HIS

Worlds of History

A Comparative Reader

Volume Two: Since 1400

Seventh Edition

Kevin Reilly Raritan Valley College

bed ford/st.martin's Macmillan Learning

Boston I New York

25

The Cold War and the Third World

V.Ietnam, Cuba, the Congo, and Afighan.Istan,1945-1989

I HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) were allies during World War 11. Meetings between the heads of state could be strained, but the Allies cooperated in the war and reached many agreements on the peace that followed, including the division of Europe and the creation of the United Nations and other international organizations. The Cold War developed within these agree- ments about postwar Europe and in the debates of the new international organizations, but it also festered from prewar ideological differences and antagonisms. U.S. troops were sent to fight "communist" Latin American regimes throughout the first half of the century; the Soviets never forgot Western efforts to reverse the Russian Revolution of 1917, and they never imagined that capitalism would outlast socialism.

World War 11 ended with the devastation of Germany and Japan and the exhaustion of England and France. One of the casualties turned out to be the colonial system that had fed and served the imperial powers. Some German colonies in Africa and Japanese colonies in Asia were turned over to the Allies after the war, but the postwar decades eventually brought an end to English and French colonies as well: British India as early as 1947, French Vietnam (Indochina) in 1954, and most of Africa by the early 1960s.

Although the Soviet Union had suffered enormous losses, it emerged with the United States as one of the two great "superpowers" of the post- war world. Both countries hoped to build a new world in which they

896

would play a dominant rol which the Soviets meant th that they believed caused ti meant the expansion of Sol communist governments in the Soviet Union champion from the ashes of colonjali5 with the other power. In rei declared themselves "nonl`( were members of a "Third Third World leaders \`.ere n find it, and some found the The Cold War had much [o the Soviet Union to `+Too tht and into American or Sol-ie

I THINKING HIST

Detecting ldeologica

The great enemy of clear between one's real and instinctively to long ``-o spurting out ink. In our of politics." All issues art of lies, evasions, foll}-. ha

-tie In his 1946 essay, George C and fascist dictatorships` bi ical language served the im "ideology") rather than the

the speaker as well as the ai Since Orwell confrontet

period of the developing Cc study of the Cold War as an logical language. It was an ( ernment efforts to control p and public relations; and a t to win the "hearts and mint political writers at the time gandists were not the onl\- c poses. Political practition;rs that the words they chose tr

25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld . 897

would play a dominant role. Both professed opposition to imperialism, by which the Soviets meant the capitalist commercial and military expansion that they believed caused two world wars and by which the Americans meant the expansion of Soviet military power in Eastern Europe and communist governments in China and beyond. Both the United States and the Soviet Union championed the emergence of new independent nations from the ashes of colonialism, but neither wanted these new states to ally with the other power. In response, leaders of some of these new states declared themselves "noncommitted" to communism or capitalism-they were members of a "Third World" caught between the first two. Many Third World leaders were nationalists who sought help where they could find it, and some found the road to independence blockaded at either end. The Cold War had much to do with the effort by the United States and the Soviet Union to woo these new nations to capitalism or communism and into American or Soviet spheres of influence.

I THINKING HISTORICALLY

Detecting Ideological Language

The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink. In our age there is no such thing as "keeping out of politics." All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia.

-George Orwell, ``Politics and the English Language"

In his 1946 essay, George Orwell flagged the Big Lies of Hitler, Stalin, and fascist dictatorships, but he also ruminated on the ways that polit- ical language served the interest of the ruling political belief system (or "ideology'') rather than the truth. The result of language that deluded

the speaker as well as the audience was poor, often self-defeating policy. Since Orwell confronted the political distortions of language in the

period of the developing Cold War, a term he coined, we will use our study of the Cold War as an opportunity to examine the use of ideo- logical language. It was an era of new mass media like television; gov- ernment efforts to control public opinion through pollsters, advertisers, and public relations; and a competitive struggle between superpowers to win the "hearts and minds" of the world. Many of the efforts of political writers at the time were devoted to propaganda. But propa- gandists were not the only ones to choose their words for political pur- poses. Political practitioners did so as well, and often without realizing that the words they chose trapped them in dogma, fantasy, or a fog.

1

WINSTON CHURCHILL

Iron Curtain Speech, 1946

Winston Churchill (1874-1965) was British prime minister a.nd

an ally of president Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War 11. On March 5,1946, six months after the end of.World War 11 and a year after the deaLth of.Roosevelt, Churchill spoke a.t the invitation of Roosevelt's successor, President Harry S. Truman, at Westminster College in Truman's home state of Missouri. As you read the selec- tion, keep in mind the foHowing questions: What cha.nges since the end of the war does Churchill describe? Why do they concern him?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

This speech is often said to have signaled the beginning of the Cold War. As in any good speech, Churchill's words evoke emotional responses in addition to providing information. Keep in mind the following questions as you rea.d the selection: What emotional responses do phrases like t.row cwrfc7i.# and C4ri.s£/.4„ ct.v/.//.zcif/.on evoke i n

this speech? How would parts of the speech have helped to create a "cold war" mentality?

A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist interna- tional organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain-and I doubt not here also-towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals

SG.73eg"s of pe4ce, (the J7oco C%rf".# Speecfr), presented at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5,1946. Reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London on behalf of The Estate of Winston S. Churchill. © The Estate of Winston S. Churchill.

898

of the ancient states of-Cen[r, Prague, Vlenna, Budapest. 8{ famous cities and the populari the Soviet sphere, and all are su Soviet influence but to a \.er`- I sure of control from +\Iosco`;-. .I glories-is free to decide its fun and French observation. The I has been encouraged to make Germany, and mass expulsions t ous and undreamed-ot-are now which were very small in all [h{ raised to pre-eminence and poi seeking everywhere to ob[ain « are prevailing in nearl\- e`-er`- cas there is no true democ.rac`-.

Turkey and Persia ar.e both the claims which are being madi exerted by the Mosco\`- Go`-er the Russians in Berlin to build zone of Occupied German`- t``- left-wing German leaders.. .\t. t American and British Armies ``-it an earlier agreement, to a depth front of nearly four hundred mil€ to occupy this vast expanse or-[< cies had conquered.

If now the Soviet Go\-ernmen a pro-Communist German`- in [h difficulties in the British and .Imei Germans the power of pu[[ing tl Soviets and the Western Demol`r drawn from these facts-and I-ai- Liberated Europe we fought [o bi the essentials of permanent peal`e.

The safety of the world requirt no nation should be permanen[]`-{ strong parent races in Europe trial or which occurred in former [im lifetime we have seen the United 5 traditions, against arguments. the to comprehend, drawn b}' jrresis[il secure the victory of the good i`au' and devastation had occurred. T``i, several millions of its young men ,

Churchill/lroncurtainspeech I 899

of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing mea- sure of control from Moscow. Athens alone-Greece with its immortal glories -is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale griev- ous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.

Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of Occupied Germany by showing special favours to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westwards, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of 150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democra- cies had conquered.

If now the Soviet Government tries, by separate action, to build up a pro-Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the British and American zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts-and facts they are-this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace.

The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. Twice in our own lifetime we have seen the United States, against their wishes and their traditions, against arguments, the force of which it is impossible not to comprehend, drawn by irresistible forces, into these wars in time to secure the victory of the good cause, but only after frightful slaughter and devastation had occurred. Twice the United States has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to find the war;

900 I 25/ThecoldwaramdtheThirdworld

but now war can find any nation, wherever it may dwell between dusk and dawn. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe, within the structure of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. That I feel is an open cause of policy of very great importance.

In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other causes for anxiety .... In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a grow- ing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. These are sombre facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains ....

NIKOLAI NOVIKOV

Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership, September 27, 1946

Nikolai Novikov (1903-1989) was a Soviet diplomat who served as Soviet amba.ssador to the United States in 1946-1947. In this tele-

gram to Foreign Minister Molotov, Novikov assesses the policies and intentions of the U.S. government under President Truman. As you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: What is his assessment? How is his view of the United Sta.tes different from that of churchill?

"Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership,"

September 27,1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP SSSR, f. 06. op. 8, 45, 759; published in Mczbd#7?4rod#4y4 Zbj.z#' no.11 (1990),148-54; translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808.

Novikov / Telegram from r\ I kc>i

THINKING HISTORIC

Ideological language cols often repea.ted frequer:l\ . meaning. Keep in mind [Li,

Selection: What exampres How might the telegrari ri Churchill or the Unitec! St€

Reflecting the imperialisti` US foreign policy has been desire for world dominatior ments by President Truma ruling circles that the L-S ha of American diplomac`-` th€ science have been place.d at 1 in mind broad plans i-or ex[ both diplomaticall}- and [hr air bases far from the l'S. a' newer weapons ....

The increase in peacetirr a large number of na\-al and ders are clear indicators of-tl

For the first time in [hc Congress adopted a la\`- to but on the basis of ltlm.ersJI which is to reach 1 million erably increased. At the eni reduced quite insignifican[l` the US Navy occupies first F Navy far behind, not to men

The colossal grou'tl: rj; i prising $13 billion in the 19 budget of $36 billion ' and expenditures in the 1938 but

These enormous budget tenance of a large Arm\-. \-a a vast system of na`'al ;nd a According to available of-ri` support bases, and radio s[a a.nd 2.58 in the Pacific OceJi bases are located outside the are to be built on islands in [1 Cuba, Trinidad, Bermuda. [hl

Novikov / Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, SovietAmbassadorto the us . 901

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Ideological language consists of empty words or phra.ses that are often repeated frequently, as if repetition were a substitute for meaning. Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection: What examples do you see here of ideological language? How might the telegram raLise questions about the ideology of Churchill or the United States?

Reflect.ingtheimperialistictendencyofAmericanmonopolycapital, US foreign policy has been characterized in the postwar period by a desire for world domination. This is the real meaning of repeated state- ments by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles that the US has a right to world leadership. All the forces of American diplomacy, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, industry, and science have been placed at the service of this policy. With this objective in mind broad plans for expansion have been developed, to be realized both diplomatically and through the creation of a system of naval and air bases far from the US, an arms race, and the creation of newer and newer weapons ....

The increase in peacetime military potential and the organization of a large number of naval and air bases both in the US and beyond its bor- ders are clear indicators of the US desire to establish world domination.

For the first time in the country's history in the summer of 1946

FOTgres: aftopted,a LFIV to.for.in a.Peacettn;e army not of uj,ri;e;;s ?.::=o_I?.PeLpa:_iso`fpniu!,:salmilitar;co,nscr_ip.tion_.fhe-s;z:'ofii:'ir=;,which is to reach 1 million men as of 1 July 1947, has been consid- erably increased. At the end of the war the size of the US Navy was reduced quite insignificantly compared to wartime. At the present time the US Navy occupies first place in the world, leaving the British Royal Navy far behind, not to mention other powers.

I_h_e drc+O!o`SS`£! grpwtf a of. :TP,epd_i?u_i es f.or the.Army and Nauy, com- prising $13 billion in the 1946-1947 budget (about 400/o of the entire budget of $36 billion) and is more than 10 times the corresponding expenditures in the 1938 budget, when it did not even reach $1 billion.

These enormous budget sums are being spent along with the main- tenance of a large Army, Navy, and Air Force and also the creation of a vast system of naval and air bases in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. According to available official plans, in the coming years 228 G¢ses, support bases, and radio stations are to be built j.7z ffre A£/¢#Z¢.c Oce¢7z and 258 j.# Zfre Pzzcj./¢.c Oce4#. The majority of these bases and support bases are located outside the United States. The following bases exist or are to be built on islands in the Atlantic Ocean: Newfoundland, Iceland, Cuba, Trinidad, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Azores, and many others; in

902 . 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

the Pacific: former Japanese mandated possessions-the Marianas, and the Caroline and Marshall Islands, Bonin, Ryukyu, the Philippines, the Galapagos Islands (which belong to Ecuador).

