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Climate, Capital, Conflict: Geographies of Success or Failure in the Twenty-First Century

Glen MacDonald

To cite this article: Glen MacDonald (2020) Climate, Capital, Conflict: Geographies of Success or Failure in the Twenty-First Century, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 110:6, 2011-2031, DOI: 10.1080/24694452.2020.1800300

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2020.1800300

Published online: 03 Sep 2020.

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P R E S I D E N T I A L A D D R E S S

Climate, Capital, Conflict: Geographies of Success or Failure in the Twenty-First Century

Glen MacDonald

Department of Geography, UCLA, and School of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews

Anthropogenic climate change will disproportionately affect equatorial regions and closely adjacent areas, referred to here as the Fateful Ellipse. The vulnerability of these regions is exacerbated by a lack of capital for adaptive measures against the impacts of climate change. The increasing transference of capital from governmental control to private hands, and the increasing concentration of such capital into the hands of fewer individuals raises further concerns about capacity to mitigate or adapt to climate change. In addition, conflicts arise regarding the choice of climate change solutions. Ironically, the people of the Fateful Ellipse, who are most vulnerable to climate change, produce the lowest amount of carbon per capita. As a result of the colonial enterprise, including slavery, they also paid a heavy price toward the economic ascendency of Europe and North America and the Industrial Revolution that fueled the rise in greenhouse gas production. The discipline of geography itself owes some measure of its development and ascendency to colonialism and the exploitation of the Fateful Ellipse. As geographers we have the capacity, and a special responsibility, to contribute to the development of climate change solutions and global environmental justice. Key Words: capital, climate change, conflict, Fateful Ellipse, geography, inequality.

人为的气候变化，会不成比例地影响赤道及其相邻区域（即，命运椭圆）。这些地区的脆弱性，由 于缺乏应对气候变化影响所需的资金而加剧。资本持续地从政府转移到私人、持续地聚集在少数人 手中，进一步增加了我们对减轻和适应气候变化的能力上的顾虑。此外，气候变化解决方案的不同 选择也带来了冲突。具有讽刺意味的是，命运椭圆的脆弱性最强，但那里的人均碳排放最少。由于 殖民经营（包括奴隶制），命运椭圆为欧美经济优势和（产生温室气体的）工业革命付出了沉重的 代价。地理学的发展和优势也得益于对命运椭圆的殖民主义和掠夺。做为地理学者，我们有能力和 责任为解决气候变化、实现全球环境正义而贡献力量。 关键词：资本，气候变化， 冲突， 命运椭 圆，地理学，不平等。

El cambio clim�atico antropog�enico afectar�a de manera desproporcionada a las regiones ecuatoriales y �areas adyacentes, referidas aqu�ı como la Elipse Funesta. La vulnerabilidad de estas regiones se ve exacerbada por la falta de capital para medidas adaptativas contra los impactos del cambio clim�atico. La creciente transferencia de capital desde el control gubernamental a manos privadas, y la creciente concentraci�on de tal capital en manos de unos pocos individuos levanta mayores preocupaciones sobre la capacidad de mitigar o adaptarse al cambio clim�atico. Adem�as, se presentan conflictos en lo que concierne a la escogencia de soluciones al cambio del clima. Ir�onicamente, la gente de la Elipse Funesta, que son los m�as vulnerables al cambio clim�atico, producen las m�ınimas cantidades de carb�on per c�apita. Como resultado de la empresa colonial, incluida la esclavitud, ellos pagan tambi�en un alto precio hacia la ascendencia econ�omica de Europa y Norteam�erica, y la Revoluci�on Industrial que aliment�o el alza en la producci�on de gases de invernadero. La propia disciplina de la geograf�ıa, por su desarrollo y ascendencia, est�a en deuda en cierta medida con el colonialismo y la explotaci�on de la Elipse Funesta. Como ge�ografos, tenemos la capacidad, y una responsabilidad especial, para contribuir al desarrollo de soluciones sobre el cambio clim�atico y la justicia ambiental global. Palabras clave: cambio clim�atico, capital, conflicto, desigualdad, Elipse Funesta, geograf�ıa.

What is geography? This question has beena frequent focus of American Associationof Geographers Presidential Addresses. Many thoughtful discourses have ensued. As all geographers know, though, we are the products of

the times and places in which we live and work. We comprehend the geographies we encounter and our discipline through the prism of our personal experiences and interests. My own perspective is largely centered on climate change and its impacts.

Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 110(6) 2020, pp. 2011–2031 # 2020 by American Association of Geographers Published by Taylor & Francis, LLC.

With this in mind, I focus on the global challenge of climate change, because that is my context for defining geography. I also believe that climate change must have a central place in defining our wider discipline and our efforts in the twenty-first century. I am not the first president to focus on this topic (e.g., Winkler 2016) and will certainly not be the last. Here I will consider anthropogenic climate change broadly in relationship to the global distribu- tion of capital. By capital I mean the national finan- cial resources available to pay for climate change mitigation or adaptation. I then consider conflicts

related to climate change. Such conflicts include not only violent physical altercations but also the con- flicts of perspectives and prescriptions that swirl around the topic of climate change, the latter being my main focus. These are massive and complex issues. The constraints of space and the limitations of my own knowledge mean that these remarks will be a hurried sketch of a massive and unfolding land- scape. At the conclusion I will turn again to our eternal question of “What is geography?” and the significance of anthropogenic climate change to defining our discipline.

Figure 1. Top: Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 projected CO2 emissions, projected mean global temperature increase, and projected sea level rise. Bottom: Per capita gross domestic product percentage change, ratio of wealth held by top 1 percent and bottom 50 percent. Note: GDP¼ gross domestic product; PPM¼ parts per million. Data from Meinshausen et al. (2011), IPCC (2014), Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015), Jevrejeva et al. (2016), and Alverado et al. (2017).

2012 MacDonald

The Steepening Slope: Trajectories of Global Anthropogenic Climate Change

Let’s start by taking an ageographical global view of data and model projections for anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and related climatic changes. For the past two centuries, human popula- tion has grown at an incredible rate, climbing from approximately 1 billion people in 1800 to more than 7.6 billion today. Human population is projected to reach 9.7 billion people in 2050 and 10.9 billion by 2100 (Roser, Ritchie, and Ortiz-Ospina 2019; United Nations 2019; U.S. Census Bureau 2019). At the same time, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have grown in an exponential manner from 280 ppm in 1800 to approximately 408 ppm in 2019 (Institute for Atmosphere and Climate 2019; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Earth System Research Laboratories 2019). The “business as usual” GHG scenario developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) is called Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 (RCP 8.5; Figure 1). According to RCP 8.5, atmospheric con- centrations of CO2 will reach levels of 540 ppm by 2050 and 935 ppm by 2100 (Meinshausen et al. 2011). Other GHGs, such as CH4 and N2O, are also increasing. By 2100 the concentrations of CO2 and these other GHGs would be the equivalent of CO2 reaching 1,231 ppm (Meinshausen et al. 2011).

