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U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

A N a t i o n a l A s s e s s m e n t o f

C u r r e n t P r a c t i c e s

U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Corrections

320 First Street N.W. Washington, DC 20534

Morris L. Thigpen Director

Larry Solomon Deputy Director

George M. Keiser Chief, Community Corrections/Prisons Division

BeLinda P. Watson Project Manager

National Institute of Corrections World Wide Web Site

http://www.nicic.org

Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners

A National Assessment of Current Practices

James Austin, Ph.D.

Kenneth McGinnis

June 2004

NIC Accession Number 019468

This report was funded by the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) under cooperative agreement 01P09G1Q1 with Security Response Technologies, Inc., and subcontracted with The Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections at The George Washington University. Points of view or opinions stated in this doc- ument are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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A project of this nature would be impossible to conduct without extensive coopera- tion and assistance from all who participated in the agreement. We would first like to acknowledge our colleagues on the project team: Karl R. Becker, Kathy Dennehy, Michael V. Fair, Patricia L. Hardyman, Ph.D., Pablo Stewart, M.D., and Mary West. On behalf of the team, we extend sincere appreciation to those who served on the project advisory committee—Glenn Goord, Gary Johnson, Joe Lehman, Michael Maloney, Gary Maynard, and Ronald Shansky. Their input was invaluable in keep- ing the project focused on the type of work that held the most potential benefit for correctional managers and practitioners.

Special thanks go to Ronald Angelone, President of the Association of State Cor- rectional Administrators (ASCA), and Maryland Commissioner William Sonder- van, chair of ASCA’s Managing Disruptive Inmates Committee, under whose leadership the committee agreed to integrate its work with that of this NIC project. The collaboration of the Managing Disruptive Inmates Committee eliminated dupli- cation of effort and improved the efficiency of the project’s data collection. We also extend appreciation to all of the staff who assisted in the work reflected in this report, and in particular to the personnel in each department who assisted in col- lecting survey data and in coordinating the team’s onsite visits.

We would like to sincerely acknowledge the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) for its continuing commitment to the development of the literature on internal clas- sification systems. In particular, we would like to offer special thanks to Dr. Susan Hunter. It was under Susan’s leadership and guidance during her tenure as Chief of the NIC Prisons Division that this project to identify, classify, and manage high-risk and special management prisoners came to fruition.

We would also like to acknowledge the long-term support of Ms. Sammie Brown, formerly a Corrections Program Specialist with NIC, who served as project coordi- nator and liaison during the period of this project. She has been a strong and per- sistent advocate of objective prison classification and NIC’s technical assistance program.

In the true spirit of a cooperative agreement, both Susan and Sammie worked close- ly with the project team to guide the research and refine the analysis. Their partici- pation, guidance, and feedback over the course of the research and fieldwork made a valuable contribution to this report.

Finally, we would like to thank Janet McNaughton and Brian Higgins, Aspen Sys- tems Corporation, for editing and coordinating the production of this document.

AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments

Acknowledgments .............................................................................................. iii

Executive Summary........................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1

NIC Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 4

Project Tasks .............................................................................................. 5

Chapter 2. Overview of Risk Assessment ......................................................... 7

Approaches to Risk Assessment ................................................................ 7

Limitations of Risk Assessment ............................................................... 8

Special Topics: Reentry and Medical and Mental Health Needs ............ 11

Chapter 3. Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments ................................ 15

Internal Management Systems................................................................. 15

Instruments To Assess General Criminality ............................................ 17

Instruments To Assess Sex Offenders...................................................... 21

Instruments To Assess Violence and Dangerousness............................... 22

Methods of Identifying Gangs and Security Threat Groups ................... 23

Chapter 4. Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates........................................................................................ 25

Total Inmate Population ........................................................................... 25

General Population................................................................................... 26

Special Management Populations ............................................................ 28

Screening and Assessment ....................................................................... 42

Contents

Chapter 5. Identification and Review of Model Programs............................47

Connecticut Department of Correction.................................................... 51

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ................................ 56

Federal Bureau of Prisons........................................................................ 61

Chapter 6. Issues and Recommendations....................................................... 63

Notes .................................................................................................................. 65

References .......................................................................................................... 67

Suggested Readings .......................................................................................... 71

Appendix: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates....... 75

Contents

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Exhibit 1. Typology of High-Risk and Special Management Inmates................. 2