The situating of American bases on islands often 10-12,000 kilo- meters from US territory and located on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans clearly shows ffoe ¢ggress¢.c;e 7¢cz£„re of fbe sf7i¢feg£.c cJesg.g73s of the US Army and Navy. The fact that the US Navy is studying the naval approaches to European shores in a concentrated manner is also confirmation of this. During 1946 US Navy ships visited Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, and Greece with this purpose in mind. In addition the US Navy constantly cruises the Mediterranean Sea.

All these facts clearly show that their armed forces are designed to play a decisive role in the realization of plans to establish American world domination ....

In recent years American capital has been being introduced into the economies of M!.dczJe E4sfe7'7? countries quite intensively, partic- ularly in the oil industry. At the present time there are American oil concessions in all the Middle East countries which have sources of oil (Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). American capital, which first appeared in the Middle East oil industry only in 1927, now controls about 42°/o of the total proven reserves of the Middle East (less Iran). Of the total proven reserves of 26.8 billion barrels of oil 11 billion belong to US concessions. In striving to guarantee the fur- ther development of its concessions in individual countries, which are often the largest (as is the case in Saudi Arabia, for example), American oil companies are planning to build a trans-Arabian pipeline which is to pump oil from the American concession in Saudi Arabia and in other countries to the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean, ports in Palestine and Egypt.

In pursuing expansion in the Middle East American capital has British capital as its competition, which is stubbornly resisting this expansion. The fierce nature of the competition between them is the main factor which prevents Britain and the United States from achieving an agreement about the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East, which might only take place at the expense of direct British inter- ests in this region.

Palestine, where the US has recently displayed great interest, creat- ing many difficulties for Britain, can be cited as an example of the quite sharp differences in US and British policy in the Middle East as is occur- ring in the case of the demand of the US government to allow 100,000 European Jews into Palestine. American interest in Palestine, outwardly expressed in sympathy for the Zionist cause, actually only means that American capital is expecting to become rooted in the economy of Palestine by interfering in Palestinian affairs. The choice of a Palestinian port as one of the terminal points of the American oil pipeline explains a lot about American foreign policy on the issue of Palestine ....

The \',e=-

The current pohc}- ot- the .I USSR is also directed a[ limi[ing boring countries. While implen various international conr-ereni`i which, on the one hand. mamr-I ary forces in former enem`- or t the object of creating ol);{i:]c`s co"77£rz.es but, on the other. „ P American capital into tl)eir i:I-jr and disbanding [rt7z/o:/„f] the which are friendly to the l-SSR ernments which would obediEr US. In this policy the US rei`ei`-ei

It ought to be full\- realized war are being conducfed ``-i[h I which in the eyes of Amerii`an American path to world diimin of the US Army for \`-ar \`-ith [h of American strategic bases in rei on Soviet territory, the intensiri regions as tactical approal`hes [o I Germany and Japan to use them

The Vietnamese De of Independence, 15

Although this document T=. : the importance of the ai: cc c> the end of world War 11. \ -a:-=

from 1887 until World \..`'a' I `

Declarat:ion of`lndepende-ce '{

nationalists to prevent the Frei defeatedJapanese.

The author of the dectir=: c

prime example of the kinc= c7.-- the appeals of.Washingto-a-c Communist Party in 1921 as ...,

nist Party in 1930, he vi as a sc

Ho Chi Minh, from Ho C/7/. +\Jjtl/-. _<:-.=-.-::-

Reprinted by permission of The G:L P_--

Thevietna.mese Declarationoflndependence . 903

The current policy of the American government with respect to the USSR is also directed at limiting or displacing Soviet influence from neigh- boring countries. While implementing it the US is trying to take steps at various international conferences or directly in these very same countries which, on the one hand, manifest themselves in the support of reaction- ary forces in former enemy or allied countries bordering the USSR z"¢.£b the object of creating obstacles to the processes of democratizing these countries but, on the other, in Providing Positions for the Penetration of A77¢erz.ccz7€ cczPz.£cz/ z.7¢fo Jbez.r eco7¢o77¢c.es. Such a policy relies on weakening and disbanding [#czz/oz4v.£] the democratic governments in power there which are friendly to the USSR and then replacing them with new gov- ernments which would obediently carry out a policy dictated from the US. In this policy the US receives full support from British diplomacy....

It ought to be fully realized that American preparations for a future war are being conducted with the idea of av¢r czgcz¢.7zs} ffoe So„c.e£ U7Gg.o7G, which in the eyes of American imperialists is the chief obstacle in the American path to world domination. Such facts as the tactical training of the US Army for war with the USSR as a future enemy, the situating of American strategic bases in regions from which strikes can be launched on Soviet territory, the intensified training and reinforcement of Arctic regions as tactical approaches to the USSR, and attempts to pave the way in Germany and Japan to use them in a war against the USSR testify to this.

27.09.46 NOVIKOV

The Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, 1945

Although this document may predate the Cold War, it demonstrates the importance of the anticolonial struggle to create new states at the end of.World Wa.r 11. Vietnam had been part of.French Indochina from 1887 until World War 11, when it was occupied byjapan. This Declaration of Independence represented an effort by Vietnamese nationalists to prevent t:he French from retaking the country from the defeaLtedjapanese.

The author of the declaration, Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969), is a

prime example of the kind of.new national leader torn between the appeals of`Washington and Moscow. A founder of the French Communist Party in 1921 as well as the Vietnamese Commu- nist Party in 1930, he was also the leader of.the Viet Minh, the

Ho Chi Minh, from Ho Cb;. M£.77fo, Se/ecfeJ Wo7'fas. Copyright © The Gioi Publishers. Reprinted by permission of The Gioi Publishers.

904 . 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

Vietnamese nationalist movement, even enjoying the secret help of the United States during World War 11 in the battle againstjapan. As

you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: Wha.t, according to Ho Chi Minh, were the effects of French colonialism in Vietnam? Wha.t reasons does he give for Vietnamese independence?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Since this document was intended as a declarat:ion of vietnamese nationalism, delivered in Vietnamese to the Vietnamese people, one is struck by the use of ideological language from both the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Keep in mind the following questions as

you read the selection: How is the langua.ge and style of this docu- ment similar to the American Declaration of Independence? What other signs do you see that Ho Chi Minh maLy ha.ve been interested in attracting the fa.vor of a U.S. or French a.udience? Wha.t purpose would such a strategy serve?

"All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with

certain inalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Indepen- dence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the Earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and to be free.

The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the Rights of Man and the Citizen also states: "All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.''

Those are undeniable truths.

abusTnegv:£tehset[::Sd'afr°droTi:;etrh,;,nEegfg£;,¥yy:%rds'Ft„2:e:::,;:ihhfamv:evr,i:11:::Sj our Motherland and oppressed our fellow-citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice. In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty.

They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center and the South of Vietnam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united.

They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots-they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood. They have fettered public opinion; they have practised obscurantism against our people. To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol.

1 This was the rallying cry of the French Revolution of 1789. (F#¢£er#G.£y means brother-

hood.) [Ed.]

T+

In the fields of ecol impoverished our peopl(

They have robbed us raw materials. The\- ha`-t export trade. The.`- ha`- reduced our people: espe{

They have hampere they have mercilessl}- e.`]

In the autumn or- Indochina's territor`- to Allies, the French impel handed over our countr`

Thus, from that da[: of the French and the Ja: The result was that r-for year, from Quang Tri pr( million of our fello``--ci. French troops were disa either fled or surrendere( "protecting" us, but thal

our country to the Japan On several occasions

French to ally themsel`-es to this proposal, the Freni ities against the Vietmin+

great number of our polit Notwithstanding al

fested toward the Frenc the Japanese putsch or- .\ Frenchmen to cross the jails, and protected Frem

From the autumn of French colony and had b

After the Japanese h. rose to regain our natio Republic of Vietnam.

The truth is that \`- Japanese and not from [1

The French ha\-e i-lt Bao Dai has abdicated. ( nearly a century ha\-e I-etl Fatherland. Our people I chic regime that has reign has been established the I

For these reasons` `` representing the whole \

Thevietnamese Declaration of lndependence . 905

In the fields of economics, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impoverished our people, and devastated our land.

They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolised the issuing of bank-notes and the export trade. They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty.

They have hampered the prospering of our national bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our workers.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese Fascists violated Indochina's territory to establish new bases in their fight against the Allies, the French imperialists went down on their bended knees and handed over our country to them.

Thus, from that date, our people were subjected to the double yoke of the French and the Japanese. Their sufferings and miseries increased. The result was that from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, from Quang Tri province to the North of Vietnam, more than two million of our fellow-citizens died from starvation. On March 9, the French troops were disarmed by the Japanese. The French colonialists either fled or surrendered, showing that not only were they incapable of "protecting" us, but that, in the span of five years, they had twice sold

our country to the Japanese. On several occasions before March 9, the Vietminh League urged the

French to ally themselves with it against the Japanese. Instead of agreeing to this proposal, the French colonialists so intensified their terrorist activ- ities against the Vietminh members that before fleeing they massacred a great number of our political prisoners detained at Yen Bai and Cao Bang.

Notwithstanding all this, our fellow-citizens have always mani- fested toward the French a tolerant and humane attitude. Even after the Japanese putsch of March 1945, the Vietminh League helped many Frenchmen to cross the frontier, rescued some of them from Japanese jails, and protected French lives and property.

From the autumn of 1940, our country had in fact ceased to be a French colony and had become a Japanese possession.

After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French.

The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the Fatherland. Our people at the same time have overthrown the monar- chic regime that has reigned supreme for dozens of centuries. In its place has been established the present Democratic Republic.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government, representing the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on

906 I 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligation that France has so far subscribed to on behalf of Vietnam and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland.

The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to feconquer their country.

We are convinced that the Allied nations which at Tehran and Sam Francisco have acknowledged the principles of self-determination and equality of nations, will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Vietnam.

A people who have courageously opposed French domination for more than eighty years, a people who have fought side by side with the Allies against the Fascists during these last years, such a people must be free and independent.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, solemnly declare to the world that Vietnam has the right to be a free and independent country and in fact it already has been so. The entire Vietnamese pe,ople are determined to mobilise all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.

EDWARD LANSDALE

Report on CIA Operations in Vietnam, 1954-1955

France did not cede independence to Vietnam in 1945; nor did the United States support the Viet Minh against the French. The newly declared Democratic Republic of.Vietnam controlled only the north while French forces cont:rolled the south. Ho Chi Minh and the Viet

Minh forces continued their struggle against the French, finally defeating them at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. An international peace conference at Geneva ca.Iled for a temporary division of northern and southern Vietnam to be followed in two

years by a national election for a unified government. However, in the wake of the Chinese communist victory in China in 1949 and the American fear of.its further spread in the Korean War (1950-1953),

Edward Lansdale. Excerpts from "Report on CIA Operations,1954-1955" in Tfoe Pe#£4go77 Pc!Pe7s, Abridged Edition, ed. George C. Herring. Copyright © 1993 by MCGraw-Hill, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the MCGraw Hill Companies.

La n s 5 a

the United States incre

part of.the expansion c dence movement. In 1 S "falling domino'. [heor

communist victories [h that Ho Chi Minh \`ou namese election, Elsenl

government and army I U.S. advisors and resoi allel permanent. But or

Catholics lived in the nt

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ln this selection. Ed\.

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THINKING HISTORl(

Notice how Lansdale us

the "government,.` and . ing questions as you rea terms? What do you thH for giving "the U.S. an o

does Lansdale describe 1 "Vietnamese na[ional ar

the differences bet\` eeri sions could one dra\` '

Foreword

. . . It was often a frustrati Agreements signed on 21 official Americans, inclu( and intelligent enem`' rna ities in establishing his s.

