or l o o k i n g a w a y from the a c t i o n . It is a scene of desultory violence, a n d their faces l o o k m o r e b o r e d t h a n engrossed. In m a n y of these scenes we see t h e same t e r r i t o r i a l m a r k e r s ; only t h e lone rock- t h r o w e r has stepped off the sidewalk into the street; t h e others are safely in the n o n - c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l z o n e of the sidewalk, except for one y o u t h w h o gingerly s t a n d s at t h e r e a r of t h e g r o u p , w i t h o n e foot in the street, t h e o t h e r o n the c u r b (Sept. 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , Peter M o r r i s o n / A s s o c i a t e d Press p h o t o , n o t s h o w n here). Similarly, in a refugee c a m p in t h e Gaza Strip, we see one y o u t h dragging a b u r n i n g tire i n t o t h e m i d d l e of the street; a b o u t t w e n t y s p e c t a t o r s are visible 150 y a r d s d o w n the street, while n e a r b y on the sidewalk are four a p p a r e n t s u p p o r t e r s , one of w h o m is just stepping off the c u r b (Oct. 1 , 2 0 0 4 , Adel H a n a / A P p h o t o , n o t s h o w n here).

4 1 6 • Chapter 11

Altogether a b o u t 20 p e r c e n t of those visible are activists, a l t h o u g h at t h e m o m e n t their activism consists in p r o v i d i n g physical c o m p a n i o n s h i p to t h e o n e individual w h o is actually d o i n g s o m e t h i n g .

We m i g h t q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r there is a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l bias in these p h o - t o s . Isn't it possible t h a t m o s t of violent activists are o u t of t h e picture frame, s o m e w h e r e else in the c r o w d ? But surely the n ews editors picked the m o s t violent p h o t o s they could find. T h e look of real violence, unlike the contrived violence of movies, is disappointingly u n d r a m a t i c , precisely because it is so i n t e r m i t t e n t a n d s p r e a d o u t . Perhaps the s t o p - a c t i o n , in- s t a n t a n e o u s n a t u r e of a still p h o t o s h o w s us only t h e p a r t i c u l a r individu- als w h o are violent a t t h a t m o m e n t ; m a y b e o t h e r s are violent a t other m o m e n t s . This is u n d o u b t e d l y so to a degree; b u t t h a t degree is small. Longer video clips do n o t s h o w any great a l t e r n a t i o n of personnel step- ping up regularly to t a k e each o t h e r ' s places in t h e front of the action. T h e r e are also identity m a r k e r s in the h e a t of t h e action t h a t correlate w i t h h o w violent an individual's p a r t i c i p a t i o n is. I h a v e already n o t e d the significance of stepping i n t o the street versus staying on the s i d e w a l k . 3

A n o t h e r marker, w h i c h h a s become c o m m o n in d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in Eu- r o p e a n d America since a r o u n d 2 0 0 0 , i s w e a r i n g b a n d a n a s , h e a d s c a r v e s , h o o d s , ski m a s k s , balaclavas, or o t h e r m a s k s to cover the h e a d or face. In an Associated Press p h o t o (July 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 ; n o t s h o w n here) of a d e m o n - s t r a t i o n against a w o r l d e c o n o m i c s u m m i t in G e n o a , Italy, we see t w o y o u n g m e n in the m i d d l e of the street t h r o w i n g r o c k s ; behind t h e m , near

Dominance in Attention Space • 417

Figure 11.3. Single demonstrator confronts police line while crowd remains unfo- cused (Genoa, July 2001). AP/World Wide Photos.

a r o w of b u r n i n g t r a s h bins, are t h r e e m o r e w h o are c r o u c h i n g , p e r h a p s briefly b r e a k i n g the a c t i o n . Back on the sidewalk ten y a r d s away, t h i r t y people are visible, filling the space against t h e building. ( N o d o u b t t h e r e are m o r e outside t h e p i c t u r e frame.) All five activists in the f o r e g r o u n d are m a s k e d ; few of t h o s e in the b a c k g r o u n d are m a s k e d . Figure 1 1 . 3 shows t h e same d e m o n s t r a t i o n (July 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 , Associated Press) while still in the standoff p h a s e . A p h a l a n x of police in helmets a n d plastic shields confront a c r o w d , of w h o m 150 are visible in t h e p h o t o frame, s t a n d i n g a b o u t ten r o w s deep o n a sidewalk b a c k e d u p t o t h e wall. M o s t of the c r o w d are t u r n e d sideways or a w a y from the police line; only t h r e e y o u n g m e n in the front r o w are directly staring at the police. O n e of t h e m has stepped f o r w a r d i n t o t h e o p e n space of a b o u t ten feet a n d gestures w i t h his m i d d l e finger t o w a r d t h e police. A n o t a b l e detail: a l t h o u g h m o s t of the c r o w d are w e a r i n g helmets (motorcycle or c o n s t r u c t i o n type), the lone t a u n t e r is the only one w e a r i n g a gas m a s k as well (clear plastic visor w i t h a canister b r e a t h i n g filter); a l t h o u g h o n e of his h a n d s , resting on his h i p , is b a r e , the h a n d w i t h w h i c h he m a k e s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l gesture is w e a r - ing a shiny metallic glove. Even in a standoff, t h e r e is a division b e t w e e n a small n u m b e r of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l activists, a n d the m a s s of t h e c r o w d ; we see this in their p o s i t i o n in space, their p o s t u r e s , a n d their symbolic a c c o u t r e m e n t s . 4

In a p h o t o ( M a y 2, 1 9 9 2 , Associated Press) of a d e m o n s t r a t i o n in Ber- lin, o n e y o u n g m a n is in the act of t h r o w i n g a s t o n e ; he is in full c o m b a t gear, w e a r i n g h o o d a n d face m a s k . A few y a r d s b a c k , a n o t h e r m a n w e a r s a b a n d a n a m a s k a n d a p p e a r s t o b e stepping f o r w a r d t o w a r d t h e a c t i o n .

418 • Chapter 11

Still farther b a c k , t w o m e n i n h o o d s h a v e their b a n d a n a s o n b u t pulled d o w n from their faces, as if n o t currently in m a s k - a c t i o n . T w o m o r e w e a r h o o d s only, a n d at the m o m e n t are m e r e o n l o o k e r s , as are a n o t h e r six h e a d s visible in the c r o w d . T h e t h i r t e e n p e r s o n s in the picture divide into the different layers of t h e riot p a r t i c i p a t i o n , from t h e o n e currently violent activist o u t of t h e t o t a l t h i r t e e n d o w n t h r o u g h t h e varying degrees of sym- bolic aggression expressed by their a c c o u t r e m e n t s . T h e y are an expression in d e m e a n o r (in Goffman's precise sense) of t h e layers of the c r o w d found in t h e spatial zones as in figure 1 1 . 1 . 5

C l o s e u p p h o t o s manifestly s h o w only a small segment of a larger scene. P r e s u m a b l y they h a v e been chosen, b y p h o t o g r a p h e r s a n d editors, t o illus- t r a t e the p e a k of t h e action. But even here this p e a k of a c t i o n often consists of just o n e individual being violent in t h e midst of o t h e r s w h o are n o t . Some of these s h o w an individual sling-thrower w i n d i n g u p ; an individual rioter b r e a k i n g a store w i n d o w ; occasionally we get a p i c t u r e of a p r o - testor w i t h y a r d s of space a r o u n d h i m , heaving a r o c k at police lines, while a c o u p l e of figures are s p r e a d o u t h a p h a z a r d l y behind h i m . (Again in this instance, we see t h e r o c k - t h r o w e r alone in t h e street b e y o n d the c u r b , the others on the sidewalk. [London Daily Mail, M a y 2, 2 0 0 1 , p. 7, n o t s h o w n here]). In a l a b o r clash in Spain, we see o n e m a n in balaclava a n d face-mask firing a slingshot, while in the b a c k g r o u n d a n o t h e r seven s t a n d i n casual poses, leaning o n railings o r s t a n d i n g a r o u n d ten t o t w e n t y y a r d s a w a y (Sept. 2 2 , 2 0 0 4 , R a m o n Espinosa/Associated Press, n o t s h o w n here).

At m o s t , we see little g r o u p s of the actively violent: t w o y o u n g Palestin- ians climbing t w e n t y feet up a wall to p r o t e s t an Israeli barrier in the West Bank, the foreground area of p e r h a p s 800 square yards is empty except for a single y o u t h waving a flag (Dec. 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 , Agence Presse-France p h o t o , n o t s h o w n here). We get a closeup of four Palestinians releasing their sling- shots in unison. (The [London] Times, Oct. 14, 2 0 0 0 , p. 6, n o t s h o w n here). It is very r a r e to get a p h o t o w h e r e everyone visible is violent at the same time, or even a majority. Five Palestinians crouch on the p a r a p e t of a wall, three actively t h r o w i n g rocks or holding t h e m in readiness, a n o t h e r t w o resting (Oct. 7, 2 0 0 0 ; Reuters p h o t o , n o t s h o w n here). In a Reuters p h o t o (Oct. 2 9 , 2 0 0 2 , n o t s h o w n here) depicting Israeli settlers t h r o w i n g stones at Palestinian h o m e s , in fact only one of thirteen persons visible is actually t h r o w i n g a stone. W h a t are the others doing there? I suggest they are setting an a t m o s p h e r e a n d providing s u p p o r t ; their pretense of vio- lence—simply being there in the front line of the confrontation zone—is emotionally necessary so t h a t some can be the few w h o are violent.

I n Shanghai, t h r e e y o u n g Chinese m e n are t h r o w i n g r o c k s a t the J a p a - nese c o n s u l a t e , while eleven others are visible t h r e e r o w s deep in the back- g r o u n d (April 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 , C h i n a P h o t o s / G e t t y Images, n o t s h o w n ) . H e r e

Dominance in Attention Space • 419

Figure 11.4 (four-photo sequence) Lone demonstrator, energized by small group of supporters, runs forward to taunt police and is shot (Gothenburg, Sweden, 2001).

we can see the facial expressions; the r o c k - t h r o w e r s ' faces look tense, teeth or lips clenched in the m o m e n t of m u s c u l a r effort; t w o others in the b a c k u p g r o u p have their m o u t h s open in yells of e n c o u r a g e m e n t ; b u t several of the o t h e r s look d o w n or a w a y from the a c t i o n . 6 W h a t is dis- played is the tension of c o n f r o n t a t i o n on the p a r t of the actively violent; others supply their presence as a nearby m a s s of bodies in solidarity with t h e m , along w i t h a noisy a t m o s p h e r e a n d emotional focus.

In the following we see t h a t a cheering cluster of activists energizes a lone individual to go forward into extremely d a n g e r o u s p r o v o c a t i o n . A sequence of p h o t o s (figures 11.4A, B, C, D) s h o w s a d e m o n s t r a t o r being shot by police at the E u r o p e a n Union s u m m i t in G o t h e n b u r g , Sweden (news reports in The Independent, J u n e 17, 2 0 0 1 , p. 1; Sunday Telegraph, J u n e 17, 2 0 0 1 , p . 3 ; I T N p h o t o s ) . Wearing a h o o d e d jacket a n d w a v i n g

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a w o o d e n club, he a p p r o a c h e s w i t h i n a b o u t t w e n t y y a r d s of a g r o u p of six helmeted police w h o have been s e p a r a t e d from the m a i n force. T h e t a u n t e r sees a p o l i c e m a n t a k e aim w i t h a g u n , t h e n t u r n s a n d r u n s . T h e sequence of p h o t o s s h o w s mostly e m p t y p a v e m e n t ; just t h e few police on a b r o a d a v e n u e , a n d a sole s u p p o r t i n g d e m o n s t r a t o r n e a r b y as t h e t a u n t e r is hit a n d falls to t h e p a v e m e n t , p e r h a p s forty y a r d s a w a y from the police. T h e r e h a d been a large, peaceful m a r c h of m a n y t h o u s a n d s in a festival a t m o s p h e r e . Later in t h e day, t e c h n o music from a van w a s suddenly t u r n e d up to a deafening level. Police p u s h e d a g r o u p of a h u n d r e d or so d e m o n s t r a t o r s into a p a r k ; a smaller g r o u p in m a s k s a p p e a r e d from a side street a n d cut off a small g r o u p of police, pelting t h e m w i t h cobblestones a n d d o w n i n g one c o p w i t h a hit t o t h e h e a d . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c a m e r a - m a n ' s r e p o r t , the d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n balaclavas cheered, t h e n screamed w h e n the police o p e n e d f i r e w i t h eight shots a t t h e lone t a u n t e r w h o d a r e d to a p p r o a c h w i t h i n t w e n t y y a r d s of the police. T h e episode resembles the filmed tribal w a r f a r e described in c h a p t e r 2, consisting m o r e in t a u n t i n g a n d episodic hits t h a n in sustained fighting, w i t h the m o s t active few rush- ing briefly t o w a r d e n e m y lines, t h e n r u n n i n g away. But here we see a telling a d d i t i o n a l detail: an intermediate-size cluster near the front line, w h o s e cheering gives e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t t o t h e few w h o t a k e the confron- t a t i o n still closer to the enemy.

Retreats s h o w m u c h t h e same division between t h e small n u m b e r of activists a n d the rest of the c r o w d . W h e n a c r o w d r u n s away, in the face of police t e a r gas, concussion g r e n a d e s , s h o o t i n g , b a t o n c h a r g e , or just plain f o r w a r d - m o v i n g t h r e a t , p h o t o s typically s h o w a p a r t of t h e c r o w d t h a t is n o t p a n i c k e d because they are already at a safe distance of 150 y a r d s or m o r e , or off on a sidewalk b a c k e d up against the buildings. In the m i d d l e distance, t h e r e is a r u s h w i t h backs t u r n e d ; generally t h e r e are a few defiant o n e s , retreating b u t facing the o n c o m i n g forces. Sometimes t h r e e or four o u t of a h u n d r e d s t o p at fifty y a r d s or so to t u r n a n d t h r o w r o c k s at the a t t a c k e r s (as we see in figure 11.5). In places w h e r e such emblems of militancy are w o r n , we see h o o d s a n d m a s k s on t h e defiant few at t h e tail of the retreat. T h e y are the boldest a n d m o s t belligerent. This is n o t to say they are unceasingly brave; we see this in t h e p h o t o sequence (figure 11.4) of the Swedish d e m o n s t r a t o r w h o shifts from t a u n t - ing to a terrified expression as he tries to flee a gun aimed at him.

N e x t , a few w o r d s on victories. Fighting usually disassembles a c r o w d ; a victory t e n d s to reunite it. J u s t h o w large a n u m b e r reunite varies nearly inversely w i t h h o w close their victory celebration is to t h e fighting itself. On t h e borderline of a victory g a t h e r i n g is a f o r w a r d p a n i c type of a t t a c k ; we h a v e seen p h o t o s of these in c h a p t e r 3, w h e r e a g r o u p of a t t a c k e r s has g o t t e n t h e u p p e r h a n d , h a v i n g isolated or k n o c k e d d o w n a single victim. As in t h e R o d n e y King beating t a p e , m o s t of the beating m a y be carried

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o u t b y p e r h a p s 2 0 percent o f the g r o u p , while t h e others p r o v i d e e m o - t i o n a l a n d vocal s u p p o r t . 7 T h e lion's share of t h e e m o t i o n a l energy goes to t h o s e at t h e forefront of t h e a t t a c k ; an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t witness to an African street m o b a t t a c k i n g a m a r k e t thief n o t e s t h a t t h e bulk of the c r o w d w a i t s their t u r n to c o m e up a n d give a n o t particularly enthusiastic kick to the fallen b o d y (Igor Kopytof, p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , F e b . 2 0 0 2 ) . But the rest of t h e c r o w d does at least pull together, sharing solidar- ity in t h e sheer massing of bodies—just w h a t is a b s e n t in t h e m o m e n t s of a t t a c k s a n d retreats w h e n the issue is n o t yet settled.

T h e m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n violence leaders a n d the c r o w d is illustrated in p h o t o s from t h e Palestinian intifada, w i t h its o n g o - ing r o u n d of reciprocal killings a n d atrocities. F o u r Israeli soldiers called t o d u t y w i t h their u n i t i n R a m a l l a h u n k n o w i n g l y drove into t h e a f t e r m a t h of a funeral procession for a seventeen-year-old boy killed by Israeli sol- diers (The [London] Times, O c t . 1 3 , 2 0 0 0 , p h o t o s AFP). Young m e n in the procession h a d been s h o u t i n g Allah-u-akbar ( G o d is great), tearing their shirts, a n d cursing the Israelis as killers of children; older m e n joined in religious c h a n t s . W h e n the soldiers' car w a s s p o t t e d , it w a s set afire w i t h p e t r o l b o m b s . Palestinian police rescued t h e m a n d t o o k t h e m to a police station; a lynch m o b of several h u n d r e d s w a r m e d t h e walls a n d

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b r o k e t h r o u g h b a r r i c a d e s , injuring a d o z e n policemen. A p h o t o (figure 11.6) t a k e n m i n u t e s later, s h o w s a y o u n g m a n leaning o u t the second- floor w i n d o w of t h e s t a t i o n , his m o u t h o p e n in an e x u l t a n t yell, h o l d i n g up his b l o o d i e d palms for the c r o w d to see. T h e b l o o d - s t a i n e d h a n d s of t w o o t h e r m e n are also t h r u s t i n t o view i n the w i n d o w . I n the c r o w d below, the p i c t u r e silhouettes seven m e n , p a r t of a larger t h r o n g , a l m o s t all t u r n e d t o w a r d the w i n d o w w i t h a r m s e x t e n d e d t o clap o r w i t h clenched fists. M o m e n t s later bodies of t w o d e a d Israelis are t h r o w n from the w i n d o w . A second p h o t o (not s h o w n ) s h o w s a densely p a c k e d c r o w d of fifty m e n , the inner circle kicking at t h e b o d y ; a m a n t w o r o w s back b r a n d i s h e s a knife p o i n t e d at w h e r e the b o d y lays. M o s t are jostling for- w a r d to a t t a c k t h e body, or at least get a close look at it; t h r e e m e n , however, h a v e t u r n e d their backs a n d are leaving the center of the circle— a p p a r e n t l y they h a v e seen or kicked e n o u g h . T h e i r jaws are set grimly, differing from the eager or angry expressions on the visible faces of m e n w h o h a v e n o t yet reached the center of the circle. T h e r e is one w o m a n in the picture; she pulls her s h a w l over her h e a d a n d t u r n s a w a y from the b o d y — a p p a r e n t l y she h a d c o m e to look, p e r h a p s as a relative of some p r i o r victim. This is a case in w h i c h the e m o t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g the larger g r o u p a n d its s u b - s e g m e n t s — t h e funeral m a r c h e r s , the a t t a c k e r s of t h e car a n d police s t a t i o n , the lynchers w h o c o m p l e t e the m u r d e r s — a r e acted o u t very clearly. T h e violent few s h o w off their killing, a n d receive acclaim for it; they go on to send d o w n t h e bodies as further w a y s of establishing a physical c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e n e x t - m o s t ring of p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e b l o o d y h a n d s a n d victims' bodies are like symbolic t o k e n s , establish- ing c o n n e c t i o n a m o n g the different layers of t h e m o b .

Some victories t a k e the form of a violent celebration ritual, a t t a c k i n g the b o d y of a dead enemy. We see this in a video of the battle in M o g a d i - s h u , Somalia, in 1 9 9 2 b e t w e e n A m e r i c a n forces t a k i n g p a r t in a U . N . rescue mission a n d s u p p o r t e r s of a local w a r l o r d ; an A m e r i c a n helicopter h a s been s h o t d o w n , o n e of t h e pilots is d e a d a n d his b o d y is stripped a n d dragged t h r o u g h the streets while several m e m b e r s of a c r o w d of p e o p l e — m o s t y o u n g m e n a n d boys—kick at it (KR Video 1 9 9 7 ) . In Fallujah, I r a q , four Americans in a private security firm w e r e a m b u s h e d by I r a q i insur- gents a n d b u r n e d to d e a t h w h e n the c r o w d set their vehicles on fire (April 1, 2 0 0 4 A.P. p h o t o s , n o t s h o w n ) . A n o t h e r p h o t o (figure 11.7) s h o w s the c h a r r e d bodies hoisted on r o p e s a n d h u n g from the girders of a bridge over the E u p h r a t e s River. Of twelve m e n visible in the p h o t o f o r e g r o u n d , six w a v e their a r m s in the air exultingly. A n o t h e r climbs a bridge girder w i t h his shoe in h a n d to strike the dead body, a gesture of e x t r e m e insult in A r a b culture. Earlier, a ten-year-old boy w a s seen grinding his heel i n t o a burned h e a d . In b o t h these instances, t h e r e is w i d e s p r e a d p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a higher level t h a n in actual fighting. T h e r e are also a few w h o m we may

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Figure 11.6 Ritual solidarity gestures between violent front line and supporters. Palestinian youth displays blood on his hands after lynching of Israeli soldiers (October 2000).

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Figure 11.7 Ritual desecration of enemy in victory celebration. Charred corpses of American civilians hung from a bridge in Fallujah, Iraq (April 2004). AP/World Wide Photos.

call d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists, w h o go b e y o n d others in symbolic violence over a fallen enemy.

P r o b a b l y a m o r e c o m m o n form of victory celebration at the end of a violent clash are a t t a c k s on n o n - h u m a n t a r g e t s . After the fall of the Ser- b i a n n a t i o n a l i s t leader Milosevic, t h e g r o u p of activists w h o i n v a d e d the p a r l i a m e n t building t h r e w c o m p u t e r s from t h e w i n d o w s o n t o t h e s q u a r e , to t h e cheers of s o m e of t h e c r o w d below. A p h o t o (not s h o w n ) depicts t h e state TV building, t h e chief s y m b o l of Milosevic's power, b u r n i n g . T h e n e w s r e p o r t says t h a t the c r o w d i s stoning the building. W h a t w e actually see are t h r e e m e n w i t h i n t w e n t y to t h i r t y y a r d s of the building, t w o of t h e m t h r o w i n g r o c k s at the b r o k e n w i n d o w s while flames billow u p . T h e p a n o r a m a of t h e p i c t u r e i s p e r h a p s one h u n d r e d y a r d s long, an e x p a n s e a l m o s t e m p t y of p e o p l e . A n o t h e r h u n d r e d y a r d s off to t h e side, we see t w o b y s t a n d e r s , l o o k i n g in o t h e r directions while going a b o u t their business ([London] Daily Mail, O c t . 6, 2 0 0 0 , p. 3; also The Guardian, Oct. 6, 2 0 0 0 , p p . 1-5; Daily Telegraph, O c t . 6, 2 0 0 0 , p p . 1-3). O u t of the 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 d e m o n s t r a t o r s in d o w n t o w n Belgrade t h a t day, it a p p e a r s t h a t only a tiny n u m b e r t o o k p a r t in the symbolic destruction.

Are t h e d e m o n s t r a t i v e e x t r e m i s t s t h e s a m e as t h e violent few, t h e m o s t active fighters, t h e o n e s w h o actually c a r r y o u t t h e killing a n d b e a t i n g at t h e p e a k of c o n f r o n t a t i o n ? D a t a is lacking, since we c a n r a r e l y t r a c k

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i n d i v i d u a l s from t h e m o m e n t of t h e fight to t h e expressive a c t i o n s t h a t t a k e place a f t e r w a r d . But t h e r e are some clues t o suggest t h a t t h e y are n o t t h e s a m e . D e m o n s t r a t i v e e x t r e m i s t s — t h e ones w h o kick t h e d e a d b o d i e s , hit t h e m w i t h a s h o e , a n d s o f o r t h — a r e often m u c h y o u n g e r t h a n t h e f i g h t e r s ; these a c t i o n s seem m o s t c o m m o n l y c a r r i e d o u t b y c h i l d r e n . I t m a y well b e t h a t d e m o n s t r a t i v e e x t r e m i s t s are n o t a t all c o m p e t e n t fighters, b u t emerge from t h e c r o w d after t h e violence is safely over. N o r is it useful to r e g a r d t h e m as expressing t h e e m o t i o n s of the c r o w d ( m u c h less as expressive leaders). It is d a n g e r o u s to a s s u m e t h a t we k n o w w h a t are t h e " r e a l " feelings of the c r o w d , a p a r t from w h a t is expressed by p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s ; it is m i s l e a d i n g to fall i n t o the r h e t o r i c t h a t t h e c r o w d h a s an e m o t i o n (such as r i g h t e o u s anger, v e n g e a n c e , etc.) t h a t t h e y ex- press in a c t i o n . But in fact, as I h a v e tried to s h o w t h r o u g h o u t , violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s g e n e r a t e t h e i r o w n s i t u a t i o n a l e m o t i o n s , a b o v e all t e n - sion a n d fear; a n d we see this on t h e faces a n d in t h e b o d y l a n g u a g e of m o s t o f t h e c r o w d d u r i n g these events. T h e d e m o n s t r a t i v e e x t r e m i s t s are n o t e x p r e s s i n g an e m o t i o n t h a t we c a n safely infer, on t h e basis of t h e evidence, as generally existing in t h e c r o w d ; t h e y are a n o t h e r specialized m i n o r i t y (different as well from t h e m i n o r i t y of v i o l e n t activists) w h o h a v e f o u n d their o w n e m o t i o n a l niche i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e c r o w d . A n d in fact t h e b u l k of the c r o w d does n o t usually follow t h e m , even w h e n it is safe to do so because t h e r e is no o p p o n e n t p r e s e n t b u t o n l y a d e a d b o d y or a c a p t u r e d building; the d e m o n s t r a t i v e e x t r e m i s t s a r e usually s e p a r a t e from t h e rest of t h e c r o w d .

Some evidence bearing on this p o i n t c o m e s from p h o t o s of lynchings i n the A m e r i c a n S o u t h a n d West i n t h e p e r i o d 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 3 5 (Allen 2 0 0 0 ) . M o s t of these p h o t o s — a n d the ones t h a t are m o s t revealing on this p o i n t — w e r e t a k e n several h o u r s in the a f t e r m a t h of t h e a c t u a l violence, or the following day. Individuals offering acts of g r a t u i t o u s insult to dead bodies are safely disconnected from the actual commission of t h e violence. In a p h o t o (Allen 2 0 0 0 : p l a t e 9 3 , n o t s h o w n here) we see t w o w h i t e m e n s t a n d i n g beside the b o d y of a black m a n h u n g from a tree, o n e p o k i n g the b o d y w i t h a stick, t h e o t h e r p u n c h i n g it. In the b a c k g r o u n d are four o t h e r w h i t e m e n l o o k i n g o n . I n a n o t h e r p h o t o (Allen 2 0 0 0 : plate 2 5 , n o t s h o w n ) a y o u n g m a n leans n o n c h a l a n t l y w i t h his eyes closed against the p o s t from w h i c h the c h a r r e d b o d y of a black m a n , lynched t h e previous night, is h a n g i n g ; the nineteen o t h e r faces visible in the c r o w d are somber. T h i s is the usual p a t t e r n in all the p h o t o s : a few are the d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists; m o s t of t h e others are somber, serious, a w e d , or u n c o m f o r t - able in the presence of d e a t h .

O u r first reaction m a y well be to interpret the gestures of the d e m o n s t r a - tive extremists as expressions of the racism shared by the c r o w d (or the entire society). But this w o u l d be to ignore w h a t we actually see: a small

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n u m b e r of individuals (I have selected t h e w o r s t instances available in t h e p h o t o collection) s t a n d o u t from the c r o w d i n their actions a n d bodily e x p r e s s i o n s . 8

But the m o o d of d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists in the a f t e r m a t h c o n t r a s t s w i t h the e m o t i o n s t h a t are displayed d u r i n g t h e a c t u a l lynching itself. In a r a r e set of p h o t o s , we see a lynching while it is going o n : a black m a n s h o w i n g the welts of w h i p p i n g on his back s t a n d s in a w a g o n shortly before he is h u n g ; his executioners stare at his face w i t h h a r d , hostile stares (Allen 2 0 0 0 : plates 4 2 a n d 4 3 ; n o t s h o w n here). T h e r e i s n o clown- ing, no expression of joy; these are the frontline activist few, engaged in an angry, d o m i n e e r i n g s t a r e - d o w n . A violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n itself is tense; even w h e n one side has t h e u p p e r h a n d (the usual formula for successful violence) it is compelling, focused i n t o t h e business at h a n d , u n a b l e to ironicize it.

T h u s t h e d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists, o p e r a t i n g safely in the a f t e r m a t h , s h o w s o m e t h i n g else: an a t t e m p t to raise themselves from the bulk of the c r o w d , the b a c k line of merely n o m i n a l s u p p o r t e r s of t h e violence, a n d to raise their status by closer c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the violent action t h a t h a d galvanized the a t t e n t i o n of the g r o u p . By p u t t i n g themselves close to the d e a d body, engaging in g r a t u i t o u s acts of insult u p o n it, they p u t t h e m - selves closer to t h e center of t h e a t t e n t i o n s p a c e . 9 T h e m o s t b l a t a n t expres- sion of joy a m o n g Allen's (2000) lynching p h o t o s is in p l a t e 97 (not s h o w n ) , w h i c h s h o w s t w o well-dressed y o u n g m e n g r i n n i n g (rather m i r t h - lessly) at t h e c a m e r a while viewing a black b o d y being b u r n e d . T h i s w a s n o t in the h e a t of t h e a c t i o n , however, b u t in t h e a f t e r m a t h ; t h e victim, accused of molesting a w h i t e girl, h a d already been h u n g from a l a m p p o s t a n d riddled w i t h bullets. T h e s e cheery d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists are p r o b - ably p r o u d of themselves for s t a n d i n g so close to the w o r k m a n in grimy overalls w h o is t e n d i n g the fire; everyone else in the p h o t o is farther away, a n d the t w e n t y - n i n e o t h e r visible faces r a n g e from s o m b e r to a p p r e h e n - sive. D e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists are s h o w i n g off, a c c o r d i n g to the m o r e s of the violent a t t e n t i o n space, claiming a higher level of stratification al- t h o u g h they c a n n o t r a n k w i t h the violent p e r p e t r a t o r s themselves.

Finally, let us r e t u r n to t h e standoff p h o t o s . H e r e t h e c r o w d is densely p a c k e d ; exhibiting their strength a n d resolve in n u m b e r s (as Tilly 2 0 0 3 emphasizes), they are also s u p p o r t i n g each o t h e r emotionally. But even in these p h o t o s , t h e r e is usually some differentiation visible in gestures a n d expressions. T h e front line of d e m o n s t r a t o r s , pressed against police lines—in C a i r o , Ayodhya (India), M a d r i d , Kiev—lean over a b a r r i c a d e , reach their a r m s o u t in t h r u s t i n g gestures, or h o l d their h a n d s in t h e air; it is the faces in the front t h a t include the few m o s t likely to be s h o u t i n g , t a u n t i n g , o r engaged i n s t a r e - d o w n s w i t h their o p p o n e n t s ( M a r c h 3 , 2 0 0 2 Agence-France Presse; O c t . 3 1 , 1 9 9 0 , Associated Press; M a r c h 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 ,

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E u r o p e a n P r e s s p h o t o Agency). Often visible off to the side of the barri- cade w h e r e it comes up against a building, there is the familiar c r o w d of bystanders on a sidewalk or raised sill, backs against the wall, observing silently w i t h m o u t h s closed a n d w i t h o u t gestures. In a p h o t o (not s h o w n ) taken in Kiev as rioters a t t e m p t to force out the U k r a i n i a n president, o u t of a visible c r o w d segment of thirty faces, there is just one highly expres- sive p e r s o n , gritting his teeth a n d wielding a stick in the front r o w as he tries to reach across to the security forces, w h o s e o w n sticks are raised threateningly in the air (Daily Telegraph, M a r c h 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , p. 2 0 ) . Eventu- ally the c r o w d (totaling 5,000) a n d police clashed with sticks a n d t r u n - c h e o n s ; at the p h o t o m o m e n t , however, we see a tiny p r o p o r t i o n p u s h i n g for a c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t is yet to c o m e .

A few c o n f r o n t a t i o n s r e m a i n relatively well organized even in the fight- ing phase. These are chiefly in South Korea. A p h o t o e x a m p l e (not s h o w n ) depicts a line of Korean p r o t e s t o r s , w e a r i n g gas masks a n d a r m e d with long staves, striking o u t at a police line of shields; b o t h sides are p h a l a n x - like (Nov. 14, 2 0 0 4 Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press). Ten staves are visible, all roughly at the same angle; it is n o t clear h o w m a n y d e m o n s t r a - tors actually m a k e it to the front lines, as their r a n k s a p p e a r to be only one or t w o d e e p , and the preceding rally w a s a t t e n d e d by 2 0 , 0 0 0 . Such battles m a y well be c e r e m o n i a l , following established formulas t h a t limit h o w much h a r m actually is inflicted. 1 0

M o r e usually, standoffs are differentiated, w i t h a few d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists in t h e front line, while the rest are fairly restrained. T h e tiny n u m b e r of individuals acting on their o w n in t a u n t i n g the enemy, become energized by acquiring self-confidence in the midst of a c r o w d ; but they are n o t the c r o w d ' s leaders, a n d generally m u c h of the time they are re- garded w i t h a m u s e m e n t , scorn, or distaste by the rest of the c r o w d , w h o think of them as " c r a z i e s " or (in the British term) " n u t t e r s . " W h e n they go into action a l o n e , c o n t r a s t i n g in d e m e a n o r and behavior with those a r o u n d t h e m , they fail to bring the rest of the c r o w d a l o n g w i t h t h e m . W h a t they lack is a small cluster of s u p p o r t e r s w h o mediate between them and the c r o w d ; it is this m e d i a t i n g g r o u p t h a t sets off a ripple of joining in an a t t a c k .

An occasional p h o t o enables us to analyze the m o m e n t at which a c r o w d goes o n t o the offensive. In an a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n in A n k a r a , Turkey (April 1 2 , 2 0 0 1 , EPA p h o t o ) , we sec 2 3 0 men in the p h o t o frame (out of s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 w h o h a d m a r c h e d earlier in the day) (see fig- ures 11.8). In the foreground is a cluster of eight men, a little separated from the rest of the c r o w d . T w o are t h r o w i n g sticks, expressions of m u s - cular effort on their lower faces a n d j a w s . Planking the t w o s t i c k - t h r o w e r s to left a n d right, a n d in the r o w just behind t h e m , arc six o t h e r m e n , all staring intently in the same direction, their b r o w s d r a w n together a n d

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Figure 11.8 Violent cluster in demonstration. Two men throw missiles while im- mediate companions provide emotional focus (Ankara, Turkey, 2001).

w r i n k l e d over the n o s e in the facial cues of anger ( E k m a n a n d Friesen 1 9 7 5 : 9 5 - 9 7 ) ; several have teeth clenched, the others h a v e their m o u t h s o p e n in an a p p a r e n t s h o u t . T h e militant cluster c o n t r a s t s w i t h the rest of t h e c r o w d ; a large p r o p o r t i o n of the others are l o o k i n g in o t h e r directions, some t u r n e d a w a y entirely from the front; only six o t h e r s (out of 2 0 0 visible) h a v e their m o u t h s o p e n e d a n d a p p e a r t o b e yelling. 1 1

T h e militant cluster m a y well be t h o s e w h o s t a r t e d the violent p a r t of t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n , at least in t h a t vicinity. O n l y 1 percent of those visible are d o i n g a n y t h i n g violent; w i t h their s u p p o r t e r s , they m a k e up a b o u t 5 percent of the visible s e g m e n t — w h o are also a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h o s e w h o are visible to each other in t h e a t t e n t i o n space c o m p r i s i n g t h a t p a r t of t h e c r o w d . T h e o u t b u r s t is generated in t h r e e layers, r a t h e r t h a n a two-layer t r a n s m i s s i o n b e t w e e n the initiators of violence a n d the bulk of the c r o w d . T h e c r o w d ' s c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l e m o t i o n does n o t simply well u p into vio- lence by t h e foremost activists. T h e key e m o t i o n a l surge comes first t h r o u g h their i m m e d i a t e clique of s u p p o r t e r s ; as if their job is to act as an e m o t i o n a l intensifier, r a m p i n g up the expression of anger a n d willful effort in a w a v e of s o u n d t h a t will p r o p e l the bodies of those t h r o w i n g missiles from the midst of their cluster. 1 2

Like m o s t individual c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , it is likely t h a t m o s t c r o w d s t h a t t h r e a t e n violence do n o t actually c a r r y it o u t . O u r research is largely con-

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fined to sampling on the d e p e n d e n t variable. Occasionally we h a v e an e t h n o g r a p h i c a c c o u n t of a r i o t t h a t a b o r t s . A sociologist doing develop- m e n t research in h i g h l a n d Peru in 2 0 0 5 describes such an instance (Rae Lesser Blumberg, p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , July 2 0 0 5 ) . A g r o u p of p r o - testors m a r c h a r o u n d the t o w n p l a z a , s h o u t i n g angry slogans against a judge w h o ruled against t h e m in a land dispute. T h e procession is h e a d e d by t w o m e n carrying a coffin m a r k e d w i t h a d e a t h ' s h e a d a n d the judge's n a m e . Behind t h e m are several dozen m e n a n d w o m e n , s o m e carrying signs. T h e m e n w i t h the coffin t r y to lead t h e procession up the steps i n t o the g o v e r n m e n t offices. But a w o m a n w a n t s to c o n t i n u e a r o u n d the s q u a r e . T h e procession splits; the coffin-carriers lose initiative, their e m o - t i o n a l energy. A micro-detail t h a t h a m p e r s the w o u l d - b e violence leaders is t h a t they have their h a n d s on an e m p t y coffin, so t h a t they c a n n o t actually s t a r t the a t t a c k themselves w i t h o u t p u t t i n g the coffin d o w n ; their symbolic action d o e s n ' t easily allow r o o m for violent a c t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e the c r o w d ' s c h a n t i n g is raggedy, lacking s t r o n g r h y t h m i c c o o r d i n a t i o n ; s t r o n g ritual solidarity is n o t being generated. W i t h i n a couple of h o u r s , the d e m o n s t r a t i o n h a s dissipated.

This fits the finding of table 6 . 1 (in c h a p t e r 6) t h a t the a t t i t u d e of the audience t o w a r d an incipient fight determines the severity of the fight a n d w h e t h e r it will a b o r t . T h e exception, d o c u m e n t e d in table 6.2, is t h a t if the g r o u p t h a t w a n t e d t o f i g h t w a s larger t h a n f i v e o r m o r e , i t could ignore an a m b i v a l e n t c r o w d ; in effect, g r o u p s of this size p r o v i d e their o w n a u d i - ence s u p p o r t . H e n c e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of militant clusters of m o d e r a t e size; it is w h e n these clusters are formed w i t h i n a larger c r o w d , t h a t the a m b i v a - lence of the c r o w d a n d its n o r m a l a n t i p a t h y to a c t u a l violence is over- c o m e . T h e c r o w d splits u p , a n d the small g r o u p s go i n t o a c t i o n . This is the dispersion in space t h a t we see in the a t t a c k p h o t o s , a n d in the little clusters of four or five activists w h o seek d o w n an ever smaller fragment of the enemy to pile on w i t h u n e q u a l n u m b e r s (as we h a v e seen in the p h o t o s in c h a p t e r 3).

In s u m , w h a t does the rest of the c r o w d do t h a t the violent few need for their action? Every segment or layer of the c r o w d c o n t r i b u t e s s o m e - t h i n g . T h e m o s t actively and competently violent get their i m m e d i a t e e m o - t i o n a l s u p p o r t from a little cluster a r o u n d t h e m . Some of the support cluster are also violent, b u t it a p p e a r s t h a t they spend m u c h , or p e r h a p s all, of their time m a k i n g noise a n d p r o v i d i n g e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t . T h e y are e m o t i o n providers for the a p e x of the violent few w h o go i n t o action against t h e enemy; this is so even in the cases of standoffs w h e r e the action is so far merely p r o v o c a t i v e gestures. T h e n comes the middle mass of the crowd, like-minded as to goals, s o m e w h a t less e m o t i o n a l l y energized, less confident, u n a b l e to t a k e the initiative. This n o m i n a l l y violent majority gives a sense to the leading edge t h a t o t h e r s will back them u p , give a

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weight of n u m b e r s t h a t will help o v e r a w e the enemy once the m o m e n t u m is flowing. Finally, even the back rows—those w h o w a t c h from a safe distance, hugging the s i d e w a l k s — p r o v i d e s o m e t h i n g . " It is p e r h a p s just on the level of the buzz t h a t one gets from being in a c r o w d on a big city street, or an unfocused s t r e a m of concert-goers or sports s p e c t a t o r s on their w a y to the u p c o m i n g event. Even the m o s t c o w a r d l y a n d n o n - c o m - mittal p a r t of a c r o w d provides s o m e t h i n g : the a t t e n t i o n space. T h o u g h all they do is look, they look all in the same direction, with w a v e r i n g interest as it may be; w h e n s o m e t h i n g exciting h a p p e n s , their eyes are riveted on the e v e n t . 1 4 Bringing up the rear are individual demonstrative extremists, w h o usually a p p e a r after the violence is over; it is unclear w h a t segment of the c r o w d they emerged from before then.

Sometimes the s u p p o r t of the c r o w d for the militant few is explicit and conscious. In a d e m o n s t r a t i o n by death penalty p r o t e s t e r s , when s o m e of the g r o u p were a b o u t to c o m m i t civil disobedience and be a r r e s t e d — t h e nonviolent equivalent of the activist violent few—the o t h e r d e m o n s t r a t o r s intensified their e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t . "People in c r o w d whispered to each o t h e r : 'Yell a n d you'll help keep t h e m focused.' And the c r o w d got louder [as protesters were a r r e s t e d ] " (Summers-Effler 2 0 0 4 ) .

T h e a p e x of the event is the actions of the violent few. T h e basis of their e m o t i o n a l energy—their confidence, e n t h u s i a s m , initiative, their n o n - passivity—is the successive layers of helpers, c o - p a r t i c i p a n t s , a n d specta- tors a r o u n d t h e m . T h e layers of the c r o w d arc like a giant c o n e , quasi- visible in their a r r a n g e m e n t in space, a n d a l m o s t literally m a k i n g up a giant s o u n d c h a m b e r t h a t intensifies noise t o w a r d the center; these layers of h u m a n a t t e n t i o n shape the energy t h a t makes possible the c o n f r o n t a - tion at its focal p o i n t . ' s T h e c r o w d in the standoff p h a s e provides the tension b u i l d u p . If circumstances (usually some sign of w e a k n e s s on the o p p o s i n g side) release this into action, it is n o w small clusters w h o are energized into violence. These violent few could n o t be launched w i t h o u t the prior c o n c e n t r a t i o n of e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n by the c r o w d .

V I O L E N C E W I T H O U T A U D I E N C E S : P R O F E S S I O N A L K I L L E R S A N D C L A N D E S T I N E V I O L E N C E

Since 1 have argued t h a t violence is energized by a p p r o p r i a t i n g the center of a t t e n t i o n in an e m o t i o n a l l y aroused g r o u p , I m u s t deal with the a p p a r - ent exception: highly c o m p e t e n t solitary violence, w i t h o u t audiences. T h e best evidence comes from professional c o n t r a c t killers."'

T h e m o s t typical technique is a clandestine quick-hit. T h e killer w a i t s in his car for the victim to arrive at some h a b i t u a l spot, preferably on a d a r k street w i t h o u t passersby; he then rapidly a p p r o a c h e s a n d s h o o t s as

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soon as the victim is getting in or o u t of his car. Or the victim is lured to a meeting place, a n d is shot as soon as he enters the door. Or he a n s w e r s the front d o o r a n d is immediately shot. Professional killers prefer to get the victim isolated, a n d also prefer to w o r k a l o n e . This is a w a y to mini- mize witnesses a n d reduce chances t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n will get to the police either from bystanders or from accomplices w h o m i g h t become snitches. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , it is a w a y of keeping every p r o c e d u r e in the h i t m a n ' s o w n h a n d s . T h i s enables h i m t o b e a b s o r b e d i n his o w n techniques a n d e m o t i o n a l m a n i p u l a t i o n s , avoiding side-entanglements t h a t m i g h t dimin- ish the cool self-absorption t h a t is t h e key to his success.

These kinds of hits r e q u i r e considerable p l a n n i n g . T h e h i t m a n m u s t be given i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the victim's r o u t i n e s , or he acquires it himself by tailing a n d s t a k i n g - o u t ; often he takes p a i n s to c o r r o b o r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n from his employers. He m a y s p e n d days in choosing possible sites, w o r k - ing o u t the details, a n d testing his e q u i p m e n t . T h e r e is often a long p e r i o d of clandestine activity, w h a t the l a w a n d the media refer to as cold- b l o o d e d calculation. It is precisely t h e technical details t h a t allow the e m o - t i o n a l d e t a c h m e n t ; the h i t m a n is a b s o r b e d in a series of small t a s k s t h a t he carries o u t in s c r u p u l o u s detail. His m i n d is n o t on the victim as a h u m a n being, n o r on the e m o t i o n a l aspects of the c o m i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Some h i t m e n prefer n o t t o k n o w w h a t t h e victim allegedly did, w h a t w a s the offense or r e a s o n for the hit; it is purely a technical matter, n o t involv- ing their o w n e m o t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 1 '

Some executions are less well p l a n n e d , generally because t h e victim is w a r y o r h a r d t o find. Professionally n e t w o r k e d criminals w h o k n o w t h e r e is a c o n t r a c t o u t m a y find a s u d d e n o p p o r t u n i t y w h e n they are notified t h a t the victim is in a p a r t i c u l a r place, such as a r e s t a u r a n t , or t h a t his car h a s been sighted outside a g a m b l i n g spot. But the a c t u a l t e c h n i q u e is usually the same, w a i t i n g for h i m to c o m e o u t alone, getting very close to h i m unseen, a n d firing immediately w h e n in r a n g e . If t h e victim c a n n o t be isolated, a different tactic m a y be used. W i t h i n f o r m a t i o n as to w h e r e the victim is seated in a r e s t a u r a n t , the h i t m a n enters, a p p r o a c h e s sud- denly, a n d fires immediately; or he m a y m a k e his w a y to the b a t h r o o m (if it is to t h e rear of the target) a n d u p o n r e t u r n i n g s h o o t h i m in the back o f t h e h e a d . O n e h i t m a n c o m m e n t e d t h a t a l t h o u g h h e w o u l d n o r m a l l y use a silencer, so t h e s h o t m a d e an i n n o c u o u s "pffttt," for a hit in a restau- r a n t full of p e o p l e he w o u l d use a large, loud pistol. T h e explosion w o u l d send these p o t e n t i a l witnesses diving for cover; it w o u l d also create confu- sion in w h i c h it w a s easy to escape (Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 5 7 ) . He also played on the psychological p a t t e r n t h a t having m a n y witnesses w o u l d result in a wide variety of descriptions, m a k i n g h i m impossible to identify.

Professional killers, as if a w a r e of the difficulties of firing accurately, prefer to o p e r a t e at e x t r e m e close r a n g e , often t h r e e feet or less. This

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closeness m a k e s for a severe challenge to o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l ten- sion; w h i c h is o n e r e a s o n w h y professional killers prefer to fire into t h e back of the h e a d w h e n possible. Even m o r e imp o rtan tly , the suddenness of the a t t a c k minimizes any i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n t r a i n m e n t . T h e killer suddenly confronts the victim; t h e r e is no o p p o r t u n i t y to speak or even to ex ch an g e expressions. T h e quick-hit is n o t only a w a y of getting the j u m p on the victim, m a k i n g h i m m o m e n t a r i l y incapable to resisting; it is also a w a y of avoiding t h e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l p r o b l e m s the h i t m a n m i g h t h a v e w i t h his o w n e m o t i o n s . 1 8 In s u m , b o t h the clandestine p h a s e of p r e p a r a t i o n , a n d the suddenness of t h e a t t a c k , serve to o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear.

Some professional c o n t r a c t killings, nevertheless, do involve p r o l o n g e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h the victim. T h e victim m a y be forced into a car a n d driven to a r e m o t e location to be killed; or lured to a s u p p o s e d meeting, s u r r o u n d e d by a c a r l o a d of c o m p a n i o n s w h o t u r n o u t to be his execution- ers. H o w do killers o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension in these cases? Their chief technique a p p e a r s to be to t r y to k e e p the victim calm, to lull h i m i n t o believing he m a y n o t be killed. This subterfuge is n o t just a w a y of keeping the victim u n d e r c o n t r o l ; it is also a w a y of keeping the killer calm, u p h o l d i n g the pretense for himself as well t h a t he is n o t a b o u t to kill s o m e o n e . T h e pretense t h a t there is no violence in t h e offing is a Goff- m a n i a n frontstage, b u t one t h a t is e m o t i o n a l l y contrived for the sake of the p e r f o r m e r as well as t h e victim. W h e n the killing finally h a p p e n s , it is a b r u p t , following as m u c h as possible the p a t t e r n of clandestine n o r m a l c y suddenly b r o k e n by a brief episode of v i o l e n c e . 1 9

A second factor comes into play here; in m o s t instances of p r o l o n g e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n w h e r e interactional detail is available, we find a g r o u p of a b d u c t o r s s u r r o u n d i n g a single victim. T h e killers get g r o u p s u p p o r t , t h u s d e p a r t i n g from t h e p r o b l e m of solitary violence t h a t I h a v e been con- cerned w i t h h e r e . This is even m o r e clearly t h e case in t h e r a r e instances w h e r e c o n t r a c t killers t o r t u r e a victim before killing him; this is usually d o n e in o r d e r to send a message, express revenge, or terrify an o p p o s i n g g r o u p . T o r t u r i n g builds c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension to its height, w h e r e a s his usual techniques minimize it in a tiny w i n d o w in time. It a p p e a r s t h a t t o r t u r e is virtually always carried o u t by g r o u p s , a n d the g r o u p e m o t i o n a l d y n a m i c is at t h e center of the p r o c e s s . 2 0

T h e techniques of being a successful h i t m a n are psychological a n d inter- a c t i o n a l . H e n c e , professional killers are often of m e d i u m size or even smaller, a n d n o t necessarily very s t r o n g . 2 1 T h i s is n o t simply because they always use g u n s ; all of t h e m began as d o m i n a n t fighters. Such fights t o o k place a m o n g youthful c o m p a t r i o t s , in p r o t e c t i n g o n e ' s turf in criminal businesses, or in p r i s o n ; all the h i t m e n in my sources w e r e p r o u d of their r e p u t a t i o n s for never b a c k i n g a w a y from a fight, a n d d o i n g w h a t e v e r necessary to w i n . Some s t a r t e d by building a r e p e r t o i r e of dirty fighting

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tactics; or by psychological tricks such as smiling a n d acting deceptively passive until l a u n c h i n g a s u d d e n assault (Mujstain a n d Capeci 1 9 9 3 ) . "Joey," w h o started his u n d e r w o r l d career as a fifteen-year-old n u m b e r s r u n n e r on a street c o r n e r in N e w York City, r e s p o n d e d to three bigger y o u t h s w h o d e m a n d e d a percentage of his t a k e , by going i n t o a n e a r b y store, getting a baseball bat, a n d , w i t h o u t saying a w o r d , launching a s u d d e n a t t a c k t h a t b r o k e m a n y bones (Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 11). " M a d D o g Sulli- v a n " perfected the t e c h n i q u e of digging a t h u m b i n t o the c o r n e r of an o p p o n e n t ' s eye socket a n d p o p p i n g o u t his eye (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 2 7 6 ) . In the n o r m a l r o u n d s of h a n d fighting a m o n g a c o m m u n i t y of t o u g h guys, these individuals developed psychological techniques a n d interactional tactics t h a t p u t everyone else on the defensive. T h e y became specialists in t a k i n g the violent initiative, a n d w i t h such s u d d e n n e s s , deter- m i n a t i o n , a n d ruthlessness t h a t others gave w a y t o t h e m .