Exhibit 2. Nationwide Estimated Inmate Classification Levels for the Average Daily Population ..................................................................................... 3

Exhibit 3. Prevalence of Infectious Diseases Among U.S. Prison and Jail Inmates, 1997 ............................................................................................... 13

Exhibit 4. Estimated Number of Persons With Infectious Diseases Passing Through U.S. Correctional Facilities, 1997 .......................................... 13

Exhibit 5. Prison Population ............................................................................... 26

Exhibit 6. Prison Population Housed in General Population ............................. 28

Exhibit 7. Gender Distribution of Inmates Housed in General Population ....... 30

Exhibit 8. Inmates in Administrative or Disciplinary Segregation..................... 32

Exhibit 9. Inmates in Protective Custody ........................................................... 34

Exhibit 10. Inmates in Mental Health Units....................................................... 36

Exhibit 11. Inmates in Medical Units or Facilities............................................. 38

Exhibit 12. Estimates of Current Prison Population Trends .............................. 40

Exhibit 13. Policies Governing High-Security/Maximum-Custody Inmates ...... 41

Exhibit 14. Number and Percentage of States Reporting Consent Decrees ...... 42

Exhibit 15. Active and Pending Consent Decrees by Special Management Population and State, 2002 ................................................................................. 43

Exhibit 16. Screening for Various Factors at Initial Assessment ....................... 45

Exhibit 17. Inmate Population Classified as Gang or Security Threat Group Members .................................................................................................. 46

Exhibit 18. Potential Model Programs for Managing Disruptive and High-Risk Prisoners ............................................................................................ 48

Exhibit 19. Average Length of Stay at the Ohio State Penitentiary ................... 57

Exhibit 20. Ohio State Penitentiary Population, by Classification Level and Housing Unit, September 2001 .......................................................................... 59

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 21. Ohio State Penitentiary Release Recommendations........................ 60

Exhibit 22. Ohio State Penitentiary Class II Disciplinary Incidents, May 2000 to August 2001 .................................................................................. 61

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List of Exhibits

Although most prison systems have implemented objective classification systems that have proven effective in determining the custody level assigned to an inmate designated for the general population, less attention has been devoted to identifying inmates who require special management. These inmates encompass a variety of populations, ranging from highly aggressive prisoners, sexual predators, and gang members to the mentally ill and medically challenged. There is also a pool of pris- oners in the general population who are classified as “maximum” or “close” custody because of disruptive behavior patterns or the suspicion that they may engage in such behavior in the future. These general population prisoners should also be viewed as high risk and may warrant special observation, monitoring, housing, and programming.

Inmates classified as high-risk or special management constitute an estimated 10–15 percent of the nation’s prison population. Another 10–15 percent of the total inmate population is considered maximum or close custody within the general population. In general, the majority of prisoners never become disruptive or difficult to manage. The most serious forms of disruptive behavior within a prison, such as homicide, escape, aggravated assault on inmates or staff, and riots, are rare. The majority of staff and prisoners never become the victims of such incidents.

Although high-risk and special management inmates constitute a small percentage of the national inmate population, a disproportionate amount of staff and agency resources must be allocated to them to maintain prisoner safety and institutional security. Therefore, reducing the special management population can have signifi- cant cost implications for an agency. Recognizing correctional administrators’ need for more effective means of identifying potential sources of problems in the inmate population and more proactive strategies for addressing the issues associated with these inmates, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) funded a project to advance the state of knowledge about programs and policies that identify, classify, and manage high-risk and special management prisoners. This report presents the project’s findings.

Overview of Risk Assessment

Executive Summary

reduce such incidents by studying the attributes of inmates who commit such acts and comparing them with those of inmates who do not pose such problems.

Risk assessment involves two types of classification: external and internal. The external classification process involves two decisions: whether to place the prison- er in the general population and, subsequently, what custody level (minimum, medi- um, or close/maximum custody) within the general population the prisoner should be assigned to. Both decisions are critical to the safe and efficient operation of the facility. Internal classification involves intrafacility decisions about where and with whom a prisoner will be housed and the programs, services, and work assignments that are appropriate for the prisoner. Internal classification systems are intended to ensure that prisoners who are at risk are supervised differently from other general population prisoners. Also, providing proper housing and treatment at the onset of confinement affords the prisoner the opportunity to eventually return to a less restrictive correctional environment.