Lansdale/ Reporton cIAOperationsinvietnam H 907

the United States increasingly saw Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh as

part`of the expansion of communism ra.ther than a national indepen- dence movement. In 1954 President Eisenhower voiced belief in a "falling domino" theory in which the loss of vietnam would lead to

communist victories throughout Southeast Asia and beyond. Fearing that Ho Chi Minh would win 80 percent of t:he vote in a general Viet:- namese election, Eisenhower created a separa.te South Vietnamese

government and army in violation of.the Geneva Accords, and he sent U.S. advisors and resources to make this division along the 17th par- aLllel permanent. But one of.the problems was that many pro-French Catholics lived in the north where the Viet Minh were strongest, and manyviet Minh lived and operated in the south. Thus, the crea.tion of a southern Republic of vietnam required large-scale population transfers as well as ef.forts to bolster the resources and legitimacy of an untried southern government and army.

In this selection, Edward Lansdale informs his CIA superiors of.

some of the activities of one of.the teams of advisors sent by the United States to accomplish these tasks. Lansdale was a legendary early CIA opera.tive, known for his work in defeating a similar com- munist and nationalist movement in the Philippines. As you read the

selection, keep in mind the following questions: What did Lansdale's team attempt to do in the north? What was the purpose of the first rumor campa.ign? How would you judge the tactics and success of the Saigon Mlitary Mission (SMM) team in the north? What did the CIA do in the south? How successful were its efforts?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Notice how Lansdale uses terms such as Vt.efm;.nA and Vi.efwc7mese,

the "government," and "security forces." Keep in mind the follow- ing questions as you read the selection: How might others use these terms? What do you think of Lansdale's praise of American reporters for giving "the U.S. an objective account of.events in Vietnam"? How does Lansdale describe the dif.ferences between the Viet Minh and the "Vietnamese nationa.I army"? What conclusions does he draw from

the differences between those two armies? What dif.ferent conclu- sions could one draw?

Foreword

. . . It was often a frustrating and perplexing year, up close. The Geneva Agreements signed on 21 July 1954 imposed restrictive rules upon all official Americans, including the Saigon Military Mission. An active and intelligent enemy made full use of legal rights to screen his activ- ities in establishing his stay-behind organizations south of the 17th

908 . 25/Thecoldwa.randtheThirdworld

Parallel and in obtaining quick security north of that Parallel. The nation's economy and communications system were crippled by eight years of open war. The government, including its Army and other secu- rity forces, was in a painful transition from colonial to self rule, making it a year of hot-tempered incidents. Internal problems arose quickly to points where armed conflict was sought as the only solution. The enemy was frequently forgotten in the heavy atmosphere of suspicion, hatred and jealousy.

The Saigon Military Mission received some blows from allies and the enemy in this atmosphere, as we worked to help stabilize the gov- ernment and to beat the Geneva time-table of Communist takeover in the north. However, we did beat the time-table. The government did become stabilized. The Free Vietnamese are now becoming unified and learning how to cope with the Communist enemy. We are thankful that we had a chance to help in this work in a critical area of the world, to be positive and constructive in a year of doubt ....

Highlights of the Year

a. Early Days

. . . Working in close cooperation with George Hellyer, USIS] Chief, a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat psywar was constructed and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it. A similar course was initiated for the Ministry of Information. Rumor campaigns were added to the tactics and tried out in Hanoi. It was almost too late.

The first rumor campaign was to be a carefully planted story of a Chinese Communist regiment in Tonkin2 taking reprisals against a

X£:tt]:#[s¥![::8:pwbhe°hsaev:;:I:ntE;4C5hi:eds:ohnaffr:a£::dvireet:aa[i:8e€ehafrnse:: Chinese occupation under Vietminh rule; the story was to be planted by soldiers of the Vietnamese Armed Psywar Company in Hanoi dressed in civilian clothes. The troops received their instructions silently, dressed in civilian clothes, went on the mission, and failed to return. They had deserted to the Vietminh ....

1 United States Information Service, the overseas offices of the United States Informa-

tion Agency (USIA), which was created by President Eisenhower in 1953 to project a positive image of the United States in the world. [Ed.I

2 Region of northern Vietnam around and including Hanoi. 3 Anti-communist forces of Chiang Kai-shek, known for abuse of people, unlike the dis-

ciplined communists. Point of campaign was to have Vietnamese fear all Chinese and identify them with Vietminh as communists. See g. January 1955 (below)

Lanscla

Ngo Dinh DiemJ arm as the French forces ``-ithdi and Nam Dinh in Tonkin. friendship and listened t illegible] died, reportedl`- despair grew. On 21 Jul.}-. was given to the Commur help in establishing a resis arrangements were made. .

b. Angust 1954

An agreement had been ref tary personnel with .\Il\C Vietnam on the date of- [ht Agreement. In South \-ie[I meant that SMM might ha were taken. General O.Dar under MAAG cover. plus an before the deadline. A i`all Japan, and Okina``-a ``-ere i

SMM had one small .\1 other housing, but the ne``- ing was ready and \`-ere i-r: the first days. Meetings ``-er None had had political-ps} experienced in paramilitar Plans were made quickl}-` i.oi the Vietminh had started tat areas of Tonkin still held b`-

Major Conein ``.as gi`:e itary organization in the n( took over .... [His] . . . [ean the MAAG staff working or quarters in Hanoi, \`-i[h a I

4 Ngo Dinh Diem ( 1901-lit _: .

in exile. He returned to \'ietnar. :I. I French withdrew; he was deposa= 2r.I

5 Area of northern Yie[na.T.. I:€

areas now making up Vietnam: Ti:.-|ci what is now southernmost \-ie[r.a=.. -I

6 Saigon Military Mission. I+,€ i- 7 Military Assistance Ad`-isori-(

Truman beginning in 19)-0 [o Ira:I. : `

Lansdale/ Reporton cIAOperationsinvietnam I 909

Ngo Dinh Diem4 arrived on 7 July, and within hours was in despair as the French forces withdrew from the Catholic provinces of Phat Diem and Nam Dinh in Tonkin.5 . . . The Tonkinese had hopes of American friendship and listened to the advice given them. Governor [name illegible] died, reportedly by poison. Tonkin's government changed as despair grew. On 21 July, the Geneva Agreement was signed. Tonkin was given to the Communists. Anti-Communists turned to SMM6 for help in establishing a resistance movement and several tentative initial arrangements were made ....

b. AMgust 1954

An agreement had been reached that the personnel ceiling of U.S. mili- tary personnel with MAAG7 would be frozen at the number present in Vietnam on the date of the cease-fire, under the terms of the Geneva Agreement. In South Vietnam this deadline was to be 11 August. It meant that SMM might have only two members present, unless action were taken. General O'Daniel agreed to the addition of ten SMM men under MAAG cover, plus any others in the Defense pipeline who arrived before the deadline. A call for help went out. Ten officers in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa were selected and rushed to Vietnam.

SMM had one small MAAG house. Negotiations were started for other housing, but the new members of the team arrived before hous- ing was ready and were crammed three and four to a hotel room for the first days. Meetings were held to assess the new members' abilities. None had had political-psychological warfare experience. Most were experienced in paramilitary and clandestine intelligence operations. Plans were made quickly, for time was running out in the north; already the Vietminh had started taking over secret control of Hanoi and other areas of Tonkin still held by French forces.

Major Conein was given responsibility for developing a paramil- itary organization in the north, to be in position when the Vietminh took over.... [His] . . . team was moved north immediately as part of the MAAG staff working on the refugee problem. The team had head- quarters in Hanoi, with a branch in Haiphong. Among cover duties,

4 Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963), a Catholic, became a favorite of the United States while

in exile. He returned to Vietnam in 1954 and became first president of South Vietnam as the French withdrew; he was deposed and killed in a coup in 1963. [Ed.]

5 Area of northern Vietnam. French Indochina consisted of Cambodia, Laos, and three

areas now making up Vietnam: Tonkin in the north, Annam in the center, and Cochinchina in what is now southernmost Vietnam. [Ed.]

6 Saigon Military Mission, the group run by Lansdale. [Ed.] 7 Military Assistance Advisory Group: military advisors sent to Vietnam by President

Truman beginning in 1950 to train a Vietnamese national army for South Vietnam. [Ed.]

910 I 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

this team supervised the refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift,8 organized by the French. One day, as a CAT C-469 finished loading, they saw a small child standing on the ground below the loading door. They shouted for the pilot to wait, picked the child up and shoved him onto the aircraft, which they promptly taxied out for its takeoff in the constant air shuf- fle. A Vietnamese man and woman ran up to the team, asking what they had done with their small boy, whom they'd brought to say goodbye to relatives. The chagrined team explained, finally talked the parents into going south to Free Vietnam, put them in the next aircraft to catch up with their son in Saigon ....

c. September 1954

. . . Towards the end of the month, it was learned that the largest print- ing establishment in the north intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Vietminh. An attempt was made by SMM to destroy the modern presses, but Vietminh security agents already had moved into the plant and frustrated the attempt. This operation was under a Vietnamese patriot whom we shall call Trieu; his case officer was Capt. Arundel. Earlier in the month they had engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October, including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two days later Vietminh cur- rency was worth half the value prior to the leaflets. The Vietminh took to the radio to denounce the leaflets; the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that even most of the rank and file Vietminh were sure that the radio denunciations were a French trick ....

d. October 1954

Hanoi was evacuated on 9 October. The northern SMM team left with the last French troops, disturbed by what they had seen of the grim efficiency of the Vietminh in their takeover, the contrast between the silent march of the victorious Vietminh troops in their tennis shoes and the clanking armor of the well-equipped French whose Western tactics and equipment had failed against the Communist military-political- economic campaign.

The northern team had spent the last days of Hanoi in contami- mating the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of

8 To fly Catholics from the northern city of Hanoi to South Vietnam. [Ed.I 9 A plane; Civil Air Transport was established in Shanghai in 1946 as a Chinese airline

and was owned and used by the CIA after 1950. The C-46 was a military transport and cargo plane made by the Curtiss-Wright Company. [Ed.]

L2rs

the engines in the buses of the railroad (``'hil`h cal team in Japan \`-ho detailed notes of po[en (U.S. adherence to the rying out the acti\-e sab water facilities, harbor. . contaminating the oil. I storage room. Fumes fi them out. Dizz`. and ``-€ kerchiefs and c6mplered

Meanwhile, Polish . transport southern \-let: This offered the opporn was developed b}- Binh `` Vietminh Resistani`e Co Vletminh they would be submarine attacks` and warm clothing item ``-o` that Vietminh were being

f. Deceanber 1954

. . . Till and Peg Durdin a Times, Homer Bigart of-I Time and John Roderil-k SMM and worked hard : and give the U.S. an ot`jei met with us at times [o a known to them, meeting mature and responsible service for their coun[r`-. .

9. January 1955 The Vletminh long ago hat the people are the \`-ater am mass of the population dun exceptions; in contrast. [h€ many Asian armies, adept , viding them with girls. S.\L beginning. Since the \-anor a strong organization throu it was the key to stabilizing Army and people could he weapon against Communisr

Lansdale/ ReportoncIAOperationsinvietnam . 911

the engines in the buses, in taking the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special techni- cal team in Japan who performed their part brilliantly), and in writing detailed notes of potential targets for future paramilitary operations. (U.S. adherence to the Geneva Agreement prevented SMM from car- rying out the active sabotage it desired to do against the power plant, water facilities, harbor, and bridge.) The team had a bad moment when contaminating the oil. They had to work quickly at night, in an enclosed storage room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces with hand- kerchiefs and completed the job.

