American history Homework Assignment

4/12/19, 1(40 AMGive Me Liberty (Brief), 5E

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Cold War Foreign Policy: NSC 68 (1950)

During much of the Cold War, the United States sought to “contain” the spread of communism. Over time,

however, the meaning of containment shifted. When State Department official George Kennan (1904–2005) first

coined the term in 1946, he envisioned a policy, focused on Europe, that would use economic and political tools

to curb Soviet influence. By the 1950s, American officials saw containment as a global policy backed by military

force.

Developments in 1949 contributed significantly to this rethinking. In August of that year, the Soviet Union

tested an atomic bomb, ending the U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons years earlier than most experts had

thought possible. Shortly thereafter, Communists triumphed in China’s civil war, bringing some half a billion

people into the Communist sphere. In the wake of these events, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) asked his

National Security Council to undertake a comprehensive review of the global situation and U.S. strategy. This

group of diplomatic and military advisors completed their top-secret report, dubbed NSC-68, in April 1950. The

58-page memorandum, which called for a shift in U.S. policy, became one of the most influential government

documents of the Cold War. As you read this memorandum, excerpted below, think about how it describes the

Soviet threat and how it proposes that the United States meet the Communist challenge.

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, D.C., 1977), 1, 290–92.

n the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under

present programs and plans . . . becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to

accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic and

military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world

relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current

programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the

direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative

in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United

States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive

program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in

the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust.1 Without such a cooperative effort, led by

the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that

we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual

strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will

be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program

beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must

light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated

in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with

which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the

strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national

security demands that we achieve our objectives by the cold war, building up our military strength in order

that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the

steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet

world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program—

harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives—is necessary if we are to regain and

retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United

States and the rest of the free world.

4/12/19, 1(40 AMGive Me Liberty (Brief), 5E

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This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our

allies and which is consonant with our objectives. . . . The present world situation, however, is one which

militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important

pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the

United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the

free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking

negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new

situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in

observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures

necessary to sustain the build-up. . . .

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the

American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free

world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed

to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a

full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the

program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the

issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

Study Questions

1.  How do the authors of NSC-68 describe the global goals of Soviet leaders? What threat do they believe the Soviet Union poses to the world order?

2.  According to the document’s authors, how should the United States respond to the Soviet threat? Why shouldn’t the United States continue on its current path? Why don’t the authors support immediate

negotiations with the Soviet Union? When do they think negotiations might be fruitful, and what would

they hope to achieve with this kind of diplomacy?

3.  NSC-68 argues that the American public and other “free peoples” must be made to see “that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake.” What does this suggest about

American public opinion in early 1950? Why might Americans have been reluctant to support an

expensive military buildup? What development later in 1950 helped to change public opinion, allowing

the report’s recommendations to be enacted?

4.  The authors of this report call for the “steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world.” What do you think they mean by this? Do you think Soviet

leaders would see this as creating a “positive program for peace”? Do you?