1 global studies essay

Climate Change, Migration, and Governance Author(s): Susan Martin Source: Global Governance, Vol. 16, No. 3, International Migration (July-Sept. 2010), pp. 397-414 Published by: Brill Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29764954 Accessed: 08-07-2019 05:24 UTC

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Global Governance 16 (2010), 397-414

Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

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Susan Martin

There is growing recognition that the effects of climate change are likely to lead to more migration, both internally and internationally, in the relatively near future. These climate change-induced migrations are likely to pose new challenges to the international system, ranging from an increase in ir? regular migration, to strains on existing asylum systems, to protection gaps for certain migrants affected. Yet the legal and normative framework, and institutional roles and responsibilities, relating to climate change-induced migration remain poorly developed. This article provides an overview of the interactions between climate change and migration, outlines the current in? ternational response, and considers new approaches to the global gover? nance framework. Keywords: climate change, migration, asylum.

AS EARLY AS 1990, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE

(IPCC) warned that significant levels of migration could occur as a result of changing climatic conditions.1 The concept of environmental migration proved to be a controversial one, largely because of the difficulty in measuring the ex? tent to which environmental factors compel people to move. Since the 1980s, when the term environmental refugees was coined, experts within the environ? mental and migration fields have differed in their characterization of the phe? nomenon. Oli Brown puts those concerned with the interconnections in two groups?alarmists and skeptics.2 The alarmists see the environment as a princi? pal cause of population movements, emphasize the forced nature of the migra? tion (thus, using the term "refugee"), and often project that hundreds of millions

of persons will be affected, frequently without differentiating between those who will move short distances to safer ground versus those who will move thousands of miles to new countries. The skeptics, by contrast, raise questions about the models used to generate estimates of those who will be forced to migrate and emphasize that pull factors in destination locations are often more important than push factors at home in determining whether, where, and in what volume people will migrate. Perhaps not surprisingly, some environmentalists have been particularly alarmist, often using the threat of mass migration as a reason that immediate action should be taken to address climate change and other environ?

mental problems. Migration experts, concerned about a potential backlash against migrants and misuse of terms like "refugee," which is carefully defined in international law, have tended to join the camp of the skeptics.

397

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398 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Recognizing the complexity in determining causality, and the broader con? text in which the environment affects population movements, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has offered the following broad definition of environmental migrants: "Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the en? vironment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or perma? nently, and who move either within their country or abroad."3

Policymakers have been slow, however, to develop national, regional, or international laws, policies, or organizational responsibilities?that is, a system of governance?to manage environmentally induced migration. This situation derives in part from uncertainties about the actual impacts of the environment, particularly as exacerbated by climate change, on migration. But even where there is a recognition that some form of migration related to environmental change is likely to occur, addressing these movements is hampered by the paucity of policy or institutional responses that are deemed appropriate to these forms of migration.

This article begins with a brief discussion of the potential impact of climate change on migration patterns. I continue with an examination of existing capac? ities to address these forms of movement, discussing gaps in governance. I con? clude with recommendations for addressing climate change-induced migration.

Climate Change and Migration While new research is emerging on the relationship between climate change and migration,4 without such basic information as how many people are likely to move, from where to where, and for how long, developing an appropriate policy framework is exceedingly difficult.

It appears that there are four paths, in particular, by which environmental change may affect migration either directly or, more likely, in combination with other factors:

1. Intensification of natural disasters, such as hurricanes and cyclones that destroy housing and livelihoods and require people to relocate for shorter or longer periods;

2. Increased warming and drought that affects agricultural production, re? ducing people's livelihoods and access to clean water;

3. Rising sea levels that render coastal areas uninhabitable; and 4. Competition over natural resources that may lead to conflict, which in

turn precipitates displacement.5

Vulnerability or resilience to these situations?that is, the capability to cope or adapt to them?will determine the degree to which people are forced to

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Susan Martin 399

migrate. The availability of alternative livelihoods or other coping capacities in the affected area generally determines the scale and form of migration that

may take place. For slow-onset events, such as intensified drought and rising sea levels, as compared to such natural disasters as hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons, or human disasters, such as conflict, the urgency to migrate may be less pressing since the environment and the harms associated with it change

more slowly. But if alternative livelihoods are not available within a reason? able time frame for the would-be migrant, then migration may be the best or only option available, even in slow-onset situations.