Approaches to Risk Assessment

Correctional administrators have long relied on professional clinical judgment in assessing prisoners for parole, inclusion in a security threat group (STG), trusty positions, and placement in administrative segregation or protective custody. This method has been favored because it requires only a professional with the skill and experience necessary for the assessment. Unfortunately, professional judgment has been shown to be by far the least accurate risk assessment method.

Dissatisfaction with relying on professional judgment has led to the development of actuarial-based assessments, which are common classification tools in correctional settings. Longitudinal studies of prisoners and offenders identify attributes associ- ated with misconduct, escapes, and recidivism. These risk factors are then translat- ed into a scoring system that assigns a numeric score, which can then be converted into a risk category. The reliability (consistency in assessments) and validity (proof that a risk factor is associated with the behavior to be predicted) of actuarial assess- ment are significantly higher than can be achieved with professional judgment. Fur- thermore, actuarial assessment can be performed by those without extensive professional experience.

The latter advantage is also a limitation. Because actuarial assessment does not allow for professional judgment, it may be overly rigid. A third method, adjusted actuarial assessment, allows for modification of a scored assessment by considering supplemental information (e.g., input from a variety of correctional specialists with expertise in disciplines such as security, medicine, and mental health) that is not incorporated into the actual scoring system.

Limitations of Risk Assessment

The key assumption in risk assessment is that high-risk inmates can be identified. However, any classification system is subject to error. Although there is evidence of

Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners

the predictability of the behavior of groups, reliably predicting the behavior of indi- viduals within groups—such as which prisoners will engage in serious destructive behavior and under what circumstances—is difficult, if not impossible. In part, this is because of a large number of situational or environmental factors that are unpre- dictable in terms of their effect on behavior. For example, a chance meeting with another prisoner belonging to a rival gang, a hostile interaction between staff and the prisoner, or an unexpected decision to cancel a work detail are daily events that may lead to a serious incident that is understandable in retrospect but could not have been known in advance and prevented. Although a pattern to such incidents may emerge over time, suggesting they are deterministic in nature, predicting them remains problematic. This is in part why major incidents like riots, escapes, sui- cides, and assaults on staff and prisoners resulting in serious bodily injury are so dif- ficult to prevent.

Reentry and Medical and Mental Health Needs

Reentry, the transition from a segregated inmate population to the general popula- tion or from incarceration to the community, is an issue of special concern with regard to special management prisoners. Much more attention is now being given to consideration of whether the lack of transitional programming for prisoners, com- bined with the accelerated number of releases, poses an additional public safety threat that could slow down or reverse the gains made in reducing the incidence of crime over the past several years. Recidivism rates for ex-convicts have been described as excessively high. Although most prisoners are released via parole or other forms of supervision, an increasing number are being discharged after having served their entire sentence and therefore are not subject to any postrelease super- vision requirements. Given that most maximum-security and administrative segre- gation prisoners are offered negligible programming and allowed minimal exposure to normal human contact and that few programs are available to help these prison- ers navigate the reentry process, unsupervised release should be viewed as a major public safety issue.

The medical and mental health needs of special management prisoners also merit special concern. There is growing evidence that a significant portion of the prison population suffers from highly contagious and life-threatening diseases. A signifi- cant number of persons who pass through America’s prisons and jails are infected with AIDS, HIV, hepatitis B and C, and other diseases that are easily transmitted through illicit drug use and unprotected sexual behavior. Prison systems must iden- tify these prisoners, give them the necessary level of medical care, and educate them on how to avoid spreading the disease further. It may be necessary to house some portion of these prisoners in segregated units where specialized forms of treatment can more readily be provided. When releasing these prisoners, correctional systems must ensure that medical treatment will be maintained while they are on parole or under community supervision. At a minimum, soon-to-be-released prisoners can be given information on where treatment can readily be obtained for a sustained period of time.

The same recommendations apply to prisoners with major mental health problems. BJS estimates that approximately 16 percent of the prison population suffers from a mental health problem that requires some method of formal treatment. Undiag- nosed and untreated mental health problems detract not only from the prisoner’s well-being but also from the safety of the prison system. Growing evidence shows that some prisoners placed in administrative segregation for violent and assaultive behavior suffer from undiagnosed mental illness. Thus, the handling of special man- agement prisoners must include the ability to diagnose and treat mental health con- ditions related to their disruptive behavior.

Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments

The number and type of instruments available for use in screening inmates for a variety of risks and dangerous behaviors has increased significantly. The risk assessment systems and instruments that have been used, or are being promoted for use, within correctional agencies include internal management systems and instru- ments designed to assess general criminality, sex offenders, and violence and dan- gerousness.

Internal Management Systems

Internal management systems are used to determine how prisoners should be housed within a particular facility or complex. These systems assume that prison- ers have varying levels of aggressiveness or vulnerability that can be measured with a questionnaire:

� Adult Internal Management System (AIMS). AIMS relies on two instru- ments to identify inmates who are likely to be incompatible in terms of housing and those who are the most likely to pose a risk to the safe and secure operation of a facility. The first instrument, the Life History Checklist, focuses on the inmate’s adjustment and stability in the community. The second instrument, the Correctional Adjustment Checklist, is designed to create a profile of an inmate’s likely behavior in a correctional setting.

� Prisoner Management Classification System (PMC). PMC uses a semistruc- tured interview supplemented by ratings of 11 objective background factors that assess an inmate’s social status and offense history. The system also provides detailed guidelines for safe and appropriate management of inmates within their designated housing units after they are classified and highlights programming approaches to prepare inmates for readjustment to the community.

Instruments To Assess General Criminality

Executive Summary

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� Level of Service Inventory–Revised (LSI–R). This instrument primarily assesses the respondent’s social situation within the community. It is best suited for use with probationers and parolees as opposed to those who are incarcerated.

� Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS). COMPAS includes four major risk assessment scales (violence, recidivism, flight, and community noncompliance) for use both in assessing an offender’s appropriateness for community corrections and in making decisions regarding release and case management supervision. It also evaluates psy- chosocial stressors—such as residence in a high-crime community, poverty, vocational problems, social isolation, and scarcity of social supports—that may be useful in designing case plans.

� U.S. Board of Parole Salient Risk Guidelines. These guidelines include an additive point scale to classify inmates by their risk level. The “salient factor score” is based on two sets of factors associated with recidivism rates for inmates released from federal prisons: the seriousness of the offense committed and the likelihood of success or failure under parole supervision.

� Client Management Classification (CMC) System. Developed for use in pro- bation and parole services, CMC is essentially the same as the PMC system. It is based on a questionnaire completed by probationers and parolees to deter- mine both the level of supervision they should receive and the types of services they may require.

� Risk of Reconviction (ROC) Scale and Criminogenic Needs Inventory (CNI). New Zealand’s ROC scale and CNI, which is a further development of the ROC, include assessments of an inmate’s emotions, propensity towards vio- lence, relationships, alcohol- and drug-related behaviors, impulsivity, and crim- inal associates.

� Community Risk/Needs Management Scale (CRNMS) and Case Needs Identification and Analysis (CNIA). The CNIA was designed to assess inmate needs at admission. The CRNMS built on information included in the CNIA and streamlined its design in order to evaluate criminal history risk, case needs, the likelihood of reoffending, and the level of community supervision necessary per offender.

Instruments To Assess Sex Offenders

The public’s growing awareness and fear of recidivism among released sex offend- ers have led to increased interest in identifying and treating them. The following instruments are those most frequently used in adult corrections today to assess the risk of recidivism in convicted sex offenders:

Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners

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� Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR). The RRASOR assigns a score based on four items found in inmates’ case files: prior sex offenses, age at release, victim gender, and relationship to victim.

� Static–99. Similar to the RRASOR, the Static–99 is an inventory of 10 items found in inmate case files that reflect attributes of convicted sex offenders and that were shown to be associated with recidivism in four separate Canadian and U.K. samples.

� Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool–Revised (MnSOST–R). This inventory scores 16 items drawn from inmate files: 12 static variables related to the offender’s criminal record and relationship to his victims, and 4 dynam- ic components that measure factors associated with age and behavior while incarcerated.

� Sexual Violence Risk–20 (SVR–20). Developed for use as a topical guideline for risk assessments linked with studying violent sexual offenders, the Sexual Violence Risk–20 incorporates information pertaining to an offender’s psy- chosocial adjustment and future plans. It also includes factors specifically relat- ed to the offender’s attitudes toward and history of committing sexual offenses.

Instruments To Assess Violence and Dangerousness

Two instruments were developed in Canada to assess psychopathic violence: the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL–R), and the Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG), which is also used to predict sex offense recidivism. Both instru- ments are intended for use only by a licensed psychologist or other mental health professional working under the supervision of a licensed psychologist.