The IPCC has produced more optimistic projec- tions of GHG emissions for the twenty-first century. These are based on possible changes in behavior and technologies. Although the first IPCC report was issued in 1990, and there were alarms sounded about GHGs, climatic change, and associated dangers well before that (e.g., Revelle et al. 1965; Matthews, Kellogg, and Robinson 1971; Mercer 1978), the annual rate of emissions of CO2 has continued to rise in recent decades. This trajectory of increasing GHGs has in fact accelerated despite growing concern and attendant international efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] 1997) and the Paris Agreement (United Nations Climate Change 2016). Since 1970, emissions of CO2 have increased by 90 percent, largely due to the burning of fossil fuels (Boden, Marland, and Andres 2017). After three years of little to no growth, CO2 emissions are pro- jected to have increased by approximately 2 percent in 2018 and reach record highs (Figueres et al. 2018;

Global Carbon Project 2018). In 2019 the global GHG trajectory remains close to RCP 8.5.

That the increasing GHG concentrations are pro- ducing climatic changes consistent with long pro- jected outcomes (e.g., Revelle et al. 1965; Manabe and Wetherald 1975) is clearly evident. Manabe and Wetherald (1975) displayed great prescience when they wrote several decades ago:

It is shown that the CO2 increase raises the temperature of the model troposphere, whereas it lowers that of the model stratosphere. The tropospheric warming is somewhat larger than that expected from a radiative- convective equilibrium model. In particular, the increase of surface temperature in higher latitudes is magnified due to the recession of the snow boundary and the thermal stability of the lower troposphere which limits convective beating to the lowest layer. It is also shown that the doubling of carbon dioxide significantly increases the intensity of the hydrologic cycle of the model. (3)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, global average surface temperature has increased by about 1.2 �C (Copernicus 2019). Approximately 80 percent of this warming has occurred since the 1970s. The trajectory of warming has steepened in recent years. This, along with the accumulated warming of past decades, has led to 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 being the warmest years in the period of instrumental climate records (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2020). Although varying in magnitude, overall surface warming has been almost universal in terms of geography. Warming has indeed been amplified at higher northern latitudes as predicted by Manabe and Wetherald (1975). As a consequence of the warming, many of the world’s gla- ciers have been declining in mass and extent at an unprecedented rate (Zemp et al. 2015; IPCC 2019b). Perhaps the most worrying aspect of this decline is the situation in Greenland. Analysis of Greenland’s ice cover indicates that beginning in the 1980s the glacial mass balance there began to deviate negatively from natural variability. Since that time, the loss of ice has increased sixfold (Mouginot et al. 2019). A recent report from the IPCC (2019b) concludes that ice loss from Greenland doubled between 2007 and 2016 and the loss from Antarctica tripled. As the planet has warmed, the world’s oceans have absorbed much heat, and this has led to thermal expansion of the sea at the same time that melting glaciers have contributed additional water to ocean basins (IPCC 2019b). Accordingly, global mean sea level has risen

Climate, Capital, Conflict 2013

by 16 to 21 cm since the start of the twentieth cen- tury. The rate of sea-level rise has been accelerating in recent decades, and approximately 7 cm of the rise has occurred since 1993 (Wuebbles et al. 2017). The rate of sea level rise between 2006 and 2017 was about two and a half times as fast as that for the period from 1900 to 1990 (IPCC 2019b).

Although the long-term trajectories and recent accelerations of changes in GHGs, temperature, gla- cial mass balance, and sea level are clear, many other important aspects of climatic change remain less well resolved. Debate continues around drought frequency and intensity (Milly and Dunne 2016; Mukherjee, Mishra, and Trenberth 2018) or whether there have been significant changes in episodic extreme events such as superstorms, floods, and large hurricanes (Trenberth, Fasullo, and Shepherd 2015; Klotzbach et al. 2018). A recent reanalysis by Dai and Zhao (2017), however, presents compelling evidence that accelerating surface warming and associated enhanced evaporation rates since the 1980s have become an increasingly important cause of widespread drying on the continents. Despite present uncertainties regard- ing some aspects of climate change, it is clear that more than temperature is changing.

Up to now, the world is likely to have experienced only the relatively gentle piedmont of the mountain- ous landscape of climate change that lies ahead. What are some of the projections for the rest of this century? The 2014 IPCC report and subsequent assessments (e.g., Raftery et al. 2017) suggest that global mean annual temperature will likely rise by 3.2 �C to 5.4 �C above the average of the early indus- trial period (1850–1899; Figure 1). These projections might well be understatements, though. A recent run of two French general circulation models that will be used in the next IPCC assessment suggest the planet might experience a 6 �C to 7 �C increase in tempera- ture by the end of the century (CNRS 2019). Estimated changes in global mean sea level (Figure 1) have also increased in magnitude since the time of the 2014 IPCC report and now range from 90 cm to over 200 cm by 2100 (e.g., Jevrejeva et al. 2016). For some perspective, the streets of the French Quarter of New Orleans are only about 91 cm above sea level today and vulnerable to even lower estimates of sea- level rise. The higher estimate would put streets in Miami and lower Manhattan under water by the end of the century. Low-lying island nations such as Tuvalu and Kiribati in the South Pacific will likely

become uninhabitable by the end of the century (Batur and Weber 2017). A rise of 200 cm could dis- place an estimated 187 million people (Willis and Church 2012).

The effects of the climatic changes projected under the RCP 8.5 scenario extend well beyond changes in climate and coastlines. Two important concerns for humans are health and nutrition. For about 30 percent of the world’s population, heat stroke is an important health threat and potential cause of mortality (Mora et al. 2017). Under RCP 8.5, it is possible that by 2100 approximately 74 per- cent of the world’s population will be exposed to the dangers of lethal heat stroke (Mora et al. 2017). Health risks could increase from a number of tropi- cal and temperate infectious diseases. Malaria- and dengue-carrying mosquitoes or ticks that carry Lyme disease could spread to higher latitudes and eleva- tions. In addition, warmer temperatures might accel- erate pathogen and vector life cycles and increase transmission rates in areas where these diseases already exist (Wu et al. 2016; Andersen and Davis 2017). Warming in some hot tropical regions, how- ever, might also decrease diseases such as malaria because of increased mortality in mosquito popula- tions due to the higher temperatures (Murdock, Sternberg, and Thomas 2016). Of course, increased human population size will in itself create a higher number of humans at risk of disease. For example, due to climate change coupled with population growth, the number of people exposed to dengue fever could increase to more than 5 billion by 2100 (Hales et al. 2002).

