the sheer scale of its terrain, the buoyancy of its population, and the logistical difficulties of transporting war materiel 3000 miles across the Atlantic. Yet the British in India often viewed themselves as facing similar difficulties. Here, too, it could seem that – while occasional, brilliant victories were more than possible – these by themselves would never be enough. That indigenous opponents would simply withdraw temporarily, tap into inexhaustible reserves of local manpower, and regroup to fight another day, with French aid, and with weaponry increasingly comparable to the Company's own. 'We drive Hyder from the field', wrote a British army officer despairingly of a campaign against the southern Indian kingdom of Mysore that would shortly steal his life:

> but we can neither take his artillery, nor prevent his retreat. Every man we lose on these occasions is valuable to us, and though he should lose ten for one, it is a matter of no consequence to him.[25]

As this suggests, while one challenge confronting the British was always the overwhelming scale of India and its population, a second was their own, incurable limits. After 1756, the Company's forces seemed ever more impressive on paper, but maintaining adequate and effective *European* armies in the field was another matter. Even getting sufficient white soldiers to India in the first place was difficult. Company recruiters in Britain were no more popular than their regular army counterparts, and especially in summer when agricultural jobs were plentiful, plebeian volunteers were sparse. The globalisation of war in the six decades after Plassey made them far more so. In 1776, as war with America began sucking in British manpower, the Company calculated that its artillery in India, an indispensable part of its armoury, was at least 700 men short. In 1794, by which time Britain was at war with Revolutionary France, the number of unfilled vacancies in the Company's European regiments was estimated to be as large again as the number of its European infantrymen actually serving in the field.[26]

Men successfully recruited in Britain still had to survive the passage to India. Before 1790, mortality rates among white troops on East Indiamen and transport ships sometimes compared unfavourably with that of chained blacks on transatlantic slave-ships. In 1760, thirty-three of the fifty-three officers and men sailing to India on board the *Osterly* died before arrival; a third of the men on the *Pondicherry* in 1782 perished just on the stretch of voyage between the Cape of Good Hope and Johanna Island, the latter a familiar stop-over *en route* to Madras. Sometimes whole ships, with all their men and would-be memsahibs, were lost to rough seas, as happened to the East Indiaman *Halsewell* in 1786.[27] Those Company troops



46. *The Loss of an East Indiaman* by J.M.W. Turner.

who did survive the voyage out and make landfall still had to contend thereafter with persistent germ warfare, especially dysentery, waterborne cholera, and malaria. At all times, some 20 per cent of the Company's European troops in India are estimated to have been out of action because of illness. It was a commonplace among Company surgeons that a European soldier wounded in India was six times less likely to recover than a sepoy in a similar situation, because the former's immune system was more undermined by recurrent illness, made worse in many cases by too much drink.

The logic of all this was clear to the Company from early on, and created its third perennial problem. If it was ever to control substantial tracts of India, the bulk of its manpower would have to be Indian. The stupendous rise in 'British' forces in India after the 1750s was therefore something of an optical illusion. Both the Company and the British state dispatched more European males to the subcontinent after this point, but the rise in Company army size chiefly signified a growing British dependence on Indians. Even at Plassey, more than twice as many Indians as Europeans fought on the 'British' side. During the next half-century, the disparity between white and



47. East India company sepoys at Bombay.

Indian troops in the Company's pay became far more pronounced. In 1767, just 13 per cent of the Company's rank-and-file troops in the Coromandel region were classified as European: though in reality their numbers included Americans and Caribbean blacks, as well as Germans, Swiss, Portuguese, French and varieties of Britons. Ten years later, the Company employed just over 10,000 white soldiers in India. These men were outnumbered seven to one by the Company's sepoys.[28]

The incidence of disease among whites made these already stark disparities still more so, as did the isolation of some of the Company's outposts. At Fort Victoria, 60 miles south of Bombay, 160 Company sepoys, plus their Indian officers, were nominally supervised in the 1770s by just three white Company officials, none of whom was a military man. In some Company bases, there appear at intervals to have been no whites at all. In the 1780s, a British officer recorded stumbling into a 'British' fort in the south of India where there were no Britons left. Its sepoys had continued to be provisioned by the Company, and so had simply continued to man their post. They all assembled to have a look at him, not having 'seen a European for many years'.[29] This was an extreme case that points however to an enduring phenomenon. Estimates of so-called British military strength in India need always to take account of the fact that most of it was not British at all.