Meanwhile, Polish and Russian ships had arrived in the south to transport southern Vietminh to Tonkin under the Geneva Agreement. This offered the opportunity for another black psywar strike. A leaflet was developed by Binh with the help of Capt. Arundel, attributed to the Vietminh Resistance Committee. Among other items, it reassured the Vietminh they would be kept safe below decks from imperialist air and submarine attacks, and requested that warm clothing be brought; the warm clothing item would be coupled with a verbal rumor campaign that Vietminh were being sent into China as railroad laborers ....

f. December 1954 . . . Till and Peg Durdin of the N.Y. Times, Hank Lieberman of the N.Y. Times, Homer Bigart of the N.Y. Herald-Tribune, John Mecklin of Life- Time and John Roderick of Associated Press, have been warm friends of SMM and worked hard to penetrate the fabric of French propaganda and give the U.S. an objective account of events in Vietnam. The group met with us at times to analyze objectives and motives of propaganda known to them, meeting at their own request as U.S. citizens. These mature and responsible news correspondents performed a valuable service for their country....

9. January 1955 The Vietminh long ago had adopted the Chinese Communist thought that the people are the water and the army is the fish. Vietminh relations with the mass of the population during the fighting had been exemplary, with a few exceptions; in contrast, the Vietnamese National Army had been like too many Asian armies, adept at cowing a population into feeding them, pro- viding them with girls. SMM had been working on this problem from the beginning. Since the National Army was the only unit of government with a strong organization through the country and with good communications, it was the key to stabilizing the situation quickly on a nation-wide basis. If Army and people could be brought together into a team, the first strong weapon against Communism could be forged ....

5

ROGER CRANSE "Baguettes and the Forever War," 2018

The author worked for the U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment (USAID) in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968. USAID was supposed to be independent of the military, but this incident illustrates how the fog of war could shroud the best intentions. As you read the selec- tion, keep in mind the following question: What does this account ten you about the mix of.idealistic and military goals of.the United States in its war in Vietnam?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

As Roger Cranse writes, the America.n war in Vietnam still ha.s lessons

to teach us. Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection: Wha.t, according to CraLnse, are those lessons? How does his language change from the beginning to the end of this essa.y? How do you rea.d phraLses like "hearts and minds"? How might ha.ve

phrases like that hindered American understanding of.what they were doing? What signs do you see that the author's view of.the war changed over time?

In October 1967, two Viet Gong regiments and elements of two North Vietnamese Army regiments attacked the compounds of the Vietnamese district headquarters and the Special Forces "A" team in Loc Ninh, Binh Long Province. Nearly all of Loc Ninh's 3,000 inhabitants fled south to An Loc, the provincial capital, sixty miles north of Saigon, up Route 13.

At the time I was a young Foreign Service reserve officer with the United States Agency for International Development living in An Loc in an old French office building along with five or six other USAID civilians. We were the counterinsurgency workers, the hearts and minds guys. We thought we could win the war by being nice.

My job was refugee relief. I spent my days hauling food, mosquito nets, CARE packages, old clothes from Catholic Relief Services, quilts from the Mennonite Central Committee, and other miscellaneous stuff to the refugees in An Loc. Young social workers in pastel ao dais[ moved among the refugees, distributing these supplies and squatting on their heels with clipboards to register each refugee.

t Traditional Vietnamese garment. Literally "long shirt" now worn mainly by women as

silk dress with side open to leg or long pants. [Ed.]

Roger Cranse, "Baguettes and the Forever War," Ne~ Yo/fe Tj.owes, Feb. 27, 2018. Copyright © 2018 by Roger Cranse. Used with permission.

912

C

A day or two after [h week-we got word that € north to a small rubber p boss told me to go up and up a chopper-the onl`-[i] something like that. We.-d € friendlies around and Charl

Just a few days earlier ``-i for Bread." Somebod`. had tl We'd give him the flo'ur. he.d and sell the rest. Of course 1 where we were nobod}-ga`-e

The next morning I loai supplies on the chopper ani landed right on Route 13 i] gees were staying. I unloadei Catllolic priest in charge. an( ing and the next. Nothing ha

The fourth day, the chop] grown field across from the I the edge of the field the prii hands up in the air. I had no to the road, the priest poin[e(

That evening, sitting on t ing Scotch whiskey from the the legacy mine field. We had Later that night the VC sent onto our location. We huddle and then, after the attack. dra

I left vietnam in Februari school, family, a career in ai`: think about it much and didn

Then one day, a lifetime 1{ throughapatchofweedsandg

Some things play along }-a pened and long after }-ou thin ten at all. The forlorn ref-uge{ gracious social workers in a( out CARE packages; scar}. ro into no-man's-land-all these I carried on with my blisst-ull`-

2 American slang for Viet Cong: \-.( 3 PX stands for Post Exchange. ::h.i

greatly reduced prices. [Ed.]

Cranse/"BaguettesandtheForeverwar" 11 913

A day or two after the initial attack-the battle kept up for a week-we got word that a hundred or so Loc Ninh refugees had fled north to a small rubber plantation town bordering Cambodia. My boss told me to go up and check it out. I got on the horn and ordered up a chopper-the only time in my life I've had enough power to do something like that. We'd essentially be flying into no-man's-land: no friendlies around and Charlie2 everywhere and nowhere at once.

Just a few days earlier we'd got a big shipment of bags labelled "Flour for Bread." Somebody had the idea of cutting a deal with our local baker: We'd give him the flour, he'd make baguettes every morning, give us half, and sell the rest. Of course this was against USAID regulations but out where we were nobody gave a damn about regulations like that.

The next morning I loaded wicker baskets of baguettes and other supplies on the chopper and flew up to where the refugees were. We landed right on Route 13 in front of a small theater where the refu- gees were staying. I unloaded the baguettes, spoke with the Vietnamese Catholic priest in charge, and took off. We went back up the next morn- ing and the next. Nothing happened.

The fourth day, the chopper landed not on Route 13 but on an over- grown field across from the theater. I started walking across the field. At the edge of the field the priest and other people were throwing their hands up in the air. I had no idea what they meant; I kept going. I got to the road, the priest pointed and said, "Mine field; old French mines."

That evening, sitting on the verandah of the French building drink- ing Scotch whiskey from the PX3 in Saigon, I told my colleagues about the legacy mine field. We had a good laugh and I forgot the whole thing. Later that night the VC sent its regular barrage of mortars and rockets onto our location. We huddled in bunkers at either end of the verandah and then, after the attack, drank more Scotch.

I left Vietnam in February,1968, and got on with things: graduate school, family, a career in academe. Vietnam became my past. I didn't think about it much and didn't talk about it hardly at all.

Then one day, a lifetime later, taking a short cut across our campus through a patch of weeds and grass, I thought: I 4}ope £4„.s ¢.s7G'f cz 77#.7¢c /¢.e/d.

Some things play along your nervous system long after they've hap- pened and long after you think you've forgotten them. I hadn't forgot- ten at all. The forlorn refugees in the old theater near Cambodia; the gracious social workers in ao dais squatting on their heels, handing out CARE packages; scary rockets whistling in at night; dicey flights into no-man's-land-all these had stayed alive somewhere inside while I carried on with my blissfully uneventful life.

2 American slang for Viet Gong: V.C.: Victor Charlie: Charlie 3 PX stands for Post Exchange, the store where military personnel shopped, usually at

greatly reduced prices. [Ed.]

914 I 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

My wife and I visited the Vietnam Veterans Memorial early in the new millennium. There are 58,318 names are on the Wall. Half of these deaths were inflicted after the 1968 Tet Offensive, after we knew we were on the way out.

No one knows exactly how many Vietnamese died during our war there. Three million is probably a safe estimate, roughly 20 percent of Vietnam's population at the time. On our population base that would be the equivalent of 60 million Americans.

Before that, we supported the French in their colonial war against Vietnam's independence. And after the French lost that war we helped engineer the division of Vietnam, setting the stage for the subsequent "American War."

But we've moved on now, the Cold War is over, there are new chal- lenges in the world, Vietnam was ages ago. Indeed, most Americans and most Vietnamese weren't even alive during that now antique war. But I wonder: have we entirely reckoned with our moral culpability for tormenting that little country for nearly three decades?

And I wonder too if there isn't a flaw, something missing in national char- acter-an inability to see where we might be going wrong and to stop before making a big mistake. And then an amnesia, forgetting the mistake and mak- ing it all over again, and then again, and again. Maybe it's our unshakeable sense of our own rightness, our exceptionalism. We can do no wrong.

In 1972 An Loc was destroyed in a long, bitter battle. I'm sure the old French building is gone, the marketplace, the chopper pad, the bakery.

Sometimes people ask me, "Have you ever gone back?" as if I were returning to a favorite childhood vacation spot. In some ways, I found out over the years, I've never left.

PATRICE LUMUMBA

Interview with Russian News Agency TASS, July 1960 Patrice Lumumba. (1925-1961 ) was a founder and leader of the independence movement of the Congolese in the Belgian Congo in the 1950s and the first freely elected prime minister of the Republic of.the Congo upon independence in 1960. He was a charismatic speaker and popular national lea.der. The U.S. ambassador, who was

Patr.ice Lun\umba, The Truth about a Monstrous Crime of the Colonialists, transcribed by Thomas Schmidt (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,1961), 53-55.

Lumumba lnte-,

no friend, said Lumumba co

politicians as a waiter \``i[n a minister.

Belgium hoped that Cor£ symbolic. After nominali+ gr

Belgium continued to suppo lucrative mining compant ii

ln 1961, Lumumba \`as c]{

Joseph Mobutu, and then as rich, breaka.way Congo state Belgium and the United S[a:{

the Congo with an iron fis:. I of the Cold War, Mobutu el| As you read the selec[ion. ke-(

According to this documet.:. What was the response of :-t struggle become a part ot-I-€

THINKING HISTORICALL`

Lumumba clearly knew [ha: n`

by giving an interview [o the i especially a friendly in[er` lei.. .

as you read the selection: \..+a more ideological than infoma view show Moscow and LijTL, might you try to determine i`1

ganda and when it is genuine?

Question: How, in your opinit sion on the rapid withdra\`-al o fulfilled?

Answer: Belgium has alrea Security Council decisions. The aggressive actions and sa\-age I recalled that as far back as Tul}- a resolution that Belgian [roopi armed forces to our coun[r`- [o I a single Belgian soldier has .left [1 troops of the Belgian colonialist. massacre hundreds of Congoles known in the world because the of other Western countries to ``-r of Belgian soldiers in the Congo.

Our government and ParlialT that Belgian troops should lea`-i []

Lumumba/ lnterviewwith Russian NewsAgencyTASS H 915

no friend, said Lumumba could walk into any gathering of congolese

politicians as a waiter with a tray on his head and come out as prime minister.

Belgium hoped that Congolese independence would be only symbolic. After nominally granting independence onjune 30,1960, Belgium continued to support its colonialists, soldiers, and the very lucrative mining company in Katanga.

In 1961, Lumumba was deposed in a coup by his former aide,

Joseph Mobutu, and then assassinated by agents of the resource- rich, breakaway Congo state of Katanga, with the connivance of Belgium and the United States. From 1965 to 1997, Mobutu ruled the Congo with an iron fist. For most of those years, until the end of the Cold War, Mobutu enjoyed the support of.the United States. As you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: According to this document, what did Belgium do to retain control? What was the response of.t:he United Nations? How did this power struggle become a pa.rt of.the Cold Wa.r?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Lumumba clearly knew tha.t he wa.s enraging the United Sta.tes by giving an interview to t:he Soviet press while in Washington - especially a friendly interview. Keep in mind the following questions

as you read the selection: What words in this transcript convey a more ideological than informative message? What parts of.this inter- view show Moscow and Lumumba. trying to please each other? How might you try to determine when one of.the compliments is propa-

ganda and when it is genuine?

Question: How, in your opinion, is the U.N. Security Council deci- sion on the rapid withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo being fulfilled?