There has been much active research on estimat- ing the impacts of climate change on the world’s agriculture. For example, under the RCP 8.5 climatic scenario there could be a 40 percent decline in global maize production and a 20 percent decline in global soybean production. These effects could lead to 175 million more people being undernourished (Fischer et al. 2005; Iizumi et al. 2017). The world need not wait until the end of the century to feel the impacts of climate change on disease and nutri- tion. According to the World Health Organization (2014), “Compared with a future without climate change, the following additional deaths are projected for the year 2030: 38 000 due to heat exposure in elderly people, 48 000 due to diarrhoea, 60 000 due to malaria, and 95 000 due to childhood under- nutrition” (1).

2014 MacDonald

The points just raised barely scratch the surface of the climatic changes and their impacts that lie ahead along the current GHG trajectory. The potential dev- astating effects on the other species that inhabit the Earth, overall biodiversity, and ecosystems services are not even considered here. The observations and pro- jections just outlined are being updated continu- ously—and projected changes often become worse with each iteration (e.g., IPCC 2019a, 2019b). This indicates that not only does humankind face tough slopes ahead in terms of mitigating or adapting to cli- mate change but those slopes are steepening.

Trajectories of Capital and Inequality

Efforts to counteract the effects of twenty-first- century climatic change will require massive amounts of capital to cover everything from increased cooling costs for our buildings, to con- structing sea walls for low-lying cities, to offsetting the financial tolls from disease and heat-related deaths. History has shown that economists and financial managers find it impossible to accurately estimate the timing or magnitude of the next reces- sion under normal market conditions. It is not sur- prising that projecting the costs of climate change over the decades ahead is difficult and has generated a wide range of estimates. The figures presented here are a sampler of such analyses but are in no sense meant to be considered definitive.

An analysis of global demand for increased resi- dential air conditioning due to climate change sug- gests that by 2100 more than 40,000 additional petajoules of energy could be required annually for this purpose (Isaac and Van Vuuren 2009). This might be crudely approximated as an additional annual cost of $2.9 trillion (values given hereafter are roughly equivalent to costs in 2018 U.S. dollars). Additional annual costs for coastal infrastructure to protect against higher sea level could range from $12 billion to $71 billion (Hinkel et al. 2014). According to the World Health Organization (2014), the direct costs of climate change on human health could be $2 to $4 billion per year by 2030. These represent only a tiny subsampling of costs, and all climate change–related costs would increase as the century continues and climate change contin- ues unabated. Estimating the total costs of the con- tinued growth of GHGs is difficult. There is a wide range of values estimated for the cost of losses of

privately manageable financial assets, from $2.5 tril- lion to more than $13 trillion (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015; Dietz et al. 2016). The upper figure represents just a bit less than 10 percent of the world’s total stock of financial assets held by financial institutions other than banks (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015). When these losses are cal- culated from the perspective of public-sector finan- ces, the losses could be on the order of $43 trillion (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015). That would be roughly 61 percent of the value of all of the world’s stock markets today (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015).

Climate change will also affect the generation of new capital. This will be reflected in declines in annual gross domestic product (GDP) in many coun- tries and globally (Figure 1). Again, such estimates vary widely and have often been in the range of 7 percent to 10 percent (Stern 2008). A recent analy- sis, based on nonlinear relationships between tem- perature increase and declines in economic productivity, suggests that the decline in global GDP could more likely be 23 percent under RCP 8.5 (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015). Any of these pro- jected declines would be a serious economic contrac- tion in a world where global GDP has typically grown annually at a rate of between 2 percent and 3 percent. The dependence on endless compound growth and the limitations placed on such growth by the environment have been identified as key contra- dictions in the capitalist system (Harvey 2014) that will certainly be exacerbated by climate change.

Who controls capital will undoubtedly influence who benefits most from climate change adaptation efforts. There has, in recent decades, been a marked concentration of capital in the hands of the wealthi- est people and wealthiest nations in the world. This group typically represents the top 1 percent of the population. Data from the World Economic Forum (2016) indicate that by 2015 the economic top 1 percent controlled as much wealth as the remaining 99 percent of the world’s population. Today the world’s top 1 percent control about twice the amount of capital as the entire bottom 50 percent. If the global trajectory of capital concentration into the hands of the few follows the recent trajectory of the United States (Alvaredo et al. 2017), then by the close of the twenty-first century the top 1 per- cent could control about eight times as much of the world’s wealth as the bottom 50 percent (Figure 1).

Climate, Capital, Conflict 2015

As the control of capital concentrates into a pro- portionally smaller number of private hands, how much will be available in public coffers for govern- ments to use in funding climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts? The trajectory toward impov- erishment of public treasuries relative to the private sector has been striking. Since the 1970s there has been a marked decline in the ratio of public wealth relative to private wealth in many of the world’s developed national economies, as well as in China (Piketty, Yang, and Zucman 2017). In the United States and in the United Kingdom, the percentage of national wealth in the public sector has declined from more than 10 percent and more than 20 per- cent, respectively, to slightly negative values as the sum of the national debt has grown (Piketty, Yang, and Zucman 2017). In June 2019 the Financial Times reported that the level of global national debt had risen to its highest level since World War II— although not yet nearly as high as during that time (Stubbington 2019). If such trends continue, public- sector efforts to adapt to or mitigate climate change and its impacts will need to rely on increasing levels of governmental deficit spending that are potentially unsustainable economically.

The increase in costs and decrease in income caused by climate change will accelerate going for- ward into the twenty-first century. Given current trends in wealth concentration and inequality, the

capital to adapt to or mitigate climate change will be concentrated in a smaller proportion of the world’s population. At the same time, a smaller pro- portion of the world’s capital will be controlled directly by governments. As a result, a lower propor- tion of the world’s capital will be available to gov- ernments to fund society-wide goals of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Funding such goals would likely entail significant governmental debt and the possibility of associated financial repression and societal costs that are often necessi- tated to resolve such debts (Reinhart and Rogoff 2015). Governments might simply not have the cap- ital necessary to confront climate change at the scale required. Can we count on wealthy individuals and the private sector to fill this gap and allocate capital in a manner that reflects the greater global good rather than self-interest? The future of capital and its distribution can further steepen the global gradi- ent of successfully addressing climate change.

Geographies of Climate Change and Capital

Up to now, the discussion has been ageographical, focusing on global trajectories of climate change and capital. Success tackling the challenges ahead, how- ever, requires an explicitly geographical perspective. Climate change is without doubt a global issue, but

Figure 2. University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2019) map of climate change vulnerability by country and the general location and the Fateful Ellipse discussed in text. Map reproduced by permission of the University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.