It is important to keep in mind that migration can have positive as well as negative consequences for the affected populations and the communities to which they migrate. The negative impacts stem particularly from emer? gency mass movements, generally those related to the rapid-onset natural disasters and to competition for resources that may result in conflict. These movements most closely resemble refugee movements and often require large-scale humanitarian assistance. The negative impacts may also be more extreme if receiving communities, particularly urban areas, are unprepared to absorb large numbers of spontaneous migrants. The more positive im? pacts occur when migration is a voluntary coping strategy that allows people time to weigh alternatives and use migration as a way to reduce household risk.6

It is also important to keep in mind that climate change-induced migra? tion is not a single event. Different issues arise at each stage of environmental

migration. The first stage is premigration, when actions to prevent, mitigate, and help individuals adapt to environmental hazards take place. Prevention of the underlying causes of environmentally induced migration is the most criti? cal need in managing the issues covered in this article, but it will require con? siderable political will, time, and resources to take the steps that are needed to protect the environment.

Adaptation and disaster risk reduction deal more specifically with migra? tion. Adaptation refers to "initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change ef? fects."7 Disaster risk reduction involves "systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events."8 Identifying vulnerabilities is essential in each case since the "characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset. . . make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard."9 Adaptation and disaster risk reduction can involve steps to reduce the need for individuals to migrate to get out of harm's

way, or it can involve migration as an adaptation or risk reduction strategy that allows a community or household to cope with changes and, perhaps, reduce risk for others.

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400 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Movement is the second stage of the life cycle. Migration can be planned or spontaneous, involving individuals and households or entire communities. It can be internal, with people moving shorter or longer distances to find new homes and livelihoods within their own countries, or it can be international,

with people seeking to relocate to other countries. It can proceed as an orderly movement of people from one location to another, or it can occur under emer? gency circumstances. It can be temporary, with most migrants expecting to re? turn home when conditions permit, or it can be permanent, with most migrants unable or unwilling to return. Each of these forms of migration requires sig? nificantly different approaches and policy frameworks. Depending on the spe? cific situation, the environmental migrants may resemble labor migrants, seeking better livelihood opportunities in a new location, or they may resem? ble refugees and internally displaced persons who have fled situations beyond their individual control.

Most migration occurring from climate change is likely to be internal, al? though a portion will undoubtedly be international. In the most extreme cases, particularly in the context of rising sea levels, an entire population of island nations may need to be relocated. The third stage of the life cycle involves re? turn or settlement in another location and the integration of migrants. The de? cision as to whether return is possible involves a range of variables, including the extent to which the environmental causes?either direct or through other channels?is likely to persist. Policies in the receiving communities and coun? tries, depending on whether the migration is internal or international, will also affect the likelihood for return or settlement in the new location. In addition to

immigration policies, the policies affecting return and settlement include land use and property rights, social welfare, housing, employment, and other frame? works that determine whether individuals, households, and communities are able to find decent living conditions and pursue adequate livelihoods. Integra? tion is also affected by plans and programs to mitigate future dislocations from environmental hazards, coming full circle on the life cycle to a focus on pre? vention, adaptation, and risk reduction.

In this article, I define global governance to include legal frameworks and institutional roles and responsibilities to manage climate change-induced mi? gration. I organize the article around the three stages described above: premi gration, with a particular emphasis on adaptation, movements within borders, and movements across borders, including (re)settlement and (re)integration of migrants.

Premigration The Copenhagen Accord, adopted at the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Decem? ber 2009, highlighted the importance of adaptation strategies:

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Susan Martin 401

Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the imple?

mentation of the Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, espe? cially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustain? able financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the im? plementation of adaptation action in developing countries.10

National adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) are the principal mech? anisms through which low-income developing countries identify adaptation needs and programs. The governing legal accord is the UN Framework Con? vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that NAPAs "provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage."11 As of October 2008, thirty-eight countries had submitted plans.12 NAPAs have serious limitations as a mechanism for identifying the full range of adaptation needs and plans. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) assessed NAPAs in its 2007/2008 Human Development Report:

First, they provide a very limited response to the adaptation challenge, focussing primarily on "climate-proofing" through small-scale projects. . . . Second, the NAPAs have, in most countries, been developed outside the institutional frame? work for national planning on poverty reduction. The upshot is a project-based response that fails to integrate adaptation planning into the development of wider policies for overcoming vulnerability and marginalization.13

NAPAs nevertheless remain one of the few planning instruments for LDCs that are facing the prospect of large-scale dislocations due to climate change. The Copenhagen conference in December 2009 made some progress in identifying funding mechanisms to support adaptation initiatives. Paragraph 8 of the Copenhagen Accord specifies:

Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support en? hanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emis? sions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention.

