Midterm

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60 Environmental Liability Directive, Article 2, No. 3. Specifically, species and habitats stipulated in Article 4, No. 2 and Appendix I of the Birds Directive, or in Appendices II and IV of the Habitats Directive; as well as natural habitats listed in Appendix I of the Habitats Directive, and those breeding and resting grounds stipulated in Appendix IV of that Directive. 61 Ibid., Articles 1 and 2, Nos. 1–3, and Articles 4 and 5. 62 Ibid., Article 2, No. 1 lit a), clause 2. See also Knopp, L. and Wiegleb, G. 2009. Der Biodiversitätsschaden des Umweltschadensgesetzes, at 32. Berlin/Heidelberg. 63 Cf. supra, note 23, Section 19, para. 1, clause 2; Schumacher, J. § 19 Rd. no. 47–48; supra, note 28. 64 Schumacher, ibid. 65 ECJ, judgement of 10 January 2006 – C-98/03, NuR 2006, p. 166. 66 Supra, note 21, Article 6, para. 4. 67 BVerwG, judgement of 27 January 2000 – 4 C 2/99, NuR 2000, p. 448. 68 Supra, note 23, Section 15, para. 1, clause 1. 69 Ibid., Article 6, para. 4. 70 Ibid., Section 15, para. 2, clause 4. 71 BVerwG, judgement of 12 March 2008 – 9 A 3.06, NuR 2008, 633 Rd. no. 203. 72 Cf. Schumacher, J. In: Schumacher and Fischer-Hüftle, supra, note 28, § 19 Rd. no. 44. 73 Supra, note 21, Article 6, para. 1 and supra, note 23, Section 32, para. 5, i.e., the Habitats Directive Management Plans. 74 Supra, note 23, Section 15, para. 2, clause 4. 75 Ibid., Section 15, Rd. no. 71 ff. 76 Supra, note 21, Article 6, para. 1. 77 Thum, R. 2006. “Chancen und Risiken von Flächenbevorratung und Ökokonto: Ein Praxistest”. Umwelt- und Planungsrecht 26(8): 289–296, at 294. 78 Gellermann, M. 2010. § 15 BNatSchG. Landmann, R. v. and Rohmer, G. Umweltrecht, 57. Ergänzungslieferung, Rn. 22. 79 Koch, H.-J. and Krohn, S. (2008): “Das Naturschutzrecht im Umweltgesetzbuch im Auftrag der Föderalismusreform erfüllen”. Forum Umweltgesetzbuch 7: 20. German Federal Environment Agency; supra, note 77; Gellermann, supra, note 78.

80 Administrative Court of Saarlouis, judgment of 29 January 2002, NVwZ-RR 2003, p. 265. 81 Supra, note 21, Article 4. 82 Lütkes, S., § 15 Rd. no. 71. In: Lütkes, S. and Ewer, W. 2011., supra, note 39. 83 Fischer-Hüftle, P. and Schumacher, A., § 15, Rd. nos. 72, 74. In: Schumacher J. and Fischer-Hüftle, P., supra, note 28. 84 Administrative Court of Schleswig, judgement of 21 September 2006 – 12 A 162/00, NuR 2007, p. 278. 85 Supra, note 23, Section 15, para. 1, clause 1. 86 Ibid., Section 15, para. 1, Clause 3. 87 Ibid., Section 15, para. 6. 88 Ibid., Section 15, para. 2, Clause 3. 89 Cf. Ssymank, A. 1994. “Neue Anforderungen im europäischen Naturschutz. Das Schutzgebietssystem Natura 2000 und die ‘FFH-Richtlinie der EU’”. In: Natur und Landschaft 69(9): 395–406, 402–403. 90 As designated under Saxon Law on Spatial Planning, Section 9, para. 1. 91 As designated in accordance with Section 7 of the Federal Water Act. 92 Saxon Nature Conservation Act, Section 10, para. 1. 93 Tucker, G.M., Underwood, E., Farmer, A., Scalera, R., Dickie, I.A., McConville, A.J. and van Vliet, W. 2013. Estimation of the financing needs to implement Target 2 of the EU Biodiversity Strategy. Report to the European Commission. London and Brussels: Institute for European Environmental Policy. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/ pdf/2020/Fin%20Target%202.pdf. 94 B e r l i n U n i v e r s i t y o f Te c h n o l o g y. [ U n d a t e d ] Ü b e r p r ü f u n g u n d Weiterentwicklung von Beurteilungskriterien für Natur und Landschaft innerhalb der Umweltrisikoeinschätzung des Bundesverkehrswegeplanes für die Verkehrsträger Straße und Schiene. R&D project 899 82 110 funded by German Nature Conservation Agency. Bundesamt für Naturschutz FKZ 899 82 110, final report. 95 Supra, note 15.

Climate Change Vulnerabilities – Legal Status of the Displaced People –

by Awal Khan*

Bangladesh is a low-lying deltaic State, made up of watersheds and flat land in South Asia with a large number of rivers (seven major rivers and over 200 minor ones) and many channels.1 Of these, 54 (including the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna) originate in India, which has one of the largest river networks in the world.2 These rivers and their branches define the geography of the country and the lifestyle of its people. They are important for agriculture, fisheries, irrigation, commercial and internal transport, and other marine resources. Due to these benefits, most of the communities live along the riverbanks and are mainly dependent on the flood plains for their livelihoods. As a result, they are very exposed to natural hazards such as floods, cyclones and droughts.3

South Bangladesh has a very long coastline along the Bay of Bengal. The country consists of low and flat land except for the hilly regions in the north-east and south- east.4 Most of its territory lies either very close to the sea shores or to riverbanks. Bangladesh is more vulnerable to climate change than other countries in South Asia because

Bangladesh

* Ph.D. candidate, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Australia.

of its regional connectivity through geo-physical and hydrological features and its reliance on trade.5 Due to this unique geographic position, Bangladesh is now regarded as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries on earth.6

As residents of a disaster-prone area, the people of Bangladesh are familiar with natural disaster and calamities. They know how to survive regular floods, cyclones or extreme cold or heat. They have grown used to adapting with limited resources and capacity; however, the climate change situation is a more recent phenomenon. Due to the unpredictable and ever-growing impact of climate change, their livelihoods are now under threat because they do not know what to do or how to prepare themselves against the adverse impacts of climate change.