2016 MacDonald

any effort to adapt to or mitigate climate change must be predicated on understanding the importance of space, place, and associated regional dimensions. The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2019) provides a useful mapped summary of national vulnerability to climate change (Figure 2). The analysis is based on each nation’s biophysical exposure to climate change, the sensitivity of eco- nomic sectors and the population to climate change, and the adaptive capacity in terms of sector-specific resources for adaptation. Examination of the geo- graphic distribution of RCP 8.5 climatic changes, their effects, and economic capacity to respond shows that a number of nations in the equatorial regions and adjacent areas are particularly at risk (Figure 2). This geographic area, defined by height- ened human vulnerability to climate change, lies within a delineable multicontinental region that extends from South and Central America, across Africa, and through Southwest and Southeast Asia. I refer to this high-risk region as the Fateful Ellipse (Figure 2). I use the term fateful because through fail- ure of humankind to act on climate change this region could be fated to some of the most extreme negative impacts. Alternatively, through coordinated global efforts the region could succeed in averting extreme calamities and establish new mechanisms and positive benchmarks for human cooperation and achievement. Tackling climate change calls for coor- dinated action and moving beyond the constraints of tropicality, whereby the equatorial regions have often been viewed as separate and inferior to the temperate zones—and fated to remain so (Arnold 1996; Clayton and Bowd 2006). The broader reality of shared humanity and shared planet must be embraced. What happens in the Fateful Ellipse in the face of climate change will, for good or bad, define the success or failure of humanity in the twenty-first century. It is the most fateful of geographies.

If we map the distribution of maximum daily tem- peratures—the ones that are likely to cause heat stroke, for example—we find it is in the already hot tropical and subtropical regions where such extreme temperatures are concentrated. In RCP 8.5 projec- tions, average maximum daily temperatures of more than 35 �C will be widespread in the Fateful Ellipse. In large areas of Africa and Southwest Asia, temper- atures higher than 40 �C are projected. Although the impacts of anthropogenic climate change on precipi- tation remain difficult to estimate, the high

temperatures and associated high potential evapo- transpiration rates will likely result in net increases in aridity in some regions of the Fateful Ellipse (Dai and Zhao 2017).

Geographic projections of heat-related deaths clearly show that they will be concentrated in the tropical and subtropical areas delineated by the Fateful Ellipse (Mora et al. 2017). Some portions of southwest Asia are projected to have maximum daily temperatures higher than 50 �C to 60 �C (Pal and Eltahir 2016). Prolonged exposure to temperatures greater than 35 �C can generate heatstroke, and tem- peratures higher than 60 �C in humid conditions can quickly be lethal. Even physical infrastructure and machinery can be compromised by prolonged tem- peratures of 40 �C and above (Pal and Eltahir 2016). The high daily maximum temperatures projected for Southwest Asia in 2100 have led Pal and Eltahir (2016) to conclude that for humans some areas of Southwest Asia might simply become uninhabitable.

A global mapping of vulnerability to rising sea levels, due to factors of topography, population size, infrastructure, and economic capacity, shows that it is the coastlines and the islands of the Fateful Ellipse in Africa, southern Asia, the Caribbean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the tropical Pacific Ocean that are at the most risk (Nicholls and Cazenave 2010). A recent modeling of increased storm surge exposure for the end of the twenty-first century similarly indi- cates that the greatest risks are found in southern Asia, the Caribbean, Pacific Oceania, and sub- Saharan Africa (Lloyd et al. 2016). Based on these projections, 8.2 million people in Bangladesh and 2.7 million people in Mozambique will be exposed to storm surge–related mortality (Lloyd et al. 2016).

Temperatures within portions of the Fateful Ellipse might indeed become so hot as to be lethal to pathogens and insect vectors of diseases like malaria (Paaijmans, Read, and Thomas 2009; Lyons et al. 2012; Mordecai et al. 2013). It is likely, how- ever, that increased human population density, cou- pled with faster pathogen generation times and pathogen and vector survival at higher latitudes and altitudes, will increase disease load in many portions of the Fateful Ellipse (Hales et al. 2002; World Health Organization 2014; Wu et al. 2016). High temperatures, coupled with coastal flooding and increased inland flooding and extreme climate events, will increase incidences of disease such as cholera in the Fateful Ellipse (Wendel 2015).

Climate, Capital, Conflict 2017

Declines in crop yields due to climatic changes by the end of the twenty-first century also provide evi- dence of disproportionate impacts within the Fateful Ellipse. It is possible that warmer temperatures, if coupled with sufficient moisture, will increase yields of rice under the RCP 8.5 scenario (Iizumi et al. 2017). Yields of wheat, maize, and soybeans, how- ever, are likely to experience declines within the Ellipse under an RCP 8.5 climate (Iizumi et al. 2017). In taking a broad view of crops and potential productivity at the close of the twenty-first century, Cline (2007) concluded that there will be a concen- tration of crop yield declines within countries of the Fateful Ellipse relative to other parts of the globe. Agricultural productivity declines of 15 percent to 25 percent are estimated for many Ellipse countries. The most recent IPCC (2019a) report highlights the exposure of Africa and southern portions of Asia to increased food vulnerability.

What about future available capital and the finan- cial capacity of nations to mitigate the impacts of the changing climate? Here again, we see a disproportion- ate share of the burden is likely to be borne within the Ellipse. The GDP of most countries within the Fateful Ellipse is already well below that of more developed nations (International Monetary Fund 2019). The highest proportions of people living in extreme poverty are similarly found concentrated in nations of the Fateful Ellipse (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017). Alarmingly, analysis by Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) suggests that GDP for many countries within the Fateful Ellipse could decline by 50 percent or more by the end of the century due to climate change.

There is a bitter irony in the coalescence of some of the most egregious impacts of climate change on some of the most vulnerable peoples of the world, as represented by the Fateful Ellipse. This irony reflects both recent conditions and deeper history. If we look at the per capita production of the GHGs that are driving climate change, we see that the countries within the Fateful Ellipse are the world’s lowest pro- ducers by far (Muntean et al. 2018; Ritchie and Roser 2018). For example, in 2017 the annual per capita production of CO2 by the United States was 15.74 tons. Many countries within the Fateful Ellipse pro- duced less than 2.0 tons per capita, and some nations in Africa produced less than 1.0 ton per capita.

The irony of the Fateful Ellipse has an even deeper and more troubling context. The countries within this region were at the heart of Europe’s

colonial empires (Lehning 2013). The unequal trade relations between these regions and colonial powers provided resources and contributed capital that helped to drive the Industrial Revolution and associ- ated economic growth and prosperity of Europe (Habib 1984; Sheppard 2015). Commodities such as gold, silver, cotton, sugar, coffee, and tea flowed from the Fateful Ellipse. A part of that enterprise and associated trade network was the odious subjec- tion and commerce in human beings—slave labor and the slave trade. This human enslavement and trafficking contributed to European economies into the early nineteenth century and underlays part of U.S. prosperity into the mid-nineteenth century (Habib 1984; Baptist 2014; Olmstead and Rhode 2018). Fanon (1963) famously stated, “Europe is lit- erally the creation of the Third World. The wealth which smothers her is that which was stolen from the underdeveloped peoples” (102). In short, the people of the Fateful Ellipse paid a high price for the Industrial Revolution, which has led to the climate crisis, yet they reaped far fewer economic benefits than the former colonial powers and the United States. They are now set to pay a disproportionately high price for the effects of climate change.

