Week 5 Discussion: Biological and Evolutionary and Integrative Personality Theories

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Reference: Epstein, S. (2012). Cognitive-experiential self-theory: An integrative theory of

personality. (In H. Tennen & J. Suls, Eds.). Handbook of Psychology, 2nd ed., Vol.5. Personality

Section. Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory: An Integrative Theory of Personality

Seymour Epstein, Professor Emeritus

Psychology Department, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Key words: CEST, cognitive-experiential self-theory, integrative personality theory, adaptive

unconscious, dual-process theory

Author’s Note

This chapter includes material from several of my articles published elsewhere including

in the first edition of the Handbook of Psychology. The research reported here was supported by

a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Research Grant MH 01293 and NIMH Research

Scientist Award 5 KO5 MH 00363.

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Abstract

Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is a global theory of personality that substitutes

an adaptive unconscious for the Freudian maladaptive unconscious. The unconscious of CEST is

an associative, automatic learning system, mediated by affect, that humans share with other

higher order animals that have adapted successfully with it over millions of years of evolution.

The system is referred to as an “experiential system” because it adapts by empirically learning

from experience. Humans also uniquely process information with a “rational system,” which is

verbal reasoning system. The 2 systems operate by different rules and attributes. They operate in

parallel and are bi-directionally interactive, both simultaneously and sequentially. Although the

systems usually operate in harmony and often synergistically, they also may conflict with each

other and otherwise interfere with each other’s performance.

The influence of the experiential on the rational system can account for the irrationality of

humans particularly when attempting to solve interrelationship problems, both interpersonal and

inter-societal. According to CEST, despite their remarkable intelligence people often do poorly

in solving relationship problems, which fall primarily in the domain of the experiential system,

as their experiential processing biases their rational processing.

This chapter demonstrates that CEST has theoretical and research implications for

elucidating a wide range of psychological issues, including the nature of intuition, the existence

of a global factor of experiential intelligence, psychological sources of physical and emotional

wellbeing, psycho-biography, and the meaning of dreams.

Word count: 235

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Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is a global theory of personality that integrates

significant aspects of self/phenomenological theory, learning theory, cognitive theory

psychoanalytic theory, and emotions theory. It includes important aspects of

self/phenomenological theory by assuming that everyone automatically constructs an implicit

theory of reality in the course of living because such an implicit theory is rewarding as it is

necessary for effective adaptation. An implicit theory of reality includes sub-theories about the

self, others, the inanimate world, and beliefs regarding their interactions. People’s implicit

theories of reality automatically and effortlessly direct people’s everyday behavior and also

influence their interpretation of events, feelings, and conscious thinking. Thus, people’s implicit

theories of reality determine in large measure their performance and the quality of their lives.

Learning theory plays a critical role in CEST because of the assumption that the implicit

beliefs in people’s theories of reality are acquired by automatically learning from experience

according to the principles and attributes of associative learning. The experiential system in

humans is assumed to be the same system with which non-human animals have successfully

adapted to their environments over millions of years of evolution. The automatic learning of this

system because of its adaptive significance can be assumed to be intrinsically highly compelling,

as life itself has depended on it. It follows that people’s deliberative conscious reasoning cannot

easily over-ride the influence of experiential processing. Learning theory is extended in CEST by

regarding the attributes of associative learning as important as its operating principles in

determining its manner of its operation. The attributes refer to the following kinds of

characteristics of associative learning: it operates in a manner that is automatic, effortless, rapid,

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primarily non-verbal, holistic, concrete, minimally demanding of cognitive resources, and it

normally operates outside of awareness. The operating rules of associative learning include

association, contiguity, reinforcement, extinction, and spontaneous recovery..

Although the operating rules and attributes of associative learning evolved because of

their adaptive significance once having evolved, the same principles and attributes can be used

for other purposes than learning from experience by a process referred to in evolutionary theory

as preadaptation. This assumption greatly expands the explanatory power of experiential

processing, as it makes it possible for its rules and attributes to account for responses to entirely

new information as in implicit learning, unconscious pattern identification, and intuitive

responses to situations never before experienced.

Important aspects of cognitive theory are assimilated in CEST by the assumption that

people learn cognitions in the form of internal representations of events, schemas, or implicit

beliefs that are the building blocks of people’s implicit theories of reality. The learning of such

schemas is considered much more important for personal theories of reality than the learning of

behavioral/motor responses. In agreement with cognitive theory and in contrast to Freudian

theory, most information processing is assumed to occur outside of awareness, not because of

repression as Freud believed, but because it is a more efficient, less effortful way of processing

information in everyday life than by conscious reasoning. CEST is also similar to cognitive

science in its views on how schemas, or implicit beliefs, are encoded, stored and retrieved. CEST

differs from cognitive theory by its much greater emphasis on the importance of emotions,

psychodynamics, self/phenomenological concepts, and learning theory.

Important aspects of psychoanalytic theory are incorporated into CEST by the importance

attributed to unconscious processing, psychodynamics, and transference reactions, which are

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viewed more generally in CEST in terms of generalization. CEST differs from psychoanalytic

theory by its view of unconscious processing, by its de-emphasis on psychosexual stages, and by

its assumption that unconscious rather than conscious processing is primarily (not exclusively)

the default condition in everyday life. A particularly important difference between the two

theories is that CEST replaces the Freudian maladaptive unconscious, which is indefensible from

an evolutionary perspective, with an adaptive unconscious that is consistent with evolutionary

principles.

Affect and emotion occupy are is considered to be significant aspect of almost all, if not

all, associative networks in the experiential system. According to CEST they are particularly

important because of their critical role in reinforcement and motivation and therefore of the

acquisition of the implicit beliefs and networks in the experiential system. They are also

important as they provide a royal road to the identification of the schemas in people’s implicit

theories of reality

In the remainder of this chapter, I review the basic assumptions of CEST and summarize

the research my associates and I have conducted to test and extend its assumptions. I further

consider the implications of CEST for elucidating a few topics of particular interest, such as the

nature of intuition, an evaluation of the accuracy and value of the concept of, emotional

intelligence and the relation of the operation of the experiential system to physical disease,

psycho-biography, and the meaning of dreams.

The Existence of Two Information Processing Systems

According to CEST, people process information with two information-processing

systems, rational and experiential. The two systems are assumed to operate in parallel and to

interact bi-directionally simultaneously and sequentially. CEST has nothing new to say about the

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rational system, other than to emphasize the degree to which it is influenced outside of awareness

by experiential processing. CEST does have a great deal to say about the experiential system. In

effect, CEST introduces a new system of unconscious processing in its proposal of an

experiential adaptive system that is scientifically defensible in ways in which the Freudian

unconscious system is not.

Before proceeding further, a caveat is in order about the term “rational” as referred to in

the rational system of CEST. Unfortunately the word “rational” has two meanings. One meaning

is “reasonable,” whereas the other refers to a logical process of reasoning. According to CEST a

logical manner of reasoning can only occur in the rational system as it is dependent on the use of

grammatical language. Experiential processing can never be rational as the term is used in CEST,

but it can be reasonable and therefore rational according to the alternative meaning of rational.

As previously noted, according to CEST everyone automatically constructs an implicit

personal theory of reality that includes sub-theories concerning the self, others, and the inanimate

world, as well as beliefs about their interactions. Personal theories of reality consist of a

hierarchical organization of schemas, or implicit beliefs, that are organized into cognitive-

affective networks. Toward the apex of the organization are highly general implicit beliefs, such

as that the self is worthy, people are generally trustworthy, and the world is mainly orderly and

benevolent. Because of their high level of generality these beliefs and networks of beliefs have

widespread connections with other schemas and cognitive-affective networks. As a result, they

are normally highly stable and not easily invalidated. However, should they be invalidated, it

would tend to destabilize the overall conceptual system. Evidence that such destabilization

actually occurs is provided by the profound disorganization following unassimilable experiences

in acute schizophrenic reactions (e.g., Bleuler, 1978; Bowers, 1974; Epstein, 1979a; Kaplan,

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1964; Perry, 1974). At the opposite end of the hierarchy are narrow, situation-specific schemas.

The narrower schemas are readily susceptible to change, and their changes have little effect on

the overall stability of the organization of the conceptual system. Thus, the hierarchic structure of

implicit personal theories of reality allows the theory to be stable in the vicinity of its apex and

flexible at the more specific levels. It is important to recognize, in this respect, that the

experiential system is an organized, adaptive system, rather than a collection of unrelated

implicit cognitions and networks, like tools in a cognitive tool box as some have proposed (e.g.,

Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As it is assumed in CEST that the experiential system in humans is

essentially the same system with which nonhuman animals adapt to their environments, it

follows that nonhuman animals also have an organized model of the world that is subject to

disorganization. Support for this assumption is provided by the widespread dysfunctional

behavior exhibited in animals exposed to emotionally significant unassimilable stimuli (e.g.,

Pavlov, 1941).

Unlike nonhuman animals, humans in addition to having an implicit experiential system

also have an explicit rational system. The degree to which people’s implicit and explicit theories

of reality are discrepant is considered in CEST to be an important source of stress and

psychopathology.

The Operating Principles of the Two Systems

The experiential system adapts to reality by empirically learning from experience in a

manner that is automatic, preconscious, rapid, effortless, holistic, concrete, associative, primarily

nonverbal, and minimally demanding of cognitive resources. It encodes information in two ways:

as memories of specific events, particularly those that were emotionally arousing, and in an

abstract, more general way. The abstract representations are in the form of generalizations,

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prototypes, and as complex other representations that often include a significant, subordinate

rational component as in metaphors, narratives, and scripts.

The implicit beliefs in a personal theory of reality are assumed always to be associated

with affect, which may vary from negligible to intense. As previously noted, affect is extremely

important in CEST as it plays critical important roles in reinforcement in learning, in affect-

driven motivation, and in providing a royal road to identifying the beliefs in people’s implicit

theories of reality. It follows that CEST is as much an emotional as a cognitive theory, as without

affect there would be no associative learning and therefore no experiential system. The primary

motive of the experiential system is to operate according to the hedonic principle. It is

noteworthy that although emotions and affect are often sources of irrational behavior in humans

because of the biasing influence of experiential on rational processing, affect also serves a

critically important function in the development of an implicit model of reality. Thus, by

pursuing positive affect and avoiding negative affect organisms, including humans, automatically

empirically construct an adaptive working theory of reality.

In contrast to the experiential system, the rational system is an inferential reasoning

system that operates according to an individual’s understanding of the rules of reasoning

including the importance and evaluation of evidence. The rational system operates in a manner

that is conscious, primarily verbal, analytic, effortful, relatively slow, affect-free, and demanding

of cognitive resources. Unlike the experiential system, the rational system has a very brief

evolutionary history. The primary motive of the rational system is to operate according to the

reality principle, the desire to be realistic and logical. A comparison of the operation of the two

systems is provided in Table 1.

Which system is superior? At first thought, it might seem that it must be the rational

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system. After all, with its ability to solve problems with the use of grammatical language the

rational system is a recent very high level of evolutionary development that is unique to the

human species. It is capable of much higher levels of abstract thinking and complexity than the

experiential system, and it makes possible planning, long-term delay of gratification, cross-

situational, conceptually determined generalizations, high levels of stimulus and response

discrimination, comprehension of cause-and-effect relations, and communication over great

distances and across generations. These attributes of the rational system have made it possible

for the remarkable accomplishments of humans in science, technology, mathematics, medicine,

and the arts.