Answer: Belgium has already proved that she has no respect for Security Council decisions. The Belgian Government is continuing its aggressive actions and savage reprisals against our people. It will be recalled that as far back as July 14, the Security Council demanded in a resolution that Belgian troops should leave the Congo; it sent U.N. armed forces to our country to back up this decision. But since then not a single Belgian soldier has left the territory of the Congo. Every day the troops of the Belgian colonialists kill soldiers of our national army and massacre hundreds of Congolese civilians. These facts are not widely known in the world because the Belgian colonialists have got the press of other Western countries to write as little as possible about the doings of Belgian soldiers in the Congo.

Our government and Parliament have from the very first demanded that Belgian troops should leave the Congo. The pertinent Soviet proposal

916 . 25/Thecoldwa.randtheThirdworld

tabled in the Security Council was the only proposal fully conforming to our people's interests. We continue to demand and declare that the imme- diate withdrawal of Belgian troops is the only way of restoring law and order in the Congo. That is why we ask all democratic and peace-loving countries to support our demand. The last Belgian soldier should have left the Congo long ago. The U.N. troops, which arrived to ensure implemen- tation of the Security Council's resolution, have now been in the Congo for over a fortnight. But the situation has not changed. I must say that the Security Council's resolutions are being fulfilled anything but properly, although the Council had already passed two resolutions-on July 14 and 22-on the need to withdraw Belgian troops from the Congo. Such a small country as Belgium allows herself to behave in this way only because the Congo now lacks the weapons to throw out the Belgian colonialists.

Question: What is the situation in Katanga? What is your opinion of Katanga's so-called secession from the Congo recently announced by Mr. Tshombe?

Answer: There has never been a Katanga problem as such. The gist of the matter is that the imperialists want to lay their hands on our country's riches and to continue exploiting our people. The imperialists have always had their agents in the colonial countries. Tshombe, in par- ticular, is an agent of the Belgian imperialists. Everything he says and writes is not his own. He merely mouths the words of the Belgian colo- nialists. It is well known that Tshombe is an ex-businessman who has long since thrown in his lot with the colonial companies in the Congo. But very few people know that just recently, as a result of dishonest machinations and overdrafts, Tshombe owed Belgian companies in the Congo more than ten million Belgian francs. He was arrested and was to be tried. But in view of the situation that took shape, Tshombe was "pardoned" and released by the Belgians and since then he has been

obediently carrying out all their orders. Question: What is the Congolese people's view of the Soviet Union's

stand on the Congo's struggle to attain genuine independence and terri- torial integrity?

Answer: The Soviet Union was the only Great Power whose stand conformed to our people's will and desire. That is why the Soviet Union was the only Great Power which has all along been supporting the Con- golese people's struggle. I should like to convey the heartfelt gratitude of the entire Congolese people to the Soviet people and to Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev personally for your country's timely and great moral support to the young Republic of the Congo in its struggle against the imperialists and colonialists. I should also like to thank the Soviet Union for the assistance in food which it is extending to the Congo.

United States Su December 1960

Africa was almost ..off [h, The French and British st]

dence in Africa, especiail+

French AIgeria and the \1

United St:aces had no Aft

presence in Africa. Europi of the United States. and of NATO, the mill.tar\J al li

States in mutual defi:|se , The interests of the Frercl Africa), and the Belgians I

the interests of the Uri-[ec Almost all of Africa w a

but by 1960 "the winc! of Macmillan noted, \`ras s\`'

Brita,in and France foulc±

Belgian resistance to f.ull i

Congo was at the root of Belgian decolonization \`t

prevailing wind). This selection ;s dra`.` n

of the Congo crisis b}' the twilight of the Eisenho\`ei is called an "Analytlcail Ch

chronology consisting of € report concentrated ori :h future policy for the incon inherit the issue on /anuar

pages from the beginning pages on the development

As you read the selecc'c

What did the authors o+~:I to know? How might thes{ this selection tell you aboi

Congo Crisis became part

"Analytical Chronology" [Decemser

Library and Museum,1-3,18-:Cl.

United States Summary of Congo Crisis, December 1960

Africa was almost "off the map" of u.S. foreign policy in the 1950s. The French and British struggled against rising demands for indepen- dence in Africa, especially against the Na.tional Liberation Front in French AIgeria and the Mau Mau uprising in British Kenya, but the United States had no African colonies and little corporate economic

presence in Africa. European coloniaLl powers were, however, a.Ilies of the United States, and many, including Belgium, were members of NATO, the military alliance thatj'oined Europe and the United Scat:es in mutual defense against the Soviet Union and its satellites. The interests of the French (as in Vietnam), the British (as in South Africa.), and the Belgia.ns (as in the Belgian Congo) easily bled into

t:he interests of t:he United States. Almost all of Africa was still under colonia.I control in the 1950s,

but by 1960 "the wind of change," as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan noted, was sweeping through the African continent. Britain and France found it easier to acclimate than did Belgium. Belgian resistance to full independence for the new Republic of the Congo was at the root of.what was called "the Congo Crisis" (as if Belgian decolonization were a single storm rather than a tree in a

prevailing wind). This selection is drawn from a study of the roots and meaning

of.the Congo crisis by the government of the United Sta,tes at the twilight oft:he Eisenhower administration in 1960. The report is ca.Iled an "Analytical Chronology" (versus a "nona.nalytjca.I"

chronology consisting of a simple list of dates and events). The report concentrated on t:he events of 1960 in an ef.fort to devise future policy for the incoming Kennedy administration that would inherit the issue on ja.nua.ry 20,1961. This selection contains a few

pages from the beginning of the report, on background, and a few pages on the development of u.S. policy.

As you read the selection, keep in mind t:he following questions: What did the authors of the report think were the important things to know? How might t:hese concerns be dif.ferent today? What does this selection tell you about how U.S. policy developed and how the Congo Crisis became part of the Cold War?

"Analytical Chronology" [December 1960], National Security Files, Box 27, John F. Kennedy

Library and Museum,1-3,18-20.

917

918 H 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

THINKING HISTORICALLY

The "Background" section of t:he selection discusses, among other things, the education and motivation of various Congo leaders, both "moderate" and "radical." Keep in mind the following questions as

you read the selection: How does the author's treatment of these t:wo groups differ? What does this suggest a.bout how one becomes a moderate or a radical? ln the section on "Development of u.S. Pol- icy," how evenly does the author present the positions of Belgium and Lumumba? What signs do you see of contradictions or delusions in U.S. policy? How might have official words and conceptual catego- ries contributed to confusion or self-delusion?

I. Early Background

The Congo crisis has become so complicated that some of the early, rather simple facts about it are sometimes forgotten. Although basic information is found in a number of research documents ..., it may be helpful to recall some early US planning assumptions and basic political factors.

1. Constitutional difficulties for the Congo were freely predicted because of the tribal diversity of the country, the brevity of the life of political institutions which might have developed unifying trends, the clashing personalities of the candidates for leadership, and the differing regional interests. The constitution under which the new state obtained independence was a provisional document. The Congolese parliament was at the same time a constitutional convention which was to elab- orate a new constitution. The United States was informed, even prior to the independence of the Congo, of Mr. Tshombe's intention to pro- claim an independent Katanga. (We discouraged him and also told the Belgians that we thought this a dangerous idea that should not be supported. At the same time, we decided to maintain friendly relations with Mr. Tshombe as far as possible since support for an independent Katanga might still become desirable some time in the future.)

2. Severe economic difficulties in the Congo were predictable, and the Department in fact worked intensively on plans to help over- come those initial difficulties. The flight of capital especially during the year prior to independence, the drawing-down of reserves by the Belgians, the advance collection of taxes to meet the growing difficulties, and the enormous public debt which the Belgians proposed to saddle on the Congo, coupled with Belgium's limited ability to assist the new coun- try, clearly foreshadowed an economic crisis almost immediately upon the attainment of independence. Although Belgian investments in the Congo amounted to about $3.5 billion, public improvements had been largely financed by the floating of bonds, many of which had been sold

U

in foreign money markets. Si 23 per cent of ordinar}- Con! gap of about $180 million be and planned Congo Go\-ern independence, and had \`-or [fearing that otherwise the] ( debt, resort to the printing pr in order to meet its diffil`ultie

3. A breakdown of the ii even though great internal ! tribal and regional di\-ergen 24,000 African troops and 9- as a well-trained, non-poli[ii`{

(and we, who relied on Belgif degree of loyalty of the troo expected that some ot-[heir their property endangered. I civilians-who on the \`-hole I Belgian-officered "Force Publi

protect European lives and pri 4. Even before the crisis e

ical Patrice Lumumba \`-ould the point of view of Belgiur more likely to preser`-e frienc the House of Representa[i`-es iates obtained 36 out ot-13- obtained 12 seats .... The 8€1g icap Lumumba's government. Kasavubu. Their plan misi`arr a coalition government, Lum maneuvering Lumumba \`-as c Kasavubu more clearl`- iden[il resulted in Lumumba becomin! ident, a position that \`'as ini[Ia

5. There was no kno\`-n ( leadership. However, there \`-ei among them was Lumumba. let lais (MNC), who was kno``-n a' political campaigns, Lumumba been reports that the Commu] leaders of other countries) had I Gizenga, the leader of the Par quently also came under hedw quantity for a long time exl`e[ invited on a brief trip to Easter

Unitedstatessummaryofcongocrisis . 919

in foreign money markets. Service on that debt was expected to absorb 23 per cent of ordinary Congolese budget expenditures. We estimated a gap of about $180 million between expected internal financial resources and planned Congo Government expenditures during the first year of independence, and had worked out plans to help close that gap . . . [fearing that otherwise the] Congolese government would repudiate its debt, resort to the printing press and possibly expropriate Belgian assets in order to meet its difficulties.

3. A breakdown of the internal security system was not expected, even though great internal strains were anticipated due to political, tribal and regional divergences. The "Force Publique," consisting of 24,000 African troops and 975 Belgian officers, was correctly regarded as a well-trained, non-political organ of the executive, but the Belgians (and we, who relied on Belgian information) completely misjudged the degree of loyalty of the troops to their Belgian officers. The Belgians expected that some of their women would be molested and some of their property endangered, but they saw the danger as coming from civilians-who on the whole did not misbehave-and thought that the Belgian-officered "Force Publique" would help to unify the country and protect European lives and property.

4. Even before the crisis erupted, it had become clear that the rad- ical Patrice Lumumba would be an undesirable Prime Minister from the point of view of Belgium and that Joseph Kasavubu would be more likely to preserve friendly ties with Belgium. In the elections to the House of Representatives in May,1960, Lumumba and his affil- iates obtained 36 out of 137 seats whereas Kasavubu's Abako party obtained 12 seats .... The Belgians clearly showed they wanted to hand- icap Lumumba's government-forming mission and that they favored Kasavubu. Their plan miscarried, however. Kasavubu failed to create a coalition government, Lumumba succeeded, and as a result of this maneuvering Lumumba was even more bitter about the Belgians and Kasavubu more clearly identified with them. As part of the deals that resulted in Lumumba becoming Prime Minister, Kasavubu became Pres- ident, a position that was initially thought to be largely honorific.