The aim of this paper is to address this situation and to examine the impact of climate change on population displacement from and within Bangladesh. As legal recognition of displaced people is not available under the existing climate-change legal regime, this paper outlines the on-going argument and controversy with regard to climate-change displacement to determine the status of the displaced people under both international and Bangladeshi law. In addition, this paper suggests that there is a logical

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justification in bringing the rights of climate-change- displaced people within the Bangladeshi legal framework.

The Observed Climate-Change Scenario in Bangladesh

Climate change is a continuing threat to Bangladesh and it has already affected most parts of the country severely. The Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that South Asia is the most vulnerable region of the world to the impacts of climate change7 and the international community ranks Bangladesh high on the list of most vulnerable countries.8 Bangladesh is more vulnerable because of its weak economy, low adaptive capacity, corrupt politics and various social hindrances. Moreover, the geographical position of Bangladesh places it in a difficult position to combat climate change. Two-thirds of the country is less than 5 m above sea level and in an average year around one quarter of the country is usually flooded. The Bangladesh Delta is most vulnerable to sudden storm surges. Instances have been observed where up to two-thirds of the land mass was inundated with water after extreme weather phenomena.9

The situation of Bangladesh is also extreme because of its small territory and large population.10 Bangladesh will not be able to cope with the predicted loss of habitable territory resulting from climate change11 because the unaffected territory will not be able to absorb all of the displaced population.12 The present trend of displacement indicates that most will probably be internal, rather than cross-border or external, in nature.13 International and regional security would be threatened if a large number of people from Bangladesh were displaced.14

Bangladesh has a sub-tropical monsoon climate with six seasonal variations in rainfall, humidity and heat.15 Impacts of climate change are evident in Bangladesh in the form of extreme temperature; unpredictable rainfall; sudden and increased numbers of intensified floods, cyclones and droughts; and the prevalence of rough weather in the Bay.16 Frequent weather variations have been observed in recent times.

Bangladesh ex p erien ced th e lo w est recorded temperature in its history (3°C in three northern districts) during January 2013.17 On the other hand, extreme high temperatures (42.08°C in Jessore, a southern district) have been recorded over 14 years. On 27 April 2009, a record number of patients were admitted to the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b) due to illness caused by extreme heat.18

On 28 July 2009, the heaviest rainfall in 60 years was recorded in Dhaka – 333 mm (290 mm in six hours, a record for the capital).19 A total of 408 mm rainfall in Chittagong (measured on 11 June up to 21.00, the heaviest in 25 years) resulted in a landslide killing at least 124 people.20 On the other hand, there was 21 percent less rain during the monsoon period (June–August) in 2009 and the northern districts suffered from drought.21 Droughts were reported even in the coastal zone.22

A number of severe floods have hit Bangladesh in the last decade: “recurring floods occurred in 2002, 2003, 2004,

and twice in 2007 (July–August and September). Flash flooding in the hilly terrain of the eastern and north eastern part of Bangladesh has been increasing and also occurring a few days earlier in recent years than 40–50 years ago”.23 Similarly, the number of cyclones developing into landfall and storm surges has also increased substantially: for example, Super Cyclone Sidr, on 15 November 2007; Cyclone Nargis, on 2 May 2008 (which hit Myanmar and affected Bangladesh as well); Cyclone Rashmi, on 27 October 2008; and Cyclone Aila, on 26 May 2009.24

The insecurity surrounding cyclones – the lack of advance warning and the uncertainty in forecasting of the timing and vulnerability to climate changes – is already being experienced by Bangladeshi people, and it is extremely frightening. Changes in rainfall patterns and in the frequency and severity of tropical cyclones and storm surges are likely to happen quickly.25 Other changes such as sea-level rise may occur after 20 years or possibly longer.26 This variation in climate will impact the lifestyle of the people of Bangladesh. Displaced people face more serious challenges than other climate-change victims.

Climate-Change Vulnerability in Bangladesh

According to a recent climate vulnerability rating, Bangladesh ranks 12th out of 166 countries.27 Another measure, the Global Climate Risk Index 2009, recognised Bangladesh as the most vulnerable country for extreme weather events.28 A number of hydro-geological and socio- economic factors are responsible for the high vulnerability of Bangladesh due to climate change, such as its sea- proximate geographical location, flat deltaic topography with very low elevation, extreme climate variability (the monsoon, source of acute water distribution over space and time), high population density, poverty and the fact that its agriculture-based economy is highly dependent on rainfall and temperature.29

It has been predicted that increased temperatures, monsoons, rain, riverbank erosion, more intense cyclones and more severe droughts will be observed over the next century.30 The primary impact of this on the livelihoods of the people will occur through factors such as food production,31 water supplies, health, home and income.32 By the middle of the 21st century, there will be water scarcity to the point where there is likely to be insufficient water in low rainfall periods.33

Moreover, “the coastal zone of Bangladesh hosts over 35 million people who are exposed to cyclones, storm surges, rough seas, salinity intrusion and permanent inundation due to the sea level rising”.34 Bangladesh needs to prepare for these large numbers of people who are likely to be displaced due to climate change. There are 72 offshore islands with an area of 4,200 km2 where over three million people are extremely vulnerable.35 A joint report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) stated that, in 2008, at least 36 million people in Bangladesh were displaced by sudden-onset natural disasters, including 20 million displaced as a result of climate-related events.36

