U.S. DIPLOMACY

COERCIVEDIPLOMACYWITHLECTURE.pptx

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COERCIVE DIPLOMACY A case study done for History 3676 by

JAMES R. CORCORAN Ph.D.

Page 1: For the purposes of this second lecture, I have done a special study on the use of diplomacy in America's First Gulf War: Coercive Diplomacy Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91. when I say Coercive Diplomacy what I mean is that America is exercising its will through its Diplomatic, Economic, Political and Military means. So this is really a study in the practical application of diplomacy. This study follows Secretary of State James Baker as he conducts what has been termed shuttle diplomacy, frequent trips between the world’s capitals done in order to negotiate U.S. foreign policy initiatives first hand by the SecState him/her self. The term first appeared with SecState Henry Kissinger in the 1970s during a series of repeated trips to the middle east to construct a middle east peace process. The primary source for my case study here is James Baker’s excellent and valuable book: Baker, J. A., III. The Politics of Diplomacy. NY: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1995. Baker served on active duty with the U.S.M.C. as a young junior officer, then went on to get a law degree, followed by decades of public service to the nation. Your readings for this lesson relate to this case study, but Baker’s book is the main source, so you don’t need to read from his book, just follow my comments for each of the slides here. Another of my main points is that this war, Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a successful venture and we should study and model success. Enjoy .

ALLIED AND IRAQI FORCES: 2-23-1991

Page 2: You see a map of the forces which are engaged in that war as it finally came about. What I am going to do in this lecture is go through the Diplomatic, And Political And Economic Actions which led up to what you see on this map of the various forces that were used in Desert Storm to drive Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Forces Out Of Kuwait. In august 1990 Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the small oil producing nation of Kuwait. Then the United States determined that could not stand and that the United States had to take action to force Saddam to withdraw all of his forces from Kuwait. It was done successfully. What we are involved in here is to work our way through the various twists and turns, especially from the standpoint of the U. S. Secretary of State at the time, James Baker, as to how we finally accomplish a successful resolution to Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and early 1991. Most important on this map where you see these forces note that you have large coalition forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia and moving into Iraq and moving into Kuwait. Very important on the right you see Saudi, the various Mechanized Brigades we call Gulf Cooperation Council Forces, various forces from various middle eastern nations who agreed to cooperate with the Coalition commanded on the ground by U. S. Four Star General Norman Schwarzkopf . And you see the participation by these various other nations. In this operation, if you look to the center part you see Egyptian Mechanized Forces and Armored Forces, Saudi Mechanized Forces and Armored Brigades, Kuwaiti Brigades and the Syrian 9th Armored Division. And there will be, in there, other Middle Eastern Forces. You will also see British Forces, the British 1st Armored Division participating in the 18th Airborne Corps Sector, next to that the French 6th Light Armored Division with a flank protection mission. S So my point here is that what we are going to look at in this lecture is the success of bringing various nations into Coalition in order to carry out an operation which resulted in success in that Saddam Hussein's forces were forced to withdraw from Kuwait. That was the purpose of this operation: Desert Shield, Desert Storm. Desert Shield was the lead up to the actual attack on Iraq. Desert Shield carries on through the turn of the year to January 17th when the Coalition attack begins and at that point it is called Desert Storm. The “actual fighting” is called Desert Storm a coalition air/ground/sea attack into Iraq and Kuwait.

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

“We would begin with diplomatic pressure, then add economic pressure, to a great degree organized through the United Nations, and finally move toward military pressure by gradually increasing troop strength in the Gulf. The strategy was to lead a global political alliance aimed at isolating Iraq. Through the use of economic sanctions, we hoped to make Saddam pay such a high price for his aggression that in time he would be forced to release his Western hostages and withdraw from Kuwait. If he didn’t, we would expel him by military force.” DIPLOMACY, Baker, 279.