The parties to the accord pledged to provide US$30 billion for the period from 2010 to 2012, with funding allocated between adaptation and mitigation.

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402 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

The most vulnerable developing countries, such as the LDCs, small-island de? veloping states, and African countries, will be given priority for adaptation programs. Developed countries also committed to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. To what extent projects related to migration will be funded is unknown.

Internal Migration Different systems of global governance pertain to internal and international movements of people. For the most part, there are no systems of global gov? ernance that address internal migration, which is an internal matter of state sovereignty. The limits of sovereignty are not absolute, however. The Univer? sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides clear guidance in Article 13 that "everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (ICCPR) affirms that "everyone lawfully within the terri? tory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement

and freedom to choose his residence." The ICCPR provides certain exceptions: "The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant." To the extent that climate change produces conditions that under? mine national security, public order, or public health, which may be the case in extreme natural disasters or conflict, then governments would have the right to enact provisions that would require people to move.

A further relevant framework is the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis? placement and the recently adopted, but not yet in force, African Union (AU) Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. Internally displaced persons are described as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an inter? nationally recognized State border."

Since the definition encompasses people who are forced to leave their homes because of natural or human-made disasters, the guiding principles and AU Convention, when it comes into force, apply to some of those who will mi? grate as a result of climate change. In fact, the AU Convention explicitly rec? ognizes that there will likely be displacement from climate change, stating in Article 4: "States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human-made disasters, in? cluding climate change."

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The World Bank and the regional development banks have promulgated guidelines in measuring the adequacy of resettlement plans adopted in the con? text of large-scale development programs. These guidelines are pertinent to the

management of resettlement in the environmental context. The roles of other international organizations with regard to internal migration as a result of cli?

mate change are in evolution, much as are the legal frameworks. The most de? veloped governance structure pertains to situations of forced displacement from natural disasters and conflict that may be related to climate change. The UN emergency relief coordinator established a cluster system in 2005 to co? ordinate relief operations that include natural disasters and conflict. Lead agencies are assigned to each cluster, which include health, shelter, nutrition, agriculture, education, camp management, water, sanitation and hygiene, and protection, particularly of internally displaced persons. Evaluations of the cluster approach indicate that it has improved coordination but that the clus? ters vary in their effectiveness.14 Interesting for the purpose of this article, the protection of persons displaced by factors other than conflict remains an area without special designation. Although the UN High Commissioner for Refu? gees (UNHCR) is the designated lead in conflict situations, the lead in cases of natural disasters and other situations will be determined on a case-by-case basis. In the event of large-scale displacement from climate change, such an approach might lead to significant gaps in protection of those who are forced to migrate.

International Migration

The International Legal and Normative Framework There are no international instruments that specifically address international migration stemming from climate change or other environmental factors. Those migrating because of environmental factors have the same rights and re? sponsibilities as others who cross international borders. As with other mi? grants, they enjoy all of the human rights applicable in international law. The UDHR, the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) define the basic rights of all persons. They include the right to life, liberty, and security; the right not to be held in slavery or servi? tude; the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, de? tention, or exile; freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state; the right to marry and to found a family; and the right to work, free choice of employment, and just and favorable conditions of work. These rights are provided without distinction of any kind regarding such things as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori? gin, property, or birth (Article 2 of the UDHR).

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404 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Importantly, UDHR Article 13 also declares that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's own coun? try." The declaration does not require any other country to admit people who exercise their right to leave. Similarly, UDHR Article 14 states that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution," but there is no corresponding obligation on the part of states to offer asylum.

A number of countries have ratified conventions sponsored by the Interna? tional Labour Organization (ILO) specifically protecting the rights of migrants. Forty-nine countries have ratified the Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised) No. 97, and twenty-three countries have ratified the Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers No. 143. The In? ternational Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers builds on the ILO's conventions. It reaffirms basic human rights norms and embodies them in an in? strument applicable to migrant workers and their families. The underlying goal of the convention is to guarantee minimum rights for migrant workers and members of their families who are in either a legal or irregular situation. Its im? plementation could significantly encourage basic humane treatment of all mi? grant workers. However, the number of states ratifying the convention is still disappointingly small.15 No major destination country of migrants has yet signed the convention, raising further questions about its effectiveness.