By the onset of the Victorian age, this system of exercising imperial rule overwhelmingly through the bodies, swords and guns of some of the ruled was broadly, though not universally taken for granted. Earlier, however, its intrinsic insecurity and audacity alarmed and even terrified. 'It will be allowed', wrote a Company army officer frankly in 1769: 'that it is a dangerous measure to place our chief dependence upon the very inhabitants of the country we mean to keep in subjection', and similar arguments were regularly advanced in Parliamentary debates and in correspondence between India House and its agents.[30] In part, such nervousness simply reflected the fact that, as far as the Company was concerned, a large-scale sepoy system was still something new, and no one could yet be confident it would endure, as distinct from melting away or turning against its paymasters. But some British officials were also fearful that sufficient cash might not always be forthcoming to pay and provision this ever-expanding Indian mercenary army.

This helps to explain why the Company's directors in London opposed what they perceived as irresponsible expansionism by elements in its army. Warfare in India was expensive in itself, but it also devastated local trade, agriculture, and tax-payers. And how were the Company's sepoys possibly to be paid for, if profits from Indian commerce, agriculture and land began drying up? As it was, a shortage of provisions triggered large-scale sepoy desertions from the Company's armies during the First Mysore War in 1768, and disruptions in supplies of food and cash contributed to serious sepoy mutinies in the early 1780s. To John Zephaniah Holwell and others, it seemed that the spiral of violence after Plassey could only end by swallowing up the East India Company itself:

New *temporary* victories stimulate and push us on to grasp at new acquisitions of territory; these call for a large increase of military force to defend them; and thus we shall go on, grasping and expending, until we cram our hands so full that they become cramped and numbed, and we shall be obliged to quit.[31]

There was a fourth and final respect in which the Company's expanding armies could seem counterproductive, and dangerous to the British themselves as well as to Indians. The East India Company never operated in a vacuum. In the half century after Plassey, it was one, alien, expanding power amidst other contending Indian powers. South Asian scholars now accept that the contraction of Mughal political and military authority in India after 1720 by no means resulted in general fragmentation and disorder. Powerful successor states emerged in certain regions, that sometimes exhibited a greater capacity and will to modernise than had the Mughal emperors. As far as military change was concerned, these renovated Indian states never relied solely on European models. In some, such as the Maratha Confederation, the shift away from feudal armies to greater military centralisation was already apparent in the seventeenth century; while Persian and Afghan invasions in the early eighteenth century, and conflict between the different Indian kingdoms, also helped to power military change in the subcontinent.[32] None the less, and as had been the case since the 1500s, European technologies, tactics, and mercenaries were systematically copied and adopted by some Indian rulers. The growing military machine sponsored in India by the East India Company helped to bring into being – and had to contend against – other very large armies, supplied with comparable weaponry and equipment.

It is easy enough to detect in post-Plassey, post-Buxar British writings a growing recognition of these changes. Ritualistic and reassuring remarks on innate Indian passivity and ductility are ever more intermixed, especially in confidential writings and high-level missives, with acknowledgements that the Indian scene was becoming more militarily dynamic and dangerous in fact. 'Every year brought with it an increase of military knowledge to the black powers,' wrote an East India Company colonel of his Mysore campaigns in the late 1760s.[33] 'The Indians have less terror of our arms,' conceded the British governor of Madras in 1781, 'we less contempt for their opposition.' 'The mass of the [British] people are . . . uninformed in regard to the changes that have taken place among the warlike tribes of India,' wrote a veteran looking back on the struggles of the early 1800s, '. . . which, *combined with their natural courage* and their numerical superiority, has rendered our conflicts with them sanguinary in the extreme.'[34]