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Recent satellite images show that an island known as New Moore Island or South Talpotti (uninhabited disputed territory of Bangladesh) has disappeared due to sea-level rise.37 It is predicted that other small islands in the Bay of Bengal may disappear like South Talpotti in the coming decades.38

Sea-level rise is also anticipated to worsen and subsume up to 30 percent of Bangladesh’s coastal land by 2080.39 Even a rise of one metre may submerge 17.5 percent of all the land in Bangladesh.40 If this happens, then many places in Bangladesh will disappear and large numbers of people will migrate. Already many people have migrated to the urban slums from the coastal areas due to repeated cyclones, storm surges, and riverbank erosion.41 During the last five years, about 135,632 families have become homeless due to riverbank erosion on 12 rivers in Bangladesh.42 Three-quarters of the population live in rural areas which are environmentally vulnerable and half of rural households are landless.43 Preliminary estimates indicate that around 26 million people in Bangladesh are under threat of sea-level rise.44 A major disruption could result in low-lying, shoreline areas becoming submerged.45 An example of this occurred in 1995, when half of Bhola Island became permanently flooded, leaving 500,000 people homeless, who have been described as some of the world’s first climate-change-displaced people.46 Cyclone Sidr affected 30 districts out of 64, impacting nearly 8.7 million people in 2007; among them, 650,000 people were displaced and 3,447 killed.47 In April 2009, Cyclone Bijli displaced around 200,000 people.48

The country was hit twice in 2009. In May, Cyclone Aila smashed the coastal area and nearly 4.82 million people were affected.49 Then according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 16,651 families were displaced from only two upazilla (sub-districts) in November 2009 as a direct consequence of Cyclone Sidr.50 On average, those events resulted in displacement of 2 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively, of the total population of the country, and this representing 6.5 percent of the coastal population.51

It has been further predicted that a one metre sea-level rise will lead to 14.8 million people becoming landless. Over 29,000 km2 of Bangladesh’s land will be lost and 40 million of its people displaced.52 In the transnational Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, half a million people are displaced regularly as a result of flooding.53 The Lohachara Island in the Ganges delta (close to Bangladesh), where 10,000 people used to live,54 has been totally submerged. However, it is impossible to distinguish the numbers of people moving due to soil degradation in the Sahel or a rise in sea level in Bangladesh from those making the same journey for other reasons.55

Regardless of the exact estimate, it has been recognised that climate-change-related displacement is now a burning issue for Bangladesh. Frequent devastation by natural disasters has been one of the major reasons for poverty.56 So it is a pressing concern for Bangladesh to protect its citizens from the severe impacts of climate change.

Who Are Climate-change-displaced People? The traditional climate-change literature argues that

climate-induced migration occurs due to fear57 and it is depicted as a manifestation of the severe vulnerability of those people affected by the climate.58 There are four main climate-change-related displacement scenarios:59 weather- related disasters, such as hurricanes and flooding; gradual environmental deterioration and slow-onset disasters (such as desertification, sinking of coastal zones and possible total submersion of low-lying island States); increased disaster risks resulting in relocation of people from high-risk zones and social upheaval; and violence attributable to climate- change-related factors.

In its First Assessment Report, the IPCC indicated that the most severe effects of climate change may be those resulting in human migration.60 It documented a strong link between these phenomena. In Bangladesh, as in many other countries, they have also been linked to severe and immediate threats to human rights and environmental security.61 The Report called for specific situation- necessitated treatment for climate-change-displaced people. Academic literature also highlights these points. Despite national and international controversy on the legal identity of the climate-change-displaced people, it has been observed that “neither the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),62 nor its Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change63 (Kyoto Protocol) includes any provisions concerning specific assistance or protection for those who will be directly affected by the effects of climate change”.64 In the same way, climate-change-displacement issues are acknowledged only in academic discussions in Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh does not legally recognise a category of climate-change-displaced people.

This paper intends to clarify their position. There are many arguments and criticisms regarding the formal and legal identification of, and the suitable terminology to define, climate-change-displaced people. Various literary and academic discussions define a climate-change refugee as an individual who is forced to flee his or her home as the result of sudden or gradual environmental disruption/ change and who is, as a result, temporarily or permanently displaced across a national boundary as a consequence of climate change.65 Due to the lack of an official or widely accepted definition, however, the meaning of these words often remains unclear.66 Sometime these people are referred to as “environmental refugees”, “climate refugees” or “environmental migrants”.67 However, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies generally agree that these terms should be avoided because they are misleading and could theoretically undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees.68

UNHCR has stated its clear position regarding the identification and legal position of displaced people. UNHCR has argued that the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)69 is applicable in some cross-border displacement scenarios. UNHCR has serious reservations with respect to the terminology and notion of environmental refugees or climate refugees.

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These terms have no basis in international refugee law. Furthermore, the majority of those who are commonly described as environmental refugees do not cross an international border. Hence, use of this terminology could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees and create confusion regarding the link between climate change, environmental degradation and migration. While environmental factors can contribute to prompting cross-border movements, they are not grounds, in and of themselves, for granting refugee status under international refugee law.70

Reference to them as “environmental refugees” or “climate refugees” would be contrary to the Refugee Convention,71 where the displaced climate-affected people remain within the borders of their own territory.72 However, there are situations in which environmentally displaced persons are legitimately “refugees”. It is argued that if there are grounds for treating such a person as a refugee under the Refugee Convention, then he or she might be protected even if the force compelling displacement is environmental. For example, where victims of natural disasters flee from their homeland because their government has consciously withheld or obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalise them, they would appear to be legitimately considered refugees in the traditional sense of the term.73

The UNHCR has taken a strict position in relation to including people under the Refugee Convention who have been displaced across borders as a result of long-term climate change or sudden natural disasters.74