Page 3: You see the quote by SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER taken directly from his book, The Politics Of Diplomacy and I just want to go through it with you and stress some of the things . He begins with “We would begin with diplomatic pressure” notice that Diplomatic Pressure, and “then add economic pressure”, and that , of course, is in the form of sanctions and getting other nations to cooperate and not continue to supply commodities and weaponry for military use to Saddam’s Iraq at that time. As Baker says “organized through the United Nations”. this is a very important aspect of pulling this coalition together. United Nations’ support of the objective of driving Saddam’s occupying forces out of Kuwait. And finally, and it should be said--finally , “and finally move toward military pressure” if necessary. If the diplomatic pressure and the economic pressure and activities within the United Nations do not force Saddam’s forces out of Kuwait then “finally move toward military pressure by gradually increasing troop strength in the Gulf.” This would have been the period of Desert Shield from September 1990 right up until the beginning of Desert Storm beginning January 17th, 1991. “The strategy was to lead a global political alliance aimed at isolating Iraq. Through the use of economic sanctions we hoped to make Saddam pay such a high price for his aggression that in time he would be forced to release his Western hostages and withdraw from Kuwait. If he didn’t we would expel him by military force.” This is a very important summation of the approach taken by the United States and I call this COERCIVE DIPLOMACY although that is not necessarily what Secretary Of State James Baker called it . At this point I want to introduce the concept of the national elements of power. The national elements of power are those instruments that the president and his departments and agencies in the federal government have at their disposal to carry out national policies and programs. In this case there are Five Elements Of National Power; the first is Socio-cultural-psychological; the second is the Political element of national power ; the third is the Economic element of national power ; the fourth is the Diplomatic element of national power; and the fifth, and I include it as last and you see Secretary of State Baker’s statement that military force is used last, is of course the Military element of national power. There is a little code word to help you remember this: SPEDM—the S (in SPEDM) is Social-cultural-psychological, the P (in SPEDM) is Political, the E (in SPEDM) is Economic, the D (in SPEDM) is Diplomatic and the M (in SPEDM) is Military. SPEDM is the Five Elements Of National Power. The application of these elements of national power are quite well described here in Secretary Of State James Baker’s statement. The elements are not used one at a time or one after the other, they are used in concert with each other almost like a beautiful musical quintet where you have the different instruments and they all chime in together to make beautiful music. You wouldn’t think of a quintet as being one instrument at one time followed by another. The most important aspect of all of this is, however, is the application of Military Force is to be done last. In other words; after you have applied the Elements Of National Power in the Social-cultural-psychological, Political, Economic and Diplomatic realm and have not accomplished your national security objective, in this case, forcing Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, then you apply the military element of national power. This is most important for this course and you must understand this--and you must master this. Let us begin. I am going to show you the diplomatic slice of the of the entire pie of the activities which took place in Desert Shield and Desert Storm and that Secretary Baker played a key role in the success of Desert Shield, Desert Storm. What I’m going to do—and this is part of the study I have done for this course in my research, what I am going to do is lead you through his activities in the months leading up to the beginning of Desert Shield and then through the actual fighting portion in Desert Storm to the successful conclusion of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces withdrawing from Kuwait.

COALITION BUILDING (Place names are those visited by Baker )

