

Revisiting Women's Ways of Knowing

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When Mary Belenky, Nancy Goldberger, Jill Tarule, and I began the project that led eventually to our book on *Women's Ways of Knowing* (WWK, 1986/1997), we called it Education for Women's Development. We set out to interview women varying widely in age, ethnicity, and social class, women who had attended or were attending a variety of educational institutions ranging from small, selective liberal arts colleges to inner city community colleges, as well as several "invisible colleges," social agencies serving mothers of young children living in rural poverty. The question that guided our research continues to guide my research today. I like the way Mary Belenky words the question: "How come so many smart women feel so dumb?" Based on our own experiences in college and graduate school, and experiences recounted by our friends and our students, the four of us suspected that part of the answer might lie in the structure and practices of these educational institutions. Thus, we shared with earlier psychologists such as G. Stanley Hall a concern that higher education might be harmful to women's health. Hall worried that college might shrink women's wombs, rendering them infertile or "functionally castrated" (1917, p. 634); we worried that it might shrink their minds, or at least fail to expand them to their full potential.

In an attempt to explore the nature of the problem and to consider how institutions might be modified to better serve the needs and interests of women, we developed an extensive interview and administered it to 135 women, along with several standard developmental measures. The interview included sections dealing with self-concept, moral judgment, relationships, and educational experiences, as well as one ultimately labeled "ways of knowing." Although, like all of the contributors to this volume, we were familiar with William Perry's "scheme" tracing epistemological development in the college years (1970), and Nancy Goldberger (1981) and I (Clinchy & Zimmerman, 1982; 1985) had used it in previous longitudinal research, epistemology was at first no more salient in our thinking than any other aspect of development. Gradually, however, as we coded responses to what we then called the "Perry part" of the interview and then read the rest of each woman's interview in the light of the coding, we came to believe, as we say in the preface to the second edition of the book, "that the women's epistemological assumptions were central to their perceptions of themselves and their worlds," and so "epistemology became the organizing principle for our data analysis and for the book that we were beginning to imagine" (WWK, 1997, xviii).

In the book we describe five different perspectives from which women view the world of truth, knowledge, and authority. Perry's scheme provided the scaffolding we used in coding the women's responses, and the perspectives we present are deeply grounded in his "positions," although we emphasize slightly different aspects of epistemology. Perry's positions are defined mainly in terms of the nature of knowledge and truth (truth as absolute, for example, versus multiple), whereas we stress the women's relation to knowledge and truth, their conceptions of themselves as knowers. For instance, do they conceive of the source of knowledge as internal or external, and do they experience themselves as receiving or as creating truth? We listened, too, for deviations from Perry's scheme, for one would not expect the responses of women varying widely in age, class, and educational background to be identical to those of Perry's largely privileged and largely male undergraduate sample. Indeed, we found that while the general outline of Perry's scheme survived, many of the answers the women gave could not be wedged into it, and so, "In this instance, as in others, when the data the women provided diverged from the theories we had brought to the project, we forced ourselves to believe the women and let go of the theories" (WWK, 1997, pp. xii-xiv).

The book plunged us into a lively, wide-ranging conversation: It drew serious attention, often intensely critical, among scholars and researchers from a variety of disciplines, as well as moving testimonials from hundreds of "ordinary" women who saw parallels between their own stories and the stories in the book. I intend this chapter to be a contribution to this continuing conversation. I shall discuss some salient and controversial aspects of each of the perspectives we defined, drawing on the original text and also on research and theoretical speculations that have emerged in the years since its publication.

SILENCE

We named this, the least adequate perspective we could discern, "Silence," signifying the voicelessness of women at this position. Asked, "How do you feel about speaking?" Trish responds, "Um. I wonder if I'm using the right words. I can't do it anywhere." These women have difficulty hearing as well as speaking. As Belenky writes, they "see words more as weapons than as a means of passing meanings back and forth between people. They do not believe themselves capable of understanding and remembering what the authorities or anyone else might say to them" (Belenky, 1996, p. 394). Lacking "the most basic tools for dialogue, the Silenced feel voiceless and excluded from the community" (Belenky, 1996, p. 394). They have been excluded, also, from theories of epistemological development, for these theories are based on words—oral or written accounts—produced mainly by people with considerable formal education. Silent women, feeling "incapable of articulating their own thoughts and feelings to others," (Belenky, 1996) make poor research subjects, and they rarely wend their way into institutions of higher learning. All of the women who taught us about Silence came from the invisible colleges, not the visible ones, and most of them could describe the position only because, having moved somewhat beyond it, they could view it retrospectively. For example, Ann said:

I could never understand what they were talking about. My schooling was very limited. I didn't learn anything. I would just sit there and let people ramble on about something I didn't understand, and I would say "Yup, yup." I would be too embarrassed to ask, "What do you really mean?" . . . I had trouble talking. If I tried to explain something and someone told me that it was wrong . . . I'd just fall apart. (WWK, p. 23)

In fact, the Silence perspective does not belong in accounts of epistemological "development." Silence grows out of a background of poverty, isolation, subordination, rejection, and, often, violence. It is not a step in "normal" development but a failure to develop, "a position of not knowing" (Goldberger, 1996b, p. 4) imposed by a society inattentive to the needs of its members.¹ It should not be seen, as some readers have interpreted it, as the first stage in a developmental sequence.

Still, since the publication of WWK, I have learned that the position, although "abnormal," may not be as rare as I once thought. A few years ago, while outlining the WWK positions for a group of community college faculty, I remarked that we could skip quickly over "Silence" because such people were unlikely to appear in their classes. A flurry of hands went up, and the participants proceeded to disabuse me of my assumption. The position was heavily represented, they said, among the many very poor people who had recently entered their colleges, mostly perforce, as a result of changes in welfare regulations.

¹In this respect, Belenky's (1996) renaming of the position as *Silenced* seems appropriate.

Even highly educated articulate women, some of whom make a profession of speaking and writing, have testified to us in hundreds of letters that they resonate to the description of this perspective. Although they are by no means entrapped in (capital "S") Silence, they report that they frequently find themselves in situations in which they are (lowercase "s") silenced. Lewis and Simon offer a fascinating account of a graduate course taught by Simon in which Lewis and the other women students felt silenced by the males in the class. They quote an account by one student that is remarkably similar to Ann's:

I don't understand what they [the men] are talking about. I feel like I'm not as well educated as them. I haven't done too much reading in this area. They know so much more than I. I just feel that if I said anything, they'd say, what is she doing in this class, she doesn't know anything, so I keep my mouth shut. (Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 466)

As Simon says,

Being muted is not just a matter of being unable to claim a space and time within which to enter a conversation. Being muted also occurs when one cannot discover forms of speech within conversation to express meanings and to find validation from others. (Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 464)

The muting of the women in Simon's class was confined to a particular (although not uncommon) situation, and the women were able to devise strategies for eliminating it. The muting of the profoundly Silent women pervades their entire lives and is much less tractable, but it is not irreversible: The invisible colleges and programs like the "Learning Partners" project directed by Belenky and her colleagues (Belenky, 1996; Belenky, Bond, & Weinstock, 1998), have succeeded in providing settings in which Silent women can "express meanings and find validation from others."