The convention defines the rights of migrant workers under two main headings: "The human rights of migrant workers and members of their fami? lies" (Part III), which reaffirms the human rights of all migrants regardless of their legal status, and "other rights of migrant workers" (Part IV), which sets out additional rights applicant only to migrant workers in a regular situation. Documented migrants are defined as those "authorized to enter, to stay and en? gage in a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements to which that State is a party" (Ar? ticle 5). To the extent that environmental migrants use such programs, they would be covered under the provisions of the convention.

Environmental migrants who use irregular means of entry may be covered under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Es? pecially Women and Children and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Mi? grants by Land, Sea and Air, both of which supplement the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and went into force in De? cember 2003 and January 2004, respectively. Within a few years of their adop? tion, the trafficking and smuggling protocols have garnered considerable support, with more than 100 signatories and 67 and 59 parties, respectively.

Some environmental migrants may be covered under the 1951 UN Con? vention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.16 The conven? tion defines refugees as persons who were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries because of a "well-founded

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fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group." States have no obligation to admit refugees, but they do have an obligation not to refoule (return) a refugee to "frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac?

count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." While few persons seeking protection because of purely environmental reasons are likely to meet the definition, those fleeing because of competition for resources arising from climate change may qualify if they are unable to access resources because of a protected characteristic (i.e., race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opin? ion). In Africa, the scope of coverage might be greater because the 1969 Or? ganization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa includes anyone who, "owing to external aggres? sion, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is com?

pelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality" (emphasis added). To the ex? tent that climate change seriously disturbs public order, persons forced to leave their homes may be covered.

At the national level, immigration laws of most destination countries are not conducive to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants, unless they enter through already existing admission categories. Typically, destination countries admit persons to fill job openings or to reunify with family members. Employment-based admissions are usually based on the labor market needs of the receiving country, not the situation of the home country. Family admissions are usually restricted to persons with immediate relatives (spouses, children, parents, and, sometimes, siblings) in the destination country.

Humanitarian admissions are generally limited to refugees and asylum seekers; that is, those who fit the definition in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Most environmental migrants will be unlikely to meet the legal definition of a refugee under national law because their coverage is re? stricted under international law.

Some countries have established special policies that permit individuals whose countries have experienced natural disasters or other severe upheavals to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation. The United States, for example, enacted legislation in 1990 to provide temporary protected status (TPS) to persons "in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environ? mental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions." Environ? mental disaster may include "an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary,

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406 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

disruption of living conditions in the area affected."17 In the case of environ? mental disasters, as compared to conflict, the country of origin must request designation of TPS for its nationals.

Importantly, TPS only applies to persons already in the United States at the time of the designation. It is not meant to be a mechanism to respond to an unfolding crisis in which people seek admission from outside of the country. It also only pertains to situations that are temporary in nature. If the environ? mental disaster has permanent consequences, a designation of TPS is not available, even for those presently in the United States, or it may be lifted.

When the volcano erupted in Montserrat in 1997, TPS was granted to its citi? zens and was extended six times. In 2005, however, it was ended because "it is likely that the eruptions will continue for decades, [and] the situation that led to Montserrat's designation can no longer be considered 'temporary' as re? quired by Congress when it enacted the TPS statute."18

Another significant factor is that the designation is discretionary, to be made by the secretary of homeland security. Countries or parts of countries are designated, allowing nationals only of those countries to apply. Currently, the designation is in effect for citizens of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. TPS was originally triggered by the earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001 and Hurricane Mitch in 1998 in the other countries. It has been extended until 9

September 2010 (El Salvador) and 5 July 2010 (Honduras and Nicaragua). Notably, TPS was not triggered for the hurricanes that destroyed large parts of Haiti in 2004 and 2008, although it was granted to Haitians following the earthquake of 2010. Given the temporary nature of the grant and its applica? tion only to those already in the country, TPS has only limited utility in ad? dressing environmentally induced migration.