900802: UN RES. 660–

CONDEMS SADDAM’S INVASION

DEMANDS COMPLETE, UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL

0807: MOSCOW

USSR (still) WOULD NOT JOIN THE MILITARY COALITION

. . . WOULD SUPPORT US ON UN RESOLUTIONS

0811: TURKEY

CLOSED IRAQ’S PIPELINE

WANTS SADDAM GONE

RECEIVES AN OFFER OF $1.5 BILLION FOR LOSSES

SUPPORTS US

Page 4: The beginning of the Coalition Building, and the place names I have on these pages, are those visited by Secretary of State James Baker during this multi-month period. On August 2, 1990 Secretary Baker is at the United Nations and the U.N. passes Resolution 660 which condemns Saddam’ Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait--and this is very important because the activities of the U. S. State Department enabled us to bring together a majority opinion within the United Nations to condemn Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Also, Resolution 660 demands a complete, unconditional withdrawal so there is the statement, this is our basis, these are our the objectives that we are aiming toward. Five days later Secretary of State Baker flies off to Moscow. Remember, at this time in 1990 President Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Edmond Shevardnadze, you will see that later on, are working with the United States but they are in a situation in Russia as a result of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (opening), a situation in Russia where they are going through a complete transformation of the Soviet Union’s communist Russian structure and situation which eventually, of course, leads to the collapse of the Soviet Union the year after the period we are addressing here, in December of 1991--a year and a half after the time on this slide the Soviet Union disappears from the planet earth and it becomes the Russian Federation. A federation of remnant associates; Soviet Socialist Republics, and so, it is important whenever you look at the history of American Diplomacy to realize what is going on in some of these different parts of the world at that time. In this case what you see is the reasons Secretary Baker talks to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, the President and Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and they would not openly join the military coalition. It would be too injurious to the Soviet Union to be seen joining shoulder-to-shoulder with its former enemy and, still, its enemy in the Cold War. Competition between the Super Powers left the United States leading the western camp and the Soviet Union leading the Warsaw Pact in the east and that competition was still going on, so Moscow could not join the military coalition, but, very importantly, Baker could get out of them the agreement to support the U. S. on the U. N. Resolutions because in the U. N. Security Council where you have five votes by America, Russia, China, France and Great Britain, the five members, if any one of those members votes against a motion, then that motion is defeated. So it was very important for Russia to agree to support the U. S. on the various United Nation’s Resolutions related to this activity of Saddam’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Four days later, Secretary Of State Baker is in Turkey (August 11, 1990) north of Iraq, and he is able to gain cooperation from the Turkish government to close Iraq's pipeline, an oil pipeline where Iraq ships its oil out across the county to the port where it was then distributed to the world. Turkey agrees to close Iraq's pipeline and Turkey expresses that it wants Saddam gone. And at the same time, Secretary Baker, in his talks with the nation of Turkey agrees to offer $1.5 billion for any losses that Turkey might suffer, for example, with the shutdown of this pipeline or other losses for their engagement and activities related to Desert Shield and Desert Storm--and Secretary Baker got Turkey’s statement of support of the U. S. in our actions.

COALITION BUILDING (Continued)

0825: UN RES 665

OUTLAWS ALL TRADE W/ IRAQ

AUTHORIZES MILITARY FORCE TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS

0906: SAUDI ARABIA

ALLOWS STATIONING OF US FORCES

WANTS SADDAM DESTROYED

AGREES TO GIVE A $15,000,000,000 “CONTRIBUTION”

Page 5: We see then toward the end of that month (August 25, 1990) Secretary Baker is in the United Nations when the U.N. passes Resolution 665. Resolution 665 outlaws all trade with Iraq. Here you have the economic element of power in outlawing all trade with Iraq and resolution 665 also authorizes military force to enforce these sanctions—this prohibition of trade. This is a very, very, successful act on the part of the United States. In the next month (September 6, 1990) Secretary Baker is in Saudi Arabia and he pens an agreement that allows stationing of U. S. forces in Saudi Arabia. This is very important because Saudi Arabia being close to the religious center Of Mecca , the enter Of world Islam , of course, Saudi Arabia is quite shy about having foreign military forces , especially non-Islamic forces in its own country. It was important, of course, we have to be realistic here, and we have to acknowledge, that Saudi Arabia, at that time , was quite afraid that after Saddam’s military occupation of Kuwait right on the border, that Saudi Arabia would be next and so was more than willing to do what it takes in order to prevent Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia. In that regard, Saudi Arabia stated that they want Saddam destroyed. Also Secretary Baker gets the agreement from Saudi Arabia to provide a $15,000,000,000 ($15 Billion) to the activities which will be Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Very, very important is for Coalition Members to generously give. That’s a Real Coalition: funding, political support, and forces on the ground.