RECEIVED KNOWING²

From this perspective, built on Perry's (1970) Dualism, truth is absolute and unambiguous. Received Knowers³ believe that for every question there is a single, correct answer. They see the world in terms of black and white, right and wrong, true and false, good and bad; there is no room for ambiguity. "The stars twinkle for one reason," a student said. "That's why they do it. If something is proven, then there is no other way it could happen." Truth is external; it lies in the hands

²In WWK we call this position "Received Knowledge." All four of the coauthors now prefer the more active verbal form for each of the positions.

³For convenience, I refer to Received "Knowers" rather than "Knowing," but I do not mean to imply that a given individual always operates out of a single perspective.

of Authorities, and one is utterly dependent on Them to dispense it.⁴ "How can you learn if the teacher isn't telling you?" In the course of a longitudinal study of epistemological development in young women, based on Perry's scheme, (Clinchy & Zimmerman, 1982; 1985), Claire Zimmerman and I asked Wellesley undergraduates, "Suppose two people disagree on the interpretation of a poem. How would you decide which one is right?" A sophomore replied, "You'd have to ask the poet. It's his poem."

Like many of my colleagues, I grow impatient with students who behave as Received Knowers. These are the students who sit, pencils poised, prepared to record the truths I dispense, the ones who ask exactly how long the paper should be, and exactly which topics will appear on the exam. These students are willing to regurgitate the information they have stored in their heads on a test, but they don't like being asked to apply it. They tend to see knowledge as something to be stored and reproduced, but not to be used and never to be questioned. They like multiple choice exams, and I don't. I can muster some compassion for Received Knowers by recalling how I revert to this position whenever I am faced with something novel, complex, and incomprehensible, like the first time I saw a game of cricket or heard a piece of atonal music. On such occasions I yearn for an expert who will just tell me what it all means.

It was not until I embarked on the WWK research however, that I came to feel genuine respect for Received Knowing. I teach at an academically selective, academically rigorous college, and I see it as my task to help students move beyond received knowing and on to more active, reflective modes of thinking. But through this project we met women for whom Received Knowing was an achievement, rather than something to be "got over," like measles or chicken pox or adolescence. They showed us that the position has virtues. The chief virtue of the Received Knower is that she is receptive. She can listen, even if the listening seems hardly more active than the listening a tape recorder does. Women who rely on received knowledge can take in information, while Ann, looking back on a life in Silence, recalls that she "could never understand what they were talking about." Received Knowers can appreciate expertise and make use of it. Silent women do not perceive authorities as sources of knowledge. "Authorities bellow but do not explain," although they must be obeyed; they cannot be understood.

Ann began to emerge as a knower when she became a mother. She needed to know how to take care of her baby, and she was lucky enough to live in an area serviced by a Children's Health Program, where the staff "knew all the answers," and took the time to spell them out in language she could understand. Unlike many professionals, they continually emphasized her competence, rather than their own.

I'd walk in there and they would say, "You're wonderful. You're a great mother." . . . I'd walk out of there feeling so good. I'd feel like I could tame

⁴I borrow the uppercase (A and T) from Perry to connote the power of Authority and the nature of Truth as conceived at this position.

the world. . . . I feel like I could go in there and they could hire me, you know, that's how much knowledge they have given me.

While recognizing the virtues of Received Knowing, it is important, also to see its limitations. For Received Knowers, as we defined the position, Authority is the only source of knowledge. Judging by the comments of some of our critics, we did not make the "only" point clear. The feminist literary theorist Patrocino Schweickart, for instance, recalls herself as listening intently and taking careful notes in college and graduate school. We "miss something important," she says, if we assume that in this case she was behaving as a Silent woman or a Received Knower. But the authors of WWK would make no such assumption; we would agree with Schweickart that "silence" in this case might well be "a sign not of passivity, but of the most intense intellectual engagement" (1996, p. 307). It is important to distinguish between (lowercase) received knowing as a "strategy" (Goldberger, 1996a) that one chooses to deploy in a particular situation (during a lecture, say, or a cricket game), because of its adaptive value, and (uppercase) Received Knowing as a compulsory position from which authorities are viewed as the sole source of knowledge, knowledge that is assumed to be absolutely true, and which one simply ingests "as is" without any awareness of active processing. Similarly, we do not assume, of course, that simply because a person is not speaking, she is operating from a position of Silence.

As Goldberger points out, "Relying on experts or yielding to the knowledge of others is not necessarily indicative of the narrowly defined version of Received Knowing we present in WWK. . . . It is the way in which a person 'constructs' authority and expert that helps us understand more fully his or her epistemological stance" (1996a, p. 347). For instance, in her own research with "bicultural" Americans, Goldberger found that although African Americans stressed in their stories the importance of relying on God, "their construal of God as authority is more one of Collaborator and Coknower than Dictator" (1996a, p. 347). Goldberger implies that WWK's treatment of Received Knowledge is culture bound: "Yielding to authorities external to oneself is often characterized in Western culture, which values autonomy and independent judgment, as 'childlike,' 'passive,' or 'dependent'" (1996a, p. 347). I agree, and I think, too, that we were "bound" by the limits of our sample. Most of the women we coded as Received Knowers occupied relatively subordinate positions in terms of age or social class, being either very young undergraduates or very poor older women. Received Knowing might take a different form among, say, a sample of prosperous middle-aged people.