The experiential system has important virtues, some never before recognized, which will

be discussed shortly. For now, it will suffice to note that it’s most important ability is one that no

animal, including humans, could live without, namely the ability to effortlessly, rapidly, and

efficiently direct everyday behavior.

The widespread belief in the superiority of the rational-analytical is supported by research

that examines people’s ability to solve normative problems. However, increasing evidence is

emerging that the experiential system is superior to the rational system in several other ways

(e.g., Norris & Epstein, in press; Wilson, 2002) and even in some kinds of complex information-

processing (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Reber, 1993). Research my associates and I have conducted

has identified several important previously unrecognized ways in which the experiential system

is superior to the rational system. For example, in a study by Norris and Epstein (in press) it was

found that the experiential system is more strongly associated than the rational system with

creativity, empathy, favorable interpersonal relationships, intuition, sense of humor, and

aesthetic judgment. A more detailed comparison of the virtues and limitations of the two systems

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will be presented in the section on research.

Returning to the question of which system is superior, the only reasonable conclusion is

that neither system is generally superior as each has equally important advantages and

limitations. It is therefore encouraging to realize that since the two systems are independent,

improvement in one does not have to be obtained at the expense of improvement in the other. It

is therefore to people’s advantage to cultivate the desirable attributes of both systems. Moreover,

even if people wished to suppress the operation of the experiential system in order to become

more rational, it would no more be possible to accomplish this than to stop breathing because the

air is polluted. Rather than attempting in vain to suppress its influence, the only way to

effectively to control the experiential system it is to identify, understand, and influence its

operation, particularly with regard to its biasing influence on rational processing (Epstein,

1998a).

How the Experiential System Operates

As previously noted, the operation of the experiential system is intimately associated with

affect in the form of “vibes” as well as emotions. Vibes refer to vague feelings that are

experienced only dimly, if at all, in a person’s consciousness. Stating that vibes often operate

outside of awareness is not meant to imply that people cannot become aware of them, but only

that people usually make no attempt to do so. Examples of negative vibes are unarticulated

feelings of agitation, irritation, tension, disquietude, and apprehension. Examples of positive

vibes are unarticulated feelings of wellbeing, affection, gratification, positive anticipation,

calmness, and light-heartedness.

When a person responds to an emotionally arousing event, the sequence of reactions is

assumed normally to occur as follows: The experiential system automatically and

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instantaneously searches its memory banks for related events. If the memories are pleasant, the

person has thoughts, images, and impulses that promote behaving in ways anticipated to

reproduce the feelings. If the memories are unpleasant, the person has thoughts, images, and

impulses to behave in ways anticipated to avoid experiencing the feelings. As this sequence of

events occurs automatically, people are usually unaware of its operation. Seeking consciously to

understand their behavior, people under the influence of the hedonic principle of the experiential

system construct the most favorable explanation they can think of within acceptable reality limits

in their rational system. In other words they rationalize, meaning according to CEST that they

attribute primarily experientially determined behavior to a rational cause. According to CEST,

such rationalization is a routine process that occurs far more often than is recognized and helps to

maintain the undetected influence of experiential on rational processing. It should be noted that

the experiential system in the above explanation biases the operation of the rational system

outside of awareness at two points in time, once at the beginning of the response sequence and

again at the end of the sequence. Such influence of experiential on rational processing is

considered particularly important in CEST because it helps to explain why despite their

remarkable intelligence people often think irrationally in ways that are destructive to others and

even to themselves.

Basic Needs

Most major theories of personality propose a single basic need. CEST achieves an

integration of their positions by regarding four proposed basic needs as equally basic according

to criteria shortly to be noted.

Identification of Basic Needs. In classical Freudian theory, the one most basic need

before the introduction of a death instinct was the pleasure principle, which refers to the pursuit

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of pleasure and the avoidance of and pain (Freud, 1924/1960). Some learning theorists such as

Thorndike (1927) make a similar assumption in their view of the importance of affective

reinforcement. For object-relations theorists, most notably Bowlby (1988), the most fundamental

need is the need for relatedness. For Rogers (1951) and other phenomenological psychologists,

it is the need to maintain the stability and coherence of a person’s conceptual system. For

Allport (1961) and Kohut (1971), it is the need to enhance self-esteem. (For a more thorough

discussion of these proposals see Epstein, 1993a, 1998b.) From the perspective of CEST, the

four proposed basic needs all meet the following criteria for a basic need: the need is universal;

the need can dominate the other basic needs; and a failure to fulfill the need can destabilize the

overall conceptual system.

Recently the view in CEST regarding basic needs was modified as follows. Two super-

ordinate basic needs were added, the need to behave according to the hedonic principle, i.e., the

pursuit of positive affect and the avoidance of negative affect and the need to maintain cortical

excitationwithin homeostatic limits (Epstein, in pressa). The previous basic needs were

accordingly reclassified as subordinate basic needs. The reason why the two super-ordinate basic

needs were added is that both are important aspects of all the sub-ordinate basic needs. Thus, all

the sub-ordinate basic needs are assumed to vary along two dimensions, a bipolar dimension of

positive versus negative affect and a unipolar dimension of degree of cortical excitation. It

follows from this assumption that each sub-ordinate basic need is associated with some kind of

positive and negative affect. For example, the pleasure and pain associated with the sensory

pleasure principle are qualitatively different from the pride and displeasure experienced in

increases and decreases in self-esteem. That is, although all basic needs involve experiencing

positive and negative affect, the kind of positive and negative affect is different for different

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needs.

Interactions among basic needs. Given two super-ordinate basic needs and four sub-

ordinate basic needs that operate simultaneously, it follows that behavior is determined by the

degree of activation of all of the needs in a particular situation. An important adaptive

consequence of the result of such behavior is that the needs normally serve as checks and

balances against each other. Thus, if a basic need is fulfilled at the expense of fulfilling other

basic needs, the fulfillment of the other basic needs becomes increasingly insistent. However,

under certain circumstances the motivation to fulfill a particular need may be so great that

frustration of the other needs is disregarded. Such a condition is assumed to be a source of

different kinds of pathology, shortly to be discussed.

The finding that normal people characteristically have unrealistic self-enhancing and

optimistic biases (Taylor & Brown, 1988) has evoked considerable interest because it appears to

contradict the widely held assumption that reality awareness is an important criterion of mental

health. From the perspective of CEST, rather than indicating that reality awareness is a false

criterion of mental health, all it indicates is that it is not the only relevant criterion. According to

CEST, a compromise commonly occurs between the fulfillment of different needs. Unrealistic

self-enhancement can be understood as a compromise between the need for self-enhancement (in

the experiential system) and the need to be realistic (in the rational system). The result is a

modest self-enhancing bias that is not seriously unrealistic. It suggests that normal individuals

tend to give themselves the benefit of the doubt in situations in which the cost of a modest degree

of inaccuracy is outweighed by the gain in positive feelings about the self.

There are important individual differences in how people fulfill a specific basic need in

relation to fulfilling their other basic needs. Poorly adjusted people tend to fulfill their basic

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needs in a conflicted manner, whereas well-adjusted people tend to do so in a harmonious

manner by fulfilling each of their basic needs in a manner that is compatible with, and where

possible, even synergistic with fulfilling their other basic needs. For example a well-adjusted

person is likely to fulfill the need for relatedness in a manner that enhances the person’s self-

esteem whereas a poorly adjusted person may fulfill the need for relatedness by ingratiating

himself with others and feeling diminished after having done so.

Imbalances in the fulfillment of basic needs as sources of psychopathology. As

previously noted, specific imbalances among the basic needs are associated with particular

mental disorders. For present purposes, it will suffice to present a few such examples. Paranoia

with delusions of grandeur can be understood as an extreme compensatory response to a threat to

self-esteem. The cost of doing so is a failure to fulfill other basic needs. Thus, being incarcerated

in a mental institution for a delusion of grandeur results in a failure to fulfill the need for a

favorable sensory pleasure-pain balance, as such incarceration does not provide for a happy

existence. Fulfilling the need for self-esteem with a delusion of grandeur also sacrifices the need

to maintain favorable relationships with others, who are not likely to appreciate being treated as

inferiors, and who are repelled by unrealistic views and inappropriate behavior. The need to

maintain a coherent, realistic conceptual system is obviously sacrificed because a delusion of

grandeur is unrealistic.

Paranoia with delusions of persecution can be understood as a desperate attempt to defend

the stability of a person’s conceptual system and, to a lesser extent, to enhance self-esteem.

Attributing problems in living to persecution by others can provide a desperately needed increase

in the stability of a conceptual system that is threatened with disorganization. Another source of

stability is provided by the mobilization of efforts to defend or retaliate against perceived

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persecutors. In other words, such focus and mobilization against threat provide a unifying state

of cognitive organization that serves as a defense against disorganization. Delusions of

persecution contribute to self-esteem as well as to stability as the perception of persecutors as

powerful or important people implies that the targets of their persecution must also be somewhat

important or the persecutors would not bother with them. The basic need for the fulfillment of

the sensory pleasure principle is sacrificed as a delusion of persecution is a terrifying experience.

Fulfillment of the need for relationships is sacrificed as others are perceived as threatening and

are repelled by the paranoid individual’s unrealistic beliefs.

Schizophrenic disorganization is understood in CEST as the best bargain in need-

fulfillment available to a schizophrenic person in a particular situation at a particular time. Given

the threat of disorganization and the intense anxiety it produces, it can be a relief for a

schizophrenic individual to succumb to total disorganization and with it a loss of the conceptual

system that has been the source of great anxiety and misery (Jefferson, 1974). Thus, what is

gained is a net improvement in the super-ordinate pleasure-pain balance from a negative to a

zero value and an improvement in the fulfillment of the super-ordinate for maintaining cortical

excitation by reducing it to a more acceptable level. What is sacrificed are all the subordinate

basic needs, namely the need to maintain the stability and coherence of the conceptual system, to

achieve a positive sensory pleasure/pain balance, to maintain relatedness, and to maintain self-

esteem.

It is hypothesized that disorganization of a conceptual system developed in the course of

evolution, as it provided for the possible correction of a conceptual system that has failed to

fulfill basic needs, and the possible reconstruction of a more effective belief system (Epstein,

1979a; Laing, 1965; Perry, 1974; Silverman, 1970). Menninger observed, “Some patients have a

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mental illness and then get well and then get weller! I mean they get better than they ever were

… This is an extraordinary and little realized truth” (in Silverman, 1970, p.63). Lara Jefferson

(1974), who recovered from a prolonged state of a complete disintegration of her conceptual

system stated the following: “Remember that when a soul sets out on that unmarked sea called

Madness, they have gained release much greater than your loss – and more important. Though

the need which brought it cannot well be known by those who have not felt it. For what the sane

call “ruin” – because they do not know – those who have experienced what I am speaking of,

know the wild hysteria of Madness means salvation” (p. 199).

Basic Beliefs

The four subordinate basic needs are sources of four corresponding basic beliefs. These

basic beliefs along with the four basic needs are considered among the most important constructs

in an implicit theory of reality. Because of their dominant and central position and their

corresponding influence on an extensive network of lower order beliefs, should any of the

subordinate basic beliefs be invalidated, the entire conceptual system would be subject to

destabilization and the person would experience intense anxiety. The disorganization, should it

occur for psychological reasons, as previously noted, would correspond to an acute

schizophrenic reaction.