The Paris Climate Agreement to cut carbon emis- sions is a laudable step in addressing the climate change challenge created by the developed world and foisted onto the entire planet. Importantly, the Paris Agreement also recognizes the obligation of the wealthy countries of the world to assist the countries within the Fateful Ellipse. The Agreement pledges to mobilize $100 billion a year of public and private funds for transfer to developing countries by 2020. Although these levels have not yet been fully met, this is also a step in the right direction. It is particularly troubling, though, that the United States, which is one of the largest emitters of GHGs and whose economic development benefited from the African slave trade into the 1860s, has indicated its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.

Climate, Capital, and Conflict: The Battle of Ideas, Policy, and Ideology

It has been suggested by a number of researchers that climate change can or will lead to increased human conflict (e.g., Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013; Bollfrass and Shaver 2015; Mach et al. 2019). The proposition

2018 MacDonald

that climate change can instigate violent conflict has also been taken up in a somewhat sensationalist manner by the popular press (e.g., Parenti 2011). Much of this focus has been on the countries of the Fateful Ellipse. The factors presumed to drive this increase in violent conflict include drought and agri- cultural failure, mass migrations driven by climate change, inundation by the sea of low-lying areas, and so forth. Some studies suggest that increased temperatures in and of themselves influence human cognition and might induce a greater propensity to violence (Gamble and Hess 2012; Halali, Meiran, and Shalev 2017). After a large review of relevant studies, Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) concluded that the occurrence of climatic departures, measured as standard deviations from average conditions, pro- vided the best guide to an increased propensity for violence driven by climate. Their mapped summary of climatic potential for conflict shows that these climatic departures were among their greatest magni- tudes in the Fateful Ellipse. Troublingly, the region has already experienced high levels of state fragility and warfare relative to the rest of the world in the post–World War II period (Marshall 2019). The view that climate, rather than other causes is, or will be, a principal driver of violent conflict in the Fateful Ellipse or elsewhere remains a matter of strong debate (Buhaug et al. 2014; Hsiang et al. 2014; Koubi 2019), however. It is hard to imagine that in some locations and in some circumstances the pressures of climate change would not increase the likelihood of violent conflict, but it also does not seem accepted that this will be a universal response either. A recent analysis based on expert consensus concluded that although climate has influ- enced armed conflict within countries, and climate change is estimated to increase future risk of armed conflict, other drivers including poor socioeconomic conditions and weak governance capacity are sub- stantially more influential (Mach et al. 2019). In addition, the analysis concluded that the specific mechanisms by which climate influences conflict linkages remains unclear.

I wish to shift focus to the intellectual and policy conflicts that arise over climate change, and particu- larly the conflicting views on how to best mitigate it. First, let’s dismiss the chimera that there is legitimate scientific conflict over the basic fact that human activity has dramatically increased levels of atmo- spheric GHGs and this is altering the climate.

Observed levels of atmospheric GHG increases, record-breaking temperatures, and climate model pro- jections have now convinced 97 percent of climate scientists that human activity is altering the climate (Cook et al. 2016). There clearly remain uncertainties in projections of future climate (Knutti and Sedl�a�cek 2013; Woldemeskel et al. 2016; Soden, Collins, and Feldman 2018), but the basic outlines of the phenom- enon and its challenges are clear. Even the well- known climate change skeptic, Patrick Michaels, agrees that humans are changing the climate, although he disputes the potential magnitude of future changes (Michaels and Knappenberger 2016). There are some scholars who argue that the benefits of significantly decreasing CO2 emissions are outweighed by the eco- nomic costs or that the warming associated with cli- mate change and the effects of increased CO2 levels might actually be a net benefit (Lomborg 2007; Goklany 2015; Lindzen 2017), but they are a small minority, often with very few to no peer-reviewed cli- mate change publications to substantiate their views. I accept the 2009 statement by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and eighteen other scientific organizations who have reached the conclusion that “based on multiple lines of scientific evidence [… ] global climate change caused by human activities is now underway, and it is a growing threat to society” (AAAS 2009). Therefore, the discussion that follows will focus on the conflicts that arise due to the differing potential pathways for mitigating climate change. By mitigation I mean signifi- cantly and quickly decreasing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere or significantly attenuating the cli- matic impacts of these gases. The GHG target levels required for this effort are massive. According to the UN Secretary-General, at least seventy-seven nations have agreed that a goal of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 is required (Guterres 2019). The current potential strategies for mitigating anthropogenic cli- mate change can be broadly grouped into five approaches: geoengineering approaches, technology substitution approaches, consumer behavior approaches, economic reform approaches, and societal change approaches.

Geoengineering Approaches

Geoengineering approaches largely address climate change through one of two means—removing GHGs from the atmosphere or decreasing the radiative

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impact of the GHGs. There are a wide variety of potential means of removing GHGs. Major ones include forestation and vegetation restoration, ocean fertilization and alkalinity enhancement, increasing soil carbon sequestration, enhancement of rock weathering and mineral carbonation, and direct air capture of CO2 and storing or recycling it (Royal Society 2018). The necessary scale and potential costs of such an enterprise are immense. In 2018 global CO2 emissions reached a record high of 37.1 gigatons (Global Carbon Project 2018). This amount of CO2 is difficult to visualize, but one metric ton is about the same volume as a two-story detached home. Potential costs for carbon capture are declin- ing as technologies improve (Keith et al. 2018; Tollefson 2018). A recent report by the Royal Society (2018), however, concluded that pricing for the emissions of CO2 would still need to be around $100 per ton to make a GHG removal (GGR) strat- egy economically feasible. Given present technolo- gies and costs, the first recommendation from the report is “Continue and increase global efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Largescale GGR is challenging and expensive and not a replacement for reducing emissions” (Royal Society 2018, 10).

Reducing the radiative effect of GHGs through the application of aerosols such as sulfates to the lower stratosphere would cost relatively little. A recent estimate places this annual cost at US$2.25 billion (Smith and Wagner 2018). This approach, although potentially cost-effective in lowering tem- peratures, is controversial for a number of reasons (Keith, Parson, and Morgan 2010; Williamson and Turley 2012; Dalby 2013, 2015; Parson and Keith 2013; Surprise 2018; Trisos et al. 2018). These include questions about how the process would be governed, concerns about the effects of the resulting unchecked increases in CO2 on vegetation function- ing and on ocean acidification, unintended conse- quences of how the geoengineered climate would function, and how to deal with the fact that some regions would benefit by the climatic manipulations but others might not. In addition, if the aerosol enrichment process is stopped, temperatures would accelerate with unprecedented rapidity, and poten- tially catastrophically, toward an equilibrium with the high levels of GHGs then in the atmosphere. Finally, atmospheric geoengineering has also been criticized from the Marxist perspective insofar as it

would serve as an artificial prop to a capitalistic hegemony, masking capitalism’s contradictions and its inability to respond adequately to climate change (Surprise 2018). Although Parson (2017) argued that some form of atmospheric geoengineering is essential to meeting global temperature targets pro- posed under the Paris Climate Agreement, he also acknowledged that it cannot replace efforts to miti- gate GHG emissions.