I believe, now, that we paid too little attention to distinctions within our sample of Received Knowers. As it is, our construction of this and the other positions partakes of what might be called "epistemological (or perhaps 'positional') essentialism," lumping into the same category perspectives that may differ in significant ways. Received Knowing cannot be quite the same for a first-year student in an elite college who depends on the words of a presumably benign

professor, and a fifty-year-old with minimal formal education who is at the mercy of the "information" supplied by an abusive mate. Or consider a milder, but not insignificant contrast: the experiences of a male and a female Received Knower in Perry's sample (Harvard undergraduates in the 1960s) might also differ, for the male knew that he might someday be one of Them, while the female could envision no such possibility.⁵

SUBJECTIVISM

Subjective knowing is in some respects the opposite of received knowledge. Received Knowers believe in universally valid Absolute Truths. Subjectivists adhere to the doctrines of "Multiplicity" (Perry, 1970) and "Subjective Validity" (Clinchy & Zimmerman, 1982): truth (lowercase t) is personal and individual, all opinions are equally valid, and everyone's opinions are right for them. While Received Knowers see knowledge as external and utterly objective, subjectivists look inside themselves for knowledge; for them, truth springs from the heart or the gut. In WWK we tell the story of Inez, a young single mother of three, who (in our terms), had lately moved out of Received Knowing into Subjectivism. She told us, "There's a part of me that I didn't even know I had until recently—instinct, intuition, whatever. It helps me and protects me. It's perceptive and astute. I just listen to the inside of me and I know what to do."

Unlike Received Knowers, Subjectivists tend to be deeply suspicious of the information dispensed by authorities. For most of her life Inez had been abused and exploited by powerful males, first her father and brothers, then her husband. She grew up believing that, as she put it, no woman could "think and be smart." Inez no longer pays any attention to external authorities; she is her own authority. "I can only know with my gut," she said. "I've got it tuned to a point where I think and feel all at the same time and I know what is right. My gut is my best friend—the one thing in the world that won't let me down or lie to me or back away from me."

For Inez, Subjectivism spells liberation, but for Kim, a first-year African American student at a traditional elite college, it almost certainly spells trouble. I asked Kim to read and respond to the following statement: "In areas where the rights answers are known, I think the experts should tell us what is right. But in areas where there are no right answers I think anybody's opinion is as good as another's." Kim didn't just agree with the second sentence; she also *disagreed* with the first, the notion that there are in any area "right answers" that are "known." "I don't like that," she said. "I just don't like that. Who's to say what answer is right and what answer is wrong? They could have been given the wrong information. I'm sure there are a helluva lot of teachers who are walking around being misinformed. . . . I very seldom go by what people say."

⁵Even today, women constitute only about 12% of Harvard's faculty of Arts and Sciences.

Like other Subjectivists, Kim relied on the data supplied by first-hand experience rather than the second-hand information offered by authorities:

If they were to tell me that there was going to be an earthquake tomorrow, that scientists had gone and studied all the scales and said this, I wouldn't believe them. I'd have to wait and see. The only way I could believe it is for it to actually happen. It is said that the earth goes around the sun. I don't have any proof. It is written in books, sure. But the person who wrote it in books could have been misinformed.

A Subjectivist would not dream of "asking the poet" how to interpret his poem. In her view, it isn't "his poem," it's hers, and "there isn't any right or wrong. We're all allowed to read into a poem any meaning we want." As one woman said, "Whatever you see in the poem, it's got to be there." Here, the external world seems almost to disappear. The words on the page dissolve into a sort of Rorschach inkblot exerting little constraint on the meaning the reader projects onto the page. What the Subjectivist reader "sees" is likely to resemble closely what she already "knows." Asked how she decided among competing interpretations being discussed in English class, one student said, "I usually find that when ideas are being tossed around I'm usually more akin to one than another. I don't know—my opinions are just sort of there." And another said, "Well, with me it's almost more a matter of liking one more than another. I mean, I happen to agree with one or identify with it more."

Unless she can "identify" with a phenomenon, the Subjectivist cannot deal with it. "I cannot relate to an atom," Kim told me. Asked what she meant by "relate," she said, "I can comprehend it, I can feel it." Some of her classmates, she said, "can see why two positives would connect. I can't see that force, but I can see anger and emotions." How, I wondered, was this young woman going to pass the science distribution requirement?

Subjectivists "just know" what they know; their knowledge is based not on words or inferences but on the immediate apprehension of reality. Mrs. Spender, a character in Angela Thirkell's novel, *Growing Up*, says, "You only have to mention a thing to me and I seem to see it . . . I don't need to read, I just sense what things are about." Mrs. Spender does not question the validity of her perceptions, nor does she leave room for others to question them. "A person's experience can't be wrong," as one young woman said, and "an idea is right if it feels right"—right for herself, although not necessarily for anyone else. Subjectivists are as tolerant of others' opinions as they are of their own: judge not, that ye not be judged. When Kim told me that she didn't like to call people wrong, I asked, "Would that extend to people like Hitler?" "Absolutely," she replied. "I would never, no—I wouldn't call him wrong. Whatever he has done, I would not call him wrong . . . I value my opinion. I value what I do. I have no right whatsoever to go out and call somebody wrong because it is different from what I do."

At first glance, this passage may strike the reader, as it did me, as amoral and mindless relativism. But Kim's next sentence makes it clear that she does have

values of her own: "Now I think that the extermination of the Jews was wrong. I am not saying that he was wrong." It is not clear whether Kim means that Hitler's opinion is wrong in some objective or absolute sense, or whether it is simply wrong for her, but it is clear that she distinguishes between persons and the opinions they hold. She knows that, as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz puts it, differences of opinion are not just "clashes of ideas," that "there are people attached to those ideas" (Geertz, quoted in Berreby, 1995). Only if you realize that, Geertz maintains, can you be "open to dialogue with other people."

Kim realizes it, but she is not open to dialogue with other people. She disagrees with Hitler, but she would see no point in exploring the issue with him. She is not interested in why he believes in the extermination of Jews, nor would she care to argue the point: Hitler's opinion may be right for him, but it is irrelevant to her. Subjectivists do not see values—their own or anyone else's—as a subject for reflection, and without reflection there can be no genuine dialogue. Their anemic "discussions" are like parallel play: based on "mere unlikeness" of views, in Geertz's phrase, they are characterized by a "vacuous tolerance that, engaging nothing, changes nothing" (Geertz, 1986, p. 113). As the philosopher Elizabeth Spelman wrote:

Tolerance is . . . the least of the virtues of people who really want to learn about others and about their lives: to tolerate someone is simply to let her have her say; I needn't listen to her, I needn't respond to her, I needn't engage with her in any way at all. All I have to do is not interfere with her. Prior to and after I've allowed her to make her presence known, I can blot her out of my consciousness. (Spelman, 1988, p. 181)

Although Subjectivists preach "openness," they actually practice a sort of aloof tolerance toward other points of view; they listen politely, but they do not really hear. As the philosopher Iris Murdoch might put it, they are unable to love. "Love," Murdoch said, "is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real. Love . . . is the discovery of reality" (1970/1985, p. 51). Genuine dialogue, Geertz says, requires the realization that "other people are as real as you are" (quoted in Berreby, 1995). In some sense, the Subjectivist lacks this realization; she is lost in her own subjectivity. Although she acknowledges in theory the existence and validity of other realities, only her own is really real to her. She can only look out through this subjective reality; she cannot transcend it or detach herself from it.