Methods of Identifying Gangs and Security Threat Groups

The Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Colorado Department of Corrections have developed systems that assign an inmate points for having certain attributes associ- ated with gang membership. Outside these two jurisdictions, the identification of members of gangs and other STGs remains subjective. Typically, states develop policies that require highly trained staff to be designated as specialists in the identi- fication of STG inmates, their movements, and their illicit activities. These staff draw on multiple sources of information, including tattoos, prior affiliations with known gang members, gang-related literature, and the word of other prisoners.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

The survey, which was sent in 2002 to the correctional agencies of all 50 states and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico (hereafter referred to as “states”), was designed to obtain information on the procedures used to classify high-risk inmates, particularly those in protective custody or administrative segregation, and inmates

Executive Summary

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with mental illnesses or medical problems. The last section of the survey asked for information on new or model programs, including the name and location of the pro- gram, the target population, screening processes, programs and services offered, and staffing levels.

The survey responses demonstrated little consensus on the use of even the most basic classification terms such as “general population,” “protective custody,” and “administrative” as opposed to “disciplinary” segregation. Further, very few correc- tional data systems were able to aggregate quickly and accurately the numbers and types of prisoners in each of these discrete classification categories. Disagreement about prison classification terms and delay in implementing automated data systems are not new, but these issues made it difficult for some agencies to complete the sur- vey fully. Many agencies either had limited access to the information requested or stored their records in a way that prevented them from retrieving the data. There- fore, most of the survey results are based on a limited number of respondents.

Forty-one states and Puerto Rico completed and returned the survey, yielding a response rate of 81 percent. The number of inmates ranged from 740 in Wyoming to 157,142 in California. The states with the next largest inmate populations were Texas, with 143,302, and Florida and New York, with populations of approximate- ly 70,000 each. After Wyoming, the states with the smallest inmate populations were New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia, all of which reported fewer than 2,000 inmates.

In all states that reported general population data, the great majority of the inmates (an average of 80 percent) were assigned to the general population, indicating that there were no special security, medical, or mental health needs for most prisoners. Overall, no major differences were found in the proportion of male and female pris- oners in the general population in each state.

The special management category to which the highest proportion of prisoners was assigned was administrative and/or disciplinary segregation. (Because of the varia- tion in the responding states’ use of the terms “administrative” and “disciplinary,” data on these two segregated populations were combined in compiling the survey results.) On average, 5 percent of the total inmate population in the reporting states was assigned to this status on any given day, although there was considerable vari- ance among the states. The balance of the prison population assigned to a special management status was in protective custody, mental health/mental retardation, or medical infirmary units. The percentage of the total prison population housed in each type of unit varied considerably among the states.

The majority of the survey respondents reported that both their male and female inmate populations were increasing (66 percent of respondents and 61 percent of respondents, respectively). Approximately one-third reported that their prison pop- ulations had declined or remained stable. A higher proportion of the states indicat- ed that their special management populations had either decreased or remained

Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners

unchanged, and most agencies reported that inmate-on-staff and inmate-on-inmate assaults had not increased.

Nearly all the states that responded to questions regarding high-security/maximum- custody prisoners restrict these inmates to their cells for 22–23 hours per day, limit their contact with visitors, and require the use of restraints at all times when mov- ing them; 68 percent allow maximum-custody inmates to have contact with other high-security inmates. In 47 percent of the responding states, mentally ill inmates who are disruptive are subject to the same maximum-custody policies as all other inmates.

The use of special management units has given rise to a significant amount of lit- igation, typically focusing on one of the following three issues: the criteria for designation as a special management prisoner, the conditions of confinement in such units, or the process for releasing the inmate back to the general prison pop- ulation. The majority of consent decrees in place concerns mentally ill or medical populations.

All states responding reported that all prisoners are screened for suicide risk, mood disorders, and psychotic disorders. Nearly all of the responding states screen for mental retardation and escape risk. Most of the responding states screen their pris- oners for STG membership.

Identification and Review of Model Programs

Only a small number of states responded to the survey’s questions regarding model programs, and most of the programs they described targeted inmates who had already been placed in administrative segregation. No state reported programs or policies directed at high-risk prisoners housed in the general population whose actions had not yet led to their removal to a special management population. None of the programs described had been formally evaluated to determine its effective- ness in reducing violence either among these prisoners or within the prison system at large.