Euphoric British assumptions, in the immediate aftermath of Plassey and Buxar, that fighting and winning in India were always going to be a pushover, thus gave way to more realistic and grimmer appraisals of Indian warfare. Again, Sarah Shade's narrative makes the point. Utterly lacking in any kind of triumphalism, it is not just a testimony to over two decades of British imperial advance in India, but also a story of pathos, loss and mixed military fortunes. Shade herself, as we have seen, was taken captive in Mysore and wounded several times. She also lost two husbands, and – in the span of a week – saw 'sixteen officers' wives being widowed' in the British regiment she marched alongside. The essential context of her narrative – and what makes it an arresting read even now – was both expanding British power in India, and British fears and recurrent reversals there. This is also the essential background to the rise in British captivity experiences in India, and to yet another rich seam of captivity writings.

Apprehension and astonishment in the face of the huge risks involved in what they were doing, can be seen among Britons at home, as well as in India, and were expressed indirectly as well as explicitly. From the 1750s onwards, tigers stalk the British imagination. Sarah herself was mauled by a tiger in the early years of her marriage to John Cuff. Her arms were permanently scarified by its claws. She had another confrontation with the animal, when she witnessed one devouring the pregnant Indian companion of a Company army officer. (Or was this perhaps an addition by her ghost-writers worried at what was known about levels of cross-racial sex in the Company's legions?) Building on the horror of these fierce encounters, Sarah's publishers inserted a special appendix in her captivity narrative describing the wild animals of India, of which the tiger, they insisted, was by far the worst:

A tiger is one of the most ferocious animals that Nature has produced; stately and majestic in appearance, yet cowardly and artfully cunning in his actions; never openly facing his prey, but springing upon it from ambush.

The tensions in this description are interesting and suggestive. The tiger, in this version, is at once a magnificent beast and lacking in courage, both dangerous and devious. Most of all, it is unpredictable, as India itself seemed unpredictable. By this stage, anthropomorphic tiger references of this sort had become common in British literature and art. Before the battle of Plassey, however, Britons had known little of tigers outside of wildly inaccurate images in ancient bestiaries and books of heraldry. It was the conquest of Bengal that brought these animals to their notice.

48. George Stubbs' tigress.

Company officials working there encountered them in the wild, in princely zoos, and on tiger-shoots. A few managed to export live examples back to Britain. The duke of Cumberland was given several of the beasts in the 1750s; and in 1762 Robert Clive, now governor of Bengal, presented a tigress to the duke of Marlborough. This was the animal that George Stubbs painted three times over. More even than his canvases of leopards and cheetahs, Stubbs's *Portrait of the Royal Tiger* (1769) became a much reproduced image.[35] There were good and bad copies, engravings, polygraphs, even versions in needlework. Stubbs's tiger also established an artistic fashion. In subsequent decades, James Ward, James Northcote and other artists also painted tiger canvases; while the north country artist Thomas Bewick and the young Edwin Landseer produced wonderful engravings of the beast in books ranging from fine art albums to children's literature.[36]

It was not simply a case, however, of the East India Company's conquests familiarising Britons back home with the subcontinent's most impressive animal. To a degree that was deeply revealing, the tiger became synonymous in British minds with India itself, and an image through which shifting ideas and apprehensions of the subcontinent could be expressed.

49. *Fight between a Lion and a Tiger* by James Ward.

'The tiger is peculiar to Asia', wrote Bewick, '[but] the greatest number are met with in India.'[37]

Tigers seemed appropriate metaphors at various levels. They were massive, magnificent and regal, just as India itself was vast, costly, and a land of multitudinous princes. Sleek and deadly, they were also, as Edmund Burke wrote in the very year of Plassey, creatures of the sublime:

> Look at . . . [an] animal of prodigious strength, and what is your idea before reflection? *Is it that this strength will be subservient to you? . . . No: the emotion you feel is, lest this enormous strength should be employed to the purposes of rapine and destruction* . . . The sublime . . . comes upon us in the gloomy forest, and in the howling wilderness, in the form of . . . the tiger, the panther, or rhinoceros.