According to CEST people acquire implicit basic beliefs based on their experiences

regarding the fulfillment and frustration of their basic needs. When a basic need is fulfilled it is

accompanied by positive affect and when its fulfillment is frustrated it is accompanied by

negative affect. Because of the superordinate hedonic principle, people automatically attend to

whatever is associated with the fulfillment and frustration of their basic needs. As a result, they

develop basic beliefs corresponding to each of the basic needs. Let us examine this in greater

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detail.

Depending on a person’s reinforcement history, the person will tend to develop super-

ordinate basic beliefs about the self, others and the inanimate world as being sources of positive

and negative feelings and therefore of being sources of favorable or unfavorable beliefs. Thus, if

a person had predominantly favorable experiences concerning the self, others, and the inanimate

world, the person will tend to represent the experiences in terms of implicit basic beliefs

reflecting these experiences. This will occur at both the superordinate and subordinate levels of

belief. For example, at the super-ordinate level of belief a person may have very general implicit

beliefs about the self, others and the inanimate world located along a dimension varying from

highly favorable to highly unfavorable beliefs. The basic implicit belief about the overall

favorability of a person’s experiences will be reflected in a person’s general optimism or

pessimism. The process just described for the acquisition of super-ordinate favorable or

unfavorable beliefs can be extended to all other basic beliefs. Given space constraints, it is not

possible here to describe the development of each of the basic belief dimensions from the

fulfillment of their corresponding basic needs. The interested reader can find such information

in a book on CEST (Epstein, in pressa).

Interactions between the Experiential and Rational Systems

As previously noted, according to CEST the experiential and rational systems operate in

parallel and are interactive. The interactions occur bi-directionally, both simultaneously and

sequentially.

The influence of the experiential system on the rational system. As the experiential

system is the more rapidly reacting system it is in a favorable position for influencing the

subsequent processing of the rational system. Such a relation is particularly important because,

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as previously noted, it can help to explain why humans, despite their unique intelligence, in

many circumstances, particularly in those that involve human relationships, think and behave

irrationally.

The influence of the experiential system on the rational system can also be positive, such

as by providing associations that can contribute to creativity that would not otherwise be

available to the linear-processing rational system. Since the experiential system is an empirical

learning system, it can also be a source of useful empirically derived information that can be

incorporated into the rational system. In addition, the experiential system can provide a source of

infused passion for the rational system that the rational system otherwise lacks. The result is that

intellectual pursuits can be passionately pursued. Experiential processing can also contribute to

rational processing by having a synergistic effect when the two systems operate in a harmonious

manner. Thus problem-solving can be facilitated by using procedures that harmoniously engage

both systems, such as by the use of metaphors, narratives, and the use of concrete examples of

abstract principles (e.g., Epstein, Denes-Raj, & Pacini, 1995).

The Influence of the Rational System on the Experiential System. As the slower

reacting system, the rational system is in an advantageous position for correcting the experiential

system. It is common for people to reflect on their immediate thoughts and impulses, suppress

those they consider inappropriate, and substitute more constructive thoughts and impulses. For

example, in a flash of anger an employee may have the thought that he would like to tell off his

boss, but, on further reflection, he decides it would be most unwise to do so. To investigate this

process, we conducted an experiment in which people listed their first three thoughts in response

to a variety of provocative vignettes (reported in Epstein, 1993; Epstein & Morling, 1995;

Epstein & Pacini, 1999). The first thought was often an inappropriate, emotional response

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consistent with the operation of the experiential system whereas the third thought was usually

more reasonable and in the mode of the rational system.

The rational system can also influence the experiential system by identifying and

understanding its operation and deciding whether to express or suppress its promptings.

Understanding of the principles and attributes of experiential processing can also be used by the

rational system to train the experiential system, so that its prompting are more constructive

(Epstein, 1998a).

The rational system may influence the experiential system in unintentional ways. As the

experiential system is an associative system, conscious thoughts in the rational system can

trigger associations and emotions in the experiential system that influence behavior. For

example, a student attempting to solve a mathematics word-problem that requires calculating the

arrival times at a destination of two speeding automobiles travelling from different starting

points is reminded of a near fatal car crash he experienced when driving too fast. The memory

produces emotional reactions that interfere with his performance. We have here an interesting

cycle of the rational system influencing the experiential system, which then influences the

performance of the rational system.

Another unintentional way in which the rational system influences the experiential

system is through the effect of repeatedly responding in a way that was initially controlled by the

rational system. As the result of continued replication, the behavior becomes increasingly

automated, or “experientialized.” An obvious advantage to this shift in control is that it allows

the behavior to be conducted with minimal cognitive effort. A disadvantage is that it makes the

behavior difficult to change. Although this is desirable for constructive thoughts and behaviors, it

can be problematic when the thoughts and behavior are counter-productive, or if circumstances

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change so that what was once adaptive is now maladaptive. Under such circumstances, the

person has developed a bad habit that is difficult to break.

The Lower and Higher Reaches of the Experiential System

The experiential system, often with various degrees of contribution by the rational system,

operates over a wide range of complexity.

Conditioning. Classical conditioning is an example of the operation of the experiential

system at its simplest level. In classical conditioning, a neutral stimulus, such as a tone, precedes

an unconditioned stimulus (the UCS), such as food. Over several trials, a relation is established

between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli so that the animal salivates on hearing the

tone in anticipation of receiving the food. Thus, the neutral stimulus becomes a conditioned

stimulus (CS) that elicits a conditioned response (CR), which in this case is salivation. With a

failure to provide reinforcement, the CR gradually extinguishes, but spontaneously recovers after

a while. This process illustrates the operation of several attributes of experiential processing,

including forming associative connections between stimuli, outcomes, and responses; the role of

affective reinforcement; the increasing strength of the associations as a function of the number

of reinforced trials; the occurrence of the extinction of the associations as a function of

number of unreinforced trials; and the occurrence of the spontaneous recovery. It is noteworthy

that the CS is responded to holistically, which is an attribute attribute of the experiential system,

as the animal reacts not only to the CS and the UCS but to the overall laboratory situation.

Through such classical conditioning animals, including humans, automatically obtain

information about relations between stimuli with each other and with outcomes that are

important building blocks in the construction of a model of the environment including its

effectson them (Hollis, 1997; Rescorla, 1988).

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

21

Through operant conditioning animals learn about the relation between their responses to

stimuli and the outcomes that follow , which expands their model of reality as it now includes the

consequences of their behavior. Through observational learning organisms learn vicariously

about relations among stimuli, responses, and outcomes. All these associations allow animals to

construct a working model of their environments, its influence on them, and their influence on it

that has allowed higher order organisms to adapt successfully to their environments by

automatically learning from experiences over millions of years of evolution. Note that the

essence of such adaptation is that it is based on automatic, empirical learning from experience

and not on reasoning. The point I wish to emphasize is that building a working model of the

environment and its effect on the organism and the organism’s effect on it by empirically

automatically learning from experience is no inconsequential feat and should not be dismissed as

simply a crude form of adaptation that is inferior to adaptation by reasoning.

Heuristics. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) defined heuristics as cognitive short-cuts

that people use when making decisions. They and other cognitive psychologists consider

heuristic responses to be adequate for making decisions in situations where a high level of

accuracy is unnecessary, but that it is can be a source of serious irrational decisions in situations

in which greater accuracy is required. For example, people typically report that protagonists in

situations described in vignettes would become more upset following arbitrary outcomes

preceded by acts of commission than by acts of omission, by near than by far misses, by free

than by constrained behavior, and by unusual than by usual acts. As they respond in all these

situations as if the protagonist’s behavior is responsible for arbitrary outcomes, their thinking is

clearly irrational. If people thought that way when investigating in the stock market they would

lose a lot of money, and as Tversky and Kahnmen and others indicate, this is what actually

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

22

happens because people do think that way. They do tend to sell when prices go down and buy

when prices go up.

Psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Nisbett and Ross (1980), and others

regarded heuristics as “cognitive tools” that are employed within a single conceptual system that

includes deliberative processing. This is very different from the view in CEST, according to

which there are two kinds of heuristics, one that corresponds to cognitive shortcuts and the other

to the use of an entirely different system of information processing which operates by different

rules and has different attributes. Of particular interest, the outcome of such processing unlike

the other kind of processing is often preferred to the outcome of deliberative processing even

when the latter is available without requiring additional effort or resources (e.g., Denes-Raj &

Epstein, 1994), and it is even sometimes superior to deliberative reasoning (e.g. Dijksterhuis,

2004; Norris & Epstein, in press; Reber, 1993; Wilson, 2002.

In conclusion, the assumption that all heuristic processing can be attributed to the use of

cognitive short-cuts is an overgeneralization that has resulted in a failure to recognize an

alternative mode of information processing in the experiential system that operates automatically

and effortlessly and is inherently highly compelling and sometimes more effective than rational

processing. It is noteworthy that Kahneman (2003) has more recently acknowledged the

limitations of his previous view of heuristics and now endorses a dual-process explanation of

heuristics that is very similar to the position of CEST.

Experiential processing in more complex decision-making. The experiential system is

able to generalize, discriminate, integrate, and direct behavior in more complex ways than by

classical and operant conditioning and heuristics. It often does so with a subordinate contribution

by the rational system, as in its use of prototypes, metaphors, symbols, and narratives.

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

23

Representations in the experiential system are also associated and generalized through their

relations with emotions. It is perhaps through processes such as these that the experiential

system is able to make its contributions to empathy, creativity, the establishment of rewarding

interpersonal relationships, the appreciation of art, and a sense of humor (Norris & Epstein, in

press).

Can the experiential system reason? Is it is possible for non-human animals to reason

without the use of language? If so, it can be assumed that the experiential system in humans can

also do so. The answer to the question is that it can be done with the use of imagery. All that is

necessary is for an animal to imagine alternative solutions to a problem and to select the image

associated with the most favorable affect. This, of course, is solving a problem by trial and error.

However, as the trial and error occurs in imagination it qualifies as reasoning if reasoning is

defined as solving problems by mental operations.

Psychodynamics and maladaptive needs and beliefs

Psychodynamics, as used in CEST, refers to the interaction of implicit and explicit

motives, defenses and beliefs and their influence on conscious thinking and behavior. The

influence of experiential processing on conscious thinking and on behavior is assumed in CEST

to be mediated by feelings, including vibes and emotions. A major source, but not the only one,

of maladaptive behavior, is the implicit beliefs acquired in childhood when individuals are most

dependent on others and have limited cognitive resources.

The implicit beliefs in people’s implicit theories of reality consist primarily of

generalizations from emotionally significant experiences. These affect-laden implicit beliefs, or

schemas, indicate how people tend automatically to view themselves, others, and the impersonal

world. Particularly important sources of such beliefs are emotionally significant early

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

24

experiences with parents, siblings, peers, and authority figures. These schemas exist at varying

levels of generality. Implicit beliefs at a more general level are about what the self and other

people in general are like, for example is the self love-worth and competent or the opposite and

are other people helpful and trustworthy or the opposite. At a more specific level are views about

categories of people, such as authority figures, parental figures, siblings, and peers. At a yet more

specific level are beliefs about how categories of people behave in categories of situations. Such

implicit beliefs at all levels influence how people relate to others, particularly to those who

provide cues that are reminders of their important generalization figures.