The term “refugee” narrowly describes a sub-class of the world’s forced migrants and it is often misunderstood to apply to those who have moved or are anticipated to move for environmental or climate reasons.75 The reasons that displaced people are generally outside the definition of refugee in the Refugee Convention is because they are not normally being prosecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular racial or political group.76 As noted, however, in some circumstances, displaced people could arguably fall within the definition of refugee as in the case of prosecution through environmental harm.77 Even then, although the refugee terminology is used for them, they are, in fact, more correctly recognised as climate-change-displaced persons.78

Moreover, due to the combined impacts of conflict, the environment and economic pressures, the scenario to define climate-change-displaced people is becoming increasingly complicated.79 Indeed, the scope of climate- change-induced displacements is still very much debated because an individual’s decision to move is often induced by various factors.80

The concepts of “environmental migrant” and “climate- change-induced migrant” correlate with each other such that they are sometimes combined under the term “climate migrant”. Under the IOM definition, “environmental migrants” are those who, “for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country

or abroad”.81 A person who is initially forced to migrate due to environmental effects is defined as an environmentally displaced person.82 But the force of the environmental change displacing them does not necessarily mean that they have no other options but to leave that place. These people are motivated to move because of choice and environmental factors (for example, natural disasters, slow-onset land degradation, and sea-level rise).83 This type of migration can also be viewed as a coping strategy against climate change, and people can take time to choose this strategy and to consider social and other factors. This definition adopts a realistic approach, as it generally includes people displaced by climatic events as well as by climatic change,84 people moving temporarily or permanently, people forced to move, and those choosing to do so.85

The first overarching definition of “environmental refugee” was used by Essam El-Hinnawi of the United Nations Environment Programme in 1985, when he stated environmental refugees are those people who have been forced to leave their traditional place of living temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption leaving that place unable to support human life.86

The concept of “environmental refugee” has been expansively and loosely used, and it has attracted wide interest.87 The definitions of that phrase usually encompass victims of climate change. Generally, environmental migrants move voluntarily because the situation of any gradual and natural degradation in an area may lead people to decide to seek a better and more convenient place to live. On the other hand, extreme or sudden environmental disasters could force people to leave their homes. Here, they have no alternative but to abandon their home and property. Thus the vulnerability and sufferings of environmental migrants and climate-change-displaced people are quite different. International and national obligations with respect to enforcing the human rights of these two groups obviously vary due to their particular aspects and the nature of their vulnerabilities. These terms are used herein to refer to those who are only moving because of global climate change, as opposed to any other changes in the environment.88

The term environmental refugee is widely used and climate-change refugee is more specific. But it is clear from the report of UNHCR, as discussed previously, that using the term refugee is misleading and contrary to the Refugee Convention. Thus this article prefers to use the term “climate-change-displaced persons”.

However, there is still a problem of distinguishing them on the basis of their movement. They are referred to as “internally displaced persons” when they have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence due to natural or human-made disasters, but have not crossed an international State border.89 This definition includes only those who are forcibly displaced within their national territory due to the adverse effect of climate change; it remains debatable whether, when they cross international borders, they would be defined as “climate refugees”. As the IOM has noted, “Environmentally-induced migration is therefore best understood as a continuum, ranging from clear cases of

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forced movement to clear cases of voluntary movement, with a large grey zone in between”.90

If these sorts of people are treated as refugees and fall within the definition of the Refugee Convention, they will be protected under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, anyone who crosses borders solely because of environmental degradation in their nation of origin is not accorded this protection.91 There is no developed legal protection of climate migrants under national legal systems. It is also well known that, due to resource constraints and political reasons, developing countries such as Bangladesh are not interested in providing special legal protection to climate- change-displaced people.

It can be argued that human displacement due to climate change is a result of human-made conditions; the poor and displaced people are not responsible for these conditions, but ultimately they become the victims. The governments thus have to bear the responsibility for such people’s legal identity and protection. This article recommends calling them “climate-change-displaced people” – a concept that is less debated and would be well accepted. Given that their rights and identity are very controversial in the international arena, it may be better to determine their status through national legal mechanisms rather than internationally.

Climate-change-displaced People in Bangladesh

The climate-change-displacement scenario in Bangladesh is quite complex. Large numbers of people are already displaced and will be displaced in the future due to climate change.92 It is happening in Bangladesh due to the intensification of both sudden and slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse consequences of increased warming and climate variability for livelihoods including impacts on health, water, food and housing.93 Unexpected environmental events and regular environmental change can affect population displacement in various ways.94 But large-scale human movement usually happens due to floods, cyclones and riverbank erosion. In these cases, people usually return to their place of origin when the natural disaster is over. But in cases involving coastal erosion, sea-level rise, salt-water intrusion, changing rainfall patterns and drought, a more permanent form of migration may be necessary.95

Owing to strict border protections, human movement in Bangladesh due to climate-change impacts is mainly internal – visible in the migration from rural to urban areas – although there are also incidents where people are displaced across the borders.96 Various economic, social and environmental factors exist to influence people to migrate. In making this choice, people are usually influenced by their social network,97 but climate change or environmental degradation may leave them no option but to migrate from the vulnerable place. Although some experts argue that people typically migrate to urban areas temporarily during floods and the dry season, in order to increase their means of subsistence,98 this option is not available to those who are susceptible due to climate change.

As a separate issue, when large numbers of people move towards urban areas, it may create law, order and security problems in that area.