5. There was no known Communist among the top Congolese leadership. However, there were a number of leftist radicals. Foremost among them was Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement National Congo- lais (MNC), who was known as a clever anti-white rabble-rouser. In his political campaigns, Lumumba had opposed Communism but there had been reports that the Communists (as well as certain radical African leaders of other countries) had helped to finance his campaigns. Antoine Gizenga, the leader of the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), who subse- quently also came under heavy Communist influence, was an unknown quantity for a long time except that it was known that he had been invited on a brief trip to Eastern Europe following the Brussels Round

920 I 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

Table Conference in December,1959. He is thus sometimes referred to as being "Moscow (or Prague-) trained" but there is no evidence that he actually was trained or that he embraced the Communist ideology and party discipline. He returned from his Eastern European trip by way of Guinea where he picked up Madame Andree Blouin, a confirmed anti-Western Marxist. Anicet Kashamura, who was Information Minis- ter in the Lumumba Government, was a radical anti-Belgian exponent of CEREA (Centre de Regroupement Africain), a pro-Marxist and had visited East Berlin and Prague during the Brussels Round Table Con- ference, and likewise became a friend of Mine. Blouin. He was also at one time eager to visit the United States. In general, the line between pro-Communism on the one hand and hyper-nationalist, anti-"colo- nialist," Marxist thinking on the other is very difficult to draw in the Congo or anywhere else in Africa. Events, including the kind of support and opposition they encountered subsequent to independence, no doubt influenced the thinking of the entire Congolese leadership.

Although there was no Communist Party in the Congo, accusa- tions of Communist sympathies or loyalties were freely used already during the election campaign in May. In Katanga province, for instance, the anti-Lumumba propaganda of Moise Tshombe's Belgian-financed CONAKAT (Confederation des Associations Katangaises) party pictured Lumumba as a puppet manipulated by Moscow. Clearly, to all the parties that realized that cooperation with Belgium and with the West in general was most desirable and indeed necessary for the Congo, Lumumba was the arch-enemy. He reciprocated the sentiment by picturing his conser- vative enemies as stooges of the Belgians. The line between moderates (such as Bomboko, Bolikango, Sendwe, Tshombe) and radicals (such as Lumumba, Gizenga and Kashamura) was thus pretty clearly drawn before the Congo emerged onto the international scene ....

VI. Development of US Policy

The Department from the beginning supported the principle of a UN operation in the Congo and believed that exclusive reliance on the UN for the rehabilitation of the Congo provided the best means of keep- ing out Soviet assistance and its inevitable subversive accompaniments. The President issued a directive that US aid should be given through the United Nations. In implementing this policy, we placed severe restraints on our own bilateral aid operations. In this respect, our policy was clear from the beginning. On the other hand, the US position with respect to Katanga and the rate of Belgian troop withdrawal was heavily influ- enced by the uncertainties of the situation, the desire to keep open the possibility of alternative policies, Lumumba's violent pronouncements, and considerations of NATO solidarity.

When Premier Tshom, informed our Consul that possible that the US might but under no, repeat no. i-i himself was informed that discuss problems with our I our inability to recognize I hostility toward himself-or

The Belgian Go\-ernrT Congo crisis in terms or- [1 Wigny told the US, British activities of the past fe\`- da

problems must be looked This means that the esseri[i< on he can only be a sourc( takeover in the Congo.- 8 tion would result in strengt] Political Affairs of the Belg ``suggested that the Vl'-estem

the central government or-t the actual authorities in i`ol six provincial governments.

Belgium did not gi`-e oi ment, but from the beginnin Belgian troops" (Brussels I( that "the United States con maintenance of unit`. ot- [h chance of fulfillment. .\[ t[ a day-to-day basis \\'ith the which should protect our pc

Belgian Minister of Stal July 19 and drew parallels expressing the hope that th Korean case." He said his F( in the UN" and said at the draw only their ``inter`-en[io stationed on the Belgian bast the dispatch of the U\- i-ori-I discussed the possibilit`' that sist of only one or two .ci\-ili£

On July 20, tfie Belgiar Merchant and asked that [h proposal setting a time lin Congo. He claimed that the ( it had not been put to a `-ote

Unitedstatessummaryofcongocrisis I 921

When Premier Tshombe of Katanga asked for US recognition, we informed our Consul that "should other states recognize Katanga it is possible that the US might reconsider its position (against recognition) but under no, repeat no, circumstances will we take the lead.'' Tshombe himself was informed that we hoped he would feel free to continue to discuss problems with our Consul on a frank and friendly basis and that our inability to recognize his government should not be interpreted as hostility toward himself or his government (Deptel 17).

The Belgian Government consistently attempted to picture the Congo crisis in terms of the Cold War. On July 16, Foreign Minister Wigny told the US, British and French ambassadors that "Lumumba's activities of the past few days . . . have now made it clear that the Congo problems must be looked at in the context of the East-West struggle. This means that the essential thing is to get rid of Lumumba. From now on he can only be a source of trouble and an instrument for a Soviet takeover in the Congo." (Brussels 200). He argued that the UN opera- tion would result in strengthening Lumumba's position. The Director of Political Affairs of the Belgian Foreign Ministry on the same occasion ``suggested that the Western countries might withdraw recognition from

the central government of the Congo and deal on a de facto basis with the actual authorities in control of the situation in the country, i.e., the six provincial governments."

Belgium did not give outright recognition to the Katanga govern- ment, but from the beginning it sought "de facto autonomy enforced by Belgian troops" (Brussels 207). Our Embassy at Brussels recommended that "the United States continue publicly to proclaim support for the maintenance of unity of the Congo as long as this objective has any chance of fulfillment. At the same time, we cannot avoid dealing on a day-to-day basis with the de facto government of Katanga province, which should protect our position for the future.''

Belgian Minister of State Camille Gutt called on the Secretary on July 19 and drew parallels between the Congo situation and Korea, expressing the hope that the US reaction "would be as firm as in the Korean case." He said his Foreign Minister hoped for "full US support in the UN" and said at the same time that Belgians intended to with- draw only their "intervention forces," i.e. that Belgian troops originally stationed on the Belgian bases in the Congo would remain. He opposed the dispatch of the UN forces to the Katanga. The Secretary and Gutt discussed the possibility that the UN "presence" in Katanga might con- sist of only one or two civilian representatives.

On July 20, the Belgian Ambassador called on Under Secretary Merchant and asked that the US oppose, if necessary by its veto, any proposal setting a time limit for the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo. He claimed that the Congo-Belgian treaty was still alive because it had not been put to a vote by the Congolese and Belgian parliaments.

I,,ll!lllllillllll!,l,F, I

922 a 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

Mr. Merchant urged the Ambassador to have at least some troop with- drawal take place before the Security Council met, but said the question of ultimate withdrawal could still be related to the ability of the UN to establish and maintain order (i.e., the position which had been so vio- lently denounced by Lumumba).

The Department was disturbed about the possibility of armed clashes between the UN troops and the Belgian troops serving Pre- mier Tshombe of Katanga, and consistently counseled caution on the part of the UN. In view of Belgian agitation over the possibility of an armed UN action against Katanga, the Department on July 27 upon recommendation of Ambassador Burden in Brussels instructed Ambas- sador Timberlake (Deptel 262) "as soon as possible after [UN Secretary General] Hammarskjold's arrivalt . . . (to) seek to see him and ascertain his plans with respect to Katanga and Belgian bases. The Department has consistently felt that the best chance of working out these problems lies in the passage of time and the absence of precipitate UN action."

The British and French Governments also made demarches to Hammarskjold, urging him to "slow down" the evacuation of Belgian troops from Katanga. Hammarskjold refused, citing the UN reso- lutions, and urged instead that the British and French put pressure on the Belgians to see the light and comply. (Our Charge d'affaires commented: "Judged by Lumumba's press statements in the US and conversations with Congolese of various political stripes here, the Belgian troop issue is the central, all-pervading issue occupying all Congolese minds. Despite the pitiful state of almost everything, they think and talk about nothing else. The whole future of the UN mission is tied up in this issue. If the UN fails or appears to drag its feet they will very probably be asked to leave and be replaced by someone who wants Belgian troops out.")

The Belgians also frequently cited NATO interest in their bases in the Congo, but these were feeble arguments. (Any public references to such arguments, however, were eagerly seized by Radio Moscow to pic- ture the Belgian action in the Congo as NATO-inspired and approved.) One factor in British and French support for the Belgian position on the bases was the argument that "for Belgium to withdraw from these bases under pressure of a UN decision would create a precedent which could jeopardize other foreign bases in Africa and elsewhere, particularly Bizerte" [French Tunisia] (Brussels 378). The Belgians and the French, and to a lesser extent the British, were concerned with maintenance of NATO solidarity on the Congo issue, and this, too, operated as an inhibiting factor in establishing a clear US position in favor of speedy implementation of the UN resolutions ....

1 Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold died September 18,1961 when his plane crashed

under suspicious circumstances on a flight from Katanga for peace talks.

Soviet Telegram September 7, 19(

Onjanuary 1,1959. C.3£ threw the government ci--1 The Cas[ro governrTier: 1 United St:aces and relie= o

efforts to depose Cas:'c - by Cuban exiles at the CL± months afterjohn F. Ke-r`, U.S. attempts at [oppi irg t from the Soviet Unior ~ 5 learned of chejr exis[erce o

be withdrawn and orcere5 confronta[jon, kno\`r 2s :+ came dangerously close :c ended with Khrushche` .... r'

States pledging not [o i-. 2< missiles from Turkey.

This document re\ea s C the Cuban receipt of the 1 document is a [elegrarr. =2 ambassador in Cuba [o =-e he informs Moscow abou: I the selection, keep ;n mir: to be happening? What con draw? What does the arr]a do? How well jnformec cJoe events in Cuba, the Uni:e= 5 President Kennedy \`'oi.Ic -a

t:his telegram?

THINKING HISTORICAL

Keep in mind the followinE c;

are the words that the So`.Te[ tion in Cuba different fro~ :` How significant were the Sc"

Telegram of Soviet Ambassador H. C= =a Affairs (MFA), September 7,196]. a: Tl-I Cold War International Histor`-PftT€``:. .org/document/111762. [Souri`.e: .\r.` -.: -I i RF), Moscow, copy courtes}' ot-\-a:i`-.-3: Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Soviet Telegram on Cuba, September 7, 1962

0njanuary 1,1959, Cuban revolutionaries under Fidel Castro over- threw the government of.U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista. The Castro government increasingly fa.ced opposition from the United Stat:es and relied on the support of the Soviet Union. U.S. efforts to depose Castro included a fa.iled CIA-sponsored invasion by Cuban exiles at the Cuban Bay of pigs, April 17-19,1961, three months afterjohn F. Kennedy came into office. Expecting further U.S. attempts at toppling the regime, the Castro government received from the Soviet Union midrange nuclear missiles. President Kennedy learned of thelr existence on October 14,1962. He demanded they be withdrawn aLnd ordered a naval blockade of cuban ports. The confrontation, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, came dangerously close to erupting into a nuclear war. The crisis ended with Khrushchev withdrawing the missiles and the United States pledging not to invade Cuba and to withdraw American missiles from Turkey.

This document reveals Cuban and Soviet a.ttitudes shortly after the Cuban receipt of the missiles but a month before the crisis. The document is a telegra.in, dated September 7,1962, from the Soviet ambassador in Cuba to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. In it he informs Moscow about recent events on the island. As you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: What seems to be happening? What conclusions does the Soviet ambassador draw? What does the ambassador want the Soviet government to do? How well informed does the ambassador seem to be about events jn Cuba, the United States, and Latin America? Do you think President Kennedy would have been less alarmed if.he had read this telegram?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection: How a.re the words that the Soviet ambassador uses to describe the situa- tion in Cuba different from the way Americans would understa.nd it? How significaLnt were the Soviet missiles for the ambassador? ls there

TelegramofSovietAmbassadortoCubaA.I.AlekseevtotheUSSRMinistryofForeign Affairs (MFA), September 7,1962, at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Vlrtual Archive: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter .org/document/111762. [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, copy courtesy of National Security Archive (NSA), Washington, DC; trans. Mark H. Doctoroff.]

923

924 I 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

a.ny evidence here that he did not realize how seriously the United States considered the threat of nuclear missiles in Cuba? Why are the charges of.aggressive activity by the United States against Cuba more believable in this document than they would be in a magazine article or a public speech?