An important question is why people maintain maladaptive negative beliefs that are

sources of distress. Why are such beliefs not simply abandoned because of the ubiquitous

influence of the hedonic principle? There are three reasons why people maintain beliefs that are a

source of distress. First, people’s biased perceptions and interpretations are usually consistent

with and therefore support their maladaptive beliefs. For example, an offer by someone to be

helpful may be interpreted as condescending or as an attempt to gain trust that can be used to

exploit others, and an expression of affection can be viewed as manipulative. Second, people

often engage in self-verifying behavior, such as by provoking responses in others that confirm

their view that other people are unfriendly, aggressive, or rejecting. For example, a person who

fears rejection in intimate relationships may behave with aggression or withdrawal whenever

threatened by intimacy. This provokes the other person to react with counter-aggression or

withdrawal, which is interpreted as evidence that the other person is rejecting. Third, people

often fail to recognize the influence of their implicit beliefs and the behavior it promotes, which

prevents them from identifying and correcting their biased interpretations and self-verifying

behavior. As a result, they attribute the consequences of their maladaptive behavior to the

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

25

behavior of others.

Returning to the presumed ubiquitous influence of the hedonic principle in maladaptive

behavior, the question remains as to whether people’s behavior that is a source of distress is

consistent with or violates the operation of the hedonic principle. It will be recalled that one of

the four subordinate basic needs is the need to maintain the stability of people’s conceptual

systems and that the hedonic principle, as a super-ordinate motive, is involved in all behavior

and the fulfillment of all needs. Thus, fulfilling any basic need is a source of positive affect and a

failure to fulfill any basic need is a source of negative affect. It follows that behaving in a way

that fulfills the need to maintain the stability and coherence of people’s belief systems is a source

of positive affect and behaving in ways that conflict with fulfilling this the need is a source of

negative affect. Thus maintaining behaviors that are maladaptive and produce distress is

consistent with the hedonic principle in a very fundamental way, namely the affective

consequences of maintaining or failing to maintain the stability and coherence of one’s belief

system, which can over-ride the negative affective consequences of people’s maladaptive

behavior. In other words, it is assumed that people automatically tend to behave in a manner that

will produce the best affective bargain possible under the circumstances as perceived by the

person, which may result in an unhappy state, but is at least a less unhappy one than that

produced by the perceived available alternatives.

Psychoanalysts have emphasized the importance of transference relationships in

psychotherapy. They often encourage the development of maladaptive transference relations in

psychotherapy with the aim of interpreting to their patients a presumed tendency to establish

similar maladaptive relationships with others. Although this procedure is well-intended and may

often be effective, it is fraught with danger, as patients may become overly dependent on their

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

26

therapists. Moreover, an emphasis on maladaptive transference relationships may cause the

analyst to overlook other important reasons for people’s maladaptive behavior than the influence

of early relationships with their parents as the source of the difficulties. Moreover, working

through a transference relationship, even when successful, may not be the most efficient way of

treating inappropriate generalizations about relationships. Nevertheless, it illustrates how

generalizations from early childhood experiences are often reproduced in later relationships,

including those with therapists, and how correcting such maladaptive generalizations can be

therapeutic.

Although there are obvious similarities between the concepts of transference in

psychoanalysis and of generalization in CEST, there are also important differences.

Generalization is a much broader concept, which, unlike transference, is not restricted to the

formative influence of relationships with parents. Rather, it refers to the generalization of all

significant relationships, including relationships with siblings, other children, teachers, and

authority figures.

Schemas derived from childhood experiences are emphasized in CEST because later

experiences are assimilated into extant cognitive-affective networks. Also schemas derived from

early childhood experiences are likely to be poorly articulated and therefore exert an unconscious

influence on maladaptive behavior that, in the absence of identification may be overlooked in

certain therapeutic approaches, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, or may be considered

untreatable by such an approach.

Important as early relationships are, a caveat is in order regarding an over-emphasis on

such relationships at the cost of recognizing other important sources of maladaptive behavior.

Psychoanalytically oriented therapists often search for maladaptive parenting as the sole or major

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

27

source of their clients’ difficulties. They therefore may convince their patients that their

problems are the result of destructive childhood relationships with their parents, which may then

operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such an expectancy about maladaptive parenting patients

may then selectively recall or even imaginative incidents that falsely confirm their expectancy.

This may result in an apparent improvement in the patient because of the general effectiveness of

scapegoating in raising self-esteem. That is, the self-esteem of patients is elevated by their

construction of a narrative in which the origin of their problems lies in their parents’ behavior

and not at all in their own behavior or in completely other sources. Unfortunately, I have

observed such a development all too often in acquaintances whom I know well and with whom I

have discussed their psychotherapeutic experiences. In some cases, I believe the therapist

completely missed the mark by emphasizing poor parenting and failing therefore to recognize

that the origin of the patient’s maladaptive behavior was initiated by circumstances in which, as a

child, the patient was fortuitously rewarded for having an important maladaptive belief by

circumstances that had nothing to with the child’s parents. For example, maladaptive beliefs and

behavior can be rewarded by providing a short term advantage despite a long term disadvantage.

That is, the person has been seduced by the short-term time perspective of the experiential

system into making a pact with the devil, who later claims his long-term price. As the results of

such observations I believe that Freud’s view that all neurosis is the result of repression and

maladaptive relationships with parents has been far more influential than is warranted and has

resulted in the neglect by many psychoanalytically oriented therapists of other important sources

of their patients’ difficulties in living. Such behavior contributes to my belief that there is

nothing more destructive than a strong, wrong hypothesis. It has been the source of lost battles,

wars, and empires, and, not surprisingly, is no less unforgiving in psychotherapy.

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Support for CEST in an Extensive Research Program

Three kinds of research are reviewed, research on the operating principles of the

experiential system, research on the interactions within and between the two processing systems,

and research on individual differences, including individual differences in the “intelligence,” or

efficacy, of the experiential system, in the degree to which people engage in processing in the

two systems, and in the sources of individual differences concerning basic beliefs..

Research on the Operating Principles of the Experiential System

My associates and I have conducted an extensive research program for testing the

operating principles and attributes of the experiential system. One approach consisted of

adapting procedures used by Tversky and Kahneman and other cognitive and social-cognitive

psychologists to study heuristic information processing through the use of specially constructed

vignettes.

As previously noted, in most of the research on heuristic processing there is a failure to

distinguish between two different kinds of heuristic processing. Thus, some researchers interpret

all their results on heuristics as indicative of cognitive shortcuts within a single system that

includes deliberative processing, whereas others attribute all their results on heuristics to a

different system of information processing. This latter approach has been criticized by noting

that the results claimed to report a different kind of information processing from deliberative

processing could just as well be attributed to cognitive shortcuts in a single processing system

(Kruglansky, Thompson, & Spiegel, 1999). The only way to establish a different system of

processing is to demonstrate that it operates by different principles, has different attributes from

analytical processing, and may conflict with the latter.

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

29

Irrational reactions to unfortunate arbitrary outcomes. People in everyday life often

react to arbitrary outcomes as if they or others are responsible for the outcomes. Thus, they

reward the proverbial bearer of good tidings and punish the conveyer of unwelcome news. Such

rrational reactions are readily explained by the attributes of the experiential system.

We investigated people’s reactions to arbitrary unfavorable outcomes by adding some

questions to the usual one concerning the protagonists’ reactions to the situations in the

vignettes. We asked the participants to indicate in addition to how most people would behave,

how the participant would behave in real life, and how a completely logical person would

behave (e.g., Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992). To investigate the effect of degree of

emotional consequences of the outcomes, one group was given a version of the vignette with a

very unfortunate outcome and another group was given a version with a less unfavorable

outcome. As an example, one of the vignettes described a situation in which two people dawdled

at home for ten minutes before driving to the airport. Both missed their flights because of

unanticipated heavy traffic and both arrived at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled

departure of their flights. One learned that the flight left on time, and the other learned that the

flight was delayed and left only a few minutes ago. Who felt more foolish about having dawdled

at home? Participants were asked to respond from three perspectives, how most people would

react in the situation, how they themselves would react, and how a completely logical person

would react. Tversky and Kahneman (1982) reported that their participants indicated that the

protagonist who barely missed the flight would be more upset than the other protagonist. We

replicated this finding, and we also found that most participants reported that a logical person

would feel much less foolish about having dawdled than the participant or others would feel.

The significance of the consequences of missing the flight also influenced the protagonists’

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

30

responses. When the outcomes were very unfortunate the respondents were said to feel more

foolish for having dawdled than when the outcomes were less unfortunate. The results support

the following hypotheses based on CEST:

• People are aware of two different modes of thinking, one that determines how people

normally behave, which corresponds to the operation of the experiential system, and the

other that determines how people would behave if they were logical, which corresponds

to the operation of the rational system.

• The more people are emotionally involved in an outcome the more they tend to think and

behave in the mode of the experiential system.

• People regard themselves as similar to others in processing information primarily in the

experiential mode, but they consider themselves more than others like a completely

logical person, indicating that they explicitly (not necessarily implicitly) value rational

over experiential processing.

• The experiential system can co-opt the rational system as indicated by a substantial

minority of participants rating heuristic responses as the way a completely logical person

would respond . Such co-option of the rational system by the experiential system is

considered in CEST to be an important source of the prevalence of human irrationality

despite the capacity of humans for extraordinary levels of rational thinking.

The ratio-bias phenomenon. The ratio-bias (RB) experimental paradigm is of

particular interest for dual-process theories as it pits experiential against rational processing

in a situation in which the two modes of processing are equally accessible and in which both

require equally negligible cognitive effort.

Imagine you are told that on every trial in which you blindly draw a red jellybean from a

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

31

bowl containing red and white jellybeans you will receive two dollars. You are given a

choice of drawing from either of two bowls, both of which offer a 10% probability of

obtaining a red jellybean. One bowl contains 1 red and 9 white jellybeans and the other

contains 10 red and 90 white jellybeans. When people are asked which bowl they would

draw from and how much they would be willing to pay to draw from the bowl of their

choice, almost all say they would have no preference and would not pay a cent for a choice

between two equal probabilities. Yet, an interesting thing happens when they are placed in a

real situation in which they can win a significant amount of money over trials. Most then

willingly part with small sums of money from an amount given to them to keep at the

beginning of the experiment for the privilege of drawing from the bowl of their choice, which

is almost always from the bowl that contains more red jellybeans (Kirkpatrick & Epstein,

1992). The preference for the bowl with more red jelly-beans despite it having no probability

advantage has been labeled the ratio-bias (RB) phenomenon

Even more impressive than the irrational behavior of paying for the privilege of

choosing between bowls that offer the same probabilities are the results that are obtained

when the bowl with the larger number of red jellybeans offers a lower probability of

obtaining one. In one study, a probability-advantaged bowl always contained 1 in 10 red

jellybeans, and a frequency-advantaged bowl contained 5-9 red jellybeans out of 100

jellybeans, depending on the trial (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Most participants preferred

to draw from the slightly frequency-advantaged bowl despite it being probability-

disadvantaged. Some participants volunteered that although they knew such behavior was

irrational, they had a feeling that they had a better chance of getting a red jellybean when

there were more of them. Although a substantial minority consistently made optimal choices,

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

32

some acknowledged that they had to overcome a temptation to pick from the bowl with more

red jellybeans.

