Application 4

asia pacific jouRnal of social woRk and development Volume 18 • Number 2 • December 2008

Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State

and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster

The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

HUNG WONG AND TERRY T. F. LEUNG

• hung wong is associate Professor in the Department of Social work at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. E-mail: [email protected]. Terry T. F. Leung is Assistant Professor in the Department of Applied Social Studies at the City University of Hong Kong. E-mail: [email protected]. The contributors acknowledge the financial support of the Direct Grant from the Chinese University of Hong Kong for this study.

A study on activities launched by the civil society in dealing with the SARS crisis in Hong Kong identifies that civil society in Hong Kong simultaneously performs the collaborative and adversarial functions, embracing a sensitive balance between trust and risk when entrusting the state to serve the public good. Drawing on the survey analysis, the article argues that the complexity of state and civil society relation has to be understood as dialectics in the “collaboration/adversary” duality. Several hypotheses are generated from the study for further research.

Key words: civil society, public disasters, state-civil society collaboration, SARS

Introduction Hong Kong was seriously hit when the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic struck the territory in the misty spring of 2003. The then unknown virus infected 1,755 individuals and claimed the lives of nearly 300. In responding to this unprecedented community-wide health hazard, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Hong Kong, including welfare agencies, schools, religious organizations, as well as community and grassroots organizations, initiated and organized numerous actions and responses to the SARS crisis. Some of these actions supplemented governmental efforts. For example, while the government focused on information giving and public health education at the outbreak of SARS, the welfare

46 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

agencies set up different hotline services and provided needy emotional support to the general public (Leung & Wong, 2005). There was also much cooperation between the state and NGOs, like “Operation UNITE,” which was a territory-wide cleaning and education campaign initiated by the civil society but fully supported by the Government of the Special Administrative Region (henceforth referred to as the Hong Kong Government or the Government). Such concerted endeavors support the claim of complementariness and interdependence between civil society and the state, despite that civil society plays a simultaneous advocacy role to challenge the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of governmental actions. As the pandemic crisis subsided in the summer of 2003, some civil society actions also receded. This article is based on a study conducted from the SARS outbreak to an extended period in its aftermath on the actions and reactions of civil society to the community health hazard. The study set out to understand the dialectics between collaboration and adversary in the desired “state-society synergy” (Evans, 1995; Jalali, 2002), as the duties of the government and the civil society were negotiated and played out in dealing with the communal crisis.

Collaborative versus adversarial Relation between Civil society and the state in Disaster Mitigation

The relationship between the state and civil society has been a popular theme in the study of community crisis or disaster mitigation (Evans, 1995; Jalali, 2002; Powell, 2000; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1997; Shaw & Goda, 2004). In analyzing the state- civil society relation after the earthquake in Turkey, Jalali (2002) argues that an ideal disaster response system can only be based on state-civil society relations that are both collaborative and adversarial. Whilst acting as advocates for survivors and forcing changes at the state level, civil society also provides social capital to support government actions (Jalali, 2002). A “state-society synergy” (Evans, 1995; Jalali, 2002), “where civil society supplements the work of the government and voices the concern of the voiceless—are essential for alleviating the suffering of victims and creating an effective disaster response system” (Jalali, 2002, p. 124). The dialectics between collaborative and the adversarial relation in the “state-society synergy,” however, has to be understood in the light of “trust” (Seligman, 1997). Civil society, as characterized by a network of voluntary associations and citizen organizations, has always been taken as a platform for the generation of trust and development of social capital (Morris & Rodriguez; 2005; Newton, 2001; Saegert, Thompson, & Warren, 2001). A high level of social trust is seen as the basis of cooperation because it mutually reinforces expectations about reciprocity (Misztal, 2001; Scott, 1999). In the reciprocity-based model of trust, trust assumes predictability and rationality enhanced by the threat of retribution and retaliation (Morris & Rodriguez, 2005). Trust is the confidence that no party will exploit another’s vulnerability in an exchange (Sabel, 1993). Yet, such trust is built on a social contract