At the European Union level, the 'Temporary Protection Directive estab? lishes temporary protection during 'mass influxes' of certain displaced per? sons. The term 'mass-influx' refers to situations where masses of people are suddenly displaced and where it is not feasible to treat applicants on an indi? vidual basis. It was decided that 'mass-influx' was to be defined on a case-by case basis by a qualified majority of the Council."19

Sweden and Finland have included environmental migrants within their immigration policies. Sweden includes within its asylum system persons who do not qualify for refugee status, but have a need for protection. Such a person in need of protection "has left his native country and does not wish to return there because he or she: has a fear of the death penalty or torture, is in need of protection as a result of war or other serious conflicts in the country, [or] is un? able to return to the native country because of an environmental disaster."20 The decision is made on an individual, not group basis. Although many recip? ients of this status are presumed to be in temporary need of protection, the Swedish rules foresee that some persons may be in need of permanent solu? tions. Similarly, in the Finnish Aliens Act, "aliens residing in the country are

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issued with a residence permit on the basis of a need for protection if . . . they cannot return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster."21

A number of countries provide exceptions to removal on an ad hoc basis for persons whose countries of origin have experienced significant disruption because of natural disasters. After the 2004 tsunami, for example, Switzerland, the UK, and Canada suspended deportations of those from such countries as Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Maldives, Seychelles, Indonesia, and Thailand. A number of governments announced similar plans after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no international law that would compel or even encourage other governments to follow similar policies.

To date, there are no examples of legislation or policies that address mi? gration of persons from slow-onset climate changes that may destroy habitats or livelihoods in the future. For the most part, movements from slow-onset cli? mate change and other environmental hazards that limit economic opportuni? ties are treated in the same manner as other economically motivated migration. Persons moving outside of existing labor and family migration categories are considered to be irregular migrants. In the absence of a strong humanitarian basis for exempting them from removal proceedings (which is unlikely in the slow-onset situation), these migrants would be subject to the regular systems in place for mandatory return to their home countries. Because their immediate reasons for migrating would be similar to that of other irregular migrants?that is, lack of economic opportunities at home and better economic opportunities abroad?there would be little reason for destination countries to manage these movements outside of their existing immigration rules.

Institutional Roles and Responsibilities Just as the international legal frameworks for addressing climate change induced cross-border migration are weak, so are the institutional roles and re? sponsibilities at both the international and the national levels. With the excep? tion of the refugee regime, in which clear responsibility is given to the UNHCR, there is no existing international regime for managing international movements of people, let alone those compelled to move by the effects of cli? mate change.

This is not to say that there is a total absence of governance. There is a plethora of international organizations that have some responsibilities related to international migration. Perhaps the most important international organiza? tion in this area is the IOM. The IOM's constitution sets out its role as a service

organization operating on behalf of states. Its first two purposes and functions pertain to its original role in making arrangements for the transfer of migrants, refugees, and displaced persons. The IOM would also provide, at the request of and in agreement with the states concerned, migration services such as re? cruitment, selection, processing, language training, orientation activities, med? ical examination, placement, activities facilitating reception and integration,

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408 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

advisory services on migration questions, and other assistance as is in accord with the aims of the organization. It would also assist in voluntary return mi? gration, including voluntary repatriation.

The IOM's constitution also gives it a role to provide a forum to states as well as international and other organizations for the exchange of views and ex? periences, and the promotion of cooperation and coordination of efforts on in? ternational migration issues, including studies on such issues in order to develop practical solutions. With respect to this last function, it has launched a policy di? alogue with governments on policy issues. Importantly, the organization has ex? panded significantly in terms of both staff and membership, which includes more than 130 member states and observers. The IOM has been a focal point for discussion of environmental migration since 1992 when it cohosted a series of consultations on the interconnections between the environment and migration, in the context of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Since then, the IOM has published working papers and books on climate change and migration, and worked with UN agencies and experts to define more precisely the category of environmental migration.

In addition to the IOM, there are a number of agencies within the UN sys? tem that have responsibilities regarding migration. Among the more signifi? cant, the ILO has a specialized office, the International Migration Program, which "provides advisory services to member states, promotes international standards, provides a tripartite forum for consultations, serves as a global knowl?

edge base, and provides technical assistance and capacity-building to con? stituents."22 The UN Population Division in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) is responsible for collecting data on international migra? tion and took the lead within the UN Secretariat for organizing the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. The division also hosts an annual meeting for coordination of data and research on international migration.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) sup? ports the mandates of the UN special rapporteur on the human rights of mi? grants and the UN special rapporteur on trafficking and services the Committee on Migrant Workers, the treaty body supervising compliance with the Interna? tional Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and

Members of Their Families. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) co? ordinates activities related to human trafficking and human smuggling, as the key agency responsible for implementation of the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime and its smuggling and trafficking protocols. None of these agencies have evidenced a particular interest in the interconnections between climate change and the areas of their specific responsibilities.