H i t m e n m a k e themselves experts i n e m o t i o n m a n a g e m e n t , b o t h their o w n a n d o t h e r s ' . T h e r e are t w o aspects o f this, s h o r t - r u n a n d m e d i u m - r u n . In m i c r o - s i t u a t i o n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t h e h i t m a n is cool in execution. He is acutely a w a r e of the victim's e m o t i o n s ; if he h a s to confront h i m face to face, he notices signs of fear—eyes, glistening s w e a t , t r e m b l i n g h a n d s . C o n c e n t r a t i n g on these technical details, he averts e n t r a i n m e n t , the u s u a l barrier of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension. Tony the Greek, a g o o d o b - server of p r i s o n g a n g fights in the h e a t of t h e action, c o m m e n t s on the distinctive smell of tension a n d fear c o m i n g from their massed bodies (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 1 2 5 , 1 3 3 ) ( r e m a r k a b l y similar t o the SWAT officer q u o t e d in c h a p t e r 10, p. 3 7 8 ) . 2 2

F o r t h e m o s t p a r t , t h e h i t m a n tries t o get t h e j u m p o n his victim, a v o i d i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n entirely; b u t this i s n o t a l w a y s p o s s i b l e , a n d s o m e t i m e s a h i t m a n c o n t r a c t s to t a k e o u t a very difficult o p p o n e n t , even a n o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e d h i t m a n . " J o e y " sizes u p t h e relative degree o f t o u g h n e s s of his o p p o n e n t ; o n e w h o is merely in t h e business of i n t i m i d a - t i o n , t a l k i n g r o u g h l y a n d m a k i n g a show, o r using muscle ag ain st w e a k e r victims, is n o t w h a t J o e y c o n s i d e r s m u c h of an o p p o n e n t , even if t h e latter is w a r y a n d has a g u n . "I w a s n ' t really w o r r i e d . As long as I w a s q u i c k h e w o u l d never get t o use it. P e o p l e w h o d o n ' t n o r m a l l y h a n d l e g u n s are r e l u c t a n t to s h o o t at all. A n d if y o u ' v e never killed a m a n y o u ' r e really g o i n g t o t a k e s o m e t i m e t o t h i n k a b o u t i t before pulling t h e trigger. I k n e w t h a t n o m a t t e r h o w s c a r e d Squillante w a s , w h e n h e s a w i t w a s m e a p p r o a c h i n g t h e car, he w o u l d h e s i t a t e for a slight m o m e n t . . . . W h i l e he w a s t h i n k i n g a b o u t i t I w o u l d kill h i m . " I t t u r n s o u t t h a t a l t h o u g h his victim is p o i n t i n g a g u n at h i m , he acts like he is in a daze. J o e y calms h i m w i t h his s m o o t h m a n n e r a n d t a l k s h i m i n t o driving t o a n o t h e r s p o t ; w h e n J o e y f i n a l l y pulls his o w n g u n , t h e victim freezes u p c o m p l e t e l y (Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 1 6 9 - 7 0 , 1 9 3 , 1 9 9 ) .

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Figure 11.9 Contract Killers. Above: "Mad Dog" Sullivan, in chains, facing murder charges (1982). AP/World Wide Photos. Right: Joey Gallo, trigger man in killing of Mafia boss Albert Anastasia (1957). AP/World Wide Photos.

T h e h i t m a n i s n o t w i t h o u t e m o t i o n s , b u t h e m a n a g e s t h e m . W a i t i n g in a m b u s h as t h e time a p p r o a c h e s for a killing, Joey feels e x c i t e m e n t a n d a sense of p o w e r b u i l d i n g u p : " T h e a d r e n a l i n e just flowed right t h r o u g h my w h o l e body, p u t t i n g me in a super-sensitive s t a t e . I w a s a t t u n e d to everything. . . . I could h e a r s o u n d s t h e average p e r s o n c a n ' t h e a r a n d

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t h a t o r d i n a r i l y I c o u l d n ' t hear. T h e r e is a p o i n t at w h i c h t h i n k i n g ceases a n d m o v e m e n t a n d r e a c t i o n begins. I w a s b u i l d i n g t o w a r d t h a t p o i n t " (Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 1 7 9 ) . After a glitch delays t h e h i t , he n o t e s , "I h a d lost t h e killing e m o t i o n , I w a s r e l a x i n g . N o w , a s w e g o t closer t o t h e r e s t a u r a n t , I s t a r t e d letting it b u i l d up inside m e . " He s t a r e s at a s p o t on t h e v i c t i m ' s h e a d t h a t will be his t a r g e t ; checks on his silencer, a n d l o o k s for a d a r k place to p a r k t h e car. J u s t before he fires, he says, " 'So long, J o e , ' a n d t h e w o r d s s o u n d e d t r e m e n d o u s l y l o u d " (Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 1 9 9 ) . T h i s h e i g h t e n e d a u d i t o r y " t u n n e l " i s t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n o n d o c u m e n t e d i n c h a p t e r 1 0 by police s h o o t e r s , w h o vividly n o t i c e a t i n y detail at t h e m o m e n t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

S o m e h i t m e n feel fear, especially w h e n it is a d a n g e r o u s hit ag ain st a n o t h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l . T h i s is chiefly fear of failure, a n d fear of a difficult c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Tony t h e G r e e k e x p l a i n s , " I h a d r e a c h e d t h e t o p o f m y profession as a c o n t r a c t killer . . . receiving r e s p e c t from t h e crime fami- lies; a n d b o n e - d e e p I w a s afraid of losing it all, a g u a r a n t e e d d e n o u e m e n t if only o n c e I h e s i t a t e d , lost my n e r v e , or just p l a i n fucked u p . Every t i m e I w e n t on a j o b I h a d to p s y c h e myself u p , w h i p my m i n d a n d guts i n t o a n i n t e r n a l frenzy." H e i s familiar w i t h t h e e m o t i o n a l s e q u e n c e , a n d uses it to w o r k up fear of e n e m y i n t o a n g e r at enemy, giving himself m o m e n t u m t o m o v e f o r w a r d . J u s t before t h e a t t a c k h e uses i n t e r n a l dia- logue to tell himself: " You have the advantage. . . . You got the offense, Greek. Take him. Calm and fast" (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 9 - 1 0 ) .

A n o t h e r t e c h n i q u e is a l l o w i n g a small a m o u n t of fear from t h e i m m e - d i a t e s i t u a t i o n i n t o o n e ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e n using i t t o p r o v o k e a n g e r against t h e s o u r c e of fear. " J o e y " recalls t h a t early in his career, he w e n t t h r o u g h a n i n n e r d i a l o g u e i n w h i c h h e p o r t r a y e d t h e m a n h e h a d t a k e n a c o n t r a c t to kill, as just as liable to kill h i m if their p o s i t i o n s w e r e reversed (Fisher 2 0 0 2 ) . T h i s i s also a n e x t r e m e l y c o m m o n p a t t e r n for police w h o a r e involved in s h o o t i n g s ; in m o s t of t h e cases in A r t w o h l a n d C h r i s - t e n s e n (1997) a n d Klinger (2004) w h e r e subjective detail is given, t h e officer tells himself t h a t his t a r g e t h a s t h r e a t e n e d to kill o t h e r officers or civilians (see t h e incidents q u o t e d in c h a p t e r 1 0 , pages 3 7 8 - 8 0 ) . T h i s is virtually a c o n s t a n t in police s h o o t - o u t s in r e c e n t d e c a d e s ; t h e s h o o t e r h a s a belief ( w h a t e v e r its source m a y be) t h a t his o p p o n e n t h a s v o w e d t o " t a k e s o m e o t h e r s w i t h h i m " a s h e goes d o w n . T h i s m a y well b e e m o t i o n a l s e l f - m a n i p u l a t i o n , n o t merely t o p u t t h e officer m o r a l l y i n t h e r i g h t b u t to call up a b u r s t of anger, w h i c h impels h i m i n t o a c t i o n . In effect this is i n o c u l a t i n g oneself w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d dose of h o t frenzy in a n o t h e r w i s e cool t e c h n i c a l a p p r o a c h .

Some h i t m e n use a n g e r as a t o o l . J o e y G a l l o , a Mafia " m u s c l e " i n t i m - i d a t o r a n d h i t m a n , p r a c t i c e d m a k i n g frightening faces i n t h e m i r r o r ; w h e n h e b e a t u p s o m e o n e , h e w o r k e d himself i n t o a frenzy o f h a t e t h a t m a d e t h e b e a t i n g p r o l o n g e d a n d vicious. " J o e y , " i n c o n t r a s t , declares

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he h a d lost t h e c a p a c i t y to h a t e d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of his career ( p e r h a p s because o f his specialization i n c l a n d e s t i n e hits a n d lures). " M a d D o g " Sullivan g o t his n i c k n a m e from his style of w o r k i n g up e x t r e m e r a g e in his face a t t h e m o m e n t h e a t t a c k e d his victim; o r d i n a r i l y h e w a s p o l i t e , soft-spoken, a n d c o u l d m a n i p u l a t e p e o p l e calmly. H e w o u l d deliberately recall h u m i l i a t i n g c h i l d h o o d events to get himself i n t o t h e m o o d for a p a i d killing. H i s m e t i c u l o u s t e c h n i q u e followed u p s h o o t i n g b y c u t t i n g t h e t h r o a t t o m a k e sure his victim w a s d e a d , since bullets are s o m e t i m e s ineffective; since he forced himself i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r l y g r u e s o m e f o r m o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n , w h i c h o t h e r cool killers a v o i d , h e n e e d e d t o d r a w o n a d d i t i o n a l e m o t i o n a l force t o c a r r y t h r o u g h his r o u t i n e t o its c o n c l u s i o n . (Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 1 9 8 ; H o f f m a n a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 9 7 , 2 7 5 ) . 2 3

T h e e m o t i o n a l coolness o f the h i t m a n also s h o w s u p i n the i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h of a killing. H a v i n g k e p t his a d r e n a l i n a r o u s a l w i t h i n a c o n - t r o l l e d r a n g e , he has no need to w o r k it off in b o i s t e r o u s a n d w i l d b e h a v - ior (unlike Lt. C a p u t o , i n c h a p t e r 3). N o r does h e engage i n r e c r i m i n a - t i o n s ; h e c a n g o h o m e a n d get a g o o d n i g h t ' s s l e e p , 2 4 c o m f o r t a b l y p r e t e n d i n g to his wife t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is r o u t i n e ; or dress to a t t e n d a w e d d i n g r e c e p t i o n . In p a r t this is b e c a u s e he follows a psychologically self-supportive post-killing r o u t i n e . H e i s a b s o r b e d i n t e c h n i c a l m a t t e r s : b r e a k i n g a p a r t his g u n a n d silencer, disposing of t h e pieces w h e r e t h e y c a n n o t be f o u n d (e.g., Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 2 0 6 ) ; even d i s p o s i n g of t h e d e a d b o d y (if t h a t is t h e p l a n ) fills his a t t e n t i o n w i t h r o u t i n e skilled activity t h a t t r a n s i t i o n s h i m e m o t i o n a l l y b a c k t o n o r m a l c y .

H o w a b o d y is d i s p o s e d of is r e g a r d e d by t h e p u b l i c as further evidence of t h e m o r a l l y disgusting or d e r a n g e d c h a r a c t e r of p r o f e s s i o n a l killers. N e v e r t h e l e s s , if o n e a p p r o a c h e s this as p a r t of t h e sociology of w o r k — just the a t t i t u d e t h a t such killers t a k e — t h i s is m e r e l y a m a t t e r of t e c h n i - cal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A killer m a y leave t h e b o d y e x p o s e d , especially w h e n it is i n t e n d e d to send a m e s s a g e — t h r e a t e n i n g o t h e r s , publicizing p u n i s h - m e n t for o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m a l f e a s a n c e , o r d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r m o b boss is d e a d . Alternatively, as a r a t i o n a l p l a n to m i n i m i z e risk of d e t e c t i o n , t h e b o d y m a y b e d i s p o s e d of. T h r o u g h a c c u m u l a t e d experi- ence, killers h a v e f o u n d t h a t b u r y i n g a b o d y u n d e r a c o n s t r u c t i o n site will usually l e a d to d e t e c t i o n b e c a u s e of the smell if t h e b o d y is n o t d e c o m p o s e d w i t h lime; similarly a b o d y d u m p e d in a river will float to t h e surface if t h e lungs are n o t p u n c t u r e d . Some of t h e g r u e s o m e aspects o f t h e post-k i l l i ng r o u t i n e c o m e from s o p h i s t i c a t i o n a b o u t these p r o - cesses. T h e D e M e o crew, w h i c h w o r k e d i n B r o o k l y n d u r i n g t h e 1 9 7 0 s a n d 1 9 8 0 s , killing b e t w e e n seventy-five a n d t w o h u n d r e d v i c t i m s , devel- o p e d a t e c h n i q u e of c u t t i n g bodies to pieces a n d d i s p o s i n g of t h e m sepa- rately ( M u s t a i n a n d C a p e c i 1 9 9 3 : 2 2 2 - 2 3 ) . T h e y evolved refined tech- n i q u e s such as t h e g u n m a n w r a p p i n g himself in a t o w e l to a v o i d b l o o d

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splashing from t h e original hit; s t a b b i n g t h e h e a r t r e p e a t e d l y t o k e e p i t from p u m p i n g b l o o d a n d t h u s m a k i n g a mess t o b e c l e a n e d u p ; a n d w a i t i n g for a l m o s t a n h o u r for t h e b l o o d t o c o n g e a l before d i s m e m b e r i n g t h e body, again to m i n i m i z e m e s s . T w o of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e s i x - m a n c r e w h a p p e n e d t o h a v e been t r a i n e d a s b u t c h e r s , w h i c h gave t h e m t h e initial a p p r o a c h (for a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of a b u t c h e r - t u r n e d - h i t m a n w h o d i s m e m b e r e d his b o d i e s , see H o f f m a n a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 2 4 0 ) . All these t e c h n i q u e s gave t h e m a r a t h e r horrific r e p u t a t i o n , w h i c h m a d e t h e m a s t a n d o u t even w i t h i n t h e Mafia families to w h i c h t h e y w e r e loosely affil- i a t e d . But I w o u l d a r g u e t h e r e w e r e n o n e w a n d special e m o t i o n s in- volved i n their post-killing b e h a v i o r ; all this w o r k seemed t o k e e p t h e m m e t h o d i c a l a n d c a l m , paralleling o t h e r successful, h i g h - v o l u m e h i t m e n . T h e D e M e o c r e w w a s u n u s u a l chiefly b e c a u s e it did all their killing as a g r o u p activity, u n l i k e t h e o t h e r h i t m e n w h o preferred w h e n possible t o w o r k a l o n e . It is likely t h a t this g r o u p s u p p o r t is w h a t m a d e it possible for t h e m t o m a i n t a i n their cold p r o f e s s i o n a l a t t i t u d e i n t h e g r u e s o m e w o r k o f d i s m e m b e r i n g b o d i e s , w h e r e a s t h e m o r e individualistic h i t m e n preferred t o leave their victims e x p o s e d , o r t o h a v e o t h e r s c a r r y o u t t h e d i s p o s i n g . " J o e y , " w h o c a r r i e d o u t thirty-five c o n t r a c t killings o n his o w n , said t h a t h e did n o t like funerals o r d e a d b o d i e s (Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 8).

T h e h i t m a n ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t l o n g - t e r m e m o t i o n i s p r i d e . S o m e t i m e s this involves a degree of e x h i l a r a t i o n ; b u t n o t the wild c e l e b r a t i o n s f o u n d in m a n y o t h e r k i n d s of violence, s u c h as military c a r o u s i n g a n d s p o r t s violence. F o r s o m e h i t m e n , this is a feeling of mild b u t c o n t r o l l e d e x c i t e m e n t , b o t h from t h e a d v e n t u r e o f t h e killing episode a n d from t h e sense of d o m i n a n c e . T h i s is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i n s t a n c e of b u i l d i n g up e m o t i o n a l energy t h r o u g h d o m i n a n c e over EE-losing victims. " J o e y " s t a t e s , " O n c e y o u ' v e e x p e r i e n c e d h o w q u i c k a n d easy it is [to kill s o m e - o n e ] , t h e n t h e r e is a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g to it. . . . You begin to t h i n k of yourself in a different way. You feel y o u are s o m e h o w p r o t e c t e d , t h a t n o t h i n g c a n ever go w r o n g , t h a t y o u a r e a very special p e r s o n . T h i s is a w o n d e r f u l feeling i f y o u k n o w h o w t o use i t " (Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 3 4 ) . H e goes o n t o e x p l a i n t h a t this self-confidence, w h i c h applies t o t h e m o m e n t o f t h e killing itself, s h o u l d n o t u n d e r m i n e his c o m m i t m e n t t o p l a n n i n g a n d p r e p a r i n g every detail b e f o r e h a n d . H i t m e n a p p e a r t o b e a t t r a c t e d t o their calling, n o t merely because of the money, b u t because of t h e a c t i o n a n d s t a t u s . " J o e y , " w h o is t h e m o s t self-controlled of the h i t m e n in my collection, c o m m e n t s t h a t legitimate business i s b o r i n g t o h i m , a n d even his n o r m a l c r i m i n a l activities (chiefly g a m b l i n g , l o a n s h a r k i n g , a n d their enforcement) are t o o r o u t i n e w i t h o u t the o c c a s i o n a l hit (Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 4 8 , 1 0 6 ; similarly, H o f f m a n a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 2 1 4 ) .

A b o v e all, h i t m e n h a v e p r i d e in their t e c h n i q u e , especially in their c l a n d e s t i n e skills. M y i n f o r m a n t , like " J o e y " (Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 7 0 ) , w e n t o n

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at length a b o u t t h e ability to lead a d o u b l e life: to live as an a p p a r e n t l y average citizen w i t h a j o b a n d family, while h i d i n g a w a y large a m o u n t s of illegally m a d e funds. He t o l d stories of t h e h e r o e s of his p r o f e s s i o n , assassins w h o c o u l d p e n e t r a t e a n y security by their use of disguise, a n d w h o c o u l d w a l k a w a y from a hit b y t r i c k i n g g u a r d s w i t h their a p l o m b . We m a y call this t h e a t t r a c t i o n of c l a n d e s t i n e e x c i t e m e n t . 2 i Similarly, s o m e a r m e d r o b b e r s w i t h a high identification w i t h their t r a d e described a split b e t w e e n their n o r m a l lives r e s e m b l i n g t h a t of the m o s t c l a n d e s t i n e c o n t r a c t killers: " O u t s i d e , I ' m a quiet m a n , a g o o d neighbor. . . . T h e r e are different rules of e n g a g e m e n t w h e n I ' m at w o r k . I ' m never involved in violence o u t s i d e a w o r k c o n t e x t . H o w e v e r , at w o r k , I've a l w a y s been very v i o l e n t . " A n o t h e r said, " [ a r m e d r o b b e r y ] is no big deal. It's just like going o u t t o d o a d a y ' s w o r k a n d c o m i n g h o m e i n the evening t o t h e wife a n d k i d s " ( M o r r i s o n a n d O ' D o n n e l l 1 9 9 4 : 6 8 ) .

M y i n f o r m a n t , w h e n a s k e d h o w s o m e o n e m i g h t c a r r y o u t a killing i n a r e s t a u r a n t , t o l d me he w o u l d p u t his pistol w i t h a silencer u n d e r a n a p k i n , get u p t o g o t h e b a t h r o o m , w a l k a r o u n d b e h i n d m y chair, s h o o t m e i n t h e b a c k o f t h e h e a d , a n d t h e n just k e e p o n w a l k i n g n o r m a l l y , n o t l o o k i n g b a c k , right o u t t h e door. Stealth, n o r m a l a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d a p l o m b in k e e p i n g up t h e front: this w a s t h e chief s o u r c e of p r o f e s s i o n a l p r i d e . H e n c e t h e p e r s o n a l i t i e s o f h i t m e n , a l t h o u g h v a r i e d , s h o w some c o m m o n t r a i t s . T h e y a r e h a r d w o r k i n g , c o n s c i e n t i o u s , a n d m e t i c u l o u s a b o u t details, at least as these a p p l y to their profession. Some of t h e m are quiet a n d r e s t r a i n e d , even s o m e w h a t p u r i t a n i c a l ; o t h e r s s p e n d their free time in the a c t i o n - s e e k i n g h e d o n i s m of u n d e r w o r l d life, v a r i o u s l y involved in g a m b l i n g , d r u g s , a n d c o m m e r c i a l sex. My collection of hit- m e n w e r e intelligent a n d articulate; 2 * 5 in this respect t h e y r e s e m b l e the m o s t violent police, described earlier. T h e y are g o o d a t w h a t t h e y are d o i n g , h a v i n g risen to t h e t o p of a very c o m p e t i t i v e profession.

To p u l l t h e a r g u m e n t t o g e t h e r : I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t t h e basic p r o c e s s by w h i c h a v i o l e n t elite is c o n s t r u c t e d is by d r a w i n g on t h e e m o t i o n a l s u p - p o r t of t h e s u r r o u n d i n g g r o u p . H o w is this d o n e , if t h e violent elite oper- ates alone? P a r t of t h e a n s w e r is t h a t these killers h a v e m a s t e r e d tech- n i q u e s o f c l a n d e s t i n e p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d post-k illin g c o v e r u p s t h a t t a k e u p their a t t e n t i o n a n d a v o i d dwelling o n t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; t h a t they generally act s u d d e n l y t o m i n i m i z e t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l m o m e n t ; a n d t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s of their m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l skills give t h e m confi- dence a n d coolness even in t h o s e o c c a s i o n s w h e n c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a victim is p r o l o n g e d .

T h e r e is also a larger social c o n d i t i o n in the b a c k g r o u n d . C o n t r a c t killers h a v e a r e p u t a t i o n in the c r i m i n a l c o m m u n i t y . In p a r t , this is their r e p u t a t i o n for efficiency a n d reliability; it also has a m o r a l d i m e n s i o n , s t r a n g e as this m a y s o u n d from the p o i n t of view of c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l -

D o m i n a n c e i n A t t e n t i o n S p a c e • 4 3 9

ity. Both " J o e y " a n d Tony t h e Greek m a k e a p o i n t of e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t they are completely h o n e s t in c a r r y i n g o u t c o n t r a c t s . If they t a k e t h e money, they will carry t h r o u g h the killing. Since their job is frequently t o police c r i m i n a l b u s i n e s s m e n ' s employees o r clients w h o are stealing from their bosses or e v a d i n g d e b t s , the h i t m a n needs a r e p u t a t i o n as s o m e o n e w h o o p e r a t e s strictly within the rules of t h e c r i m i n a l business. In a d d i t i o n , he takes pride in keeping up his r e p u t a t i o n for never in- forming to t h e police; in r e t u r n , he e x p e c t s to be backed up with legal a n d illegal help if he gets c a u g h t . Such a h i t m a n has a g o o d professional r e p u t a t i o n , which brings him n o t only m u c h c o n t r a c t w o r k , b u t also respect. He is t h u s an elite in several respects c o m p o u n d e d . He is the t o u g h e s t of the t o u g h , h o l d i n g o u t agai ns t the police a n d rival t o u g h g u y s . He is also the m o s t skilled in the hierarchy of violence; n o t just n o m i n a l l y or actively but c o m p e t e n t l y v i o l e n t . 2 7

A l t h o u g h the h i t m a n usually o p e r a t e s o u t of sight a n d w i t h o u t i m m e - d i a t e social s u p p o r t , t h e r e is a c o m m u n i t y in the b a c k g r o u n d in which he is k n o w n a n d respected. His n a m e is n o t widely k n o w n , b u t is m o r e in the n a t u r e of special k n o w l e d g e a m o n g the c o g n o s c e n t i . T h i s g e n e r a t e s a special kind of r e p u t a t i o n a l p r i d e , possible only in a c o m m u n i t y struc- t u r e d by h i e r a r c h i c layers of secrecy a n d prestige. H i t m e n a c q u i r e their greatest e m i n e n c e , a n d w i t h it their g r e a t e s t degree of specialization a n d skill, w h e n crime is highly o r g a n i z e d as an u n d e r g r o u n d g o v e r n m e n t . 2 8

A l t h o u g h he lacks the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d prestige of o r g a n i z e d crime fami- lies with their r a n k i n g s of bosses a n d u n d c r b o s s e s , he is free of their o b l i g a t i o n s (such as being on call, a n d passing a l o n g a p e r c e n t a g e of his t a k e ) . H e i s m o r e prestigious t h a n mere " m u s c l e , " a n d t h a n o r d i n a r y mafia soldiers, even t h o u g h the latter do o c c a s i o n a l killings. His first killing has given him a r e p u t a t i o n ; as he is a p p r o a c h e d for m o r e jobs, a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y m o r e difficult o n e s , his p e r f o r m a n c e has b r o u g h t him to t h e t o p of the s t a t u s hierarchy. He r e p r e s e n t s , so to s p e a k , the prestige of p u r e violent c o m p e t e n c e and its a c c o m p a n y i n g professional s t a n - d a r d s , unalloyed by the o t h e r duties defining o t h e r criminal roles.

" I had become t h a t m o s t envied c r i m i n a l , a c o l d - b l o o d e d hit m a n , a n d daily I s a w my n e w f o u n d s t a t u s reflected in the deferent, fearful eyes of o t h e r s . " Tony the Greek defines himself in c o n t r a s t to lesser forms of violence: " I ' m n o t referring t o bullies, d i m - w i t t e d , slow-footed behe- m o t h s able to scare the shit o u t of s o m e elder l o a n - s h a r k victim, but guys w h o w o n ' t back d o w n from a n y b o d y . W h o w o n ' t run a w a y d u r i n g a s h o o t o u t . Panic driving a g e t a w a y car. W h o can kill a n d get a w a y with it" (Hoffman and H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 5 1 , 9 1 ; see also 1 3 , .103. " J o e y " describes similar experiences a n d a t t i t u d e s in Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 4 8 - 4 9 . See also Dietz 1 9 8 3 : 7 7 ) .

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T h e y also l o o k d o w n w i t h s c o r n o n m e r e a m a t e u r killers, " t h e hysteri- cally a n g r y ones s h o o t i n g their wives a n d like t h a t " a s well a s o r d i n a r y h o o d l u m s (Fisher 2 0 0 3 : 3 3 ) . T h e r e is a further h i e r a r c h y a m o n g profes- sional h i t m e n . T h o s e w h o w o r k for o r g a n i z e d crime generally will n o t t a k e c o n t r a c t s from " c i v i l i a n s , " u n c o n n e c t e d citizens w h o w a n t t o kill a s p o u s e o r collect i n s u r a n c e m o n e y (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 1 9 4 ; Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 5 0 - 5 2 ) . J o e y a n d T o n y e x p l a i n their r a t i o n a l e : civilians are t o o u n r e l i a b l e , t o o easily i n t i m i d a t e d b y t h e police, likely t o i n c r i m i n a t e their c o n t r a c t e e s . T h e s e k i n d s of j o b s are t a k e n by l o w - e n d p r o f e s s i o n a l killers; t h e y get p a i d less: on t h e o r d e r of $ 5 , 0 0 0 for l o w e n d , c o m p a r e d t o $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 o r m o r e a t t h e h i g h e n d , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e p e r s o n t o b e killed; i n c o n t r a s t , m e r e " m u s c l e " m i g h t g o o n salary, o r b e p a i d $ 2 5 0 for a n e p i s o d e ) . H e r e t h e m o n e y symbolizes r a n k , a s m u c h as it p a y s for h i g h e r - q u a l i t y service. Differences in r a n k are p a r a l l e l e d by differences in density of social s t r u c t u r e . L o w - e n d h i t m e n , like unaf- filiated criminals generally, m a k e social c o n n e c t i o n s in a r a n d o m , hit-or- miss fashion; t h e y h a v e m u c h less access t o g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t their victim's behavior, a n d their c o n t a c t s easily b e c o m e i n f o r m a n t s for t h e police (e.g., M a g i d a 2 0 0 3 ) . T h e c o r e n e t w o r k s o f o r g a n i z e d crime h a v e m u c h m o r e dense surveillance of each o t h e r ; this m a k e s it possible b o t h to find a g o o d h i t m a n w h e n o n e w a n t s his services, a n d it m a k e s h i m m o r e efficient in c a r r y i n g o u t his t a s k s (since he is generally killing per- sons w i t h k n o w n r o u t i n e s in crime businesses). T h e h i t m a n is a r e p u t a - t i o n a l elite, in a milieu acutely t u n e d to m o n i t o r i n g each other. In this larger sense, a l t h o u g h t h e elite h i t m a n kills a l o n e , he is o p e r a t i n g in a social c o m m u n i t y w h o s e respect he cares a b o u t . H i s elite i d e n t i t y is very m u c h a p a r t of his p e r s o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s as he goes a b o u t his c l a n d e s - tine w o r k . 2 9

C O N F R O N T A T I O N - M I N I M I Z I N G T E R R O R I S T T A C T I C S

If we classify violent actors by their m e t h o d s a n d n o t by their m o t i v a t i o n s a n d ideologies, we find t h a t a p r o m i n e n t variety of terrorists resemble professional h i t m e n . T h e r e is a particularly close fit w i t h suicide b o m b e r s , w h o m a i n t a i n a clandestine a p p r o a c h all the w a y up to the i n s t a n t of their a t t a c k ; like h i t m e n , they use a pretense of n o r m a l c y to p e n e t r a t e defenses a n d get very close to their victims, so t h a t the a t t a c k is highly reliable a n d does n o t miss its target as so often h a p p e n s given the n o r m a l i n c o m p e - tence of m o s t violence. Both use the tactic of s u d d e n , c o n f r o n t a t i o n - minimizing a t t a c k s on u n a w a r e victims. T h e tactic n o t only m a k e s for effective violence; it also gives psychological s u p p o r t to the killer. In de- ceiving others, one also deceives oneself; the clandestine killer does n o t

Dominance in Attention Space • 4 4 1

a p p r o a c h as if it were a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , in a m o o d of anger a n d tension, b u t in a m o o d of r o u t i n e n o t h i n g - u n u s u a l - i s - h a p p e n i n g - h e r e . T h e profes- sional killer is just an o r d i n a r y passerby, t h e terrorist is just a s u b w a y rider or a s h o p p e r w i t h a b a g — u n t i l the last m o m e n t w h e n t h e g u n is pulled o u t , t h e b o m b is left behind, or the d e t o n a t o r is pressed. C o n f r o n t a - tion is minimized n o t just by t h e clandestine a p p r o a c h , b u t by confining violence to a tiny w i n d o w in time. T h e h i t m a n ideally s h o o t s the victim in the b a c k of the h e a d as s o o n as he gets o u t of his car; if all goes well, there is n o t even a m o m e n t of eye c o n t a c t . Suicide b o m b e r s carry this psychological a d v a n t a g e to the e x t r e m e , since they never h a v e a m o m e n t w h e n t h e y confront a n o t h e r p e r s o n in o p e n recognition of a n t a g o n i s m . This is a specialized tactic for circumventing the barrier of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n a n d fear t h a t all violence m u s t s u r m o u n t ; a n d a particularly useful tactic for a sole attacker, acting alone a n d t h u s w i t h o u t the s u p p o r t or pressure of an audience t h a t gives m o s t violent individuals their e m o t i o n a l energy at the m o m e n t of a t t a c k .

T h e r e is, of c o u r s e , a m u c h w i d e r variety of t e r r o r i s t s as t h e t e r m is c o m m o n l y used, even confining it to o p p o s i t i o n a l or i n s u r g e n t t e r r o r i s t s a n d e x c l u d i n g s h o c k m e t h o d s used b y s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s t a r g e t i n g n o n - c o m b a t a n t s . 3 0 A l t h o u g h all of t h e m h a v e a p e r i o d of c l a n d e s t i n e p r e p a r a - t i o n a n d a p p r o a c h t o t h e t a r g e t , t h e y differ i n h o w m u c h c o n f r o n t a t i o n t a k e s place o n c e t h e a t t a c k is s p r u n g : at o n e e n d of t h e c o n t i n u u m are p r o l o n g e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n s such a s hijacking, h o s t a g e - t a k i n g , a n d kid- n a p p i n g , especially if they involve i n t i m i d a t i o n a n d t o r t u r e . These con- f r o n t a t i o n a l tactics are virtually a l w a y s c a r r i e d o u t by small g r o u p s act- ing in c o n c e r t , n o t only because they need the m a n p o w e r , b u t also because they use g r o u p e m o t i o n a l solidarity t o o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a - tional t e n s i o n ; they c a n n o t rely on the deception-plus-self-deception t h a t no violence is going on here. Suicide b o m b i n g s are at the e x t r e m e o p p o - site of the c o n t i n u u m , psychologically the easiest to carry o u t as far as c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n is c o n c e r n e d since t h e r e is not even a need to c o n c e r n oneself w i t h facing an a u d i e n c e while m a k i n g an escape after- w a r d . Also a t this end o f t h e c o n t i n u u m are r e m o t e - d e t o n a t e d b o m b s a n d b o o b y - t r a p s (like the r o a d s i d e devices c a u s i n g a large p e r c e n t a g e of casualties i n Iraq from 2 0 0 4 o n w a r d [ w w w : i C a s u a l t i e s . o r g l ) , a l t h o u g h they are less reliable if t h e r e is no h u m a n a c t o r on the s p o t m a k i n g sure the w e a p o n is right on its t a r g e t . "

Also near the c o n f r o n t a t i o n - m i n i m i z i n g end are m a n y targeted assassi- n a t i o n s , in which a p a r t i c u l a r individual is s o u g h t o u t — r a t h e r t h a n an accidental collection of civilians from the target g r o u p ; they often use the tactic of clandestine a p p r o a c h a n d s u d d e n c o n f r o n t a t i o n - m i n i m i z i n g a t t a c k ; these latter are virtually identical w i t h hitman t a c t i c s . 1 2

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M o s t research o n terrorists has c o n c e n t r a t e d o n their ideologies a n d motives, a n d m o r e recently o n their n e t w o r k s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l struc- t u r e s o f r e c r u i t m e n t , t r a i n i n g , a n d s u p p o r t (Sageman 2 0 0 4 ; G a m b e t t a 2 0 0 5 ; Pape 2 0 0 5 ; Davis 2 0 0 3 ; Stern 2 0 0 3 ; Geifman 1 9 9 3 ) . Relatively little is k n o w n on t h e m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l d y n a m i c s of h o w terrorists m a n - age t o confront their victims. But n o m a t t e r h o w ideologically c o m m i t t e d w o u l d - b e terrorists ar e, a n d h o w s t r o n g their s u p p o r t n e t w o r k , t h e y can- n o t be successful if they c a n n o t o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear.

Consider this question: w h a t goes t h r o u g h t h e m i n d s of clandestine terrorists in the m o m e n t s leading up to the attack? W o u l d we expect their internal dialogue to be s o m e t h i n g like: " Allah-u-akbarl D e a t h to the infi- dels! Revenge on the Jews w h o destroyed my refugee camp/killed my b r o t h e r / e t c . " ? On m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l g r o u n d s , I suggest t h a t this k i n d of internal dialogue w o u l d m a k e it difficult to k e e p up t h e pretense of n o r - malcy t h a t m a k e s t h e clandestine a p p r o a c h successful. Internal dialogue o f this s o r t w o u l d t e n d t o w o r k u p e m o t i o n s t h a t w o u l d leak i n t o o n e ' s facial expression, p o s t u r e s , a n d m o v e m e n t s ; it w o u l d n o t only m a k e it h a r d e r to avoid detection, b u t also h a r d e r to keep oneself ready for the t a s k a h e a d . Instead, t a k i n g a clue from w h a t we k n o w of the m e n t a l p r o - cesses of h i t m e n , I suggest t h a t the t e r r o r i s t ' s t h o u g h t s focus on keeping oneself calm a n d n o r m a l i z e d .

Some micro-evidence bearing on this p o i n t are p h o t o g r a p h s of suicide b o m b e r s , t o g e t h e r w i t h witness a c c o u n t s a n d bits of dialogue. First, t w o p h o t o s of female suicide b o m b e r s in t h e Palestinian intifada. O n e p h o t o is t a k e n from an ideological video m a d e shortly before the a t t a c k (April 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , R e u t e r s , n o t s h o w n here); her face is completely s m o o t h , ex- pressionless; no vertical w r i n k l e s between the e y e b r o w s n o r tense eye- lids a n d h a r d - s t a r i n g eyes expressing anger; no center-forehead w r i n k l e s , raised e y e b r o w s , a n d gasping m o u t h of fear (cf. E k m a n a n d Friesen 1 9 7 5 : 6 3 , 95-96); no h a r d - s e t m o u t h of d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d effort such as we see in t h e previous riot p h o t o s a b o v e (e.g., figure 11.8). H e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l stance is expressed entirely in her costume—head-scarf, checkered s h a w l — a n d i n t h e Q u r a n t h a t she holds i n her h a n d — a c o s t u m e t h a t she did n o t w e a r d u r i n g the a t t a c k . T h e second p h o t o (figure 11.10) is an eighteen-year-old w o m a n in Western dress, a p o r t r a i t m a d e for her family shortly before she died; again her face is completely b l a n d , n o t smiling, b u t s h o w i n g no signs of anger, fear, or d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; like t h e other w o m a n , poker-faced ( M a r c h 3 0 , 2 0 0 2 , Associated Press).

T h e i r last h o u r s are d o u b l y clandestine, hiding their intent n o t only from enemy a u t h o r i t i e s b u t also from their o w n families a n d a c q u a i n - t a n c e s . T h e eighteen-year-old talks w i t h her fiancee the evening before a b o u t finishing high school a n d getting m a r r i e d in t h e summer. T h e n e x t m o r n i n g o n her w a y t o meet the driver w h o w o u l d t a k e her t o t h e Israeli

Dominance in Attention Space • 443

Figure 11.10 Suicide bomber poses for photo shortly before attack. Her emotion- less face is part of the clandestine, confrontation-avoiding approach (March 2002). AP/World Wide Photos.

s u p e r m a r k e t w h e r e she w o u l d d e t o n a t e her b o m b , she passes a female classmate, says " H i , " a n d keeps on w a l k i n g . T h e driver says she m a d e chitchat w i t h h i m in the car, l o o k i n g c a l m w i t h the b o m b in a s h o u l d e r b a g at her feet. Five m i n u t e s before letting her o u t of t h e car, the driver asked if she w a n t e d to b a c k out; she said n o , she w a s n o t afraid, t h a t she

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w a n t e d to kill p e o p l e , t h a t she w a s r e a d y to die. Five m i n u t e s later her b o m b h a d killed herself, a y o u n g Israeli w o m a n , a n d a security g u a r d (Los Angeles Times, J u n e 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 ) .

A t h i r d w o m a n bomber, interviewed by a r e p o r t e r before h e r a t t a c k , says t h a t " y o u d o n ' t t h i n k a b o u t t h e explosive belt o r a b o u t y o u r b o d y being r i p p e d t o p i e c e s " (USA Today, April 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . A l ) . T h e r e p o r t e r says she seems n e r v o u s a b o u t the interview, b u t exchanges giggling pleas- antries w i t h t w o Palestinian w o m e n w h o greet her a s she enters t h e r o o m ; in c o n t r a s t , her escort is a grim-faced male b o d y g u a r d . T h e w o m e n b o m b - ers seem calmer, m o r e n o r m a l i z e d , t h a n t h e ideologists w h o will n o t actu- ally carry o u t the n o n - c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a t t a c k . Terrorist o r g a n i z a t i o n s se- lect their operatives on t h e basis of calm a n d m a t u r e personalities, rejecting m a n y applicants b o t h in the intifada a n d in such o r g a n i z a t i o n s as the a l - Q a e d a t r a i n i n g c a m p s (Sageman 2 0 0 4 ) .

N o t all clandestine-attack terrorists m a k e it all the w a y t h r o u g h ; some u n k n o w n p r o p o r t i o n d r o p o u t a t t h e last m i n u t e . T h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d Palestinian driver tells of delivering a twenty-year-old w o m a n to t h e vicin- ity of a c r o w d e d p e d e s t r i a n mall; fifteen m i n u t e s later she used her h a n d - held r a d i o to tell the driver to come pick her u p , begging a n d pleading, "I w a n t to go b a c k h o m e . Get m e " (Los Angeles Times, J u n e 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 ) . W h a t shift in her e m o t i o n s a n d interior dialogue could h a v e b r o u g h t this a b o u t ? C o u l d it be t h a t her t h o u g h t s drifted to her h o m e instead of staying on t h e n o r m a l r o u t i n e of p r e t e n d i n g to be a s h o p p e r ? 3 3

A n o t h e r set of p h o t o s of clandestine terrorists in action are from secu- rity c a m e r a s in t h e L o n d o n b o m b i n g s of L o n d o n s u b w a y cars a n d buses in July 2 0 0 5 . O n e p h o t o (figure 11.11) s h o w s all four b o m b e r s in the July 7 p l o t as they enter a t r a i n s t a t i o n on their w a y to L o n d o n , carrying their b o m b s i n b a c k p a c k s (July 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 , Scotland Yard). T h e four m e n are w i t h i n a few feet of each other, b u t they give off no Goffmanian tie signs of being together; they m a k e no eye c o n t a c t a n d h a v e no c o m m o n focus of a t t e n t i o n , eyes l o o k i n g d o w n or a w a y from o n e a n o t h e r as if w i t h - d r a w n i n t o themselves. L o o k i n g at each o t h e r w o u l d r e m i n d t h e m of their mission a n d a d d a layer of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action t h a t belies their clandes- tine a p p r o a c h ; n o t so m u c h t h a t they are c o n c e r n e d at this p o i n t in giving themselves a w a y t o outsiders (there are n o o t h e r p e o p l e i n the p h o t o a n d the a t t a c k is still an h o u r away) b u t because they need to c o n c e n t r a t e on their o w n sense of normalcy, the e m o t i o n a l self-deception necessary for their o w n calm. It is h a r d e r for a g r o u p to be clandestine w h e n acting in concert t h a n for a n individual, since any c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a m o n g t h e m also c a r r y a p e n u m b r a of their h i d d e n a g e n d a . 3 4

Closeups of t h r e e of the m e n , m a d e later after they h a v e split u p , s h o w very slight e m o t i o n , n o n e of it expressing anger or d e t e r m i n a t i o n . O n e

Dominance in Attention Space • 445

Figure 11.11 Four suicide bombers beginning their mission. They do not look at each other, and show no tie-signs, as if absorbed into themselves. Photo taken ninety minutes before bombing of London underground (July 2005). AP/World Wide Photos.

m a n has a t i g h t - m o u t h smile, n o t t h e s p o n t a n e o u s smile t h a t m a k e s crow's-feet wrinkles at t h e o u t e r corners of the eyes; a n o t h e r h a s a slight e y e b r o w raise a n d central b r o w - f u r r o w , a slight expression of fear, his lower face expressionless, his eyes p e r h a p s v a c a n t ; a t h i r d m a n ' s face is completely b l a n k (July 2 0 , 2 0 0 5 , Scotland Yard, n o t s h o w n , cf. E k m a n a n d Friesen 1 9 7 5 : 1 1 2 , 6 3 ) . Six m o r e individual p h o t o s s h o w a n o t h e r set of four m e n w h o failed in a similar s u b w a y - a n d - b u s c o o r d i n a t e d b o m b i n g t w o weeks later, w h e n their b o m b s s m o l d e r e d r a t h e r t h a n e x p l o d e d (July 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 , Scotland Yard). T h e faces of t h r e e of t h e m look b l a n d , u n e x - pressive, their b r o w s u n f u r r o w e d ; their m o u t h s closed, l o o k i n g p e r h a p s a little sad. N o n e looks at t h e o t h e r passengers visible in the t r a i n or bus cars, b u t they all l o o k d o w n at the floor or up at the t o p of t h e wall (see f i g u r e 1 1 . 1 2 ) . T h e fourth, going d o w n t h e p a s s a g e w a y w i t h his b a c k p a c k on his back, looks b a c k over his shoulder, as if apprehensive (his b r o w a n d forehead h i d d e n by a cap). This f o u r t h individual w a s s p o k e n to by a passenger just after he h a d been k n o c k e d d o w n by t h e abortive e x p l o - sion; he w a s described as l o o k i n g confused, dazed, s h a k e n , b u t t h e n he j u m p e d d o w n o n t o t h e t r a c k s a n d r a n . A later p h o t o of h i m on a v a c a n t

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b u s , having m a d e his escape, s h o w s his face again expressionless, his eye- lids half-shut, a slight f u r r o w (fear?) across his forehead. O n e of the others is p h o t o g r a p h e d r u n n i n g up a v a c a n t s u b w a y c o r r i d o r after t h e failed a t t a c k , m o u t h s h u t or nearly s o , face still unexpressive. Altogether, the p h o t o s are consistent w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t their cognitive tactic is to be w i t h d r a w n into themselves, n o t t h i n k i n g of a n y t h i n g except the n a r r o w e s t practical exigencies. Depression, a little leakage of fear—these are n o t surprising for p e r s o n s going into a deadly c o n f r o n t a t i o n while avoiding all t h o u g h t of it. Even after t h e a t t a c k s fail, they a p p e a r very l o w in affect, relying m o r e on clandestine expressionlessness t h a n on s t r o n g e m o t i o n s of aggressiveness a n d exertion.

In o n e case the suicide b o m b e r expresses anger, b u t it is an e x c e p t i o n t h a t proves the rule. A y o u n g m a n gathers a c r o w d at an Iraqi a r m y r e - cruiting s t a t i o n by m a k i n g a l o u d speech, angrily d e n o u n c i n g u n e m p l o y - m e n t a n d c o r r u p t i o n ; he t h e n sets off a b o m b t h a t kills himself a n d t w e n t y - t w o listeners a n d injures forty-three (Los Angeles Times, July 1 1 , 2 0 0 5 ) . H e r e the b o m b e r is using the expression of anger for i n s t r u m e n t a l p u r p o s e s , to m a s k his t r u e target a n d to bring his victims up close to kill t h e m m o r e reliably. His underlying m o t i v a t i o n m a y well be anger, b u t it is m a s k e d by a n o t h e r layer of anger p u t on as a p e r f o r m a n c e . H i s back- stage anger is h i d d e n by a p e r f o r m a n c e of frontstage anger. 3 3

In the great majority of clandestine a t t a c k s , on the contrary, backstage anger is sealed off a long w a y back in time; as the a t t a c k a p p r o a c h e s , such terrorists p r e p a r e themselves by closing d o w n their e m o t i o n s , n u m b i n g themselves, using a near trance-like b l a n d n e s s as their tactic a n d their psychological defense. 3 6 Witnesses of suicide b o m b e r s just before their a t t a c k s have often r e m a r k e d on their dazed or trance-like a p p e a r a n c e ( M e r a r i 1 9 9 8 ; G a m b e t t a 2 0 0 5 : 2 7 5 , citing a conference p r e s e n t a t i o n by M e r a r i ) . It is the t e c h n i q u e of e m o t i o n a l self-control t h a t is the key to the success of c o n f r o n t a t i o n - m i n i m i z i n g clandestine a t t a c k s . 3 7

In an i m p o r t a n t sense, t h e history of terrorist a t t a c k s , since the first r o u n d o f b o m b i n g s i n t h e 1 8 8 0 s , h a s d e p e n d e d u p o n the creation a n d diffusion of c o n f r o n t a t i o n - m i n i m i z i n g techniques of a t t a c k . 3 8 W h a t has been a d o p t e d is n o t just the t e c h n o l o g y of h o w to m a k e b o m b s a n d d e t o - n a t o r s b u t a m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l technology. It is a social technology t h a t has m a d e it possible for ideologically m o t i v a t e d t e r r o r i s m to be carried o u t b y middle-class w o m e n a n d m e n w i t h o u t b a c k g r o u n d s i n o r d i n a r y b o i s t e r o u s or criminal violence. As a generalization, the m o r e clandestine a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n - a v o i d i n g the t e c h n i q u e of violence, the m o r e its p r a c - titioners are from the respectable m i d d l e class, a n d indeed from its n o n - b o i s t e r o u s , well-behaved sector. 3 9 Terrorist b o m b i n g is, so to speak, the violence of the meek.

Dominance in Attention Space • 447

Figure 11.12 Suicide bomber escaping after a failed attack. He looks away from other subway passengers, gazing expressionlessly at the top of the wall (London, July 2005). AP/World Wide Photos.

448 • Chapter 11

V I O L E N T N I C H E S I N C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L A T T E N T I O N S P A C E

W h e r e v e r we t u r n , in every kind of violence, there is a small n u m b e r of p e r s o n s w h o p r o d u c e m o s t of the violence. We could conceive this as a collection of individual processes. T h e violent few are t h o s e w h o h a v e a c q u i r e d the techniques for being violent in p a r t i c u l a r kinds of situations. I h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t successful violence is m o r e in t h e style of dealing w i t h other p e o p l e in a c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a n in h a n d l i n g w e a p o n s per se; a b o v e all in dealing w i t h o n e ' s o w n e m o t i o n s a n d t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of o t h e r people's e m o t i o n s , b o t h s u p p o r t e r s a n d victims. W h y c a n ' t every- one learn these techniques, a n d become p a r t of the violent elite? T h i s is the a p p r o a c h of c o m b a t psychologists ( G r o s s m a n 2 0 0 4 ) a n d the aim of military a n d police t r a i n e r s , t o t u r n non-fighters into fig h ters. T h e same w o u l d apply to every o t h e r k i n d of violence: if the techniques became well e n o u g h k n o w n , p r e s u m a b l y everyone w h o w a n t e d t o could become a h i t m a n , a terrorist, a n d so forth.