Recently, the ruling circles of the USA have noticeably activated a policy of provocation against Cuba;1 military preparations and its politT ical isolation. Nearly every day, the air space and territorial waters of Cuba are violated by American airplanes, submarines and ships trying to establish permanent control over the territory of Cuba and diverting passenger and transport ships bound for Cuba. The landing of counter- revolutionary bands of spies and arms has been increased.

The constant acts of provocation are carried out from the territory of the USA base at Guantanamo, most often in the form of shooting at Cuban patrols. Especially noteworthy among all these provoca- tions are far reaching acts like the August 24 shelling of the hotel in which mainly live Soviet specialists, and also the lies published by the Kennedy Administration about the alleged August 30 attack, in inter- national waters, on an American airplane from two small Cuban ships. In the USA government's announcement, it is noted that in the event of a repeat of "an incident of this type," the armed forces of the United States "will take all necessary retaliatory measures." It is entirely evident that this carries a great danger for Cuba, since it gives the most reac- tionary anti-Cuban authorities in the USA an opening at any moment to organize a provocation and unleash aggressive actions against Cuba.

In regard to the above two last actions undertaken by the USA, the government of Cuba came forward with corresponding official declara- tions signed by Fidel Castro. Both of these declarations were circulated as official documents to the UN. The goal of these declarations is to attract the attention of the appropriate international organizations and all of world public opinion to the provocative and far-reaching acts of the USA, to unmask the aggressive schemes of the United States in relation to Cuba, and to ward them off. In these declarations the government of Cuba precisely makes the point that the anti-Cuban actions and schemes of the USA present a threat not only to Cuba, but to the whole world.

The series of provocations is now accompanied by a whipped up, broad anti-Cuba campaign in the USA press, striving with all its might to convince the population of the United States of the alleged presence

1 In November 1961, President Kennedy initiated Operation Mongoose, a secret plan to

stimulate a rebellion in Cuba, bring Cuban exiles into the U.S. army for training, undermine the regime, and assassinate Castro. General Edward Lansdale was put in charge of operations. The program was stepped up in the spring of 1962. The CIA also continued to support intern nal resistance to Castro and engaged the assistance of organized ci.ime figures who had inter- ests in Cuba to assassinate Castro. [Ed.]

in Cuba of large contingeni has turned into a militar`- I a grave threat to the l-S.i a pretext, the press, certain . demand of the Kenned`- £ Doctrine,2 establishment.or- into force of the Treat`- ol- I of Cuba.

Following the signing in in which the agreement or-I in strengthening its armed ment on September 4 poini tary preparations and noted to teach the Cubans ho\`- tc Soviet Union. Several l-S.i I Kennedy's statement` under ident of the USA ob\-ious]`- circles in the USA \``hich ai€ Cuba. Along with this. in ke uations of purported aggrest the American continent ant "defend" the continent.

According to certain i through its ambassadors no countries that the}' can e_\-pet basin "if Castro's go\-ernmen ably, in the near future the 1- ing threat to the Western h€ of increasing the pressure on tries and will probabl`-|`on` member-countries of- t.he O.i against Cuba. One can also powers in the USA (the Pen[, tion,5 and others) will contin to realize the most decisi`-e ac

2 The Monroe Doctrine 11 S:_; a 3

fere in affairs of the Americas u oi::c :i 3 The Inter-American Trear` a:-R€

nation of the Americas would be' Ti€``-a 4 Organization of American S:a:E`

Operation Mongoose "Task 1 -as -i.1+f: organization against the Castro-Ci_ir. memos, see http://www.globalsecLrr..c

5 "External counter-re\'olu[ior. - :a

including veterans of the Ba`- ot. Pi=s. I.`

SovietTelegramoncuba I 925

in Cuba of large contingents of Soviet troops and of the fact that Cuba has turned into a military base of "world Communism" which presents a grave threat to the USA and all Latin American countries. Under this pretext, the press, certain American senators and other public figures demand of the Kennedy administration the revival of the Monroe Doctrine,2establishmentofaseaandairblockadeofCuba,thebringing into force of the Treaty of Rio de Taneiro,3 and the military occupation of Cuba.

Following the signing in Moscow of the Soviet-Cuban communiqu6

in which the ?greement of the Soviet government to provide assistance in strengthening its armed forces is noted, Kennedy in a public state- ment on September 4 pointed to the defensive nature of Cuba's mili- tary preparations and noted that Soviet military specialists are in Cuba to teach the Cubans how to use defensive equipment presented by the Soviet Union. Several USA press agencies, commenting on that part of Kennedy's statement, underline the evidence of the fact that the pres- ident of the USA obviously preferred an attempt to calm down those circles in the USA which are supporting quick, decisive actions against Cuba. Along with this, in Kennedy's statement there are contained insin- uations of purported aggressive Cuban schemes regarding influence on the American continent and a threat to use "all necessary means" to "defend" the continent.

According to certain information, the USA State Department through its ambassadors notified the governments of Latin American countries that they can expect changes in the situation in the Caribbean basin "if Castro's government does not come to its senses." More prob- ably, in the near future the USA, using the pretext of an allegedly grow- ing threat to the Western hemisphere, will embark on a long process of increasing the pressure on governments of the Latin-American coun- tries and will probably convene a meeting of foreign ministers of the member-countries of the OAS4 to work out supplementary sanctions against Cuba. One can also assume that the most wildly aggressive powers in the USA (the Pentagon, the Cuban external counter-revolu- tion,5 and others) will continue to exert pressure on Kennedy in order to realize the most decisive actions against Cuba.

2TheMonroeDoctrine(1823)warnedEuropeannationsthatanyeffortsbythemtointer-

fereinaffairsoftheAmericaswouldbeviewedasaggressionrequiringU.S.intervention.[Ed.I 3Thelnter-AmericanTreatyofReciprocalAssistance(1947)heldthatanyattackonone

nation of the Americas would be viewed as an attack on them all. [Ed.] 4 Organization of American States. A State Department memo dated May 17,1962, lists

Operation Mongoose "Task 1 " as "obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime." For this and following U.S. security memos, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/intelulibrary/reports. [Ed.I

5"Externalcounter-revolution"refel.stoCubanexilesintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere,

including veterans of the Bay of Pigs, who were still organized to topple Castro. [Ed.I

926 I 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

The campaign of anti-Cuban hysteria has been conveyed via American propaganda to Latin American countries too. There the pub- lication of articles and transmissions of radio programs of anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet content is constantly encouraged, while the external Cuban counter-revolution and local reaction put constant pressure on the governments of those countries, conduct loud demonstrations and terrorize individuals and organizations which speak out in defense of the Cuban revolution, and by means of bribery and blackmail get a range of people who have visited Cuba to make anti-Cuban statements, and so forth.

mLi£:;:yu:traenpea°r::::'nts}6ea¥£#:tntrLenpur:Sss::tgLVpe:¥s:;1:°c:::ecrtspoufrtei¥ national-liberation movement in Latin America, and, given the appro- priate circumstances, the Cuban revolution itself. This is shown by such facts as the organization by the United States of schools for instruction in methods of street-fighting and anti-partisan struggle in many Latin American countries (in Panama, Peru, Colombia, Equador, Bolivia, and others); continuing intensive instruction of Cuban counter- revolutionaries in camps located on the territory of the USA, in Puerto Rico and in several Central American countries; many inspection trips to these bases, schools, and camps by responsible American military officials and the heads of the Cuban counter-revolution, including Miro Cardona;7 unflagging efforts of the USA aimed at strength- ening the unity of the external Cuban counter-revolution and unity in the action of counter-revolutionary organizations active in Cuba itself, etc.

At the same time, the USA is actively continuing to conduct its efforts towards the political isolation of Cuba, particularly in Latin

A:netrs[Coaf.E#eex¥%;Sdc£:acze]T,t8ra;£hn[€h°:opn:::i:egtpor:SxSpurreess°:htet:gu°pV;::: for the principle of non-interference and self-determination of peoples. This pressure is applied through economic means, and also by exploit- ing the domestic reaction. The realization of Kennedy's visit to Mexico, following which he was to have quickly visited Brazil too (this visit was put off to the last months of the year), served the goals of determining the likelihood of attracting these two countries to the anti-Cuban plans of the USA.

6 Whether President Kennedy was willing to mount another military operation is uncer-

tain, but active preparations were made to train exiles, prepare a blockade, and consider all options, including military. [Ed.]

7 lose Miro Cardona (1902-1974): briefly prime minister of Cuba in 1959; went into

exile and led anti-Castro Cubans in the United States. Was to be president if Bay of Pigs inva- sion succeeded. [Ed.]

8 Mexico and Brazil were thought particularly important propaganda targets by the

United States. [Ed.]

Until now none of the Mexico to its anti-Cuban ad

Under pressure I-ron [j countries the local author aimed at forbidding or [ig] viduals to Cuba, and also ( third countries. People ``-h( delegations in third countrit gations upon return to their for organizing broad and lt

±[i°nT:#;nngd3:r:a]rc::[err.al Referring to the dei`isio:

about the exclusion ol-Cuba measures to deny Cuba part with the inter-Ameril`an s`-s[{ an attempt to secure the -€.`` Health Organization P.IHC cation to join the so-called I another example. Ill In respctn of provocation, militar`-[hrea ernment is intensif}'ing Its er-I-o struggling with the internal world public opinion the agiEr{ its anti-American propaganda taking into account the aili`-12 and the possible increase in I bands and manifestations o:-i arrests were carried out in =h{ established over man}- regis[e ments and the places \`-here the

The Cuban leaders are f J} strengthening the de\-orion :o lomatic missions, partil`ularl`- taking every opportuni[`-. as u--€ Latin American Free riadc .\s

9 U.S. State Department Ill.err.i` . T_=I

coming youth festival in Helsir,ki ..` I.=-I the festival away from the Comr`_I `:> i:

ganda emanating from this supfi=t= - E=. 10 Memo from Lansdale or. lit-i:`_

Iomatic efforts are being made ro `L.-, +` C Economic Community. Similarl\. =r-:I_i=> i

Latin American Free Trade area..- E=.

SovietTelegra.moncuba - 927

Until now none of the attempts of the USA to attract Brazil and Mexico to its anti-Cuban adventures has had any success.

Under pressure from the USA, in a majority of Latin American countries the local authorities are applying the harshest measures aimed at forbidding or tightly limiting visits of any groups or indi- viduals to Cuba, and also their contacts with Cuban delegations in third countries. People who visit Cuba or make contact with Cuban delegations in third countries are subject to arrest, repression, investi- gations upon return to their homeland. The USA does not lack means for organizing broad and loud provocations against Cuban delega-

:i|onT:nt39klanngdp,:r::fc;:ternationalquorums,astookplacerecentlyln Referring to the decision taken at the meeting at Punta-del-Este

about the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS, the USA is undertaking all measures to deny Cuba participation in any organizations connected with the inter-American system. In particular, they recently undertook an attempt to secure the exclusion of Cuba from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). The unlawful denial of Cuba's appli- cation to join the so-called Latin American Free Trade Association is another example.10 In response to the American policy towards Cuba of provocation, military threats, and political isolation, the Cuban gov- ernment is intensifying its efforts on strengthening its own armed forces, struggling with the internal counter-revolution, unmasking before world public opinion the aggressive designs of the USA, and broadening its anti-American propaganda in Latin America. At the end of August, taking into account the activization of provocative actions by the USA and the possible increase in the unleashing of counter-revolutionary bands and manifestations of domestic counter-revolution, preventive arrests were carried out in the country and strengthened control was established over many registered [known] counter-revolutionary ele- ments and the places where they gather.