Climate-change Displacement Security Issues in Bangladesh

Large-scale human displacement not only violates human rights but it also affects national and global peace and stability.99 If such environmental migration is not properly managed, then the issue of human security will become a problem as individuals compete over scarce resources.100 It has been projected that this situation might act as a threat multiplier for insecurity and tension, not only in some of the most unstable regions of the world but also in currently stable regions.101 Population movement due to climate change can put people in vulnerable situations where they are separated from their communities and their usual resource base. These people, isolated from their habitual place, survive with reduced capacity for self- reliance and increased dependence on external assistance for support than in normal time and people live knowingly in hazardous locations placing them at risk.102

These security challenges are different from the traditional security concept. Traditional notions of “security” concentrate on the protection of the State and its borders while “human security” encompasses a wider range of issues relating to the livelihood of humans.103 Shifting the focus to the protection of individuals from a broad spectrum of threats, human security includes safety from hunger, disease and repression as well as crime, violence and sudden or harmful disruptions in people’s daily lives.104

In 2008, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a consensus resolution on human rights and climate change, stating that climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world.105 More recently, António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, addressed the UN Security Council regarding the security issues related to climate- change phenomena.106

The climate-change security issue has become a matter of concern in Bangladesh, where such problems have already arisen, especially in urban slum areas. “The impacts of climate change and its migratory consequences – forced or voluntary, temporary or permanent, urban or rural – raise a number of significant human security concerns in Bangladesh”.107 Climate-change security concerns might adversely affect economic development, erode social cohesion and lead to destruction of political institutions and demographic displacement both within the country and outside.108 Bangladesh has a relatively large population within a very small territory. As such, it is according this issue the highest priority. Global mass movement due to climate change, including 30 million migrants in Bangladesh, “would cause social disorders, political instability, cross-border conflicts, and upheavals”.109 Some other issues like poverty, underdevelopment, limited land availability and conflict over land are already potent drivers of migration.110 Beyond these, climate-change impacts will interact with the existing underlying cause of economic instability with impacts on river resources (such as fishing

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and agriculture) that strain governmental capacity to assist displaced people.111 No single causative factor is responsible for inducing people to leave their homes, and it is not possible to distinguish between natural disaster and other reasons underlying such movements.112

Large numbers of destitute and displaced people without proper legal protection might very probably create a threat to security. The most commonly cited security issues alleged to result from climate displacement in Bangladesh are conflicts over limited resources (including land), increasing religious extremism and militancy as a result of impoverishment, frustration and disempowerment, and cross-border tensions.113

The increased and unexpected urbanisation due to displacement will create more stress on the social security and living standard of the overpopulated cities of Bangladesh, especially the capital Dhaka.114 Already large numbers of slums have grown up in Dhaka city and, according to the IOM report, a vast number of families have lost their homes permanently due to climate change and have been compelled to move to urban slums in metropolitan areas such as Dhaka, Rajshahi, Khulna and Chittagong.115 It has been estimated that the slum population in Dhaka alone is around 3.4 million. This is expected to grow as 400,000 migrants arrive each year from rural and coastal areas as a result of naturally induced disasters.116 Such a situation can upset domestic power balances and social stability.

In Bangladesh, about 80 percent of slums are located on private land117 which means that the inhabitants are very vulnerable to violence due to forced eviction or exploitation by criminal gangs, landowners and corrupt police.118 Where people have lost their land due to erosion, and cannot return even after the disaster, they risk being entrapped in harmful or exploitative relationships with landowners.119 This type of “patron-client” relationship is clearly a risk for the most vulnerable and this scenario is also not unusual in post-disaster situations in Bangladesh.120

The entry of new slum residents into the labour market also brings real and perceived competition for employment, particularly in the informal sector such as in rickshaw or van pulling, bus or truck driving, domestic work and cleaning, and working in the garment industry.

Local residents gathering for a meeting on displacement Courtesy: Displacement Solutions

121At the same time, the abundant supply of labour can also lead to lower wages, a situation which in some instances has provoked attacks on (internal) migrants.122 If greater internal displacement and the resulting urbanisation are not well managed by the Bangladeshi Government, then some cross-border migration may result from these impacts of climate change.123

The impacts of climate change could likely stimulate large-scale cross-border emigration from Bangladesh and consequently generate international security threats.124 Bangladesh shares border and marine territories with India and Myanmar. Any mass migration of Bangladeshis towards Myanmar and India will be likely to cause tensions, border clashes and bilateral international conflict especially with China and India.125 Bangladesh already has problems with India regarding the migration of 12–17 million Bangladeshi people to the adjacent Indian states (mostly to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura) since the 1950s. So, Bangladeshi mass migration throughout the region may create international political instability in South Asia.126 Southeast Asia and Europe may further experience Bangladeshi migration and associated political tensions.127

Climate change is going to cause a redrawing of the physical map of the planet.128 If the physical territory of Bangladesh is changed due to heavy flooding, then it may cause international legal disputes to re- determine maritime territory and disrupt access to marine resources.129 Bangladesh shares the arc of the Bay of Bengal with India to the west and Myanmar to the east.130 Climate change might exacerbate the issue of maritime borders and create further international conflict for Bangladesh especially given that Bangladesh is already currently engaged in conflict with India and Myanmar over unsolved maritime border issues.

Human displacement due to climate change can further lead to trafficking in women and children. Most adaptation strategies involve the departure of the men, leaving the women alone with their children.131 This situation can also force women and children to get involved in prostitution and other illegal activities.

Security measures are addressed in international core instruments as well as in national legislation. To ensure overall security for its citizens is part of the State’s obligation, as stated in the Charter of the United Nations132 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.133 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966134 includes specific provisions to ensure peace and social security. The Constitution of Bangladesh also promises to ensure human rights,135 social security,136 and international peace and security.137

The security implications of climate change require a holistic approach to migration management including suitable recognition and support for the positive dimensions of migration as a planned adaptation strategy.138 In determining the future policy and planning in relation to climate change vulnerability and its effect on human displacement, it is essential to consider the security dimension along with other visible impacts of climate change.

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But there is a vacuum in the legal system of Bangladesh regarding the status and rights of the displaced people. With no specific solution in international law, national mechanisms should be used to define their identity. It is proposed that a national human rights commission in Bangladesh could take the responsibility to address the status and rights of the climate-change-displaced people.