As this suggests, for the British, the tiger evoked India most tellingly at this stage because it was dangerous, beyond knowing, and beyond control.

50. A tiger devours a British soldier: wood and clockwork effigy made for Tipu Sultan of Mysore.

Stubbs painted his tigress recumbent and relaxed, but its immense musculature is easily apparent beneath the beautiful, striped pelt, and the lustrous eyes – which do not engage with the viewer – are entirely unhuman. As Judy Egerton puts it, we are left in no doubt that this superb beast possesses the power to 'spring to attack with one lithe and supremely co-ordinated bound'.[38]

The currency of tiger images after 1750 must be seen as one more expression of British wonder and uncertainty in the face of their own increasingly violent but still unpredictable involvement with the Indian subcontinent. It was an image both of obsession and fear. It was not long in fact before writers and artists began to play with the conceit of using encounters between a lion and a tiger to comment on the wider British–Indian encounter. One thinks of Stubbs's *Lion and Dead Tiger*, or of James Ward's vicious *Fight between a Lion and a Tiger*, both painted at times of sharp imperial conflict in India. As the nineteenth century advanced, imaginary animal contests of this sort became something of a source of complacency. 'The unanimous voice of ages', remarked Landseer in his *Twenty Engravings of Lions, Tigers, Panthers and Leopards* (1823), pronounced the lion 'to be the King of beasts'.[39] India and its tiger, it appeared, had been safely vanquished by a leonine Britannia. Hence, surely, the large numbers of Victorian British males who had themselves painted and later photographed with their feet firmly planted on the skin or the carcass of a dead tiger. What for Mughal princes had been an emblem of rule, a tiger caught and killed in the hunt or kept behind bars,

became for the British an emblem of imperial supremacy over India. Before the early 1800s, however, this sense of confident, animal dominion in regard to the subcontinent was rare, because the tiger was still able to catch them unawares. 'They attack all sorts of animals, even the lion,' mused Thomas Pennant in his *History of Quadrupeds* in 1781, a year of terrible British defeats and captivities in southern India 'and it has been known that both have perished in their combats.'[40]

The tiger then was already established in British minds as an emblem for India *before* the reign of Tipu Sultan (1782–99), the Mysore ruler who employed tiger-symbolism for his own religious and ritual purposes in a systematic fashion, and who became the villain of a major British captivity panic in the 1780s and '90s, a captor indeed for several months of Sarah Shade herself. There was a sense in which, for the British, Tipu's tiger-ornamented court, the stylised tiger stripes on the uniforms of his soldiers, and the exquisite, jewelled tiger-heads snarling from the rings on his fingers and the pommel of his sword, only brought into focus more longstanding and inchoate fears that advancing into India was fraught with danger, that they were riding the tiger in fact. And tiger and lion imagery had another, less acknowledged significance for the British.



51. A tiger-headed Mysore cannon at Madras.

If India often seemed to them a large, fierce, untameable, unknowable beast, then by the same token the British themselves appeared ever more dangerous, and ever more remorseless to the peoples of the subcontinent, and to many others across the entire globe. The half-century after the Battle of Buxar in 1764, that won them Bengal, would witness unprecedented levels of British military violence, much of it carried out – as in India – by *condottieri* of a sort, hard men with swords and guns and ships, fiercely on the make, and often operating substantially out of reach of London and its control. They would fall upon and tear out whole chunks of the world, like ravenous beasts unleashed:

> 'This I seize', says the lion, 'because I have got teeth; this, because I wear a mane on my neck; this, because I have claws; and this last morsel, not because I have either truth, reason, or justice to support me and justify my taking it, but because I am a lion.'[41]

Savage beasts preoccupied the British, then, even before their armies, with Sarah Shade trudging gamely in their wake, marched on to face the tiger-mouthed cannon of Mysore.