Subjectivists perceive the world in terms of themselves, ignoring its otherness. The writer/teacher Peter Elbow calls this "projection in the bad sense" (Elbow, 1973, p. 149). They hear a person (or a poem) meaning what they would mean, if they said those words, or else they do not hear it at all. In order to perceive otherness, one must acquire a degree of objectivity. To avoid projection in the bad sense, Subjectivists need to acquire techniques for "imaginative entry . . . into an alien turn of mind" (Geertz, 1986, p. 118). They need to learn how to explore and examine ideas—their own and other people's. They must rediscover on a higher

plane the insight achieved by children of four and five, that belief and reality do not always coincide.

The Limits of Preprocedural Knowing

At my college, many students, especially in the first year or two, exhibit a split epistemology. Typically, they perceive science and mathematics from a Received Knowing perspective, and the humanities from a Subjectivist perspective. Students with a strong proclivity for Received Knowledge gravitate toward the first domain, and those who are strongly tilted toward Subjectivism gravitate toward the latter.⁶ If they persist in these positions, both groups will run into trouble, especially in advanced courses: Received Knowers may be confronted with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Bohr's principle of complementarity, and Subjectivists will certainly encounter teachers who insist that only those interpretations that are thoroughly grounded in the text deserve consideration. Unless they are to find themselves "in over their heads" in the psychologist Robert Kegan's (1994) phrase, in college and beyond, they will need to develop more powerful ways of knowing, for both these perspectives, although seemingly so different, share similar serious deficiencies.

Both are uncritical ways of knowing. Ann, the Received Knower, perceives the staff at her invisible college to be infallible, and Inez, the Subjectivist, perceives her own gut as infallible. They do not examine their knowledge; they simply accept it as true and act on it with unquestioning obedience. Both modes are relatively passive. Ann and Inez do not create their knowledge. Ann's opinions come ready-made from the agency; Inez's opinions are, as that student put it, "just there." People who rely solely on received or subjective knowledge are in some sense not really thinking. They have no systematic, deliberate procedures for developing new ideas or for testing the validity of ideas. Judging from longitudinal data and the women's retrospective accounts, this "Procedural Knowing" is for some the next step in development.

PROCEDURAL KNOWING

Procedural Knowers no longer believe that one can acquire knowledge or arrive at truth through immediate apprehension. Knowledge does not consist of facts to be stored "as is," nor of the static residue of direct experience. Knowledge is a

⁶In a survey distributed as part of the "Pathways Project" (Rayman & Brett, 1993) at Wellesley, students were asked to respond to the statement, "I prefer subject matter with precise answers to subject matter with multiple interpretations." This question discriminated significantly, and more than any other, (a) between those students who said on entering the college that they planned to major in math or science from those who said they planned to major in social sciences or humanities; and (b) between those who at the end of the sophomore year stuck with their plan to major in math or science and those who switched to a nonscience major.

process, and it requires work. Although no single "answer" may be "right," all interpretations are not equally valid. Knowing requires the application of procedures for comparing and contrasting and constructing interpretations, and the quality of the knowledge depends on the skill of the knower.

In WWK we described two sorts of procedures that we called "separate" and "connected" knowing. Separate Knowing is a detached, impersonal, objective, critical approach, best typified, perhaps, by the model of "hard science." Many people would call it simply "thinking," or maybe "good thinking." Once upon a time, so did I. Elsewhere, I have told how Zimmerman and I stumbled on what we now call "connected knowing" while searching for evidence of what we now call "separate knowing" among Wellesley undergraduates. Some of our interview questions were designed to ascertain whether the students had acquired an appreciation of critical thinking, a component of Perry's Position 4. For example, we asked them to respond to a statement another student had made in an earlier interview that seemed to provide evidence of critical thinking: "As soon as someone tells me his point of view, I immediately start arguing in my head the opposite point of view. When someone is saying something, I can't help turning it upside down" (Clinchy, 1998, p. 770).

Although some of the women agreed heartily with the quotation, some disagreed. One said, "When I have an idea about something, and it differs from the way another person's thinking about it, I'll usually try to look at it from that person's point of view, see how they could say that, why they think they're right, why it makes sense." And another said,

If you listen to people and listen to what they have to say, maybe you can understand why they feel the way they do. There are reasons. They're not just being irrational. When I read a philosopher I try to think as the author does. It's hard, but I try not to bias the train of thought with my own impressions. I try to just pretend that I'm the author. I try to really just put myself in that person's place and feel why is it that they believe this way.

This young woman would agree with Virginia Woolf (1932/1948) that in reading a book one should "try to become" the author, his "fellow worker" and "accomplice."

In time, as my colleagues and I accumulated more and more responses like these, we began to think that connected knowing might constitute a genuine procedure, and this is how we present it in WWK. In retrospect, this seems to me to have been an audacious, perhaps presumptuous move. Because we had little empirical data of our own to use in constructing the concept, having never asked a single question designed to elicit it, in a sense we "made it up"—not out of whole cloth, to be sure, but out of a necessarily eclectic assortment of ideas. Since the publication of the book, along with various collaborators, I have been attempting through systematic research and conversations with colleagues (alive and dead, in person and in print) to define the components of connected knowing and separate knowing more clearly and to ascertain how the two procedures (or various

versions thereof) play out in actual practice. Annick Mansfield and I (1992) developed an interview designed to elicit the ways in which men and women define the two procedures, how they feel about them, what they see as their benefits, drawbacks, and purposes, when and where and with whom they do and do not use each procedure, and how their use of them has changed over time. A number of researchers, including my own students as well as other investigators at various institutions working with widely varying populations, have also used some version of this interview. Because most of this research is still in progress, and because of limitations of space, I shall not dwell on it in detail here, but I have drawn on it in developing the description of the two procedures that I present here.

Table 4.1 summarizes some contrasting features of separate and connected knowing. The two modes have somewhat different purposes: while Connected Knowers are primarily interested in understanding the object of attention, Separate Knowers are primarily oriented toward its validity. The Connected Knower asks, "What does this poem (person, idea, etc.) mean?" The Separate Knower might ask, "How good is this poem? What are its strengths and weaknesses?"