Conclusion Natural destructive phenomena have become regular

incidents in Bangladesh. The high sensitivity of Bangladesh to natural calamities is known worldwide. Since ancient times, human migration and displacement have been recognised as types of survival strategies and responses to environmental threats.139 But uncontrolled and unplanned migration is likely to bring huge suffering for a country. In this case, poor and displaced people migrate first and they face the hardest situation.

Human displacement, whether voluntary or forced by unfavourable climate conditions, may be considered a major human rights violation, because people choose it as their last option of adaptation against the climate. On the other hand, migration can be encouraged if it can “help reduce risk to lives, livelihoods and ecosystems, contribute to income diversification and enhance overall capacity of households and communities to cope with the adverse effects of environmental degradation and change”.140 There is little chance, however, that large numbers of climate-displaced people would bring any fortune for the country. For this reason, it seems essential that climate- displaced people should be given special attention, care and protection.

This article has identified the vulnerabilities of the climate-change-displaced people, especially from a Bangladeshi perspective. It has further proposed that the definition of “climate-displaced people”, among the various definitions and terms available, is more suitable to address their legal position. As the Refugee Convention is not applicable for climate-change-displaced people at the moment, so climate-change-displaced people deserve to get legal identity through the legal system of Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh could establish their legal identity through the Constitution and national human rights commission. This initiative would not only help Bangladesh to manage unexpected displacement but also reduce overall climate change vulnerabilities.

Notes 1 Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. Highlights. New York NY: United Nations. 2 Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 2002. “Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)”. Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 3 Poncelet, A. et al. 2010. “A Country Made for Disasters: Environmental Vulnerability and Forced Migration in Bangladesh”. In: Afifi, T. and Jäger, J. (Eds) Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability, at 211. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 4 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 2011. Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh 2010. Ministry of Planning. 5 The Women’s Environment and Development Organization. 2008. Gender, climate change and human security: Lessons from Bangladesh, Ghana and Senegal. Athens: ELIAMEP.

6 Displacement Solutions. 2012. “Climate Displacement in Bangladesh: The Need for Urgent Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Rights Solutions”. Geneva: Displacement Solutions. 7 McCarthy, J. et al. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. “Executive summary”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8 Ahmad, A.U. 2006. Bangladesh Climate Change Impact and Vulnerability: A Synthesis, at 1. Dhaka: Department of Environment and Forest. 9 Mirza, M.M.Q. 2002. “Global Warming and Changes in the Probability of Occurrence of Floods in Bangladesh and Implications”. Global Environmental Change 12: 127–128; Parry, M.L. et al. 2007. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, at 687, 691. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10 According to World Bank Report 2012, the population of Bangladesh is more than 150 million within 144,000 km2 of territory, at a density of over 950 person/ km2. World Bank, Data, Bangladesh (3 August 2013), at http://www.worldbank. org/en/country/bangladesh. 11 Poncelet, A. 2009. “Bangladesh Case Study Report: The land of mad rivers”. Brussels: EACH-FOR. 12 Mayer, B. 2011. “The international legal challenges of climate-induced migration: Proposal for an international legal framework”. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 22(3): 357–416. 13 McAdam, J. 2012. Climate change, forced migration, and international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14 McAdam, J. and Saul, B. 2010. “Displacement with Dignity: International Law and Policy Responses to Climate Change Migration and Security in Bangladesh”. University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 10(113). 15 Supra, note 4. 16 Ministry of Food and Disaster Management. 2010. “National Plan for Disaster Management 2010–2015”, at 22–23. Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 17 AFP. 2013. “80 die in record Bangladesh cold snap”. ABC NEWS, 10 January 2013, at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-01-10/80-dead-as-temperature-hits- record-low-in-bangladesh/4460004. 18 Supra, note 16. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Technical Committee on Food Security. 2011. “Bangladesh National Road Map for adaptation to Climate Change Impacts on Food Security”. Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 22 Ibid. 23 Supra, note 16. 24 Ibid. 25 Ministry of Environment and Forest. 2005. National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 26 Ibid. 27 Maplecroft, a global risk analyst organisation, described this information on 10 January 2013, see maplecroft.com/portfolio/doc/climate_change/Climate_Change_ Poster_A3_2010_Web_V01.pdf. 28 Harmeling, S. 2008. Global Climate Risk Index 2009. Weather-related loss events and their impacts on countries in 2007 and in a long-term comparison. Bonn: Germanwatch. 29 Supra, note 8. 30 Parry, M. et al. (Eds) 2007. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, at 17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 31 UK Border Agency. 2009. “Country of Origin Information Report: Bangladesh”, at para. 2.03. 32 Supra, note 13. 33 Solomon, S. et al. (Eds) 2007. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 34 Ministry of Environment and Forest. 2009. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009. Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 35 Ibid. 36 IDMC, UNOCHA and NRC. 2009. “Monitoring disaster displacement in the context of climate change: Findings of a study by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre”. IDMC/UNOCHA/NRC. 37 Rahman, M.M. 2010. “Offshore Nijhum island: Overcoming climate change impact”. The Daily Star (Dhaka), at http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news- details.php?nid=133670,10April2010. 38 Roy, D.C. 2011. “Vulnerability and population displacements due to climate- induced disasters in coastal Bangladesh”. United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security. 39 Pender, J. 2008. “Community-led adaptation in Bangladesh”. Forced Migration Review 31.