• 47Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster: The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

in which is assumed a capacity of exacting fair amounts of retribution when trust fails (Morris & Rodriguez, 2005). Morris & Rodriguez (2005) further explicate that trust in this reciprocity-based model necessitates a general suspicion and distrust as a safeguard against any potential assault or ploy. In this way, trust is a source of risk that has to be managed properly (Webb, 2006), as trust is about mediating and negotiating distrust (Morris & Rodriguez, 2005). As Misztal (2001) proclaims, healthy distrust is essential for democratic progress. This dialectic analysis between trust and risk is precisely the premise on which Jalali (2002) builds her thesis that “civil society needs to be collaborative (acting as partner) but also adversarial, giving voice to the concerns of the voiceless” (Jalali, 2002, p. 135), in the necessary safeguard against the risk of trusting. In this article, we explore the relation between the state and civil society in the light of the “collaborative-adversarial” and “trust-risk” dialectics, when Hong Kong was confronted with the SARS crisis. To capture the situational context of the study, development of the 2003 SARS crisis in Hong Kong is first deliberated.

The saRs Crisis in Hong Kong: Context of the study The SARS crisis started with an outburst of the epidemic in the Prince of Wales Hospital in early March 2003, when many doctors, nurses, and medical students were infected by a then virtually unknown virus. Worries and anxieties built up in the Hong Kong community as the number of infected cases grew. The absence of knowledge about the virus, coupled with its speedy spread, created a crisis atmosphere that was unprecedented in Hong Kong. Knowledge about the new epidemic was so imperfect that the nature of the virus, the symptoms of infection, the route of transmission, and the appropriate treatment were all subject to recurrent controversy and continual discovery. Whether facemasks should be worn in public places was also a subject of debate when the threat was initially detected. But the controversy was short-lived. The threat was clearly recognized and this was reflected in the citizens’ hunt for facemasks shortly after the onset of the epidemic. Following the detection of the threat and a series of public warnings, the community of Hong Kong reluctantly acknowledged that the customary ways of coping with public health problems did not work any more. For the first time since World War II, emergency medical services were temporarily suspended in the Prince of Wales Hospital on March 19, 2003, and subsequently in other infected hospitals as well. The communal hazard also threatened normal daily routines in Hong Kong. Witnessing the steep rise in infected cases, the Hong Kong Government announced on March 27, 2003, the suspension of classes in all schools below tertiary level. University authorities followed suit, and activity in all educational institutions was virtually put to a halt. The Government’s decision to suspend classes in all schools was related to the outbreak of a large-scale community infection in the residential area of Amoy Gardens, in which coincidental environmental factors caused the infection of hundreds of