Technological Substitution Approaches

Technological substitution approaches use low to zero carbon producing technologies to reduce CO2 emissions while maintaining economic health. This is a path that is being widely prescribed today and includes efforts such as wind, solar, and tidal genera- tion of electricity; the use of biofuels; and the replace- ment of high-carbon-emitting equipment such as internal combustion engines by equipment powered by electrical energy. The amount of global electricity demand met by renewable energy is predicted to reach 29.4 percent by 2023 (International Energy Agency 2018). This is a positive step. Unless that growth rate increases significantly by midcentury, however, a large proportion of energy demands will still rely on fossil fuels. Research on past technology transitions, such as the shift from coal-based thermal power to electricity, indicates that such transitions tend to be slow (Fouquet 2010). Some studies suggest that 100 percent renewable energy is an achievable goal for the twenty-first century but will require exceptionally careful planning and implementation road mapping (Jacobson et al. 2017). Other recent analyses of the potential rates of global transition to 100 percent renewable energy, though, indicate that many previous estimates have been overly optimistic and underestimate the challenges (Heard et al. 2017). Some analyses have concluded that renewable energy alone will likely never meet all global energy require- ments and completely displace GHG-producing energy sources (Moriarty and Honnery 2016).

Consumer Behavior Approaches

Anthropogenic GHG emissions are largely driven by consumer demand for services, such as transporta- tion, light, heating, cooling, communication and entertainment, and computing, and for goods, including food. As population increases and

2020 MacDonald

economies grow, such consumer demands are increasing. It has been projected that a growing global middle class could increase annual consumer spending from $37 trillion in 2017 to $64 trillion by 2030 (European Commission 2020). If consumer behavior is voluntarily modified so that people demand less per capita in terms of GHG-dependent services and goods, then emissions will decline pro- portionally. It has been argued that there is poten- tial for significant progress to be made in mitigation of GHG emissions through voluntary changes in consumer choices for services and products (Girod, van Vuuren, and Hertwich 2014). Consumer actions such as no-fly movements in Sweden and other parts of Europe are an example of consumer demand modification. It is reported that the Flygfritt movement has convinced 14,500 Swedes to forsake air travel in 2019 and has a target of 100,000 no-fly advocates for 2020 (Abend 2019). The desire to do what is environmentally correct, to be seen as doing so, and the positive feelings that come from this have also been identified as motivators in electric vehicle adoption by consumers in Sweden (Rezvani, Jansson, and Bengtsson 2018). Although the drivers of such reductions are complex and extend beyond individual consumer choice, per capita GHG emis- sions from Sweden fell from 6.86 metric tons in 1997 to 4.54 metric tons in 2016. In contrast, rap- idly growing production, economies, middle classes, and consumption in China and India have driven per capita emissions upward as more consumers are now able to afford increased services and goods (Wang, Su, and Li 2018). That demand is often not for products and services that could be classified as luxuries in more developed economies. Is it real- istic to expect consumers in growing economies such as China and India to forsake improvements in heating, cooling, transportation, and other aspects of life that many other parts of the world take for granted? Even in relatively affluent devel- oped economies, there are also limitations to the impact that green marketing and voluntary con- sumer choice can have in achieving environmental goals and GHG reductions (Wymer and Polonsky 2015; Fuchs et al. 2016). There might be a move toward reduced flying by some Europeans, but as a recent survey of 2,066 British consumers indicated, people are less likely to sacrifice more basic goods and services for the sake of the environment (Kantenbacher et al. 2019).

Economic Reform Approaches

It is widely agreed that economic reform approaches, as represented by economic and regulatory incentives, are required to make any significant gains in GHG mitigation (Carley et al. 2017; Heard et al. 2017; International Energy Agency 2018). Carbon taxes and cap and trade systems are the two main approaches that are being applied today. In essence these approaches operate via the profit motivation within the capitalist system by placing a governmentally deter- mined per ton price on the production of CO2. This then drives technological and operational innovation to reduce the amount of GHGs produced by a given service or product and increase the profitability to the producer. The taxes or charges that accrue to the gov- ernment can be used to offset the costs to the con- sumer and to fund clean technology development and climate change adaptation. There is some conflict among economists as to which approach is most effec- tive (Goulder and Schein 2013; Kosnik 2018)—a sim- ple tax on GHG emissions that can escalate in per ton charge over time versus a set of escalating emissions caps and charges for additional emissions and a provi- sion for firms to sell surplus emissions allocations. As of April 2019, some forty-six nations and twenty-eight subnational jurisdictions have placed, or were in the process of placing, some price on carbon emissions (Carbon Leadership Pricing Coalition 2019). The identification of target industries, price levels, proposed uses of accrued funds, and mechanisms for global appli- cation, however, remains complex and uncertain. Large emitters such as the United States and India have no national policy in place or on the horizon. Despite acknowledgment of its potential power as a market force, carbon pricing via direct taxation or cap and trade has not thus far produced the decreases in GHG emissions that are required (Climate Action Tracker 2019). Nor is it likely that this mechanism alone will produce those reductions in the time frame required to avert continued high emissions and climate change (Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018).

Societal Change Approaches

It has been argued by some, most notably eco- Marxists, that the present capitalist world system is incapable of dealing with the global challenge of cli- mate change. Deeper and broader societal changes are required. Wainwright and Mann (2015) stated, “If the character of political life prevents a radical

Climate, Capital, Conflict 2021

response to crisis, then it is the political that must change” (313). From the eco-Marxist perspective, climate change can be seen as reflecting the second contradiction of capitalism (Harvey 2014), wherein capitalism’s need for infinite economic growth bumps up against environmental limitations to such growth (O’Connor 1988; Surprise 2018). Thus, it is argued, green capitalism, as represented by geoengin- eering approaches, technology substitution approaches, consumer behavior approaches, and eco- nomic reform approaches, works to maintain unjust capitalistic hegemonies of power that will likely be ineffective in mitigating climate change. In this view, capitalism is both the root cause of anthropo- genic climate change and other environmental crises and a barrier to addressing these crises. Various ver- sions of these arguments for the need for deeper sociopolitical change have been championed in criti- cal environmental literature of both the academic and popular press (e.g., B€ohm, Misoczky, and Moog 2012; Dalby 2013, 2015; Swyngedouw 2013; Foster 2015; Klein 2015; Wainwright and Mann 2015; Surprise 2018; Ghotge 2018a, 2018b). It is often the case, though, that the fight against climate change has also become a proposed mechanism to introduce a wide variety of socioeconomic changes that can appear at best tangential to combating climate change or addressing social and environmental impacts directly related to climate change. This is illustrated in a quote from Klein (2015) writing about climate change:

[I]t could be the best argument progressives have ever had to demand the rebuilding and reviving of local economies; to reclaim our democracies from corrosive corporate influence; to block harmful new free trade deals and rewrite old ones; to invest in starving public infrastructure like mass transit and affordable housing; to take back ownership of essential services like energy and water; to remake our sick agricultural system. (7)