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40 IPCC. 1995. IPCC Second Assessment. Climate Change 1995: A Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 34. 41 IOM. 2009. “Compendium of IOM’s activities in migration: Climate change and the environment”. Geneva: IOM. 42 Poncelet et al., supra, note 3, at 213. 43 Supra, note 13. 44 Mayers, N. and Kent, J. 1995. Environmental Exodus: An emerging crisis in global arena, at 134. Washington DC: Climate Institute. 45 Williams, A. 2008. “Turning the tide: Recognizing climate change refugees in international law”. Law and Policy 30(4): 502–529. 46 Wax, E. 2007. “In Flood-Prone Bangladesh, a Future That Floats”. Washington Post, 28 September 2007. 47 Poncelet et al., supra, note 3. 48 Al-Mansur, R. 2011. Assessment of Social Protection as a Form of Capabilities to Reduce Climate Change Vulnerabilities: Public Sectors Initiatives of Bangladesh, at 8. Bielefeld: Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development. 49 Anwar, M. “UNICEF helps cyclone-hit families”. UNICEF Bangladesh, 4 June 2009, at http://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/media_5130.htm. 50 Supra, note 38. 51 Akter, T. 2009. Climate Change and Flow of Environmental Displacement in Bangladesh, at 137. Dhaka: The Unnayan Onneshan. 52 Brown, L.R. 2010. Plan B 2.0: Rescuing a Planet Under Stress and a Civilization in Trouble, at chapter 6. Washington DC: Earth Policy Institute. 53 Warner, K. et al. 2009. In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement. UNU-EHS/Care International/ CIESIN Columbia University. 54 Lean, G. 2006. “Disappearing world: Global warming claims tropical island”. The Independent, 24 December 2006, at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/ climate-change/disappearing-world-globalwarming-claims-tropical-island-429764.html. 55 Supra, note 12. 56 Ahmad, Q.K. and Ahmed, A.U. (Eds) 2002. Bangladesh: Citizens’ Perspectives on Sustainable Development, at 225. Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad. 57 IOM. 2009. “Migration, Climate Change and the Environment”. IOM Policy Brief. Geneva: IOM. 58 Tasneem, S. “Impact of Climate Change: Migration as an Adaptation Strategy”. Bangladesh Political Science Review 8. 59 Adapted from typology proposed by the Representative of the Secretary General on human rights of internally displaced persons and also used in the working paper submitted by the IASC informal group on migration/displacement and climate change, “Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: who will be affected”, 31 October 2008. 60 Tegart, W.J.McG., Sheldon, G.W. and Griffiths, D.C. 1990. Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment. Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group II. IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR). Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 61 Environmental Justice Foundation. 2012. A Nation Under Threat: The impacts of climate change on human rights and forced migration in Bangladesh, at 108. London: EJF. 62 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994). 63 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22. 64 Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 2008. “Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected?” Geneva: IASC/UN. 65 Docherty, B. and Giannini, T. 2009. “Confronting a rising tide: A proposal for a convention on climate change refugees”. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33(2): 349–403. 66 Ibid., at 349, 363; Dun, O. and Gemenne, F. 2008. “Defining ‘Environmental Migration’”. Forced Migration Review 31: 10–11. 67 Hugo, G. 1996. “Environmental Concerns and International Migration”. International Migration Review 30(1): 105–131. It defined “Persons or groups of persons who for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”. 68 Supra, note 57. 69 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954), amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267, Article 1 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 70 Guterres, A. 2008. “Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective”. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 71 Supra, note 69. As Article 1(A)(2) describes it, “the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.

72 Lopez, A. 2007. “The Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International Law”. Environmental Law 37: at 386. 73 Supra, note 70. 74 Ibid. 75 McAdam, J. 2011. “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is not the Answer”. International Journal of Refugee Law 23(1): 2–27, at 3. 76 Horn, L. and Freeland, S. 2009. “More than Hot Air: Reflections on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights”. University of Western Sydney Law Review 13: 101–135, at 122. 77 Supra, note 72, at 378. 78 Millar, I. 2007. “There’s No Place like Home: Human Displacement and Climate Change”. Australian International Law Journal 14: 71–98, at 71, 72. 79 Supra, note 75. 80 Wood, W.B. 2001. “Ecomigration: Linkages between Environmental Change and Migration”. In: Zolberg, A.R. and Benda, P. (Eds) Global Migrants, Global Refugees: Problems and solutions, at 42. New York NY and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 81 International Organization for Migration. 2007. “Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment”, at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/ about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf. 82 Keane, D. 2004. “Environmental causes and consequences of migration: A search for the meaning of ‘environmental refugees’”. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 16: 209–223. 83 Dun, O., Gemenne, F. and Stojanov, R. 2007. “Environmentally Displaced Persons: Working Definitions for the EACH-FOR Project”. 84 Climatic events include normal and predictable natural disasters. In Bangladesh, people know that a hot, humid summer happens from March to June, rainy monsoon season from June to October with regular storms and floods; and dry winter from October to March. Climate-change natural events are sometimes unpredictable and their destructive power more severe than normal climatic events. Moreover, climate change might create permanent or long-term displacement but normal climatic events may create temporary displacement. 85 Supra, note 12. 86 El-Hinnawi, E. 1985. “Environmental Refugees”, at 4. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. 87 Rayner, S. and Malone, E.L. (Eds) 1998. Human Choice and Climate Change, at 172. Columbus OH: Battelle Press. 88 Supra, note 12. 89 UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/ add.2. 90 Supra, note 57. 91 Walsham, M. 2010. “Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh”. Geneva: IOM. 92 At present there are no specific statistics on the number of climate-change- displaced people. According to a report by the Association for Climate Refugees, a non-governmental organisation based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 6.5 million had been displaced due to climatic reasons by 2011 and 30 million people might be displaced by 2050. Many people are already living in urban slum areas in which climate-change-displaced people are also living. Thus it is very difficult to separate climate-change-displaced people from non-climate-change-displaced people. 93 Supra, note 58. 94 Supra, note 91. 95 Supra, note 58. 96 Discussed earlier. 97 Poncelet et al., supra, note 3. 98 Ibid. 99 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 2008. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world; and German Advisory Council on Global Change. 2008. World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 100 Supra, note 91, at vi; Dun, O. 2009. “Viet Nam Case Study Report: Linkages Between Flooding, Migration and Resettlement”. Brussels: EACH-FOR. 101 Catarious, D.M. et al. 2007. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”. Alexandria VA: The CNA Corporation. 102 Supra, note 2. 103 Supra, note 91. 104 Jolly, R. and Basu Ray, D. 2006. “The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Report”. UNDP Human Development Report. 105 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Seventh Session, GA Res. 7/23, 7th sess, Agenda Item 1, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/78 (28 March 2008). 106 United Nations Security Council. 2011. “Maintenance of International Peace and Security: New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention”. UN Security Council Briefing, New York, 23 November 2011. 107 Supra, note 91. 108 Shamim, C. 2008. “Alternative views of environmental security in a less developed country: the case of Bangladesh”. Journal of Third World Studies 25(1): 253–272.