I am arguing t h a t this is n o t possible. These interactional techniques u n q u e s t i o n a b l y exist, a n d can b e u n d e r s t o o d , t a u g h t , a n d acquired. T h e y are n o t simply i n n a t e predispositions; a p r i m a l genetic capacity to be angry or aggressive is a long w a y from being c o m p e t e n t l y violent, espe- cially given the w i d e r a n g e of specialized types of violent interaction we have e x a m i n e d . But the limit on the n u m b e r s of those actively violent, a n d especially on those w h o are c o m p e t e n t l y violent, is so w i d e s p r e a d across different kinds of situations t h a t we m u s t conclude we are dealing w i t h a feature of i n t e r a c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , n o t a feature of individuals. As sociologists, w e t u r n the gestalt a r o u n d : w h a t a p p e a r s a s the mysterious fact t h a t some individuals have interactional techniques t h a t o t h e r s do n o t h a v e , can be seen as the w a y in w h i c h social interaction w o r k s . T h e r e is a process by w h i c h the violence of the majority is limited, a n d this is the same process by w h i c h t h e violence of a small n u m b e r is g e n e r a t e d . T h e e m o t i o n a l a r o u s a l of the g r o u p in a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l situation flows from some p a r t s of the g r o u p to o t h e r s . T h e collective effervescence of m u t u a l e n t r a i n m e n t is differentiated into an a r r a y of e m o t i o n a l qualities a n d intensities: s o m e p e r s o n s are relatively passive, feeling m o r e tension a n d fear, m o r e reliant on others in t h e g r o u p to set the t o n e a n d t a k e action; others become m o r e p u m p e d w i t h initiative, confidence, a n d en- t h u s i a s m . T h e latter are a relatively small n u m b e r because they are t h e beneficiaries of a focus m e c h a n i s m , w h e r e b y the e m o t i o n a l p o w e r of the g r o u p becomes e m b o d i e d in t h e m .

T h i s is n o t a m e t a p h o r . W h a t I am a r g u i n g can be seen directly as we closely e x a m i n e the m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n a l features of violent interactions, including their s u r r o u n d i n g o n l o o k e r s .

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Violence is an interactional a c c o m p l i s h m e n t in a situation structured by e m o t i o n . T h e m o s t pervasive emotion in situations of violent t h r e a t is confrontational tension/fear. As we have seen t h r o u g h o u t the b o o k , vio- lence is difficult, n o t easy; w h a t e v e r the b a c k g r o u n d conditions may b e — the motives, grievances, h o t h e a d e d feelings, material incentives, or cul- tural ideals—most of the time violent situations a b o r t ; there is bluster, t h r e a t , and c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but m o s t of the time p a r t i c i p a n t s back a w a y with symbolic gestures or at most with brief, untidy and i n c o m p e t e n t violence. For violence to h a p p e n , the situation must present a way for at least some p a r t i c i p a n t s to circumvent c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear.

Such p a t h w a y s can be g r o u p e d into t w o main types: h o t e m o t i o n a l violence and cool technical violence. Usually h o t violence comes from the e m o t i o n a l flow of an assembly w h o s e a t t e n t i o n has become sharply focused, w h e t h e r as c o m p a n i o n s , audience, or a n t a g o n i s t s . The most typi- cal hot emotion is anger; b u t there are other e m o t i o n a l varieties and blends: it might be a b u i l d u p of tension a n d fear suddenly t r a n s f o r m e d into a forward panic; it could also be enthusiastic a n d ebullient emotion of the kind found in c a r o u s i n g , e n t e r t a i n m e n t , a n d athletic s i t u a t i o n s . These are all h o t , high levels of adrenalin a r o u s a l , cycled t h r o u g h the assembly of h u m a n bodies. It is w o r t h repeating t h a t the mere presence of h o t emotion is not e n o u g h for successful violence to occur; the h o t e m o t i o n needs to be configured in such a w a y across the g r o u p so t h a t confrontational tension/fear is o v e r c o m e .

In a n o t h e r category arc the varieties of cool technical violence. H e r e , the violent activists perform techniques by which they m a n a g e their o w n e m o t i o n s a n d t a k e a d v a n t a g e of the e m o t i o n a l weaknesses of their o p p o - n e n t s . And since these categories are ideal types, we can find c o m b i n a t i o n s of h o t a n d cold techniques in particular kinds of violence.

O u r p r o b l e m is to explain why violence is limited to a small n u m b e r of activists a n d c o m p e t e n t elites, first for h o t violence, t h e n for cold technical violence. T h e first is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . G r o u p - l o c a t e d h o t - e m o - tion violence is a massive i n t e r a c t i o n r i t u a l , in which the assembly be- c o m e s e m o t i o n a l l y unified by focusing on a single c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; a n d this p r o v i d e s the feelings of e x c i t e m e n t a n d solidarity t h a t energize a smaller s e g m e n t of fighters. T h e t r a n s i t i o n to violence is easiest w h e n the c r o w d itself is n o t fighting a n y o n e , b u t a c t i n g only as s u p p o r t i v e spectator, as in s p o r t s a n d convivial or c e l e b r a t o r y a u d i e n c e s w h o t r e a t fights as e n t e r t a i n m e n t . Similarly w i t h staged fights a m o n g hero-elites: the latter h a v e the peculiarity, as in many species of d u e l s , t h a t the fight- ers themselves m a y n o t h a v e h o t e m o t i o n s , but they are forced into f i g h t - ing by the e m o t i o n a l p r e s s u r e of the c r o w d , a n d by pride in m a i n t a i n i n g their s t a n d i n g . T h e s e kinds of s p e c t a t o r s - s u r r o u n d i n g - f i g h t e r s a r r a n g e - m e n t s c o m m o n l y t a k e the form of a unified ring of s p e c t a t o r s w h o help

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t h e fighters o v e r c o m e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear; t h e e m o t i o n a l s u p - p o r t flows i n w a r d to the few at t h e center.

T h e p r o b l e m of overcoming c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear is h a r d e r w h e n the larger g r o u p itself becomes a p a r t i c i p a n t in the violence—even if this is only n o m i n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , n o t really doing m u c h , b u t nevertheless t a k - ing up a stance of confronting a real o p p o n e n t w h o m i g h t engage t h e m . Sometimes the c r o w d has an easy o p p o r t u n i t y , as w h e n an a u t h o r i t y - free z o n e is created, a n d the c r o w d can engage in rioting against inert physical emblems of the o t h e r side, such as by looting a n d b u r n i n g . H e r e , t o o , we have seen t h a t the c r o w d is stratified i n t o looting leaders, preex- isting gangs or clusters, a n d , g r a d u a l l y over t i m e , a larger a m a t e u r i s h m a s s of participation-seekers d r a w n by the e m o t i o n a l a t m o s p h e r e ; yet even t h e latter reaches only a b o u t 10 to 15 p e r c e n t of t h e c o m m u n i t y w h o could t a k e p a r t . Similarly in celebration rituals over t h e dead b o d y of an o p p o - n e n t ; the situation is safe from real c o n f r o n t a t i o n , b u t the desecrators of bodies are few, a n d even in these situations t h e r e is a tiny a p e x of the g r o u p w h o b e c o m e d e m o n s t r a t i v e extremists, like t h o s e climbing t h e gird- ers of t h e bridge at Fallujah to hit the bodies t h a t are h a n g i n g t h e r e w i t h t h e sole of a shoe. Even t h e activist c r o w d is u n e q u a l l y energized, w i t h the m a s s confining themselves to gestures.

T h e m o s t widely s h a r e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s w h e n a n entire g r o u p goes i n t o a f o r w a r d p a n i c . H e r e the energy comes from tension/fear of a standoff or chase, s u d d e n l y released w h e n the g r o u p finds it has a w e a k e n e m y w h o has given up the c o n f r o n t a t i o n . We h a v e seen this in the c l i m a x of military battles, in police chases, a n d in t h e typical p a t t e r n of ethnic/com- m u n a l violence. In these cases, the g r o u p is so strongly energized because it uses c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension/fear as its source of a r o u s a l ; t e n s i o n a n d fear are easy e m o t i o n s to a r o u s e , unlike anger in t h e face of a real o p p o - n e n t . This r o u t e is, so to speak, the m o s t n a t u r a l w a y of dealing w i t h a violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n . T h e tension/fear p h a s e of t h e conflict, b e c o m i n g intensified while it r e m a i n s d r a w n - o u t , serves to d r a w t h e g r o u p together e m o t i o n a l l y as long as they m a i n t a i n a tight social o r g a n i z a t i o n a m o n g themselves, r a t h e r t h a n b r e a k i n g off into pieces going in different direc- t i o n s . If t h e enemy suddenly s h o w s a collapse of resistance, t h e e m o t i o n - ally energized a n d unified g r o u p goes i n t o an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e a t t a c k , a frenzy of piling on a n d overkill.

A f o r w a r d p a n i c m i g h t seem to be an e x c e p t i o n to the small n u m b e r s of violent activists, a n d the still smaller n u m b e r of the violently c o m p e t e n t in the sense of successfully destroying the enemy. We lack detailed e n o u g h descriptions to k n o w just h o w w i d e s p r e a d is the p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a for- w a r d p a n i c violence. In police chases, w h e r e we h a v e recordings, a small p r o p o r t i o n of the officers p r e s e n t — r a r e l y a b o v e 20 percent except in very small g r o u p s — a c t o u t the f o r w a r d p a n i c , as if on behalf of t h e larger

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g r o u p . In military f o r w a r d panics, we h a v e less detail; a p p a r e n t l y every- o n e rushes f o r w a r d , a n d large n u m b e r s m a y t a k e p a r t in killing the fallen or cowering e n e m y (like the battlefield at Agincourt) or t o r c h i n g civilian h u t s (as in V i e t n a m ) . But it is unclear h o w m a n y in this situation w e r e effective killers a n d arsonists, a n d h o w m a n y merely r u s h e d a r o u n d , per- h a p s a d d i n g their e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t to t h e scene by yelling. Similarly for ethnic massacres w h e n rioters b r e a k in on demoralized victims. T h e h o t , frenzied e m o t i o n of g r o u p activists a p p e a r s to be widely shared; b u t those w h o do the a c t u a l br eaki ng in a n d killing m a y be different p e r s o n s from t h o s e w h o engage i n ritual d e s t r u c t i o n , while others m a y merely express vocal s u p p o r t . 4 0

If h o t violence is p r o d u c e d by the c r o w d acting as a large focused inter- action ritual, cool technical violence is a cluster of practices t h a t at first glance a p p e a r to be individual. A brief list w o u l d include (1) staying cool in t h e m i d s t of o t h e r p e o p l e ' s h o t e m o t i o n s : being "in the z o n e " while o p p o n e n t s are in the glaze of c o m b a t ; (2) self-absorbed focus on t h e tech- nicalities of o n e ' s w e a p o n s a n d p r o c e d u r e s (e.g., snipers); (3) e m o t i o n a l self-manipulation techniques (e.g., m a k i n g oneself angry by recalling p a s t insults); (4) m a n i p u l a t i n g victims' e m o t i o n s ; (5) clandestine, confronta- tion-minimizing tactics; (6) victim-finding t e c h n i q u e s , such as t h o s e p r a c - ticed by muggers a n d a r m e d r o b b e r s , in m o r e e x t r e m e forms by serial killers a n d serial r a p i s t s ; (7) victim-training techniques, including the long-term relationship b e t w e e n bullies a n d their victims, a n d the form of d o m e s t i c abuse t h a t I have called "terroristic t o r t u r e r e g i m e s . " In s u m , there is a bag of techniques t h a t m a k e up the c o m p e t e n c e of cool technical specialists in violence. T h e theoretical puzzle applies to all of t h e m : w h y is it t h a t the p r a c t i t i o n e r s of these techniques are always a small n u m b e r of t h e n o m i n a l l y violent c o m b a t a n t s , in every a r e n a of conflict?

In the case of h o t frenzied forms of violence, we h a v e already a n s w e r e d the question: the violent elite generally d e p e n d on the e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t of a g r o u p a n d the n a r r o w i n g focus of e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n as the g r o u p distributes violent energy to only a few p e r s o n s . In t h e case of the cool t e c h n i q u e s , however, we m i g h t ask, W h y c a n ' t everyone learn these tech- niques? Individuals could be t r a i n e d to practice b r e a t h i n g techniques to k e e p their a d r e n a l i n in a m i d d l e r a n g e , a n d overlearn their firing responses on a r a n g e so t h a t it becomes a u t o m a t i c in a c o n f r o n t a t i o n ( G r o s s m a n 2 0 0 4 ) ; they c o u l d learn to s h u t o u t the h u m a n aspect of their targets by focusing on calibrating their aim, to keyhole their violence by confronta- t i o n minimizing, or to practice techniques of e m o t i o n m a n a g e m e n t on themselves a n d their victims. Since this is a t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t , imagine psychology courses in colleges, or m o n t h - l o n g c o m m e r c i a l t r a i n i n g semi- n a r s , in w h i c h instead of a n g e r - m a n a g e m e n t or touchy-feely e m o t i o n a l expression there are studies a n d drills in h o w to b e c o m e an accomplished

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gun-fighter, a r m e d robber, clandestine c o n f r o n t a t i o n - m i n i m i z i n g killer, victim-finder, a n d so o n . T h e t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t forces us to ask, Is t h e r e an u p p e r limit to h o w m a n y people could become violent e x p e r t s ? 4 1

My a r g u m e n t is t h a t there is an u p p e r limit to such n u m b e r s . Even if m o r e people h a d the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to learn these techniques, the fluctua- tion w o u l d stay within a range; the ceiling w o u l d still be a r o u n d 10 per- cent or less of any given g r o u p of the nominally violent becoming c o m p e - tently violent. I will give first a theoretical analogy, and then p r o p o s e m e c h a n i s m s . T h e analogy comes from the w o r l d of intellectuals. T h r o u g h o u t w o r l d history the n u m b e r of n o t a b l e p h i l o s o p h e r s , in any generation w h e n there is any intellectual action t h a t achieves i m p o r t a n c e in historical m e m o r y , has a l m o s t always between three a n d six (Collins 1 9 9 8 ) . This " l a w of small n u m b e r s " divides up niches in the attention space t h a t m a k e s up the intellectual c o m m u n i t y . If there are t o o m a n y intellectuals claiming to create i m p o r t a n t new philosophies, some of t h e m fail to find a niche; they a t t r a c t few followers, a n d their historical m e m o r y dies o u t .

Both intellectual a n d violent a t t e n t i o n spaces are structured by conflict. Creativity in the intellectual world consists of saying s o m e t h i n g new; that means n o t only negating w h a t w a s d o n e in the past but also negating the positions of rivals w h o are also struggling to gain recognition. Creativity is driven by conflict; creativity occurs simultaneously in different parts of the field, never in a single isolated upheaval against the past but in rival reformulations of d o m i n a n t c o n c e p t i o n s of k n o w l e d g e . T h e m o s t creative intellectuals are puzzle finders, raising points to argue about, not just puzzle- solvers. Star intellectuals, like the violent elite, m a k e their r e p u t a t i o n s by stirring up t r o u b l e . Instead of backing a w a y from it, as most people do from violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , they seek it o u t , as we have seen with career criminals and hooligans as well as ace pilots a n d c o w b o y c o p s .

Creativity is energized by the attention space. This is stratification of e m o t i o n a l energy, n o t merely possession of superior cultural capital. In intellectual n e t w o r k s the eminent t hi nker s of one generation tend to breed the future eminents of the n e x t g e n e r a t i o n . But star teachers have m a n y s t u d e n t s , a n d those w h o become the m o s t creative do n o t initially differ from m a n y others a r o u n d them in the cultural capital t h a t they receive from their teachers a n d m e n t o r s . But some use their inherited cultural capital m o r e aggressively t h a n o t h e r s . They become w h a t I have called "energy s t a r s , " a personality pattern t h a t emerges as those w h o have ac- quired a successfully exploitable niche in the field t h r o w themselves obses- sively into their w o r k ; they turn o u t a huge volume of p u b l i c a t i o n s , often far m o r e t h a n the segment they become famous for. Subjectively, these intellectual leaders are m o r e self-reliant, able to o p e r a t e in longer periods of isolation from c o m p a n i o n s , absorbed in their o w n w o r k . But they are by no m e a n s isolated from their c o m m u n i t y . They begin their careers in

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t h e core of social n e t w o r k s of the already highly c o m p e t e n t ; they struggle against t h e m o s t c o m p e t e n t rivals of their o w n generation; they are a w a r e of their position in the larger a t t e n t i o n space of the audience t h a t h e a r s a n d r e a d s their w o r k .

W h a t creative intellectuals get from their predecessors is n o t just a stock of culture, b u t also techniques of h o w to t h i n k , h o w to m a k e effective a r g u m e n t s against o p p o n e n t s , h o w t o sense t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s for w h e n to create a n e w t h e o r y or a n e w style. W h a t proteges h a v e a c q u i r e d is their m e n t o r s ' techniques for w i n n i n g battles in the struggle to c o n t r o l t h e a t t e n t i o n space, even if they apply these techniques to n e w s i t u a t i o n s , a n d forge n e w techniques going b e y o n d t h e older ones. Creative intellec- tuals h a v e internalized a sense of the s u r r o u n d i n g intellectual w o r l d a n d its lines of loyalties a n d conflicts; they can t h i n k m o r e rapidly t h a n their c o m p e t i t o r s a n d p u t t o g e t h e r c o m b i n a t i o n s o f ideas t h a t will a p p e a l t o audiences. This a p p a r e n t l y intuitive grasp of the field comes from having deeply internalized t h e ideas a n d techniques of t h i n k i n g t h a t m a r k m e m - bership in v a r i o u s intellectual factions. Their t h i n k i n g is w i t h o u t labori- ousness a n d self-consciousness, because their very process of t h i n k i n g car- ries w i t h it a sense of t h e social p o s i t i o n t h a t they occupy in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r s in the intellectual field. Instead of arguing w i t h o t h e r p e r s o n s , or w i t h a b s t r a c t ideas, they argue w i t h b o t h simultaneously; their t h i n k i n g consists in m a k i n g coalitions in t h e m i n d while picking battles in the m i n d . A n d these coalitions a n d battle-lines confidently t r a n s l a t e i n t o o n - going centers of c o n c e r n in the intellectual c o m m u n i t y . T h e creative elite h a s an a u t o m a t i c , overlearned sense of p o s i t i o n s in the field, b o t h as to w h o their s u p p o r t e r s ar e, as well as their rivals.

T h e violent elite, t o o , s t a r t o u t in the s a m e place as m a n y others w i t h the same cultural b a c k g r o u n d or milieu. Instead of seeing their b a c k g r o u n d as a disability for m a k i n g a career according to m a i n s t r e a m middle- class values, we could view it as cultural capital favoring success in violent a n d criminal careers. But those w h o become the violent elite are n o t t h e only ones w h o c o m e from poverty, t o u g h n e i g h b o r h o o d s , b r o k e n families, a n d so forth. Because we so often sample on the d e p e n d e n t variable, d o i n g o u r research o n those w h o b e c o m e the violent elite, w e miss h o w m a n y in t h e same b a c k g r o u n d h a v e failed to m a k e a success at violence. J u s t as n o t a b l e intellectuals s t a r t e d o u t in n e t w o r k s t h a t give t h e m high cultural capital, the stars of violence s t a r t e d o u t in n e t w o r k s w h e r e they inherited a high level of the culture of violence. T h e q u e s t i o n is w h y s o m e of those w h o s t a r t w i t h this cultural inheritance w i n o u t over others t o b e c o m e t h e elite; they do n o t simply inherit violence, b u t m u s t o u t c o m p e t e others similarly s i t u a t e d . 4 2

A second p o i n t of analogy is t h a t for t h e violent elite, t o o , it takes e m o t i o n a l energy t o build on o n e ' s cultural capital r a t h e r t h a n passively accepting it. In the biographies of h i t m e n we see this e m o t i o n a l e n e r g y 4 3

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building up as they begin to m a k e their w a y in t h e crime w o r l d as y o u n g teenagers. T h e y w i n o u t over rivals w h o t h r e a t e n to m o v e in on their slice of the crime business, small as it is at t h a t p o i n t ; we see o n e picking up a baseball bat t o repel those w h o w a n t t o h o r n i n o n his n u m b e r s racket; a n o t h e r hustling to build up his muscles by o v e r l o a d i n g himself w i t h boxes in his delivery job (Fisher 2 0 0 2 ; M u s t a i n a n d Capeci 1 9 9 3 : 3 0 ) . A l t h o u g h in one sense the violent elite of t h e criminal w o r l d are lazy— they w a n t a s h o r t - c u t to success, they scorn the r o u t i n e of o r d i n a r y j o b s — they are nevertheless a very h a r d - w o r k i n g g r o u p . T h e crime business oper- a t o r has t o m a k e his daily r o u n d s , picking u p his money, checking o n w h o m i g h t b e c h e a t i n g , p u t t i n g i n a n a p p e a r a n c e t o m a k e sure others k n o w h e ' s t h e r e , applying t h r e a t or muscle w h e n needed. Even their off h o u r s in t h e carousing or g a m b l i n g scene are in a sense obligatory; they h a v e to be a r o u n d to keep their h a n d in. Keeping up one's r e p u t a t i o n is a full- time j o b . 4 4 T h u s a l t h o u g h t h e r e m a y be an ideology of " w o r k is for suck- e r s , " w i t h i n the milieu of " w i s e g u y s " a n d their a n a l o g u e s , it is the lazier w h o lose o u t to t h e energetic a n d c o m m i t t e d . Instead of seeing these as individual characteristics, we s houl d grasp t h e p a t t e r n as a social distribu- t i o n of e m o t i o n a l energy.

T h e same is t r u e in o t h e r areas of violence. T h e crime w o r l d m a y be the m o s t m u t u a l l y c u t - t h r o a t ; b u t there are indications of the same p a t t e r n for t h e violent elite a m o n g soldiers, pilots, police, a n d o t h e r s . Ace pilots h a t e desk jobs; their biographies are full of incidents w h e r e they sneak o u t against orders w i t h the i n t e n t i o n to fly. E v e r y w h e r e , the m o s t successful in their b r a n d s of violence are also the m o s t energetic a n d c o m m i t t e d .

T h i r d , t h e r e is an a n a l o g u e to the intellectual stars in their higher level of self-reliance, self-directedness, a n d willingness to go t h r o u g h long peri- ods of isolation. This is clearly illustrated by h i t m e n , e n d u r i n g long h o u r s of staking o u t their victims, c h a r t i n g their m o v e m e n t s , w a i t i n g for an o p e n i n g . M i l i t a r y snipers are the violent e x e m p l a r s of quiet patience p a r excellence. Burglars a n d a r m e d r o b b e r s often o p e r a t e alone, the m o s t ded- icated of t h e m m a n y h u n d r e d s of times; o p e r a t i n g alone does n o t b o t h e r t h e m , a n d a p p a r e n t l y feels c o m f o r t a b l e , even a source of strength. N o t to say t h a t the violent elite are isolates all the time; they also m a y check in o n t h e u s u a l action scenes a n d keep their presence k n o w n a m o n g their peers. But this is a n a l o g o u s to intellectuals; they m a y s p e n d long h o u r s alone writing, b u t also keep c o n t a c t w i t h their professional n e t w o r k . Self- m o t i v a t i o n in isolation is highest a m o n g t h e violent elite, t h o s e w h o are best at t h e cool techniques of violence; t h e less c o m p e t e n t layer of the actively violent, practicing h o t violence in the m i d s t of g r o u p s , have m u c h less of this self-reliant character.

A f o u r t h p o i n t of analogy is the n e t w o r k p a t t e r n . E m i n e n t intellectuals emerge from n e t w o r k s w h e r e the action previously has been, and reorga-

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nize the n e t w o r k for the n e w r o u n d of action in the present. F o r intellectu- als, this dependence u p o n the n e t w o r k has b o t h a vertical a n d a h o r i z o n t a l aspect: the stars of the n e w g e n e r a t i o n t e n d to h a v e teachers a n d m e n t o r s of the creative stars of the last g e n e r a t i o n ; a n d the n e w stars t e n d to start o u t in clusters w h o strike o u t in a n e w direction t o g e t h e r . 4 5

To give just one e x a m p l e : youthful clusters m a k i n g their career moves together a p p e a r t o b e c o m m o n i n gangs, w h e r e they m a k e u p the m o r e serious criminal crews, in c o n t r a s t to others w h o are in the g a n g merely for p r o t e c t i o n or excitement. T h e former often g r a d u a t e to a higher level t h r o u g h a stint in p r i s o n , a place t h a t tests a n d w i n n o w s the youthfully defiant into those w h o are genuinely g o o d at violence a n d c o m m i t t e d to it; this takes place t h r o u g h fights to establish the pecking o r d e r in p r i s o n , which create cliques at the t o p of the local violence hierarchy; a n d these cliques then go on to m o r e s e r i o u s — m o r e competent—violence when they are released. Tony the Greek describes h o w n e t w o r k ties c o n c a t e n a t e into clusters in prison: since he k n e w Irish h o o d s from the West Side of N e w York, he w a s taken into a t o u g h Irish prison gang d u r i n g his first stint in p r i s o n , at age twenty. He describes the prison "class s y s t e m " : " ' g o o d g u y s ' d i d n ' t r a t a n d could t a k e care of themselves in a fight; ' b a d g u y s ' w e r e n ' t violent a n d d i d n ' t k n o w anybody. T h e good guys h a d free rein to beat up a n d e x t o r t the bad g u y s " (Hoffman and Headley 1 9 9 2 : 4 5 ) . At this point in his life, Tony had been a d r u g dealer a n d m u s c l e m a n ; soon after being released from prison he performed his first c o n t r a c t kill- ing. He killed a p i m p on behalf of a p r o s t i t u t e he sold heroin t o ; since she w a s u n d e r the auspices of a Mafia family c a p t a i n , Tony came to be k n o w n in the Genovese family and received further c o n t r a c t s , which he success- fully carried o u t , launching his career. J a n k o w s k i (1991) similarly de- scribes H i s p a n i c and black prison gangs t h a t s u p p o r t and strengthen the gang identities of individuals in prison; w h a t needs to be a d d e d here is a w i n n o w i n g process, w h e r e b y some p e r s o n s gravitate into the a p e x of the n e t w o r k , while others are peripheralized by their lesser c o m p e t e n c e or c o m m i t m e n t t o f i g h t i n g .

Similarly for e m e r g e n t n e t w o r k s . P a r t i c i p a t i n g in the business side of crime gives the o p p o r t u n i t y t o meet p e r s o n s w h o help t a k e o n e ' s violence to a higher level. A u t o theft is low-level, usually n o n v i o l e n t c r i m e , b u t w h e n it becomes regularized a n d repetitive by c o n n e c t i n g to c h o p - s h o p s for stolen p a r t s , an a u t o thief m a y meet a r m e d c r i m i n a l s , a n d these in t u r n m a y c o n n e c t to a Mafia a c q u a i n t a n c e , a n d eventually form a c r e w of c o n t r a c t killers ( M u s t a i n a n d Capeci 1 9 9 3 ) . T h i s kind of analysis poses m a n y empirical a n d analytical p r o b l e m s ; it is n o t merely a m a t t e r of m a k i n g the n e t w o r k c o n t a c t s b u t also w i n n o w i n g t h e m ; only a few w h o have c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h c h o p - s h o p s go on to join a h i t m a n crew.

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H o w t o t h e o r i z e this w i n n o w i n g p r o c e s s i s a crucial p r o b l e m for t h e sociology of violent n e t w o r k s .

E x p e r t s in o n e k i n d of v i o l e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n are n o t necessarily g o o d at o t h e r k i n d s . T h a t is because violent t e c h n i q u e s are in specialized niches; y o u c a n n o t t a k e t h e w h o l e niche w i t h y o u just because y o u h a v e t h e t e c h n i q u e , since this w o u l d m e a n b r i n g i n g a l o n g the s a m e b u i l t - u p r e l a t i o n s h i p s of turf-claiming t h a t existed in o n e ' s p r e v i o u s field. Some h i t m e n h a d c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e , b u t p l a y e d i t safe a t t h e front (Fisher 2 0 0 2 : 12); a n d Mafia soldiers d i s p a r a g e d c o m b a t v e t e r a n s , a p p a r e n t l y o u t of a feeling t h a t a different a t t i t u d e t o w a r d violence is involved ( M u s t a i n a n d Capeci 1 9 9 3 : 2 2 ) . B o t h Tony t h e G r e e k a n d J o e y G a l l o w e r e n o t o r i o u s l y t o u g h m u s c l e m e n a n d h i t m e n , b u t w h e n r i o t s b r o k e o u t in their respective p r i s o n s , n e i t h e r w a s in t h e violent forefront of t h e fighting; b o t h o p e r a t e d coolly in t h e h e a t of t h e r i o t , Tony b e c o m i n g a n e g o t i a t o r w i t h t h e g u a r d s , Joey r e s c u i n g a c a p t u r e d g u a r d a n d t u r n i n g h i m over, t o c u r r y favor for his o w n release (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 1 5 0 - 5 6 ) . T o ironicize a b o u t their a p p a r e n t c o w a r d i c e i n these s i t u a t i o n s w o u l d b e t o i m p o s e o u t s i d e r s ' values u p o n t h e m ; b o t h r e m a i n e d de- t a c h e d a n d t o o k i n d i v i d u a l a d v a n t a g e o f the h e a t e d s i t u a t i o n , w h i c h w a s h o w they h a d m a d e their c a r e e r s .

For the intellectual w o r l d , the n e t w o r k s t r u c t u r e t e n d s t o r e p r o d u c e the p a t t e r n of a small n u m b e r of stars; b o t h because only a few lineages a n d clusters are generated at the center of action, a n d because those at the center de-energize a n d exclude other c o m p e t i t o r s . Analogously, n e t w o r k p a t t e r n s centering a r o u n d the violent elite w o u l d p r o m o t e a small- n u m b e r s p a t t e r n for each t y p e of violence.

We c o m e n o w to the m i c r o - m e c h a n i s m s by w h i c h a small n u m b e r of individuals m a k e themselves the elite, while others w h o start o u t w i t h similar a m b i t i o n s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s d r o p by the w a y s i d e . T h e creative elite builds up e m o t i o n a l energy specific to a p a r t i c u l a r b r a n c h of the intellectual field—philosophers, m a t h e m a t i c i a n s , sociologists, p a i n t e r s , etc.—whatever constitutes itself as a self-enclosed a t t e n t i o n space. W i t h i n this space, t h e r e is c o m p e t i t i o n over a small n u m b e r of niches, positions t h a t can receive recognition. E m o t i o n a l energy in its general form is the sense of e n t h u s i a s m , confidence, a n d initiative; in the case of a b s t r a c t verbal intellectuals, they w o r k w i t h ideas t h a t feel successful (feel like great ideas). T h e y enjoy using their intellectual techniques a n d r e n e w their energy by using t h e m , because those techniques are p a r t of their positions in the field; in using their techniques they are enacting their sense of inter- action w i t h t h e audience they have internalized. In terms of t h e m o d e l of t h i n k i n g I have described in Collins ( 2 0 0 4 : c h a p . 5), these intellectuals are engaged in interna) interaction rituals, loops of e m o t i o n a l self-entrain-

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ment t h a t give them both confidence in w h a t they are d o i n g a n d a sense of their identity in the field of their c o m p e t i t o r s a n d s u p p o r t e r s .

As Chambliss (1989) finds for s w i m m i n g races, w i n n e r s are t h o s e w h o h a v e acquired m i n u t e techniques t h a t they believe give themselves an edge over c o m p e t i t o r s ; t h e r e is a positive feedback l o o p because they identify w i t h these techniques a n d enjoy practicing t h e m . Their dedication to p r a c - ticing n o t only deepens their skills; the very exercise of their skills p u t s t h e m i n t o a special social space, a relationship of eliteness in relation to the rest of t h e field, even w h e n they are ostensibly alone a n d the o p p o n e n t s are merely implicit. Practitioners of such techniques find themselves in a c o c o o n of self-confidence t h a t C h a m b l i s s calls t h e " m u n d a n i t y of excel- lence," a cool a t t i t u d e t h a t o p p o n e n t s mystify to their o w n d e t r i m e n t . Small m a r g i n a l differences in p e r f o r m a n c e become magnified as w i n n e r s become further energized, while losers b e c o m e de-energized. Similarly, some cops practice s h o o t i n g on the range religiously, a n d c o n s t a n t l y r e - m i n d themselves of scenarios in w h i c h they m a y face a life-or-death s h o o t o u t (Klinger 2 0 0 4 : 3 7 - 3 8 , 4 2 , 8 5 ; A r t w o h l a n d Christensen 1 9 9 7 : 6 4 , 150); while others play d o w n b o t h p r e p a r a t i o n a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n . A l t h o u g h we k n o w less a b o u t this for other kinds of violence, some sol- diers e m b r a c e their w e a p o n s t r a i n i n g a n d l o o k for o p p o r t u n i t i e s to use it; others slough it off, some sooner, some later d e p e n d i n g on their chains o f e n c o u n t e r s b o t h w i t h enemies a n d w i t h c o m p a t r i o t s w h o are m o r e strongly or w e a k l y c o m m i t t e d t h a n themselves. Similarly again, to be an accomplished g h e t t o street fighter or a r m e d robber, it is n o t e n o u g h simply to be in the milieu of violence; s o m e w h o start o u t in this a r e n a h o n e their violent skills at every o p p o r t u n i t y , while others settle for occasional t o k e n e n c o u n t e r s t h a t are just e n o u g h t o keep u p their r e p u t a t i o n . H i g h - frequency r o b b e r s a n d burglars (like t h o s e w h o c o m m i t a crime m o r e t h a n once a day) are always keeping their h a n d in a n d their skills u p ; t h o s e w h o are n o t very g o o d at burglary or r o b b e r y risk it less often, a n d are sooner to d r o p o u t . W h a t A n d e r s o n calls the code of the street is a skilled p e r f o r m a n c e for s o m e , m e r e w i n d o w - d r e s s i n g for o t h e r s ; it is the former w h o " g o for street," their identities a n d energies t a k e n over by their p e r f o r m a n c e because it is the m o s t successful t h i n g they d o .

T h e e m o t i o n a l energy of the intellectual elite is c o n t i n u o u s l y being re- built by a positive spiral. Being m o r e energized t h a n others enables t h e m to create forefront p o s i t i o n s before o t h e r s d o ; they get m o r e acclaim, w h i c h in t u r n feeds their self-image, their confidence, a n d their flow of energy to get still further w o r k d o n e . T h e s a m e positive loops generally flow on the m a t e r i a l side as well, w i t h greater ease of access to publica- t i o n s , research e q u i p m e n t , money, a n d jobs t h a t give t h e m t h e time t o devote to their intellectual w o r k , a n d so o n .

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Similar loops flow in a negative direction for t h o s e w h o begin to lag behind the energy leaders. T h e y fail to get recognition; they find t h e m - selves t o o late a n d b e c o m e d i s a p p o i n t e d in their e x p e c t a t i o n s . M a t e r i a l s u p p o r t s fall a w a y as well; s o m e w o u l d - b e intellectuals find they c a n n o t m a k e a living at their v o c a t i o n , just as s o m e w o u l d - b e criminals find their life of crime brings in t o o little i n c o m e . As the distance between t h e m - selves a n d the leaders p a l p a b l y w i d e n s in the r e p u t a t i o n a l field, w o u l d - b e elites face a choice p o i n t : to c o n t i n u e to strive for recognition as a leader while getting s h u n t e d to the side; or to give up their claim for eminence, a n d settle for being a follower of s o m e o n e else's p o s i t i o n . Some lose their e n t h u s i a s m a n d their identity entirely, a n d d r o p o u t of the field. This m o d e l of the intellectual w o r l d explains w h y eminence in violence t o o is limited to a small number, simultaneously by processes t h a t t a k e place in the emergent elite a n d in the emergently failing non-elite.

T h e r e is n o t only a process of emergence b u t also of submergence; a n d the t w o are reciprocals of each other for p e r s o n s in different positions w i t h i n the same a t t e n t i o n space. T h e same holds for the emergence of a violent elite a n d the submergence of those w h o try a n d fail. It is n o t simply a m a t t e r of the elite having learned p a r t i c u l a r kinds of high-performance t e c h n i q u e s . They h a v e learned these techniques in the m i d s t of c o m p e t i - t i o n w i t h o t h e r s ; their e n t h u s i a s m for using their t e c h n i q u e s , a n d engaging in the practice t h a t sustains t h e m , comes from t h e recognition they get from a s u r r o u n d i n g c o m m u n i t y .

R e c o g n i t i o n from the larger c o m m u n i t y , like the acclaim t h a t goes to a famous intellectual, has its c o u n t e r p a r t in c o m m u n i t i e s like the w o r l d of organized crime, w h e r e a few individuals get the respect of being a hit- m a n , others famed for lesser degrees of t o u g h n e s s . In legitimate arenas like the military, there is e n o r m o u s institutionalized acclaim for such indi- viduals as fighter aces; a n d of course athletics is organized centrally a r o u n d publicizing such relative s t a n d i n g s . In all these a r e n a s , t h e ones w h o are at the t o p are energized (and receive t h a t m u c h m o r e subjective sense of high-status identity from c o n c e n t r a t i n g on their techniques), while those w h o fail to crack the a t t e n t i o n space after a p e r i o d of trying b e c o m e demoralized, a n d their techniques d e t e r i o r a t e . 4 6

Similar for recognition t h a t comes from o n e ' s i m m e d i a t e cluster of sup- p o r t e r s . T h e cluster of cops on the SWAT t e a m , or otherwise in t h e fore- front of action-seekers, m a y s t a r t o u t c o m p o s e d entirely of those w h o are energized for c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Nevertheless, in a n y p a r t i c u l a r encounter, a certain few will w o r k at the p o i n t of a t t a c k a n d get the b r u n t of the action. They b e c o m e b o t h even further action-trained, while others fall i n t o a h a b i t of relying on t h e m . Similarly in military c o m b a t , the initially gung- ho eventually find t h a t e m o t i o n a l l y they are c o n t e n t to let s o m e o n e else do it. We lack g o o d detailed evidence of this sort for criminal g r o u p s ; b u t

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it a p p e a r s t h a t in the w o r l d of gangs, it is those w h o are seeking admission i n t o t h e gang, a n d to m o v e up in its h i e r a r c h y of prestige, w h o are m o s t likely to be involved in fights ( J a n k o w s k y 1 9 9 1 ) . O n c e they have p r o v e n themselves, m a n y rest on their r e p u t a t i o n s . T h e u p p e r limits of the l a w of small n u m b e r s asserts itself, w i n n o w i n g o u t even t h o s e w h o h a v e initially staked their career trajectories a n d their idealized self-images on t h e m o d e l of the violent elite.

T h e e m o t i o n a l energy a n d the techniques of t h e violent elite are b o t h built u p a n d w o r n d o w n b y being tested. I n any violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t h e r e is a w i n n e r a n d a loser; or else t h e r e is a standoff. Of these t h r e e alternatives, the only one t h a t certainly m a i n t a i n s o n e ' s u p w a r d spiral of e m o t i o n a l energy as a violent elite is w i n n i n g . It m i g h t seem t h a t once y o u have a c q u i r e d t h e techniques of cool violence, y o u o w n t h e m as a p e r s o n a l possession. But there is evidence t h a t this is n o t t h e case. In o n e instance, a highly r e p u t e d h i t m a n w a s hired to kill a n o t h e r such h i t m a n . C a t c h i n g his rival off g u a r d by a p p r o a c h i n g in disguise, t h e n p r e t e n d i n g to be a street robber, Tony t h e Greek gets the j u m p on h i m w i t h a concealed w e a p o n ; he t h e n p r o c e e d s to use his n o r m a l tactics of t a k i n g h i m for a ride to a place w h e r e he can conveniently s h o o t h i m a n d dispose of the b o d y (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 9 - 1 4 ) . T h e rival h i t m a n , w h o p r e s u m - ably h a s some of the same techniques, recognizes w h a t is being d o n e , b u t is u n a b l e to do a n y t h i n g a b o u t it. He proceeds to give in emotionally, falling for t h e tactics of being calmed d o w n by a deception t h a t neither h i t m a n really believes in; he s h o w s u n w o n t e d m o m e n t s of fear, as he b a r - gains a n d pleads for his life; having lost e m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l , he even shits in his p a n t s — l i k e m a n y policemen a n d soldiers u n d e r fire (Hoffman a n d H e a d l e y 1 9 9 2 : 9 - 1 4 , a n d for a n o t h e r instance, 1 0 5 - 7 ; cf. G r o s s m a n 2 0 0 4 ) . Even violent techniques t h a t m a k e o n e a m e m b e r of t h e elite can be de-energized a n d de-learned.

M e r e standoffs a m o n g elites p r o b a b l y d o n o t r u n d o w n their e m o t i o n a l energy a n d their confidence in techniques as m u c h ; b u t likely they are n o t g o o d for t h e m . A likely hypothesis is t h a t violent elites w h o are n o t win- ning are losing their edge.

In m o s t fields of violence, t h e elite build up their s t a n d i n g by attacking w e a k e r victims; their skill is in seeing a n d a t t a c k i n g their o p p o n e n t s ' vul- nerabilities, n o t their s t r e n g t h s . T h u s the violent elite generally avoid going up against each other. T h i s r u n s c o n t r a r y to m y t h o l o g y of t h e Iliad t y p e , a n d to the long t r a d i t i o n of fictional violence. In t h e real w o r l d of all-out violence, an e x p a n s i o n in the n u m b e r of p e r s o n s w h o h a d elite violent skills, as individuals, w o u l d at s o m e p o i n t lead to an increase in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a m o n g m e m b e r s of this elite g r o u p . By my a r g u m e n t , a n d by the precedents cited h e r e , such c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w o u l d de-energize a n d de-skill some of t h a t elite.

460 • Chapter 11

Sports are an artificial social w o r l d in just this respect, since they engi- neer t o u r n a m e n t - l i k e w i n n o w i n g structures w h e r e the m o s t skilled c o m - petitors h a v e to face each other. Sports are a form of limited violence, w i t h plenty o f c r o w d a n d t e a m s u p p o r t t o overcome c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l ten- sion. In athletics of h e a d - t o - h e a d c o m p e t i t i o n , those w i t h skills of the " c o o l in t h e midst of h o t frenzy" k i n d nevertheless go t h r o u g h p e a k s a n d s l u m p s . Athletes a n d coaches h a v e b e c o m e very conscious of techniques, a n d use sports psychology b o t h in the form of a c c u m u l a t e d lore a n d high- tech professionalism, b u t w i t h o u t eliminating these kinds of streaks. T r e n d s over time in p e r f o r m a n c e in offense-versus-defense sports imply t h a t the t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t I described earlier, w h e r e everyone could learn the techniques of t h e m o s t highly c o m p e t e n t violent elite, w o u l d n o t lead to a n y drastic rise in t h e ceiling for the l a w of small n u m b e r s .

T h e techniques by w h i c h the intellectual elite d o m i n a t e their rivals are techniques w h i c h give an internalized sense of the field. Similarly for t h e techniques of t h e small n u m b e r s w h o successfully practice cool violence. T h e technique w o r k s because it gives one a sense of positions in the field of c o m b a t : in sizing up one's o p p o n e n t , n o t only as an individual b u t also in t e r m s of all the layers of the o p p o s i t i o n , judging, w i t h o u t h a v i n g to t h i n k a b o u t it, w h o is h o t a n d w h o is cool, w h o is bluster a n d w h o serious, w h o is frontline, s u p p o r t i v e cluster, or backline follower. Similarly t h e d o m i n a t o r ' s t e c h n i q u e e x t e n d s to a clear sense of one's o w n side, w h o is a s t r o n g or w e a k s u p p o r t e r a n d h o w well he or she is doing. Ace pilots often b r a g a b o u t n o t losing a w i n g m a n ; t h o u g h they are the stars they also u n d e r s t a n d the value of t e a m w o r k ; they are like the star q u a r t e r b a c k w h o k n o w s w h e r e everyone is on b o t h sides of the field.

T h a t t h e t e c h n i q u e is internalized m e a n s t h a t it is fast; r a t h e r t h a n self- c o n s c i o u s , t h e violent elite do n o t h a v e to s t o p a n d t h i n k . (In the same way, t h e intellectual elite d o n o t h a v e t o s t o p a n d t h i n k a b o u t h o w t o t h i n k ; they go a h e a d a n d m a k e their m o v e before s o m e o n e else t h i n k s of it.) Lacking a micro-sociological vocabulary, we t e n d to describe such b e h a v i o r as intuitive or n a t u r a l , b u t it is socially acquired; we h a v e seen h o w fighter pilots m a y go t h r o u g h a long p e r i o d of mediocrity before they click into high gear as aces. T h e w i n n i n g gunfighter, w h e t h e r c o p , duelist, or criminal, is n o t just quicker on the d r a w (or t h e quicker s w o r d s m a n of s a m u r a i lore) b u t is socially faster in getting t h e j u m p , m a k i n g decisions w i t h o u t deliberation, getting m o r e quickly into t h e zone. T h i s speed is always relative to t h a t of s o m e o n e else; o n e ' s quickness, n a t u r a l n e s s , intu- itiveness in a d a p t i n g to the speed of violent action is always a m a t t e r of being faster t h a n o n e ' s rivals. T h u s it is a t e c h n i q u e t h a t is always on the edge, always being tested; it is n o t a quality of the individual, an i m m u t a - ble possession, b u t an interactional r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e w i n n o w i n g effect of a chain of violent e n c o u n t e r s is always to build up some a n d w e a r d o w n

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o t h e r s ; it is a specialized kind of interaction ritual chain, in w h i c h the e m o t i o n a l energy of some has built up in the confidence a n d initiative to m o v e faster t h a n a n y o n e else. As in interaction ritual chains, the m a t c h u p is always a possible tipping p o i n t ; t h e violent elite have to stay at t h e d o m i n a n t edge, or their technique goes b a c k w a r d .

I h a v e been a t t e m p t i n g to s h o w w h y a l a w of small n u m b e r s applies n o t just to h o t violence, w h i c h typically d e p e n d s u p o n audience effects, b u t also to cool violent techniques, w h i c h a p p e a r to belong to individuals. It is easy to explain w h y in one type of situation the h o t - h e a d s are t h e violent few: they get their e m o t i o n a l energy to overcome c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension by the s u p p o r t of the rest of the g r o u p . We h a v e seen a version of the l a w of small n u m b e r s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n the i m m e d i a t e s t r u c t u r e of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n space: w h e n t h e r e is violence, it a l m o s t always takes the form of o n e fight per v e n u e . W h e n c a r o u s e r s fight, o n e a n t a g o - nism imposes its s t r u c t u r e u p o n the a t t e n t i o n space, defocusing a n d de- energizing o t h e r conflicts; t h e audience is mesmerized i n t o a single focus of a t t e n t i o n while the fight is going on, a n d t e n d s to buzz w i t h n a r r a t i o n s in the aftermath, w h i c h t a k e up t h e e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n for t h e time being. This is a micro-version of t h e law of small n u m b e r s ; t h e r e is an a n a l o g o u s p a t t e r n on the larger level, s p r e a d o u t over t i m e , as we tally up the n u m b e r of c o w b o y cops w h o d o m i n a t e violent incidents over a p e r i o d of years; o r ace pilots, h i t m e n , hyper-active a r m e d r o b b e r s , a n d o n t h r o u g h m o s t o t h e r forms of violence.

T h e a n a l o g y to e m i n e n t intellectuals s h o w s us a l a w of small n u m b e r s t h a t restricts t h e n u m b e r of the elite over a long p e r i o d of t i m e , an entire g e n e r a t i o n . Something similar h a p p e n s for each g e n e r a t i o n in each a r e n a of v i o l e n c e . 4 7 T h e violent elite build up their cool techniques d u r i n g a p e r i o d of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p or t r y o u t t h a t implicitly or explicitly brings t h e m i n t o c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the existing hierarchy of violent p r a c t i t i o n e r s , until they reach a p e r i o d w h e n they d o m i n a t e all rivals. W h y is it t h a t only a few can do this during any o n e e x p a n s e of time? In essence, their tech- niques boil d o w n to devices for keeping oneself from being affected by the glaze of c o m b a t t h a t is a r o u n d t h e m , a n d for t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of t h e other side's c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension. T h e i r techniques are cool precisely because they are designed to keep one from being affected by t h e h o t e m o t i o n s of c o m b a t ; they b a t t e n on o p p o n e n t s ' e m o t i o n a l states, n o t just o n the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension a n d fear t h a t m a k e s m o s t p e o p l e i n c o m p e - t e n t , b u t also o n t h e h o t anger a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l c o u r a g e o r b r a v a d o t h a t can also be m a n i p u l a t e d by a cool o p p o n e n t .

O n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of p e r s o n s can h a v e these cool t e c h n i q u e s . I state this as an empirical p a t t e r n , based on t h e evidence to d a t e . We can explain it as an e m o t i o n a l d y n a m i c of the s t r u c t u r e of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n spaces. T h e cool techniques of violent d o m i n a t i o n are social on

462 • C h a p t e r ! ]

every level: In the i m m e d i a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n , they consist in a w a y to swiftly a n d unself-consciously perceive the e m o t i o n a l positions and trajec- tories of everyone a r o u n d o n e a n d m a n i p u l a t e these to o n e ' s a d v a n t a g e . But only a few can do so, because success in exercising these techniques de-energizes the techniques of one's less successful rivals. In the chain of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t m a k e up each violent individual's life, the successful become m o r e a n d m o r e identified with their techniques; but this also m a k e s t h e m hyper-sensitive to their successes a n d failures, liable to be displaced if they fail—not merely in the sense t h a t losing a fight may cost one's life, but t h a t merely failing to d o m i n a t e , or backing a w a y from a c o n f r o n t a t i o n may cost o n e ' s edge. M o r e o v e r , if it is t r u e t h a t the violent elite tend to be in the center of r e p u t a t i o n a l n e t w o r k s , their o w n interac- tion ritual chains of fights plus their narrative aftermaths intertwine t h r o u g h o u t a c o m m u n i t y of talk; the elite's confidence in their techniques is n o t only built up t h r o u g h the fame of their successes but can also be run d o w n n o t just t h r o u g h their failures b u t even t h r o u g h a shifting of c o m m u n i t y a t t e n t i o n elsewhere. T h e rise of some other t o u g h guy, some o t h e r ace, s o m e o t h e r c o p p r o m o t e d to p o i n t m a n in the SWAT t e a m can have the effect of taking a w a y some of the e m o t i o n a l edge t h a t p o w e r s the elite. So it is in the realm of intellectuals, a c o m m u n i t y hyper-depen- d e n t u p o n c o m m u n i c a t i n g a b o u t w h e r e the intellectual action is a n d w h o s e ideas are h o t . If the analogy h o l d s , the long-term law of small n u m b e r s t h a t governs the distribution of eminence in the field of creativity also explains why even the possessors of cool violent technique are never m o r e t h a n a few.