In a study in which equal probabilities were presented in the two bowls, one bowl

always containing 100 jellybeans and the other always containing10 jellybeans, with the

probabilities of drawing a red jellybean varied randomly over trials (e.g.10%, 30%, 50%,

70%, 90%), a strong RB effect in the 10% condition became increasingly weaker as the

probability of drawing a increased until the RB effect was no longer significant at the 70%

probability condition and even exhibited a slight non-significant reverse RB effect in the

90% probability condition (Pacini & Epstein, 1999a). The results were explained by the

combined influence of two different effects, a small-numbers effect, according to which

small numbers are better comprehended by the experiential system than large numbers, and a

frequency effect according to which the comprehension of frequencies is greater than that of

ratios or probabilities, as frequencies are more concrete and within the comprehension of

three-year old children and nonhuman animals (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992). The combined

influence of these two effects can explain the results as their influence operates in the same

direction in the 10% condition and in the opposite direction in the 90% condition. In the 10%

condition, 10 in 100 red jelly beans is preferred over 1 in 10 red jelly beans because it is

frequency advantaged. It is also preferred because 1 in 10 red jelly beans is a more

compelling losing condition than 10 in 100 red jellybeans because of the small numbers

effect. In the 90% probability condition the frequency effect favors the bowl with 90 out of

100 red jellybeans but the small numbers effect favors the bowl with 9 out of 10 red

jellybeans as it is a more compelling winning condition.

The overall conclusions from the many studies we conducted on the RB phenomenon

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33

(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Denes-Raj, Epstein, & Cole, 1995; Epstein et al., 1996; Epstein

& Pacini, 1999; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Pacini & Epstein, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Pacini,

Muir, & Epstein, 1998; Yanko & Epstein, 2000) can be summarized as follows:

• The RB effect in low probability conditions can be attributed to the frequency effect and

the small-numbers effect operating in the same direction. Both of these effects are

consistent with the concrete attribute of experiential processing (e.g., Pacini & Epstein,

1999).

• An absence of the RB effect under high probability conditions can be attributed to the

frequency effect and the small-numbers effect operating in opposite directions. Both

effects are consistent with the concrete operation of the experiential system (Pacini &

Epstein, 1999).

• The two systems can respond together in the following ways: Either system can be

dominant depending on the situation and the person. Thus, most participants prefer non-

optimal, slightly frequency-advantaged responses but a substantial number consistently

makes optimal, probability-advantaged responses. The two processing systems usually

produce compromises as indicated by the most common response being a frequency-

advantaged response that is only slightly probability disadvantaged. For example, most

participants preferred a 9%.frequency-advantaged response over a 10% probability-

advantaged response but only a few preferred a 5% frequency-advantaged response over

a 10% probability-advantaged response (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994)..

• The two systems sometimes conflict with each other as indicated by some participants

reporting a conflict between frequency-advantaged and probability-advantaged choices.

• The experiential system is more responsive than the rational system to real situations and

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

34

to vividly imagined situations, whereas the rational system is more responsive to abstract,

verbal presentations (Epstein & Pacini, 2000-2001).

• With increasing maturation from childhood to adulthood, the balance of influence

between the two systems shifts increasingly in the direction of rational dominance

(Yanko & Epstein, 2000).

• Priming the rational system in young children before they have formal knowledge of

ratios by asking them to give the reasons for their responses interferes with their intuitive

understanding of ratios. This indicates that processing in the rational system can interfere

with processing in the experiential system (Yanko & Epstein, 2000; see also Wilson,

2002).

• An increase in incentive produces an increase in optimal, rational responses in some

participants and an increase in experiential, non-optimal responses in an approximately equal

number of participants (Pacini & Epstein, 1999b).

• Research with sub-clinically depressed participants verified the depressive-realism

phenomenon (Alloy & Abramson, 1988), which refers to depressed individuals being more

realistic than others as indicated by their making more optimal responses than their non-

depressed counterparts. However, we found this only occurred in conditions in which the

consequences were minimal. When the consequences were increased, the depressed

participants responded more non-optimally and the non-depressed participants responded

more optimally, which cancelled out the depressive-realism effect. The phenomenon of

depressive realism was explained as a compensatory reaction by the depressed participants

for their awareness of their more general tendency to respond irrationally. They are

presumably unable to maintain this compensatory control in more consequential, emotionally

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

35

engaging situations (Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998).

The global-evaluation heuristic. The global-evaluation heuristic refers to evaluating

people holistically as either good or bad people, rather than restricting evaluations more

accurately to specific behaviors. As the global-evaluation heuristic is consistent with the

assumption that holistic evaluation is a fundamental attribute of the experiential system (see

Table 1) it follows that global evaluations tend to be automatic, compelling, and not easily

overcome. This heuristic is particularly important because of its prevalence in causing

serious problems, as in stereotyping and in the influence of the appearance of a defendant on

jurors’ decisions.

My associates and I investigated the global-evaluation heuristic (reported in

Epstein, 1994) by having participants respond to a vignette adapted from a study by Miller

and Gunasegaram (1990). According to the vignette, a rich benefactor tells three friends that

if each throws a coin that comes up heads, he will give each $100. The first two throw a

heads, but Smith, the third, throws a tails. When asked to rate how each of the protagonists

feels, most participants report that Smith feels guilty and the others are angry at him. In an

alternative version of the vignette in which we reduced the stakes to a more modest sum, the

ratings of guilt and anger were reduced. When asked if the other two would be willing, as

they previously had intended, to invite Smith to join them on a gambling vacation in Las

Vegas, where they would share wins and losses, most participants said that now they would

not invite him, “because he is a loser.” These responses were made both from the perspective

of how the participants reported they themselves would react in real life and how they

reported most people would behave. When responding from the perspective of how a

completely logical person would behave, most said a logical person would recognize that the

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

36

outcome of the coin tosses was completely arbitrary, and they therefore would not resent

Smith and they would invite him to join them in their gambling venture.

This study indicates that people are aware of two systems of information-processing

that operate in a manner consistent with the operating principles and attributes of the

experiential and rational systems of CEST. It also supports the hypotheses that experiential

processing becomes increasingly dominant with an increase in emotional engagement and

that people over-generalize broadly and associatively by judging others on the basis of

outcomes over which the person has no control, despite knowing better in their rational

system.

Conjunction problems. The Linda conjunction problem is probably the most researched

vignette in the history of psychology. It has evoked a great deal of interest because of its

paradoxical results. Although the solution to the Linda problem requires the application of one of

the simplest and most fundamental rules of probability theory, almost everyone, including many

sophisticated about statistics, makes a conjunction error (CE) when responding to it. Linda is

described as a 31 year-old woman who is single, outspoken, and very bright. In college she was a

philosophy major who participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations and was concerned about

social justice. We asked participants to rank-order the following alternatives: Linda is a feminist,

Linda is a bank teller, and Linda is a feminist and a bank teller. Most ranked Linda as being a

feminist and a bank teller ahead of Linda just being a bank teller. In doing so, they made what

Tversky & Kahneman (1982) labeled a “conjunction fallacy,” and that we refer to as a CE. It is

an error or fallacy because, according to the conjunction rule, the occurrence of two events

cannot be more likely than the occurrence of one of them.

The usual explanation of the high rate of CEs elicited by the Linda problem is that people

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

37

either do not know the conjunction rule or they do not think of it in the context of the Linda

vignette. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1982), they make CEs because they respond by

the representativeness heuristic, according to which being both a bank teller and a feminist is

more representative of Linda’s personality than being just a bank teller.

In a series of studies on conjunction problems, including several on the Linda problem

(Donovan & Epstein, 1997; Epstein, Denes-Raj, & Pacini, 1995; Epstein, Donovan, & Denes-

Raj, 1999), we demonstrated that the major reason for the difficulty of the Linda problem is that

it provides a concrete representation of a problem in an unnatural manner. As a result, people

tend not to view the Linda problem as a probability problem, no matter what they are told about

how they view it, including as a probability problem.

Following is a summary of the conclusions we arrived at about the Linda problem based

on all the studies we conducted:

• The difficulty of the Linda problem cannot be fully accounted for by the misleading

manner in which it is presented as a personality problem, for even with full disclosure

about the nature of the problem and the request to treat it as a probability problem most

participants make CEs. However when responding to a conceptually equivalent problem

presented in a concrete, natural manner, as in a problem concerning winning one or two

lotteries or bets on horse races, almost no one makes a CE. (Epstein, Denes-Raj, &

Pacini, 1995). This is particularly interesting from the perspective of CEST because it

indicates that the experiential system (which intuitively knows the conjunction rule) is

sometimes smarter than the rational system (which may be unable to articulate the rule).

• Making a CE to the Linda problem is so compelling that when presented with the correct

conjunction rule (i.e., “two events are less like to occur than just one of them”) among

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

38

several incorrect rules simultaneously with the Linda problem, thereby circumventing the

problem of whether people think of the conjunction rule, most selected a wrong rule that

was consistent with making a CE. In other words, they made the rule correspond to their

response to the Linda problem, rather than making their response to the Linda problem

correspond to the correct rule and then using it to respond correctly to the Linda problem.

This result demonstrates the highly compelling nature of experiential processing and its

ability to co-opt rational processing.

• The difficulty of the Linda problem can be explained by the operating rules and attributes of

the experiential system, which is the mode employed by most people when responding to it.

Thus, the Linda problem demonstrates that people tend to process information associatively,

concretely, holistically and in a narrative manner, rather than abstractly and analytically

when responding to the Linda problem. For example, a few participants justified their CEs

by stating that Linda is more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist than just a feminist

because she has to make a living.

• The essence of the difficulty of the Linda problem is that it involves an unnatural, concrete

representation of a conjunction problem, where an unnatural presentation of a problem is

defined as a presentation in a different context from how such problems are normally

presented. Concrete representations facilitate performance in natural presentations, in which

case the two processing systems operate harmoniously, whereas they conflict with each other

when problems are presented in a concrete form and in an unnatural context.

• Processing in the experiential mode is intrinsically highly compelling and can over-ride

processing in the rational mode even when the latter does not require more effort or

resources. Thus, many participants, despite knowing and thinking of the conjunction rule,

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

39

simply find an experiential response more compelling than a rational response.

• Priming intuitive knowledge in the experiential system can facilitate the solution of problems

in the rational system that people are otherwise unable to solve.

Interactions

In this section I discuss research on two kinds of interaction, interactions between the two

systems and interactions among basic needs.

Interactions between the two processing systems. An important assumption in CEST is

that the two systems are simultaneously and sequentially interactive. Simultaneous interaction

was demonstrated in the compromises between the two systems in the RB studies. Sequential

interaction was demonstrated in studies on conjunction problems in which presenting concrete,

natural problems first facilitated solutions to subsequently presented conceptually similar

abstract problems, which illustrates how experiential processing can prime the effective

operation of rational processing.

There is also considerable evidence that priming the experiential system subliminally can

influence subsequent responses in the rational system (see review in Bargh, 1989). Other

research indicates that the form, independent of the content, of processing in the rational system

can be influenced by priming the experiential system. Thus, when processing in the manner of

experiential mode is followed by attempts to respond rationally, the operation of the rational

mode can be compromised (Chaiken & Maheswaren, 1994; Denes-Raj, Epstein, & Cole, 1995;

Epstein et al., 1992).