48 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

residents in a small residential community. Residents in the most infected block of Amoy Gardens were quarantined in their own flats on March 31, 2003, and were later quarantined in holiday camps in an effort to control the infection. The Amoy Gardens infection, which eventually accounted for more than 40 deaths, prompted the introduction of quarantine measures for the family members of infected patients. At the same time, the number of contracted cases went into a steep rise. The highest number of new infections in a single day during the period was 81. With such a high number of new cases, a sense of risk built up quickly in Hong Kong. This sense of risk was manifested among consumers in a rush to supermarkets to stock up when, on April 1, April Fools’ Day, a 14-years-old lad spread a rumor over the Internet to the effect that the border would be closed (Ta Kung Pao, 2003). In the face of an invisible and unknown virus hiding in the community, the customary values of trust and courtesy came under challenge. Government promotional clips on television urged the citizens of Hong Kong not to use their hands to touch their eyes, nose, and mouth, and to wash their hands always before touching any part of their face. As carriers of the virus might not present symptoms, people were advised to keep others at a distance. Shaking hands, a normal expression of courtesy in social life, was discouraged. In the shadow of SARS, social life in Hong Kong was virtually brought to a temporary halt, when people were asked to avoid public places and close encounters with other people. Ostensibly, SARS had emerged as more than a public health hazard. It was a challenge to the customary life of the people in Hong Kong. The public health hazard arising from the SARS epidemic was beyond the experience of the Hong Kong Government, and was not included in any pre-conceived contingency plan. Amidst the uncertainties accompanying the new virus and in the absence of any precedent, complaints and arguments were not wanting during the period. One main argument at that time was whether sufficient protective facilities were provided to hospital staff and whether they were distributed in an efficient manner. It was not until April 12, 2003, that infection figures began to display a steady downward trend. As the Hong Kong community began to come to terms with the reality of the epidemic, various sectors began to take measures to resume operations in the shadow of the threat from SARS. Educational institutions issued a policy on wearing facemasks when classes resumed. The facilities management sector upgraded their cleaning standards and enhanced their cleaning procedures to regain the confidence of users. The operators of public transport provided free masks to passengers and advised them to wear them during their journey. Civil society also started to contribute its own resources when the Government, on its own, was seen as inadequate in responding to the disaster. The media initiated a fund-raising campaign to provide protective clothing and masks for medical workers. Some young professionals established a website to announce the residential and work addresses of infected SARS cases when the Government refused to do so. Welfare agencies also initiated a number of contingent services for vulnerable groups to supplement the

• 49Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster: The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

Government’s efforts. The pandemic began to recede on June 23, 2003, when a null infection was registered. The pandemic crisis came to a close in August 2003, when all SARS patients were discharged from hospitals. Contingent and ad hoc measures by the Government and civil society were gradually ended, replaced by longer-term health education and community support initiatives. During the SARS crisis, 1,377 reported events were launched by NGOs. The Hong Kong Council of Social Service (HKCSS), a coordinating body for welfare agencies, claimed that the SARS crisis united NGOs, the business sector, professional bodies, and the Government in a strategic partnership (HKCSS, 2003). Critics were meanwhile cynical about this “state-civil society partnership.” Shiu (2003) argued that most activities launched by civil society during the SARS period were “repeated political narratives” and “public relations tactics,” representing a collusion between the state and the civil society for rebuilding legitimacy and authority of the state. Law (2003) explained the ready “collusion” between the Hong Kong Government and NGOs by the legacy of colonial governance culture was characterized by the NGOs’ heavy financial dependence on the Government. No empirical evidence is, however, available to support the above divergent claims about the relation between the state and civil society during the SARS crisis. The research on which this article is based is an endeavor to fill this empirical gap for further exploration of the relationship between the state and civil society. The main objective of this article is to explore the purpose and nature of the post-disaster actions and activities of NGOs, and the perceived role and perceived relationship of the non-governmental organizers with other stakeholders in handling similar community crisis.

Research Method The current study was conducted in June 2004, in the aftermath of the SARS crisis, by employing a survey method. By Internet search with Yahoo, Google, and Wisenews (a Chinese News database covering all major Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and China), it was found that 128 NGOs in Hong Kong have organized activities in response to SARS during the period from March 2003 to March 2004. A questionnaire was posted to these 128 NGOs. The major items covered in the questionnaire include: (a) a description of SARS-related activities organized; (b) difficulties encountered during the organizing process; (c) the perceived arena of risk engendered by the SARS crisis; (d) the perceived level of trust in other stakeholders in combating similar crisis; (e) the perception of the organization’s role in the face of a similar crisis; and (f ) the perceived extent of contact and linkage with different stakeholders. Altogether, 55 organizations successfully completed and returned the questionnaire, yielding a response rate of 43 percent. The majority of the responding organizations (75 percent) were social service agencies, whilst about one-tenth (11 percent) were religious organizations, and another one-tenth (9 percent) were self-help and mutual help groups.