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109 “Hasina Highlights Unfortunate Plight of Climate Migrants”, The New Nation, 25 September 2010, at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-237905607.html. 110 Saul, B. 2012. “The Security Risks of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh”. Journal of Human Security 8(2): 5–35. 111 Ibid. 112 Supra, note 53. 113 Supra, note 14. 114 Ibid. 115 Supra, note 57. 116 World Bank. 2009. “Urban Growth: A Challenge and an Opportunity”. 117 Ibid. 118 Supra, note 13. 119 Supra, note 91. 120 Haque, C.E. and Zaman, M.Q. 1989. “Coping with Riverbank Erosion Hazard and Displacement in Bangladesh: Survival Strategies and Adjustments”. Disasters 13(4): 300–314. 121 Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies/Saferworld. 2010. Climate Change and Security in Bangladesh. 122 Ibid. 123 Supra, note 14. 124 Campbell, K.M. et al. 2007. The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change. Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies. 125 Podesta, J. and Ogden, P. 2008. “The Security Implications of Climate Change”. The Washington Quarterly 31: 115–118.

126 Supra, note 124, at 57. 127 Supra, note 14. 128 Paskal, C. 2007. “How climate change is pushing the boundaries of security and foreign policy”. London: Chatham House. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 Poncelet et al., supra, note 3. 132 Charter of the United Nations. 1945. 59 Stat.1031; T.S. No 993; Bevans 1153. Preamble. 133 “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” – Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed in 1948 by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 194, Article 3. 134 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / [1980] ATS 23 / 6 ILM 368 (1967). This document forms a milestone for human security through enumeration of specific socio-economic rights around the text. 135 “The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person shall be guaranteed…” – The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Article 11. 136 Ibid., Article 15(d). 137 “Promotion of international peace, security and solidarity” – ibid., Article 25. 138 Supra, note 91. 139 Supra, note 67. 140 Supra, note 91.

REFERENCES TO OTHER TOPICS Tommy Koh Receives the Great Negotiator Award

EPL congratulates Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, on whom Harvard University’s Program on Negotiation bestowed the Great Negotiator Award. After his success in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Koh was elected President for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro). It is no surprise to us that such a dynamic and able person also received this award, and we congratulate him on his award and thank him for his tireless efforts.

ITLOS Issues Order for Release of the “Arctic Sunrise”

On 22 November 2013, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an order in response to The Netherlands’ request for provisional measures, ordering the Russian Federation to release the Netherlands-flagged Greenpeace vessel the “Arctic Sunrise” and the persons detained on it, as soon as the Netherlands posts the € 3,600,000 bond, as security with regard to any future disposition of the vessel in the case Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation, originally filed in October 2013. The Tribunal’s order is available at http://www. itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/ C22_Ord_22_11_2013_orig_Eng.pdf. The initial filings in the Arctic Sunrise case are available at https://www.itlos.org/index. php?id=264#c1465.

INTERPOL Becomes Involved in San Juan River Dispute

Costa Rica recently requested INTERPOL to involve itself in the country’s dispute with Nicaragua over the dredging of the San Juan River (see EPL 43(3): at 175 and 43(4-5): at 276). Reportedly, INTERPOL initially accepted a warrant against Nicaragua, but later withdrew its acceptance, following a submission by Nicaragua which noted that, in an on-going case, the International Court of Justice had formally declared that the area is a “disputed territory”. “San Juan River: Costa Rica and Nicaragua at Interpol”. Derecho Internacional Público. Costa Rica, 7 January 2014, at

http://derechointernacionalcr.blogspot.de/2014/01/costa-rica- and-nicaragua-at-interpol.html.

United Nations

– SIDS Conference The final preparatory meeting in advance of the third

international conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) was held in New York from 21–29 April 2014. The meeting’s primary outcome document reflected agreement on disaster- risk reduction, food security (integrating gender equality and the empowerment of women), health, sustainable consumption /production, sustainable tourism and water, but opted not to address the unfinished processes on the post-2015 development agenda and technology transfer. This document will form the basis of the work of the Conference itself, when it meets in September 2014, in Apia, Samoa. “Zero Draft of the Outcome of the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States”, at http://www.sids2014.org/content/documents/298SIDS%20 zero%20draft_14%20March%20WITH%20ATTRIBUTIONS.pdf.

– HLPF Operational Materials Online Consonant with the inaugural meeting of the High-Level

Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), reported in EPL 43(6): 282–283, the Secretary General submitted a resolution to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that addressed the “format and organizational aspects” of the HLPF, and was adopted last July by UNGA-67 as decisions A/RES 67/290 and A/RES 67/289. The final version of these materials is available in two parts, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ RES/67/290 and http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=A/RES/67/289.

– International Law Commission Report The United Nations General Assembly has posted the “Draft

report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-fifth session”, including the ILC’s most recent deliberations on the protection of the environment in armed conflicts. Available

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