C H A P T E R 1 2

Epilogue: Practical Conclusions

T H I S B O O K IS P R I M A R I L Y an effort at sociological u n d e r s t a n d i n g . But a few practical implications suggest themselves.

It is r e m a r k a b l e h o w many different kinds of violence there are. T h e b o o k began with c o m b a t infantry a n d police violence, and ended with h i t m e n , ace pilots, a n d clandestine terrorists, with stops in between at bullies, gang initiations, a n d mosh pits, a m o n g o t h e r s . I c o u n t at least thirty types of violence in the b o o k . And there are many kinds of violence n o t treated in this v o l u m e , including r a p e (which comes in various kinds), t o r t u r e , h o l o c a u s t , serial killings, a n d school r a m p a g e s . This m e a n s t h a t no single practical r e c o m m e n d a t i o n can w o r k for everything.

Practical r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s should n o t be addressed just to g o v e r n m e n t agencies or legislators. This t o p - d o w n a p p r o a c h , c o m m o n in policy stud- ies, m a y n o t be w h e r e the greatest value in sociology lies. This b o o k is focused on the micro-level of interaction, the h e r e - a n d - n o w t h a t we all inhabit when we w a k e up in the m o r n i n g . Its insights o u g h t to be useful to us as real people living o u r lives as they actually h a p p e n , r a t h e r t h a n in the r h e t o r i c of official speakers on formal occasions.

T h e job of a serious sociologist is n o t to be simple-minded. This is r a t h e r the o p p o s i t e of the t e c h n i q u e of electoral politicians a n d speakers for ideological m o v e m e n t s , w h o generally sway public attention to the degree t h a t they can simplify issues d o w n to a rhetorical slogan. No slo- gan on the o r d e r of " z e r o t o l e r a n c e " or " h u g s not d r u g s " will c o m e close to dealing with the issues of violence. This is true also for goals t h a t are good in themselves, such as eliminating poverty a n d racial prejudice. If poverty w e r e eliminated (which seems very unlikely u n d e r present cir- c u m s t a n c e s ) , a great m a n y kinds of violence w o u l d still exist; the back- g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n of poverty is not w h a t causes c a r o u s i n g violence, for- w a r d p a n i c s , sports violence, or c o n t r a c t killings, to mention just a few. T h e r e h a s been a real r e d u c t i o n in racial prejudice in recent decades, b u t t h a t has n o t reduced m a n y forms of violence. We need to think truly o u t s i d e the b o x , a n d t h a t m e a n s outside the cliches on all sides of the political s p e c t r u m . O u r o w n side's cliches are a l w a y s hardest to recognize as such.

I p u t forward these suggestions w i t h o u t d o g m a t i s m , since most p r o - g r a m s of action have unforeseen a n d u n i n t e n d e d consequences. Often these side-effects can be quite negative, especially when p r o g r a m s are in-

464 • Epilogue

stituted by b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s , b o t h public a n d p r i v a t e , since m a c r o - i n s t i t u t i o n s have their o w n m o m e n t u m . I h o p e t h a t advice on the micro-level is less likely to lead astray, but we need to keep alert to such possibilities.

1. W h e n e n c o u n t e r i n g the police, be a w a r e of their p o t e n t i a l to go into a f o r w a r d p a n i c . It is y o u r t a s k to reduce their c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension. If you find this a loss of p e r s o n a l dignity, r e m i n d yourself t h a t y o u are t a k i n g charge of the situation e m o t i o n a l l y by calming people d o w n . Be especially a w a r e of the p r o b l e m as the n u m b e r s of police on the scene goes u p .

2. Similarly as advice to police officers a n d officials: Awareness of p a - t r o l officers' p o t e n t i a l for f o r w a r d panics in tense situations m a y help c o u n t e r a c t t h e m . Be a w a r e t h a t the m o r e officers called to the scene, t h e greater the chance of a f o r w a r d p a n i c or o t h e r k i n d s of police violence, quite a p a r t from w h a t t h e suspect d o e s . Be a w a r e t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n these situations are p r o n e t o r u m o r s , w h i c h build t h e p o t e n t i a l for violence. M a n y police officers already k n o w h o w to defuse potentially violent e n c o u n t e r s ; police forces sh o u ld s p r e a d the k n o w l e d g e of h o w they do it.

3. T h e same awareness of f o r w a r d panics s h o u l d be explicitly recog- nized b y military c o m b a t t r o o p s a n d officers. T h e public a n d the media s h o u l d also try to u n d e r s t a n d the d y n a m i c s of e m o t i o n s u n d e r the pressures of c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tension in a c o m b a t zone. Instead of being vindictive a n d self-righteous a b o u t f o r w a r d p a n i c atrocities, we w o u l d do better to recognize the dynamics of f o r w a r d panics a n d develop a p r o g r a m to deal w i t h t h e m .

4 . Advice again t o u s o r d i n a r y p e o p l e : L e a r n h o w t o deal w i t h bluster, including o n e ' s o w n . Focus o n h o w t o m a k e blustering a m o n g an- tagonists an equal-sided ritual, r a t h e r t h a n escalating by trying to t o p t h e other. Potential fights w i n d d o w n w h e n the blustering be- comes repetitive a n d boring; t h a t ' s w h a t y o u sh o u ld try t o achieve.

5. Learn some sensitivity to the inner-city black c o d e of the street. Try to distinguish b e t w e e n p o s t u r i n g t h a t is d o n e defensively a n d for effect, a n d the kinds of challenges w h e r e s o m e o n e is seriously look- ing for a fight. A c c o r d i n g to Elijah A n d e r s o n , m o s t street c o d e per- formances are t h e former. This k i n d of sensitivity on the p a r t of whites a n d others s houl d h a v e i m p o r t a n t effects in reducing racial tension.

6. A r a t h e r speculative p r o p o s a l : inner-city violence could be reduced if the practice of defending a g r o u p ' s h o n o r (or " r e s p e c t " ) w e r e

Practical Conclusions • 465

replaced by the practice of one-on-one fair fights. Even duels with pistols w o u l d be better t h a n gang drive-bys and street fights, with their potential for bystander hits and chains of future r e t r i b u t i o n . M a y b e duels could be t u r n e d into boxing matches or s o m e t h i n g like t h e m ; even ostensibly very violent o n e - o n - o n c fighting rituals are better t h a n v e n d e t t a s . Remember, the history of dueling was a mo v e- m e n t t o w a r d self-limiting forms.

7. This w o u l d n o t t a k e care of d r u g business violence, which is built into the necessity of defending one's territory a n d policing malfea- sance in dealers' supply c h a i n s . T h e a n s w e r here is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : legalize d r u g s . I have no expectation t h a t in o u r political climate this is likely to h a p p e n . But it is clear to social scientists t h a t a m a r k e t for illegal c o m m o d i t i e s , which c a n n o t enforce its c o n t r a c t s by law c o u r t s , creates its o w n u n d e r g r o u n d system of enforcement. T h o s e of us w h o u p h o l d d r u g prohibition are indirectly responsible for m u r d e r s in the d r u g business.

8. Learn h o w n o t to be a victim; recognize the techniques t h a t bullies, domestic a b u s e r s , muggers, a n d street thugs try to use on you. This is easier said t h a n d o n e ; b u t it is n o t a m a t t e r of your physical size, but y o u r e m o t i o n a l energy a n d interactional style.

An e x a m p l e from Elijah A n d e r s o n : He is p u m p i n g gas late at night at a crime-ridden spot in the g h e t t o , w h e n a y o u n g black m a n suddenly walks up a n d asks if he has t h e time. "Instinctively I looked him in the eye a n d said, ' W h a t ' s u p , b u d d y ? ' as t h o u g h I expected an answer. T h e r e w a s silence. Then I said, 'I ain't got no w a t c h , m a n . ' Experience o n the streets h a d t a u g h t m e t h a t one ruse muggers use is to ask the intended victim a question t h a t distracts him, getting him to d r o p his g u a r d a n d setting him up for the mu g - ging. By saying ' W h a t ' s u p , b u d d y ? ' I gave him pause a n d m a d e him rethink his i n t e n t i o n s . In a stickup or a mugging, timing is crucial. My body language, my t o n e of voice, a n d my w o r d s , all taken t o - gether in t h a t instant, may have t h r o w n him off, possibly averting an a t t e m p t e d stickup. . . . T h e rules of the street say t h a t a strange black male does n o t a p p r o a c h a n o t h e r black male a r o u n d midnight on a Saturday night a n d ask for the t i m e " (Streetwise, 1 9 9 0 : 1 7 3 ) . 1

This is careful micro-analysis. A naive outsider m i g h t think t h a t if a r o b b e r has superior force, he is going to c a r r y o u t the robbery no m a t t e r w h a t the victim d o e s . N o t so; even the habitually violent c h o o s e their time a n d circumstances; they a t t e m p t to establish the e m o t i o n a l m o m e n t u m , get the j u m p on the o t h e r by timing their a p p r o a c h , setting the d o m i n a n c e in the interaction before the vio- lent p h a s e . Being " s t r e e t w i s e " is being tuned in to these r h y t h m s a n d using t h e m for defense.

466 • Epilogue

N o t being a victim does n o t m e a n y o u h a v e t o escalate a n d counter- a t t a c k ; t h e r e is a subtle w a y of d o i n g this t h a t leaves the situation stable, e m o t i o n a l l y flat. After all, m o s t situational violence does n o t c o m e off. O u r aim is to keep it t h a t way.

9. A tip from the military psychologist Dave G r o s s m a n (2004): if you are in a situation w h e r e tension is rising, you can feel it in your b r e a t h i n g a n d your heart rate. Adrenalin is p u m p i n g , which can go in the direction of either fear, anger, or self-conflicting m i x t u r e s . These e m o t i o n s are d a n g e r o u s , to yourself or to other people. You will deal better with the situation if you can bring your heart rate d o w n . This can be d o n e by b r e a t h i n g in while you c o u n t four sec- o n d s , holding your breath for four seconds, then b r e a t h i n g o u t for four seconds, h o l d i n g your breath for four seconds, and so o n . T h e key is n o t just to t a k e a deep b r e a t h , b u t to establish the four-part r h y t h m slowing d o w n all p a r t s of the b r e a t h i n g cycle.

1 0 . Be a w a r e of t h e influence t h a t audiences h a v e on w h e t h e r a fight will become serious, mild, or a b o r t . As an audience, we h a v e great influence on fights t h a t h a p p e n in o u r presence, at least if the n u m - ber of a n t a g o n i s t s is b e l o w a b o u t five on a side. T h e c r o w d has a big effect in p r o v i d i n g the e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t to overcome confron- t a t i o n a l tension; if we d o n ' t p r o v i d e it, fights t e n d to peter o u t . T h a t d o e s n ' t m e a n everybody will be h a p p y , b u t we can keep violence to a relatively i n n o c u o u s level.

A t h e m e r u n s t h r o u g h my suggestions. Eradicating violence entirely is unrealistic. Trying to m a k e every o n e a d h e r e to an idealistic code of g o o d m a n n e r s is n o t going to w o r k ; m o r e likely it will divide people i n t o those w h o follow it a n d those w h o defy it. Given the a n t i n o m i a n t r e n d of p o p u - lar y o u t h c u l t u r e , m a n y will t a k e the latter direction. But it is possible to reduce the intensity of some kinds of violence, to replace serious violence w i t h relatively mild a n d ritualistic forms.

T h e r e is no single r e m e d y for t h e ills of violence. Different m e c h a n i s m s of violence n e e d to be h e a d e d off in different w a y s . T h i s seems d i s c o u r a g - ing. But t h e r e h a v e been s o m e successes w i t h i n this vast f i e l d . R u n n i n g a m o k w a s a t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m of h o n o r a b l e suicide in I n d o n e s i a , w h e r e a m a n w o u l d s u d d e n l y go i n t o a frenzy of slashing at e v e r y o n e a r o u n d h i m w i t h his m a c h e t e u n t i l h e w a s f i n a l l y c u t d o w n (Blacker a n d T u p i n 1 9 7 7 ; W e s t e r m e y e r 1 9 7 3 ) . A m o k s i n t r a d i t i o n a l I n d o n e s i a n society w e r e e r a d i c a t e d w h e n t h e a u t h o r i t i e s s t o p p e d killing t h e m a t the c l i m a x o f their killing frenzy. I n s t e a d , they w e r e sentenced to life in p r i s o n a n d n o t a l l o w e d t o die. Since r u n n i n g a m o k w a s a n h o n o r a b l e f o r m o f suicide, this e l i m i n a t e d t h e p u r p o s e . O n e case w a s solved. W o u l d t h a t t h e rest w e r e as easy.

Notes

CHAPTER 1 T H E MICRO-SOCIOLOGY OF VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS

1. See summaries in chapters 4 and 10. 2. I am concerned here chiefly with the violence of individuals and small

groups. A different kind of violence, as in war or genocide, is structured by large- scale organizations, and can produce much higher numbers of persons killed and injured, in actions that can go on for much longer periods of time. But even here, the individuals involved are not violent all the time and in all contexts; at other times they generally are surprisingly different from the way they act in the midst of their violent routines.

3. During 2004, between fifty-three and fifty-six journalists and media workers were killed, the highest number since 1994 during the ethnic violence in former Yugoslavia (San Diego Union Tribune, Jan. 8, 2005). A considerable proportion of these were photographers and video camera operators.

4. I first began to get an inkling of the micro-sociology of violence when I asked a Vietnam vet, during the late 1960s, what the war was actually like. He was very reluctant to talk about it. Finally, when I persisted, he said that it was not at all what you think. Men were burrowing into the ground, shitting in their pants, crying like children—not at all the heroic image; nor the vicious destructive image held by the anti-war movement that I was active in at the time.

5. Even in communities where fighting is common, and most individuals pre- sent an image of themselves as tough, they do not jump in on the action when two tough guys threaten to fight. See the incident of armed black men (from An- derson 1999) described in chapter 9. The crowd was attentive, but rather hushed, watching the confrontation.

6. An example is reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 2, 2005, under the headline: "Phillies prospect injured. Cole Hamels, thought by many in the organization to be its best young pitcher, broke his throwing hand in a fight near a Florida bar." My ethnographic materials include numerous examples.

7. Fighting among children is not simply a matter of masculine culture. At young ages, when girls are about as strong as boys, little girls often engage in hitting, biting, and kicking at about the same rate as boys—varying by about 5 percent at most, and sometimes slightly exceeding boys (Trembley 2004). And by strategically picking situations where parents are present, a little girl can get away with fighting her male siblings, even in attacking them, thus turning the boys- don't-pick-on-girls ideology to their own advantage, since the boy is the one who typically gets punished for retaliating. I have observed this repeatedly among small children in domestic situations.

468 • Notes to Chapter 1

8. In my collection of twenty-two photos of faces of bank robbers and other hold-up men in action (mostly from security cameras), none is smiling; their ex- pressions range from tight-lipped concentration and tension to fear. In eighty-nine observations of fights from student reports and my own observations, in only three cases are the fighters in good humor: one where a pair of pre-adolescent boys bully a smaller boy by throwing a beach ball at him; and two instances where post-game fans, young black males, on a crowded bus harass middle-class white college students. Good-humored fighters thus appear only in situations of very limited violence, more accurately bluster, by groups with overwhelming advantage over their targets.

9. Bourgois (1995), Willis (1977). For a critical debate over these perspectives, see Wacquant (2002), Anderson (2002), Duneier (2002), and Newman (2002). Resistance theory gives few clues as to how violence would vary. Resistance vio- lence is ascribed only to class and racial subalterns; but those subordinated by gender and sexual preference do not display resistance violence to any significant extent (more in the case of battered women killing their batterers than in the case of homosexuals striking back); women and homosexuals are chiefly victims of violence, whereas class and racial minorities are perpetrators of resistance vio- lence. Obviously a theory of mobilization of grievance into violence is called for; but this is a level of specificity on which resistance theory does not proceed.

10. At a conference where I presented a piece of the present theory, one audi- ence member rose during the question period to dispute why I had considered merely physical violence, and not symbolic violence. He asserted that he himself had been a victim of symbolic violence, in the previous session, when he did not get called on in the question period. There is a micro-sociology of who does or does not get to speak in a group meeting, and at what point in the sequence of speakers (Gibson 2 0 0 1 , 2005); even on this level, to invoke "symbolic violence" as an explanation of what happens is merely to make a rhetorical complaint, not to provide an explanatory mechanism. The fact that sophisticated intellectuals can believe that what they call symbolic violence is at all close to physical violence, shows how unaccustomed most intellectuals are to thinking in micro-sociological terms, and what little familiarity we have with real violence.

11. Tremblay, Nagin et al. (2004) argue that violence is the result of interaction between innate predisposition and social interactions in the family; the innate propensity tends to become socially repressed, since aggressive behavior is highest among young children and declines thereafter, except for a minority who go on to become criminals. But small children's violence, as seen in micro-situational detail, is very limited and to an extent indulged by parents and other children; it is often a mode of making social contact and getting attention. This is consistent with Tremblay's (2004) finding that violence of small boys and girls is more fre- quent if there are siblings present in the home. Small children's violence fits the pattern of protected and staged violence for an audience, which I describe in chap- ter 6. The situational conditions of early childhood interactions determine this violence as well as that of adults. In Tremblay's (2004) data, child violence peaks at about thirty months old, not earlier; it is constructed during the social develop- ment of the first three years. This is the period of "the terrible twos" related to the formation of an autonomous self through greater internalization of social im-

Notes to Chapter 2 • 469

agery and audience viewpoint; in symbolic interactionist terms, the formation of "me" and "other" rather than expression of sheer primal " I " (Collins 2004: 7 9 - 8 1 , 204-5).

12. I will consider the dynamics of warfare in greater detail in later chapters; and in a following volume, which will deal with macro-dimensions of conflict. Modern armies, too, are relatively poor performers in face-to-face combat, but they have improved their killing abilities in several ways: by organizational devices for keeping troops on the battlefield; by technologies for killing at long distance, where confrontational tension is lower because one cannot see the enemy's face; and by weapons of such highly destructive power that a small amount of compe- tence may produce at least some casualties. We have become more deadly in battle, not because of greater individual ferociousness but because we have found social and technological ways around confrontational tension/fear. See Grossman (2004: 192-218).

13. Elias (1939/1978). In effect, Elias historicized Freud, presenting evidence that rough manners of all kinds (such as spitting, nose-blowing, and touching food with one's fingers) were gradually tamed, beginning with the rise of court societies in sixteenth-century Europe, which brought independent warriors under control of a centralizing state. Elias argues that aggression was regarded as a plea- sure, alike in combat and in torturing, mutilating, and killing helpless victims. But this does not mean that violence was easy to perform in the micro-situational conditions of politically fragmented medieval societies, or in prior periods of his- tory. We cannot assume, like Freud (1920/1953) in the period of his death-instinct theory, that there exists a primal reservoir of aggressiveness, once upon a time unrepressed, that is kept down only to the extent that there are social controls on it, and that pops out when controls are off. To the contrary, I will attempt to show that violence is always socially constructed; the history of violence is the history of social techniques for constructing particular kinds of violence. Accordingly, recent historical increases in violence are not the result of "decivilizing" but are the construction of new kinds of social techniques of violence; for example, in chapter 8,1 argue that football hooligan violence, as it emerged during the 1950s to 1970s, was the creation of a sophisticated technique.

14. For example, I used to work at home in California in an upstairs study, with the windows open in good weather; every afternoon the children in the house just behind the hedge some twenty feet away would come out to play with their babysitter. Their repetitive patterns of whining used to annoy me, until I realized that there was a distinctive vocal pattern, which I could follow with stopwatch and notebook. This bit of data finds its way into chapter 9. And being in the researcher mode was a lot better for my own peace of mind.

CHAPTER 2 CONFRONTATIONAL TENSION AND INCOMPETENT VIOLENCE

1. Keeley (1996) is concerned to controvert the interpretation that casualties in tribal warfare are low. What he demonstrates, however, is that casualties in full-scale battles are generally low; but since such battles may be very frequent,

470 • Notes to Chapter 2

the aggregate number of deaths over a period of years can be quite much higher than the battle deaths of large-scale modern societies when averaged across their bigger populations and relatively infrequent wars. Keeley overrides the distinction between micro- and macro-sociological levels; on the micro-level, his data are consistent with the pattern given here.

2. Marshall's method of firsthand, total reporting did not ask each soldier: "Did you fire your gun or not?" Marshall's estimate of 15 to 25 percent was of the soldiers who stood out in his interviews as having carried on the bulk of the activity of the battle. He was concerned with the top end of the distribution, not the bottom end. Thus it is not clear from his report that the remaining 75 to 85 percent were uniformly frozen in fear or inactivity. He himself noted they often did things to help the most active firers; by Marshall's criterion, some of them might have fired occasionally. Later I use Glenn's (2000b) Vietnam data, and my own analysis of combat photos to reconstruct a more nuanced picture.

3. In a battle in the Ardennes, during the crucial Battle of the Bulge, December 1944, Marshall describes a battalion in which the number firing at the enemy was "between 25 and 30 per cent. Even so, it had as high an efficiency of fire as any unit which I have ever known." Marshall praises this unit, which won all its bat- tles, with these words: "I doubt there has ever been a finer fighting unit in the Army of the United States" (1947: 73-74).

4. These figures are for heavy continuous action in World War II, and estimates for trench warfare in World War I. In many other wars, the actual time spent in combat might be rather intermittent (Holmes 1985: 75-76).

5. Glenn's data comprised two samples: infantry troops (mostly enlisted men) and officers at the combat level of platoon and company commanders.The re- sponse rate for the surveys was 52 percent of the troops, 70 percent of the officer sample. About half of the troop sample who replied were non-commissioned or commissioned officers; only 30 percent were combat riflemen or other weapons- handling troops. More than half of the troops sample were volunteers, not draft- ees (although the combat troops in the Vietnam war generally were highly skewed toward draftees). Virtually all those troops who had served additional combat tours in Vietnam beyond the one-year rotation—about one-fifth of those who responded to the survey—had enlisted as volunteers (Glenn 2000b: 7). Volunteers had higher self-reported firing rates than draftees. Of the volunteers, 57 percent were in the high firing group, compared to 41 percent of the draftees in this sample (calculated from Glenn 2000b: 164).

6. This is not without problems. What are presented as war photos are for the most part not actually photos of soldiers confronting their enemy at the moment of violence. In eleven collections of war photos or illustrated histories of wars, the number of photos showing troops in combat ranges from 5 to 44 percent, with a median of 22 percent. We will call this category (A), but more frequently war photos show (B) soldiers awaiting combat, or moving into the combat zone, or wounded and dead in the aftermath of battle; (C) soldiers in rear areas, including troops and supply vehicles on the road, and in hospitals and prisoner areas; (D) top military leaders and politicians, and scenes of recruiting and training. There are hazy boundaries between (A) and (B), such as when soldiers are on patrol. And some combat photos show warfare at a distance: planes dropping bombs, or

Notes to Chapter 2 • 471

artillery firing. I confine my analysis to category (A), further limited to infantry engaged with small arms, including machine guns and man-portable rockets (and sometimes with knives, machetes, and rocks), while omitting artillery and mortar crews. The photos are grouped into three collections: an extensive collection of Vietnam (the most heavily photographed of all wars)—104 photos (Daugherty and Mattson 2001; all other twentieth-century wars—seventy-two photos (Ar- nold-Forster 2001; Beevor 1999; Bowden 2000; Gilbert 1994; Holmes 1985; Howe 2002; Keegan 1976, 1993; Marinovich and Silva 2000); and photos of the conventional phase of the 2003 Iraq war—seventeen photos (Murray and Scales 2003). Since it is not always clear whether a particular soldier is firing, I have given them the benefit of a doubt and present maximal percentages. Each set of photos is subdivided into all photos, and those in which at least one combatant is firing (or using a weapon). The latter category guarantees that it is indeed possi- ble to fire, giving maximal chances that other soldiers will fire also.

It is possible, of course, that soldiers who are not firing at the moment the photo is taken are firing at other moments. But see my discussion in chapter 11 of the similar problem of the small numbers of active participants in riot photos and their constancy over time. Embedded reporters and TV camera operators in the 2003 Iraq war showed mostly military vehicles rolling across the desert but only occasional snippets of behavior under fire, which did not contradict the SLAM pattern. Ultimately it may be possible to use video from unmanned battlefield drones (UAVs) for continuous data on soldiers in combat, similar to cameras now mounted in police cars.

7. McNeill 1995; Speidel 2002. When Roman armies were defeated by Ger- mans, on the other hand, it was usually because they were marching in densely wooded areas, where their formations were broken—as in the famous battle of the Teutoburger Wald in A.D. 9

8. "The majority of the active firers used several weapons; if the machine gun went out, they picked up a rifle; when they ran out of rifle ammunition, they used grenades" (Marshall 1947: 56).

9. Preston 2000: 399; Chadwick 2006. The Zulus lacked firearms, and inflicted only seventeen deaths with their spears. The Zulus thus also had a low level of effectiveness—only one out of 175 attackers killed anyone—although they did have high solidarity in keeping up the attack; this was due among others reasons to the adoption of European-style phalanx formation, which they found very ef- fective against unorganized native African fighters. Ineffectiveness of hand weap- ons was historically typical; in a battle in the Roman civil wars in 48 B.C., thirty thousand arrows were collected, which wounded 1,500 men (a ratio of one per two hundred arrows), and killed less than twenty (Caesar 1998: 105 [Civil War, Vol. 3: 52]).

10. British army experiments have used laser pulses to simulate historical bat- tles of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; these have shown that the potential firing accuracy of the weapons was always much higher than the casualty rates actually found in those battles (Grossman 1995: 16).

11. It has been argued that very recent, twenty-first century warfare, with the advent of precision-guided weapons, has changed all this. Long-distance weapons are claimed to be becoming infallible; by implication, emotions of confrontation

472 • Notes to Chapter 2

become irrelevant to the outcome. I discuss such weapons in the following section. It should be noted that the claim applies only to large-scale military combat, not to the other forms of violence discussed in this book. And the photo evidence on the 2003 Iraq war does not show infantry firing rates different from previous wars.

12. In another variant, troops empty their guns at an enemy who has already been defeated, or even killed. Shalit (1988: 141-42) gives an example of Israeli troops overwhelming an Egyptian position in a 1973 commando raid: surprise was achieved and firing was almost completely one-sided, continuing so heavily that the dead were riddled with bullets. He comments that "firing is a very effec- tive method of relieving tension and fear, and is often engaged in even when there is no need for it. . . . One often fires not so much to destroy and conquer the enemy as to overcome and control one's own fear." Shalit concludes from his observations that 100 percent of well-trained troops usually fired, overcoming the SLAM problem. The mechanism here is similar to what in chapter 3 I analyze as "forward panic."

13. "You began by firing by platoons, and perhaps two or three would get off orderly volleys. But then would follow a general blazing away—the usual rolling fire when everybody blasted off as soon as he had loaded, when ranks and files became intermingled, when the first rank was incapable of kneeling, even if it wanted t o " (quoted in Holmes 1985: 172-73). This was Frederick the Great's army, considered the most disciplined of the eighteenth century.

14. Friendly fire casualties of this sort happen in mass demonstrations as well. In the overthrow of the Yugoslav dictator Milosevic in October 2000, the turning point came when workers brought a bulldozer to break through police lines. A girl in the crowd was killed by being accidentally run over (The Guardian, Oct. 6, 2000, p. 1).

15. Murray and Scales 2003: 269-77. The experience of the U.S. bombings in Afghanistan in 2001-02, continued to include incidents of bystander hits. The air war in Afghanistan was described by the Pentagon as the most accurate ever, with 75 to 80 percent of bombs and missiles hitting their targets. Nevertheless, some of these air bombardments caused "fratricide" of coalition troops, estimated at 35 percent of coalition casualties; and several thousand Afghani civilians were killed (Burgess 2002). There were similar results with NATO bombing in Serbia in 1999; among the famous mishaps was the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, under conditions of haste and bureaucratic complexity where out-of- date information was fed to operational forces. During the Israeli bombardment of Hezbollah missile sites in Lebanon in 2006, a U.N. post was repeatedly hit and U.N. observers killed even though they had phoned Israeli officials and identified themselves. The information did not make it up the Israeli military hierarchy to where targets were chosen (Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2006, A l l , A13).

16. Casualties of American/Canadian/European forces in the Afghanistan war Oct. 2001 through April 18, 2002: total forty-one deaths; fifteen by hostile fire, seven by friendly fire, nineteen by traffic accidents (chiefly aircraft) and non-com- bat accidents (USA Today, April 19, 2002). Total enemy-caused combat deaths 37 percent; non-enemy-caused deaths 63 percent. This is much higher than Keegan's estimate for 15 to 25 percent in the world wars. In the Iraq war from March 2003

N o t e s t o C h a p t e r 2 • 4 7 3

t h r o u g h m i d - N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , 2 2 7 o f t h e 2 , 0 8 3 U . S . m i l i t a r y d e a t h s (11 p e r c e n t ) w e r e f r o m n o n - c o m b a t - r e l a t e d i n c i d e n t s (USA Today, N o v . 2 1 , 2 0 0 5 ) .

1 7 . O n t h e r e p e t i t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f s c a n d a l s , see T h o m p s o n ( 2 0 0 0 ) . O n t h e s t r u c - t u r e o f friendly fire a c c i d e n t s , see S n o o k ( 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e u n d e r l y i n g e x p l a n a t i o n i s P c r r o w ' s ( 1 9 8 4 ) t h e o r y o f n o r m a l a c c i d e n t s : the c o m b i n a t i o n o f c o m p l e x i t y a n d n o n - l i n e a r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a m o n g m a n y c o m p o n e n t s o f a s y s t e m — t e c h n o l o g i c a l and/or h u m a n — m a k e s i t s t a t i s t i c a l l y likely t h a t u n f o r e s e e n c o m b i n a t i o n s o f s m a l l a n o m a l i e s will c o n c a t e n a t e i n t o p e r i o d i c d i s a s t e r s . T h e a c c i d e n t s a r e c a u s e d b y the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l s y s t e m , a l t h o u g h o u r c u l t u r a l ritual a l w a y s s e e k s o u t s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s t o b l a m e .

1 8 . T h i s i n c l u d e s t h e r i t u a l i s t i c p o s t i n g o f y e l l o w d o - n o t - e n t e r t a p e s a r o u n d a r e a s o f a c r i m e s c e n e , o r even o f a t r a f f i c a c c i d e n t — p a r t o f t h e s e l f - i m p o r t a n c e o f t h o s e i n v o l v e d i n a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , v i s - a - v i s all t h o s e n o t s o p r i v i l e g e d a s t o b e i n v o l v e d . F o r i n s t a n c e , a L o s A n g e l e s f r e e w a y w a s c l o s e d i n b o t h d i r e c t i o n s f o r seven h o u r s , c a u s i n g a n e n o r m o u s t r a f f i c p i l e - u p , w h i l e p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t e d a c a r in w h i c h a m a n had b e e n s h o t t o d e a t h ( L o s Angeles Times, D e c . 2 3 , 2 0 0 2 ) .

] 9 . D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I I , o v e r 5 0 p e r c e n t o f A m e r i c a n t r o o p s i n the E u r o p e a n t h e a t e r w e r e n e v e r u n d e r e n e m y fire; i n V i e t n a m , a r o u n d 7 0 p e r c e n t ( H o l m e s 1 9 8 5 : 7 6 ) .

2 0 . E m o t i o n s a r e c a t e g o r i z e d f o l l o w i n g t h e m e t h o d s o f E k m a n a n d F r i e s e n ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; see a l s o E k m a n ( 1 9 8 5 ) . I h a v e e x p a n d e d t h e c o l l e c t i o n t o i n c l u d e p r i s o n e r i n t e r r o g a t i o n s a n d e x e c u t i o n s , a n d w o u n d e d s o l d i e r s a n d m e d i c s i n t h e c o m b a t z o n e . M u l t i p l e c o d i n g o f e m o t i o n - b l e n d s b r i n g s t h e t o t a l a b o v e 1 0 0 p e r c e n t .

2 1 . M y c o l l e c t i o n o f n e w s p h o t o g r a p h s i n c l u d e s o n e i n w h i c h a m a n d i s p l a y s a l m o s t t h e i d e n t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n o f r a g e a s t h e p e a c e d e m o n s t r a t o r i n D a u g h e r t y a n d M a t t s o n ( 2 0 0 1 ) : j a w t h r u s t f o r w a r d , m o u t h o p e n e d h a r d a n d s q u a r e , n e c k a n d f a c e m u s c l e s c o n t o r t e d . I n this c a s e , t h e a n g r y m a n i s t h e f a t h e r o f a m u r d e r e d w o m a n , c o n f r o n t i n g t h e c o n v i c t e d m u r d e r e r i n c o u r t ; t h e m u r d e r e r sits i m p a s - sively a n d t h e rest o f t h e a u d i e n c e l o o k s u n e a s y (San Diego Union Tribune, M a r c h 7 , 1 9 9 2 , A l ) . I n g e n e r a l , a n g r y f a c e s a r c m u c h m o r e c o m m o n i n p h o t o s o f p e a c e f u l d e m o n s t r a t i o n s t h a n o f s i t u a t i o n s o f v i o l e n c e .

2 2 . N a p o l e o n w a s e x p l i c i t a b o u t his t a c t i c s d u r i n g t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n i n 1 7 9 5 i n d i s p e r s i n g a P a r i s i a n c r o w d a t t a c k i n g t h e s e a t o f R e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n - m e n t : " I m a d e t h e t r o o p s fire ball a t first b e c a u s e t o a m o b w h o a r c i g n o r a n t o f f i r e a r m s , i t i s t h e w o r s t p o s s i b l e p o l i c y t o s t a r t o u t b y firing b l a n k s . F o r t h e p o p u - l a c e , h e a r i n g a g r e a t n o i s e , a r e a little f r i g h t e n e d a f t e r t h e first d i s c h a r g e b u t , l o o k - ing a r o u n d t h e m a n d seeing n o b o d y killed o r w o u n d e d , t h e y p l u c k u p t h e i r s p i r i t s , b e g i n i m m e d i a t e l y t o d e s p i s e y o u , b e c o m e t w i c e a s i n s o l e n t , a n d rush o n fearlessly, and i t b e c o m e s n e c e s s a r y t o kill t e n t i m e s the n u m b e r t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n k i l l e d i f b a l l h a d b e e n used i n t h e first p l a c e " ( q u o t e d i n M a r k h a m 1 9 6 3 : 2 9 - 3 0 ) . A f o r m e r d i s t r i c t m a g i s t r a t e i n I n d i a r e p o r t s his e x p e r i e n c e t h a t w h e n p o l i c e w e r e given o r d e r s t o a v o i d firing a t e t h n i c r i o t e r s e x c e p t a s a last r e s o r t , t h e c r o w d s g e n e r a l l y a c t e d i n a m o r e t h r e a t e n i n g m a n n e r t o t h e p o l i c e , a n d t e n d e d t o p a n i c t h e m i n t o w i l d f i r i n g . I n c o n t r a s t , w h e r e p o l i c e w e r e a u t h o r i z e d t o f i r e a s t h e y d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y , t h e i r d e m e a n o r t e n d e d t o s c a r e o f f the r i o t e r s , a n d i n c i d e n t s o f a c t u a l f i r i n g w e r e very l o w (S. K . M e n o n , p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , F e b . 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e s a m e p a t t e r n i s r e p o r t e d i n B e l g i u m i n t h e late 1 9 8 0 s , w h e r e p o l i c e f o r c e s

474 • Notes to Chapter 2

controlling soccer crowds were given the option of wearing more casual uniforms (short sleeves) to provide a friendly atmosphere, or militaristic paraphernalia in- cluding helmets and shields. The police in casual dress reported feeling vulnerable to missiles thrown by hooligans; these police produced more violence than those in intimidating gear (Van Limbergen, Colaers, and Walgrave 1989). Lode Wal- grave, Catholic University of Leuven (personal communication, Sept. 2004), pro- vided detail on this point.

2 3 . Both the firing ratio and the accuracy level appear to be much higher than for soldiers or police; although in 105 of 151 incidents more than one person had a gun, and in 79 of 107 times when a gun was fired there could have been several people firing; hence the firing ratio and accuracy level could be much lower. When respondents fired, they claimed to have hit their opponents 51 percent of the time; when opponents fired, respondents were hit 13 percent of the time (calculated from Wilkinson 2003: 129-30, 216). Respondents reportedly outhit their oppo- nents by 3.8 to 1. There may well be some egotistical bias in their recollections; but it also may indicate that these ultra tough guys were chiefly picking their fights when they had the advantage over their opponents. As we shall see (in chapter 6), gangs as well as solo hoodlums attempt to avoid violent situations in which they do not have the upper hand from the outset. Wilkinson reports (181) that which- ever side initiated the fight (shot first) was more likely to injure the other side.

24. Marshall 1947: 44—48 stresses this point. "The common scene in open warfare is landscape: the total absence of moving things is the surest sign that one has reached the line of danger. . . . On the battlefield it is only when the fire im- passe has been at last broken that military forces have that appearance of continu- ity of strength in line which the uninitiated mistake for the reality of a victorious tactical formation when they see it on the motion-picture screen" (89).

25. In a survey of attempted violence, 80 percent of American children between ages three and eighteen who had siblings admitted trying to hurt their brother or sister during the year; almost half had kicked, punched, or bitten a sibling; 40 percent had hit one with a hard object; and one-sixth had beaten one up (Gelles 1977). But the rate of injuries from being struck reported in emergency depart- ments for ages five to fourteen is 3.1 percent (2.7 percent for ages zero to four); even if we attributed all such injuries to siblings and if we assumed only one vio- lent incident per child per year, the proportion of sibling attacks that resulted in effective violence is very small. Calculated from "Overall struck by/against nonfa- tal injuries and rates, 2 0 0 1 , " National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (at www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars).

26. A characteristic instance is a medic who went forward under severe fire to treat a wounded soldier who was obviously about to die. The medic's explanation: "When someone hollers for a medic, if you're a medic you run toward the shout" (Miller 2000: 42).

27. For instance, in a security camera photo of a holdup at an ATM, the gun- man holds a pistol at the back of the victim's neck, who has his head bowed; the gunman's face is tense. There is no eye contact (Oct. 4, 1991, AP distribution of Maitland, Florida, police photo).

28. From interviews with Philadelphia police officers. In another instance, U.N. forces in Srebrenica, Yugoslavia, in July 1995 became emotionally domi- nated by Serbian paramilitaries, and thereby failed to prevent a massacre of 7,000

Notes to Chapter 3 • 475

Bosnian prisoners. The Dutch commander of the U.N. troops, who backed down in a face-to-face confrontation with the Serbian commander, was incapacitated for several days thereafter with severe diarrhea (Klusemann 2006).

29. Similarly in the case of audiences of political speeches, applause lasts much longer than booing; and booing is harder to get going, and harder to sustain, since mass participation drops out more easily (Clayman 1993).

CHAPTER 3 FORWARD PANIC

1. A similar case of LAPD officers beating a car thief at the end of a footchase, videoed by a news helicopter, is shown in a sequence of photographs in the Los Angeles Times, July 24, 2004.

2. But not, apparently, a completely innocent and passive person: he was vo- cally aggressive, at least until the fight started; he had worked in dangerous man- ual labor; he also had a certain amount of prominence in local political circles, as protege of a local sheriff (Stump 1994: 206). This type of individual seems characteristic of the rough politics as well as the rough spectator atmosphere of baseball at this time.

3. The feat of hitting .400 two years in a row was matched only once, by Rog- ers Hornsby in 1924-25. The pressure of batting over .400 is probably the highest experienced in sustaining any baseball record, since it requires getting two or more hits every day of the season (allowing for occasional hitless days), making virtually every at-bat crucial, without any letdown.

4. I owe this observation to Robert Lien, a sociologist who has studied emo- tions in high-challenge sports.

5. The debilitating effect of an adrenalin rush that is not allowed to culminate in a fight is shown in the following incident. In a game at Yankee Stadium in 1923, Ty Cobb was managing the Detroit Tigers against a pitcher, Carl Mays, who had killed a man, Ray Chapman, by hitting him with a fastball. Cobb instructed his batter to fall down at the first close pitch and writhe around, whereupon Cobb walked to the mound. The batter recalled, "I thought he intended to jump all over Mays. But to my surprise he only said, 'Now, Mr. Mays, you should be more careful where you throw. Remember Chapman?' Cobb walked back to the plate, shaking his head. Mays was actually trembling . . . he was so unnerved that he couldn't get anybody out. We scored five runs off him to beat New York easily" (Stump 1994: 351). Cobb's reputation as the most violent man in baseball had the pitcher keyed up for a severe fight; when it did not happen, his body was shaking with undischarged adrenalin. The incident also indicates that an ex- tremely aggressive person like Ty Cobb was not simply at the mercy of raging impulses; like some other persons who make a career out of aggressiveness—such as Mafia enforcers—he could let himself go into the tunnel of violent emotion, but he could also recognize other persons' anticipations of his behavior and play on their expectations to his own advantage.

6. One sees a similar version among athletes in sports victory celebrations, combining expressions of elation with a kind of symbolic or truncated gesture of anger: a home-run hitter circling the bases pumping his fist; a pitcher celebrating a

476 • Notes to Chapter 3

strikeout at a crucial moment with a gesture like a boxer's punch. Compare figures 8.5A and B in chapter 8 of pitchers' pumping fists and protruding lower jaws.

7. See Collins (2004: 205-11) and Katz (1999, esp. 18-83 and 229-73) for analyses of rhythmic self-entrainment; these includes private forms of magic-like incantation such as cursing and forms of crying.

8. We are inclined to take this kind of laughter during a forward panic atrocity as further evidence of the extreme moral depravity of the perpetrators. But this is our folk psychology, and it reverses the actual order of causality; the hysterical laughter is an expression of uncontrollable self-entrainment.

9. A similar incident was substantiated by the U.S. Army's investigative Viet- nam War Crimes Working Group for an infantry attack on villages in the Que Son Valley in September 1969, killing animals along with civilians and children while burning homes in a sweep for guerrillas. Documents summarized in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 6, 2006, p. A9.

10. Just what proportion participated with what degree of enthusiasm is diffi- cult to estimate from available evidence. As we have seen in the SLAM ratio of firing in combat, and as we will see more extensively in chapter 10, a small propor- tion of the group carries out most of the violence in virtually all collective actions; where victims are completely helpless, however, many others follow the violence leaders.

11. The term was coined by William James, then imported into sociology by Martin (1920).

12. The example of John Rabe, the Nazi Party member who attempted to stop the killing at Nanking, and even wrote letters of protest to his Nazi superiors in Germany, asking for their political intervention with the Japanese (Chang 1997: 109-21), shows again the situational character of atrocities. The Nazis, for all their own atrocities, were not atrocious in all situations; where they were not caught up in their own dynamics of killing, they might take the stance of outside observers shocked by such violence.

13. In this respect it is similar to the milder phenomenon of carousing zones, discussed in chapter 7.

14. A variant of the responsibility-from-above theme is that official policy has inadvertent consequences leading to atrocity. Gibson (1986) is chiefly concerned to show that in the Vietnam war, the emphasis by the U.S. military command upon a high level of enemy body counts, in order to calculate the progress of a war of attrition, was responsible for loose definitions of combatants and the killing of civilians. This explanation fits classic organizational theory of unintended conse- quences of purposive action, and is very likely true. Nevertheless killing of civil- ians did not occur in every possible encounter, but in particular situations; many of these had the emotional dynamics of forward panics, although the proportion is hard to establish.

15. Thus mass rapes are typically the result of a forward panic which opens the way for a moral holiday. Conversely, moral holidays may occur independently of forward panics, as we see in chapter 7.

16. This passivity is situational, not a constant. A Jewish militant assassinated a German diplomat in Paris in 1938; in 1943, the Warsaw ghetto carried out two military uprisings. Passivity was specific to the deportations and death camps,

Notes to Chapter 3 • 477

where the whole interactional atmosphere was rigged to produce not just physical but emotional dominance by the Nazis.

17. When artillery, machine guns, or other lethal distance weapons became available, as in the Napoleonic wars, the American Civil War, and the world wars, lengthy battles involving assaults on dug-in defensive positions produced higher casualties. In the Civil War, casualties in major battles ranged from 6 to 12 percent at the low end to 25 to 29 percent at the high end. Under these circumstances, the heavy casualties were usually taken by the attacker, unless there was a sudden breakdown and panic retreat, such as Union forces underwent at Chickamauga and Confederate forces at Chattanooga in 1863. See Griffith (1986: 46; 1989).

18. Caesar (Civil War, 197) explicitly chose a similar target for attack in a lengthy marching battle during his African campaign: "He gave the signal when the enemy had begun to throw their weapons perfunctorily and carelessly, and suddenly launched his cohorts of foot and squadrons of horse at them. In an instant they drove the enemy effortlessly from the field."

19. There continue to be instances, even with modern mechanized warfare, where a local rout concatenates to demoralize and disorganize an entire army. These include the Italian army's disastrous retreat from Caporetto in 1917, and the French army's response to the German blitzkrieg in 1940. The main features of a forward panic attack are reproduced on the macro level when one side suc- ceeds in paralyzing their opponents by imposing emotional momentum on them. In the Gulf war of February 1991, Iraqi forces went into a panic retreat of vehicles streaming back along the highway from Kuwait into Iraq. American pilots strafed them unmercifully, causing thousands of casualties in an air-power version of a forward panic, with the pilots reporting back in a mood of elation at the "turkey shoot." In the conventional phase of the March-April 2003 Iraq war, U.S. attack so disorganized the Iraqi army that it melted away, with few units giving con- certed resistance. Similar to small-scale forward panics, losses of winners and losers were hugely disproportionate: Germans in 1940 losing 1 per 150 of their troops, the French having virtually their entire army taken prisoner; in the Gulf War, the United States losing 1 per 3,000 troops, in the Iraq invasion 1 per 1,400; Iraqi losses in each war disintegrated armies of hundreds of thousands (Biddle 2004; Lowry 2003; Murray and Scales 2003; www.icasualties.org/oif). The situa- tional nature of such disparities is indicated by the fact that U.S. losses were pro- portionately much higher during the phase of guerrilla war that followed during the occupation of Iraq, when forces on both sides fought without organizational breakdown.

20. The vestibule was five feet wide by seven feet deep. Two of the officers led the firing, shooting sixteen bullets each; the other two were caught up in the conta- gion, firing an additional nine bullets between them. (New York Post, Feb. 9-13, 1999; USA Today, Feb. 28, 2000; www.courttv.com/archive/national/diallo).

2 1 . In the following I draw heavily on Horowitz (2001), a study of 150 cases of ethnic violence, almost all since World War II, chiefly in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union, with the largest number of cases from Hindu-Muslim riots in India.

22. Horowitz (2001: 80). These are especially prominent in ethnic riots in South Asia and Africa; not in American race riots. But racial lynchings often have a similar process of rumor exaggeration about ritualistic offenses, which in turn

478 • Notes to Chapter 3

are paid back by corresponding ritual mutilations (Senechal de la Roche 2001; Allen 2000). Since the initial rumor is generally false, the imagery of mutilation circulated during that period is more a matter of creating an image, foreshadowing or planning what will be done to the victim.

2 3 . One such case occurred in Gujarat (western India) during February 27 to March 2, 2002: Muslims firebombed two railroad cars full of Hindu demonstra- tors passing through the area on their way to a sacred site in central India con- tested between Muslims and Hindus, killing fifty-eight. In the ensuing three days of attacks by Hindus on Muslim villages, several thousand villagers were trapped and burned to death, while firefighters were blocked from entering the area (Human Rights Watch 14, no. 3 [April 2002]; available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 2002/india/).

24. Horowitz (2001: 74): "Once the riot becomes intense, any disposition the targets may have felt to resist and counterattack will almost certainly disappear. In the relatively few cases of significant early resistance, there are reports of victims who then became 'pathetically passive and allowed themselves to be slaughtered like sheep.'"

25. Nor are targets picked because of maximal cultural distance. Nearby com- parisons are easier to make than distant ones, and thus nearby ethnic targets often are relatively similar in culture to their attackers (Horowitz 2001: 187-93).

26. On occasion, a smaller ethnic group may attack a larger one. Horowitz (2001: 393) refers to these as instances of "desperation demography," where one group is becoming outnumbered by the more rapid breeding or in-migration of their rival group. But in these instances, too, there is always local superiority of numbers: attacking in just those neighborhoods where the balance of power is favorable, and targeting more civilized, middle-class groups who are averse to using violence. More "advanced," educated, urbanized and middle-class ethnic groups rarely riot against groups less "advanced" on these indices, although they sometimes may be recruitment bases for guerrilla or terrorist movements (Horo- witz 2001: 180).

27. Thus Horowitz (2001) points out how much care a riot-preparing group may put into choosing its targets, avoiding false positives, members of the wrong ethnic group who might get mistaken for the appropriate victims. This may be regarded as a form of calculating rationality, fighting with just the targeted ethnic group, and avoiding raising further enemies and having to fight more than one enemy at a time.

28. In Petersburg, after the first confrontation, a small number of rebellious soldiers in the demonstration fired back, and government troops eventually re- treated; each side sustained about the same number of killed and wounded (Trotsky 1930).

29. Buford (1990: 303-8) describes what it is like being the victim of a police attack in just these circumstances. As a journalist accompanying a large group of British football hooligans during the World Cup match in Sardinia, he finds him- self in the pathway of Italian police on their way to counter-attack a large group of hooligans who have just rampaged through the city. Buford decides to detach himself from the crowd and to crouch in a defensive posture with his hands guard- ing his head, hoping that the police will just give him a passing blow on their way

Notes to Chapter 4 • 479

to attacking the main group. Instead he unknowingly has taken the most vulnera- ble victim position, attracting three policemen who beat him at length while he is lying on the ground trying to cover up vulnerable parts of his body; this seems to goad the police into a mini-contest to try to tear his hands and arms away so that they can hit him more painfully.