Sequential interactions occur not only in the direction of the experiential system

influencing the rational system but also in the opposite direction. A common example is

suppression of the expression of unacceptable thoughts and impulses.

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

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Interactions among basic needs. A basic assumption in CEST is that behavior often

represents a compromise among basic needs. This process is considered to be particularly

important, as it provides checks and balances against the excessive investment in the fulfillment

of a particular need. It occurs because fulfilling any need at the expense of fulfilling other needs

increases the strength of the other frustrated needs. To test this assumption about compromises

among needs, we examined the combined influence of the needs for self-enhancement and self-

verification. Swann and his associates previously demonstrated that the needs for enhancement

and verification tend to operate sequentially, with the former preceding the latter (e.g., Swann,

1990; Hixon & Swann, 1993). We wished to demonstrate that the interaction also occurs

simultaneously in the form of compromises between them. Our procedure consisted of varying

the favorableness of evaluative feedback and observing whether participants had a preference for

feedback that either matched or was more favorable than their self-assessments (Epstein &

Morling, 1995; Morling & Epstein, 1997). In support of hypothesis, participants preferred

feedback that was only slightly more favorable than their self-assessments, consistent with a

compromise between fulfilling the needs for verification and self-enhancement.

Individual Differences in Experiential and Rational Information Processing

In this section I discuss several measures of individual differences and the research that

was conducted with them. Included are measures of individual differences in the intelligence of

the experiential system, individual differences in the extent to which people report they engage

in experiential and rational thinking styles, and individual differences in basic beliefs.

Individual Differences in the Intelligence of the Experiential System

If there are two different processing systems for adapting to the environment it is

reasonable to suspect that there may be important individual differences in the intelligence of

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

41

both systems. It is assumed in CEST that each system has its own form of intelligence and that it

therefore would be useful to have ways of measuring such individual differences. Fortunately,

there are many tests of intelligence that provide excellent measures of individual differences in

the intelligence of the rational system. Such tests are fairly good predictors of academic

performance and to a somewhat lesser extent of performance in the real world, including

performance in the work place, particularly in situations that require complex operations (see

reviews in Gordon, 1997; Gottfredson, 1997; Hunter, 1983, 1986; and Hunter & Hunter, 1984).

However, as there were no tests that measured experiential intelligence if I wanted one, I had to

construct it, which I did with the aid of one of my assistants. We named the test the Constructive

Thinking Inventory (CTI; Epstein, 2001).

People respond to the CTI by reporting the degree to which they have certain adaptive and

maladaptive automatic or spontaneous thoughts. An example of an item is, “I spend a lot of time

thinking about my mistakes, even if there is nothing I can do about them” (reverse scored). The

CTI provides a Global Constructive Thinking scale and six main scales, all but one of which has

subscales. The six main scales are Emotional Coping, Behavioral Coping, Categorical Thinking,

Esoteric Thinking, Naïve Optimism, and Personal Superstitious Thinking. The main scales all

have high internal-consistency reliability coefficients and evidence of validity from numerous

studies. The CTI has been translated into 14 languages and research with it has been conducted

in many of these countries as well as in the United States. The CTI scales are predictive of a

wide variety of criteria related to success in living. A review of the extensive literature

supporting the validity of the CTI is beyond the scope of this chapter, but is available in the

manual for the CTI (Epstein, 2001). For present purposes, it will suffice to note that it has been

found to be related to performance in the work-place, superior achievement by managers,

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

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superior academic performance, social competence, leadership ability, ability to cope with stress,

emotional adjustment, physical wellbeing, and an absence of drug and alcohol abuse.

The relation of constructive thinking to intellectual intelligence is of special interest for

theoretical as well as practical reasons. As the experiential and rational systems process

information by different rules and have different attributes (see Table 1), it was found in several

studies that scores on the Global CTI scale were either unrelated or negligibly related to IQ (see

review in Epstein, 2001). Of additional interest, constructive thinking and intellectual

intelligence exhibited a nearly opposite course of development across the life span. It can be seen

in Fig. 1 that constructive thinking is at its nadir in adolescence when intellectual intelligence is

at its peak and gradually increases throughout most of the adult years when mental age is

gradually declining.

Although constructive thinking is less strongly related to academic achievement than

intellectual intelligence, it contributes significant variance beyond that of intellectual intelligence

to performance in the classroom, as indicated by grades received and class rank (Epstein, 2001).

Apparently, good constructive thinkers are able to behave in ways that gain them recognition for

and appreciation of their intellectual ability, whereas poor constructive thinkers are less able to

do so.

A finding of particular importance is that there is a general factor of experiential

intelligence that is measured by the CTI Global Constructive Thinking Scale. As this factor

includes a wide variety of favorable non-intellective abilities and attributes it is suggestive of a

general factor of non-intellective ability comparable in generality to the general factor of

intellectual ability.

Individual Differences in Rational and Experiential Thinking Styles

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The Rational/Experiential Inventory (REI) was constructed to measure individual

differences in the extent to which people report they process information according to each of the

two processing modes. The REI includes two main scales that measure the extent of processing

information in rational and in experiential thinking styles. Each of the main scales has subscales

of the degree to which one engages in a particular processing mode and one’s self-assessed

ability to use it effectively. A summary of the major findings from studies conducted by my

research team with the REI (Epstein,2001; Epstein et al., 1996, Norris & Epstein, in press;

Pacini & Epstein, 1999b; Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998) is presented in Table 2, in which it can

be seen that a rational thinking style is more strongly positively associated than an experiential

thinking style with intellectual performance and a variety of measures related to good

adjustment, including low anxiety, low depression, low stress, low neuroticism, high self-esteem

and high meaningfulness of life. An experiential/intuitive thinking style is more strongly

associated than a rational thinking style with measures of creativity, empathy, aesthetic

judgment, intuitive ability, and establishing satisfactory interpersonal relationships. It follows

that no statement can be made about the general superiority of either thinking style, as each is

superior in some equally important ways and inferior in other equally important ways than the

other thinking style.

It is important, when introducing a new measure, to demonstrate that it provides

information that is unavailable from existing instruments. In order to determine whether the REI

meets this standard we conducted a study (Pacini & Epstein, 1999b) in which we compared the

REI to several other personality inventories, including the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FI;

Costa & McCrae, 1992), the most popular measure of the “Big Five” personality traits (see the

chapter by McCrae, Gaines, & Wellington in this volume). The REI contributed independent

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

44

variance to the prediction of many of the same variables as the NEO and unique variance to the

prediction of other variables. When scores on the five NEO-FFI scales were entered into a

regression equation as predictors of scores on the REI scales, they accounted for less than half

(e.g., 37%) of the variance of the rationality scale and considerably less (e.g., 11%) of the

variance of the Experiential scale. This demonstrates that the REI scales are mainly independent

of the NEO-FFI and that the NEO-FFI mainly measures attributes associated with the rational

system and is comparatively deficient in measuring attitudes and behavior associated with the

experiential system.

Individual Differences in Basic Beliefs Concerning the Self, Others, and the Impersonal

World

A major assumption in CEST is that people’s implicit beliefs about themselves, others,

and the impersonal world are derived primarily from emotionally significant experiences in

childhood and that such beliefs are important determinants of people’s feelings, behavior,

adjustment, and overall quality of life. Based on this assumption, a measure of basic beliefs, the

Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI; Catlin & Epstein, 1992), was constructed. The BBI is a self-report

questionnaire that includes a global scale of individual differences in the overall favorability of

basic beliefs and also scales for measuring the favorability of the following more specific beliefs:

self-esteem, love-worthiness, competence, meaningfulness of life, views about relationships, and

views about the world. A study with the BBI was conducted that tested the hypotheses that two

important sources of basic beliefs are extreme life-events, as in the loss of a loved one or

experiencing a transforming love relationship, and relationships with parents during early

childhood.

In support of hypothesis, both kinds of experiences were related to individual differences

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in basic beliefs. People who reported favorable relationships with their parents and those who

obtained high scores on overall favorableness of extreme life-events based on both positive and

negative events obtained higher scores than others on the BBI scales of self-esteem,

meaningfulness of life, favorable view of others, and an optimistic view about the world. Those

who reported unfavorable relationships with their parents or who reported predominantly

unfavorable extreme life-events, such as the death of a beloved pet or a significant failure in an

important event obtained less favorable scores than others on all basic beliefs.

The more recently an extreme negative event occurred, the less favorable a person’s

current basic beliefs. Over time, the effect of extremely unfavorable life-events became less

unfavorable and sometimes even favorable. This is consistent with other research I conducted on

extreme life events in which several participants reported that they gained strength from having

to cope with adversity (Epstein, 1979b).

Parental relationships and life-events often made supplementary contributions to the

prediction of the same basic belief. Also, the quality of childhood relationships with parents

moderated the influence of extreme life-events. For those who reported favorable childhood

relationships with parents there was a strong positive relation between the basic belief in the

meaningfulness of life and the overall favorableness of extreme life events, whereas for those

who reported poor relationships with parents there was a near zero relation between these two

variables. This suggests that those who felt most secure in their relationships with their parents

were able to assimilate their favorable life events, whereas those who reported poor childhood

relationships with parents were more resistant to assimilating the implications of their extreme

life-events. It is as if they did not trust viewing life as meaningful as such a belief could make

them vulnerable to destabilizing changes in their belief system.

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Summary and Conclusions Regarding Research on the BasicAssumptions in CEST

An extensive research program provided support for the validity of all the assumptions in

CEST that were tested, which is most of the assumptions in CEST. In summary, the following

basic assumptions in CEST received research support: There are two independent information-

processing systems that operate in parallel and are simultaneously and sequentially bi-

directionally interactive. The influence of experiential processing on rational processing is of

particular importance, as it identifies a process by which people’s automatic, preconscious,

experiential processing operating most often outside of awareness biases their deliberative,

conscious rational thinking. The influence of experiential processing is intrinsically highly

compelling and can over-ride rational processing and influence people to behave against their

better judgment (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). However, when people are aware of their

experientially generated maladaptive thoughts, they often are able to control or correct them

through their rational processing.

There are reliable individual differences in the efficacy, or “intelligence,” of the

experiential system. As hypothesized based on CEST, experiential intelligence is independent of

intellectual intelligence and is more strongly associated than rational intelligence with a variety

of non-intellectual desirable attributes and abilities, whereas rational intelligence is more

strongly associated with intellectual performance and emotional adjustment. With respect to the

latter, people apparently can be well adjusted within a wide range of experiential processing so

long as it is not irrational.There are also reliable individual differences in the degree to which

people report they engage in experiential and in rational processing. Rational and experiential

thinking styles exhibited different relations with a variety of important criterion variables. It was

therefore concluded that neither mode of information processing can be considered generally

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superior to the other mode. The hypothesis was supported that there are reliable individual

differences in self-reported basic beliefs. Other hypotheses that received support are that two

important sources of basic beliefs are early relationships with parents and the occurrence of

extremely favorable and unfavorable life events.