NINE

The Tiger and the Sword

Mysore and its meanings

10 September 1780. Pollilur: ten miles north-west of the temple town of Kanchipuram, and just several days' hard marching from Madras. It is imperial nightmare time. There are no Gatling guns to jam, and the one remaining British colonel still has some time to live, but the square of redcoats around him is diminishing in front of our eyes. Outside it, the stragglers are already being picked off, speared through the neck, or decapitated with vicious, curving sabres as they try to run. There is no refuge inside the square either. The men still have their muskets, but the ammunition wagon has just exploded, and soon they will be fighting with swords, pikes, bare hands. Converging on them from all sides is wave upon wave of Mysore cavalry, glittering in scarlet, and blue, and green. Colonel William Baillie lies wounded in a palanquin, sweats into his thick, braid-encrusted uniform, and gnaws at his fingernails in anguish. By contrast, Tipu Sultan Fath Ali Khan, eldest son and soon-to-be successor of Haidar Ali of Mysore, is in control and simply dressed in a silk tunic patterned with tiger stripes. He surveys the slaughter from his war elephant, savours the scent of a rose, and ponders how many of the British to kill, how many to capture.

Yet the thirty-foot-long mural of Pollilur that glows still from the walls of Tipu's elegant wooden summer palace just outside Seringapatam is more than a commemoration of Mysore victory. Looked at closely, this piece of courtly propaganda by an unknown artist in the service of Tipu is also a meditation on warrior masculinity and its absence. Without exception, Tipu and his turbaned armies are shown all sporting beards or moustaches. Even their French allies fighting alongside them bristle with facial hair. But their British opponents have been portrayed very differently. In reality, some of Baillie's men would have struggled and died that day wearing tartan kilts and motley colours.[1] Here, though, his white soldiers all appear in uniform jackets of red, a colour associated with blood, fertility and power, but also in India with eunuchs and with women. Baillie's men

of war in England during the American Revolution', *WMQ*, 32 (1975), 264.

35 As Richard Sampson remarks, 'most British military historians appear to have been satisfied to "write off" these men' – and not just military historians: *Escape in America*, xi–xii. *Parl. Hist.*, 19 (1777–8), 1178.

36 Raphael, *People's History*, 135, 332.

37 For Allen, see Raphael, *People's History*, 18–21; Michael A. Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier* (1995).

38 *Ethan Allen* (1930), 37, 40, 82, 118.

39 Howe to Washington, 1 August 1776, PRO, CO 5/93, fol. 487.

40 For McCrea, see June Namias, *White Captives: Gender and Ethnicity on the American Frontier* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1993), 117 *seq.*; *Parl. Hist.*, 19 (1777–8), 697.

41 BL, Add. MS 32413, fol. 71B.

42 Revd Wheeler Case, *Poems occasioned by . . . the present grand contest of America for liberty* (New Haven, CT, 1778), 37–9.

43 Carl Berger, *Broadsides and Bayonets: The Propaganda War of the American Revolution* (San Raphael, CA, 1976 rev. edn), 199.

44 *John Dodge* (1779), 14; *John Leeth* (1904), 29–30; Neal Salisbury (ed.), *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God by Mary Rowlandson* (1997), 51–5.

45 *Benjamin Gilbert* (1784), 12; *Ebenezer Fletcher* (1798), 6.

46 See Sidney Kaplan and Emma Nogrady Kaplan, *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution* (Amherst, MA, 1989); and Raphael, *People's History*, 177–234.

47 There has been an explosion of published work on these aspects of the Revolution in recent decades. For some of the best, see Kaplan and Kaplan, *Black Presence*; Sylvia R. Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, NJ, 1991); Gary B. Nash, *Race and Revolution* (Madison, 1990); Colin Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country* (Cambridge, 1995); and see Kirk Davis Swinehart's forthcoming Yale University PhD dissertation 'Indians in the House: Empire and Aristocracy in Mohawk Country, 1738–1845'.