30. Generalizations in this section, and in chapter 1 1 , are based on my collec- tion of four hundred photos of crowd violence from 1989 through 2005 in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The reader may find many of the photos cited in this book by date in the online image archives of the following: APImages.com; pictures.Reuters.com; procorbis.com; Gettylmages.com.

3 1 . We may add yet a fourth factor leading to the prolonged beating of King: the officer who initially led the car chase and first attempted to arrest King was a woman. King's demeanor when he finally left his car to surrender in the first mo- ments of the arrest was not so much threatening as insolent. The woman highway patrol officer testified that he grabbled his buttock and shook it at her. King was not taking the arrest seriously, and even was expressing a sexual innuendo at the woman officer. At least this was how the other officers present took the gesture. The woman officer, having trouble subduing King, drew her pistol; whereupon the LAPD sergeant on the scene told her to get back and that he and his men were taking over the arrest (testimony on Court TV video "The Rodney King Case," 1992). King rushed the officer who tried to handcuff him, knocking him down, whereupon a second officer hit him across the face with a baton, and the beating was on. All this fits a pattern that is common in fights generally, although more usually in carousing, barroom and nightclub scenes: men are more likely to fight in the presence of women (Grazian 2003: 2 1 ; personal communication, 2004). This does not mean that they are fighting over the women; my ethnographic collec- tion of student reports indicates that men without dates pick fights with other men without dates. This may be regarded as a particular kind of bystander effect: women onlookers, even if they are entirely passive, tend to make men more con- tentious toward each other, and to blow up confrontations into violent ones. In a sense, King and the policemen who took over the arrest from the woman officer were all showing off in front of her. Thus, on the micro level, the tension continued to escalate even after the end of the car chase.

32. A similar sequence in West Virginia in 1901 ended in a lynching. It began when a small-town police chief chased a black man fleeing from arrest for a street disturbance; in the ensuing tussle, the black shot the cop with his own revolver, then jumped through a window and was pursued by a crowd of five hundred who had gathered watching the fight; after a half-mile chase, the fugitive was beaten and hung from a tree (Allen 2000: 193).

CHAPTER 4 ATTACKING THE WEAK: I. DOMESTIC ABUSE

1. Maxfield and Widom (1996). This was an unusually thorough follow-up study of abuse victims through age thirty-two, by which time most crimes are commit- ted. Similarly for other criminal arrests for nonviolent violations: excluding traffic

4 8 0 • N o t e s t o C h a p t e r 4

v i o l a t i o n s : t h e a b u s e d a n d n e g l e c t e d g r o u p h a d a r a t e o f 4 9 p e r c e n t , bur t h e c o n - t r o l g r o u p w a s 3 8 p e r c e n t — a r a t i o a g a i n o f 1 . 3 t o 1 . U n d e t e c t e d c r i m e s a n d v i o - l e n c e w o u l d n o d o u b t m a k e t h e s e f i g u r e s higher, b u t t h e r a t i o b e t w e e n t h e t w o g r o u p s s e e m s l i k e l y t o b e t h e s a m e .

2 . K a u f m a n a n d Z i e g l e r ( 1 9 9 3 ) give 3 0 p e r c e n t a s b e s t e s t i m a t e f o r i n t e r g e n e r a - t i o n a l t r a n s m i s s i o n o f severe a b u s e , i n r e t r o s p e c t i v e s t u d i e s ; t h a t is, s a m p l i n g o n t h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e , 7 0 p e r c e n t o f a b u s e r s did n o t r e p o r t b e i n g a b u s e d . S a m - p l i n g o n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i n a l o n g i t u d i n a l s t u d y , E g e l a n d ( 1 9 9 3 : 2 0 3 ) f o u n d a 4 0 p e r c e n t t r a n s m i s s i o n r a t e ; t h i s , h o w e v e r , i s a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f b e i n g a b u s e d , a n d d o e s n o t c a p t u r e t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h o s e w h o a b u s e o t h e r s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s e a r e f a m i l i e s w i t h m u l t i p l e s o u r c e s o f s t r e s s ; i n t h e l a r g e r p o p u l a t i o n w h e r e risk f a c t o r s a r e l o w e r , t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n p e r c e n t a g e m i g h t well b e l o w e r . I n a n y c a s e , t h e s e f i g u r e s a r e m u c h h i g h e r t h a n e s t i m a t e s o f t h e r a t e o f c h i l d a b u s e i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n , a b o u t 2 t o 4 p e r c e n t ( S t r a u s a n d G e l l c s 1 9 8 6 ) . T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f b e i n g a b u s e d h a s s o m e c a u s a l e f f e c t o n subsequently- a b u s i n g o t h e r s . I f w e e x p a n d t h e definition o f b e i n g a b u s e d t o all f o r m s o f c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t , this b e c o m e s a very w e a k p r e d i c t o r , s i n c e t h e r e a r e m a n y m o r e p e r - s o n s w h o w e r e s u b j e c t e d t o c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t o f n o n - e x t r e m e f o r m s ( a r o u n d 9 0 p e r c e n t ) t h a n t h o s e w h o g o o n t o c a r r y o u t e x t r e m e a b u s e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a t i o n . J o h n s o n a n d F e r r a r o ( 2 0 0 0 ) , s u m m a r i z i n g t h e c h a n g e i n s c h o l a r l y o p i n i o n i n t h e 1 9 9 0 s , n o t e t h a t m o s t o f t h e s t u d i e s o f t h e 1 9 8 0 s t h a t m a d e p o p u l a r t h e " c y c l e o f a b u s e " e x p l a n a t i o n w e r e f r o m c l i n i c a l d a t a l a c k i n g c o n t r o l g r o u p s a n d relied o n r e t r o s p e c t i v e d a t a .

3 . S i m i l a r l y f o r t r a n s m i s s i o n o f s p o u s a l v i o l e n c e t o t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n b y e x - a m p l e ; J o h n s o n a n d F e r r a r o ( 2 0 0 0 : 9 5 8 ) n o t e t h a t " e v e n a m o n g t h e g r o u p o f men w h o s e p a r e n t s w e r e t w o s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s a b o v e a v e r a g e i n level o f p a r t n e r v i o l e n c e , 8 0 p e r c e n t o f a d u l t s o n s had n o t even o n c e i n t h e last 1 2 m o n t h s c o m m i t - ted a n y a c t s o f s e v e r e v i o l e n c e o n t h e i r p a r t n e r s . "

4 . C o m p a r e t h e c o m m o n i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f p e a c e - k e e p i n g f o r c e s i n s i t u a t i o n s o f e t h n o - n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t . L o c a l fighters q u i c k l y r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e a l t r u i s t i c c o m - m i t m e n t o f U . N . t r o o p s a n d o t h e r n e u t r a l p a r t i e s m a k e s t h e t h r e a t o f u s i n g v i o - l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e m i m p l a u s i b l e ; t h u s n o t o n l y a r e t h e y n o t i n h i b i t e d f r o m c o n t i n u - ing t o a t t a c k t h e i r l o c a l e n e m i e s , b u t t h e y a l s o t y p i c a l l y steal aid s u p p l i e s a n d b l a c k m a i l p e a c e k e e p e r s i n t o t r a d i n g s u b s e r v i e n c e f o r a n y s h o w o f c o o p e r a t i o n ( O b e r s c h a l l a n d S e i d m a n 2 0 0 5 ; K a l d o r 1 9 9 9 ) .

5 . D a l y a n d W i l s o n ( 1 9 8 8 ) a r g u e t h a t s t e p f a t h e r s a n d o t h e r n o n - r e l a t i v e s a r e m u c h m o r e likely t o h a r m c h i l d r e n o f t h e i r s e x u a l p a r t n e r , w h e r e a s b i o l o g i c a l f a t h e r s a r e n o t , b e c a u s e o f a g e n e t i c p r o p e n s i t y t o m a x i m i z e t h e p r o p a g a t i o n o f o n e ' s o w n g e n e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a n y such g e n e t i c t h e o r y m u s t p r o v i d e a m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l p r o p e n s i t y t o v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t c h i l d r e n o p e r a t e s . I t w o u l d h a v e t o b e s o m e t h i n g t h a t o p e r a t e s t h r o u g h d i f f e r e n t i a l p e r c e p t i o n o f s t r u g - gle w i t h an a t t e n t i o n - s e e k i n g , c r y i n g c h i l d . A p u r e l y s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t f o r ( m a n y , i f n o t a l l ) b i r t h f a t h e r s , t h e r e h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l i n t e r a c t i o n r i t u a l s b e t w e e n m o t h e r a n d f a t h e r w i t h t h e b a b y i n t h e f o c u s o f a t t e n t i o n ; t h e b a b y b e c o m e s a s a c r e d o b j e c t , a n e m b l e m o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d t h e i r i d e n t i t y a s a f a m i l y . T h e l a c k o f t h i s s y m b o l i c b o n d o f r e s p e c t f o r t h e b a b y ( h o w e v e r m u c h i t m a y b e s t r a i n e d b y o t h e r p r o c e s s e s ) i s a key d i f f e r e n c e t h a t e x p l a i n s w h y n o n -

Notes to Chapter 5 • 481

parents commit more violence against partners' children. This could be tested: biological fathers who had no ritual contact with the mother and child around time of child-bearing would act like non-fathers in their propensity to abuse.

6. By the same token, parental ideology does make a difference for the amount of corporal punishment used on teenagers; perhaps because parents have more of a range of control resources to choose from (Straus and Donnelly 2001: 208). About 50 percent of teenagers are hit by parents in any given year (Dietz 2000; Straus 1994).

7. Daly and Wilson (1988: 37-94). The evolutionary psychology argument is that mothers kill their children when they assess they do not have a good chance to raise them to maturity. It is dubious that mothers who commit infanticide make this kind of rationalistic judgment; often they are reacting to their own stigma of an unwanted or socially illegitimate birth (Kertzer 1993).

8. The use of corporal punishment in schools was notorious in some traditional Catholic schools, where nuns used disciplinary methods bordering on torture, such as making children sit on hot radiators. Nuns have also sometimes inflicted brutal punishments upon novices in nunneries. The exalted nature of authority in such organizations, and their greater traditionalism, are responsible for nuns using more violence than other modern teachers. My point here is that there is nothing intrinsically male about it; where women have extreme control over oth- ers, they also use violence.

9. Mothers who have more children are more likely to use corporal punish- ment, and to commit child abuse (Eamon and Zuehl 2001). This is understandable in that women in this situation are more absorbed in child-rearing, more socially isolated, and have less resources to devote to controlling each child; violence is the cheapest and most rapidly applied control in the immediate situation. But it also means that women who on the face of it are most "maternal" are also those who are most violent toward their children. Structurally, this is the same pattern as German forces using more brutality in rounding up Holocaust victims to trans- port to concentration camps (and killing more by a factor of four to one) when there was a lower ratio of guards to prisoners (Browning 1992: 95); or of prison guards who are isolated from the outside world and are heavily outnumbered by their prisoners (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1983).

10. Or her, as in the case of abuse of small children, like the babysitter who held the child's hand in scalding water.

CHAPTER 5 ATTACKING THE WEAK: II. BULLYING, M U G G I N G , AND H O L D U P S

1. Olweus (1993: 14), however, in Scandinavian data found much lower cross- over, with 17 percent of victims also acting as bullies; these bullies/victims were 1.6 percent of all children.

2. Students were twice as likely to be bullied at elementary school than on their way to or from school; in high school, three times as likely (Olweus 1993: 21). The school is the bullies' field of action; and high school is an especially intense field, although as noted, the bullying becomes more verbal and less physical. Ol-

482 • Notes to Chapter 5

weus (1993: 15-16) found that there are many more victims than bullies in the earliest grades; by the time they have reached secondary school, there are more bullies than victims. This implies a shift from individualized bullying to collective bullying.

3. Since much assault in prison, as well as elsewhere, is not bullying in the strict sense of the term (an ongoing exploitative dominance relationship; not simply the experience of being beaten up in a fight), there is a serious methodological prob- lem of separating out bullying when trying to measure its extent in prisons, and to gauge whether it is stable, intransitive, or passed on by cyclical reversal to others.

4. In one study, 56 percent of youth offenders and 26 percent of adult inmates were called insulting names within the past month; but only 20 percent of the serious assaults during that month involved insults. Moreover, 70 percent of the youth and 80 percent of the adult prisoners were not assaulted during the month, indicating that most incidents of insult don't escalate (Edgar and O'Donnell 1998: 640). Similarly, Ireland (2002) found that insults are much more frequent than fights.

5. Homophobic language is often used by students in the popular crowd to denigrate members of music bands and drama groups, which are mid-ranking "alternative" cultures in American high schools (Milner 2004: chap. 4 and n. 62). Milner judges that most students do not seriously believe these accusations, but only use them to justify scorning the position of certain individuals in the school status system. Kimmel and Mahler (2003) note that in the mass killings in schools in the 1990s, most of the shooters had been called homosexual, but none of them actually was. The killers were weak victims of collective bullying: either small and skinny, or badly overweight, with complexion problems, and far from the school ideal of the athlete and sexual market stars; it was this low-status position in the school hierarchy that gave some local sense for branding them as homosexual.

6. Gaughan, Cerio, and Myers (2001) found in a national opinion survey that blacks regarded bullying as a less serious problem than whites.

7. Franzoi et al. (1994) used five categories: popular, controversial, average, neglected, and rejected. The last are those most explicitly bullied, at least by repu- tational jeering and pointed exclusion.

8. The crucial feature affecting likelihood of killing is whether the victim is hooded, not the killer (Grossman 1995: 128). On a less lethal level, this is the same pattern as in the humiliation by U.S. military guards of hooded prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in 2004 (Mestrovic 2006).

9. Muggers may be gang members, but the gang as a whole is generally an umbrella organization for a variety of criminal activities, and mugging is usually carried out by small groups temporarily detaching themselves from the gang (Jan- kowski 1991). The vast majority of muggers (98 percent) are male; about 20 per- cent of their victims are female; the victims of female muggers are almost always female (Pratt 1980).

10. Goffman analyzes this structure formally in Strategic Interaction (1969) as a hierarchy of clandestine moves in deception and uncovering it. An example is in the Choderlos de Laclos novel, Liaisons Dangereuses: the seducer of a young ingenue makes his first move by offering to deliver her letters from her lover,

Notes to Chapter 6 • 483

against the wishes of her mother; she agrees and gives him a key to her bedroom; when the seducer shows up in her bed, he prevents her from calling for aid by asking how she will explain it to her mother that she has given him the key.

11. In the sympathetic public atmosphere of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, racial minorities sometimes play this drama in street en- counters for its own sake, without money payoffs. Duneier (1999: 188-216) de- scribes in close detail, with both conversational recordings and photographs, how an aggressive poor black man can dominate the sidewalk in a white upper-middle- class Manhattan neighborhood, making persistent sexual advances to young white women who act embarrassed about fending them off. Here the payoff is nothing more than situational dominance itself, through having mastered a tech- nique of face confrontation. The very fact that the polite white middle-class style is what Goffman calls "civil disattention," is made into a source of weakness by the black man who gives it the interpretation of racist rejection. He thereby gets to control the situation and to expand his emotional energy, at the expense of the other's EE loss.

12. Katz (1988). Just such an event was described to me by a young Chicano male who had been held up while working in a liquor store.

13. Such robbers were particularly nervous in the moments immediately before the robbery, as they tried to bring themselves to the point of making the attempt: "1 was thinking, 'Will 1 do it? . . . Can I do it?'" Another: "It's the initial . . . enormity of what you're doing. Once you get over that, everything becomes eas- ier" (Morrison and O'Donnell 1994: 74).

14. The black nationalist Eldridge ('leaver (1968: 33), in a famous passage, describes how he became a rapist: "To refine my technique and modus operandi, I started out by practicing on black girls in the ghetto . . . and when I considered myself smooth enough, I crossed the tracks and sought out white prey." He does not say what those techniques were that he perfected. Cleaver was a big muscular man, so the techniques he developed were not simply a matter of raw force. One of my students, who also had associated with Cleaver (some ten years after he had written the above), reported that he taught how to look at the everyday details of the urban scene like a hunter looking for prey, noting attractive women's habit- ual routines, and finding ways to catch them off guard.

15. An example: A homosexual army sergeant engages in giving fellatio to a fellow soldier (who is not primarily homosexual himself, and never reciprocates). Their relationship becomes obsessive as they fall into the practice of seeking out situations in which they are in danger of being caught by other soldiers nearby; both of them explicitly recognize a major part of the thrill comes from the risks they are taking (Scott 2001).

CHAPTER 6 STAGING FAIR FIGHTS

1. These fights are highly idealized, in the crucial sense of my analysis: virtually every fight is described as brief and deadly, usually settled in one blow by the winning hero; in fights where both heroes are especially important, the fight is

484 • Notes to Chapter 6

slightly prolonged by parrying a preliminary blow by the other side. There are virtually no misses; everyone is competent and accurate. The only exceptions occur in single combats: the counter-hero sometimes misses—but very closely— with his weapon; or a hero's armor—which is one of the ritual foci of attention, and a prime object of victorious spoils-taking—just staves off a deadly hit. Homer vividly describes wounds and death-agony, and this gives a ring of brutal authen- ticity; but this is the kind of blood-and-gore authenticity that war stories have always had, diverting attention from the unrealistic idealization of military brav- ery and competence that goes with it.

2. They put themselves forward with some trepidation, since Hector is re- garded as ranking superior to virtually all of them; only Achilles, the top Greek fighter, is considered better, but he is sulking in the camp, refusing to fight because of a quarrel he has had with the Greek paramount king over possession of women captives. There is a clear rank ordering among heroes. Menelaos and Paris, who fought the opening duel, are considered rather low on the list, and Menelaos is prohibited from representing the Greeks against Hector for this reason. In this social arena, not only are all reputations clearly known among both friend and foe, but they are strictly ranked by fighting prowess. The sequence of single com- bats that make up the plot of the Iliad resembles a heavy-weight boxing tourna- ment: starting with lower-ranking fighters, and ending with the top two.

3. This is explicitly described as a stroke of good luck, since Aias along with Diomedes are considered the top heroes currently available: that is, they are num- bers two and three, below Achilles, in the Greek top ten.

4. Such organization is superior to the single-combat style in two senses: supe- rior in winning battles by force, killing the others; and superior in dominating the emotional focus of the situation. Romans did not have a code of honor encom- passing dueling or vendettas; because their army was organized in this distinctly different fashion; and because in domestic politics, dominant households assem- bled huge blocs of property and power by the use of political connections and organized force (MacMullen 1974). No Roman would risk himself in a duel, when he could use his money and influence to buy votes, or his agents to assassinate opponents; if both antagonists were strong, they raised large armies (by money, by repute for generalship and therefore by chances of winning, and to an extent by kin ties and patronage). Roman honor focused chiefly on an honorable death, especially suicide when one was defeated in battle or in politics. Individual cour- age was a last refuge against being paraded in a degrading way in a conqueror's triumphal train, not a display of one's own fighting prowess. Something like a duel existed but only in the gladiatorial shows and in their training schools; but gladiators were not Roman citizens, but an inferior class providing entertainment. Romans did not fight duels but civil wars. Neither vendetta nor duel are to be explained simply as "ancient Mediterranean" traditions, since the most famous Mediterraneans of them all practiced neither.

5. The rampages by Homeric heroes through the opposing army are secondary in the narrative to their single combats, but the rampages may be regarded both as demonstration of their capacity to act like a "berserker"—carried away in a frenzy of attack—and as a way of building up their reputation in the course of the narrative, so that their eventual single combats are given proper weight.

Notes to Chapter 6 • 485

6. In laboratory experiments with small groups, the presence of an audience has been found to produce escalation in an exchange of insults, with more escala- tion when egged on by a troublemaker, and less escalation when advised by a peacemaker (Felson 1994: 33-34). These are one-on-one conflicts, which remain short of violence, at the level of what I would call bluster; in real-life violence, and with sizable audiences, as we see the effects are even more palpable.

7. Assaults peak statistically on Friday and Saturday nights, and in carousing zones (Budd 2003: table 6). What has not been measured is whether fights are more frequent per capita present in those venues.

8. Fukuzawa was in fact generally a courageous man, who risked assassination many times during his career, as a leading Westernizer during the political strug- gles over the opening of Japan. Five or six years earlier than this incident, when he was a student in Osaka, he and his classmates would start mock fights in the midst of crowds on summer evenings, just for the fun of frightening bystanders, who were from the lower-ranking merchant class (1981: 66). In each case the interactional situation promoted, controlled, or demobilized the violence.

9. My collection of violent confrontations were almost entirely without guns; in only one case was a gun present, and it was only shown, not drawn; the audi- ence was neutral, and the fight aborted. It is possible that audience effects are less important in a heavily armed, lower-class milieu. Wilkinson's (2003) study of violent young black and Hispanic males does not directly address the effect of various stances taken by the audience. Her data does show that if fights take place without weapons, 26 percent of them are squashed or abort before they become serious, and only 14 percent lead to an ongoing expectation that the fight would be resumed at another time. If guns are used, only 8.5 percent aborted, and 40 percent were ongoing; these figures rise to 10 percent and 48 percent if successful holdups are excluded (calculated from Wilkinson, 205). Thus fights with guns (even if the guns are not fired or no one is hit) are harder to abort, and are more likely to promote an ongoing conflict. It is unclear how much this is affected by the patterns of street fighting in East Coast cities; in West Coast gangs, drive-by shootings are the most prominent form of gun use, and these are usually brief and quasi-abortive (Sanders 1994). There are also numerous incidents where rival gangs taunt each other in a school yard or playground by lifting their shirts to show guns tucked in their waist-bands, but do not engage in firing (from court files). In Wilkinson's data, guns were present in 78 percent of the crew-on-crew confrontations (fifty-nine of seventy-six) and were fired in 36 percent of the sce- narios where they were present (twenty-one of fifty-nine) (calculated from Wilkin- son, pp. 130, 188). As we shall see, in the case of dueling, guns per se do not exclude powerful audience effects.

10. Bystanders generally stay out of staged fair fights, as well as most other fights, unless they are strongly tied to one of the fighters and are antagonists of the group represented by his opponent (as in a football firm or ethnic group). Researchers (e.g., Tilly 2003) have placed so much emphasis on the activation of collective identities in group fights that they overlook this pattern, which is proba- bly much more frequent. There need to be special conditions, even when group identities exist, to mobilize the audience up to the level where they overcome con- frontational tension/fear and actually fight.

486 • Notes to Chapter 6

11. Compare incidents in Chicago in September 2002 and April 2003. In each case one or two rowdy fans invaded the baseball field and attacked, respectively, a fifty-four-year-old coach and an umpire. The attacks appeared to be motivated by drunken ebullience, and a stated desire to get into the center of attention by getting on television. My point here is the social reaction: in both instances players from both teams rushed the invaders and beat them before they were taken away by police; the crowds strongly booed the invasion, and cheered for the players who retaliated against them. The intruding fans were taking attention away from the primary contest; it was this frame-breaking that called forth a widely shared reaction of moralistic punishment.

12. The earliest schools in ancient Greece were for training cohorts of upper- class youth in games and gymnastics that prepared for various kinds of combat; such schools predated by several centuries schools for literacy and verbal skills (Marrou 1964; Collins 2000).

13. There are other rituals as well, such as a sequence of fighting moves (kata) performed against an imaginary enemy, which can be interpreted as reenactments of famous fights in the past by masters of the lineage. Sources for the observations in these paragraphs include Draeger (1974) and five years of my own experience in three different martial arts schools, as well as observations of such schools attended by my children.

14. The staging that is pervasive in such schools presents their technique as much deadlier and more effective than it actually is; in real life, trained martial artists too rarely live up to the ideal touted in the schools. I once asked my karate teacher what to do if there were someone with a gun; his reply: "Run like hell." As if to illustrate the point, the world-champion Thai-style kick-boxer, Alex Gong, was shot to death on a San Francisco street when he chased a driver who had crashed into his parked car [San Diego Union, August 5, 2003).

15. Hence boxing schools in the black inner-city ghetto provide a haven from the violent code of the street, not a weapon to use in it (Wacquant 2004).

16. In hundreds of hours in karate schools, witnessing hundreds of matches, I have never seen a fight that spilled over the stopping point—the fighters might get angry during a match, and try to hit harder, but they did not keep on hitting after the master called the round to an end, nor fail to bow to the other. Members of karate schools could have grudges against each other, but they usually expressed them not by fighting but by use of etiquette. This was especially likely when a lower-ranking fighter bested a higher-ranking fighter in a match (e.g., a green belt beating a red belt). Retaliation usually took the form of the higher-ranking fighter later ordering the lower-ranking one to mop the floor or perform some other menial task.

17. The sport of boxing emerged in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century En- gland from rural and lower-class bouts sponsored and attended by the upper- class "sporting set," as a form of staged excitement and gambling. It was these aristocrats who codified the rules, including eventually the wearing of padded gloves. Bare-knuckle fights lasting unlimited rounds until one fighter was unable to continue were largely supplanted by the 1880s. The pastime in the 1920s was epitomized by Hemingway, who routinely engaged in practice sparring—of which

Notes to Chapter 6 • 487

he was very proud—but never fought in a public competition (Dunning 1999: 5 5 - 60; Callaghan 1963).

18. A student report describes an incident in the early 2000s in which a group of Korean-American students got involved in a fist-fight over who was going to escort a girl. Although one of the participants in the fight was trained in the mar- tial arts, he did not use any of its techniques. This fits a ritual separation of spheres: idealized fighting at school, low-level brawling outside.

19. Hamlet's duel is in fact a school-like fencing match, consisting of a series of rounds with supposedly baited (blunted) foils. It starts with a courtier, acting as go-between, who delivers the challenge; but in this case it takes the form of a bet, made by the king, who is sponsoring the contest: new French dueling swords, wagered against a more traditional prize, war horses. The duel as a purely private grudge match to the death, enacted under etiquette, is not yet depicted in Shakespeare.

20. In this respect, the duel was a considerable change from the medieval prac- tice of trial by combat; the older practice was an official one, legal when granted by the king, and such combat would take place in the presence of the assembled authorities. Duels were for purely private grievances, indeed rather trivial ones in contrast to the property and vengeance claims that made up the medieval judicial combat; and duels were fought in secret, as far as official society was concerned. Trial by combat could be granted to any free man; dueling was monopolized by the aristocracy as a mark of status.

2 1 . McAleer (1994: 75, 9 3 - 9 4 , 1 1 4 , 224); Nye (1993:185). German duels gen- erally were punished by the authorities, including special army courts, only when there were deaths; hence the high range of estimates is for duels without fatalities.

22. In France during the 1880s, about one-third of duels were settled before they were fought (Nye 1993: 186).

23. Even today, the effective range of a .45 caliber military pistol is officially set at eighty-three feet (U.S. Air Force 2006: 50)—that is, twenty-seven paces. Most police shootings take place at ten feet or less, and as we have seen, misses are frequent.

24. Compare the early chapters of Tolstoi's War and Peace, which includes a scene of carousing army officers drinking, gambling, and showing off by dares such as draining a bottle of rum while perched suicidally on an upper-floor win- dow sill. This was published in 1867, based upon Tolstoi's military experiences before and during the Crimean War of J 854-55.

25. And indeed there was a distinctive "backwoods" style among poor white farmers and laborers that prevailed in the South before the dueling style percolated down from the upper classes (Corn 1985). These "rough-and-tumble" fights were no-holds-barrcd, allowing eye-gouging as well as hair-pulling and maiming; their boisterousness appears to have been in deliberate conttast to the emotionally re- strained, polite manners of upper-class duelists. In the eighteenth and early nine- teenth centuries, the upper classes regarded poor whites as beneath their dignity to duel with. As democratization proceeded, the two styles came closer together.

26. Not that the pacified nineteenth-century elite had no insults and disputes, but it was in the process of developing an etiquette that included sanctions such as "cutting" an offender (in a purely metaphorical sense) by refusing polite ges-

488 • Notes to Chapter 6

tures of recognition in public, as well as an array of institutions such as private clubs from which an offender could be blackballed (Baltzell 1958; Cannadine 1990).

27. The most famous gunfighter of the late 1870s, Billy the Kid, worked for one of the rival syndicates of property owners during the so-called Lincoln County war in the New Mexico territory. He became famous because of widespread news- paper coverage of the conflict, with its rival claims to organize law-enforcement in remote areas of the territory, and its connections to wider political factions (Kooistra 1989). Gunfighters were generally hired mercenaries, but also robbers, professional gamblers, and thus part of an "action crowd" similar to urban crimi- nal milieux. They resemble eighteenth-century British highwaymen, similarly preying on newly founded long-distance transport services such as stagecoach lines. The growth of popular culture heroizing pistol-wielding plebeian high- waymen must have been part of the process that lowered the status of gentlemen's pistol duels; these largely disappeared from British society by the 1820s.

28. We are used to thinking in terms of an evolutionary sequence between tribal organization and early states, but there is often an intermediate formation that is neither (Weber 1922/1968: 365-66; Borkenau 1981; Collins 1986: 2 6 7 - 97; Grinin 2003). It arises not only when tribes have begun to amalgamate, but as warriors leave their clan identities behind to join marauding groups. Examples are the Viking bands; many of the German coalitions outside the Roman Empire; Greek instances reflected in mythology include the Argonauts, a band of heroes who join together for a distant voyage in search of booty; and the ad hoc army that besieges Troy.

29. Hero-warriors of this type must be distinguished from famous bandits, who may also have the idealized reputation as brave, daring, and invincible fight- ers. The structures under which these appear are where a state breaks down (as in weak phases of Chinese dynasties), or where a state penetrates into tribal or local village areas enough to motivate formation of bands of resisters (hence "bandits"); the state lacks sufficient administrative structure to rule, while the bandits lack organizational capacity to supplant the state (Eberhard 1977; Hobs- bawm 2000). The key is that aristocratic heroes fight one another under an honor code; bandits do not fight horizontally but vertically, against stronger organized forces from above. This gives bandit-heroes their reputation as romantic individu- alists, miraculously defying authority and evading capture; aristocratic heroes do neither.

30. Another deliberately contrived modern tribe-like structure is the athletic team: thus teams engage in vendetta-like patterns of violence (e.g., bean-ball wars in baseball), and their fans engage in corporate vengeance upon each other. This idea will be developed in chapter 8.

3 1 . An intermediate form exists where the belligerents suggest or demand that the other "step outside"; this is a naming of time and place, but it happens immedi- ately and without the mediation of seconds, in contrast to formal duels. This degree of scheduling is almost always confined to fist fights; indeed, if the chal- lenge is agreed upon to step outside, it is implied that the fight will be limited in that respect. Thus staged fair fights from the twentieth century (or, for England

Notes to Chapter 6 • 489

and America, since the mid-nineteenth century) onward have become almost ex- clusively fist fights.

32. An apparent exception: In the fights described by Fox (1977), given earlier, the principals were the subject of much community gossip and treated as celebri- ties. This helps highlight by contrast the distinctive features of fights in anonymous urban venues: the Irish west coast island community had an extensive network linking virtually everyone and thereby making a shared public object out of every- one's reputation; and this network was instrumental in keeping the fights orga- nized as fair, and in limiting their escalation.

33. My collection of student reports includes cases like the following: A dense crowd is exiting a train in New York City's Penn Station, bumping and jostling (late November 2001). A black woman, moving rapidly and wearing a headset, is bumped by a white woman, causing her to drop her CD player. The black woman calls out, "Oh shit! Watch where you're going!" The white woman gives an exasperated sigh, pauses briefly and begins to rush off. The black woman is angered by the lack of acknowledgment, and yells "Hey, pick it up! Pick up my CD, bitch! You, BITCH!" The white woman glances back and continues to walk away. The black woman shouts "YOU WHITE FUCKING BITCH!" and kicks her in the back—a little clearing having formed in the crowd as other passengers shied away. A white male bystander picks up her CD player and hands it to her; the black woman takes it roughly and storms away. The dispute does not become very escalated, because one side (the white woman) simply refuses to stay and fight, not so much forfeiting honor as not recognizing the situation as one involv- ing honor.

34. Sanders (1994: 148) notes that among Mexican-American gangs, "[0]ne can always save face by noting the inopportune nature of the situation and claim retaliation at a later date when the situation lends itself better to retaliation." Wilkinson (2003: 137, 141, 144, 151, 154-55, 169) gives numerous instances where a confrontation ends because one or both sides run away from a gun. In one instance, an armed crew invaded another's neighborhood to take revenge for the robbery of one of their girlfriends, but after a brief shootout in which no one was hit, they left and never returned (Wilkinson 2003: 156-57).

35. In chapter 10,1 give evidence that the proportion of gang members among young males in a community is usually around 10 percent at most. Alice Goffman (personal communication, Oct. 2005) confirms that the violent drug dealers she studied would admit only a small proportion of would-be recruits into their ranks; failure to be admitted into the criminal elite is an important reason why others in the community pursue low-paying straight jobs.

36. In an incident described in footnote 1 1 , one of the two males who invaded the field and attacked a coach, when asked why he did it, answered, "He flipped us off." If true, this could have occurred in response to the fan's heckling. More- over, the older of the two had made cell phone calls telling friends to watch the game on TV because something involving themselves was going to happen. San- ders (1994:147) notes that although gang members use the rhetoric of retaliation to account for how fights start, "there are too many instances of gangs instigating violence for this to be true."

490 • Notes to Chapter 6

37. These are in contrast to the names chosen by middle-class white gangs, who play upon an ironic counter-culture stance as outcasts ("the Losers"). Simi- larly with counter-culture youth groups generally (Milner 2004); they do not go looking for respect, but for disrespect, ironically mocking standards of respect- ability and popularity.

38. A member of the San Diego Police Department Gang Unit told me in the summer of 2004 of an agreement established among members of the Mexican Mafia—a kind of honorary inter-gang association of Chicanos who had been in prison and were regarded as especially tough. After a drive-by shooting in which a small child had been killed, the relative of one of the Mexican Mafia members, he gathered the heads of gangs together and got them to agree that one foot must be on the ground (rather than both feet in the car) while shooting. The rule was presumably designed to make firing more careful. The rule was generally adhered to by Chicano gangs, but was ignored by black gangs. White and Asian gangs, on the other hand, did not practice drive-bys. Motorcycle gangs were mostly white, and confined their rivalries to each other. Each ethnic group was segregated by violent techniques and targets; each constituted its own audience and field of reputation.

39. This is based on my collection of cases; in duels the audience does not cheer, but it takes an extremely active part in organizing the duel, and is crucial for whether the duel will come off or not.

40. In my collection of cases, of the twenty-six serious fights, only five came about without scheduling at least some major aspect of the situation; all the others (81 percent) were either announced and scheduled as fights, demonstrations, or confrontations (eight), or developed in the midst of scheduled carousing situations (street festivals, parties, games: eleven); or in crowded school assemblies (two). In contrast, of forty mild or brief fights, twenty-two (55 percent) similarly were in scheduled situations; of twenty-three abortive fights, seven (30 percent) were in scheduled situations.

Putting the matter the other way around: of fifty conflicts arising in scheduled situations, twenty-one (42 percent) produced serious fights, whereas in thirty-nine non-scheduled situations there were five serious fights (13 percent); in scheduled situations, fights aborted only 14 percent of the time (seven cases), whereas in non-scheduled situations, they aborted 41 percent of the time (sixteen), with the remaining 46 percent (eighteen) cases) being mild fights.

4 1 . In the seventeen instances in my data where the audience cheered the fight, eight of these were one-on-one fights; the others took the form of attacking the weak. All were in scheduled situations.

42. Hamlet, for example, cannot decide how to take revenge—vendetta style— and refuses an opportunity for unfair advantage in killing the king when he catches him alone and unarmed. In the end he engages in a ritual duel, is fatally wounded because his opponent cheats, and finally encompasses his revenge by killing all those who are implicated in the trespass of dueling rules. At almost every point, Hamlet shows his moral superiority by following the rules of fair fights; the exception is when he kills an eavesdropper by stabbing him through the wall-hanging, but even this is a punishment for deception, and of a lower- ranking person.

Notes to Chapter 6 • 491

4 3 . Jankowski (1991) stresses this interpretation: what I see as incompetence he sees as deliberate cultivation of a terroristic image, which is good for business if one is attempting to sell protection or create monopolies of illegal enterprise. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive; I argue only that the incompe- tence is pervasive and generic, even if gangs take advantage of it for their own purposes.

44. Wilkinson's data (2003, recalculated from pp. 182 and 188) shows that one-on-one fights are most likely to be carried out with no weapons (51 percent, 60 of 118) and only 28 percent of them involved guns (33 of 118); in all other kinds of fights (ganging up on one victim; and crew-on-crew) only 20 percent (33 of 162) were without weapons, and 68 percent (110 of 162) involved guns. Guns are least likely to be used in fights among friends (32 percent, 11 of 34) or acquain- tances (38 percent, 33 of 86) and most likely among rivals (66 percent, 35 of 63), and intermediate among strangers (52 percent, 67 of 130). The concept of a fair fight exists in these groups and instances are given throughout Wilkinson's inter- views, although there are no explicit figures on fair fights.

45. This discussion refers primarily to violence within and between Mafia orga- nizations, which is where most of the killings take place. Mob violence is more overt and public when it is used against victims in the outside world whom it wants to shake down, subject to taxation and protection payments; this is to a considerable extent put on as an intimidating show. But it is businesslike in its purposes, to establish and keep up a regular flow of income.

46. One reason why Mafia has had a relatively strong, self-reproducing organi- zation is that it recruits from real families. Lower-class gangs, in contrast, often recruit from broken families, and are unable to use family ties much as a basis of organization. This is more true of black gangs than Hispanic gangs (Horowitz 1983).

47. Another reason for the romanticization of the Mafia is suggested by its historical timing: popular sentimentalized films about Mafia families, like The Godfather, began in the 1970s. This was just the time that the Mafia began to be displaced as a major force in organized crime; Jamaican and Hispanic syndicates took over the wholesale drug business; in the 1990s, old standbys of extortion and organized prostitution became dominated by Russian and other ex-Soviet crime business. The widespread legalization of gambling also cut into a traditional area of criminal protection. It is a much more localized and less culturally threat- ening Mafia that is the real-life basis for romanticization in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

CHAPTER 7 VIOLENCE AS FUN AND ENTERTAINMENT

1. This last perception is not strictly accurate. In large and prolonged riots, most arrests are for looting. In the 1992 Los Angeles (Rodney King) riot, arrests totaled 9,500; in the 1977 New York City blackout, 3,000 arrests; in the 1965 Watts (L.A.) riot, 3,900 arrests (Halle and Rafter 2003: 341-42). But in the mood of the moral holiday, few think of this contingency, and in fact their chances of

492 • Notes to Chapter 7

being singled out from other perpetrators is relatively low. The prevailing feeling is of membership in a collective entity that is temporarily impervious to outside authority.

2. Breaking glass has a dramatic and symbolic quality that is used in many situations; it seems to be a favorite of the semi-violent, those who make a show of contentiousness but are wary of following through into full-scale fighting. In chapter 2, we saw a fight that began when someone threw bottles from the trash into the street, but that quickly petered out; in chapter 8, we will meet English football hooligans who mark their departure from a pub by simply dropping their beer glasses onto the floor. Riotous celebrations in eastern Europe (e.g., New Year's eve in Prague) chiefly revolve around bottle-throwing in public squares, leaving a spectacular litter of broken shards. In 2004, British pubs began experi- menting with a law replacing glass beer mugs with plastic ones; preliminary results indicate that these have reduced the amount of violence (Meredith Rossner, per- sonal communication, Sept. 2004).

3. Burning an enemy's property, in contrast, is a very different tactic. There is a long history of arson as a weapon: in uprisings against landowners; as a punish- ment for failure to pay taxes (used in states with low organizational capacity); in a literal "scorched earth" policy for putting down guerrillas; as a terroristic dis- play by a conquering army to compel later surrenders (Goudsblom 1992: 118, 160, 184).

4. Hannerz (1969: 173) noted that in the Washington, D.C., riot in 1968, there were some incursions into the predominantly white downtown shopping area, looting some clothing stores, but virtually no fires were set there; the fires were almost all in the ghetto, along its main shopping streets; which is to say, the local gathering places.

5. Similarly with the rioting by North African immigrants in France from Octo- ber 27 to mid-November 2005, which went on for about twenty days. It consisted especially in nocturnal car burnings (plus burning public buildings and stoning transport vehicles and police), beginning in one Paris suburb, spreading to other working-class immigrant suburbs on days four through six, then to distant cities beginning days seven through eight, while the violence petered out around Paris. Destruction built progressively to a peak at days ten through twelve, the time of maximum geographical spread, then steadily declined. In most cities, the maximal duration of violence was five to seven consecutive days. The overall level of vio- lence across France declined as participating areas reached this time-limit of active involvement, and fewer new locations were added (calculated from timeline and statistics in en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 2005_Paris_suburb_riots).

6. Spilerman (1976), in a study of racial disturbances in 170 American cities between 1961 and 1968, found that few cities had repeated disturbances; most of these were small in destructiveness and short in duration. The bulk of the riots were concentrated in the latter part of the 1961-68 period, especially in the weeks following the Martin Luther King assassination in April 1968. In the immediate aftermath of that heavily publicized event, cities experiencing a first outbreak had more severe violence and destruction (i.e., more looting and arson) than cities that were veterans of previous riots. In the remaining months of 1968, the more riot- experienced cities had a decline in severity. Myers (2000) found that riots in

Notes to Chapter 7 • 493

smaller places (i.e., cities with smaller black populations and black neighbor- hoods) were shorter and less severe in every respect.

7. Tilly (2003) summarizes a wide range of evidence in the generalization that looting (which he regards as opportunism) occurs on the fringes of virtually all forms of collective violence; that is, away from the central focus of attention or chain of command. In my view, this happens because violence destroys most forms of authority except its own, and where rebels lack a military command structure, the situation turns into a moral holiday.

8. The contrast with looting following natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods shows that absence of authority is not a sufficient cause; it must be a break- down of authority against which the crowd regards itself as collectively in rebel- lion. In natural disasters, looters are a tiny number compared to as many as 20 percent of a population who loot in a civil disturbance. Disaster looters are usually solitary individuals, strangers to the area, working secretively, and are almost uni- versally disapproved; whereas civic looters are local residents who do their looting in groups, openly and in an atmosphere of social support (Quarantelli and Dynes 1970).

9. There had been, however, a prior history of racial protest uprisings in the same black and Hispanic poverty areas of the city thirteen years before.

10. Eighty-two percent of those arrested in the first hour had records of previ- ous arrest; this dropped to 67 percent of those arrested in the second wave, and to 55 percent of those arrested in early morning and daylight hours.

11. In news photos of the 1992 L.A. riot, 16 percent of the looters visible are women (calculated from Los Angeles Times, May 1-2, May 12, 1992). Women made up 7 percent of those arrested in the NYC blackout riot (Curvin and Porter 1979: 86).

12. The most detailed description is in Compton Mackenzie's autobiographi- cal Sinister Street (1913) book 3; the scene is satirized in Max Beerbohm, Zuleika Dobson (1912), and Evelyn Waugh, Decline and Fall (1928); it is treated seriously in Waugh, Brideshead Revisited (1945).

13. Famously wild parties are indexed by the degree of spectacular destruction. At one celebrated football weekend at Princeton (still storied in the early 1960s, but probably dating from the 1930s) the crowd of students managed to overturn the local railroad cars from the tracks. Drunken Dartmouth students were remem- bered for going off a ski jump in a baby carriage.

14. This occurs most typically where one's living quarters and surroundings are temporary; what one smashes up is not one's core, identity-giving property, but things one has the use of by virtue of one's status as privileged sojourner. The worst kind of such destruction is the middle-class parents' nightmare: leaving their home in the hands of youthful children, who give a house party that ends up leaving the house completely trashed. Such parties tend to expand through remote network connections, acquaintances of acquaintances, as word of mouth lets it be known that there is available, in effect, a free zone. Eventually the majority of the party-goers have no connection with the hosts and no sense of responsibility; and at the same time early bits of careless trashiness (spilling, leaving debris around) send a message that further destruction is acceptable or even at some point expected. If the parents' absence is prolonged, the house may be badly de-

494 • Notes to Chapter 7

stroyed. Structurally similar opportunities can result in similar outcomes: youth gangs in the 1920s, enticed into a local Chicago settlement house by its recreation room (and the indulgent attitude of the settlement workers), vandalized the pool table and the play equipment, made bonfires out of playing cards, and left no part of the rooms undefaced (Thrasher 1927/1960: 78).

15. The Detroit riot of July 1967, which resulted in massive casualties, began when police attempted to raid an after-hours drinking and gambling club in the heart of the black area. The police raid could hardly have been more ill-timed: at peak hours on a Saturday night, the high point of a carousing weekend. After a failed attempt to get into the club at 10 p.m., which served only to alert the deni- zens of the club, police returned in greater force at 4 a.m. This time they succeeded in shutting down the club, but a crowd gathered and pelted the officers as they loaded arrestees into paddy wagons. Faced with this counter-escalation, the police withdrew, setting off a full-scale moral holiday of looting and arson (Kerner Com- mission 1968: 84-87).

16. Gould (2003) argues that violence is caused not by inequality but by hori- zontal relations and by adjacent positions in a status hierarchy that is inconsistent or unstable.

17. Indeed, in the literal dictionary sense, "carousing" means "a noisy, lively drinking party" (Oxford Concise Dictionary). I am using "carousing," however, in a wider sense, of emotional ebullience in a socially constructed situation of moral holiday. The archetype of a wild party is the North American Indian pot- latch. But potlatches (at least until very late in their history) were carried out without alcohol (see sources cited in earlier discussion). There is an emotional intoxication as well as a physical one; the thread of my argument throughout is that the emotional dynamics of group situations are the key determinant of when violence does or does not come off.

18. Other social psychological and cultural mechanisms connecting alcohol and violence have been proposed by MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969), Lithman (1979), Bogg and Ray (1990), Lang (1983), Gantner and Taylor (1992), Pihl, Peterson, and Lau (1993), Taylor (1983), Room (2001), Room and Makela 1996.

19. It is not clear how much looting in riots is accompanied by drunkenness. Descriptions of the kind given so far in this chapter show that the emotional mood of the moral holiday is an emotional intoxication of its own, and stories of drink- ing do not figure prominently. Liquor stores are looted where possible, but it ap- pears that the serious looters do not do very much drinking, since it impairs their ability to make away with the loot. In the 2002 Ohio State football victory riot, none of the persons arrested (generally those who were most active in destruction or in confronting the police) was intoxicated, according to police reports (Vider 2004: 146). This supports the point that those who are most effective or militant in violence are the soberest ones, although they are supported by a cheering crowd (of which they are only a small percent), many of whom are drunk.

20. They get drunk more often, so they also have more chances to get into fights. There are about one-fourth as many heavy drinkers as occasional binge drinkers, but they drink at least five times as often. The average American binger gets drunk about twelve times a year; heavy drinkers are binging around sixty

Notes to Chapter 7 • 495

times a year, totaling 720 million binges; although it seems surprising, their chances of getting into fights per binge are slightly lower than occasional bingers.

2 1 . Chapter 6 presented evidence that attitude of the crowd has a strong effect; in the above incident outside the fraternity house, the crowd of spectators looks forward to a fight, although the immediate friends of the fighters do not seem enthusiastic.

22. A member of the U.S. Olympic team in tae kwon do karate was asked by a reporter if he ever used his skills on the street. He said he had one time. "You know how guys can get after you . . . they're drunk or whatnot. Things happen." But the fight ended quickly. "I think that's the worst time for someone to really try and attempt to get in a fight. When they're drunk, they don't have much balance to begin with. It's not much of a fight" (San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 28, 2004). Police also find drunks the easiest kinds of belligerent offenders to subdue; they are more likely to receive the minimal amount of force than sober suspects; and they put up the least violent resistance to the arresting officers, usually confining themselves to verbal bluster and passive resistance (Alpert and Dunham 2004: 67, 8 1 , 164).

23. Intoxicated suspects were least likely to be encountered by police investi- gating property crimes (12 percent) and most likely when called for domestic cases (48 percent) (Alpert and Dunham 2004: 73). This fits the pattern that domestic abuse, as we have seen, is largely attacking the weak; alcohol is most often in- volved in violence when the violence is already easy to perform, not when it is difficult. In the British Crime Survey, victims 17 percent of the time thought their muggers were drunk (Budd 2003: Table 1.1).

24. The whole sequence shows how difficult it is be successfully violent. In an earlier encounter, the protagonist carried a gun but had been smoking marijuana and failed in shooting his opponent; subsequently they had also had a fist fight, a one-sided knife-fight (the protagonist was the aggressor in all of these fights), and finally a two-sided gunfight in which both had missed (Wilkinson 2003: 2 1 2 - 13). He is finally successful when he loads up all possible advantages: getting his opponent outnumbered, disguising himself, sneaking up from behind, as well as being sober versus drunk.

25. Thus what anthropologists (e.g., Marshall 1983) call "pseudo-intoxica- tion"—pretending to be drunk—may be the ideal tactic if one really wants to do well in a fight. But it appears what usually happens is not necessarily violence, but just offensive behavior and blustering. And the pseudo-intoxicated in these studies are generally taking advantage of more sober people, not drunker ones.

26. According to some of my informants, straight-edgers generally confine their fights to the punk scene. They differentiate themselves by marking XXX on their forearms, and also (at least in particular periods during the past twenty-five years that punk culture has been in existence) by all-black clothing rather than the chains, mohawks, and colorful hair of what might be called "mainstream punk" style. Other informants say that straight-edgers also fight jocks and skin- heads; the latter are their particular enemies, since skinheads tend to hang around punk concerts but differ radically in political ideology (right- versus left-wing). Still other informants say that straight-edgers do not fight, but take part only in mosh pits (which I discuss shortly), which they regard as expressing anger in a

496 • Notes to Chapter 7

righteous manner against the larger social system. My sources on straight-edgers include a female punk musician; a former straight-edger from the early 1980s; and a half-dozen persons of university student age. Straight-edgers are also de- scribed in "underground" punk magazines. See also Milner (2004: 42, 248) on straight-edgers in the high-school status system.