TABLE 4.1
Characteristics of Connected and Separate Knowing

Aspect	Connected Knowing	Separate Knowing
The name of the game:	The "Believing Game": looking for what is right; accepting	The "Doubting Game": looking for what is wrong; critical
Goals:	Emphasis on meaning: to understand and be understood	Emphasis on validity: to justify, test, refine, convince, and be convinced
The relationship between the knowers:	Supportive: reasoning with the other	Adversarial, challenging: reasoning against the other
The knower's relation to the known:	Personal. Attachment & intimacy: "stepping in"	Impersonal. Detachment and distance: "stepping back"
The nature of agency:	Active surrender	Mastery and control
The nature of discourse:	Narrative	Argument
The role of emotion:	Feelings illuminate thought	Feelings cloud thought
Procedure for achieving (approximating) "objectivity":	Adopting the perspective of the particular other; empathy	Adopting a neutral perspective, "from no position in particular," adhering to rules for avoiding bias
Basis of authority:	Personal experience (own or vicarious)	Mastery of relevant knowledge and methodology
Strengths:	Holistic, inclusive	Narrowing, discriminating
Vulnerabilities:	Absence of conviction; loss of identity, autonomy, and power. Danger of always being the listener	Absence of conviction; alienation and absence of care and intimacy. Danger of never listening

"What is the evidence for and against this theory?" In attempting to get at the meaning of an idea, the Connected Knower adopts a "believing" stance (Elbow, 1973; 1986), using empathy in an attempt to share the experience behind the idea, "feeling with" and "thinking with" the author of the idea. One woman told us that in counseling undergraduates, she is "usually a bit of a chameleon. I try to look for pieces of the truth in what the person's saying instead of going contrary to them, sort of collaborate with them." In contrast, Separate Knowers take a critical stance, acting as adversaries rather than allies. Instead of stepping into the other's shoes they step back, measuring the quality of the object against impersonal criteria such as the logic of the argument or the fit between the theory and the data.

Both Separate and Connected Knowers exhibit objectivity, but of a different sort. Separate Knowers believe in separating the knower from the known, so as to avoid "contamination." In searching for truth, they try to "weed out the self" using Elbow's (1973, p. 149) phrase, putting their own feelings and values aside and adopting a neutral perspective, "from no position in particular." To avoid bias, they adopt procedures such as "double-blinding" in conducting experiments and "blind grading" in assessing students' work. Connected Knowers also attempt to suspend their own beliefs, but instead of adopting a neutral perspective, they adopt the perspective of the other. When we asked women what "objectivity" meant to them, and why one should be objective, they often said something like, "When you're trying to help a friend decide whether to get an abortion, you have to forget what you think about abortion and see it from her point of view, given her assumptions." Connected Knowers do not "extricate" (Elbow, 1973) the self: convinced that the knower and the known are inextricably related, they use the self to help them connect with the other. To "the strong democrat," wrote the political scientist Benjamin Barber:

"I will listen" means not that I will scan my adversary's position for weaknesses and potential trade-offs, nor even . . . that I will tolerantly permit him to say whatever he chooses. It means, rather, "I will put myself in his place. I will try to understand, I will strain to hear what makes us alike" (1984, p. 175; emphasis added).

Connected Knowers take this approach not only to people but to relatively "impersonal" objects. "To understand a poem," an undergraduate said, "You must let the poem pass into you and become part of yourself, rather than something you see outside yourself. . . . there has to be some parallel between you and the poem." And the biochemist portrayed by June Goodfield in *An Imagined World* says, "If you really want to understand about a tumor you've got to be a tumor" (Goodfield, 1991/1994, p. 226). In contrast, Separate Knowers adhere to what the feminist philosopher Susan Bordo calls "the Cartesian masculinization of thought;" for them it is "the otherness of nature [that] allows it to be known," and "empathic, associational, or emotional response obscures objectivity, feeling for nature

muddies the clear lake of the mind" (Bordo, 1986, p. 452). Connected Knowers, in contrast, believe that emotions can serve as clues. A nursery school teacher once told me that in trying to understand a particular child, she asks herself, "How does this child make me feel?" "I know my reaction says something about me," she says, "and I have to sort that out, but it also tells me something about him."

Separate and connected knowing, as presented here, are inventions, something like ideal types. In our work we have never encountered an individual who exhibited all the aspects of either mode, and it is possible that different categories of individuals will show different patterns, containing some components of a mode and excluding others. In a study of attitudes toward separate and connected knowing among Wellesley and MIT undergraduates, Mansfield and I found that many of the Wellesley undergraduates we interviewed embraced some aspects of Separate Knowing as we presented it (impartial analysis, for example) but strongly objected to its more oppositional aspects, such as playing "devil's advocate," and while most of the women included empathy in delineating their own versions of "connected knowing," not one of the men referred to empathy or, indeed, made any mention of affect (Rabin, 1994). (We suspect that the difference has as much or more to do with the cultural norms of the two institutions as with gender.)

Some of our research participants seem to express more complex versions of the modes than others. As the philosopher Sara Ruddick reminds us, "a 'position' or 'way' allows development within its modality" (Ruddick, 1996, p. 255). In an attempt to trace this development, Mansfield and I are looking for specific differences between versions that seem intuitively more or less sophisticated, and we are examining longitudinal data collected from adolescents in search of developmental change, asking, for instance, whether some components appear to come in earlier than others.

As work continues, particularly in different cultures and subcultures, researchers will surely deconstruct the crude dichotomy presented in Table 4.1, identifying configurations that contain elements from both its columns. Consider, for instance, Kochman's (1981) intriguing account of the distinctive ways in which urban community Black students and White middle-class students in his Chicago college classroom deal with conflict. The White students seem to adopt a prototypical detached Separate Knowing style: They "relate to their material as spokesmen, not advocates . . . They believe that the . . . merits of an idea are intrinsic to the idea itself. How deeply a person cares about or believes in the idea is considered irrelevant to its fundamental value." Blacks, on the other hand, use an approach that is adversarial, but neither disinterested nor unemotional. They "present their views as advocates. They take a position and show that they care about this position" (p. 20). Whites believe that "caring about one's own ideas" makes a person "less receptive to opposing ideas," but Blacks see no contradiction between attachment to one's own ideas and openness to alternative ideas, which they also value; in fact, they are suspicious of people who present an argument as if they had no personal stake in it. "Whites believe that opinions should be evaluated on their own merits: they are taught to present ideas as though the

ideas had an objective life, existing independent of any person expressing them," but Blacks, "because they feel that all views . . . derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal . . . often probe beyond a given statement to find out where a person is 'coming from' in order to clarify [its] meaning and value" (Kochman, 1981, pp. 20-23).