Recognizing the complex set of organizational responsibilities, the Global Migration Group (GMG) was established to promote coordination and iden? tify gaps in the international system. The GMG grew out of an existing inter agency group, the Geneva Migration Group, established in April 2003 by the

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heads of the ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNHCR, and UNODC. In 2006, membership in the Geneva Mi? gration Group was expanded to include the DESA, UNDP, UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and World Bank. Following a recommendation by the Global Commission on International Migration for strengthened coordination, the group was renamed the Global Migration Group that same year and expanded to include the UN Regional Commissions, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

While some participants in the GMG have noted that the group has too large and diverse a membership to be effective, it is still the case that the GMG is missing representatives who would be useful in gaining progress on issues related to climate change and migration. The GMG has listed a number of rel? evant documents pertaining to these issues, including reports from a number of the member organizations. Yet absent from the GMG are the UN Environ? ment Programme (UNEP)23 and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, which have significant interest in these issues. This is unfortunate because UNEP has col? laborated with members of the GMG on specific projects. Their involvement in discussions on migration is at least as relevant as those of the other special? ized agencies that participate in the GMG. To address the concern that the GMG has grown too large, and has too many members with peripheral inter? est in migration, it might make sense to invite specialized agencies only when issues connected to their core agendas are to be discussed in the GMG.

Conclusion Discussion of policies to manage environmental migration is in its infancy. As understanding increases of the various ways that environmental change affects migration patterns, and vice versa, governments are beginning to think through how to manage the implications of these interconnections. Much of the atten? tion to date focuses on internal migration, largely in the context of adaptation strategies and, to a lesser degree, movements that may arise as a result of nat? ural disasters and climate change-induced conflict. Few potential destination countries have explicit policies to manage climate change-induced migration, unless affected populations migrate through the normal immigration policies that give preference to family reunification and employment-based admis? sions. While potential destination countries have asylum or resettlement sys? tems to manage admission of persons who cannot return home because of a well-founded fear of persecution, none have systems in place to manage ad? mission of persons who cannot remain or return home because of environ? mental threats. At best, destination countries have policies to defer deportation of those coming from countries with natural disasters, but these are generally postdisaster and ad hoc in their implementation. In sum, no major destination

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410 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

country has a proactive policy designed to resettle persons adversely affected by environmental hazards.

The system of global governance is at an equal or, perhaps given the paucity of global governance more generally on migration, greater level of infancy. The emerging UN systems for responding to internal displacement from con? flict and natural disasters have not fully engaged issues related to climate change. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has a website that focuses on the humanitarian dimensions of climate change,24 but the mate? rials on climate change-induced migration are rudimentary at best. The GMG has not taken up these issues to any significant degree, nor have governments in the state-owned consultative process, the Global Forum on Migration and

Development, although there will be a roundtable on climate change and mi? gration at its meeting in Mexico in November 2010.

Given the current gaps, more attention needs to be placed on identifying and testing new frameworks for managing potential movements. Attention needs to be given to both sides of the environment and migration nexus: iden? tifying adaptation strategies that allow people to remain where they currently live and work, and identifying resettlement strategies that protect people's lives and livelihoods when they are unable to remain. Since internal migration is the most likely outcome for those affected by climate change and other en? vironmental hazards, highest priority should be given to policies and programs aimed at managing these issues within the most affected countries.

Nevertheless, some international migration may well be needed, particu? larly for the citizens of island nations, necessitating identification of appropri? ate admissions policies in potential destination countries. Highest priority should be given to identifying likely patterns of migration. Particular attention should be placed on identifying who cannot be relocated within their home countries, either because of widespread habitat destruction (again, as in the case of certain island states) or because relocation would pose security risks that could provoke violence or even conflict. Some attention should also be addressed to the slow-onset situations in which loss of livelihoods generates emigration pressures. In the absence of legal opportunities to immigrate, at least some portion of those who lose livelihoods as a result of climate change and other environmental hazards will likely become irregular migrants. The challenge in these cases is determining whether these individuals should be given consideration over others who migrate in search of better opportunities. There is reason for skepticism that many destination countries will answer this question in the affirmative. With the exception of their refugee and asylum policies, countries tend to frame their admissions policies around their own national interests, prioritizing admission of persons who will contribute to eco? nomic growth, meet labor shortages, or have close family ties in the destination country. While exceptions may be made for environmentally induced migrants whose situation most resembles that of refugees, there is less likelihood that

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governments will make an exception for those who resemble economic mi? grants. Yet at least in the case of island states that are affected by rising sea lev? els, the absence of an appropriate international response could render large numbers of people stateless because they are unable to remain at home, but have no legal recourse for entry elsewhere.