The Cuban leaders are paying serious attention to the question of strengthening the devotion to the revolution of the cadres of its dip- lomatic missions, particularly in Latin American countries; they are taking every opportunity, as was the case with their presentation at the Latin American Free Trade Association, to widen the sphere of their

9 U.S. State Department memo, June 27,1962: "it is important to work with the forth-

coming youth festival in Helsinki (where there will be 2,000 Latin American students) to take the festival away from the Communists and ensure a good amount of anti-Communist propa-

ganda emanating from this support." [Ed.] 10 Memo from Lansdale on Operation Mongoose, July 5,1962: "State reports that dip-

lomatic efforts are being made to block Cuba's application for accreditation to the European Economic Community. Similarly, efforts are being made to exclude Cuba from the proposed Latin American Free Tra.de area." [Ed.]

928 H 25/Thecoldwa.randtheThirdworld

activity in Latin America; they are strengthening their connections with the Latin American peoples by inviting to Cuba society delegations and individual Latin American officials; in timely fashion and aggressively, they speak at international organizations, unmasking the aggressive schemes and actions of the USA; they are striving to take part in any international forums at which there is a possibility to expose the aggres- sive character of American imperialism; they are strengthening Cuba's ties with African and Asian countries, etc.

The Cuban leadership believes, however, that the main guaran- tee of the development of the Cuban Revolution under conditions of possible direct American aggression is the readiness of the Soviet gov- ernment to provide military assistance to Cuba and simultaneously to warn the USA of that fact. From this position, the joint Soviet-Cuban communiqu6 about [Ernesto "Che"] Guevara's visit to Moscow was greeted by the Cuban leaders and the vast majority of the Cuban people with great enthusiasm and gratitude. The Cuban leadership and Fidel Castro himself suggest that these warnings will help to pre- vail against those forces in the USA that are warning of the outbreak now of a world conflict, and are staving off a direct American attack on Cuba in the near future.

In our opinion, in the near future the ruling circles of the USA will continue to expand the attacks on Cuba by all the above-mentioned means: provocations, the propaganda campaign, military preparations, and actions of the domestic counter-revolution, political isolation, and so forth. Their success in drawing the Latin American countries into their aggressive actions will most depend on the positions of the govern- ments of Mexico and Brazil.

We also suggest that the question of direct American actions against Cuba will be decided by the correlation of forces in American ruling circles which have differing approaches to questions of war and peace in the present period, and the struggle between them on these issues.

The mood of the overwhelming majority of the Cuban people is defiant, and regardless of the reality of the threat of intervention, no panic or fear before the threat which is hanging over Cuba is observed in the masses of the people. The American provocations make possi- ble an ever-tighter unity of the Cuban workers and raise the political consciousness of the masses.

Regarding the provocations, the influence of the Soviet Union in Cuba has grown as never before, and our cooperation with the Cuban leaders has been strengthened even more.

In the interest of future productive work with our Cuban friends it would be desirable to receive from you for dispatch to the Cuban leaders information which we have about the plans of the USA govern- ment toward Cuba.

Telephone Trans{ and Afghan Prim The Soviet war ;n Afgl har s:i tributed to the djssoli,[ic-c American war jn Vie[nar. ,. client who lacked \`'IdesD'e2

the first of those steps. The a leader of the commjr s: ~ t:he Afghan presi.denc` as a ' His ambitious progra'T o--ra religious leaders. After c-\ €

ment, he was seeking a,= J=o' document. It is a transcr:: c the Soviet premier AlelE <cs Mohammed Taraki or \'a+ Soviets sent troops in:c i--i+

premier from 1964 [o 19Si=' lt was common in I+e Cc

the big powers, like Tarak . a! recognized that such co"=5oi read the selection, keep -Ti the dif.ferent powers cLia= <cs tion? How are their dlf+-ere-:€

THINKING H I STO R I CA L L

Notice that Kosygi.n uses = =e. Afghan people. Keep lr ~ -= I selections: What are these = = How did Soviet ;deolog. ' -=€

KoS¥GIN Ask comrade Tafakj Afghanistan.

TARAKI The situation is bad an Kos¥GIN Do you ha\-e sufpeir

petty bourgoisie, and the `` still anyone on }.our side;

TARAKI There is no acti`-e suf| almost wholly under [he mrli heathens, but follow us. The

"Transcript of telephone con`-ersar] t:r :t'=^ =

Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki- .\1=:.`= I Project Bulletin 8-9 (:W.Inter 19961+ .-.. i

Telephone Transcript: Soviet Premier and Afghan Prime Minister, 1979

The Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), which eventually con- tributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself; began, like the American war in Vietnam, with seemingly small steps on behalf of a client who lacked widespread support. This document reveals one of. the first of those steps. The Soviet client was Nur Mohammed Taraki, a leader of the communist movement in Afghanistan who came to the Afighan presidency as a result of.a milita.ry coup in April 1978.

His ambitious program of radical social reform alienated tribal and religious leaders. After only a year of an Afghan communist experi- ment, he was seeking aid from Moscow-an effort captured in this document. It is a transcript of a telephone conversation between the Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin and the Afghan prime minister Nur Mohammed TaLraki on March 18,1979, about six months before the Soviets sent troops into Afghanista.n. Alexei Kosygin served as Soviet

premier from 1964 to 1980. It was common in the Cold War period to speak of.clients of.

the big powers, like Tara.ki, as "puppets," but historians have since recognized that such collaborators had considerable power. As you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: What a.re the dif.ferent powers that Kosygin and Taraki exert in this conversa- tion? How are their dif.ferences expressed and resolved?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Notice that Kosygin uses different words than Taraki to describe the Afghan people. Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selections: What are these differences, and how do you explain them? How did Soviet ideology hinder Soviet policy?

Kos¥GIN Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

TARAKI The situation is bad and getting worse. Kos¥GIN Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, the

petty bourgoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?

TARAKI There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans-follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by this.

"Transcript of telephone conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime

Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki" (March 18, 1979) from Co/d Wczr J7zfer7!4£¢.o724/ H¢.story Pro/.ec£ 8%/Je}j.77 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997): 145-146. Available at www.CWIHP.org. 500.

929

930 E 25/Thecoldwa.randtheThirdworld

Kos¥GIN Are there many workers there? TARAKI Very few-between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all. Kos¥GIN What are the prospects? TARAKI We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will

develop an offensive. Kos¥GIN Do you not have the forces to rout them? TARAKI I wish it were the case. Kos¥GIN What, then, are your proposals on this issue? TARAKI We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance,

involving people and arms. KoS¥GIN It is a very complex matter. TARAKI Iran and Pakistan are working against us, accordingly to the

same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the revolution.

Kos¥GIN The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

TARAKI I ask that you extend assistance. Kos¥GIN We must hold consultations on this issue. Do you not have

connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

TARAKI Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kushka and from the direction of Kabul. In our view, no one will be any the wiser. They will think these are Govern- ment troops.

Kos¥GIN I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's interven- tion in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly airlift tanks, the neces- sary ammunition and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

TARAKI I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

Kos¥GIN Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

TARAKI Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

Kos¥GIN Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

TARAKI The core can onli students, and a fe\`- u: very small, but it is a lt measures, if necessari-.

Kos¥GIN We have deciae

property to you and to free. We have also deci and to raise gas pril`es I

TARAKI That is ver}-good. Union send Uzbeks. Ta one will recognize [he] drive tanks, because \`-€ Let them don At-ghan i`( will recognize them. 1[ I Pakistan's experience is do this work, the}- ha`-e

KoS¥GIN You are, of. cour5

political and jn[ernatio hold consultations again

TARAKI Send us infantr}-ri{ KoS¥GIN Do you hal.e an`- TARAKI We will find dri`-e.I. KoS¥GIN Are they reliable?

their vehicles? After all. t TARAKI Send vehicles toge[I

Tajiks and Uzbeks. Kos¥GIN I expected this i

and are waging a commt stand on ceremon\- ``-ith ( to this.

I REFLECTIONS

The Cold War used to be -an taking speed and with sul`h p there might be lessons \Te net lapsed in 1991, like the Berlii heap of rubble. Commissars I Russia, Leningrad turned bai- with hammer and sickle \``as i of red, white, and blue. Shop| lines disappeared; shell.es ot-I fully stocked.

Reflections H 931

ly

TARAKI The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students, and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

Kos¥GIN We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. W€ have also decided to deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from $21 per cubic meter to $37.

TARAKI That is very good, but let us talk ofHerat. Why can't the soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is anything to go by, it is clear that it is easy to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

Kos¥GIN You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but, irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you.

TARAKI Send us infantry fighting vehicles by air. Kos¥GIN Do you have anyone to drive them? TARAKI We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles. Kos¥GIN Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with

their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the language. TARAKI Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language-

Tajiks and Uzbeks. Kos¥GIN I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades

and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

I REFLECTIONS

The Cold War used to be "ancient history." It ended at such breath- taking speed and with such pronounced results that few imagined there might be lessons we needed to learn. The Soviet Union col- lapsed in 1991,like the Berlin Wall in 1989, into an irretrievable heap of rubble. Commissars became capitalists, the USSR awoke as Russia, Leningrad turned back into St. Petersburg, and the red flag with hammer and sickle was exchanged for a French-like tricouleur of red, white, and blue. Shoppers replaced placeholders as waiting lines disappeared; shelves of pricey foreign delicacies appeared fully stocked.

932 . 25/ThecoldwarandtheThirdworld

Whole countries cracked off along the periphery of what had been a great empire. Baltic city-states breathed their own air and minted their own money. Newly independent Central Asian coun- tries built mosques and elected new dictators. These non-Soviet "stans" sent Russians back to Russia, from which they emigrated

by the millions from Moscow to Miami or Tel Aviv. Some of those who stayed turned nationalized industries into personal possessions. Others lost their jobs, their savings, their homes, and half their life expectancies. New classes emerged-the ``Russian mafia" from the KGB, the plutocrats from the bureaucrats-except they were often the same people in better clothes.

So too the view from America. Reagan's ``Evil Empire" of 1983 became a partner in peace. In 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev received the Nobel Prize for ending the Cold War. Tc.77Ge magazine named Gorbachev "Man of the Year." Ex-president Nixon-the same Nixon who had made a career of anticommunism, coming into national prominence in a "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev in 1959-said Gorbachev should have been ``Man of the Decade." Times had changed.

But the New World Order of nuclear disarmament, shrunken military budgets, and global cooperation that Gorbachev and Reagan envisioned never quite arrived. A CIA director became president of the United States, shortly followed by his son, and a KGB secret police- man from the old USSR became president of the new Russia. George W. Bush, Jr., said he looked into the eyes of Vladimir Putin, the KGB man, and saw his soul. Putin saw a partner. That was in June 2001. In the following years, the United States became more militarized and chose to show it could fight two major wars (in Iraq and Afghanistan) at the same time, while Putin, as president and prime minister, closed down the budding democracy of Russia faster than one could say Ivan the Terrible. In 2016, another American President thought he found a soulmate in Vladimir Putin, but their marriage of convenience did not reduce the size of either's armies.

From the vantage point of 2019, ghosts of the Cold War have reemerged. Despite, or perhaps because of, the rise of a common enemy of terrorist organizations, a more militarized Russia and Western Europe face off along newly charged precarious borders.

26

New Democr

The World,1977 t`

I HISTORICAL CON

One of the most striking d€`- fifty years has been the rei`er] increasing consensus that dei 1945, democracy \`'as limi[e{ ruled colonial empires hke d( an end to those colonial emp states of Asia and Afril`a did became independent in 19J-. world's largest demacrali-.- b regimes established single-pal

In some ways the Cold V and the Soviet Union deman( "client states." For the So`-]c.I

puppet Communist parties iri the desired loyalty of friendl` munism at home and abroad. than democrats who \`-ere ore communists and socialists im superpowers extinguished t`ui cratic parties. At least t.or the regimes in Eastern Europe. Le were rewarded with finani-ial to continue old feuds` soi=ie] I remained loyal to their pa[ror

As the Cold War came to and indebted former enemie.s I South Africa, or Argentina. all