The relations of straight-edgers to other sub-groups suggests a process of build- ing internal rankings inside the alienated youth subculture. There is a parallel here to my analysis of English soccer hooligans, in the following chapter: hooligans are also a sophisticated development of fighting (although in the realm of collective maneuvers, not a sobriety advantage over opponents); and they are similar in elaborating an internal hierarchy within the larger category of sports fans. Among Belgian soccer hooligans in the late 1980s, the hard-core fighters avoided alcohol and drugs in order to have a clear-headed advantage during confrontations with their rivals; in other respects they consciously emulated the tactics of English hoo- ligans (Van Limbergen et al. 1989). There is also an old tradition of mugging or "rolling" drunks (Shaw 1930/1966), but this was not carried out by members of a carousing scene, and had little prestige. During the twentieth century, it appears that the sophistication of techniques of recreational fighting has evolved along with local prestige standards.

27. Of eighty-nine cases, seventy-eight were isolated single incidents (including both fights and abortive fights); in six cases where incidents were chained together, the second incident included all or some of the antagonists of the first incident (four of these second incidents aborted); in five cases there were two or more entirely separate fights in the same gathering (6 percent of the total). A total of thirty-eight of all incidents were in carousing or entertainment venues; of these thirty were single incidents; four were chained repetitions; four involved separate fights (11 percent of the total).

28. These included two individual fights witnessed by one observer in the Mardi Gras crowd, followed by a riot; multiple fights and riots seen by another Mardi Gras observer a different year; two separate incidents of prolonged harass- ment in a post-NBA All Star game crowd, taking place in separate buses; an indi- vidual fight off to the side of a mosh pit, followed by an unrelated battle between two groups of skinheads invading the floor (I do not count the moshing itself as a fight). One instance took place in a non-entertainment situation: a large political demonstration, with 2,300 demonstrators and 700 police; the violence took the form, typical of crowd violence, of breaking up both sides into small groups of unequal size, with the clusters beating isolated members of the opposing crowd.

29. Some instances are documented in California court cases, where a bar is sued for injuries caused during fights, in which several fights break out in the same bar. In one case, the crowd engages in several fights just outside the bar at closing time (a version of end-resisting violence).

30. In this respect they are not so different from the high school popular groups who dominate a lunchroom scene—in white middle-class schools as well—and who jeer at intruders, as well as engage in food fights and other pelting as a form of fun. See Milner (2004) and discussion in chapter 5. Only the degree of escala- tion differs.

Notes to Chapter 7 • 497

3 1 . Chapter 1 noted that violations of the rule of one-fight-at-a-time can occur in playful group water fights, snowball fights, or food fights; but these stay multi- sided only as long as they are light-hearted and unserious. In the following section we examine mosh pits. In all these apparent exceptions, the rale holds: fights that threaten what is understood as real violence make the situation highly polarized, for audience as well as participants, producing a simple bipolar structure.

32. Jackson-Jacobs describes the euphoria of these party-fighters, after a suc- cessful fight, as connected above all to the awareness that they finally managed to pull off a fight. "And even though I got beat up, I was kind of happy we got in a fight. Just because it's kinda good to do that once in a while so you don't forget . . . what it's like to get in a fight" (Jackson-Jacobs 2003). It is instructive to con- trast this with soldiers after combat. Soldiers are almost never euphoric when they have been beaten. Indeed, soldiers are often not euphoric even after they have won, especially if it has been a long battle. There is of course plenty of ritual narrative about military combat; but tough talk and story-telling occur mainly among soldiers in the rear areas, whereas the frontline soldiers are contemptuous of this talk (as we have seen in chapter 2). Why are the narrative rituals so dis- joined from the actual experience in combat? One reason is the large amount of mythology surrounding combat; the extent of fear and incompetence in combat being very high, there is an elaborate defense against explicitly recognizing it. And also, especially in modern armies where the tooth-to-tail ratio is high, there are large numbers of troops in intermediate areas who can have an audience of troops even farther from the front; Goffmanian staging of toughness in the form of brag- ging and combat stories seems mostly designed for the most naive audiences; it wouldn't fly with the frontline soldiers who know better what combat is like. Frontline soldiers do not construct narratives about how brave they are, and war stories are taken as marks of not really being part of the combat group. The narra- tive emphasis of party-fightets shows how far their staged experiences are from the realities of combat.

33. The following is based on five student reports, and interviews with a punk band musician.

34. Appatcntly only one mosh pit at a time can be sustained. In some concerts, smaller pits may be initiated off to the side of the main pit, but these disintegrate quickly. This is probably because the pit needs the active support of the crowd, but the crowd can sustain only one violent focus of attention at a time. The pattern supports the point that one fight per venue takes up the attention space.

35. This resembles the instrumental leader, as distinguished from the expressive leader, in small groups of all sorts (Bales 1950). I Iere it is notable that the biggest male does not use his size advantage to be more violent than others; since too much violence actually threatens the existence of the group, the way to lead the group is to use his size as protector and tacit rule-enforcer.

36. In this respect moshers are distinguished from gangs, which have dense tics of mutual acquaintance, and which tend to be ethnically homogeneous. Here moshers betray their middle-class orientation, more individualistic and more cos- mopolitan than lower-class gangs. Several participant-observers commented on the mosh pit as a true melting pot, held together in its own self-created solidarity.

498 • Notes to Chapter 8

37. From my own experience: in 1960 I attended a dance at Princeton during the Harvard football weekend. In the field house, three bands were playing simul- taneously: Count Basie; Jerry Lee Lewis; and, off in a side room, the Coasters. These were top-rank stars from the swing and rock 'n' roll eras. Not only did the bands have to compete against each other for attention; the audience spent more of their time dancing than clustering around the respective stages.

38. We have seen this in the foregoing discussion of straight-edgers, who are very active participants in moshing.

CHAPTER 8 SPORTS VIOLENCE

1. The early history of sports is full of rule changes that sometimes dramatically reshape the action (Thorn, Palmer, and Gershman 2002: 79-103). Numerous changes have been made in recent decades as well; for example, professional foot- ball changes penalty rules to protect quarterbacks and pass receivers, in order to encourage more dramatic pass plays.

2. These side-contests provide a way in which interest is kept up, over and above the main outcome—but they don't seem to figure in precipitation of sports violence. American games have particularly complex dramatic formats. One might call this an American tradition of inventions of social technologies for sports entertainment. In older sports contests, of the racing or track-and-field vari- ety, there is also some emphasis on record-breaking; but this does not usually change the dramatic structure of the contest: setting the world record in the 100- meter dash necessarily involves winning the race and cannot be a side-show to it.

3. Sports violence has been approached by social sciences as part of the larger question of why spectators find violence appealing to watch. Theories are re- viewed in Goldstein (1998), who concludes that there is no well-substantiated theory of the attractions of violent entertainment. McCauley (1998) notes that existing psychological theories fail to explain why viewing fictional or contrived violence is sometimes appealing but watching real violence (as in experiments with realistic films of slaughterhouses or violent injuries) is not. The difference, of course, is the dramatic plot tension.

4. Some parallel contests in practical reality have an element of defense as well as offense. In races, runners may block each other; occasionally they get tangled up and fall down; and a common way that a very fast runner will lose a race is because he or she gets trapped in a pack and cannot get to the front. These patterns occur chiefly in middle-distance racing, where runners are not confined to separate lanes, and there is not enough time for the pack to thin out. Such events can lead to bitter defeats and sometimes prolonged hard feelings: the most famous incident was among two women racers in the 1984 Olympic 1,500 meters, when the Amer- ican Mary Decker Slaney was tripped by the South African Zola Budd, knocking both of the famous stars out of the race; Slaney was hostile to Budd for years thereafter. But blocking during races almost never leads to fights. Races can indeed be severely contested; African marathoners, for whom prize money is a very im- portant consideration if they are poor, are known to throw their water bottles at

Notes to Chapter 8 • 499

opponents' refreshment tables in order to slow them down; but fights do not ap- pear to result. The structure of the action itself precludes it: to take time out from a race in order to fight is to lose the race.

There are, however, instances of auto-race pit crews who fight. In a NASCAR race at Chicago, Kasey Kahne was leading the race when he was spun out by the car driven by Tony Stewart; Kahne crashed into the wall (but was not seriously injured) and Stewart went on to win (Los Angeles Times, July 14, 2004). Kahne's pit crew went to Stewart's pit, where a heated discussion turned into a shoving match, which was finally broken up by officials. This fight took place not among the drivers but their assistants, who do not race; and it was instigated by the team that was out of the race. For them the issue of losing time in the race did not arise.

5. Boxing is unusual among virtually all sports, including the most confronta- tional ones, in that there are fairly frequent pre-game fights. Fights in other sports typically happen late in the game when dramatic tension has built up. In profes- sional boxing matches, however, it is common for the fighters to appear at a cere- monial weighing-in, where they pose for the press, and are photographed face to face (see figure 8.2.). The ritualized stare-downs and trash talking that may occur on these occasions sometimes escalate into brief fights; but these are almost always confined to shoving, sometimes knocking over furniture, and usually involve scuf- fles with the entourage of the opposing fighter. The pattern is ceremonial bluster; fists are rarely used. Some of it is deliberately hyped to stir up interest in the commercially staged fight. All this fits the pattern of fighting as audience-oriented entertainment. Even where fighters are genuinely hostile, pre-fight violence is very restrained, keeping the focus on the scheduled violence. In other kinds of sports, although individuals or teams may sometimes bluster at each other in the days before the game, this is usually discouraged by coaches and the players themselves in order not to stir up their opponents. As we shall see, football games have the highest amount of pre-game scuffles (other than boxing weigh-ins); coaches do not object to this, since it is a way of establishing aggressive dominance in the immediate situation, whereas mere talk during the preceding days of practice are regarded as aiding the other team's emotional preparation.

6. That is, real sport wrestling as practiced in school or amateur federation matches. In contrast, professional wrestling, which has little to do with the rules and techniques of sport wrestling, is heavily staged to give an impression of all- out violence, and includes regular occurrences of wrestlers fighting their oppo- nents outside the ring, persisting in blatantly illegal weapons and techniques of attack. This is staged and rehearsed; in my opinion, a serious amateur wrestler would be able to tie up a professional exhibition wrestler very easily by applying standard take-down and immobilization moves. Sumo wrestlers also seem never to fight outside the prescribed moment. They do spend considerable time in pos- turing and stamping just before taking their starting positions for the match; this has an element of attempting to disrupt the opponent's concentration, especially by standing up and walking away from the ring for a few seconds with a gesture of contempt. The honorific nature of these moves is shown by the fact that higher- ranking sumo wrestlers are officially given more time for these preliminary rituals; and these gestures are often cheered by spectators for their theatrical quality (from

500 • Notes to Chapter 8

my observations and explanatory pamphlets at the Tokyo sumo arena, May 2005).

7. One study asked high school athletic directors in North Carolina to estimate the frequency of verbal and physical intimidation, as well as outright violence in three sports (Shields 1999). Violence was judged highest in football (hockey was not included in these schools); soccer had a level of verbal intimidation slightly above football (this seems surprising, but it may be because bluster was the only weapon available, given strong restrictions on actual violence). Basketball was moderate in verbal and physical intimidation, and almost as low as soccer in vio- lence. Intimidation builds up in a sequence: verbal intimidation explained 45 per- cent of the variance in physical intimidation (i.e., shoving and grappling); and physical intimidation in turn explained 42 percent of the variance in physical vio- lence. These figures must be taken with a grain of salt; they are not based on actual counts of incidents in games, but on summary statements of athletic directors as to their impressions of the overall amount of the various kinds of intimidation and violence.

8. High school athletic directors also indicated that intimidation and violence occurred more often in playoff games than in regular games (Shields 1999).

9. During the eleven NBA seasons between 1987 and 1997, there were six playoff games that had fights serious enough to result in suspensions by the league. In three of these games, one player was suspended for throwing a punch (i.e., without significant retaliation); three of the games involved brawls, but only two players took a major part in each, while others were penalized for coming onto the floor during the fight (San Diego Union-Tribune, May 16, 1997). There are about eighty playoff games per season, so about 0.7 percent of playoff games have fights. I estimate that the frequency of fights is lower during the regular season. Sociological researchers who study amateur and school basketball teams confirm that fighting is very infrequent (Reuben A. Buford, personal communication, Aug. 2005); Scott Brooks (personal communication, 2003) reports that inner-city bas- ketball players do not have to fight for reputation, even though it is required of other young black males. Wilkinson (2003) collected instances of fights among black and Hispanic hoodlums; although they play various recreational sports in- cluding basketball, the only fights they mention as arising in connection with games occur in football.

10. Thus hockey penalties vary from two minutes for ordinary rule violations; four minutes for excessively rough play; if players go on fighting for more than the ten or twenty seconds it usually takes the referees to separate them, they may be ejected from the game. But since both fighters are usually ejected, and substi- tutes are allowed, this does not much favor one team or the other.

11. The most serious injuries in hockey violence come not from fights when the game action has stopped, but from vicious hits in the course of the game itself: like when a player blind-sides an opponent skating up the ice away from the puck, in retaliation for an earlier confrontation.

12. In National Football League games during 1980-88 there were sixty-five serious injuries per team per year, or about three per team for each game played (Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24,1997). Almost 10 percent of the team roster is injured each week. Football was an especially violent game at the turn of the twentieth

Notes to Chapter 8 • 501

century; in 1905, eighteen players were killed in college games (professional foot- ball was not yet in existence) (Rudolph 1962: 373-93). Injuries were historically high in part because players' protective gear was not very effective: relatively thin leather helmets and body pads, compared to the heavy plastic and foam-padding that developed after 1950, and the military flak jackets and face visors that came to be used late in the twentieth century. Prior to the adoption of the hard-shell helmet in the late 1940s, tackling and blocking were done with the shoulder, like a boxer slipping punches rather than straight-on blows (Underwood 1979: 9 3 - 109). Thus although football players are bigger and stronger than in the early days, there are fewer fatal injuries. With improved training techniques, weight- lifting, steroids, and other body-building measures, contemporary football players doubtless hit much harder than early players, demonstrating the importance of protective padding in allowing a much higher level of controlled violence. Fatali- ties now almost all occur during the rigors of training.

13. Players try to get the ball away from opponents at the bottom of the pile by biting, eye-gouging, clawing, and jabbing vulnerable parts of the body including testicles (player interviews in Sport Illustrated, Jan. 3 1 , 2005: 38-39). One player said, "The ball generally changes hands only once. You have trouble breathing in the pile, let alone having enough room for the ball to be moving around. There's usually one thief able to take it away from somebody, and that's the end of it." This is dirty play outside the rules, invisible and uncontrolled by referees, who judge who has the ball only when the bodies are finally unpiled. But these hidden fights are self-contained, and do not lead to further fighting once the players are back on their feet.

14. Injuries in soccer games, worldwide at all levels from youth leagues to pro- fessionals, are on the order of two to three injuries per match (twenty-two players) for male players, half that for females. These are mostly contusions, strains, and sprains to the legs; fractures or concussions were much rarer. Injuries that result in missing a subsequent match are about one per match at the professional level (Junge et al. 2004). These are much lighter than American football injuries, which are reported only if they substantially affect the chances of playing the following week's game.

15. At the end of chapter 2, under the heading "Fear of What?" I argued that soldiers and other serious fighters are less concerned with physical injury to them- selves than with the confrontational tension of threatening another human being in face-to-face contact. Confrontational tension/fear is chiefly about disruption of the basic entrainment of human interactions, a symbolic/emotional hurt. In the case of athletes, the specific tension is above all of losing one's aplomb, one's self- direction, in a publicly visible scene where one is in the center of attention.

16. These protections do sometimes figure in baseball fights. In several photos one can see catchers in a fight with an opposing team player (e.g., Red Sox catcher Jason Varitek, intervening to get between arch-rival New York Yankee slugger Alex Rodriguez and the Boston pitcher who just hit him with a pitch; see figure 8.3). In both cases the fight takes the usual form of a shoving match; in both we see the catcher, still wearing chest-protector and face-mask, shoving the oppo- nent's jaw and face backward and upward with both arms extended. The catcher is not only protected against effective retaliation, but since his fist is still inside his

502 • Notes to Chapter 8

catcher's mitt while shoving into the opponent's face, he is not doing much dam- age. See also Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2002.

17. This seems also to be true of pickup games. One student ethnography de- scribes how contention built up between two players over several days; when the fight finally broke out, other players stood around and watched.

18. A player recalls his first day in the majors: "We had two bench-clearing brawls. I just came out of the dugout with everyone else. I didn't know what to do. It was my first day. I was nervous already" (San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 13, 2001; see also Adler 1984).

19. Baseball bats are, however, sometimes used as weapons in street fights and in holdups (e.g., Felson 1994: 32; Morrison and O'Donnell 1994, Fisher 2002).

20. Although Cobb has been retrospectively labeled a "psychopath," the his- torical circumstances of competition are a better explanation of his behavior than attributing it to a personality essence. Baseball created his personality.

2 1 . Teams that are being beaten not only lose emotional dominance, but lose their cohesion. An interviewer asked Eric Dickerson (record-holder for most rush- ing yards in a season), "How could you tell when a defense was cracking?" He replied, "What you'd have is, you'd have a team bickering. That's when you knew you'd got them. You'd have them, 'Why don't you guys make a tackle up front!' Then, 'Why don't you make a tackle in the back!'" (Los Angeles Times, Dec. 27, 2003).

22. It is important here to distinguish between short-run and long-run flows of EE. In the prior statement of my theory of interaction ritual chains (Collins 2004), I noted that EE tends to be cumulative, both in positive and in negative directions. As individuals move from one encounter to the next, those who come to an encounter with high EE will dominate someone who comes in with low EE, and this repeats throughout the chain. A series of repeated encounters among the same persons will stabilize their EE ranking relative to each other. In sporting contests, such a pattern would make for boring and predictable games, lacking in drama. Even if teams were initially matched for levels of prior success, whoever broke out on top would dominate the rest of the way. Game rules are contrived to prevent this. There must be opportunities for players to get back the EE (also known as momentum) that they have lost. Hence games leave a role for chance (e.g., lucky or unlucky bounces of a ball); and for large ramifications of very small differences in performance: a difference of a fraction of an inch in a pitch can make the difference between a strikeout, foul ball, or home run. This is yet another respect in which games are artificial. Ordinary life is far less fair, less balanced; bullies keep on bullying monotonously, and their victims rarely turn the tables. In sports, techniques of dramatic production have been developed over the years to present something more dramatically satisfying.

23. It is notable in this regard that batters and pitchers rarely look at each other's eyes, or even faces. They seem to be attempting to maximize the trickiness of the guessing game by assuming the demeanor of poker players. Another aspect of the situation is that players take direct looks as hostile gestures; eye contact triggers a fight as much as verbal insult. In one instance, a fight began during the batting practice period before a major league baseball game, when a player from one team approached a rival player to apologize for an incident that had happened

Notes to Chapter 8 • 503

in the previous game. The rival took the effort to make eye contact as a challenge, starting off a brawl that lasted four minutes (San Diego Union-Tribune, July 28, 2004). This is paralleled by my observation of a near-fight in a long line waiting to clear airport security (in August 2006): one man warned another with whom he was quarreling about cutting in line: "Don't get in my face." The offender backed away from eye contact and the fight aborted.

24. Some pitchers, such as Roger Clemens, or historically Bob Gibson, are known for their intimidating manner; these are pitchers who have set strikeout and ERA records, although other record-setting pitchers did not have the same confrontational style. Intimidation is one technique among others.

25. Some batters take the other tack and make it part of their technique to stand close to the plate, even to risk getting hit often as a way of getting on base and of disrupting the pitcher's pattern. Thus the same players lead the league yearly in being hit by pitch. A hypothesis in keeping with my observations is that such batters do not become angry when they are hit by a pitch, nor become in- volved as principals in brawls. Just as there are pitchers who rely on deception and those who emphasize overt domination, there are batters who rely more on cool-headed technique and others who rely on energy surges. (Recent examples of the former would include Barry Bonds, Ichiro Suzuki, and Tony Gwynn; of the latter, Manny Ramirez.) It is the latter who we would expect to start more fights. Similarly, we would expect pitchers who try to overpower batters are more likely to get into fights than pitchers who rely on deception and fine placement. Thus a fight would be most likely where a power pitcher faces a batter who relies on sheer muscular dominance or sheer emotional intensity.

26. Wayne Gretsky, the all-time scoring leader in professional hockey, had a reputation among opponents as a "sneaky" player, deft and surprising in his moves to the goal rather than confrontational.

27. There are limits on how many such players a team needs. A headline and lead in a story about the Philadelphia Flyers read, "Fedoruk in a fight for en- forcer's job. But the Flyers might not be able to keep two tough guys" (Philadel- phia Inquirer, Sept. 28, 2001).

28. According to my informants among knowledgeable fans, fights in hockey are especially likely after a team has clearly lost the game. The losing players start these fights, as if to show they still have a presence on the ice, even though they can no longer win the game.

29. In chapter 7, I suggested the principle that "one fight per venue" fills the emotional attention space. There can be multiple fights in a game, as in the present example. But these are all part of the same drama between two opposing sides; just like some fights in carousing venues, they are a series of chained fights with an overlapping cast of principal and supporting characters.

30. I have offered the generalization that turning point fights usually occur in the latter part of a game. But where games take place in a series of repeated rival- ries, fights in pre-game warm-ups sometimes set the tone for the game. In the final football game of the regular season in 2002, the Pittsburgh Steelers, attempting to clinch the AFC northern division championship, were in the home stadium of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, who had already clinched their division. Tampa defen- sive star tackle Warren Sapp—a huge man known for his mouthy outbursts—was

504 • Notes to Chapter 8

prancing and exhorting the crowd during the pre-game warm-ups; Pittsburgh's huge running back, Jerome Bettis (known as "the bus" for his size), bumped and shoved Sapp. "Last year they walked all over us during warmups," Bettis said, "and we wanted to let them know we were going to bully them in their own house." Several players from each team pushed and shoved each other. When the game started, the Steelers jumped to a 14-0 lead within the first four minutes, then held on to win 17-7. Pittsburgh dominated time of possession; Sapp ended up with no tackles, assists, or sacks, shut out by the Pittsburgh offensive line (San Diego Union-Tribune and Los Angeles Times, Dec. 24, 2002).

3 1 . An example is the 2003 American League championship series between the New York Yankees and the Boston Red Sox (Los Angeles Times, Oct. 10-13, 2003). The Red Sox, who had not won a world series in eighty-five years, were heavily hyped as having their best chance in years. After splitting the first two games at Yankee Stadium, during which both teams repeatedly threw knock- down pitches at each other, the Red Sox returned home to a pivotal game with each team's best pitcher on the mound, Pedro Martinez and Roger Clemens. In the top of the fourth, as the Yankees rallied to overcome a Red Sox lead, 4 - 2 , Martinez angrily threatened to hit the Yankees batters in the head, and the Yan- kees yelled back at him.

In the bottom of the inning, Clemens took the mound for the Yankees; he had been warned by the umpires that any retaliation would result in being thrown out of the game; teammates said the veins were popping out of his neck from the tension as he attempted to keep his emotions under control. The next batter was the star Red Sox slugger, Manny Ramirez, who had driven in the first run of the game in the first. Clemens threw a pitch high, but not inside; although the pitch was not near his head, Ramirez reacted as if it were, and stepped toward the mound, waving the bat in his hand—the dangerous weapon that batters almost never use in a fight. (The bat-waving was bluster; it was never used.) Both teams ran onto the field in a melee that lasted for fifteen minutes. Immediately after play resumed, Manny Ramirez struck out flailing at the first pitch Clemens threw, even though it was far outside the strike zone. Ramirez was emotionally out of control in the entire fight sequence, and failed to get a hit the rest of the game. The Red Sox went flat after the fight, and ended up losing the game 4 - 3 . The Yankees took the offensive in another fight at the end of the game, beating and kicking a stadium groundskeeper rooting for the home team. After this emotional climax, there were no more fights in the remaining games. The teams alternated close victories, and the Red Sox again failed to make the World Series.

32. This was the same duo who started a brawl between the two teams the previous July (shown in figure 8.3 discussed above in note 16). The July fight was widely taken to represent the dramatic rivalry between these two teams, both competing to post the best record in the American League, and reprising their fight at the end of the previous season. After the July fight, the entire Red Sox team went on a victorious surge that eventually took them into the playoffs and the showdown with their hated rivals.

33. Police records for stadium disturbances do not usually distinguish among assaults, public drunkenness, and other misbehaviors; and mere numbers of ar- rests, citations, and ejections from particular games give little sense of what spe-

Notes to Chapter 8 • 505

cifically happened and in what context. Figures occasionally compiled by newspa- pers show no clear pattern or trend (San Diego Union-Tribune, Oct. 3 1 , 2004).

34. In Smith's (1978) data, in only 10 percent of the sixty-eight incidents of serious sports violence was there crowd violence unrelated to player fights or near- fights on the field.

35. In September 2004 in Oakland, during a tight race between the two teams for a playoff berth, a player on the visiting Texas Rangers threw a chair into the stands at a persistent heckler sitting near the bullpen; the result was a bystander hit, breaking the nose of the woman sitting next to the heckler. The entire Rangers team congregated at the bullpen to back up their player, showing the usual solidar- ity of teams in fights (USA Today, Sept. 15, 2004).

36. Consider the ritual of catching a foul ball (or indeed a home run) hit into the stands. This is treated as a matter of great importance by the fans, and the one who catches it momentarily becomes a hero in the immediate vicinity. The baseball is treated as a sacred object, a connection from the peripheral realm of the stands to the heart of the collective attention space on the field. It is enough to get the ball any way one can, whether it is rolling around or even handed over by a field attendant; but there is special prestige in making a real catch on the fly. This is one way in which a fan can momentarily rise above his/her status, genu- inely emulating one of the acts of the players. This always brings applause by the other fans. The phenomenon is similar to collecting autographs, another form of subservient contact with spectator idols for tokens of connection. The utilitarian- minded will say that baseballs are sometimes worth a great deal of money on the sports memorabilia market, as in the case of record-setting home runs. But this does not explain why ordinary baseballs are also treated with ritual respect; nor indeed why record-setting balls have such a market value. The more famous balls are intensifications of the ritual value of ordinary ones.

37. For a detailed analysis of celebrating riots, see forthcoming book by Jerry M. Lewis.

38. In this section I am using the term "football" in the European sense (i.e., "soccer"); clubs of violent fans or "supporters" can also be referred to as "firms," using the British term. The term originated in the London criminal underworld, after a "mafia-like gang that ran its criminal affairs in a corporate manner. In the 1970s, the term was appropriated by gangs of violent football supporters" (Bu- ford 1993: 316). Subsequently, a "firm" might refer to small groups who stick together and take an active part in fights (what Americans would now call a "posse"); or it might be used loosely to refer to all the supporters of a soccer team who engage in deliberate fighting tactics. Supporters are a larger group than hooligans or firms.

39. This is the same pattern as seen in the historical mobilization of the work- ing class in labor movements. The degree of mobilization does not depend on the amount of economic grievance, but on resources for mobilization. The height of soccer hooligan violence, the 1980s, was a period of relative prosperity.

40. Buford (1993: 29, 213) describes most of the prominent leaders as flashing expensive clothes, cars, and other wealth. Some of them are professional criminals such as thieves and counterfeiters (confirmed by Anthony King, personal commu- nication, Nov. 2000). Football violence, however, is not an ordinary criminal ac-

506 • Notes to Chapter 8

tivity for them, since it is more costly than profitable; Buford's leaders behave as if they are enjoying themselves immensely. For this section generally, see also Dun- ning et al. (1988, 2002); Dunning (1999); King (2001); Johnston (2000); Marsh, Rosser and Harre (1978); Van Limbergen et al. (1989).

4 1 . Something very like jibbing is found in higher social classes, chiefly among children, although it is usually very small-scale. Scott Fitzgerald in This Side of Paradise describes a small group of Princeton undergraduates in the years before World War I making an extended spree in Atlantic City without any money, by jauntily ordering food in restaurants and then leaving without paying, having learned the Goffmanian lesson of the strength of maintaining normal appearances.

42. In Elias and Dunning's (1986) pioneering formulation, sports became orga- nized from the eighteenth century onward to allow for a pleasurable tension that is lacking in modern life. The civilizing process, the argument runs, causes repres- sion of natural impulses—in effect, the Freudian argument that repression is the price we pay for civilization; sport allows a safe parallel universe of fantasy con- flicts in which these tensions can be expressed that previously would have come out in violence. In addition to releasing tensions, sports create a pleasurable ten- sion and excitement that is in demand in proportion to the monotony that specta- tors experience in everyday life.

There are two weaknesses in this argument. One is that premodern violence was not so easy and untrammeled; confrontational tension/fear has existed throughout history, and violence was not a pleasurable expression of natural impulses but the same kind of ignominious attacking of the weak, or an honorific limited and staged fighting, as we have seen in this book. What sport expresses does not exist as natural unrepressed violence anywhere. Second, premodern sports also created pleasur- able tension, ranging from tribal games, ancient Olympics, Byzantine chariot- races, to medieval jousts and popular games. As Elias and Dunning (1986) them- selves document in the case of medieval English folk football, the chief difference from modern times was that the games of the lower classes had little formal orga- nization; there were no referees or codified rules, and participation drew in entire communities rather than specializing among the most skilled, encouraging large and unspecified numbers of players who might be variously on horse and on foot, of all ages and sizes, using sticks, hands, or feet; thus serious injuries or deaths were common. What has changed is the growth of formal, specialized organiza- tion that has controlled some aspects of violence but encouraged others, in the interest of creating the most dramatic experiences of entertainment, those that sustain long and complex plot tension. Upper-class sports had more such organi- zation throughout ancient and medieval times, since they had the resources to contain confrontational tension/fear and simultaneously convey high status by staging fights among equals who followed stylized rules. The main historical shift has been the growth of wealth and leisure among all social classes, and an ongoing expansion of the life-cycle period of schooling; these have created more opportu- nity and time to fill, time that would previously have been taken up for most people with the drudgery of work. It is doubtful that the amount of monotony has shifted much throughout history. What is displaced into sports by modernity is not an allegedly uninhibited premodern violence, but the former pervasiveness

Notes to Chapter 8 • 507

of work. The distinctive forms of sports violence are not a civilizational substitu- tion but an ongoing civilizational creation.

43. This is also shown in a Reuters photo (Feb. 16,1995), "English fans attack an Irish fan outside match at Dublin." It shows a three-on-one cluster (see pictures.Reuters.com).

44. A number of examples of this pattern were related to me during 2000-01 by English field researchers Anthony King and Eric Dunning. Buford (1993: 9 3 - 95) gives one example: After having rampaged through an Italian city after the soccer match, the English supporters gathered in a bar during the evening; their animated talk concerned not the game itself, which Manchester United had lost, but their own victory, and "how the Italians had 'shat themselves.' There was a sense of closure to the evening, an end-of-a-good-day's-work atmosphere." Out- side in the square, several thousand Italians had gathered, seeking revenge on the two hundred English inside. The English did not venture out, but waited until police arrived to escort them away. Notice that the Italians outside, although en- joying great advantage in numbers, did not attempt to invade the bar. Bluster and confrontational tension/fear are found among hooligans and their opponents, as elsewhere. In the earlier literature on football hooligans, emphasis was on their development of deliberate tactics and organization to evade police counter- measures; what needs to be added is that they are also sophisticated in overcoming the perennial problem of all fighting, confrontational tension and fear—in this case by elaborate techniques for holding off attacks until they get their opponents in weak moments.

45. King (2001). In Germany, an English supporter goes around shouting "Heil Hitler!" because it is an appropriate way to upset the Dutch supporters whom England is facing in a tournament (Buford 1993: 228). Van Limbergen et al. (1989: 11) sum up the ideological self-presentation of Belgian hooligans: "They pretend to be racist, sexist, and regionalist. Their ideas are simplistic and antidem- ocratic. This ideology is rather badly developed and not well thought out. They only chant specific slogans to provoke."

46. It is often claimed that meeting on a playing field is a substitute for interna- tional violence and a way to bring enemies together; but such meetings also tend to stir up, indeed to create, national animosities. Sipes (1973) concluded from a comparison of premodern societies that those with warlike games were also those that more frequently attacked other societies. This does not directly address the issue of international (or in this case, inter-tribal) competitions; no doubt there are multiple causes, since a degree of peace and international contacts are neces- sary for international sports to take place; given that, what are the further effects of sports? The ancient Greek Olympic games were held in a region where inter- city fighting was endemic, and the struggle for honor in the games was given a chauvinistic interpretation.

47. Dunning et al. (1988). American baseball games were historically similar in some of these respects; in the early 1900s, crowds in the outfield stood and were separated from the field only by ropes. A famous game in New York in 1908 hinged on the fact that the crowd surged onto the field as the home team scored the ostensible winning run in the ninth inning; but a runner named Merkle had not touched base (hence this was known as the "Merkle boner"), and the visiting

508 • Notes to Chapter 9

Cubs chased down the ball in the crowd, touched the base, and had the Giants called out for the inning and their run nullified. The game was replayed at the end of the season with the pennant at stake, before an unprecedented overflow crowd; this game was several times interrupted by fans invading the field. When the Giants lost, there was a post-game riot in the stadium.

48. During the American League championship series between Boston and New York in October 2004, the Yankees fans greeted Red Sox pitcher Pedro Mar- tinez with a child-like refrain. I Ie had said to the press, after losing several games to the Yankees, that the Yankees were like his daddy; the fans chanted this over and over in a sing-song voice, "Who's your dad-dy, Who's your dad-dy," up-and- down a musical minor third exactly in the tune of preschool children jeering at an outcast of the group (traditionally "Nya-nya, nanny-goat.").

49. "They see themselves as the true heart of the club; most of the players arc just mercenaries" (Anthony King, personal communication, Nov. 2004). "The real match was not inside the stadium; it was here in the streets outside it. This is where you found the crowd, the press, the television cameras, the audience" (Bu- ford 1993: 215).

50. There are of course significant differences; moshers practice pseudo-vio- lence, and are ideological poles apart from the soccer hooligans (and from skin- heads, their nearest American counterpart).

CHAPTER 9 I l o w FIGHTS START, OR N o r

1. Lakoff's (1987) analysis of common idioms for talking about anger goes so far as to claim that the folk theory is an accurate induction from experience, that this is how violence is actually caused, although he offers no evidence beyond the linguistic expressions themselves.

2. For this reason, it is important to maintain a distinction between real physi- cal violence and other kinds of aggressiveness. Social activists and official control agencies dealing with various kinds of violence and abuse try to expand the defini- tion and the scope of their problem, by subsuming verbal aggression and emo- tional outbursts as forms of "abuse," "harassment," or "bullying," and prescrib- ing "anger management" programs as a cure-all for violent and non-violent aggressiveness alike. But that badly muddies the causal pathways: it is not possible to explain real violence by the model of normal, institutionalized acrimony; in crucial respects their causal patterns are antithetical. Anderson (1999: 97) de- scribes a group of black inner-city youths watching a video on conflict resolution as an alternative to fighting; their reaction is to dismiss it as unrealistic, in the context where they perceive violence could be headed off or at least contained only by putting on a show of pretended anger and other posturings of the street code.

3. Non-Western societies often have even more stringent standards of pro- tecting one's own face and saving others' face; Goffman (1967: 15-17) includes some comparisons to classic Chinese manners; see also Bond (1991) for contem-

Notes to Chapter 9 • 509

porary Chinese and Ikegami (2005) for Japanese manners. Interactional practices in these cultural regions appear to be ultra-Goffmanian.

4. For instance, a punch thrown by one professor at another, during the course of a political argument, resulted in a lawsuit, and in the professor, despite his considerable eminence in his field, being unable to get another appointment in an American university; and eventually in the abolition of the department itself by the university administration. (These events took place around 1970.)

5. Two supporting observations: (a) Late in the afternoon, I would be at home (during a period when I was writing at home) with my two children, a boy and girl at ages between four and eight, waiting for their mother to come home from work. We are carrying on a playful conversation. The mother comes in the door; the children greet her with excited shrieks and hugs. She reciprocates warmly for a few minutes, then sits down to tell me about her day. At this point the children start up a whining tone of voice, sometimes also squabbling with each other. Even- tually she loses her temper, bursts out with a complaint about being received like this when she comes home, and retires to another part of the house. Examining this situation in terms of attention: the children begin by being in the center of adult attention for a half hour or so, while also anticipating the moment when they will see their mother. After that peak of excitement, they become relegated to the background while the adults fall into the flow of a conversation between themselves. The children's whining eventually restores attention to them briefly and negatively; but at any rate, the offending conversation among adults ends also. This seems to restore equilibrium for the children, since after this event they stop whining and go back to their normal moods.

(b) Over a period of many months, I had the opportunity every afternoon to hear two small children in a neighboring house, ages two to three and four to five, come out to play in their backyard, which was behind a hedge about twenty feet away from the study in which I was writing with windows open to the warm southern California air. The children were accompanied by a babysitter. The smaller child, within a few minutes after entering the yard, would begin to cry. Her voice modulated in intensity, from annoyed-sounding whimpering, up to strong crying; typically this started in a dispute with the older child (possibly over posses- sion of a toy), but also this happened if the babysitter's voice was not heard for a few minutes, indicating that her attention was elsewhere. Inevitably the babysit- ter's voice would reply, upon which the child's crying would modulate down, sometimes quite abruptly. These episodes would repeat when the babysitter's voice withdrew, until finally she would give up and take the children into the house. This scenario was repeated each day almost without fail. Small children do not simply cry spontaneously because of pain and distress, but can use crying as a move in response to the social situation. Small children have little resources for power over others, but crying is one resource they have, and they sometimes use it in tyrannical manner (cf. Katz 1999: 229-73).

6. An example from a student report: At the end of a family gathering in a restaurant, a dispute breaks out over who picks up the check. The widowed mother takes it as an affront that one of her married daughters tries to pay for everyone, stating that she seems to think that she (the mother) can't afford to pay for her own children. The siblings take sides with one or another of the principals;

510 • Notes to Chapter 9

their siblings' spouses maintain an embarrassed silence, as if tacitly taking advan- tage of their more distant relationship to stay out of the quarrel. The scene culmi- nates in an angry shouting match in the parking lot, with car doors slamming as they drive away, the two disputing groups in separate cars. This is a Goffmanian face dispute, in which neither side backs down. Nevertheless, despite the blowup, the family group is committed to periodic reunions, which they go on having; they handle the dispute by never mentioning it again, going on with normally staged encounters as if nothing had happened. Black (1998) generalized, on the basis of comparing anthropological evidence, that groups built on intimate and relatively egalitarian relationships tend to smother quarrels rather than resolving them.

7. Among male acquaintances, stirring up a quarrel is often a way of enlivening a boring encounter, a milder version of the frustrated carousing pathway to vio- lence described in chapter 7. This hypothesis can be tested by the situations and emotional sequence in which such quarrels arise. Typically this occurs in sociable situations, and is all the more likely in carousing situations where participants consciously expect a level of excitement, "action," out of the ordinary. Middle- class men generally confine the dispute on the level of an emotionally heated ver- bal exchange; working-class men, especially young men, are more likely to threaten violence, if not always to carry it out. Couples also quarrel in such situa- tions; survey evidence shows entertainment is the second most common occasion for marital quarrels, after disputes over money (Blood and Wolfe 1960: 241).

8. An institutionalized form is the testimonial dinner or awards ceremony. A series of speakers take the floor, holding the group's attention to tell the recipient how wonderful he or she is; the recipient in turn thanks the others by telling them how wonderful they are. The higher social classes thus manage to avoid first- person boastfulness, while putting on a fine example of Mauss's (1925) ritualistic gift-exchange.

9. Labov 1972. A comparable custom in some middle-class professions is a "roast," a banquet at which the honored guest is the target for joking put-downs. A "roast" is a strictly controlled middle-class version of boisterous masculine rit- ual conflict. The custom emerged in the 1970s, perhaps as part of the emulation of lower-class manners that went on at that time. It is not part of the politer or more traditional part of the middle and upper classes; it does not exist for instance in academic circles, nor in high society. Women may be integrated into these occa- sions but the provenance is distinctly male.

10. A recording of the former may be heard in the bird-like cries in tribal battles in New Guinea in the film Dead Birds (see chap. 2 above); of the latter, during the urban uprising in 1958, in the documentary The Battle of Algiers. For a study of ululation see Jacobs (2004).

11. Anderson 1999: 112. The street code is more sharply marked in male cloth- ing and body demeanor styles than in female styles. Males are the core members in the group marked by the street code; although females participate, usually as followers, or in a derivative way. Lynn Green (2001), studying the sex lives of working-class black teenage girls, notes that their daily lives are dominated by their boyfriends' activities if they hang around with them, and that the girls feel they have to break with them if they want to concentrate on their schoolwork or just to follow interests of their own.

Notes to Chapter 9 • 511

12. This conflict helps explain the appeal of Muslim or African outfits for black males: they represent a way to express rejection of white mainstream membership, but at the same time to express commitment to a disciplined, middle-class lifestyle. They are a militant version of the "decent" culture of the black ghetto. The role of African and Muslim clothing is often misperceived by whites, who see it as a hostile form of reverse racism. What they miss is the commitment to conventional middle-class behavior that is expressed by these same symbols. Far from being an ally of the street culture, it is an alternative to it. For the emergence of this style, see Lincoln (1994).

13. Being topped in trash-talking does not necessarily lead to violence, how- ever. There is typically an audience present, and the verbal ritual is usually carried out with the audience in mind. A person in the position of having been verbally put down might take the stance of the audience, joining in laughter and acknowl- edging it as a good joke. This is a situational displacement of self to another part of the group; and since the group also conveys membership in the street scene, such a move can temporarily defuse violence.

14. Jones (2004). In the late 1990s, black teenage girls wearing Muslim-style robes and headcoverings were targets for fighting in Philadelphia high schools, attacked by girls who claim to feel put down by the Muslims who publicly criticize their sexual behavior and drug use. The Muslim clothing is an extreme rejection of street clothing styles, above all in female dress including long robes, headcover- ings, and veils; and is associated with a message overtly attacking the street culture as morally inferior. These fights are similar to those in which street-oriented males attack those students who are visibly members of the "decent" culture, on the rationale that these are claiming to be "better than us."

15. Another piece of evidence against seeing disrespect as the motive for vio- lence is the fact that the street style is widely adopted, in one degree or another, by white youths, including affluent ones (Anderson 1999: 124). Far from being a reaction against disrespect, among these white youth it is a claim for high status in the youth scene. One can see this in the situational way in which they put on their gang-like clothes and manners in carousing situations such as party weekends, and put them off when they return to the utilitarian routine of school and work.

16. Anderson (1999: 73). This pattern is common in criminal organizations such as the Mafia, especially among those playing the role of the enforcer. A num- ber of these gangsters have nicknames such as "Crazy Joe." They were able to rise through the ranks to a position of eminence by acquiring the reputation for going into a frenzy of violence, committing extremely vicious acts of overkill or gratuitous cruelty to those whom they are attempting to intimidate (for instance in loan-sharking enforcement or extortion rackets, or in fighting with rival gang- sters). Some evidence that this is a deliberate performance in building a reputation comes from the pattern that these acts of violent frenzy typically happen early in the gangster's career; later, after he has risen to a commanding rank in the organization, he may act quite routinely with little or no personal violence, which he can now delegate to others. Thus Sam "Mooney" (1930s slang for "crazy") Giancana, and Tony "Joe Batters" Accardo (for taking a bat to a victim's head) both rose to be competent heads of the Chicago mob, positions that they held in

512 • Notes to Chapter 10

sequence during the years from 1950 to 1966 (Chicago Sun Times, August 18, 2002).

17. On the other hand, attempting to avoid being a "chump," an apparently easy victim of a stickup, is a major motive for decent people putting on the street code (Anderson 1999: 131).

18. I will deal with long tunnels of violence in a companion volume on time- dynamics of violence, including also its long-term macro dimensions.

19. The dueling code provided a different way of dealing with this point. Mak- ing a challenge to a duel, and accepting it, brought the immediate confrontation to an end; the actual violence was postponed to another time. The stage of bluster and insult was ended with the setting of the duel. Issuing a dueling challenge solved the Goffmanian problem of "making a scene" by giving a polite method of being offended, which preserved everyone's face, at the cost of risking physical casualties later.

20. In a different historical setting, Francis Bacon (1225/1963, Essays, chap. 62) advised that common insults may be used in quarrels without making deep enemies, but that insults which hit home at an individual's particular weakness will not be forgiven. It is a problem for empirical investigation whether general- ized insults ("asshole," "stupid shit," etc.) are less likely to give rise to violence than insults especially tailored to the individual.

2 1 . The "he stole me" incident described by Anderson (described in the previ- ous section of this chapter) gives an example of this dynamic.

22. Thus one reason the Dreiser-Lewis fight ends so easily is that it takes place in private. In addition, the one-man audience who intrudes, while not anonymous, acts not to encourage the fight but to break it up.

CHAPTER 10 T H E VIOLENT FEW

1. Information on the distribution of violence-prone individuals within police forces is difficult to get. Police unions guard the confidentiality of such records, and departments are concerned over lawsuits. The best statistics are from the Christopher Commission, which investigated the Los Angeles Police Department after the scandal of the Rodney King case; its data covers the period from 1986 to early 1991.

2. "Improper tactics" generally^ means highly aggressive or reckless behavior in dealing with suspects, a lesser administrative charge than excessive force, which is criminally actionable. "Excessive" or "improper" force in the internal records of a police department does not usually mean that these officers were charged or convicted of violations, or even administratively punished.

3. Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio 1990; Shannon et al. 1988; Piquero, Farrington, and Blumstein 2003; Piquero 2000; Piquero and Buka 2002; Polk et al. 1981; Nevares, Wolfgang and Tracy 1990; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Farrington 2001; Wikstrom 1985; Pulkinnen 1988; Guttridge et al. 1983. These studies cover nu- merous American cities and other parts of the world.

Notes to Chapter 10 • 513

4. Burglaries are sometimes unviolent, but they are among the more adventur- ous and nervy crimes, and may lead to confrontations with victims, and hence to assaults and rapes.

5. These calculations confirm the findings of cohort studies. The concentration of crime among female prisoners is similar to that among males (English and Mande 1992). Their crimes, however, are generally less violent than men's.

6. Calculated from Department of Justice, National Youth Gang Center; FBI Uniform Crime Reports; U.S. Census; and information provided by the San Diego Police Department gang unit.

7. Calculated from Thrasher 1927/1963: 130-32, 2 8 2 - 8 3 . 8. We do know that murders committed by persons under age eighteen are

only 5.2 percent of all murders; and in the black population, victims ages thirteen to nineteen are only 12.9 percent of all black murder victims, and most of these are in the ages seventeen to nineteen group. (Where information is known, 92 percent of all black murder victims are killed by other blacks.) In contrast, 53.2 percent of black murder victims are ages twenty to thirty-four. Altogether, this implies that the substantial proportion of gang members below age twenty, and especially those below age eighteen, commit very few of the murders even in gang neighborhoods (calculations from FBI Uniform Crime Reports 2003, Violent Crime, tables 2.4, 2.6, and 2.7).

9. Sources from chapter 6 pp. 214-15; and calculations from McEvedy and Jones 1978; Gilbert 1970: 11; Cambridge Modern History 11: 409, 579; Kluse- mann 2002. The Prussian, subsequently German army ranged from 500,000 in 1870 to 790,000 million in 1913; one estimate shows the proportion of officers at 2 percent.

10. Several teachers have reported that multiple fights among different children sometimes happened in the same class period; these involved sixth-, seventh- and eighth-grade classrooms in urban poverty area schools (Mollie Rubin, personal communication, Nov. 2004; Patricia Maloney, Oct. 2005). Milner's research (2004: 105) describes one occasion in a big, racially mixed (but predominantly white middle-class) high school when two fights broke out within ten minutes of each other during the lunch period; the first fight was all-white, the second black- on-black. There were many hundreds of students in the lunch area, and most of them ignored the fights, especially the fight in the other racial group; all of which suggests that the school had segregated attention spaces. The only description I have encountered where adults had several fights simultaneously in the same at- tention space is from Riker's Island prison in New York City, where an inmate describes three fights going on as he walked down the cell block, each pair of individuals fighters surrounded by a circle of spectators "watching the battle of their choice" (Hoffman and Headley 1992: 45). Yet the observer, a professional killer, seemed to regard this as very unusual, and an indication of how extremely tough this prison population was. The crucial factor may be that these multiple (but in fact limited, one-on-one) fights were a way the inmates as a whole could defy the guards, much as multiple fights in a classroom are a way of running the teacher ragged. The authority that is defied may be the key element in these atten- tion spaces.

514 • Notes to Chapter 10

1 1 . Worden 1996. Controlling for both resistance and demeanor, race of sus- pect also determines the likelihood of police violence, with blacks receiving more violence. Race is the weakest factor; overall in the raw data, blacks are more likely to be beaten by police but most of this violence is explained by race-neutral fac- tors; blacks are more likely than other races to resist the police, and to show a hostile rather than compliant demeanor. There is a large gap here between the empirical data and public perception. Racism is the most frequently asserted ex- planation of police violence. But being a racist does not make it easy to commit violence, and situational conditions are still necessary—and indeed operate also without racism.

12. Peter Moskos (personal communication, April 2005) reported, on the basis of his participant observation study in a big-city police force, that officers with a reputation for being involved in a lot of violence tended to be on specialty units such as drug squads or gang squads. Similarly, officers self-select to get on SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams, which specialize in violent confrontations.

13. He fired his gun in three of these encounters, illustrating that even in the most dangerous situations police shoot only a small proportion of the time. A study of four big-city police departments found that police fired in only a "frac- tion" of the situations where law and policy would allow it (Scharf and Binder 1983). Klinger (2004: 58) interprets such instances as reasonable restraint. Micro- interactional detail, however, supports the point that those who shoot are those who are most energized in such confrontations. The prevalence of non-firing can also be interpreted as confrontational tension/fear, and as fitting the normal pat- tern of small numbers of violent activists.

14. A similar remark about enjoying the "cat and mouse" game of car chases was made to me by a police officer in a ride-along in 2004 in which his squad car was cooperating with the narcotics squad in setting up a drug sting. This officer was a member of an elite special unit, the gang squad. The arrest, however, was completely without violence; the suspects gave themselves up passively when they were finally pulled over.

15. In Peter Moskos's study, which focused on police who were most interested in easy jobs and extra pay opportunities, being involved in shootings was regarded as a way of getting into trouble with the administration (personal communication, April 2005). Conversely, officers who want easy duty attempt to serve on midnight shifts, since there is relatively little action especially after 3 a.m.