AMBASSADOR BAKER WITH KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA

Page 6: Secretary Of State Baker is shown with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on the right of the photo, and they are actually in Saudi Arabia. Left to right, next to Secretary Baker is Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, the son of King Fahd. Prince Bandar has been the celebrated ambassador to the U. S. for a number of years. Also you see the interpreter there next to the King.

COALITION BUILDING (Continued)

0907: EMIR OF KUWAIT (IN SAUDI ARABIA)

ALSO AGREES TO GIVE A $15,000,000,000 “CONTRIBUTION”

Page 7: The next day, the following day (September 7, 1990) U. S. Secretary of State Baker meets with the Emir of Kuwait (Emir is another name for Leader, Sultan, they are all similar) who is now in residence in Saudi Arabia because his nation was occupied by Saddam Hussein the month before. Secretary Baker attains an agreement from the Emir of Kuwait to provide a $15,000,000,000 ($15 Billion) contribution to the conduct of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. “Contribution” is the term that is used here. At first the Emir of Kuwait was not willing do this even though Kuwait was quite a wealthy nation and was one of the major contributors to foreign investors in the United States at that time; most of it funneled through English banks because of the close cooperation between England and Kuwait from the time of the English Mandate following World War I. Baker was successful in applying pressuer to the Emir to volunteer the $15B in funding.

AMBASSADOR BAKER WITH EMIR OF KUWAIT

Page 8: Here you see the photo where Secretary Baker is seen with the Emir of Kuwait, agreeing to a $15,000,000,000 ($15 Billion) “Contribution”. Their smiles may be forced, Baker may be thinking ‘you little rascal, I finally pinned you down’ and the Emir is saying ‘here we go, I’ve got to have my country back so I have got to give in the $15,000,000,000 ($15 Billion).’ Maybe, we don’t know for sure what they were thinking at the time. But after that Secretary of State Baker goes to Egypt.

COALITION BUILDING (Continued)

0908: EGYPT

AGREES TO TROOPS FOR COALITION

US FORGIVES EGYPT’S $7,100,000,000 DEBT

0909: HELSINKI

GORBACHEV/SHEVERDNADZE

DELINK IRAQ & ISRAEL/PALESTINE

0912: MOSCOW

US SIGNS FOR REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

RECEIVES GORBY’S REQUEST FOR $4-5,000,000,000 HELP

(SAUDIS PROFFER UP $4,000,000,000 FOR USSR)

Page 9: (September 8, 1990) Secretary of State Baker goes to Egypt and Egypt agrees to troops for Coalition and this is a very important act. Secretary Baker, in sensible trading then forgives Egypt’s $7,100,000,000 ($7.1 Billion) debt that Egypt owes the United States. When I say Baker did that, that was U. S. policy made at that time to accomplish the objective of getting support from Egypt and as you saw in the battle line-up at the beginning of the lecture Egypt had tanks and fighting personnel on the ground in Iraq. That is what is important, forces on the ground. And then, the next day, on the 9th of September, Secretary Baker finds himself in Helsinki Finland where he is meeting again with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. They sit down and agree to delink Iraq from the Israel/Palestine situation. Very, very, important that these two major powers agreed that the activities directed toward Iraq would not involve activities that are going on in Israel/Palestine; chiefly to make sure, if it could be done, to make sure Israel would not attack Iraq at the same time as operations by the Coalition Forces are going on. If Israel did attack, that would have broken up the coalition because the Muslim members would not abide Israeli attacks on any Muslim nation. Also, that is exactly what Saddam would try to do; get Israel to attack with the result of the breakup of the coalition.

COALITION BUILDING (CONTINUED)

0914: SYRIA

ASSAD AGREES TO TROOPS FOR THE COALITION

SAUDIS AGREE TO PAY SYRIA’S COST

0915: ROME

AGREES TO A SQUADRON OF TORNADOES

0915: GERMANY

CONSTITUTION FORBIDS SENDING TROOPS

OFFERS $2,000,000,000 “ASSISTANCE”

OFFERS $MILLIONS IN SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

INCREASES MIL & ECON AID TO TURKEY

PROVIDES SHIPS TO TRANSPORT EGYPTIAN FORCES TO GULF

Page 10: Two days later SecState Baker is in Syria dealing with Assad (see the next slide for the photo). Note on this slide the results, especially in relation to Saudi Arabia.