Based on the survey responses and independent sources, the project team identified 23 model programs in 15 states. Site visits were made to facilities of three jurisdic- tions that demonstrated well-structured, highly effective or promising programs: Connecticut and Ohio, which have programs that focus on the disruptive prisoner

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Executive Summary

who has been removed from the general population, and the Federal Bureau of Pris- ons, which operates an innovative program for female prisoners who have been trau- matized by physical and sexual abuse before being incarcerated.

Connecticut Department of Correction

Most jurisdictions manage and house all high-risk inmates through a single admin- istrative segregation structure, irrespective of differences in the nature of the risk the prisoners represent to the institution’s safety or in their security and programming needs. The Connecticut Department of Correction (CDC) has taken another approach and developed a model called the Close Custody Phase Program that it has adapted to the specific needs of different groups of high-risk inmates. The CDC’s three Close Custody Phase Programs for high-risk inmates are the Close Custody Gang Management Program, the Close Custody Chronic Disciplinary Program, and the Administrative Segregation Transition Phase Program. The structure and pro- gram requirements of each unit are based on examination of outcome data and con- sideration of the needs and characteristics of the respective groups and are intended to facilitate the inmates’ return to the general population, if appropriate. The process includes regular and frequent reviews by the classification staff and structured movement of the inmate through the levels, or phases, of the program until release.

CDC data show that violence has decreased significantly in its facilities, both in the general population and in the high-risk units, since it began implementing programs targeted to specific groups of high-risk inmates. The CDC approach is being repli- cated to some degree by Colorado and New Mexico.

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) employs a well- structured, well-validated inmate classification system with five basic security lev- els: minimum, medium, close, maximum, and high maximum. Inmates in each security level may be assigned to a special management or segregation designation. Those who commit disciplinary violations are placed in a restricted unit with one of the following designations: administrative, security, disciplinary, and local control. Inmates sent to a security, disciplinary, or local control unit are returned to the gen- eral population within a relatively short period of time. Those who the DRC believes should be removed and segregated on an indefinite basis are assigned to either administrative control, high maximum custody, or protective custody. All high maximum-custody inmates are housed at the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP).

The DRC built the OSP as a super maximum-security facility in response to a major prison riot that occurred in the 1990s. Opened in 1998, the OSP has four levels of con- finement with differing degrees of privileges. A treatment plan established for each inmate outlines the types of programs the inmate is expected to participate in and the areas of conduct in which the inmate is expected to improve. This treatment plan is reviewed and updated as part of the inmate’s reassessment at 6-month intervals.

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Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners

The rate of serious misconduct among OSP inmates is impressively low, undoubt- edly because of the security precautions in effect at the facility. The absence of behaviors such as banging on cell doors, destroying cell property, flooding cells, or threatening staff is also noticeable, suggesting that placement in the OSP stabilizes or suppresses the inmates’ institutional conduct.

Federal Bureau of Prisons

The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ New Pathways program offers female prisoners who have a history of sexual abuse the opportunity to meet in small groups (10 or fewer women) under the guidance of a psychologist to discuss the general topic of sexual and physical abuse. Participants are given the opportunity to meet individually with the supervising psychologist for followup sessions if issues raised in the group bring up painful or disturbing reactions.

Issues and Recommendations

� General population. � Special management:

❖ Administrative segregation.

❖ Disciplinary segregation.

❖ Protective custody.

❖ Severe mental health care.

❖ Severe medical care. xviii

Executive Summary

The National Survey also revealed that few states had correctional data systems that could quickly and accurately aggregate the numbers and types of prisoners in their custody. The states are strongly encouraged to upgrade their correctional data sys- tems so that they are capable of tracking and monitoring the prisoner population on a daily basis according to the six basic categories listed above. State correctional data systems should also provide more detailed information about the basis for assigning a prisoner to a category and on the movement of prisoners from one cat- egory to another.

Research into proactive methods for preventing prison violence should include an examination of the effects of environment on prisoner behavior. It is well known among corrections professionals that prison architecture influences inmate behavior and that similarly situated inmate populations can have very different rates of seri- ous misconduct. It is strongly recommended that the states and the federal govern- ment initiate studies to determine the impact of architecture and prison management methods on disruptive inmate behavior.

Such studies should include assessments of the often advocated but still highly con- troversial super maximum-security facilities. More information is needed on how best to identify inmates who require this level of segregation, how long they should remain segregated from the general population, what interventions should be used to control their high-risk behavior, when and how they should be returned to the general population, and how they behave after release from these units. In the absence of such basic research, it is difficult to propose new methods for identify- ing such high-risk prisoners and to apply interventions that will help control and manage them.