In moving toward more coherent frameworks, the lessons of the past will be useful, particularly in the context of those countries that foresee the possi? bility that planned resettlement, including international movements, may be needed. More systematic examination of previous planned resettlement pro? grams?in the context of transmigration and development projects?would help ensure that climate change-induced resettlement programs do not fall victim to problems identified in these initiatives. Michael Cernea cites eight interrelated risk factors associated with resettlement from development proj? ects: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property, and so? cial disintegration.25 Under the worst-case scenarios, when the long-term needs of the relocated have not been taken into account, the displaced have been at serious risk of "becoming poorer than before displacement, more vulnerable economically, and disintegrated socially."26

Identification of best-case examples of resettlement?that is, programs that respected the rights of the resettled and resulted in an improved economic and social situation?is as important as identification of pitfalls experienced in pro? grams that failed. Guidelines promulgated to protect those who are involuntar? ily resettled from development projects or who are displaced from natural disasters should be examined systematically to determine their applicability to the resettlement programs proposed by countries fearing the worst conse? quences of climate change. Technical assistance and training to the ministries that may be responsible for resettlement is essential to make certain that: (1) all alternatives are exhausted before people are required to relocate, (2) affected populations are involved in the planning, and (3) all steps are taken to ensure appropriate preparations and implementation.

The promulgation of such guidelines and the development of policies to respond to environmental migration will require new modes of international cooperation. Given the weak legal and institutional situation today, and the looming prospect that climate change will significantly contribute to increased internal and international migration, efforts to build an effective system of governance should begin soon. Whether a new convention on climate change related displacement is desirable or, for that matter, feasible are questions that beg easy answers.27 The history of international conventions related to migra? tion is a mixed one, determined largely by whether the movements are forced or voluntary. While the refugee convention and trafficking protocol are widely ratified, the conventions on labor migrants have had low levels of ratification. Because climate change-induced migration will likely have elements of both

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forms of migration, depending on whether the trigger is slow or rapid onset, the future of such a convention would be questionable.

Beyond feasibility, a number of other issues would need to be addressed before determining that a new convention is the best way to improve gover? nance related to climate change-induced migration. First, how should climate change migrants be defined? For that matter, what term should be used in cat? egorizing this form of migration, particularly given the other factors that are usually at play in explaining movements? Would the same approach work for internal and international movements? Who among those who migrate be? cause of climate change or related environmental reasons are deserving of in? ternational protection? And, the list goes on.

The promulgation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement may be a more effective model for addressing the development of international standards related to climate change-induced migration. The Guiding Princi? ples built on existing human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law to develop norms and standards that apply to internally displaced persons. Although they are not themselves binding, the Guiding Principles bring together pertinent law in a manner that has allowed governments and international organizations to set standards that are consistent with international norms. The adoption of the AU Convention on Internally Displaced Persons, which is based largely on the Guiding Principles, demonstrates that this approach has given credibility to the norms established. It is particularly relevant for this article that the AU Convention has incorporated protection of those displaced by climate change into its provisions. A similar process that would also address international

movements could be equally effective in developing a legal framework for ad? dressing climate change and migration. ?

Notes Susan Martin holds the Donald G. Herzberg chair in international migration and serves as director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the School of For? eign Service at Georgetown University. She also directs the university's Program on Refugees and Humanitarian Emergencies. Her publications include Refugee Women (2003), The Uprooted: Improving Humanitarian Responses to Forced Migration (2005), and numerous monographs and articles on immigration and refugee policy.

1. Oli Brown, Migration and Climate Change, Migration Research Series No. 31 (Geneva: International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2008), p. 11.

2. Ibid. 3. IOM, "Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment," 2007, MC/INF/288,

available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/ microsites/IDM/workshops/evolving_global_economy_2728112007/MC_INF_288_EN .pdf.