Rome's Tornadoes were the Brit made fighter jets.

Germany becomes more important as can be seen on the slide. NATO had a policy in place named “interoperability”. Specifications for weapons/ ammo/equipment were standardized so that each NATO nation could use other NATO nations’ weapons. This was important in this war because of the large number of foreign military forces taking part in the coalition.

Ambassador Baker with President Assad of Syria, 1-13-91

Page 11: Described on the last slide. It is the son of this man who is slaughtering his own people (Spring 2012) in order to stay in power as the Syrians continue to rise up against him.

ALL NECESSARY MEANS

“POWELL AGREED WITH MY BELIEF THAT THE MILITARY OPTION HAD TO BE LINKED WITH A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE IF NECESSARY.” DIPLOMACY, BAKER, 302.

Page 12: This statement by SecState Baker glues together the meanings of this power point lecture: Coercive Diplomacy. In the previous slides you can see just how Baker went about putting theory into practice; with the result of a massive, effective, strong, winning, multi-nation coalition (far different than “the coalition of the willing” employed in OIF in 2003). Important here is the close cooperation between the SecState and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

ALL NECESSARY MEANS 1031: USPRES AUTHORIZES + 200,000 TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA

ESTIMATED TIME IN WAR – MONTHS

THATCHER WANTS TO GO UN ART. 51 (UNILATERIAL FORCE)

US TO CHAIR UNSC DURING NOVEMBER 1990

SO, US WANTS USRESO “ALL NECESSARY MEANS . . . FORCE”

THAT REQUIRES INTENSIVE DIPLOMACY :THREE US CONDITIONS

US COMMANDS EFFORT

BOMBING OF IRAQ IS ALLOWED

COALITION HOLDS, EVEN IF ISRAEL RETALIATES

Page 13: Some three months have elapsed since Saddam’s no-notice invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Intel analysis and wargaming showed that the war would last for some three to six months. Saddam had T-72 Soviet tanks, advanced fighter aircraft, other advanced weapons and equipment and an army filled with experienced combat vets from the 8 year Iran/Iraq war which had just ended two years before this. Estimated U.S. casualties prompted the U.S. to order and store 40,000 “body bags” for those killed in action (KIA).

The PM of England (who had finished a successful Falklands war 6 years prior to this) wanted to go without a coalition; she’s tough!

The U.S., by good fortune (things just seemed to fall in place for the U.S. in this war) was scheduled to be the next rotating Chair of the UNSC. To make the operation successful, Baker had to get the coalition participants to agree to these terms. As you can see, at this point his successful diplomacy had gone a long way toward that goal.

ALL NECESSARY MEANS (Continued)

1104: BAHRAIN – YES

EMIR “BAHRAIN WILL SUPPORT ANY EFFORT AGAINST IRAQ.”

1105: SAUDI ARABIA – YES

VISIT TO THE US 1 CAV DIV.

KUWAIT EMIR. WANTS COUNTRY BACK, SADDAM DEFEATED

TORTURED/MUTILATED KUWAITIS

KING OF SAUDI ARABIA THINKS US FORCES STOPPED IRAQIS

HE AGREES TO US STATIONING + 20,000 TROOPS

AGREES TO + $2,500,000,000 TO SUPPORT US TROOPS

Page 14: SecState Baker is back in the Middle East and he gets full cooperation as seen on this slide. See the next slide for a photo of his visit to the troops in the field.

SECRETARY BAKER ADDRESSING FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION

Page 15: Here, remember that James Baker served as a junior officer in the U.S.M.C. Prior service greatly enhances a senior statesman’s clout and understanding.

SECRETARY BAKER WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR 1-13-91

Page 16: Always troubles: a brand newly elected Brit leader to begin working with. That’s democracy .