Connected Knowing Versus Subjectivism

Of all the themes presented in WWK, the concept of Connected Knowing has provoked the most interest, probably the most research, certainly the most controversy, and—in my defensive opinion—the most misunderstanding. As I have written:

In WWK we defined connected knowing as a rigorous, deliberate, and demanding procedure, a way of knowing that requires work. Contrasting it with . . . "subjectivism," we said, "It is important to distinguish between the effortless intuition of subjectivism (in which one identifies with positions that feel right) and the deliberate imaginative extension of one's understanding into positions that initially feel wrong or remote." (WWK, 1986, p. 121). Many of our readers—friends and foes alike—have ignored the distinction, conflating connected knowing with subjectivism by treating it more as a reflex than a procedure. (Clinchy, 1996, p. 209)

Connected Knowing builds on the positive qualities of Subjectivism, but it transcends its limits. Table 4.2 presents some of the similarities and differences between the two modes. Connected Knowers retain the Subjectivist's respect for subjectivity and for the lessons that can be learned from first-hand experience, but they are not imprisoned within their own subjectivity or confined to their own narrow slice of experience; they develop techniques for entering into alien subjectivities and making use of vicarious experience. Connected Knowers, like Subjectivists, are reluctant to make judgments; they are in this sense "accepting," but theirs is not the passive acceptance, the "to-each-his-own-indifferentism" (Geertz, 1986, p. 122) of the Subjectivist. Fully developed Connected Knowing requires that one "affirm" or "confirm" the subjective reality of the other, and affirmation is not merely the absence of negative evaluation; it is a positive effortful act. Affirmation of a person or a position means "saying Yes to it" (Elbow, 1986, p. 279), rather than merely offering sympathetic understanding. Confirmation means, in the theologian Martin Buber's wonderful phrases, to "imagine the real," to "make the other present" (Buber, quoted by Friedman, 1985, p. 4). It involves "a bold swinging . . . into the life of the other" (Buber, quoted by Kohn, 1990, p. 112).

We saw that Subjectivists cannot engage in genuine dialogue; although they speak, often they cannot really hear. "What's the point of class discussion," one student asked, "when you have your own thoughts that feel right?" For

TABLE 4.2
Subjectivism and Connected Knowing
Similarities and Differences

<i>Subjectivism</i>	<i>Connected Knowing</i>
reflexive, reactive, spontaneous locked in one's own perspective often, "projection in the bad sense" (Elbow): egocentric assumption that others share one's view Everyone has a right to their own opinion and everyone's opinion is right for them. All opinions are equally valid; an opinion has validity simply because someone holds it. Assertion of validity of one's own opinion for one's self, but only for one's self. Knowledge is derived from first-hand experience. Only my own subjectivity is really real to me. One should show tolerance and respect for views that differ from one's own. Intuition and feeling are involved, but not empathy. (feeling, but not feeling with) little or no reasoning involved; the "gut" or "the heart" predominate. One need not entertain other views as possible options for the self. (Resistant to change)	deliberate, effortful; midwifery entering another perspective suspending, "bracketing" one's own view Everyone has a right to a considered opinion. People are responsible for their opinions. Some opinions are better than others, but one should not evaluate an opinion unless one has tried hard to understand it. Knowledge can be acquired through vicarious experience. One can enter into other subjectivities. One should try to imagine, explore, and understand views that differ from one's own Intuition and feeling may be involved, especially empathy. "thinking with" as well as "feeling with" the other. One should entertain other people's opinions as possibilities for the self. (Open to transformation)

Connected Knowers knowledge is neither absolutely private nor absolutely certain; hearing other voices becomes not only possible but, because truth is now problematic rather than transparent, essential. Connected Knowers begin to perceive other people's realities not just as "alternatives to" themselves, as Subjectivists do, but as "alternatives for" themselves (Geertz, 1986, p. 111, citing Bernard Williams). Other people's realities become possibilities for them.

Connected Knowers develop techniques for facilitating and eliciting these realities through "active listening" (Rogers & Farson, 1967). Active listening is not a natural capacity, but in Geertz's phrase, a "skill arduously to be learned" (Geertz, 1986, p. 122), one that is rarely practiced in daily life. Having tried for years with more and less success to learn and to teach the art of interviewing, I know how difficult it is to listen "objectively" in the connected sense, that is, to hear the other in the other's own terms, to act, as the psychologist Evelyn Schwaber puts it, as "an observer from within" (Schwaber, 1983, p. 274). Connected Knowers achieve skill, too, in making themselves understood by finding a route into the other's subjectivity: Kim, the African American student we met earlier, seemed to move outside her normally

Subjectivist frame when, in the midst of describing an experience of racial discrimination, she suddenly leaned across the desk and asked, "Are you Jewish?"—searching, it seemed, for some "parallel" between us that would allow her experience to "pass into" me.

Connected Knowing, like Subjectivism (and unlike Separate Knowing), attends to feelings as sources of insight, but it also involves reasoning—feeling with and thinking with. This point is often overlooked, perhaps because the dichotomy between separate and connected knowing that we present is assimilated into the dualism between thinking and feeling that pervades this culture, leading to a fallacious syllogism: If separate knowing involves thinking, and connected knowing involves feeling, connected knowing must not involve thinking. We say that although connected knowing is uncritical it is not unthinking, but in a culture in which the predominant view is that thinking is critical thinking, "uncritical thinking" becomes an oxymoron.

Issues of Gender

Although WWK is based entirely on interviews with women, it has been widely described as a study of "sex differences," perhaps partly because when male and female are perceived as binary opposites, as they typically are, it is difficult to see why one would speak of "women's" ways of knowing except to distinguish them from men's ways. We did not argue that the positions we described applied only to women, although we speculated that for various reasons, the positions might take somewhat different form in men; Marcia Baxter Magolda's research (chap. 5, this volume) suggests that this might be so. In particular, we did not mean to imply that all women, and only women, are Connected Knowers or that all men, and only men, are Separate Knowers. Because we interviewed only women, the voices we used to illustrate both modes were largely, of course, women's voices. Indeed, we did not attempt to "code" participants as Connected or Separate Knowers, but only as Procedural Knowers, for, having not yet clearly defined the two modes when we began the research, we had asked no questions designed to elicit the relevant data.

Subsequent research, involving men as well as women, and using recently developed survey measures as well as interviews focusing directly on separate and connected knowing, suggests that the two modes may be gender-related, but not gender exclusive. For instance, in two studies involving undergraduates at academically selective colleges, females consistently rated connected knowing statements higher than separate knowing statements, while males' ratings of the two modes did not differ (Galotti, Clinchy, Ainsworth, Lavin, & Mansfield, 1999; Galotti, Drebus, & Reimer, 1999). I know of no studies comparing the frequency of use of the two modes by males and females except in terms of self-report; more objective (observer-based) data would be useful.