48 BL, Add. MS 32413, fol. 73; [Lind], *Answer to the Declaration*, 96, 108.

49 Sidney Kaplan, 'The "Domestic Insurrections" of the Declaration of Independence', *Journal of Negro History*, XLI (1976), 244–5; Benjamin Quarles, 'Lord Dunmore as Liberator', *WMQ*, XV (1958).

50 Quoted in Lester C. Olson, *Emblems of American Community in the Revolutionary Era* (Washington, DC, 1991), 80; Burke quoted in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (eds), *Peace and the Peacemakers: the Treaty of 1783* (Charlottesville, VA, 1986), 9–10.

51 James W. St. G Walker, *The Black Loyalists* (1976), 4; Jack M. Sosin, 'The use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: a reassessment of responsibility', *Canadian Historical Review*, 46 (1965).

52 Raphael, *People's History*, 140.

53 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson* (Oxford, 1990), 305.

54 Abbatt, *Crisis of the Revolution*, 83.

8 Another Passage to India

1 See *Sarah Shade* (1801), a 45-page pamphlet that I have drawn on throughout this chapter.

2 See Matthew Stephens, *Hannah Snell: The Secret Life of a Female Marine, 1723–1792* (1997); and Dianne Dugaw (ed.), *The Female Soldier* (Los Angeles, CA, 1989).

3 Like all people operating in a mainly verbal culture, Sarah often misremembers dates. Thus her own narrative has her born in 1741, whereas the Stoke Edith parish register reveals that she was baptised on 30 November 1746. But all the characters and major events in her story can be verified. For example, her first husband John Cuff is down on a Madras army muster roll as arriving in India in 1764, five years before Sarah: IOL, L/MIL/11/110. I make these points to stress how possible it is – despite assertions sometimes made to the contrary – to uncover and investigate imperial histories from below.

4 *OHBE*, II, 542.

5 C.W. Pasley, *Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire* (1810), 1–4.

6 IOL, L/MAR/B/272G and L/MAR/B/272S (2).

7 For two expert and colourful evocations of the East India Company's maritime evolution, see John Keay, *The Honourable Company* (1991) and Anthony Farrington, *Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia 1600–1834* (2002). Those interested should visit the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich and ask to be shown the many canvases of East Indiamen, by no means all of which are normally on display.

8 For a succinct and valuable survey, see Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (1993).

9 Brian Allen, 'The East India Company's Settlement Pictures: George Lambert and Samuel Scott', in Pauline Rohatgi and Pheroza Godrej (eds), *Under the Indian Sun* (Bombay, 1995).

10 *OHBE*, II, 487–507.

11 As the future Lord Macaulay put it: 'After the grant, the Company was not, in form and name, an independent power. It was merely a minister of the court of Delhi.' Its transformation into something very different, was 'effected by degrees, and under disguise': *Hansard*, 3rd ser., 19 (1833), 507.

12 P.J. Marshall, *East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1976), 217–18.

13 P.J. Marshall (ed.) *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: Madras and Bengal, 1774–85* (Oxford, 1981), 402. For a powerful evocation of mortality rates, see Theon Wilkinson, *Two Monsoons: The Life and Death of Europeans in India* (1987 edn).

14 William Fullarton, *A View of the English Interests in India* (1788 edn), 49–50.

15 'In calculating the relative power of England over that country [India], we were too apt to commit the fallacy of estimating our own strength in one balance, and placing in the other the resources of 150,000,000 of inhabitants': *Hansard*, 3rd ser., 64 (1842), 449. It is interesting that Disraeli still felt this was a problem at a time when British hegemony in the subcontinent was virtually complete. C.A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1988).

16 Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes*, 43; Om Prakash (ed.), *European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India* (Cambridge, 1998); S.Arasaratnam, *Maritime Commerce and English Power: Southeast India, 1750–1800* (Aldershot, 1996), 242.

17 C.A. Bayly (ed.), *The Raj: India and the British 1600–1947* (1991), 130. On the military labour market in India, see D.H.A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy* (Cambridge, 1990); and Seema Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company* (Delhi, 1995).