50 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

findings SARS-related Activities by the NGOs In the survey, 211 SARS-related activities were reported by the responding organizations. Among these 211 activities, the majority of them comprised provision of financial/material support (55 percent), whilst 29 percent comprised fundraising or collection of in-kind materials, 9 percent comprised health education activities and 5 percent comprised provision of emotional support. The major targets of these activities were families of patients who had contracted SARS (44 percent) and high- risk groups (15 percent) such as elderly persons and young children. Among others, 11 percent of the activities targeted the medical workers whose contribution to mitigating the SARS crisis was highly commended by the Hong Kong society. The responding organizations were asked to indicate the goals they assigned to the 211 SARS-related activities. As some activities had multiple goals, 298 goal items were reported. These goal items were classified into “collaborative” goals or “adversarial” goals, in terms of their agreement with the Government’s stated mission in relation to combating community health hazard. Among the 298 stated goal items, 93 percent were “collaborative” goals, whilst 7 percent were “adversarial” goals. The details can be found in Table 1.

Perceived Role of the NGOs in Similar Crisis The respondents were asked in the survey to indicate their perceived role in confronting a similar crisis on a five-points Likert scale. The role as “provider of direct service to the

TABLE 1 Distribution of Activities by Goals

Goal category Goal items Frequency (%) % in 211 activities Collaborative goals

Preventing the re-occurrence of SARS 76 (26%) 36.0% Imparting knowledge and information about SARS to citizens

50 (17%) 23.7%

Providing counseling, support or direct service to the needy

49 (16%) 23.2%

Enhancing community cohesion & solidarity

49 (16%) 23.2%

Providing finance and in-kind assistance to the needy

27 (9%) 12.8%

Helping Government implement anti-SARS activities

26 (9%) 12.3%

Adversarial goals

Monitoring government departments 5 (2%) 2.4% Filling up service gap arising from Government inadequacy

16 (5%) 7.6%

298 (100%)

• 51Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster: The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

CHART 1 Roles Perceived by NGOs in Combating Similar Crisis

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

4.00 3.65 3.62 3.45

2.35

Direct service to the needy

Community cohesion

Fill government service gap

Help government

handle crisis

Watchdog on

government work

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

3.19 3.17 3.15

2.70 2.66

C oo

pe ra

tio n

co m

m un

ity o

rg an

iz at

io ns

2.53 2.50 2.40

2.06

M ut

ua l-

he lp

c om

m un

ity re

si de

nt s

C oo

pe ra

tio n

se rv

ic e

ag en

ci es

H os

pi ta

l a ut

ho rit

y

H ea

lth d

ep ar

tm en

t

H ea

lth a

nd w

el fa

re b

ur ea

u

So ci

al w

el fa

re d

ep ar

tm en

t

In di

vi du

al

C hi

ef e

xe cu

tiv e

CHART 2 Perceived reliability of different actors in responding to the SARS crisis

52 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

needy” received the highest mean score of 4.00, whilst the role as “facilitator to enhance community cohesion and solidarity” had a mean score of 3.65, and “auxiliary to fill up Government service gap” and “auxiliary to help Government handle crisis” had a mean score of 3.62 and 3.45 respectively. The responding organizations did not commonly take up the “watchdog” role, which received the lowest mean score of 2.35.

Trust among Different Actors in Combating Similar Crisis We further explored trust among the responding organizations as manifested in their perception of relationship with other stakeholders. “Trust” was measured in the study by a five-points Likert scale on the perceived reliability of different stakeholders in combating similar crisis, and the organization’s perceived reciprocal reliance on different stakeholders. It was found that perceived reliability was highest for “community-based organizations” (mean score = 3.19) and “community members / residents” (mean score = 3.17). “NGOs” had a slightly lower score of 3.15, whilst all the government departments received a score less than the neutral mark of 3. Among the government departments, the Hospital Authority had the highest score at 2.53. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region received the lowest trust score at 2.06.