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Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners

A properly function-

ing classification sys-

tem is seen as the

“brain” of prison

management. It

governs many im-

portant decisions,

including those that

heavily influence fis-

cal matters such as

staffing levels, bed-

space, and program-

ming expansion.

Introduction

During the past decade, prison systems have experienced increased pressure to improve their approaches to classifying prisoners according to custody, work, and programming needs. Litigation and overcrowding have caused classification sys- tems to be viewed as a principal management tool for allocating scarce prison resources efficiently and minimizing the potential for violence or escape. These sys- tems are also expected to provide greater accountability and to help forecast future prison bedspace and prisoner program needs. In other words, a properly functioning classification system is seen as the “brain” of prison management. It governs many important decisions, including those that heavily influence fiscal matters such as staffing levels, bedspace, and programming expansion.

Objective prison classification systems were originally adopted in the 1980s, but by the late 1990s, significant modifications, including new risk assessment measures developed by statistical analysis centers, had improved classification practices. The results of these improvements include a reduction in the number of overclassified prisoners (i.e., those assigned to higher custody levels than necessary), more con- sistent custody decisions, validation of criteria for custody decisions, systematic assessment of prisoner program needs, and increased institutional safety for both staff and prisoners.

Prisoners requiring special management encompass a variety of populations, includ- ing highly aggressive prisoners, sexual predators, youthful offenders (including juveniles housed in adult facilities), gang members, the mentally ill, and the med- ically challenged. There is also a pool of prisoners in the general population who are classified as “maximum” or “close” custody because of disruptive behavior patterns or the suspicion that they may engage in such behavior in the future. These general population prisoners should also be viewed as high risk, and may warrant special observation, monitoring, housing, and programming. Such preemptive intervention by staff members may negate the need for more restrictive interventions later on.

oneC h a p t e r

In general, the major-

ity of prisoners never

becomes disruptive or

difficult to manage.

Exhibit 1 shows the categories that have been established for high-risk prisoners— those whose behavior is so problematic that they must be removed from the gener- al population and placed in a very secure and heavily staffed unit or prison for a substantial period of time—and special management prisoners. These categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a prisoner may be categorized as “chronic misbehavior—assaultive,” but the prisoner’s conduct may also be related to a men- tal condition. Although most of these designations are based on subjective judg- ments, staff members are sufficiently trained and skilled in making such assessments and can use additional sources of objective data to reach a determination.

The most current estimates are that approximately 10–15 percent of the nation’s prisoner population falls within one of these special prisoner categories (exhibit 2). Another 10–15 percent of the total population is considered maximum or close cus- tody within the general population. In general, the majority of prisoners never becomes disruptive or difficult to manage. The most serious forms of disruptive behavior within a prison, such as homicide, escape, aggravated assault on inmates or staff, and riots, are rare events. The majority of staff and prisoners never become the victims of such incidents.

Chapter 1

Category and Assessment Method Placement

Security threat group Administrative segregation or general Subjective assessment based on at least three sources of inde- population—high custody. pendent objective data as applied to well-defined agency criteria.

Likely victim Protective custody or restricted general Subjective assessment based on at least three sources of inde- population facilities. pendent objective data as applied to well-defined agency criteria.

Mentally ill Mental health unit and/or administrative Standardized psychometric tests and clinical judgment by mental segregation. health staff.

Chronic misbehavior—assaultive General population—high custody, admin- Objective external classification. istrative segregation, or mental health unit.

Chronic misbehavior—nonassaultive General population—high custody, admin- Objective external classification. istrative segregation, or mental health unit.

Nonsexual predator General population—high custody, admin- Subjective assessment based on at least three sources of inde- istrative segregation, or mental health unit. pendent objective data as applied to well-defined agency criteria.

Sexual predator General population—high custody, admin- Subjective assessment based on at least three sources of inde- istrative segregation, or mental health unit. pendent objective data as applied to well-defined agency criteria.

Developmentally disabled General population (all custody levels) or Standardized psychometric tests and clinical judgment by mental mental health unit. health staff.

Exhibit 1. Typology of High-Risk and Special Management Inmates

Reducing the special

management popula-

tion can have signifi-

cant cost implications

for an agency.