However, sex differences were not then and are not now a central interest for me. I resonate to the words of Carol Gilligan: "When I hear my work being cast

in terms of whether women and men are really (essentially) different or who is better than whom, I know that I have lost my voice, because these are not my questions" (1993, xiii). They were not our questions either. We did not mean to assert that connected knowing was "better" than separate knowing, only that it was "a different voice," a legitimate and effective voice that deserved to be heard. Like Gilligan and other "different voice" theorists, we "wished to repair an omission in psychological theory and in the society, by bringing into public consciousness a way of seeing, speaking, and knowing that emphasized attachment and interdependence rather than detachment and autonomy" (Clinchy & Norem, 1998, p. 785).

Critics contend that connected knowing is essentially a powerless way of knowing. I argue that it can be a powerful way of constructing knowledge (Clinchy, 1998), but I acknowledge that a society that devalues it will devalue the person who uses it. Until the "omission" of that voice in the institutions of this society is repaired, those who use it will suffer. I was reminded of this recently when I heard a colleague in economics tell how she insists that her students develop "a public voice" for use in class, a confident, decisive, authoritative voice that differs from the hesitant, groping, vague, and uncertain "private" voice they use in the residence hall. "I tell them," she said, "that if the CEO asks them how many factories they should build, and they say 'F-i-i-i-ve . . . ?' (with rising inflection), while the guy next to her says firmly 'Seven!,' seven will be built and the guy will be promoted above them." A bit shaken, I recalled how that very morning I had been urging the students in my seminar not to conduct an interview as if it were an exam, but to say things like "So - o - o - o, you mean . . . ? . . . I'm not sure I understand . . . I think maybe . . ." In effect I was asking them to bring their private voices into the public domain. Which of us was right, I asked myself, the economist or me? Both. One voice is more effective in one context, the other in the other. We know from research that these procedures are not mutually exclusive, indeed, measures of the two appear to be orthogonal (David, 1999; Galotti, Clinchy, Ainsworth, Lavin, & Mansfield, 1999; Galotti, Drebus, & Reimer, 1999). Students need to develop skill in both modes, so that they can deploy whichever is appropriate for a given occasion. In time, we might even envision their achieving a way of knowing that integrates the two voices into one. What would such a voice sound like? In WWK, we weren't sure, but, we began to sketch it out, and we called it Constructed Knowing.

CONSTRUCTED KNOWING

The chapter on Constructed Knowing in WWK was by far the most difficult to write. It passed from hand to hand among us for months, as we wrote and revised it, and I, for one, have never been satisfied with it. Because this is the most complex of the positions, it is the most difficult to construct, and because our sample contained so few Constructed Knowers, we had little data to work with. Since the

publication of WWK, my students and I have sought out research participants who we believed might help us in constructing a richer portrait of the position—for instance, relatively privileged adults active in professional and community life, and a sample of undergraduates nominated by their professors as "complex thinkers" in their fields (Arch, 1998). In this section, I rely largely on their words, elaborating on several aspects of the position presented in WWK. This research is in its infancy, and my comments should be read as highly speculative.

Constructed knowing has much in common with Perry's Position 5. Complexity and ambiguity are assumed, and "right answers are a special case." Anna, a senior honors student majoring in history, said that in her field, although there were some questions such as "Did this happen on this day?" to which an answer could be true or false, "those aren't the questions on this day?" to which an answer is "There's a state of creative confusion, or at least doubt. I think it's always going to be that way." When last she encountered math and science, Amy had assumed that they contained "Truth with a capital T."

My experience with [science and math] has been on such a basic level that it's almost like spelling. You can spell right and you can spell wrong . . . I have a sense, though, that [in] higher level mathematics and stuff you get into things where just one answer isn't sufficient or isn't the only way. Things can sort of just diverge off, and there is more than one possibility. . . . I think that exists, you know, it must. Can't all be '2 and 2 is 4.'

When we ask Procedural Knowers to describe their ways of learning and thinking, they often enumerate a linear step-by-step program. Constructivists are less articulate; they struggle to find images to express the process, and the images are more often circular than linear. Amy says "it's hard to explain."

You proceed out of confusion. . . . There's just sort of a sense of a mixing bowl where you sort of let—where you are confused and you don't have any solid or stable. . . . I think it's sort of like a whirlpool or something like that. Where you've got a lot of ideas zooming around, and you haven't yet affixed any of them to being right or wrong in your head yet or meshing with all the others. Things are still just sort of whirling around; then you start, pulling them out and filtering things out and making sense out of them.

Similarly, Marie said:

A lot of it has been lots of passive and then 'Boom!', all of a sudden something comes and really sticks, and I'm very active, and [then] lots of passive again, and then 'Boom!' again. It's like I have to take in a whole lot and sift it all down. You know, put it all in a big sieve and sift it all down

and the stuff that falls through I collect and start building with, and then 'Wham!'—all of a sudden the right piece will fall into the sieve and something will be completed.

We gave the Constructed Knowing chapter the subtitle, *Integrating the Voices*, to capture the women's tales of "weaving together the strands of rational and emotive thought and of integrating objective and subjective knowing" (WWK, p. 134). Amy and Marie weave together the "active surrender" of connected knowing with the "mastery and control" of separate knowing into a single way of knowing. In her practice as a family counselor, Sara tries to combine the empathy of connected knowing with the detachment of separate knowing. Recently, she told us, she canceled an appointment with a client in order to take a needed vacation with her daughter, and the client felt betrayed. "I'm working hard to get to a place where I can really understand how tortured she feels by this," she said. "I want to stay right with her as much as I can. I also have to keep monitoring this whole thing from a professional stance, trying to see it all and keep it all in perspective." Aware that she herself is tilted toward connection, she observes herself carefully: "If I find myself being too much into that close-up stance where I'm completely involved in that person's perspective and maybe lose touch with the professional stance, I need to scramble to get my professional stance back." Although Sara is aware that some therapists find an aggressive approach effective, she knows that it would not work for her. "Even if I have to confront sometimes, I still want to do that within a relationship that I feel is viable and trusting." She has evolved an approach that blends aspects of separate and connected knowing: she will "take an oppositional stance," voicing exceptions to a client's interpretations, but she phrases her comments in connected language, "in a way that hopefully isn't argumentative, but sort of like a confused statement." No one taught Sara this technique; she developed it herself to suit the sort of person she is. As Kegan might put it, while Procedural Knowers are "subject" to their procedures, Constructed Knowers are in control of them; they own them.