Implications of CEST for Diverse Topics

As a broadly integrative global theory of personality, CEST provides a useful perspective

for elucidating a wide variety of psychological phenomena In this section I describe research

based on CEST regarding the following topics: the nature of intuition, the limitations and

extension of emotional intelligence, the influence of affect on heuristic processing, the meaning

of dreams, Hitler’s rabid anti-Semiticism, and the existence of a cancer-prone personality.

Implications of CEST for Understanding Intuition: What it is, What it Does, and How

it Does it

Intuition has been a most confusing topic in psychology. There is not even agreement on

what it is, let alone on how it operates. In a survey by Abernathy and Hamm (1995), 20 different

definitions of intuition were identified. Although many psychologists believe there is something

of importance captured by the idea of intuition, there are some who doubt it is a useful construct,

and others who consider it as simply a lazy form of cognition (e.g., Simon, 1992). Interestingly,

most authorities define intuition in terms of what it is not rather than by what it is. For example,

Bruner (1961) defines intuition as “the intellectual technique of arriving at plausible but tentative

conclusions without going through the analytic steps by which such formulations would be found

to be valid or invalid conclusions” (p. 13). Others identify intuition with unconscious processing,

which is only a slight improvement in the absence of describing its operating principles and

attributes. In contrast, CEST is explicit about what intuition is, what it does, and how it does it.

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

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According to CEST, intuition is nothing more and somewhat less than the operation of the

experiential system (Epstein, 2010). It is a subset of experiential processing that operates

according to the rules and attributes of experiential processing. It thereby arrives at impressions

automatically and by procedures that occur outside of awareness. However, unlike the very

broad domain of experiential processing it does not include superstitious thinking it has a

narrower range of content and does not include fundamentalist religious beliefs, irrational fears

and the motor and sensory coordination that occur in activities such as catching a ball. It follows

that intuition consists primarily of tacit information acquired by automatically learning from

experience outside of awareness. Thus intuition can be valid or invalid depending on the relation

of past experience to present circumstances. Although mainly based on past learning, intuition

can also be exhibited in completely new situations by a process referred to in evolutionary theory

as pre-adaptation. According to pre-adaptation, a process acquired for one purpose may be used

for other purposes. Thus, intuitive reactions can occur in entirely new situations by processing

information according to the principles and attributes of the experiential system

Implications of CEST for Emotional Intelligence

More than two decades ago Salovey and Mayer (1990) introduced the idea that there is an

important non-intellectual form of intelligence that is related to emotions. They and their

associates constructed a performance test of what they referred to as emotional intelligence, the

MSCEIT V2.0. This test includes a global scale of emotional intelligence (EI) with subscales of

managing emotions, understanding emotions, using emotions to facilitate thinking, and the

accurate perception of emotions (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). The authors note

that theirs is the only test of EI that is a performance test, and that it is specifically restricted to

aspects of coping with emotions. All other tests of EI are self-report tests that measure many

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attributes different from emotions, such as assertiveness, self-regard, problem solving, and social

responsibility.

Although the construction of a performance test for measuring EI would be a notable

achievement, from the perspective of CEST the test is not a measure of emotional intelligence

but rather a test of intelligence about emotions. It is one thing to know about adaptive emotional

responses and another to have them. A proper test of EI that remains to be constructed would

include items that refer to the degree to which people have adaptive. and not maladaptive,

emotions in a variety of situations (Epstein, in pressb). A person who had emotions such as

anger, fear, sadness, joy, and affection appropriately would obtain a high score on such a test,

whereas a person who reacted emotionally inappropriately would obtain a low score. It is

uncertain how such scores would be related to scores on a test of intelligence about emotions. I

suspect the relation would not be strong because the former is primarily related to automatic

experiential processing whereas the latter is primarily related to rational processing.

Among the various self-report tests purported to measure of EI, the most thoroughly

researched is the BAR-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (BAR-ON EQ-1, BAR-ON, 1997). The

test has impressive evidence of factorial and empirical validity. However, all the self-report tests,

including the BAR-ON, that have been constructed are open to the criticism that they are not

actually tests of EI as they include a variety of other abilities and attributes that are not

emotional (e.g., Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003; Locke, 2005).

From the perspective of CEST, although criticisms of such self-report tests as not valid

measures of emotional intelligence are correct, they make the mistake of throwing out the baby

with the bath- water. What these tests unintentionally importantly demonstrate is that there is a

global factor of nonintellectual ability that is broader than EI. That is, just as there is a global

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factor of intellectual intelligence, there is also a global factor of non-intellectual intelligence,

which includes abilities and attributes such as ego-strength, assertiveness, independence,

empathy, flexibility, and social facility, among others. The existence of such a broad global, non-

intellectual ability is consistent with the operation of the experiential system of CEST. It would

include the following abilities and attributes of the experiential system identified in Table 2:

empathy, social ability, sense of humor, creativity, and intuitive ability. Thus, the global non-

intellectual factor would accurately have to be referred to as experiential intelligence rather than

as emotional intelligence (Epstein, in pressb).

Implications of CEST for Psycho-biography

Two basic principles of CEST particularly relevant to psycho-biography are:(1) where

there is grossly irrational behavior there is likely to be the biasing influence of experiential on

rational processing, and (2) where there is maladaptive experiential processing there is often a

background of an intense negative life experience or experiences. The operation of both of these

principles is well illustrated in Hitler’s rabid and irrational hostility toward Jews. For example,

he stated that if Jews were not eliminated from the world they would destroy all humanity and

therefore exterminating them should be regarded as is a humanitarian act.

An interesting hypothesis about the source of Hitler’s hostility to Jews was proposed by

Gertrud Kurth (1947), a psychoanalytically oriented psychologist. The hypothesis was later

expanded on by Rudolph Binion (1976), a psychoanalytically oriented psycho-historian.

According to the hypothesis, Hitler’s hostility to Jews was the result of the displacement of

repressed hostility to Dr. Bloch, the family physician, who was a Jew who treated Hitler’s

mother for terminal cancer.

Hitler’s mother experienced a prolonged period of intense suffering because of her

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treatment with iodoform, a form of chemotherapy used at the time. Dr. Bloch warned Hitler

against this treatment as he said it would cause his mother great suffering and provide only a

negligible possibility of remission. Hitler nevertheless insisted on using it if it offered any hope

at all. Dr. Bloch later reported that he had never seen anyone exhibit as intense empathy in

response to the suffering of another as he witnessed in Hitler’s reaction to his mother’s suffering.

It is noteworthy in this respect that Hitler was so deeply devoted to his mother that he kept a

photograph of her with him at all times until his death.

It is noteworthy that Hitler expressed his appreciation to Dr. Bloch in a post card he wrote

after his mother’s death. He also gave Dr. Bloch a note granting his request to immigrate to

America and ordering any readers of the note to treat Dr. Bloch very favorably.

The question may be raised as to why Hitler was not hostile to Dr. Bloch. The answer is

that Dr. Bloch was carrying out Hitler’s orders and to condemn him would mean condemning

himself, which would probably arouse more guilt than Hitler could bear. Moreover, Hitler was

never one to accept responsibility for his poor decisions.

To test the hypothesis concerning the displacement of Hitler’s repressed hostility to a

Jewish physician I had an undergraduate research assistant, Lisa Sirop, tally the number of

paragraphs in the first volume of Mein Kampf (Hitler, 1925) in a 2 x 2 table with divisions

according to the presence or absence of a reference to Jews and the presence or absence of a

disease-metaphor (Epstein, 2003). There were 223 paragraphs that included one or more

references to Jews. On average, Hitler made a reference to Jews 1.6 times in every 10 paragraphs

or more than once in every 2 pages. Clearly Hitler was obsessed with Jews.

The number of disease-related metaphors was also very large, with 194 such references.

Thus Hitler was almost as obsessed with disease-related metaphors as he was with Jews. The

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critical question is whether there is a statistical relation between the two obsessions. To

determine whether there is such an association I calculated a chi-square and obtained a value of

57.82, 1 df, p <.0001. Apparently in Hitler’s mind there was a very strong association between

disease-metaphors and Jews. Examining the data in greater detail, in 33% of Hitler’s use of a

disease-related metaphor it was used with reference to Jews as “poisoners,” which is consistent

with an association to iodoform, the chemical treatment that caused his mother great suffering.

Following is an example of a metaphor that expresses Hitler’s rage and wish for retribution

against Jews for their “poisonous” influence: “But now the time has come to take steps against

the whole of the treacherous brotherhood of the Jewish poisoners of the people. Now was the

time to deal with them summarily without the slightest consideration for any screams and

complaints that might arise, - It would have been the duty of a serious government – to

exterminate mercilessly the agitators who were misleading the nation” (p. 169). It is also of

interest that in 16% of Hitler’s use of a disease-related metaphor for Jews, he refers to them as

parasites. Cancers are, of course, parasites that destroy their hosts, a relation often noted by

Hitler.

In conclusion, the present study of Hitler’s extremely irrational, rabid thinking about Jews

supports the hypothesis that Hitler’s hatred of Jews is at least in part related to displaced hostility

to a Jewish physician who, under the direction of Hitler, treated Hitler’s mother with a form of

chemotherapy that caused her great suffering. Although the experience concerning the death of

his mother may seem an insufficient explanation for Hitler’s wish to exterminate all Jews, this is

only true from a rational perspective. From an unconscious, associative, experiential,

psychodynamic perspective a much more viable case can be made for such a relation.

Implications of CEST for a Cancer Prone Personality

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Is there any validity to the concept of a cancer-prone personality (CPP)? Alice Epstein

(1989) in a book she wrote describing her very unusual recovery from a terminal stage of cancer

stated that she believes there is a relation between a cancer-prone personality and cancer based

on her own experience. She has now been free for more than two decades of all signs of a kidney

cancer from which the likelihood of remission, let alone cure, according to actuarial data at the

time of her disease was less than 4 in 1,000 (DeVita, Hellman, & Rosenberg, 1985). She believes

that the reason for her recovery was the transformation of her cancer prone personality that was a

source of self-negation and depression into a happier and more adaptive personality, so that now

it is even difficult for her to remember how she used to feel. .

According to CEST there is good reason to suspect that there is a relation between certain

personality characteristics and a proneness to certain diseases as well as the course of recovery

from them. This is because the experiential system is intimately related to emotions, and

emotions have physiological as well as psychological components and therefore can serve as a

mediating link between personality characteristics and physical disorders. An association

between a particular personality characteristic and disease has been demonstrated in the relation

between the suppressed anger component of the Type A personality and hypertension as well as

by our own findings of a relation between poor constructive thinking and psychosomatic

disorders (e.g., Epstein & Katz, 1992; Valach & Epstein, 1995). In the same research we

demonstrated that negative emotions are a mediating link between personality characteristics and

physical ailments. When we entered emotions into a regression equation in which there had been

a significant relation between constructive thinking and physical ailments, emotions completely

displaced constructive thinking as a predictor of physical ailments.

Alice Epstein’s book inspired one of my graduate students, Laurie Katz, to conduct a

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study under my supervision in which she investigated whether there is an unusual incidence of

other cases like that of Alice Epstein in which transforming a CPP to a more adaptive personality

resulted in an extremely unusual remission from a terminal stage of cancer (Katz & Epstein,

2005).

In the study, the scores on a Cancer-prone Personality Inventory (CPPI) of an exceptional

cancer-recovered group were compared with the scores of two unexceptional recovered groups,

an unexceptional cancer-recovered group and an unexceptional heart-disease recovered group.