Roles perceived by the NGOs in Combating Similar Crisis Reciprocal reliance “among staff,” “between client and staff,” and “between management and staff ” were categorized as “intra-organizational trust,” whilst reciprocal reliance

CHART 3 Perceived Reciprocal Reliance on Different Actors

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

4.27 4.22 4.09

3.70 3.63

Trust Staff-staff

Trust Client-staff

Trust Management-

styaff

Trust NGOs-NGOs

Trust CBO-CBO

2.94 2.82

2.65

Trust Government

-NGOs

Trust Government department- government department

Trust Government-

citizen

• 53Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster: The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

“between the organization and other NGOs” and “between the organization and other community-based organizations” were categorized as “inter-organizational trust.” All perceived reciprocal reliance involving a governmental party was categorized as “trust on Government.” It was found that “intra-organizational trust” was the highest among the responding organizations, with an aggregate mean score of 4.19 (mean score for perceived reciprocal reliance “among their own staff ” = 4.27, “between client and staff ” = 4.22, and “between management and staff ” = 4.09). “Inter-organizational trust” had an aggregate mean score of 3.67 (mean score for perceived reciprocal reliance in relation to other NGOs = 3.70, in relation to community-based organizations = 3.63), still standing on the positive side). Trust levied on the Government, however, received the lowest aggregate mean score at 2.82. Trust between the Government and NGOs (mean score = 2.94), between the government departments (mean score = 2.82), and between the Government and civilians (mean score = 2.65) all stood below the neutral mark of 3.

Contact and Linkage between Different Actors The responding NGOs were asked in the survey to indicate their linkage with other actors. Perceived close contact and linkage was highest among staff in the organizations (mean score = 4.16), whereas the mean score between client and staff was 3.76, and between management and staff was 3.7. The contact and linkage between the NGOs had a lower mean score of 3.35, and that of between community- based organizations was 3.19. The mean score for contact and linkage between the Government and other parties stood at the lowest (mean score for linkage between the Government and NGOs = 2.94, between government departments = 2.93, and between the Government and civilians = 2.57). The rank order was consonant with that of perceived trust between different actors.

Correlation between Activity Goal and Perceived Reliability of Different Actors Correlations between the number of collaborative and adversarial activities, and between activity goal and perceived reliability of different actors are shown in Table 2. It is found that the number of collaborative and adversarial activities is positively correlated (R = .437, p < 0.01), and the correlation is highly significant. It means that organizations taking part in more collaborative activities tend to have more adversarial activities too. It rejects the assumption of a dichotomous division between collaborative and adversarial organizations in terms of their relation with the state. Meanwhile, the number of adversarial activities is found to be correlated to perceived reliability of the Government (R = .283, p < 0.05). Organizations perceiving the Government as reliable tend to organize more adversarial activities. It indicates that the adversarial function of NGOs is not contradictory to their trust in the state. Adversarial endeavors can sit comfortably with a trust of the state’s capacity and reliability.

54 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

CHART 4 Contact and Linkage between Different Actors

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

4.16

3.76 3.70 3.35

3.19

Contact Staff-staff

Contact Client-staff

Contact Management-

styaff

Contact NGOs-NGOs

Contact CBO-CBO

2.94 2.93

2.57

Contact NGOs-

government

Contact Government department- government department

Contact Government-

citizen

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

No. of adverserial activities

No. of collaborative

activities

Faith – Govt

Faith – Community

Faith – Individual

No. of adverserial activities

Pearson corr. 1 .437(**) .283(*) .140 .160 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .042 .324 .252 N 55 55 52 52 53

No. of collaborative activities

Pearson corr. .437(**) 1 .113 .225 .350(*) Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .425 .108 .010 N 55 55 52 52 53

Faith – Govt Pearson corr. .283(*) .113 1 .420(**) .388(**) Sig. (2-tailed) .042 .425 .002 .004 N 52 52 52 52 52

Faith – Community

Pearson corr. .140 .225 .420(**) 1 .519(**) Sig. (2-tailed) .324 .108 .002 .000 N 52 52 52 52 52