At the heart of constructed knowing, as is implicit in Perry's Position 5, is the belief that "All knowledge is constructed, and the knower is an intimate part of the known" (WWK, p. 137). Kegan asks, "Having put our world together, are we awake to the fact that it is an invented reality, a made world? Do we regularly look for some quite different way the same experience could cohere and so render a whole different meaning?" "[W]e 'make sense,'" he goes on, "but we do not always take responsibility for it as made" (Kegan, 1994, p. 205). Although none of us, of course, is always conscious of inventing reality, Constructivists often are, and at least on reflection, they recognize that they are responsible for their constructions and that it is their duty—"an ethical imperative," as one woman put it—to consider alternative constructions. If truth is "an increasing complexity," as the poet Adrienne Rich (1979, p. 187) said, and as our Constructivists believe, there is never a single, crucial experiment or a perfect, "impregnable" argument that will settle the matter. Procedural Knowers stay within a given system—the

viewpoint of a particular person or a particular discipline, for example. Constructivists move among systems. Amy, who worried during her sophomore year that she might "mix up" the material from one course with the material from another, and "say the wrong things on the exam," told us, as a senior:

I think one of the most exciting things is when you're getting different insights into a similar thing. Like when you're taking seventeenth-century literature as well as art you have a sense of a lot of things coming together, a lot of different things that explain each other sometimes . . . And you start getting a much greater sense of what was happening, and why each thing in turn produced the other, and how they all interact.

In WWK we wrote, "[C]onstructivists show a high tolerance for internal contradiction and ambiguity" (p. 137). "Dialogue" and 'balance' were key words in [the] epistemological vocabulary" of the "complex thinkers" interviewed by Joanna Arch (1998, p. 53). For example, Karen approaches history, her field of concentration, as "a dialogue" between past and present; although it is important for historians to avoid projecting current assumptions and concerns "blindly back into the past," she said, it is important also to keep them in mind. Philosophers and psychologists refer to this sort of approach as "dialectical thinking" (e.g., Basseches, 1986; Clayton & Birren, 1980; also see Oser & Reich, 1987, on "complementarity"), Karen calls it "my little two-direction thing." (Notice that, like Sara, she "owns" the approach.)

When Constructed Knowers find their thoughts and feelings in conflict, they try to cultivate a "conversation" between the two, instead of allowing one to silence the other. In her "rational mind," Karen said, she is opposed to censorship, but, "intuitively," because of an experience involving the attempted suicide of a friend after reading an assigned book, she is in favor of it:

There has to be a way for that experience to coincide with thought. And be more than a gut reaction, even though the gut reaction is the strongest thing about it. And I think that's true of all sorts of things. . . . I remain convinced . . . that what's truly right will work on both an emotional and a logical level. And maybe that's not true. But I'd like to think that and pursue that thought.

Although barely twenty one years old, Karen seems to have the beginnings of "wisdom," as defined by Labouvie-Vief: "While *logos* has insisted on the separation of such realms as reason and faith, thinking versus feeling, outer versus inner, or mind versus body, wisdom maintains that these two realms constitute but complementary and interacting poles of thought (1990, p. 78)."

Interviews with older, seemingly "wise" women like Sara have led me to suspect that when constructed knowing reaches its fullest development (probably not before middle age, I would guess), the construction of self and other might look

something like Kegan's (1994) "fifth order consciousness." To illustrate the difference between fourth and fifth order consciousness, respectively, Kegan invents two couples, the Ables and the Bakers, both of whom have been married for many years. The Ables respect their differences, and most of the time they are "comfortable" with them. "We're probably more comfortable with each other," they said, "because we're a lot more comfortable with ourselves. . . . Anyway, we've become a good team. We find that our differences are often complementary. One picks up what the other one misses." For each of the Ables, the self is single and complete: "Mr. Able comes over to discover the world of Mrs. Able, but in all his respectful discovering he never questions the premise that this is not his world." For each of the Bakers, on the other hand, the self is multiple and incomplete, an "evolving self" (Kegan, 1982) composed of contradictory parts. The Bakers have come to see that the differences each experiences between the self and the other are also differences within the self and the other. "When Mr. Baker comes over to try on the perspective he has identified with Mrs. Baker, . . . he is vulnerable to discovering another world within himself." For instance, to an outsider it may appear that one of the Bakers is an activist and the other a contemplative. But "when we are at our best," said the Bakers themselves, "we get a good glimpse of the fact that the activist . . . also has a contemplative living inside him." And when they have a fight, if it's a good fight, "the fight becomes a way for us to recover our own complexity, . . . to leave off making the other into our opposite and face up to our own oppositeness."

The Ables have learned to avoid destructive conflict by treating each other as complements rather than enemies; through respecting each other's points of view, compromising, and taking turns, they have become "a good problem-solving team." But their relationship is not a source of growth: "We are who we are," they say (Kegan, 1994, p. 308). The Bakers' relationship is a source of growth, "a context for a sharing and an interacting in which both are helped to experience their 'multipleness,' in which the many forms or systems that each self is are helped to emerge" (Kegan, 1994, p. 313). When differences between partners are acknowledged as differences within each of the partners, they become similarities between them, and the apparent opposition between similarity and difference is dissolved. Piaget was right, I think, in positing difference and contradiction as powerful forces in development, but I believe that similarity and coincidence can be equally powerful, and that the integration of the two, in constructed knowing, is more powerful still.

CONCLUSION

In WWK we could not assert with confidence that the epistemological positions we defined represented a developmental progression, for we had longitudinal data for only the small proportion of our sample whom we had also interviewed in earlier studies; otherwise, we had to rely on retrospective accounts. In any

case, I now believe that we should be wary of moving too quickly to embrace theories that postulate a single, acontextual linear direction in epistemological development. Such global theories have been useful in the past, but, the pervasiveness of "domain specificity" has led me to believe that we need to examine development within rather than across domains. For instance, it seems likely that, while in approaching the humanities, students often move from a Subjectivist to a Procedural position, in approaching science they may "skip" Subjectivism, going directly from Received to Procedural Knowing. I believe that microanalytic longitudinal investigations of individuals grappling with a particular discipline or set of issues can be especially illuminating, for example, studies of changes over months or years in students' conceptions of truth within a particular course, as revealed through interviews and essays (e.g., McCarthy, 1987; McCarthy & Fishman, 1991). Besides providing a more detailed account of the nature of development, longitudinal "case studies" of this sort can lead to hypotheses about the kinds of experiences that facilitate epistemological development, for example, Haviland and Kramer's (1991) analysis of the diary of Anne Frank suggests that intensity of emotion about a particular issue can serve as a stimulus to more complex constructions of the issue.

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