The CPPI was constructed by creating a pool of items from the psychological and medical

literature on a proposed CPP. The final items in the CPPI were those that most strongly

contributed to the alpha reliability of the scale and were minimally redundant. The CPPI has 27

items and an alpha internal-consistency reliability coefficient of .90 - .95. The items in the CPPI

describe someone who is reluctant to express emotions, who feels helpless, hopeless and lacking

in commitment to an important goal, who is unassertive and unable to fulfill her own needs, yet

eager to please others and fulfill their needs, who feels unwanted or unloved, who maintains a

stoic façade of well-being despite her underlying misery, and who has a very negative self-image

despite being reasonably successful. Such a person tends to be liked by everyone but herself.

In support of the hypothesis that mitigation of a cancer-prone personality is associated

with unusual recoveries from cancer, the exceptional cancer-recovered group obtained higher

CPPI scores for the reporting period preceding diagnosis and a greater decrease in CPPI scores

from before to after recovery than the other recovered groups. After recover the CTI scores of

the two cancer groups no longer differed

Of additional interest, both cancer groups reported more frequent and more intense

stressful life events in the 2-year period preceding diagnosis than the heart-disease group

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reported. This occurred to the greatest extent for stressful events concerning a loss or threatened

loss of a close relationship. It is noteworthy that this is a condition widely considered likely to

produce feelings of depression.

Implications of CEST for the Meaning of Dreams

The operation of the experiential system of CEST provides a very different view about the

nature of dreams than the operation of the Freudian unconscious. Freud regarded his book, The

Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1950), as his most important achievement as in it he believed he

had unlocked the secret of dreams and the operation of the unconscious mind.

As previously noted, according to CEST there is one thing wrong with Freud’s

understanding of the operation of the unconscious mind, he had the wrong unconscious. Freud’s

view of an unconscious mind that unrealistically operates according to primary process thinking

is indefensible from an evolutionary perspective according to which it is highly unlikely that the

foundation of mental activity would be maladaptive and would require the addition of a

conscious, rational mind for people to behave adaptively. Moreover, as non-human animals do

not have a verbal, conscious, reasoning system, they are left with only a wish-fulfillment,

unrealistic unconscious mind that is incapable of adaptive action by itself. In contrast to Freud’s

conception of a maladaptive unconscious mind, the unconscious mind of CEST is in the form of

an experiential system that is highly adaptive. This raises the question of how, if at all, the

experiential system account for the strangeness of dream content that is anything but realistic? It

can do so by proposing that the dream-mind reflects the operation of a degraded form of

experiential processing as the result of the altered state of consciousness that occurs during

sleep.

Based on principles in CEST and a research program, shortly to be described, CEST is in

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agreement with the following principles of dream formation proposed by Freud: association,

displacement, symbolic representation, and condensation. However, there remain important

differences between the two theories. CEST rejects wish-fulfillment as the underlying motive for

all and even most dreams. As previous noted, according to CEST, dreams simply reflect the

degraded operation of experiential processing in the altered state of consciousness produced by

sleep. If there is one major motivation that influences dream representations according to CEST,

it is the super-ordinate need to control cortical excitation, which is consistent with Freud’s view

that the dream work operates in a manner that normally protects sleep..

Dreams according to CEST are assumed to be influenced by the implicit and explicit

thoughts of the day, including thoughts about the past and the future. For evolutionary

considerations regarding the need to be alert to danger, fear-fulfillment in dreams is probably

more prevalent than wish-fulfillment. Accordingly, most anxiety dreams are considered to be

produced by thoughts related to real or imagined threats rather than to guilt reactions because of

unacceptable wishes.

Displacement is extremely important in dreams according to CEST because cortical

excitatory level can be effectively controlled in most situations by displacement. That is,

whatever level of displacement is necessary for managing a particular level of cortical excitation

can be achieved by an appropriate level of displacement for maintaining sleep, with one

exception. The exception is the occurrence of anxiety dreams that awaken the dreamer. In that

case, the biological need to control cortical excitation within a homeostatic limit is maintained by

aborting the dream and awakening the dreamer. Thus, according to CEST, the reason why

displacement is extremely prevalent in dreams is not because it prevents awareness of taboo

wishes, as Freud believed, and which is accepted in CEST as sometimes occurring, but more

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

57

generally because it is a highly effective way of controlling cortical excitation in almost all

situations.

According to CEST dreams are constructed in the following manner. Certain events and

thoughts of the day, depending on their excitatory level as a result of their personal and

emotional significance as well as the attention they automatically attract for a variety of reasons

including the degree to which they were unanticipated become potential items for inclusion in

dreams. The selection from this item-pool of candidates for inclusion in a dream is determined

by the combined influence of several variables including an item’s excitatory strength, the

strength of its associations with other relevant potential dream items, condensation, preference

for certain symbolic representations based on past experience, and cohesion with other items in

the construction of a narrative. In constructing the narrative, the dream work simply does the best

it can to assimilate a variety of disparate potential dream representation into a story that has at

least some coherence.

To investigate the operation of dreams in everyday life, I conducted a 10-year study of

my own dreams by recording what I considered to be highly transparent dreams whose meaning

was self-evident to me (Epstein, 1999).

Following is an example of the interpretation of a transparent dream and what I believe it

reveals about the nature of dreams: I dreamt I was at a very expensive restaurant. I asked the

waiter why no prices were on the menu. He said if I had to know the prices I did not belong in

that restaurant. I tried to select something very modest. I chose a salad with a side dish of brains.

The bill came to $69.00. I asked the waiter why it was so expensive. He said the salad is $4.00

and the brains are $65.00.

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

58

The day before the dream I was honored for my “scholarly achievements” by receiving

the “Chancellors Medal,” which is the highest award bestowed by the University of

Massachusetts for academic achievement. I was surprised to receive the honor because I did not

feel I was in the same league as others who had previously received it. While working on the

lecture I had to give the next day I received a call from a colleague who said he had discovered a

wonderful place for trout fishing, and he asked me to go fly fishing with him that evening. I

would have loved to go, but I declined the invitation because I had to prepare my lecture. I had

the fleeting thought that it was a mixed blessing to have achieved some measure of success. It

further occurred to me that if I were even more successful, it could mean a change in life-style

that would not necessarily be more attractive.

After awakening from the dream, I remembered my thought about being honored as a

mixed blessing, which was followed by another thought that made me burst into laughter as the

meaning of the dream became apparent to me. The thought was: “It may be too costly to have

brains.”

This dream is particularly interesting because of its creative use of metaphors. The very

expensive restaurant that is beyond my means represents the thought that the honor bestowed on

me is more than I deserve or can afford. The use of the brain metaphor appears to be a clever

joke, but the apparent humor can be explained by a fortuitous association between the price of a

meal and the price of success.

Summary and Conclusions

Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is an integrative global theory of personality

that substitutes an adaptive unconscious processing system for the Freudian maladaptive

unconscious system. The unconscious system of CEST is an associative learning system that

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

59

humans share with other higher order animals. Because it adapts primarily by empirically

learning from experience, the system is referred to in CEST as an “experiential system.” Humans

also process information with a “rational” system, which is primarily a verbal reasoning system.

The influence of the experiential system on the rational system is considered particularly

important, as it can account for the irrationality in the thinking of humans particularly when they

attempt to solve problems concerning interpersonal relationships between individuals and

between societies. According to CEST, the reason for this is that, despite their extraordinary

ability to solve impersonal problems, humans are often poor at solving relationship problems

because such problems, as demonstrated in research, are primarily in the domain of the

experiential system whereas impersonal problems are primarily in the domain of the rational

system. Thus, even when people attempt to reason logically and objectively about interpersonal

relationships their reasoning is often biased by the influence of their experiential on their rational

processing. This has had disastrous consequences throughout the course of history, as indicated

by the prevalence of warfare. It also has ominous implications for the future, as the rational

system has made it possible for humans to develop weaponry that can destroy all life on earth.

The hope for the future is that humans will be able to use their remarkable intelligence to solve

the problems created by the interaction of their two processing systems.

The operating principles of the experiential system were described and compared with

those of the rational system. The two systems operate by different rules and have different

attributes. They operate in parallel and are bi-directionally interactive. They usually operate

harmoniously and often synergistically, and they often form compromises but sometimes they

conflict with each other or otherwise interfere with each other’s performance.

As the two systems have equally important advantages and disadvantages, with the

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

60

rational system being generally superior in solving intellectual problem and in contributing to

good adjustment, and the experiential system being superior with regard to several important

non-intellectual abilities and attributes, such as effortlessly directing everyday behavior,

promoting empathy and creativity, and establishing favorable interpersonal relationships, neither

system can be considered generally superior to the other system. They are simply different

adaptive ways of processing information, one system doing so primarily by empirically learning

from experience and the other by reasoning

A research program was described that provided support for many of the assumptions in

CEST. It was noted that as an integrative personality theory CEST has widespread implications

for many important issues in psychology. Examples were provided of its theoretical and research

contributions and its implications for intuition, heuristics, emotional intelligence, everyday

adjustment, psychopathology, the relation of personality to physical disease, the meaning of

dreams, psycho-biography, the ability to think objectively without bias. Hopefully the

remarkable intelligence of the human species will allow it to solve the problems created by the

interaction of the two information-processing systems.

Cognitive-experiential self-theory

61

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Table 1. Comparison of attributes of experiential and rational information-processing systems

Experiential system Rational system

1. Holistic 1. Analytic

2. Emotional: pleasure-pain 2. logical: reason oriented (what is sensible)

oriented (what feels good)

3. Associative relations 3. Cause-and-effect relations

4. More outcome oriented 4. More process oriented

5. Behavior mediated by “vibes” 5. Behavior mediated by

from past experience conscious appraisal of events

6. Encodes reality in concrete 6. Encodes reality in abstract

images, metaphors, & narratives symbols, words, & numbers

7. More rapid processing: oriented 7. Slower processing: oriented

toward immediate action toward delayed action

8. Slower to change: changes with 8. Changes more rapidly:

repetitive or intense experience changes with speed of thought

9. More crudely differentiated: 9. More highly differentiated;

broad generalization gradient; dimensional, nuanced thinking

categorical thinking

10. More crudely integrated: 10. More highly integrated

dissociative, organized in part

by emotional complexes

(cognitive-affective modules)

11. Experienced passively and 11. Experienced actively and -

preconsciously: we are seized consciously: we are in

by our emotions control of our thoughts

12. Self-evidently valid: 12. Requires justification via

"experiencing is believing" logic & evidence

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Table 2. Correlates of Experiential and Rational Thinking Styles

Rational Thinking Style Experiential Thinking Style

Positive Attributes Positive Attributes

High level of intellectual performance Favorable interpersonal relationships

High meaningfulness in life High social popularity

Realistic thinking Imaginative thinking

Low stress in living High agreeableness

High self-esteem High empathy

Positive world view High spontaneity

Low neuroticism Emotionally expressive

Low anxiety Good esthetic sense

Low depression Good sense of humor

Conscientious Creative

Open-minded Open-minded

High personal growth High personal growth

Negative Attributes Negative Attributes

Weak tendency of a Naïve optimism

dismissive relationship style Polyannaish thinking

Stereotyped thinking

Unrealistic beliefs

Superstitious beliefs