BAKER AT UN “USE OF FORCE” VOTE WITH PICKERING AND KIMMITT: VOTE 12 TO 2, ONE ABSTENTION Iraq had to 1-15-91 to withdraw from Kuwait

Page 17: The U.S. SecState is the actual representative for the U.S. to the U.N. He can’t be there all the time so a U.S. Ambassador is posted there in place of the SecState on a day-in-day-out basis. Condoleezza Rice had earlier been the U.S. Amb. To the U.N. Interesting is that at the present (2012) the U.S. Amb to the U.N. is Susan Rice (no relation) also an African American woman.

PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN, SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE US, WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY IN CHENEY’S PENTAGON OFFICE.

Page 18: Bandar is a member of the Saudi Royal family; those are basically his qualifications. By the way, there is an “oil” connection between these two.

ALL NECESSARY MEANS (Continued)

1106: EGYPT – YES

AGREES TO SEND A THIRD EGYPTIAN DIVISION

DEMURS ON PLANES/USE OF AIR BASES (MAYBE)

CHINESE FM QIAN QICHEN (VIP LOUNGE-CAIRO AIRPORT)

WILL URGE SADDAM TO COMPLY TO UNRES

PROBABLY WILL ABSTAIN FROM VOTE FOR UNRES

Page 19: The Chinese are balking and they have a veto vote on the UNSC. Baker wrings out an “abstain” vote which will avoid defeat the U.N. resolution.

BAKER WITH PREIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK IN CAIRO

Page 20: As described on the previous slide.

BAKER WITH TROOPS IN SAUDI DESERT 11-4-90

Page 21: It is unusual for the U.S. SecState to be so visible in the field with the troops; but James Baker is a man of action.

ALL NECESSARY MEANS (Continued)

1107: TURKEY – YES

AGREES TO AN ARMORED BRIGADE TO SA

AGREES TO + US JETS TO 130 AT TURK BASES

1108: MOSCOW

2 FACTORS: 1. US LEADS UNSC, NOV. 2. RAMADAN–MID-MARCH, 91

LTG GRAVES GIVE MIL BRIEFING TO GORBY/SHEVY

RUSSIA “CLOSE” TO SUPPORTING “ALL MEANS NECESSARY”

Page 22: More successful diplomacy. LTG. Graves was a classmate of mine from West Point (much smarter than I; he was an engineer officer; I was the better athlete ).

ALL NECESSARY MEANS (Continued)

LONDON – YES

THATCHER STILL WANTS TO GO UN ART. 51

1110: PARIS – WELL, O.K.

1111 – 1116: US/BRUSSELS/GENEVA-CA/BE/IC/ET/ZA

1118/19: PARIS

ROMANIAN FM – OK. CONTINUES TO GET US $80,000,000 AID

CHINA’S FM: “YES” = USPRES VISIT, “ABSTAIN” = USSECSTATE VISIT

RUSSIA – SHEVY - YES

Page 23: More successful Baker diplomacy.

ALL NECESSARY MEANS (Continued)

1121: SAUDI ARABIA

USPRES DOES T-DAY W/ US TROOPS

1122-1125: YEMEN – NO (AT THE RISK OF - $70,000,000 US AID)

1127: MALAYSIA (AT LAX) – SCREWS AROUND – LET’S PLAY HARDBALL

Page 24: Yemen always promises to be a “sticky wicket”, yesterday, today, and tomorrow. PM Mahathir, a fervent Muslim leader of Malaysia, was also quite anti-U.S.

As with the FonMin of China, earlier, the meeting took place in the VIP room of an international airport. That’s what FonMins/SecStates do when they don’t have much to talk about: that’s diplomacy .