16. An officer who had been involved in three deadly shootings describes his emotions at the end of one shoot-out: "I was feeling this tremendous exhilaration. It was a real rush and I'd never felt anything like it. Hey, he tried to kill me, but I killed him first. Fuck him. Then when the ambulance people started working on him, I remember thinking I didn't want them to save him" (Artwohl and Chris- tensen 1997: 164). This officer volunteered for a frontline position on SWAT team search entries; his wife had temporarily dissuaded him from taking a lead position, but he was soon back again (171).

17. About sixty-five police were murdered on duty annually during the 1990s, the great majority of them with firearms. Over a ten-year span, several thousands survived being shot, and tens of thousands were assaulted ("Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted," 2000, FBI Uniform Crime Reports; Geller and Scott

Notes to Chapter 10 • 515

1992). These figures show that police in fact were winning most of their encoun- ters; they outkilled suspects at a rate of about 10-to-15 to 1, and outshot them about 10-to-l. High-violence officers mentally portray themselves in a high level of danger, but implicitly they are committed to a very high degree of dominance even in this area.

18. Hence snipers whose locations are known draw heavy fire, even from artil- lery or planes. More effectively, snipers are countered by bringing in opposing snipers, who use their own insider lore in the arts of concealment to locate their opponent, and their firing skill to dispatch him/her with a well-placed shot. Static fronts with trench warfare and abundant skilled snipers on both sides tend to produce sniper-counter-sniper contests, which are costly on both sides. Sniper- versus-sniper is a war among elites. In the criminal world, the toughest guys do not go usually up against the other toughest guys. The high attrition of the sniper- on-sniper pattern, reaching 90 to 100 percent in the world wars (Pegler 2001: 58; 2004: 140-42) suggests what would happen if they did.

19. A comparison of the visibility of human bodies, buildings, and various natural objects at varying distances is given in a 1942 Soviet sniping chart (see figure 10.1). Similar specifications are given in the 1865 U.S. Army handbook (Kautz 1865/2001: 241-43). Kautz notes that at twenty-five to thirty yards one can see the white of the eye; hence the famous order in eighteenth-century warfare, when guns were very unreliable, "wait until you see the whites of their eyes."

20. Another example is given by Ardant du Picq (1903/1999: 8) from the Cri- mean War. Two small groups of soldiers, without officers, suddenly encountered each other around a piece of broken ground at a distance of ten paces. Forgetting their guns, both sides threw rocks at each other while retreating. Finally, when an additional troop coming in from the flank set one side into full flight, the other side recovered their composure and fired at the fleeing enemy. Du Picq put this at the outset of his treatise on combat to show the importance of surprise in success- ful violence, which is to say getting the jump on the enemy and imposing one's emotional momentum upon him. Whoever is surprised is unable to defend oneself. When both sides are surprised, both are incapacitated from serious violence.

2 1 . In World War I, there were about 1,050 American pilots; they shot down about 780-850 enemy planes, or a little less than one per pilot. Aces made up about 8 percent of the pilots—an unusually high figure—and shot down a simi- larly high 68 percent of FAD. There were about 1,200 aces in World War II, when total fighter pilots numbered about 125-135,000, making the aces just under 1 percent. Super-aces with ten or more kills were 0.1 percent (calculated from Gur- ncy 1958: 83, 158-63, 187-207, 226-27, 254, 2 5 6 - 6 5 , 270-72; Kccgan 1997: 139; Dyer 1985).

22. In World War II, it is estimated that even the best pilots fired in only about one thitd of their sorties (Toliver and Constable 1997: 348).

23. Calculated from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ aces/aces.html; Shore and Williams 1994: 10; Overy 1980: 143-44; Mersky 1993; Boyd 1977.

24. www.acepilots.com/german/ ger_aces.html; Toliver and Constable 1997: 348-49. Hartmann had over 800 aerial combats, so his success rate was approxi- mately 44 percent of combat episodes, although it is impossible to say how many enemy planes he actually encountered. The number of sorties is always higher

516 • Notes to Chapter 10

than the number of actual combats, but the latter information is rarely available, and so we are left with the rough ratios of kills per sortie.

25. Record-keeping of this kind is exceedingly nationalistic, and conventional publicity often gives a distorted picture. The top French and British aces, respec- tively, had seventy-five and seventy-three kills. Altogether, eight French, more than fifteen British, and more than twenty German pilots exceeded Rickenbacker's American total (Gurney 1965: 173-75). Part of the disparity is due to the fact that these countries were in combat somewhat over twice as long as the American flyers; aerial combat began in July 1915 and became common in 1916.

26. Calculated from Gurney 1958: 2 7 0 - 7 1 . This 6.3 percent figure is a maxi- mum possible average; an unknown (but probably much smaller) proportion of EAD were shot down by bomber pilots. Moreover, since navy and marine aces accounted for about 40 percent of the EAD, the success rate for the remaining pilots was around 4 percent.

27. As a show of bravado, however, American pilots in World War I did not wear parachutes, although they were used by non-heroic balloon crews (Gurney 1958:23).

28. Thus the all-time record for kills in one combat episode was credited at the time to Lieutenant Paul Lipscomb for shooting down seven Japanese planes on January 11, 1945. Sergeant Arthur Benko had also shot down seven Japanese planes on Oct. 2, 1943, but he was a bomber gunner and was not recognized as a record-holder (Gurney 1958: 121, 140).

29. In World War II, 68 percent of U.S. Navy planes lost to enemy action were to anti-aircraft fire; in Korea, the comparable figure for all allied planes was 86 percent (Gurney 1958: 273).

30. For example, when Richard Bong in 1943 broke Rickenbacker's old World War I record of twenty-six total kills, he was pulled out of combat and returned to the United States. He eventually managed to finagle an assignment as a noncom- batant gunnery instructor in the Pacific theater; by bending the rules, he accompa- nied his students into combat and raised his total to forty kills, which still stands as the all-time record for an American pilot. Seven months before the end of the war, the top commander again removed Bong from the combat zone and returned him to home duty (Gurney 1958: 113). Since Bong's record of twenty-eight had been superceded by several other pilots who reached totals as high as thirty-eight, he had a strong incentive to return to combat.

3 1 . www.acepilots.com/index.html#top There was nothing like this prolifera- tion of records among rifle snipers. In the army that placed the greatest emphasis on snipers, the Soviet during World War II, top snipers with record kills were sometimes also retired from combat and paraded as heroes on the homefront; this was notably the case with women snipers, treated as emblems of all-out mobiliza- tion for the war effort (Pegler 2004: 177).

32. U.S. Navy pilots shot down Japanese planes in World War II at a ratio of 10.2 to 1 for American losses. The ratio grew during the war: from 3.1 to 1 in 1941-42, to 21.6 to 1 in 1945, as the quality of Japanese planes and pilots fell (Gurney 1958: 82). Hence the tendency for American kill records to escalate in the last year of the Pacific war, but not to anything like that extent in the European war.

Notes to Chapter 10 • 517

33. For this reason, the ace total has dropped in every war since World War II. The United States had very few "double aces" with ten or more kills in Korea. The Chinese kept their bases to the north of the Yalu River, past the diplomatic border of peninsular war; American jets would fly several hundred miles from the battlefront in the south, attempting to provoke the MIGs to come out and meet them. These battles took place in a corridor eight miles high colloquially called "MIG alley" (by American pilots; it is unknown what the Chinese pilots called it). American jets prevailed in combat by a ratio of fourteen kills to one (Gurney 1958: 210); nevertheless, the Chinese continued to meet them; the confrontation must have been highly honorific on both sides. Jet fighter dogfights had virtually nothing to do with the rest of the war, becoming again an enclave almost as re- stricted as in World War I. In Vietnam there were only two aces, each with the minimum five kills. The smaller North Vietnamese air force had a least two aces, the top shooting down thirteen American planes, benefiting from an abundance of enemy targets (Toliver and Constable 1997: 322-32).

34. www.acepilots.com/german/ger_aces.html Another slow starter was Otto Kittel, who eventually reached 267 kills (fourth highest on the list). He had seven- teen kills in his first six months on the Russian front (three per month); in the next fourteen months, another twenty-two (less than two per month). Thereupon he hit his stride, averaging nine to ten kills per month for two full years. Hartmann got his first kill in his second month in combat (November 1942), but his second took three months more. In subsequent months his tactics began to crystallize: he had twenty-three kills by his ninth month (now at five kills per month). Then his kills accelerated, hitting his peak rate—twenty-six per month—at about one year's experience.

35. Tiger Woods explained his ability to hit golf shots at crucial moments: "When I am in that moment when my concentration is the highest . . . I see things more clearly. It's like it's magic" (Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1, 2006 E2).

36. See note 46 in chapter 11. 37. E.g., the assassination of the French Catholic leader, the Duke de Guise,

during the religious wars in 1588, was carried out by inviting him to an audience with the Protestant king, then having guards attack him as soon as he entered the antechamber, giving him and his retinue no chance to draw their swords (Cam- bridge Modern History 3:45).

38. Pegler (2004: 195, 199). In situations like this, the elite sniper might have twenty hits in a few minutes, but he did not count them as part of his record. He did not consider this to be true sniping, showing that he made a clear distinction among his various techniques.

39. Two famous instances: the Oakland Raiders lost the Superbowl in 2003 to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers by 4 8 - 2 1 , and were completely overwhelmed on both offense and defense from almost the outset of the game, trailing at one point 3 4 - 3. In the 1940 professional football championship, the Washington Redskins, led by their record-setting quarterback Sammy Baugh, were beaten 73-0 by the Chi- cago Bears.

40. Notoriously, star college quarterbacks often turn out not to be good profes- sionals; and others who come from a mediocre background sometimes train them- selves to excellent performance at the rhythm of the professional game. The speed,

518 • Notes to Chapter 11

complexity, and deceptiveness of the professional game is at a different level and requires forming a new kind of gestalt.

CHAPTER 11 VIOLENCE AS DOMINANCE IN EMOTIONAL ATTENTION SPACE

1. As I have done in the case of the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles in 2000. Their observations fit with my memories of participating in campus demonstrations and riots in 1964-68.1 have also exam- ined a raw video of the 2002 Mardi Gras celebration in the four-block carousing zone of South Street in Philadelphia. Violent encounters between police and crowd members, or fights in the crowd, are visible in ten incidents, ranging from five to eighty seconds long; altogether the violent action totals four minutes and twenty seconds out of a video four hours long.

2. Demonstrations, such as rallies or marches without directly confronting an opposition, also have closely assembled, relatively unified crowds (McPhail 1991). I omit demonstrations from my analysis unless there are photos of violence that develops around them.

3. A photo (not shown) of a Buenos Aires protest shows a group of unem- ployed workers retreating before seven oncoming police; all seventeen protestors on the sidewalk are huddled in postures of fear against the wall (except for two cameramen who attempt to hold their ground); the police attacks are concentrated on a cluster of nine who are in the street. The five nearest the police are bran- dishing or have just dropped sticks that they apparently were using as weapons; two have tripped to the ground, and one still fights with the point man in the police wedge. Fighting or confronting authority is quite literally in the street (June 28, 2002 AP photo). Buford (1993: 283-85) describes the moments at the begin- ning of a soccer hooligan riot that hinge upon whether the first man who steps from the sidewalk into the street will be followed by others; when this collective threshold is finally crossed, the crowd becomes confident and joyous with their sense of achievement; they have "taken the street" in the face of authorities who also regard this as a threshold.

4. Figure 3.7 shows another part of the same massive demonstration; once again, we see a small number of rock-throwers (in this case, two) out in front of the crowd.

5. One might argue a purely rationalistic explanation of wearing masks: they are a way to avoid being identified by the police for one's violent acts. Neverthe- less, this does not accord with the fact that the same persons pull their bandanas up or down on their faces, depending on whether they are stepping into action or not, since they could be identified by continuous observation. There are also accoutrements that do not cover the face, such as hoods; in some fight contexts, the marker is taking off one's shirt (as in figure 3.9; see also fight narration in chap. 7, p. 267). A similar photo (Crespo 2002: 8) shows a lone paint b o m b - thrower at a demonstration at the 2000 Republican convention in Philadelphia; unlike the rest of the visible crowd, he wears a bandana and head covering, and

Notes to Chapter 11 • 519

is shirtless—a combination of all the violent action emblems. We might propose that face masks are utilitarian protection against tear gas; if so, only a few partici- pants at a time seem to have that concern.

6. In figure 2.4 (chap. 2) of Palestinian boys throwing stones toward an Israeli tank, of the twelve persons visible, eight are turned from action, not doing any- thing; of another boy we see only his face expressing fear. One boy is winding up to throw a rock, two others right next to him are crouching with rocks in their hands; while five others crouch behind them (one cowering by a wall), and four are sitting against the forward wall with backs turned to the enemy.

7. In figure 3.4, two of the twenty men visible beat the market thief; in an EPA photo (Oct. 1, 2000, Daily Telegraph, p. 2; not shown here), four men beat a Serbian riot policeman while six others are visible in the background looking in various directions; in a Reuters photo (May 1, 1992; not shown here), three black men kick one white man during the Rodney King riots in Atlanta, while seven other black persons are visible at various distances in the background. Figure 3.5 is the only one that shows everyone in the photo on the victorious side (a total of thirteen) either beating the fallen motorcyclist, or rushing to join the beating or at least to be close at hand while it happens. In this last case, the victim was killed.

8. Of fifty photos in which crowds are visible, five show individuals expressing some degree of joy; as a percentage of the total crowd faces in this subset of photos, it is well below 10 percent.

9. Of course, this is what the entire crowd of onlookers also do, but at a greater distance. In some instances, onlookers in these photos (Allen 2000: plate 32 and pp. 176,194) clutch pieces of clothing torn from the victim's body and distributed in the crowd. We are so appalled by the racism of many of these photos (although twenty-three out of eight-seven victims of lynchings in Allen's collection are white, typically following murders or in cattle wars in the West) that we tend to overlook the sociological point that lynch mobs, like violent crowds generally, feci they are morally in the right, and that they are vindicating an injustice—the alleged murder or rape that precipitated the lynching. Hence their ritualized behavior in putting themselves near the victim's body is a way of expressing solidarity with the com- munal enterprise. This is the same as what we see in the intifada, Mogadishu, and Iraq photos discussed earlier. See also Senechal de la Roche (2001).

10. Mann (1993: 635, 674), notes a similar pattern of ceremonial labor/police confrontations in pre-World War I Germany, with few injuries; it is not clear how the ranks of demonstrators behaved on the micro-level.

11. Some are carrying signs or flags, but these are mostly ten rows back in the crowd. This is a different kind of protest display, quite distinct from violence. Note that in figure 3.7 the flag-waver is turned toward his own side, not toward the enemy. A hypothesis: those in a sports crowd with flags and banners are not those who take the lead in intrusions onto the field or other spectator violence.

12. The militant cluster is not entirely supported by everyone close to them; just behind the stick-throwers, one man cowers down with his hands protectively over his head. The only other expression of fear that I sec in the crowd is the face of a man two rows back, behind one of the group's yelling supporters. In the

520 • Notes to Chapter 11

immediate vicinity, a tipping-point has been reached; the majority of those nearby throw themselves headlong into the path of violence, either in act or emotional expression, but a minority reacts with fear and withdrawal. Their fear is appar- ently of their compatriots, not of the enemy; it is not a fear of physical danger so much as it is the fear of violent confrontation coming to its peak. We may predict that these men will now retreat, leaving the field to the small clusters of militants as the crowd breaks up into violence.

13. In communal violence in India, men do the actual killing and burning, but some of the women, forming the back of the crowd, may use tactics of nonviolent resistance, lying in the streets to prevent fire engines from getting in, and thus making possible more death and destruction (Horowitz 2001; Human Rights Watch 2002). This is borderline violent activism, secondary in initiative to the main action, and far enough away in space so that these "nonviolent" women do not have to see their ethnic enemies being burned. Again, this kind of participation may be stratified; we don't know what proportion of women and other backup spectators took part in blocking the fire engines.

14. Recall evidence cited in chapter 3 that bigger crowds produce more fre- quent lynchings and other violence, and larger numbers of police and onlookers present at an arrest increases the chances of police violence—even though only a small proportion of the group takes part in the violence.

15. Data on several riots give some dimensions of different layers of the cone. In the 1965 Watts riot in Los Angeles, 5 to 10 percent of adult black males in the ghetto said that they participated in the riot, and another 33 to 40 percent had pro-riot attitudes (Ransford 1968). Another resident survey found 15 percent ac- tive in the riot, plus another 31 percent of "close spectators" (Inbert and Sprague 1980: 2-3). In the 1967 Detroit riot, 11 percent said they were participants, and 20 to 25 percent were spectators (Kerner Commission 1968: 73). These were among the most serious and violent race riots of the 1960s. For carousing and celebration riots, a campus athletic victory riot involved 3 percent of the 30,000 students on campus; many of these were spectators, and the crowd that kept up the celebratory vandalism dwindled to about 300, or 1 percent (see sources in chap. 8). In another campus football victory riot at Ohio State in 2002, between 4,000 and 6,000 students took part (8 to 12 percent of the total student body); most of them stood watching while a smaller group flipped over cars and set dumpsters and couches on fire; seventy were arrested (about 1.2 to 1.8 percent of the crowd (Vider 2004). In the 1999 Woodstock riot at the end of a massive con- cert, out of a crowd of 155,000, about 200-500 (about 0.1 to 0.3 percent) actively took part in looting and vandalizing; while several thousand (about 1-3 percent of the crowd) cheered them on. There were forty arrests, comprising 10 or 20 percent of the hard-core rioters (Vider 2004). Of the 97 percent or more who were bystanders, most simply watched, their mood bemused, cowed, or frightened.

16. The following is based on micro-situational detail culled from Fisher (2002, 2003); Hoffman and Headley (1992); Mustain and Capeci (1993); Dietz (1983); Anastasia (2004). These are chiefly based on autobiographical accounts by career hitmen or their associates. I draw also on a four-hour interview with a

Notes to Chapter 11 • 521

reputed hitman; he apparently had worked for organized crime rather than lower- paid and lower-status contract killing for "civilians." We did not discuss particu- lar killings but rather techniques of violent procedure and interaction. Most of the information here concerns high-level American hitmen working between 1950 and 1 990. Female contract killers exist, but the only ones 1 have heard of are in the lower tier. In the following examples, I refer to the victims as well as the killers as male, since this is the case in every example in the sources, with exceptions noted.

17. A contract killer in Detroit quoted in Dietz (1983: 79) said, "We're not his judges, just his executioners." The rationalization was offered both by "Joey" (the pseudonymous hitman in Fisher 2002, 2003) and by "Tony the Greek" Frankos (in Hoffman and 1 Ieadley 1992) that their victims were very bad guys; since they were usually in organized crime, this may well have been true. My interviewee spontaneously made the same statement. I Ie also commented that although he was a patriotic American and if possible would take revenge for the 9/1 1 attacks, strictly as a technical matter, he had to admire the careful clandestine tactics of the hijackers.

18. Professional hitters usually fire three bullets or less. These professional kill- ings differ from the forward panic overkill often found in military, police, and domestic killings.

19. In one instance, very unusual because the victim was a female, two young men in the DeMeo crew were assigned to kill the ninetcen-ycar-old, beautiful girl- friend of a mob associate. Both the couple were privy to mob activities and were considered liable to inform to the police. While the boyfriend was being shot with a silencer inside the gang's clubhouse, one killer flirted with the girl through one car window, while the other leaned through the opposite window, then shot her abruptly (Mustain and Capeci 1993: 152-53).

20. For an example, see Hoffman and Headley (1992: 105-7). 1 examine the social structure of torture in Collins (1974) and more extensively in a companion volume to this one; sec also Kinolf 2005. The chief exception to everything I have been arguing here is the serial killer, who usually works alone, and sometimes engages in torture before murder. This type of violence is the rarest of all. Serial killers resemble hitmen in the clandestine planning and the development of tech- nique; but they work only for themselves, and become much more emotionally- involved with their victims, while hitmen avoid any occasions for emotional inter- action. There arc several different types of serial killers, specialized by their meth- ods of finding victims and their violent techniques. The serial killers with the long- est strings of victims, however, are generally those who use non-confrontational techniques, such as poisoning medical patients or taking them off life support (Hickcy 2002). This again reinforces the point that non-confrontational violence is easiest.

2 1 . "Tony the Greek" was medium height, 160 lbs; "Joey" was a little under average height, though strongly built; I Iarvey Rosenberg, a.k.a "Chris DeMeo" was 5 ft. 5 inches and moderate in build; Roy DeMeo was pudgy and unathletic though strong. Joey Gallo, who killed mob boss Albert Anastasia in his barber

522 • Notes to Chapter 11

chair in 1957, and who later launched a war on another gang faction, was 5 ft. 7 inches and thin. Joe "Mad Dog" Sulllivan (who had over 100 hits and was re- garded by Tony the Greek as the best in the profession) was 5 ft. 11 inches, 180 lbs. (Hoffman and Headley 1992: xxii, 92, 96, 133, 154, 236; Fisher 2002: vii- viii, 198; Mustain and Capeci 1993: 28-37). Tony also did debt collecting for loan sharks, sometimes accompanied by a 300-pound man who frightened and beat their victims, and mentions several other enforcers in the 245 to 300 pound range. Hired "muscle" of this sort, however, is distinct from contract killers per se; they specialize in intermediate degrees of physical intimidation, but crime business wants continually paying customers and working employees, not dead ones. "Al- most anyone in the business is capable of running muscle," says "Joey." "Strength is not that important, although the tougher an individual looks the less often he has to prove how tough he is. But almost anybody is capable of swinging a base- ball bat or an iron pipe" (Fisher 2002: 82).

22. "Joey" similarly describes cornering his victim in a revenge killing: "I could smell the fear. If you've ever wondered why an animal attacks someone who's afraid of him, it's because the fear just pours out of him and creates an odor. I saw it. I smelled it" (Fisher 2002: 68).

23. This is a version of working up anger to motivate oneself in a fight. Athletes such as boxers, as well as team coaches in contact sports, look for anything their opponent did or said that can be construed as insults or slights, to work up anger for an upcoming match. Specialists in violence thus may hoard memories of previ- ous humiliation or deliberately nurse a grudge. Their "chip on the shoulder" should not be taken simply as mere unconscious repression or bypassed shame that comes out as rage. Not to deny that Scheff's (1994) model can operate in a straightforward manner; but there are also complex versions of emotion self- management, in which one deliberately uses past emotions as a resource to get an advantage in a present confrontation.

24. This may seem morally cold; but it is the same kind of reaction as that of the German ace pilot Erich Hartmann, who shoots down several Russian planes on a 3 a.m. sortie and returns to nap before going out to shoot down several more at 6 a.m. (www.acepilots.com; cf. Fisher 2002: 56, 63).

25. Similarly, most people are not good liars, since they do not know how to control their paralinguistic expressions that give away the fact they are lying. But those few who are good liars also tend to give off tiny facial cues that Ekman (1985: 76-79) calls "duping delight"—joy in getting away with it.

26. Fisher (2002: x; Hoffman xxv-xxvii). I found my informant to be thought- ful and clear-spoken, more serious and less boisterous than the usual masculine bar-room company.

27. Tony the Greek's closest friend was Mad Dog Sullivan, pairing two of the top contract killers in the New York underworld (Hoffman and Headley 1992: 263-64): an example of friendship homogamy by professional rank.

28. To avoid a common misunderstanding, it should be emphasized that orga- nized crime is not a unified bureaucracy, but a combination of several loose organi- zational forms. The overarching structure is a federation or peace pact among

Notes to Chapter 11 • 523

armed groups operating to limit jurisdictional disputes and to monopolize territo- ries. On another level are organized crime businesses routinely providing illegal commodities and services such as drugs, gambling, loan-sharking and auto chop- shops; these are not carried out by the crime families but by individuals who operate under their umbrella of protection. American Mafia families, strictly speaking, have been illegal governments, organized by what Weber would call patrimonialism, over and above a collection of illegal businesses.

29. It follows from this argument that low-end hitmen are less competent; be- cause they are not in a tight reputational network, they receive less emotional support.

30. Goodwin (2006) defines terrorism as attack on complicitous civilians in the effort to undermine their support for military or political authorities, or to rally one's side for an insurgency; the latter aim would include keeping up one's own morale by a spectacular if localized victory. Guerrilla warfare resembles ter- rorism in its clandestine preparation and in fading back into the civilian popula- tion after an attack. But guerrillas attack military targets, terrorists civilian ones; they differ also in that guerrilla tactics, once the moment of confrontation with the enemy occurs, are typically prolonged (at least for minutes or hours, compared to terrorist attacks taking place in seconds), and the emotional support for the confrontation is the normal military one of small groups in action together. Their different means of overcoming confrontational tension/fear makes it likely that they have different kinds of recruitment methods and organizational structures at the operational level.

3 1 . Wc have no estimate of how often remote-operated or time bombs fail, compared to suicide bombers. A spectacular example of failure was the plot to kill Hitler in July 1944, which likely would have succeeded if the German officer who carried the bomb had made a suicide attack instead of leaving the bomb behind and exiting the bunker before it detonated. Estimates are that suicide bombings are ten to fifteen times as effective as other terrorist attacks; worldwide from 1980 to 2001, suicide bombings made up 3 percent of terrorist attacks but caused 48 percent of the deaths (Pape 2005; Ricolfi 2005).

32. An early modern example from the religious wars in France shows the details of avoiding confrontation: On July 2 8 , 1 5 8 9 , the Protestant king of France was about to attack Paris, an anti-Protestant stronghold. A Catholic monk, pre- tending to present a letter to the king, went to the house where he was staying in the suburbs. While the king was reading the letter, the monk kneeling before him in the customary posture of a religious supplicant reached up and stabbed him in the belly. The piece of paper was between them; the attack was made literally without face confrontation (Cambridge Modern History 3:5, 47).

33. An estimated 5 to 10 percent of Palestinian suicide missions fail (Ricolfi 2005: 79).

34. The parallel case, as wc have seen earlier, is the professional hitman who prefers to work alone, avoiding distractions that accomplices would make in his self-absorption.

524 • Notes to Chapter 11

35. There are some analogies to this kind of complex emotion-work among professional hitmen. One created an image of himself in public (within the crimi- nal world) by pretending to be angry and out of control, as way of lulling his targets into thinking that he lacked the cool technique to be a real danger (de- scribed in the interview noted in note 16 in this chapter). Also in the routine crime business of extortion or debt-collection by intimidation, professional "muscle" may pretend to be angry, or work themselves into anger, for the calculated effect of getting the victim to pay off.

36. The mother of a nineteen-year-old Lebanese woman who belonged to an underground resistance cell and became a suicide bomber, retrospectively recalls: "We used to be watching TV with the neighbours and some issue about the [Is- raeli] occupation [of Lebanon] would come up and I would be having a heated discussion with my neighbour over it. But Loula wouldn't say anything. She'd just look at us and smile. Now we know she was working on something bigger" (Davis 2003: 79). Calming oneself for clandestine violence appears to involve a long- term technique of emotional self-control. The self-advice in the death note left by Mohammad Atta, a leader of the 9/11 attacks, similarly did not focus on griev- ances but on calming himself, avoiding to appear nervous, and repeating God's name in inner dialogue (Davis 2003: 87); the last not only has religious signifi- cance but also is a method for self-concentration.

37. An alternative interpretation of videos presenting intifada suicide bombers is that these are commitment mechanisms, devices by which these individuals are required to make a public display of their intentions so that they cannot back out (Gambetta 2005: 276, citing Merari 2005). But this does not explain why their emotional expressions are calm rather than fervent; and in fact videos of suicide bombers in action show the same expressions as the publicity videos.

38. Ricolfi (2005) notes that air hijackings, the most prominent technique of terrorist organizations in the 1950s through 1970s, were replaced in the 1980s by the diffusion of suicide bombings. Both are high-visibility techniques for publi- cizing a political cause; but whereas hijackings are merely a form of blackmail, suicide bombings carry a claim to martyrdom, at least for some audiences. I would add: the recruitment base for suicide bombings, once the technique became known, was much wider, because it is a confrontation-minimizing technique. Hijackings are at the opposite end of the spectrum, a confrontation-prolonging technique.

39. Pape (2005) finds little evidence of criminal background among suicide terrorists; see also Sageman (2004). Indeed, the threatening bluster of a confronta- tional criminal style of interaction would make it extremely difficult to carry out a clandestine suicide mission. A perhaps rather typical suicide bomber (who killed sixteen and wounded 130 Israelis—including small children—in a Jerusalem piz- zeria in August 2001) is described as a shy, "mild-mannered youth, who had never been in a fight, not even with his brothers" (Davis 2003: 106).

40. In the Peterloo massacre near Manchester in 1819, a cavalry troop (per- haps 200 men) rode into a crowd of enthusiastic election-reform supporters, slash- ing with their sabers; although a horrific scene, the twelve deaths and forty wounded and otherwise injured (such as by trampling) out of 50,000 imply that not every soldier was effectively violent (Cambridge Modern History 10: 581).

Notes to Chapter 11 • 525

An eyewitness noted that a portion of the troop confined themselves to cutting down the placards at the speaker's stand, thus performing only symbolic and nom- inal violence (Lewis 2001: 358-60). The attack began when the magistrates, frightened by precedents of violence in France and elsewhere, and by the crowd's own cheers of "Liberty or Death!" and similar rhetorical extremes, ordered the troops to attack.

4 1 . To underline a point that may be bothering the reader: I am not asking, why don't most people become professional hitmen, or cowboy cops, etc. The simple answer would be that most people don't want to because they have a moral objection. But, in fact, people can find an opportunity to be violent on any side of the law or conception of morality, and many forms of violence carry their own moral codes that their practitioners believe are highly honorable. I am ask- ing: why is it that most people who are in a particular situation of conflict— soldiers, police, mobs who have mobilized to fight what they conceive to be a morally appropriate enemy, members of the criminal population—do not become part of the small minority of actively violent, and the even smaller minority of the competently violent? I am arguing that it is not simply a question of motiva- tion; even if most people in the general population do not want to become one of these types of violent elites, the number who do is undoubtedly larger than the number who succeed at it. Social limits on the possibility to acquire and practice the technique, not people's background motivation to be violent, are the key determinants.

42. Jankowski (1991) calls gang members defiant individualists, not group conformists. Hence they are not simply explained by belonging to a group culture; they are attempting to be standouts in that culture. The analogy to intellectuals would be the distinctions between those who are happy to read others' books, or write books imitating others, and those who write original books; all of them are in the intellectual subculture, but the easier versions of conforming to the culture do not bring eminence in it.

43. To repeat: in interaction ritual theory, emotional energy is defined as initia- tive, confidence and enthusiasm in a particular kind of interactional practice.

44. Jankowski (1991) notes that gang members get little sleep; the inference he draws is that they are often irritable and erratic as a result, but it is also evidence of how hard they have to work, and how dangerous it is to take a break.

45. How far this analogy applies to the violent elite is a question at the frontier of our knowledge of careers in violence. There is a wide range of types of violence in this book; some types may be more embedded than other types in network ties to successfully violent persons. There are suggestions that network ties are important for careers in Mafia-type organized crime, and for terrorists; are they important also for ace pilots, cowboy cops, or armed robbers? And since there are two kinds of network to be explored, working this out would be an extensive research project. Network origins (intergenerational) and network emergence (ho- rizontal) may have different weights for different kinds of violence. Are the violent elite mentored by, or benefit from, close role-modeling from ties to predecessors in the violent elite? Do new generations of the violent elite start out as an ambi- tious cluster feeding off of each other's energy and determination to reach the violent elite together?

526 • Notes to Epilogue

46. Ted Williams, the most cool-headed and technical of all the great baseball hitters, flew thirty-nine combat missions as a fighter pilot, but never shot down an enemy plane. Williams set a record in a gunnery competition when he was in training, but this not did carry over into the actual conditions of combat. After his drastically lowered position in the field of fighter pilots became apparent in Korea (after his first eight or ten missions), he began to be sick, dogged by persis- tent colds that resisted medical treatment—quite possibly psychosomatic reac- tions to the positional strain. But his health recovered quickly when he was dis- charged, and he returned to his usual high-performance level in baseball (www.tedwilliams.com; Thorn et al. 2001).

47. The length of an active generation is shorter for violence than for intellectu- als; it also seems to vary among different kinds of violence: for youth gangs, ten years or less; for pilot aces perhaps only a couple of years; and so on. Burnout among police who have been involved in shootings may indicate the limits of generational succession among this particular violent elite. The problem awaits investigation.

EPILOGUE PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Anderson emphasizes (in a personal communication, 2006) he kept one hand in his pocket during the encounter, leaving an ambiguous impression whether he had a gun.

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Index

A b u G h r a i b , 4 8 2 n 8 a b u s e , d o m e s t i c , 2 0 , 134—55; o f c h i l d r e n ,

1 3 4 , 1 3 9 - 4 1 , 1 8 7 , 4 8 0 n 5 , 4 8 1 n 6 ; c o n s e - q u e n c e s of, 2 , 2 0 , 1 3 6 , 4 7 9 n l , 4 8 0 n 2 , 4 8 0 n 3 ; o f elders, 1 3 8 - 3 9 , 1 8 7 ; o f t h e h a n d i c a p p e d , 1 3 7 - 4 1 ; o f s p o u s e s , 1 4 1 - 5 0 , 1 8 7

A c c a r d o , T o n y " J o e B a t t e r s , " 5 1 1 n l 6 aces, f i g h t e r p i l o t , 6 7 , 6 9 , 3 8 7 - 9 9 , 4 0 4 ,

4 6 0 , 5 2 5 n 4 6 , 5 2 7 n 4 7 Achilles, 1 9 6 , 1 9 8 , 2 1 1 , 4 8 4 n 2 , 4 8 4 n 3 A f g h a n i s t a n , 6 1 , 6 4 , 2 5 8 , 3 8 3 , 4 7 2 n l 5 ,

4 7 2 n l 6 Africa, 3 2 6 , 4 2 1 , 4 7 7 n 2 1 , 4 7 7 n 2 2 ,

4 7 9 n 3 0 A g i n c o u r t , b a t t l e of, 1 0 4 - 6 , 1 2 7 , 4 5 1 Aias (Ajax), 1 9 6 , 4 8 4 n 3 A i k i d o , 2 1 1 A i n e i a s , 1 9 5 a l c o h o l , a n d violence, 1 1 3 , 1 7 4 , 2 4 3 , 2 5 4 ,

2 5 5 , 2 5 9 - 6 1 , 2 6 3 - 7 0 , 2 7 3 - 7 4 , 5 0 4 n 3 3 A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t , 1 0 6 - 8 A l p e r t , Geoffrey, 1 2 9 , 3 7 6 - 7 7 a l - Q a e d a , 6 4 , 4 0 9 , 4 4 4 A m s t e r d a m 7 8 , 3 7 1 A n a s t a s i a , A l b e r t , 4 3 4 , 5 2 1 n 2 1 A n d e r s o n , Elijah, 3 1 , 2 5 0 , 3 3 9 , 3 4 7 , 3 4 8 -

6 0 , 4 5 7 , 4 6 4 - 6 5 , 5 0 8 n 2 , 5 1 0 n l l , 5 1 1 n l 6 , 5 1 2 n 2 1 , 5 2 6 n l

A n k a r a , Turkey, 4 2 7 - 2 8 A r d a n t d u Picq, C h a r l e s , 8 , 4 9 , 5 9 , 1 0 6 ,

5 1 5 n 2 0 , A r d e n n e s , 4 7 0 n 3 A r g e n t i n a , 4 7 , 3 2 8 A r g o n a u t s , 4 8 8 n 2 8 A r i z o n a , 2 2 1 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 A r r o y o , B r o n s o n , 3 0 7 A r t e s t , R o n , 3 0 7 , 3 0 9 - 1 0 A r t w o h l , Alexis, 4 3 5 a s s a u l t , 3 , 1 5 , 1 8 6 - 8 7 , 4 8 5 n 7 A t l a n t a , 5 1 9 n 7 a t r o c i t i e s , 8 3 - 1 3 2 , 3 6 0 , 4 7 4 n 2 8 , 4 7 6 n l 2 A t t a , M o h a m m a d , 5 2 4 n 3 6 a t t e n t i o n s p a c e , e m o t i o n a l , 4 4 8 - 6 2 . See

also small n u m b e r s

a u d i e n c e : effects o n violence, 9 , 1 2 8 - 2 9 , 1 8 2 , 1 9 4 , 1 9 8 - 2 0 7 , 2 0 9 , 2 3 6 - 3 9 , 2 6 2 - 6 3 , 2 7 8 , 3 6 8 - 6 9 , 4 4 9 , 4 6 1 , 4 6 6 , 4 8 5 n 6 , 4 8 5 n 9 , 4 9 0 n 3 9 , 4 9 0 n 4 1 , 4 9 5 n 6 , 5 1 2 n 2 2 ; revolt of, 2 8 0 - 8 1 , 3 2 8 - 3 4

A u s t r a l i a , 1 8 2 A y o d h y a (India), 4 2 6

B a c o n , F r a n c i s , 5 1 2 n 2 0 B a g h d a d , 3 1 4 Balkan p e n i n s u l a , 108 b a n d i t s , 4 8 8 n 2 9 B a r k h o r n , G e r h a r d , 3 9 7 - 9 8 Bartov, O m e r , 102 Battle of t h e Bulge, 4 7 0 n 3 B a u g h , S a m m y , 5 1 7 n 3 9 B e e r b o h m , M a x , 4 9 3 n 1 2 Belgium, 3 1 8 , 4 7 3 n 2 2 , 4 9 5 n 2 6 Belgrade, 125, 4 2 4 , 4 7 2 n l 5 B e l m o n t , M i s s o u r i , b a t t l e of, 1 1 0 Berlin, 1 2 7 , 4 1 7 Bettis, J e r o m e , 5 0 3 n 3 0 Billy t h e Kid, 4 8 8 n 2 7 biological e x p l a n a t i o n s of violence. See ge-

netic a n d biological e x p l a n a t i o n s of vio- lence

Black, D o n a l d , 2 2 , 2 2 5 , 5 0 9 n 6 Blau, Peter, 1 5 0 bluster, 8 , 2 0 , 2 3 , 2 0 2 , 2 3 1 , 2 5 6 , 3 3 9 ,

3 4 7 - 5 9 , 3 6 2 - 6 4 , 3 6 8 , 4 6 4 , 4 6 8 n 8 , 4 8 5 n 6 , 4 9 5 n 2 5 , 5 0 7 n 4 4 , 5 2 4 n 3 9

b o a s t i n g , 6 3 , 3 4 5 ^ 1 6 Boer w a r , 100 B o n d s , Barry, 5 0 3 n 2 5 Bong, M a j o r R i c h a r d , 3 8 8 , 5 1 6 n 3 0 Bosnia, 3 1 1 , 4 7 4 n 2 8 B o u r d i e u , Pierre, 2 4 B o u r g o i s , P h i l i p p e , 2 2 9 B o u r k e , J o a n n a , 6 6 , 6 7 Boxer R e b e l l i o n , 4 6 , 6 8 b o x i n g , 1 6 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 9 - 1 1 , 2 1 8 , 2 7 7 , 2 8 6 ,

2 8 8 , 4 6 5 , 4 8 6 n 1 4 , 4 8 6 n l 7 , 4 9 9 n 5 b r a v a d o , 1 7 5 , 2 1 8 , 2 4 5 , 5 1 6 n 2 7 bravery, 3 9 - 4 0 B r o o k l y n , 2 5 7 , 4 3 6

556 • Index

B r o o k s , Scott, 5 0 0 n 9 B u d d , Z o l a , 4 9 8 n 4 B u e n o s A i r e s , 1 2 5 , 1 2 6 , 5 1 8 n 3 B u f o r d , Bill, 3 1 , 3 1 6 - 2 5 , 4 7 8 n 2 9 , 4 7 8 n 2 9 ,

5 0 5 n 4 0 , 5 0 7 n 4 4 b u l l y i n g : i n s c h o o l s , 1 5 8 - 6 8 , 1 7 1 - 7 3 , 1 8 7 -

8 8 , 2 2 1 , 3 7 3 , 4 8 1 n 2 , 4 8 2 n 5 , 4 8 2 n 6 ; i n p r i s o n s , 1 6 8 - 7 1 , 1 8 6 , 4 8 2 n 3

b u r n i n g , 8 7 , 8 8 , 9 3 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 3 1 2 - 1 5 , 4 1 5 - 1 6 , 4 2 2 , 4 2 4 , 4 2 6 , 4 7 8 n 2 3 , 4 9 2 n 3 , 4 9 2 n 4 , 4 9 2 n 5 , 5 2 0 n l 3

B u s h i d o , 2 1 0 b y s t a n d e r h i t s , 6 1 - 6 5 , 5 0 5 n 3 5 B y z a n t i n e c h a r i o t - r a c e s , 5 0 6 n 4 2

Caesar, J u l i u s , 9 5 , 9 7 , 1 0 7 - 1 0 , 4 7 7 n l 8 C a i r o , 4 2 6 C a l a b r i a , 2 2 5 C a l i f o r n i a , 8 3 , 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 6 3 , 3 7 2 , 4 9 6 n 2 9 ,

4 6 9 n l 4 Calley, Lt. W i l l i a m , 8 8 , 1 0 1 C a n n a e , b a t t l e of, 1 0 6 C a p o r e t t o , b a t t l e of, 4 7 7 n l 9 C a p o t e , T r u m a n , 3 6 5 C a p u t o , L t . P h i l i p , 8 3 - 8 8 , 8 9 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 5 ,

1 1 9 , 4 3 6 c a r o u s i n g : a n d violence, 2 4 2 , 2 5 3 - 7 7 ,

4 9 0 n 4 0 ; z o n e of, 2 4 2 - 4 3 , 2 5 6 - 5 9 , 4 7 6 n l 3 , 4 9 6 n 2 7 , 5 1 8 n l

C a r t h a g i n i a n s , 1 0 6 Celtic w a r r i o r s , 1 9 6 - 9 7 C h a m b l i s s , D a n i e l , 2 9 7 , 4 5 7 C h a n c e l l o r s v i l l e , b a t t l e of, 60 C h a n g , Iris, 1 0 2 C h a t t a n o o g a , b a t t l e of, 4 7 7 n l 7 C h i c a g o , 1 8 1 , 3 5 4 , 3 7 2 , 4 1 8 , 4 8 6 n l l ,

4 9 3 n l 4 , 4 9 8 n 4 , 5 1 1 n l 6 C h i c k a m a u g a , b a t t l e of, 4 7 7 n l 7 c h i l d r e n : violence a g a i n s t , 8 8 , 1 3 4 , 1 4 3 -

4 4 , 1 4 8 , 2 3 7 , 4 8 0 n 5 ; violence by, 2 , 1 7 - 1 8 , 2 5 - 2 6 , 7 4 , 1 8 7 , 3 7 4 , 4 6 8 n l l , 4 7 4 n 2 5

C h i n a , 2 8 , 9 7 , 1 0 0 , 1 9 7 , 2 0 8 , 3 9 5 , 4 8 8 n 2 9 C h o d e r l o s d e L a c l o s , P i e r r e , 4 8 2 n l 0 C h r i s t o p h e r C o m m i s s i o n , 3 7 5 , 3 7 9 , 5 1 2 n l CIA, 6 5 Civil War, 1 0 7 , 1 1 0 , 2 2 0 , 3 4 7 c l a n d e s t i n e v i o l e n c e , 1 8 8 , 3 8 3 - 8 5 , 4 3 0 - 4 8 ,

4 5 1 , 5 2 4 n 3 6 C l a u s e w i t z , C a r l v o n , 4 0 4 Cleaver, E l d r i d g e , 4 8 3 n l 4 C l e m e n s , Roger, 5 0 3 n 2 4 , 5 0 4 n 3 1

C o b b , Ty, 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 4 , 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 2 9 4 - 9 5 , 3 0 9 , 4 7 5 n 5 , 5 0 2 n 2 0

c o d e o f t h e street, 3 3 9 , 3 4 8 - 6 0 , 4 5 7 , 4 6 4 C o l l i n s , E d d i e , 2 9 4 C o l t , S a m u e l , 2 1 9 C o l u m b i n e H i g h S c h o o l , 9 2 , 9 3 C o n f e d e r a t e a r m i e s , 1 1 0 , 3 4 7 , 4 7 7 n l 7 c o m b a t . See m i l i t a r y violence c o m p e t e n c e a n d i n c o m p e t e n c e i n violence,

5 7 - 6 6 , 6 8 - 7 0 , 3 7 1 - 7 4 , 3 8 1 - 8 3 , 4 4 9 , 4 7 4 n 2 3

confidence. See e m o t i o n a l energy (EE) c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , 1 4 , 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 5 - 2 9 ,

3 2 - 3 3 , 4 1 - 5 6 , 7 0 - 7 3 , 7 9 - 8 2 , 8 9 - 9 3 , 1 3 2 - 3 3 , 4 0 4 , 4 0 9 , 4 2 5 , 4 5 0 , 4 6 1 , 5 0 1 n l 5 , 5 0 7 n 4 4 , 5 1 4 n l 3 ; a n d c o n f r o n - t a t i o n - a v o i d i n g violence, 1 7 4 , 2 3 9 , 3 8 4 , 4 4 1 , 4 4 3 , 4 4 6 , 4 5 1 , 5 2 1 n 2 0 , 5 2 4 n 3 8 , 5 2 4 n 3 9 ; p a t h w a y s a r o u n d , 8 - 1 0 , 3 2 - 3 3 , 1 4 8 - 5 0 , 1 9 9 , 2 1 1 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 3 2 , 4 6 9 n l 2

C o r s i c a , 2 2 5 , 2 3 1 C r i m e a n War, 4 8 7 n 2 4 , 5 1 5 n 2 0 C r o m w e l l , Oliver, 9 7 , 1 1 1 c r o w d - c o n t r o l forces, 1 1 3 , 1 2 1 - 2 8 , 4 1 7 ,

4 1 9 - 2 1 , 4 2 7 , 4 7 3 n 2 2 c r o w d violence, 6 , 7 1 , 1 1 5 - 3 2 , 2 4 2 - 5 2 ,

4 9 2 n 2 , 4 9 2 n 5 , 4 9 2 n 6 , 4 9 4 n l 5 ; a n d lay- ers o f c r o w d , 4 1 3 - 2 9

c r y i n g , 1 3 9 - 4 1 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 0 , 4 7 6 n 7 c u l t u r e o f violence, 2 3 - 2 4 , 5 2 5 n 4 2 c u r s i n g , 2 4 , 3 9 , 8 6 , 9 2 , 2 6 4 , 3 2 5 , 3 4 7 - 4 8 ,

3 8 0 , 4 7 6 n 7 , 4 8 9 n 3 3 C y p r u s , 1 1 5

D a r i u s , 1 0 7 Dead Birds (film), 4 0 , 5 4 , 7 7 , 5 1 0 n l 0 D e M e o , R o y 5 2 1 n 2 1 D e M e o crew, 4 3 6 , 4 3 7 , 5 2 1 n l 9 D e t r o i t r i o t , 2 4 8 , 4 9 4 n l 5 , 5 2 0 n l 5 ,

5 2 1 n l 7 D i a l l o , A m a d o u , 1 1 2 , 1 1 4 D i c k e r s o n , Eric, 5 0 2 n 2 1 D i o m e d e s , 1 9 5 , 4 8 4 n 3 disrespect. See h o n o r a n d r e s p e c t d r a m a t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n o f identities, 3 2 4 - 2 7 d r a m a t i c qualities: of violent s i t u a t i o n s ,

1 2 3 - 2 4 , 2 3 8 , 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 , 2 8 1 , 3 3 1 - 3 3 , 3 5 8 , 3 6 2 , 4 9 8 n 3 ; o f s p o r t s , 2 8 3 - 8 5 , 3 0 7 - 1 1 , 4 9 8 n 2 , 5 0 2 n 2 2

Dreiser, T h e o d o r e , 3 6 6 - 6 7 , 5 1 2 n 2 2 D r o g h e d a , I r e l a n d , m a s s a c r e of, 9 7 d r u g s , 8 9 , 1 6 8 , 1 8 6 , 2 0 4 , 2 2 4 , 2 3 4 - 3 5 ,

Index • 557

2 6 8 - 6 9 , 3 2 1 - 2 2 , 3 5 1 , 3 5 8 - 6 0 , 4 3 8 , 4 6 3 , 4 6 5 , 4 9 5 n 2 4 , 4 9 5 n 2 6 , 5 1 1 n l 4 , 5 1 4 n l 4

d r u n k e n n e s s . See a l c o h o l , a n d violence D u b l i n , 5 0 7 n 4 3 d u e l i n g , 1 6 , 2 1 2 - 2 3 , 2 2 7 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 6 5 ,

2 7 5 , 2 9 2 , 4 6 5 , 4 8 4 n 2 , 4 8 4 n 4 , 5 1 2 n l 9 D u n e i e r , M i t c h e l l , 4 8 3 n l l D u n h a m , Roger, 1 2 9 , 3 7 6 - 3 7 7 D u n n i n g , Eric, 1 2 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 4 , 3 3 0 - 3 1 ,

5 0 6 n 4 2 , 5 0 7 n 4 4 D u r k h e i m , E m i l e , 7 4 , 8 2 , 1 1 8 , 1 6 3 , 2 4 3 ,

2 5 0 , 2 5 3 , 2 8 0 , 3 3 2 D u t c h police, 3 7 1

E d o ( T o k y o ) , 2 0 1 EE. See e m o t i o n a l energy E k m a n , P a u l , 4 3 , 1 6 5 , 4 7 3 n 2 0 , 5 2 2 n 2 5 Elias, N o r b e r t , 2 9 , 3 1 9 , 4 6 9 n l 3 , 5 0 6 n 4 2 E m e r s o n , R o b e r t , 2 2 e m o t i o n a l e n e r g y (EE), 1 9 , 1 6 0 , 1 6 2 , 1 7 4 ,