18 NLS, MS 2958, fol. 77.

19 At least three British civilians caught up in the Patna 'massacre' of 1763 produced captivity narratives, for instance, but none of these was published until the twentieth century: W.K Firminger (ed.), *The Diaries of Three Surgeons of Patna* (Calcutta, 1909).

20 See Kate Teltscher, '"The Fearful Name of the Black Hole": Fashioning an Imperial Myth', in Bart Moore-Gilbert (ed.), *Writing India, 1757–1990* (Manchester, 1996); and S.C. Hill (ed.), *Bengal in 1756–1757* (3 vols, 1905), especially vol. III.

21 Hill, *Bengal*, III, 303 and 388.

22 *Ibid.*, III, 380; Robert Orme, *A History of the Military Transactions* (3 vols, 1803 rev. edn), II, 76.

23 G.J. Bryant, 'The East India Company and its Army 1600–1778', London University PhD dissertation (1975), 36, 247; and his 'Officers of the East India Company's army in the days of Clive and Hastings', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 6 (1978); *OHBE*, II, 202.

24 K. K. Datta *et al.* (eds), *Fort William–India House Correspondence . . . 1748–1800* (21 vols, Delhi, 1949–85) VIII, 287. For nervousness in London about the pace of expansion, see H.V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics 1757–1773* (Cambridge, 1991).

25 *British India Analysed* (3 vols, 1793), III, 839.

26 A.N. Gilbert, 'Recruitment and reform in the East India Company army, 1760–1800', *Journal of British Studies*, XV (1975).

27 *Ibid.*, 92; *British India Analysed*, III, 827. Losses at sea virtually every year can be traced in Edward Dodwell and James Miles, *Alphabetical List of the Officers of the Indian Army* (1838).

28 Gilbert, 'Recruitment and reform'.

29 IOL, MSS Eur. D 1146/6, fol. 111; James Forbes's Memoirs, Yale Center for British Art, New Haven, Rare Books and Manuscripts Department, IV, fol. 8.

30 *Proposal for Employing Mallayan or Buggess Troops* (Edinburgh, 1769), 2.

31 *Interesting Historical Events relative to the Provinces of Bengal* (1765), 181.

32 On these trends, see Stewart N. Gordon, 'The slow conquest: administrative integration of Madras into the Maratha empire, 1720–1760', *MAS*, 11 (1977); Burton Stein, 'State formation and economy reconsidered', *MAS*, 19 (1985); Pradeep Barua, 'Military developments in India, 1750–1850', *Journal of Military History*, 58 (1994).

33 BL, Add. MS 29898, fol. 41.

34 Quoted in Randolf G.S. Cooper, 'Wellington and the Marathas in 1803'. *International History Review*, II (1989), 31–2 (my italics); BL, Add. MS 38408, fols 243–4.

35 See Judy Egerton's description of one version of this work in Christie's of London's sales catalogue, *British Pictures*, 8 June 1995, 84–7.

36 For Stubbs and his contemporaries on tigers, see Christopher Lennox-Boyd, Rob Dixon and Tim Clayton, *George Stubbs: The Complete Engraved Works* (1989); Edwin Landseer, *Twenty Engravings of Lions, Tigers, Panthers and Leopards* (1823).

37 Landseer, *Twenty Engravings*, 30.

38 Egerton, sale catalogue entry, 86; Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, ed. J.T. Boulton (1958), 66 (my italics).

39 Landseer, *Twenty Engravings*, 8.

40 Lennox-Boyd *et al.*, *George Stubbs*; Amal Chatterjee, *Representations of India, 1740–1840* (Basingstoke, 1998), 78.

41 Edmund Burke in 1781: *Parl. Hist.*, 22 (1781–2), 316. For Tipu and his tigers, see Chapter Nine, and Kate Brittlebank, 'Sakti and Barakat: the power of Tipu's Tiger', *MAS*, 29 (1995).