UN VOTING – NEW YORK

1128: CUBA – NO FIRST OFFICIAL MEETING IN OVER 30 YEARS

1128: US GIVES UN $186,000,000 (OWED DUES)

1129: UN VOTE IN UNSC

YEMEN – NO

CUBA – NO

CHINA – ABSTAIN

UN RESOLUTION PASSES – AUTHORIZES COALITION TO “USE ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO ENFORCE UN RESOLUTION” (A DEADLINE 910115 FOR IRAQ TO PULL OUT – UNCONDITIONALLY – OF KUWAIT)

Page 25: Good old Fidel; remember he has outlasted 13 U.S. Presidents and he’s working on his 14th; President Obama.

At that time the U.S. Congress had refused to release $$ for the U.N. dues because the U.N. was implementing birth control programs around the world. For our purposes that could be overlooked at this time; pay up . “All means necessary” is 100% success for SecState James Baker; this is the authorization for war if Saddam did not pull out of Kuwait.

“WE MEET ON THE HINGE OF HISTORY” Baker, Chair, UNSC, 901129

Page 26: A very fitting quote; one greatly loved by this professional historian; your friendly professor .

(UNSMILING) BAKER WITH TARIQ AZIZ 1-9-91 – IRAQ’S LAST CHANCE

Page 27: Aziz and his Iraqi cohorts still trying to wiggle out of the tight spot they placed themselves in; JB is not amused .

GULF WAR 23-26 FEBRUARY 1991

Page 28: This is the big picture of the ground battle. Over in four days; who would have guessed? Saddam’s military looked powerful on paper. Also recall, the air war for Desert Storm had been going on some 5 weeks by the time of the above ground operation. Victory was gained by successful joint (U.S. services) and combined (Allied nations) operations. This was a successful war (recall that the strategic objective for this war was to expel Saddam’s forces from Kuwait NOT to invade Iraq and topple Saddam. There was an implied outcome of our warfighting: it was hoped that Saddam’s own people would throw him out in the wake of his failed war. That didn’t happen for reasons beyond this course (take my U.S. Military History course, HIST 3666, to delve deeper into this ).

Baker with Prime Minister Mulroney and Foreign Minister Clark of Canada, March 9, 1991

Page 29: The thrust of this lecture: diplomacy and statesmanship.

Baker, silhouetted against an oil fire in Kuwait, March 9, 1991

Page 30: Our man in the field again. Recall that Saddam set the Kuwaiti and his own oil fields ablaze during his retreat.

April 8, 1991: Horror at Kurdish refugee camp on Turkish border.

Page 31: The man wearing glasses, standing behind Baker, Ron Geisler, was the RSO (Regional Security Officer: in charge of all security) for the AMEMB Jakarta during my posting there during 1986’87’88. A good friend; by this time, three years later, he had been promoted to the top job guarding the big boss.

Kurdish Refugee Camp, April 8, 1991

Page 32: Saddam was not going to let the Kurds off easy.

Baker with Shamir, April 20, 1991

Page 33: The U.S. (an effort led by Ambassador Wolfowitz; the Ambassador in Jakarta during my tour there) did successfully keep Israel from responding to Saddam’s Scud missile attacks.

Baker with King Hussein April 20, 1991

Page 34: A strong military force in the desert against Saddam’s forces. His son is an important ally today as leader of Jordan.

“The Road to Baghdad” One of Three Secret Plans to Take Baghdad

Page 35: This is a declassified copy of one of the plans for “continuing/contingency operations” done by the U.S. Third Army G-3, Operations, Brigadier General Steve Arnold (who, by the way had been the 9th Inf. Div. G-3 during my time as a field artillery battalion commander, 1980,81,82).

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY “Guns are left to do what words might have done earlier, rightly used.” John Waller, 1917--, in Beirut ~ END ~

Page 36: I designed this lecture to bring home the key concepts of the successful use of diplomacy to attain U.S. National Security objectives by practicing diplomacy backed by force. I think that it is important to study, and to model ourselves after, success, not after failure. The diplomacy and the warfighting in this war, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1990-1991 were virtually picture-perfect. One couldn’t have written a more perfect scenario. It’s up to you to compare this with other wars, and their diplomacy, both before and after this war. My contribution is to leave you with this model of success in history.

~END~