Faith – Individual

Pearson corr. .160 .350(*) .388(**) .519(**) 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .252 .010 .004 .000 N 53 53 52 52 53

TABLE 2 Correlation between Activity Goal and Trust in Different Actors

• 55Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster: The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

TABLE 3 Correlations between Activity Goal and Different Roles of the NGOs

No. of adversarial activities

No. of collaborative

activities Role fill government service gap Pearson correlation .262 .219 Sig. (2-tailed) .053 .108 N 55 55 Role help government handle crisis Pearson correlation .170 .330(*) Sig. (2-tailed) .214 .014 N 55 55 Role watchdog Pearson correlation .254 .184 Sig. (2-tailed) .064 .184 N 54 54 Role community cohesion Pearson correlation .200 .282(*) Sig. (2-tailed) .143 .037 N 55 55 Role direct service to needy Pearson correlation -.015 .203 Sig. (2-tailed) .913 .137 N 55 55

Statistical analysis also found that the targets of perceived reliability are highly correlated to each other. Perceived reliability of the Government is highly correlated to perceived reliability of community (R = .420, p < 0.01) and individual (R = .388, p < 0.01), whereas perceived reliability of community is also highly correlated to perceived reliability of individual (R = .519, p < 0.01). It suggests that trust is a general attitude characterizing an organization’s disposition, and trust in one arena may induce trust in another.

Correlation between Activity Goal and Perceived Role of NGOs The correlations between activity goal and the perceived roles reported by NGOs are shown in Table 3. The number of collaborative activities is significantly correlated to the role of organizations as “facilitator to enhance community cohesion and solidarity” (R = .282, p < 0.05) and “auxiliary to help the Government handle crisis” (R = .330, p < 0.05). Both, a community focus and a state support orientation in the organizational mission, purport to collaborative activities at times of community crisis.

56 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

Discussion During the SARS pandemic hazard in Hong Kong, criticism of government response was not wanting from NGOs and the mass media. There were numerous civil-society initiatives to supplement or rebuke the Government’s actions, which were seen as inadequate in combating the public disaster. Promulgation of the residential and work addresses of infected SARS cases on the Internet by a group of young professionals against the Government’s policy was one of the examples of adversarial actions during the crisis. Whilst adversarial actions were more visible by the media attention they used to attract, its volume was, however, small compared with that of collaborative actions, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. Less than 10 percent of the non-governmental initiatives identified by the study included an adversarial goal. Meanwhile, the non- governmental sector was comfortable with a collaborative role in working with the state, as indicated in the study by a positive attitude toward their role as “auxiliary to fill up the Government service gap” and “auxiliary to help the Government handle crisis.” Despite a propensity for collaboration, the civil society in Hong Kong does not predispose to a high trust on the state. The study identified that the Government was at the tail of the league table when it came to trust they earned from the responding NGOs. A suspicious sentiment prevails among the non-governmental sector, amidst its readiness to collaborate with the state. The study findings do not support the alleged positive and harmonious relation between NGOs and the Government as portrayed by the HKCSS (2003). This suspicious sentiment can be related to the greater distance in relationship between the civil society and the state, when contact and linkage with the governmental sector is far from being close. It is worth noting that a suspicious sentiment on the state does not necessarily encourage adversarial actions in the face of public crisis. The study identified that the number of adversarial activities is positively correlated to perceived reliability of the Government. Contrary to the rule of simple logic, organizations with greater trust in the Government tend to organize more adversarial activities. The data suggests that the adversarial function of NGOs can be consonant with their trust in the state. Adversarial endeavors may represent an expectation and quest for the enhancement of state functions, which can only be built on trust in the state’s capacity for improvement. To a certain extent, this hypothesis of latent trust in the state echoes Law’s (2003) thesis about the dependency nature of civil society in Hong Kong, in the legacy of the “colonial governance culture.” Notwithstanding, the finding also indicates that NGOs’ adversarial function and watchdog role can be activated by the risk and uncertainty that communal crisis engenders, promising a critical review of their customary dependency on the state. The positive correlation between collaborative and adversarial activities as identified in the study is another finding that is contrary to popular assumption. The organizations taking part in more collaborative activities tend to have more adversarial activities. It rejects the popular assumption in Hong Kong of a dichotomous division of organizations in their relationship with the state. Nevertheless, the variable of organizational size and resources was not included in this study. Further investigation in future research is necessary to ascertain the impact of organizational capacity and power in the propensity