4. For example, Vikram Kolmannskog, "Climate Change, Disaster, Displacement, and Migration: Initial Evidence from Africa," UNHCR Research Paper No. 180 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2009); David Corlett, Stormy Weather: The Challenges of Climate

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Change and Displacement (Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2010).

5. See Clionadh Raleigh, Lisa Jordan, and Idean Salehyan, Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008); Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, and Koko Warner, Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? (Bonn, Germany: United Nations Uni? versity, 2007); Brown, Migration and Climate Change: Graeme Hugo, Migration, De? velopment and Environment, Migration Research Series No. 35 (Geneva: IOM, 2008); Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith, and Richard Black, Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows, Migra? tion Research Series No. 33 (Geneva: IOM, 2008).

6. Andrew Morton, Philippe Boncour, and Frank Laczko, "Human Security Pol? icy Challenges," in Climate Change and Displacement, Forced Migration Review No. 31 (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, October 2008), pp. 5-7.

7. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Fourth Assess? ment Report: Working Group II Report, "Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Ap? pendix 1: Glossary," (2007), p. 869, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-app.pdf.

8. UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), "Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction," 2009, available at www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/ terminology-2009-eng.html.

9. Ibid. 10. Copenhagen Accord, following the United Nations Climate Change Conference,

December 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/107.pdf. 11. UNFCCC, "Chronological Evolution of LDC Work Programme and Concept

of NAPAs" (2010), available at http://unfccc.int/cooperation_supportAeast_developed_ countries_portal/ldc_work_programme_and_napa/items/4722.php.

12. All NAPAs referenced herein can be accessed at http://unfccc.int/national_ reports/napa/items/2719.php.

13. UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008, chap. 4, "Adapting to the In? evitable: National Action and International Cooperation," available at http://hdr.undp .org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Chapter4.pdf.

14. Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, Katherine Haver, Dirk Salomons, and Victoria Wheeler, "Cluster Approach Evaluation" (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007), pp. 1-2.

15. States parties are Azerbaijan, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burk? ina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala,

Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Turkey, Uganda, and Uruguay.

16. The protocol eliminated geographic (that refugees be from Europe) and time (pre-1951) limits on the convention, making it a universal document.

17. Immigration Act of November 29, 1990, Public Law 101-649, Section 302. 18. "Termination of the Designation of Montserrat Under the Temporary Protected

Status Program; Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation," Federal Register 69, no. 128 (6 July 2004).

19. Quoted in Vikram Kolmannskog, "Climate Change-related Displacement and the European Response," paper presented at Society for International Development Vi jverberg Session on Climate Change and Migration, The Hague, January 2009, p. 4.

20. Aliens Act (2005:716), issued 29 September 2005, with amendments, up to and including Swedish Code of Statutes 2009:16; Chapter 4: Refugees and Persons Otherwise in Need of Protection.

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414 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

21. Kolmannskog, "Climate Change-related Displacement and the European Response."

22. UNHCHR, The Global Migration Group, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/cmw/GMG.htm.

23. UNEP's program related to climate change and migration has three principal objectives:

1. Research, hotspot identification and assessment of high priority vulnerable countries and subnational regions for targeted UNEP assistance on ecosystems management and climate change adaptation;

2. Awareness raising in the international humanitarian and development commu? nity of the importance of environmental sustainability in rural development and its role in forced migration movements; and

3. Country project development to assist in policy direction, plans, and programs in identified priority countries and subnational regions toward ecosystems man? agement and climate change adaptation.

24. OCHA, "Climate Change: Coping with the Humanitarian Impact," available at http://ochaonline.un.org/OCHAHome/InFocus/ClimateChangeHumanitarianImpact/ tabid/5930/language/en-US/Default.aspx.

25. Michael Cernea, "Risks, Safeguards and Reconstruction: A Model for Popula? tion Displacement and Resettlement," in M. Cernea and C. McDowell, eds., Risks and

Reconstruction: Experiences ofResettlers and Refugees (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000); Courtland Robinson, Risks and Rights: Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-induced Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003).

26. Robinson, Risks and Rights, p. 1. 27. For arguments in favor of a convention, see David Hodgkinson, Tess Burton,

Heather Anderson, and Lucy Young, "The Hour When the Ship Comes In': A Con? vention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change" (2010), available at http://www .ccdpconvention.com/documents/CCDP_Convention_Summary.pdf.

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