A similar shopping list of assorted socioeconomic and political goals is contained in the Green New Deal being proposed by progressive politicians in the United States. These broad agendas can fuel push- back against action on climate change. Some conser- vatives argue that the climate crisis is simply a cover being used by progressives to push broader political agendas or by Marxists to overturn the capitalist world order. This is often used by conservatives as a justification against making significant efforts to address climate change. In this sense, climate change

is dismissed as a socialist Trojan horse being employed as a ruse to restructure the world’s econ- omy (Varney 2019). On the other hand, radical pro- gressives might argue that such broad reconfiguring of the political-economic system is the only way to significantly tackle climate change and related envi- ronmental justice inequalities. Environmental justice is the principal that everyone, regardless of income, race, nationality, or religion, is entitled to equal pro- tection from environmental harm. Many of the calls for radical societal restructuring as a climate change solution, however, are largely aspirational and lack solid guidance and details on specific steps to be taken. Climate change is a problem requiring a global response. How will such global decisions be prioritized and taken? Who specifically will be empowered to make the very hard choices on whom to disadvantage and by how much to achieve the goals? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? It should be acknowledged that some of these same issues con- front neoliberal market-based solutions that rely on guiding the market-based systems through regulation.

Those in favor of market-based approaches point out that the environmental records of the Soviet Union and communist China were often as abysmal as anything in the capitalist world (Hamilton 2012). In addition, capital will be required for efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to unavoidable near-term climate change impacts. This additional capital could be obtained by governments through increased taxation, but that has limitations, particu- larly if GDPs and tax bases are declining due to cli- mate change. The neoliberal position would be that additional capital can be created by market-driven economic growth. Proponents of green capitalism support this latter approach and also point out that the past comparative economic performance of tightly controlled economies in Marxist-based social- ist regimes does not engender confidence in that path for producing economic growth and additional economic resources for climate change mitigation and adaptation. The increase in GDP and decrease in poverty rates in China following the opening of the economy to some privatization and a more mar- ket-based system in 1997 and 1998 stand in contrast to the precipitous declines witnessed in Venezuela under the Maduro socialist regime and associated large-scale nationalization program. In 1997 the per capita GDP in China was $750 and by 2018 it stood at $9,470 (World Bank 2019). Over the same period

2022 MacDonald

the percentage of Chinese living in extreme poverty declined from 42.0 percent to 0.7 percent (World Bank 2019). In contrast, beginning in the latter years of President Chavez’s administration and accel- erating under President Maduro, poverty, malnutri- tion, infant mortality, and many other indexes indicate a human catastrophe has evolved disas- trously (Lynch and Hickey 2019). It must be borne in mind, however, that China, with its strong cen- tral control of many macroeconomic and social deci- sions, and Venezuela, with its economic dependence on oil and pervasive corruption in the current regime, are not clear examples of either a pure mar- ket economy or a functional socialist state, respec- tively (Maya 2018; Miranda 2018).

Although much more effort is needed, it can be argued that the largely capitalistic global system has made some progress over the past decades in address- ing poverty and related ills within the region of the Fateful Ellipse (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017; World Bank 2018). Between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty dropped from 35.9 percent to 10.0 percent (World Bank 2018). Although extreme poverty rates in Africa in particular remain unacceptably high, these have dropped from 58.9 percent in 1993 to 41.1 per- cent in 2015 (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017). In sub- Saharan Africa, 33 percent of the population were undernourished in 1900 to 1992, and this had declined to 23 percent in 2015 and 2016 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the World Food Programme 2015). Progress has been made under the current world order, but for many millions it is still not enough.

The current neoliberal approaches to the global economy and their potential to confront climate change and associated economic inequality do not invite sanguinity. The apparent inability of many governments to meet emissions targets or enact meaningful economic and regulatory means to do so is a troubling indictment of current green capitalism approaches. The remarkable concentration of wealth in the hands of private individuals and corporations and accelerating trend toward economic inequality discussed earlier removes much of the power of capi- tal from most citizens and from their governments. Traditional capitalist economists, weighing in via Lomborg’s (2010) book Smart Solutions to Climate Change, have concluded that only geoengineering

and technology transfer provide “very good” and “good” solutions to climate change. Depending solely on such solutions as a road map to navigate climate change might well be considered a course to com- plete disaster.

Looking beyond competing ideologies, it can be argued that it is not capitalism in and of itself that has created anthropogenic climate change and other current environmental challenges; rather, it is the drive to increase the growth of techno-industrial economies. This goal has been embraced by both cap- italist and Marxist governments and societies over the twentieth century (Hamilton 2012). The solution to climate change, and the myriad environmental chal- lenges facing humanity in the twenty-first century, might well need to transcend the capitalist–socialist– Marxist discourse (Wainwright and Mann 2015). Nevertheless, the arguments about neoliberal green capitalism versus a socialist or more radical eco- Marxist approaches to climate change are one of the most heated ideological conflicts facing us.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that there is no single simple solution to mitigation of GHG emissions and their climatic effects. In addition, any meaningful path will not be cost-free to governments, nor to consum- ers. Conflicts will continue over the best path(s) for- ward. As illustrated here, though, we do have at our disposal a number of tools that might be used in concert to achieve success (see, e.g., Hawken 2017), if there is will and international cooperation rather than debilitating conflict and inaction. Recent anal- ysis by Rogelj et al. (2018) concluded that tempera- ture increases could be kept within �1.5 �C by rapidly shifting away from fossil fuel in favor of large-scale low-carbon energy supplies, reducing con- sumer energy use, and applying geoengineering in the form of CO2 capture and removal. They also concluded that any such pathways were not possible under conditions of internationally uncoordinated and short-term climate policies or high socioeco- nomic inequalities. Beyond being internationally coordinated, our way forward must include attention to social and environmental justice to achieve broad support. This is required not just to ensure success in the fight against climate change but also because it is our moral obligation to the peoples of the Fateful Ellipse. Calling attention to the ethical onus to

Climate, Capital, Conflict 2023

counter climate change is nothing new, but the delay in doing so meaningfully is both complex in its causes and troubling in its magnified impact on future generations (Gardiner 2006). We cannot ever forget history and the unequal geographies of the cli- mate change challenge if we hope to succeed in tackling this ethically and effectively. This means that the more affluent nations of the world cannot forsake their moral obligations to the larger world population. The importance of basic morality in framing and building consensus for climate change policy should not be dismissed or discounted in terms of being important compelling action. As Adger, Butler, and Walker-Springett (2017) argued, “Moral dimensions of public discourse about climate change give salience and political legitimacy to pol- icy interventions as well as their processes and out- comes. Moreover, there is evidence that moral framings of public policy issues affect engagement according to political orientation” (372).