• 57Collaborative vs. Adversarial Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in Facing Public Disaster: The Case of Hong Kong in the SARS Crisis

for collaborative and adversarial activities at times of communal hazard. Jalali (2002, p. 123) argues that civil society performs multiple roles in disaster. It “creates social capital (cooperation and trust) for effective disaster relief, intermediates between state institutions and the concerns of disaster victims and supports the public sphere by raising issues in the public arena and demanding public action.” Her depiction of the multiple role of the civil society is witnessed in Hong Kong when it encountered the public disaster of SARS. Ostensibly, the NGOs in Hong Kong are ready to realize their dual role in the “state-society synergy” (Evans, 1995; Jalali, 2002), whereby both collaborative and adversarial functions are incorporated into their relationship with the Government when it comes to combating public disaster. Suspicion as indicated in the low level of trust in the Government renders a necessary safeguard against any potential assault or ploy in the building of trust (Morris & Rodriguez, 2005), amidst the civil society’s readiness for collaboration. At the heart of the “state-society synergy” (Jalali, 2002) is a sensitive balance between trust and risk when the state is entrusted to serve the public good. Meanwhile, whilst public disaster can engender a strong civil society by bonding communities together in the face of adversity, it also stimulates adversarial activities and activates the watchdog role of NGOs in Hong Kong, amidst their customary dependency on the state.

Conclusion The study has rejected several simplistic assumptions in understanding the relationship between the state and civil society. Instead of a presumed division of NGOs into collaborative and adversarial organizations in terms of their relationship with the state, both collaborative and adversarial functions tend to co-exist in some NGOs. Instead of a taken-for-granted alignment between trust in the state and the extent of collaboration, organizations with greater trust in the Government tend to organize more adversarial activities; and the propensity for collaboration does not predispose to a high trust in the state. The findings are indicative of the complexity of state-civil society relation, which has to be understood as dialectics in the “collaboration / adversary” duality. As an exploratory endeavor, several hypotheses are generated from this study: (a) closer contact and linkage between the state and civil society enhances civil society’s trust in the state; (b) NGOs engage in adversarial activities with a trust in the state’s capacity for improvement; (c) risk and uncertainty can activate the adversarial function and watchdog role of the NGOs. These hypotheses are subject to verification in future research. There are some methodological and theoretical limitations in this study. First, the list of organizations constituting the sampling frame of the survey is mainly gathered from newspapers and Internet reports at the height of the SARS crisis. Unpublicized small scale or ad-hoc activities as well as activities held outside the Internet search period were excluded from the study. Accordingly, this study tends to report activities organized by formal and more established organizations, which are more susceptible to financial dependency on the Government in the specific situation of Hong Kong. Second, only 7 percent of the reported activities have “adversarial” goals. The data is

58 • hUnG wonG anD TErrY T. F. LEUnG

not sufficient for meaningful in-depth comparison and analysis in the study. Finally, as there is no validated scale in Hong Kong on “trust” between civil society and the state, a simple scale was derived for measurement in the study. The scale requires further development and validation. Last but not least, the study remains exploratory, generating hypotheses for further investigation rather than offering any theoretical proposition. By taking advantage of the SARS crisis as a situational context, we hope that this exploratory study can advance our understanding of the dialectic relationship between civil society and the state for further theoretical development.

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