1 8 3 , 1 8 5 - 8 6 , 1 8 8 - 8 9 , 2 1 1 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 3 , 2 8 5 , 2 9 6 - 9 7 , 2 9 8 , 3 0 0 , 3 0 3 - 6 , 3 9 8 , 4 5 2 - 5 3 , 4 5 6 - 5 7 , 4 6 1 , 4 8 3 n l l , 5 0 2 n 2 2 , 5 2 5 n 4 3 ; a n d d o m i n a n c e , 102—4, 1 5 5 , 1 7 7 - 7 8 , 1 9 4 , 2 9 6 - 3 0 1 , 3 0 7 , 3 7 6 , 3 7 8 , 4 0 9 , 4 3 7 , 4 5 9 , 4 7 6 n l 6

e m o t i o n m a n a g e m e n t ( e m o t i o n w o r k ) , 3 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 0 6 , 4 3 3 - 3 6 , 4 5 1 , 5 3 3 n 2 3 , 5 2 3 n 3 5

e m o t i o n s : a n g e r / r a g e , 8 , 2 0 , 2 7 , 6 9 - 7 0 , 9 3 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 4 - 4 5 , 3 6 2 , 4 2 9 , 4 3 5 - 3 6 , 4 7 3 n 2 1 , 5 0 8 n l , 5 0 8 n 2 , 5 2 2 n 2 3 ; fear, 8 , 1 9 , 4 0 - 4 9 , 6 8 - 7 0 , 7 3 - 8 2 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 7 , 1 3 4 - 3 5 , 1 7 5 , 1 8 5 , 4 4 6 , 4 6 8 n 8 , 5 1 9 n l 2 , 5 2 2 n 2 2 ; fun, 1 2 - 1 4 , 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 1 3 1 , 1 6 3 - 6 4 , 1 6 8 , 2 7 7 , 4 9 6 n 3 0 ; h a t e , 6 6 , 4 3 6 ; j o y / e u p h o r i a , 66-69, 77, 8 9 , 9 3 , 2 7 6 , 3 2 2 , 4 6 8 n 8 , 4 9 7 n 3 2 , 5 1 4 n l 6 , 5 1 9 n 7 ; p r i d e , 4 3 7 - 3 9 ; s h a m e , 1 0 1 , 3 4 4 - 4 5 , 5 2 2 n 2 3 ; s u r p r i s e , 1 7 7 - 7 9 , 3 8 7 , 5 1 5 n 2 0

E n g l a n d , 1 1 0 , 1 8 6 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 1 5 , 2 1 8 , 2 4 8 , 2 6 6 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 8 , 3 3 1

e n t e r t a i n m e n t , violence a s , 2 4 2 - 8 1 , e n t r a i n m e n t , 1 9 , 2 7 , 7 9 - 8 2 , 9 3 - 9 4 , 1 3 0 -

3 1 , 1 9 8 - 9 9 , 2 4 2 , 3 0 0 - 1 , 3 1 6 , 3 8 5 , 3 9 0 , 4 4 8 ; a s y m m e t r i c a l , 1 0 2 - 4 , 1 5 0 - 5 2 ; self- e n t r a i n m e n t , 9 3 , 1 5 1 - 5 4 , 4 1 2 , 4 5 6 - 5 7 , 4 7 6 n 7

e t h n i c violence, 2 3 , 9 9 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 5 - 2 1 , 1 2 8 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 5 , 2 4 5 - 4 6 , 3 1 1

E u r o p e a n U n i o n , 4 1 9 e v o l u t i o n : o f c a p a c i t y for h u m a n e n t r a i n -

m e n t , 2 6 - 2 7 ; o f social o r g a n i z a t i o n for c o n t r o l l i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , 2 7 - 2 9 . See also t e c h n i q u e s of violence

eye c o n t a c t , 7 8 , 8 0 , 9 0 , 1 7 4 , 1 9 4 , 3 8 5 , 5 0 2 n 2 3 , 5 1 5 n l 9

fair f i g h t s , 3 9 , 6 3 , 1 9 3 - 2 4 1 , 2 6 8 , 3 1 0 , 4 6 5 , 4 8 5 n l 0

Fallujah, I r a q , 4 2 2 , 4 2 4 , 4 5 0 fans: m u s i c , 1 6 2 , 2 7 1 , 2 7 7 - 8 1 ; s p o r t s , 3 1 ,

3 0 7 - 3 3 4 , 4 6 8 n 8 F a u l k n e r , R o b e r t , 3 0 0 f i l m s , i n a c c u r a c i e s d e p i c t i n g violence, 5 ,

1 0 - 1 9 , 3 1 , 6 4 , 2 4 0 F i n l a n d , 3 8 1 F i t z g e r a l d , F . Scott, 3 2 , 5 0 6 n 4 1 fog of c o m b a t , fog of w a r . See c o n f r o n t a -

t i o n a l t e n s i o n food f i g h t s , 1 2 - 1 4 , 3 1 9 , 4 9 6 n 3 0 , 4 9 7 n 3 1 f o r w a r d p a n i c , 6 7 , 8 3 - 1 3 4 , 1 4 5 ^ 1 8 , 1 5 2 ,

2 4 2 , 3 6 0 - 6 1 , 4 5 0 , 4 6 4 , 4 7 2 n l 2 , 5 2 1 n l 8 F o x , R o b i n , 2 0 2 , 4 8 9 n 3 2 F r a n c e , 2 0 8 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 1 5 , 2 1 6 ,

2 1 7 , 2 1 8 , 2 2 0 , 2 9 2 , 4 8 7 n 2 2 , 4 9 2 n 5 , 5 2 3 n 3 2

F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n w a r , 5 7 F r e d e r i c k t h e G r e a t , 4 7 2 n l 3 F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 4 7 3 n 2 2 F r e u d , S i g m u n d , 3 3 7 , 4 6 9 n l 3 , 5 0 6 n 4 2 friendly f i r e , 5 9 - 6 5 , 4 7 2 n l 4 , 4 7 2 n l 5 ,

4 7 2 n l 6 , 4 7 3 n l 7 f r u s t r a t i o n a n d a g g r e s s i o n , 2 0 , 1 2 0 F u k u z a w a Y u k i c h i , 2 0 1 - 2 , 4 8 5 n 8

G a l l o , Joey, 4 3 4 , 4 3 5 , 4 5 6 , 5 2 1 n 2 1 G a m b e t t a , D i e g o , 2 4 0 g a n g s , 6 1 - 6 3 , 7 1 - 7 4 , 1 1 2 , 1 7 2 - 7 3 , 2 2 3 -

3 4 , 2 2 6 , 2 3 3 - 3 6 , 2 3 8 - 4 0 , 2 7 5 , 3 5 3 - 5 5 , 3 6 3 , 3 7 2 - 7 3 , 4 8 2 n 7 , 4 8 9 n 3 4 , 4 8 9 n 3 5 , 4 8 9 n 3 6 , 4 9 0 n 7 , 4 9 0 n 8 , 4 9 1 n 4 3 , 4 9 1 n 4 6 , 4 9 7 n 3 6 , 5 2 5 n 4 2 , 5 2 5 n 4 4 , 5 2 5 n 4 7

G a u g a m e l a , b a t t l e of, 1 0 6 , 1 0 7 G a u l s , 5 4 G a z a Strip, 4 1 5 genetic a n d biological e x p l a n a t i o n s o f v i o -

lence, 2 5 - 2 9 , 1 8 7 - 8 8 , 4 4 8 G e n o a , Italy, 4 1 6 G e n o v e s e family, 4 5 5 G e r m a n y , 5 4 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 2 0 , 2 1 6 ,

558 • Index

G e r m a n y (cont'd) 217, 2 1 8 , 2 2 3 , 2 7 5 , 2 9 2 , 3 3 1 , 3 8 2 , 4 7 6 n l 2 , 4 7 7 n l 9 , 5 0 7 n 4 5 , 5 1 9 n l 0

G e t t y s b u r g , b a t t l e of, 54 G i a n c a n a , S a m " M o o n e y , " 5 1 1 n l 6 G i b s o n , B o b , 4 7 6 n l 4 , 5 0 3 n 2 4 G i l b e r t I s l a n d s , 4 8 glaze of c o m b a t . See c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n -

sion G l e n n , Russell, 5 1 , 4 7 0 n 2 , 4 7 0 n 5 G o f f m a n , Alice, 4 8 9 n 3 5 G o f f m a n , E r v i n g , 1 5 4 , 1 6 5 , 1 7 4 , 1 8 3 , 1 8 5 ,

2 1 7 , 2 2 6 , 2 3 3 , 2 3 4 , 2 3 5 , 2 4 0 , 2 4 3 , 2 7 6 , 2 9 8 , 3 1 7 , 3 3 9 - 4 6 , 3 4 9 - 5 0 , 3 5 2 , 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 , 3 6 7 - 6 9 , 4 1 8 , 4 4 4 , 4 8 2 n l 0 , 4 8 3 n l l , 4 9 7 n 3 2 , 5 0 6 n 4 1 , 5 0 8 n 3 , 5 0 9 n 6 , 5 1 2 n l 9

G o o d w i n , Jeff, 5 2 3 n 3 0 G o t h e n b u r g , S w e d e n , 4 1 9 G o u l d , Roger, 2 2 9 , 2 3 1 , 4 9 4 n l 6 G r a n i c u s , b a t t l e of, 1 0 3 , 1 0 6 , 1 0 7 G r a n t , Ulysses S., 4 9 , 6 6 , 1 1 0 , 3 4 7 G r a z i a n , D a v i d , 3 1 , 4 7 9 n 3 1 G r e e c e , 2 8 , 5 4 , 1 0 7 - 9 , 1 9 5 - 9 6 , 2 1 0 , 2 2 2 ,

4 8 6 n l 2 , 4 8 8 n 2 8 , 5 0 7 n 4 6 G r e t s k y , W a y n e , 5 0 3 n 2 6 Griffith, P a t r i c k , 4 9 , 5 7 G r o s s m a n , D a v e , 8 , 4 9 , 5 9 , 7 5 - 7 8 , 4 6 6 G u a d a l c a n a l , 4 0 6 G u j a r a t ( w e s t e r n I n d i a ) , 4 7 8 n 2 3 Gulf w a r o f 1 9 9 1 , 3 8 3 , 4 7 7 n l 9 gunfights, 2 1 9 - 2 1 , 4 8 8 n 2 7 ; o n e - g u n f i g h t s ,

2 2 6 - 2 9 g u n s , 4 2 - 5 5 , 6 3 , 7 1 - 7 2 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 7 5 ,

1 7 7 , 1 8 0 - 8 3 , 2 1 3 - 1 7 , 2 2 4 - 2 5 , 2 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 3 2 - 3 6 , 3 6 3 , 3 8 1 - 8 3 , 3 8 7 , 3 9 9 - 4 0 3 , 4 7 4 n 2 3 , 4 8 5 n 9 , 4 8 7 n 2 3 , 4 8 9 n 3 4 , 4 9 1 n 4 4 , 5 1 4 n l 3 ; fake, 1 8 3 - 8 4

G u r n e y , G e n e , 3 9 6 - 9 7 , 5 1 6 n 2 6 G u s t a v u s A d o l p h u s , 5 8 G w y n n , Tony, 5 0 3 n 2 5

H a l l o w e e n , 2 4 2 H a m e l s , C o l e , 4 6 7 n 6 H a m i l t o n , R i c h a r d , 3 0 7 H a m l e t , 2 1 2 , 4 8 7 n l 9 , 4 9 0 n 4 2 H a n n e r z , Ulf, 2 4 7 , 4 9 2 n 4 H a n n i b a l , 1 0 6 H a r t m a n n , E r i c h , 3 8 8 , 3 9 2 , 3 9 7 , 3 9 8 ,

5 1 5 n 2 4 , 5 1 7 n 3 4 , 5 2 2 n 2 4 Hatfields a n d M c C o y s , v e n d e t t a of, 2 2 6 I Iausa t r i b e , 95

H e c t o r , 1 9 6 , 1 9 7 , 2 1 1 , 4 8 4 n 2 H e m i n g w a y , E r n e s t , 4 8 6 n l 7 h e r o e s , 1 4 , 1 9 4 - 9 8 , 2 3 8 , 2 4 0 , 3 1 0 , 3 8 9 ,

4 8 3 n l , 4 8 2 n 2 , 4 8 2 n 5 , 4 8 8 n 2 8 , 4 8 8 n 2 9 H e z b o l l a h , 4 7 2 n l 5 H i n d u - M u s l i m r i o t s , 4 7 7 n 2 1 , 4 7 8 n 2 3 Hitler, Adolf, 5 2 3 n 3 1 h i t m e n . See p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n t r a c t killers H o b b e s , T h o m a s , 1 1 , 2 4 5 h o l d u p s , 1 7 5 - 8 7 , 2 6 8 , 3 5 8 - 6 0 , 3 7 2 , 4 6 5 H o l l a n d , 3 3 1 H o l m e s , R i c h a r d , 4 9 , 6 0 , 9 4 H o l o c a u s t , 7 8 , 1 0 3 , 4 8 1 n 9 Holyfield, E v a n d e r , 2 0 6 H o m e r , 3 2 , 1 9 5 , 1 9 7 , 4 8 3 n l , 4 8 4 n 2 ,

4 8 4 n 5 h o m i c i d e , 2 - 3 , 1 8 7 , 2 5 1 , 5 1 3 n 8 , 5 1 4 n l 7 h o m o p h o b i a , 2 3 , 1 7 1 , 4 8 2 n 5 h o m o s e x u a l s , 4 6 8 n 9 , 4 8 3 n l 5 H o n d u r a s / E l S a l v a d o r soccer w a r , 3 2 8 h o n o r a n d r e s p e c t , 2 0 0 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 1 8 ,

2 2 1 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 9 - 3 7 , 3 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 5 5 - 5 6 , 3 9 0 - 9 2 , 4 6 4 , 5 0 7 n 4 6 , 5 1 1 n l 5

h o o l i g a n s , soccer, 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 9 , 3 1 5 - 3 4 , 4 6 9 n l 3 , 4 6 9 n 2 9 , 4 9 5 n 2 6 , 5 1 8 n 3

H o r n s b y , R o g e r s , 4 7 5 n 3 H o r o w i t z , D o n a l d , 1 1 7 - 2 0 , 1 2 9 , 4 7 7 n 2 1 ,

4 7 8 n 2 4 , 4 7 8 n 2 6 , 4 7 8 n 2 7 H u g h e s , T h o m a s , 1 6 8 H u n g a r y , 2 1 7 H u t u s , 1 0 0 H u x l e y , A l d o u s , 3 3 3

I b o t r i b e , 9 5 I k e g a m i , E i k o , 5 0 8 n 3 Iliad, 1 9 4 - 9 6 , 2 0 8 , 4 5 9 , 4 8 4 n 2 I n c a e m p i r e , 4 6 I n d i a , 2 2 3 , 4 7 7 n 2 1 I n d o n e s i a , 4 6 6 i n s u l t s , 1 4 6 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 9 - 7 0 , 1 9 9 , 2 1 2 - 1 3 ,

2 3 9 , 3 2 5 - 2 7 , 3 4 6 , 3 5 0 , 3 6 4 , 4 0 6 , 4 2 2 - 2 6 , 4 8 2 n 4 , 4 8 2 n 5 , 4 8 7 n 2 6 , 4 8 9 n 3 3 , 4 8 9 n 3 6 , 5 1 1 n l 3 , 5 1 2 n l 9 , 5 1 2 n 2 0

i n t e r a c t i o n r i t u a l (IR), 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 5 6 , 7 4 , 7 9 - 8 2 , 1 1 8 , 1 4 7 , 1 6 6 - 6 7 , 2 0 8 - 9 , 2 2 9 , 2 7 6 , 2 7 9 - 8 0 , 3 0 0 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 9 , 3 3 1 , 3 4 4 , 3 5 4 , 4 4 9 , 4 5 6 , 4 8 0 n 5 , 5 0 5 n 3 6 , 5 1 0 n 8 , 5 1 9 n 9 , 5 1 9 n 2 0 , 5 2 5 n 4 3

i n t o x i c a t i o n . See a l c o h o l , a n d violence IRA, 3 8 2 Iraq, 5 3 , 6 5 , 3 8 6 , 4 2 2 , 4 4 1 , 4 4 6 , 4 7 0 n 6 ,

4 7 l n 1 1 , 4 7 l n 1 6 , 4 7 7 n l 9 , 5 1 9 n 9

Index • 559

I r e l a n d , 2 0 2 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 7 7 , 4 5 5 Israel, 4 2 , 4 7 , 4 1 8 , 4 2 1 , 4 7 2 n l 2 Issus, b a t t l e of, 1 0 6 , 1 0 7 Italy, 2 0 9 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 1 5 , 3 1 7 ,

4 7 7 n l 9 I w a m o t o , T e t s u z o , 3 9 5

J a c k s o n , A n d r e w , 2 1 4 J a c k s o n , S t o n e w a l l , 6 0 J a c k s o n - J a c o b s , C u r t i s , 2 7 4 - 7 6 , 3 2 4 ,

4 9 7 n 3 2 J a m e s , W i l l i a m , 8 5 , 1 5 1 , 4 7 6 n l l J a n k o w s k i , M a r t i n , 2 3 3 , 2 3 4 , 4 5 5 ,

4 9 1 n 4 3 , 5 2 5 n 4 2 , 5 2 5 n 4 4 J a p a n , 1 6 - 1 7 , 4 7 - 4 9 , 1 0 0 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 8 , 2 1 1 ,

3 1 2 , 3 9 1 , 3 9 4 , 4 7 6 n l 2 , 4 8 5 n 8 J e r u s a l e m , 5 2 4 n 3 9 J o h n s o n , M . P., 1 4 1 , 4 8 0 n 2 , 4 8 0 n 3 J o n e s , N i k k i , 3 1 , 5 1 1 n l 4 Junger, E r n s t , 9 4

K a f k a , F r a n z , 1 4 4 K a h n e , Kasey, 4 9 8 n 4 K a r a d z i k , R a d o v a n , 3 1 1 K a t z , J a c k , 5 , 3 1 , 1 4 1 , 1 7 9 , 1 8 4 - 8 5 , 2 2 8 ,

2 3 4 , 3 2 5 , 4 7 6 n 8 , 4 8 3 n l 2 K e e g a n , J o h n , 6 , 8 , 2 9 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 5 4 , 6 0 ,

1 0 4 - 7 , 4 7 2 n l 6 Keeley, L a w r e n c e , 4 1 , 4 6 9 n l K e n t State University, 3 2 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 K e n y a , 1 1 5 Kiev, U k r a i n e , 4 2 6 - 2 7 K i m m e l , M i c h a e l , 4 8 2 n 5 King, A n t h o n y , 1 2 , 3 1 , 5 6 , 3 2 2 - 2 4 , 3 2 6 ,

3 3 0 , 5 0 5 n 4 0 , 5 0 7 n 4 4 , 5 0 7 n 4 8 , 5 0 8 n 4 9 K i n g , M a r t i n Luther, 4 9 2 n 6 K i n g , R o d n e y , 4 , 8 8 - 8 9 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 1 2 8 , 2 4 6 ,

4 2 0 , 4 7 9 n 3 1 , 4 9 1 n l , 5 1 2 n l , 5 1 9 n 7 Kittel, O t t o , 3 8 8 , 5 1 7 n 3 4 Klinger, D a v i d , 3 7 8 , 4 3 5 , 5 1 4 n l 3 K l u s e m a n n , Stefan, 1 2 7 , 4 7 4 n 2 8 K o r e a , 5 8 , 6 1 , 2 0 8 , 4 2 7 , 5 1 6 n 2 9 , 5 1 6 n 3 3 ,

5 2 5 n 4 6 K o r e a n war, 4 7 , 5 0 , 5 1 , 5 2 , 6 7 , 3 7 0 , 3 8 8 ,

3 9 4 K u w a i t , 4 7 7 n l 9

L a b o v , W i l l i a m , 5 1 0 n 9 Lakoff, G e o r g e , 5 0 8 n l L a s Vegas, 2 0 6 , 2 4 5 l a u g h i n g , 8 6 , 9 2 - 9 4 , 1 6 2 , 4 7 6 n 8 , 4 9 1 n l L e b a n o n , 4 7 2 n l 5 , 5 2 4 n 3 6

Lewis, Jerry M . , 5 0 5 n 3 7 Lewis, Sinclair, 3 6 6 - 6 7 , 5 1 2 n 2 2 Lien, R o b e r t , 4 7 5 n 4 Lincoln C o u n t y war, N e w M e x i c o Terri-

tory, 4 8 8 n 2 7 L o n d o n , 1 2 2 , 1 8 2 , 1 8 3 , 2 6 2 , 3 1 8 , 3 2 0 ,

5 0 5 n 3 8 L o n d o n b o m b i n g s , 4 4 4 l o o t i n g , 9 8 - 9 9 , 2 4 5 - 5 3 , 4 9 3 n 7 , 4 9 3 n 8 ,

4 9 3 n 1 1 , 4 9 4 n l 9 Los Angeles, 4 , 8 8 , 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 , 1 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 4 6 ,

2 5 0 , 2 7 2 , 4 7 3 n l 8 , 5 1 8 n l , 5 2 0 n 1 5 Los Angeles police d e p a r t m e n t , 3 7 1 , 3 7 9 ,

4 7 5 n l , 4 7 9 n 3 l , 5 1 2 n l L o s Angeles riot, 2 5 2 , 4 9 1 n l , 4 9 3 n 1 1 L u c k e n b i l l , D a v i d , 1 8 2 , 2 2 6 Lufbery circle, 3 9 5 Luftwaffe, 3 8 9 , 3 9 2 , 3 9 4 l y n c h i n g , 4 2 1 - 2 6 , 4 7 9 n 3 2 , 5 1 9 n 9 , 5 2 0 n l 4

M a c e d o n i a n s , 9 7 , 1 0 3 , 1 0 6 , 1 0 7 M a c k e n z i e , C o m p t o n , 4 9 3 n l 2 m a c r o - s o c i o l o g y , in r e l a t i o n to m i c r o - s o c i -

ology, 2 1 - 2 2 , 3 4 - 3 5 " M a d D o g " Sullivan, 4 3 3 , 4 3 4 , 4 3 6 M a d r i d , 4 2 6 Mafia, 2 3 4 , 2 3 7 , 2 3 8 , 2 3 9 , 2 4 0 , 4 3 7 , 4 5 6 ,

4 7 5 n 5 , 4 9 1 n 4 5 , 4 9 1 n 4 6 , 4 9 1 n 4 7 , 5 1 1 n l 6 , 5 2 2 n 2 8

M a n c h e s t e r U n i t e d h o o l i g a n f i r m , 3 1 6 - 2 0 , 5 0 7 n 4 4

M a n n , M i c h a e l , 2 9 , 5 1 9 n l 0 M a r d i G r a s , 2 4 3 - 4 5 , 2 7 1 , 4 9 6 n 2 8 , 5 1 8 n l M a r s e i l l e , 3 2 4 M a r s h a l l , S.L.A., 8 , 4 3 - 5 4 , 5 5 , 6 7 , 7 2 , 7 6 ,

9 5 , 1 1 0 , 3 4 7 , 3 7 0 , 3 7 5 , 3 8 5 , 3 8 8 , 4 1 4 , 4 7 0 n 2 , 4 7 0 n 3 , 4 7 0 n 6 , 4 7 2 n l 2 , 4 7 4 n 2 4 , 4 7 6 n l 0

m a r t i a l a r t s s c h o o l s (fighting s c h o o l s ) , 2 0 7 - 1 2 , 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 3 7 , 4 8 6 n l 2 , 4 8 6 n l 3 , 4 8 6 n l 4 , 4 8 6 n l 6 , 4 8 7 n l 8 , 4 9 5 n 2 2

M a r t i n e z , P e d r o , 5 0 4 n 3 1 , 5 0 8 n 4 8 M a r x , K a r l , 3 3 7 m a s c u l i n i t y / m a c h i s m o , 2 - 3 , 2 5 - 2 6 , 6 6 ,

2 8 6 - 8 7 , 3 0 6 , 3 3 9 , 3 2 4 - 2 5 , 3 3 7 - 3 9 , 4 6 7 n 7 . See also w o m e n : c o m p a r e d to m e n

M a u s s , M a r c e l , 2 5 4 , 5 1 0 n 8 M a y D a y D e m o n s t r a t i o n , 1 2 2 , 1 2 7 M c C a u l e y , C l a r k , 4 9 8 n 3 M c N e i l l , W i l l i a m , 2 9 , 5 4 M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 5 3 - 5 4 , 4 8 4 n 4

560 • Index

M e n e l a o s , 1 9 5 , 4 8 4 n 2 M e n s u r ( G e r m a n s t u d e n t d u e l ) , 2 1 7 , 2 9 2 M e r c u t i o , 2 1 2 M e r k l e b o n e r , 5 0 7 n 4 7 M e x i c a n M a f i a , 4 9 0 n 3 8 M e x i c a n War, 2 1 9 , 3 4 7 M i l a n , C l y d e , 2 9 4 m i l i t a r y violence, 6 , 8 , 2 8 - 2 9 , 4 0 - 6 1 , 6 4 -

8 8 , 9 4 - 9 9 , 1 1 2 , 1 9 4 - 9 8 , 2 6 5 , 4 2 9 n l 2 . See also aces, fighter p i l o t ; s n i p e r s

M i l n e r , M u r r a y , 3 1 , 1 6 2 , 1 6 6 , 1 7 4 , 2 8 0 - 8 1 , 4 8 2 n 5 , 4 9 6 n 3 3 , 5 1 3 n l 0

M i l o s e v i c , S l o b o d a n , 1 2 5 , 4 2 4 , 4 7 2 n l 4 M o g a d i s h u , S o m a l i a , 4 2 2 , 5 1 9 n 9 M o n t a g n e r , H u b e r t , 1 5 6 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 0 - 6 1 ,

1 8 8 m o r a l h o l i d a y , 9 8 - 9 9 , 2 3 6 , 2 4 2 - 4 7 , 2 5 3 ,

3 1 5 , 3 2 0 - 2 1 , 4 7 6 n l 5 , 4 9 1 n l M o s c o w , 3 1 2 , 4 1 4 m o s h p i t s , 2 7 7 - 8 1 , 3 3 4 , 4 9 6 n 2 8 , 4 9 7 n 3 4 ,

4 9 7 n 3 6 M o s k o s , Peter, 5 1 4 n l 2 , 5 1 4 n l 5 m o t i v e s for violence, 2 0 - 2 1 , 3 4 , 3 3 9 ,

5 2 5 n 4 1 m u g g i n g , 1 7 4 - 7 5 , 1 8 0 , 1 8 6 , 4 8 2 n 9 ,

4 9 5 n 2 6 m u r d e r . See h o m i c i d e M u r p h y g a m e , 1 7 6 M y L a i m a s s a c r e , 8 8 , 1 0 1

N a n k i n g , r a p e of, 9 7 - 1 0 3 , 4 7 6 n l 2 N a p o l e o n , 5 8 , 4 7 3 n 2 2 N a p o l e o n i c w a r s , 2 8 , 5 4 , 4 7 7 n l 7 n a r r a t i v e gratification, 2 7 5 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 6 , 3 3 1 n a r r a t i v e s o f v i o l e n c e , 2 6 2 , 2 7 4 - 7 6 ,

4 9 7 n 3 2 N a s e b y , b a t t l e of, 1 1 0 - 1 1 N A T O , 4 7 2 n l 5 N a z i s , 7 9 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 , 4 7 6 n l 2 n e t w o r k s , 1 2 9 , 1 5 7 - 5 8 , 1 6 2 - 6 3 , 2 2 9 , 2 3 7 ,

4 3 1 , 4 4 0 , 4 5 4 - 5 6 , 4 6 2 , 4 8 9 n 3 2 , 5 2 5 n 4 5 N e w a r k r i o t , 2 4 8 N e w G u i n e a , 4 0 , 3 8 2 , 5 1 0 n l 0 N e w Year's eve, 2 4 5 ; i n P r a g u e , 4 9 2 n 2 N e w Y o r k City, 7 2 , 9 1 , 1 1 2 , 2 5 0 , 3 0 7 ,

365-66, 4 5 5 , 4 3 3 , 4 8 9 n 3 3 , 5 0 7 n 4 7 , 5 1 3 n l 0 , 5 2 2 n 2 7 ; b l a c k o u t r i o t , 4 9 1 n l , 4 9 3 n l l

9 / 1 1 b o m b i n g s , 4 0 9 - 1 2 N o r m a n d y , 5 0 , 9 5 , 3 8 7 N o r t h Africa, 1 0 7 , 1 0 9 N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , 3 8 2 , 4 1 5

N o r t h V i e t n a m , 8 8 , 5 1 6 n 3 3 N u m i d i a n s , 1 0 7

O a k l a n d , C a l i f o r n i a , 1 3 0 , 3 7 1 , 5 0 5 n 3 5 O ' D o n n e l l , I a n , 1 8 2 O h i o State University, 4 9 4 n l 9 , 5 2 0 n l 5 O . K . C o r r a l , T o m b s t o n e , A r i z o n a , 1 4 , 2 2 1 O l w e u s , D a n , 4 8 1 n 2 O l y m p i c s , 5 0 6 n 4 2 , 5 0 7 n 4 6 o p p o r t u n i t y t h e o r y o f c r i m e , 7 1 o r g a n i z e d c r i m e , 7 4 , 2 3 7 - 4 1 , 4 3 0 - 4 0 ,

4 7 5 n 5 , 4 9 1 n 4 5 , 4 9 1 n 4 6 , 4 9 1 n 4 7 , 5 1 1 n l 6 , 5 2 0 n l 6 , 5 2 2 n 2 8 , 5 2 5 n 4 5

O w e n s , Terrell, 3 0 5 O x f o r d University, 2 5 4 , 2 5 5

Pacific, 4 3 , 3 8 2 , 3 8 8 , 3 9 2 , 3 9 4 , 5 1 6 n 3 0 , 5 1 6 n 3 2

P a l e s t i n i a n s , 4 2 , 4 1 4 , 4 1 8 , 4 2 1 , 4 4 2 , 5 2 3 n 3 3

P a p e , R o b e r t , 5 2 4 n 3 9 Parker, R o b e r t N a s h , 2 6 3 p a r t i e s : a s o c c a s i o n s for violence, 2 4 7 ,

2 5 3 - 6 4 , 2 6 9 , 2 7 1 - 7 5 ; a s p o t l a t c h e s , 2 5 3 - 5 6

P a t t o n , G e o r g e S., 6 0 , 6 1 p e a c e - k e e p e r s , ineffectiveness of, 1 1 8 ,

4 8 0 n 4 Pegler, M a r t i n , 3 8 6 , 5 1 7 n 3 8 P e r r o w , C h a r l e s , 4 7 3 n l 7 P e r s i a n s , 1 0 3 , 1 0 6 - 8 P e r u , 3 2 8 , 4 2 9 P e t e r l o o m a s a c r e , 5 2 4 n 4 0 P e t e r s b u r g ( P e t r o g r a d ) , R u s s i a , 1 2 2 , 1 2 4 ,

4 7 8 n 2 8 P h a r s a l u s , b a t t l e of, 1 0 8 , 1 0 9 P h i l a d e l p h i a , 2 0 0 , 2 4 3 , 2 4 5 , 2 6 8 , 2 7 1 ,

3 0 7 , 3 4 7 - 4 8 , 4 7 4 n 2 8 , 5 1 1 n l 4 , 5 1 8 n l , 5 1 8 n 5

Phillipine g u e r r i l l a s , 1 6 5 p h o t o s a n d videos as evidence of violence,

4 - 6 , 2 9 - 3 0 , 4 2 - 4 5 , 5 3 , 6 8 - 7 0 , 8 3 - 8 4 , 8 8 - 9 0 , 1 1 5 - 1 7 , 1 2 1 - 2 6 , 1 2 8 , 1 6 5 , 2 1 8 , 2 8 3 , 2 9 3 - 9 5 , 3 2 3 , 3 6 5 , 4 0 1 , 4 1 3 - 2 8 , 4 4 2 - 4 7 , 4 6 8 n 8 , 4 7 0 n 6 , 4 7 1 n l l , 4 7 4 n 2 7 , 4 7 9 n 3 0 , 4 8 3 n l l , 4 9 3 n l l , 5 0 7 n 4 3 , 5 1 8 n l , 5 1 8 n 3 , 5 1 9 n 8 , 5 1 9 n 9

p i l l o w f i g h t s , 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 7 0 P i p p e n , Scottie, 2 8 2 P i z a r r o , F r a n c i s c o , 4 6 police violence, 8 - 9 , 2 2 , 6 3 , 6 6 , 7 0 - 7 1 ,

8 2 - 8 3 , 9 2 , 1 1 2 - 1 4 , 1 2 5 - 2 7 , 2 0 7 , 2 3 3 ,

Index • 561

2 5 3 - 6 3 , 3 7 1 , 3 7 5 - 8 1 , 4 6 4 , 4 7 8 n 2 9 , 4 7 9 n 3 1 , 4 9 5 n 2 2 , 4 9 5 n 2 3 , 5 1 2 n l , 5 1 2 n 2 , 5 1 3 n l l , 5 1 8 n l , 5 1 8 n 3 , 5 2 5 n 4 7

P o m p e y , 1 0 8 , 1 1 0 p o v e r t y , 2 , 2 0 , 1 3 5 - 3 7 , 3 4 8 , 4 5 3 , 4 6 3 P r i n c e t o n , 4 9 3 n l 3 , 4 9 8 n 3 7 , 5 0 6 n 4 1 p r i s o n e r s o f w a r , 7 0 , 7 5 , 9 8 - 1 0 1 , 1 0 3 ,

1 0 5 , 1 1 1 p r i s o n s , 1 3 , 1 8 , 1 6 6 , 1 6 8 - 7 1 , 1 8 6 , 3 6 9 ,

4 8 1 n 9 , 4 8 2 n 8 professional contract killers, 9 3 , 2 3 9 , 2 6 8 , 4 3 0 -

40, 5 2 1 n 2 1 , 532n29, 523n34, 5 2 3 n 3 5

R a b e , J o h n , 4 7 6 n l 2 r a c e , 2 , 2 2 - 2 3 , 1 2 8 , 2 0 5 , 2 4 6 - 4 9 , 2 5 2 ,

2 6 2 , 2 7 2 , 3 7 5 , 4 6 4 , 4 6 8 n 9 , 4 8 2 n 6 , 4 8 3 n l l , 4 8 9 n 3 3 , 4 9 0 n 3 8 , 4 9 3 n 9 , 4 7 7 n 2 2 , 5 1 0 n l 2 , 5 1 3 n 8 , 5 1 3 n l 0 , 5 1 3 n l l , 5 1 9 n 7

r a c i s m , 4 , 2 0 , 2 3 , 9 9 , 1 0 2 , 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 1 7 6 , 3 2 6 - 2 7 , 3 4 8 , 4 2 5 - 2 6 , 4 6 3 , 5 0 7 n 4 5 , 5 1 3 n l l , 5 1 9 n 9

R a m a l l a h , 4 2 1 R a m i r e z , M a n n y , 5 0 3 n 2 5 r a p e , 3 , 2 5 , 3 4 , 8 8 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 2 , 1 7 8 - 8 1 ,

1 8 6 , 2 0 6 , 2 2 3 , 2 5 3 , 4 6 3 , 4 7 6 n l 5 , 4 8 3 n l 4 , 5 1 2 n 4

r e p u t a t i o n , 2 7 2 , 3 5 5 - 5 8 , 3 6 9 , 4 3 2 , 4 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 8 , 4 6 2 , 5 0 0 n 9 , 5 2 3 n 2 9

resistance t h e o r y , 2 2 - 2 3 , 4 6 8 n 9 Retzinger, S u z a n n e , 3 4 4 R i c k e n b a c k e r , E d d i e , 3 8 9 , 5 1 6 n 2 5 ,

5 1 6 n 3 0 R i k e r ' s I s l a n d p r i s o n , 5 1 3 n l 0 r i o t s . See c r o w d violence r i t u a l . See i n t e r a c t i o n r i t u a l (IR) R i v e r s i d e , C a l i f o r n i a , 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 r o a d r a g e , 2 2 7 - 2 8 , 2 3 0 r o b b e r y . See h o l d u p s R o d m a n , D e n n i s , 2 8 2 R o d r i g u e z , A l e x , 3 0 7 , 5 0 1 n l 6 R o m a n s , 2 8 , 5 4 , 9 5 , 1 0 6 , 1 9 7 - 9 8 , 3 2 7 ,

4 7 1 n 7 , 4 8 4 n 4 , 4 8 8 n 2 8 R o m e o a n d J u l i e t , 2 1 2 R o s e n b e r g , H a r v e y , a.k.a. " C h r i s D e M e o , "

5 2 1 n 2 1 r o u t i n e activities t h e o r y o f c r i m e , 2 1 R u b i n s t e i n , J o n a t h a n , 9 0 R u b y R i d g e s h o o t i n g , 6 6 R u g b y S c h o o l , 1 6 8 R u s s i a , 4 9 , 2 2 3 , 3 1 2 , 3 8 1 , 4 1 6 R u s s i a n R e v o l u t i o n , 1 2 2

R u s s i a n r o u l e t t e , 2 1 9 R w a n d a , 100

S aig o n , 6 9 , 7 0 Saint-Cyr, M a r s h a l , 6 0 S a k a i , S a b u r o , 3 8 8 s a m u r a i , 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 0 1 - 2 , 2 0 8 , 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 4 6 2 S a n d e r s , W i l l i a m , 7 2 , 2 3 5 , 4 8 9 n 3 4 ,

4 8 9 n 3 6 San D i e g o , 2 3 0 , 3 9 0 n 3 8 San F r a n c i s c o , 4 8 6 n l 4 S a p p , W a r r e n , 5 0 3 n 3 0 Sarajevo, 3 1 1 S a r d i n i a , 4 7 8 n 2 9 S c a n d i n a v i a , 1 9 7 , 4 8 1 n l Scheff, T h o m a s , 1 0 1 , 3 4 4 , 5 2 2 n 2 3 Scipio, 9 7 , 109 Selma, A l a b a m a , 1 2 2 Serbia, 4 7 2 n l 5 , 4 7 4 n 2 8 , 5 1 9 n 7 serial killers, 3 , 1 8 8 , 5 2 1 n 2 0 sex (eroticism), 2 5 - 2 6 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 1 1 8 , 1 4 2 ,

1 4 9 , 1 6 0 , 162, 1 7 1 , 1 8 8 , 2 3 4 , 2 4 4 - 4 5 , 2 5 2 - 5 3 , 2 5 5 , 2 7 9 , 4 3 8 , 4 7 9 n 3 1 , 4 8 0 n 5 , 4 8 2 n l 0 , 4 8 3 n l 1 , 5 1 0 n l l , 5 1 1 n l 4

S h a k e s p e a r e , W i l l i a m , 3 2 , 1 4 4 , 2 1 2 , 4 8 7 n l 9

Shalit, Ben, 4 7 2 n l 2 S h a n g h a i , 9 7 , 4 1 8 S h a r a p o v a , M a r i a , 3 0 6 Shiloh, b a t t l e of, 49 Sicily, 2 2 5 , 2 4 0 s i t u a t i o n s , a s d e t e r m i n a n t s o f violence, 1 -

3 , 1 9 - 2 1 , 7 0 , 7 3 , 1 3 4 - 3 5 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 5 , 1 7 4 , 1 8 8 - 8 9 , 3 6 8 - 6 9 , 4 4 9 , 4 6 3

S L A M . See M a r s h a l l , S.L.A. Slaney, M a r y Decker, 4 9 8 n 4 small n u m b e r s : o f actively a n d c o m p e t e n t l y

v i o l e n t , 3 0 1 , 3 1 5 , 3 7 1 - 7 4 , 3 8 1 , 3 8 8 - 8 9 , 4 2 9 - 3 0 , 4 3 9 , 4 4 8 - 6 2 ; o f e m i n e n t intel- lectuals p e r g e n e r a t i o n , 2 7 3 , 4 5 2 - 5 8 ; o f f i g h t s p e r a t t e n t i o n s p a c e , 2 7 0 - 7 3 , 2 7 6 ; l a w of, 2 7 3 , 2 7 6 , 4 5 2 , 4 6 1 - 6 2 . See also c o m p e t e n c e a n d i n c o m p e t e n c e i n vio- lence

S m i t h , M i c h a e l , 5 0 5 n 3 4 s n i p e r s , 5 8 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 9 3 , 2 4 8 , 2 6 8 , 3 8 1 - 8 7 ,

5 1 5 n l 8 , 5 1 5 n l 9 , 5 1 6 n 3 1 , 5 1 6 n 3 8 S n o o k , Scott, 4 7 3 n l 7 social class, 2 2 , 1 3 5 - 3 6 , 1 6 2 , 1 7 1 , 1 7 5 -

7 6 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 , 3 1 6 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 0 , 3 4 8 , 3 4 9 , 4 4 6 , 4 6 8 n 9 , 4 8 3 n l l , 5 1 0 n 8 , 5 1 0 n 9 , 5 1 1 n l 5

562 • Index

Somerville, M a s s a c h u s e t t s , 1 7 - 1 8 , 3 9 , 2 0 0 S o m m e , b a t t l e of, 78 S o u t h Africa, 5 8 S o u t h Asia, 4 7 7 n 2 2 Soviet U n i o n , 1 0 0 , 3 2 8 , 3 6 6 , 3 9 5 , 4 7 7 n 2 1 Spain, 2 2 5 , 4 1 8 S p a n i s h Civil War, 6 0 , 1 0 0 s p o r t s : a n d violence by f a n s , offsite, 311—

3 4 ; a n d violence b y fans, o n s i t e , 3 0 7 - 1 1 , 4 8 7 n 6 ; a n d violence b y p l a y e r s , 3 1 , 9 1 , 2 8 2 - 3 0 7 , 4 7 5 n 5

S r e b r e n i c a , Y u g o s l a v i a , m a s s a c r e , 4 7 4 n 2 8 S t a l i n g r a d , b a t t l e of, 28 S t e w a r t , Tony, 4 9 8 n 4 s t r a i g h t - e d g e r s , 2 6 9 , 4 9 5 n 2 5 , 4 9 5 n 2 6 ,

4 9 8 n 3 8 s t i c k u p s . See h o l d u p s suicide b o m b i n g s . See t e r r o r i s t s Sullivan, J o e " M a d D o g , " 5 2 1 n 2 1 , 5 2 2 n 2 7 S u z u k i , I c h i r o , 5 0 3 n 2 5 SWAT, 4 2 , 3 7 8 , 3 7 9 - 8 0 , 4 3 3 , 4 5 8 , 4 6 2 ,

5 1 4 n l 2 , 5 1 4 n l 6 Sweeney, M i k e , 3 0 2 - 4 S w i n g R e b e l l i o n , 2 4 8 , 2 4 9 s y m b o l i c violence, 2 4 - 2 5 , 4 6 8 n l 0

t e c h n i q u e s o f v i o l e n c e , 2 8 - 2 9 , 148—55, 1 7 9 , 1 8 6 - 8 9 , 2 0 9 , 3 0 1 , 3 1 5 - 2 1 , 3 2 4 , 3 3 0 - 3 4 , 3 8 1 , 3 8 3 - 8 6 , 3 9 7 - 4 0 9 , 4 3 1 - 3 7 , 4 4 8 , 4 5 1 - 5 2 , 4 5 7 , 4 5 9 - 6 2 , 4 9 5 n 2 6 , 5 2 1 n 2 0

t e n s i o n . See c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l t e n s i o n t e r r o r i s t s , 4 0 9 - 1 2 , 4 4 0 - 4 8 Tet offensive, 88 T e u t o b u r g e r W a l d , b a t t l e of, 4 7 1 n 7 T h a p s u s , b a t t l e of, 9 5 , 1 0 9 T h e b e s , siege of, 97 T h i r t y Y e a r s ' War, 4 9 T h u c y d i d e s , 5 4 Tilly, C h a r l e s , 1 1 , 2 2 8 , 2 2 9 , 2 4 9 , 2 5 2 ,

4 8 5 n l 0 , 4 9 3 n 7 T o c h , H a n s , 3 7 1 T o k u g a w a J a p a n , 2 0 8 , 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 T o k y o W a r C r i m e s T r i a l , 1 0 0 Tolstoy, L e o , 3 1 , 4 8 7 n 2 4 T o n y t h e G r e e k , 4 3 3 , 4 3 5 , 4 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 5 5 ,

4 5 6 , 4 5 9 , 5 2 1 n l 7 , 5 2 1 n 2 1 , 5 2 2 n 2 7 t o r t u r e , 3 4 , 6 9 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 1 9 , 1 4 1 , 1 5 2 ,

1 5 4 , 5 2 1 n 2 0 T r e m b l a y , R i c h a r d , 4 6 8 n l l t r i b a l w a r , 8 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 7 4 , 1 9 7 , 4 2 0 , 4 6 9 n l T r o j a n s , 1 9 5 - 9 8 , 2 2 2 , 4 8 8 n 2 8

T u n i s i a , 9 5 , 1 0 9 T u t s i s , 1 0 0 T y s o n , M i k e , 2 0 6 Tyson-Holyfield fight, 2 0 6 , 2 8 6

U n i t e d Airlines flight 9 3 , 4 0 9 U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 4 2 2 , 4 7 2 n l 5 , 4 7 4 n 2 8 ,

4 8 0 n 4

V a r i t e k , J a s o n , 5 0 1 n l 6 v e n d e t t a , 6 1 , 2 0 3 , 2 2 3 - 2 6 , 2 3 0 , 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 ,

2 6 5 , 4 8 4 n 4 , 4 8 8 n 3 0 , 4 9 0 n 4 2 V e r d u n , b a t t l e of, 28 v i c t i m s , 4 , 3 2 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 6 1 , 9 2 , 1 0 2 - 4 , 1 0 9 ,

1 1 9 , 1 3 4 - 3 5 , 1 4 7 - 5 8 , 1 7 5 - 7 9 , 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 1 8 6 - 8 9 , 2 3 8 , 2 4 2 , 3 2 2 , 3 8 3 , 395-96, 3 9 8 , 4 0 5 - 6 , 4 5 9 , 4 6 6 , 4 7 8 n 2 4 , 4 7 8 n 2 7 , 4 8 1 n l , 4 8 1 n 2 , 5 1 2 n l 7

v i c t o r y c e l e b r a t i o n s , 7 7 , 9 3 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 3 1 2 - 1 5 , 4 2 0 - 2 6 , 4 5 0 , 4 7 5 n 6 , 5 0 5 n 3 7 5 2 0 n l 5

V i d a l , G o r e , 3 6 5 Viet C o n g , 4 7 , 6 9 , 8 6 , 8 8 , 1 0 1 V i e t n a m w a r , 4 6 , 5 0 , 5 1 , 5 3 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 6 7 ,

7 0 , 8 3 , 8 7 , 8 8 , 9 5 , 1 0 1 , 1 1 9 , 1 3 4 , 3 7 0 , 3 8 2 , 3 8 3 , 4 5 1 , 4 6 7 n 4 , 4 7 0 n 2 , 4 7 0 n 5 , 4 7 0 n 6 , 4 7 3 n l 9 , 4 7 6 n l 4 , 5 1 6 n 3 3

V i e t n a m W a r C r i m e s W o r k i n g G r o u p , 4 7 6 n 9

V i k i n g s , 3 4 5 , 4 8 8 n 2 8 v o n R i c h t h o f e n , M a n f r e d , 3 8 8 , 3 8 9 , 3 9 5

w a r . See m i l i t a r y violence War and Veace (novel), 4 8 7 n 2 4 W a r s a w g h e t t o , 4 7 6 n l 6 W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . r i o t , 4 9 2 n 4 W a t e r l o o , b a t t l e of, 78 W a t t s r i o t , 4 9 1 n l , 5 2 0 n l 5 W a u g h , Evelyn, 4 9 3 n l 2 Weaver, Jeff, 3 0 2 - 4 Weber, M a x , 2 9 , 4 8 8 n 2 8 W e h r m a c h t , 1 0 0 W i l k i n s o n , D e a n n a , 7 2 , 2 3 1 , 2 3 5 ,

4 7 4 n 2 3 , 4 8 5 n 9 , 4 8 9 n 3 4 , 4 9 1 n 4 4 , 5 0 0 n 9

W i l l i a m s , Serena, 3 0 6 W i l l i a m s , S h a u n , 3 0 5 W i l l i a m s , Ted, 5 2 5 n 4 6 W i l s o n , E d m u n d , 4 8 0 n 5 , 4 8 0 n 7 w i n n i n g : i n s p o r t s , 2 9 6 - 3 0 2 , 5 0 3 n 2 4 ,

5 0 3 n 2 5 ; i n v i o l e n t conflict, 3 8 1 - 1 0 8 w o m e n : c o m p a r e d t o m e n , 3 5 , 6 7 , 1 4 4 ,

Index • 563

1 5 9 - 6 0 , 3 0 6 , 4 8 1 n 9 , 5 l 0 n 1 I , 5 2 0 n l 3 , 5 2 0 n 16; men fighting in t h e p r e s e n c e of, 4 7 9 n 3 1 ; violence a g a i n s t , 3 5 , 8 8 , 1 4 1 - 5 1 , 4 6 8 n 7 , 4 6 8 n 8 , 4 6 8 n 10, 521 n 1 9; vio- lence by, 2 , 3 5 , 1 3 4 , 1 4 4 , 2 4 4 , 2 7 2 , 3 5 5 , 4 6 7 n 7 , 4 8 1 n 9 , 4 8 2 n 9 , 4 9 3 n l l , 5 1 3 n 5

W o o d s , Tiger, 5 1 7 n 3 5 W o o d s t o c k riot, 5 2 0 n 1 5 World T r a d e Center, 6 3 World W a r I , 4 9 , 5 0 , 5 8 , 6 0 , 6 6 - 6 7 , 7 8 ,

8 0 , 9 4 , 122, 2 1 3 , 3 8 1 - 8 3 , 3 8 7 , 3 8 9 - 9 1 , 3 9 5 , 4 7 0 n 4 , 5 0 6 n 4 1 , 5 1 5 n 2 1 , 5 1 6 n 2 " , 5 1 6 n 3 0 , 5 I 6 n 3 3 ; Western F r o n t in, 111

World W a r II, 8 , 4 6 , 4 7 , 4 9 , 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 8 - 6 1 , 6 5 , 6 7 , 9 4 , 1 0 0 , 3 4 7 , 3 7 0 , 3 8 1 - 8 3 , 3 8 8 , 3 8 9 - 9 2 , 3 9 5 , 4 7 0 n 4 , 4 7 3 n l 9 , 4 7 7 n 2 0 , 5 l 5 n 2 1 , 5 1 5 n 2 2 , 5 l 6 n 1 9 , 5 1 6 n 3 2 , 5 1 6 n 3 3 ; F a s t e r n front in, 1 0 0 , 3 8 3 , 3 9 4 , 4 0 5 , 5 1 7 n 3 4 ; Western F r o n t in, 3 8 1

Y a k u z a , 7 4 Yalu river, 5 1 6 n 3 3 York, Sergeant Alvin, 4 0 5 Y u g o s l a v i a , 1 0 3 , 2 2 3 , 3 0 8 , 3 1 1 , 4 6 7 n 3

Z u l u s 5 8 , 4 7 1 n 9