The time for action is now. Much of the responsi- bility to act lies with the peoples of the countries and regions outside the Fateful Ellipse that have pro- duced the GHG crisis. We who occupy those regions have been the largest beneficiaries of the economic fruits of the GHG world. It has to be accepted that no realistic path forward is possible without all of us accepting personal responsibility and some personal sacrifice. When we take to the streets and demand governments take action on climate change, we have to understand and accept that any meaningful governmental actions will have some impact on us individually. It is unclear, however, whether people recognize and are willing to make the personal sacri- fices required. Kuper (2019), writing in the Financial Times, put this pointedly: “The only way to prevent climate catastrophe is ‘degrowth’ now, not 2050: stop most flying, meat-eating, clothes-buying until we have green alternatives, ban privately owned cars and abandon sprawling suburbs.” How many of even the most ardent climate change activists are willing to embrace all of these prescriptions for themselves? If voluntary consumer behavioral change is not a complete solution, who will people empower to legis- late and impose required changes in personal lifestyle at regional to global levels? These questions arise whether the path ahead lies with effective green capitalism, environmental democratic socialism, or eco-Marxism. The most difficult climate change con- flicts might not be choices between technical

solutions, carbon pricing strategies, or political ideol- ogies but between our own individual wants and needs and the needs of the wider planet, including the Fateful Ellipse. One thing is clear, though: The longer we wait to resolve these conflicts, the deeper the required sacrifices are likely to be.

What Is Geography: What Should It Be in Light of Climate Change?

Let us now turn back to the old question of what is geography. I believe that our discipline must have climate change and associated issues of environmen- tal justice as a central focus. In no other discipline do we see such breadth of physical sciences, life sci- ence, social sciences, humanities, and geospatial tech- niques. The solution to climate change will be multifaceted, and all of these perspectives are required. As geographers, we are also well aware of the complexity and uncertainty such an effort engenders (Winkler 2016). The spirited engagement of critical social geographers with climate change, however, provides one example of taking up the task (Darly 2013, 2015; Swyngedouw 2013; Wainwright and Mann 2015; Surprise 2018). To succeed, our efforts must be predicated on pointing out and addressing the unequal geographies of climate change and capital (Sheppard 2015). This is the time for geographers to be at the forefront and to make good on our long-held claims that the multi- faceted geographical perspective is of fundamental importance. In doing so we can also create a nexus that draws together the diverse elements of geogra- phy into a more cogent whole.

Climate change also presents a moral obligation that is particularly incumbent on geography. The growth of the modern discipline of geography in the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries did so in collaboration with the colonial enterprise (Driver 1992; Clayton 2020). The age of explorations, map- making, and the florescence of geography was part and parcel of colonial expansion. The development of the modern academic world, and our discipline along with it, was supported by the financial fruits of the Industrial Revolution and the GHG world it has created. Colonial exploitation and GHG effects that are so severely afflicting that Fateful Ellipse today are part of our legacy as geographers. We as geogra- phers have a debt to repay.

2024 MacDonald

The threats of climate, capital, and conflict are pressing; the trajectories frightening. Time is short. Geography is a key element for success in tackling these challenges. It is often stated that “geography is what geographers do.” Given the importance of geography to combating climate change, and our obligation as geographers to do so, we might also define our discipline and organize research, educa- tional, and advocacy efforts around what we can and must do as geographers in the face of this global threat: Geography is what must be done.

Coda: May 2020

When I delivered my address at New Orleans and wrote the subsequent article at St. Andrews, I could not have imagined the world upended by the COVID-19 pandemic. I now find it impossible to consider climate change without reference to what has been revealed by the pandemic. Like climate change, the pandemic is a global crisis. At this time more than 180 countries and territories have been afflicted, with almost 3 million confirmed cases and more than 200,000 known deaths. Factory produc- tion, shop sales, food and service industries, and the transportation sector are declining precipitously under stay-at-home orders. In response, unemploy- ment rates are skyrocketing. The World Trade Organization projects a global trade contraction of 13 percent to 32 percent. All of this is reflected in declining carbon emissions. Some early estimates provided by Carbon Brief (Evans 2020) suggest the equivalent of a 5.5 percent decline in CO2 emis- sions, the largest emissions decline in modern times. These are all early data and estimates and will be revised as the pandemic runs its course. It is sober- ing, but important, to realize that at this point the decrease in carbon emissions produced by the cur- rent economic pain and surrendering of personal freedoms is likely still less than the annual reduc- tions needed by 2030 to avoid a warming of 1.5 �C or greater based on recent IPCC assessments. This underscores how steep the road ahead is in the bat- tle against climate change.

Consider human responses to the pandemic and the insights they provide. There have been many denials of the threat posed by COVID-19. These denials of science are distressingly similar to what cli- mate scientists often face. Unlike climate change, though, which is comparatively slow and against

which wealthy nations have a degree of economic insulation, the mounting COVID-19 cases, hospital- izations, and deaths have provided inarguable evi- dence of an immediate crisis. Throughout the world many countries have responded responsibly and fol- lowed scientifically informed guidance on limiting the spread of the virus. Elsewhere, though, including in the United States, there is also much disarray. Testing has been uneven. The U.S. government has withdrawn funding from the World Health Organization and, similar to climate change, has abro- gated its leadership role nationally and internationally in combating the pandemic. Some jurisdictions are competing aggressively with others to secure scarce medical supplies. There have been increasing numbers of street protests against the measures enacted to curb the spread of the virus. In the United States some protestors and politicians have made it clear that they are less concerned about other people’s health and well-being than they are about their own per- sonal indulgences and economic position. If denial, disarray, and selfishness become the overwhelming responses to the jarringly evident COVID-19 pan- demic, what hope is there for any significant actions to avoid the seemingly less proximal climate change catastrophe? On the other hand, there has also been a great focusing of scientific effort and many altruistic acts by the medical community, essential workers, volunteers, and others who have stepped up, and in cases sacrificed personally, to end or blunt the impacts of the pandemic. It is hoped that these ulti- mately will be the role models from whom humanity takes it lead and by which we move forward in response to climate change.

Acknowledgments

I express my profound gratitude to the member- ship of the American Association of Geographers for electing me president and providing me the opportu- nity of presenting this address. The resulting article was written during my tenure as a Global Visiting Fellow at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. I thank the members of the University, my colleagues in the School of Geography and Sustainable Development, and the Head of the School, Professor Keith Bennett MRIA, for support and hospitality. I thank Daniel Clayton of St. Andrews and Eric Sheppard of UCLA for their generous time and thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the

Climate, Capital, Conflict 2025

article. I also thank the Reverend Dr. Donald MacEwan, Chaplain to the University, and the Turning Pages study group at St. Andrews for fellow- ship and much useful discussion of an earlier draft of the article. David Butler provided a careful reading and many appreciated edits.

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GLEN MACDONALD is a Distinguished Professor and the John Muir Memorial Chair in Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1524. E-mail: [email protected]. His research focuses on climate change and its impacts on natural systems and societies.

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