For example, in California’s 155,000-inmate prison system, the rate of serious inci- dents (defined as assault and battery, attempted suicide, suicide, possession of a weapon, and possession of controlled substances) is approximately 8 per 100 pris- oners per year.1 Assaults and batteries comprise about half of these incidents. There were 21 suicides and 9 homicides in 2002. The stabbing rate is 0.4 per 100 prison- ers. If one were to compute a homicide rate for the California Department of Cor- rections population, it would be approximately 8–9 per 100,000, only slightly higher than the rate for the state’s citizens, which is 6.4 per 100,000. Given the demographics of the California corrections system’s population, which is mostly young males with criminal histories, one can argue that the homicide rate for this population is actually lower among those who are incarcerated than those who are on the street.

Introduction

Custody Level Percent

General population 80

Minimum/community 35–40

Medium 35–45

Maximum/close 10–15

Special populations 15

Administrative/disciplinary segregation 5–6

Protective custody 1–2

Severe mental health 1–2

Severe medical 1–2

Unclassified 5

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Exhibit 2. Nationwide Estimated Inmate Classification Levels for the Average Daily Population

NIC Goals and Objectives

Recognizing correctional administrators’ need for more effective means of identify- ing potential sources of problems in the inmate population and more proactive strategies for addressing the issues associated with these inmates, the National Insti- tute of Corrections (NIC) funded a project to advance the state of knowledge about programs and policies that identify, classify, and manage high-risk and special man- agement prisoners. NIC established the following objectives for the project:

� To examine the use of objective classification systems in assessing the level of risk posed by different types of prisoners requiring special management.

� To review the supervision and program strategies being used by correctional systems to manage these inmates, especially those classified as high risk.

� To consider the means by which high-risk and special management inmates may be returned to the general prison population.

� To examine processes for release of these inmates back into society and for their continued followup.

� To identify the best practices currently in use for managing high-risk and special management prisoners.

To accomplish these objectives, NIC’s project team identified five primary research topics that address key aspects of the management of high-risk and special man- agement inmates:

� Identification and selection. How are special management populations defined? What groups are included? How are members identified? When are they identified? Is an objective classification instrument used? When was it developed and validated? What factors do assessment or classification instru- ments examine in the identification process? Are targeted inmates properly identified and classified? How many inmates are currently classified in this group?

� Standards for conditions of confinement. What are the management conse- quences of being identified and designated as a high-risk inmate? Are special housing and treatment programs associated with this designation? Are distinc- tive case management practices used for these inmates? To what extent are they segregated from general population inmates? What supervision strategies are employed in managing them? What level of services and privileges are provided?

� Staffing. What are the staffing and training requirements for special manage- ment programs and units? To what extent do security and program staff work together in the management of the program? What is the cost of the program?

Chapter 1

The project team

conducted a national

survey of state cor-

rectional systems

to identify existing

approaches to the

classification and

management of high-

risk and special man-

agement prisoners.

� Program process. What are the treatment goals? How are decisions made to return high-risk/special management inmates to the general inmate population? How is the transition to the general population managed? How are long-term inmates maintained in these programs? Is documentation of all management activities available? Do periodic reviews of supervision and program needs occur? Are supervision/program plans developed for each inmate designated high risk or special management?

� Community issues. What are the standards for parole or release of high- risk/special management inmates? What are the standards for supervision in the community? What links exist between institutional and community treatment programs? What is the survival rate for these prisoners when they are released into the community?

Project Tasks

To achieve the objectives outlined above, the project team completed the following tasks:

� A review of the most significant current research on the topic. � A national survey of state correctional systems to identify existing approaches

to the classification and management of high-risk and special management pris- oners. (A copy of the survey is provided in the appendix.)

� Site visits to the programs judged to be the most effective and to have the great- est potential for application within other correctional systems.

This report presents the findings of the project team for each of these tasks. Chap- ter 2 provides an overview of risk assessment. Chapter 3 presents an inventory of current risk assessment systems and instruments in use by state correctional sys- tems. Chapter 4 summarizes the data obtained from state correctional agencies in the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates. Chapter 5 catalogs the best practices and model programs identified among the respondents to the National Survey and presents case studies of some promising and effective pro- grams. Chapter 6 offers recommendations for further refinement of special man- agement programs and identifies areas for future research.

Introduction

Providing proper

housing and treat-

ment at the onset of

confinement affords

the prisoner the

opportunity to even-

tually return to a less

restrictive correctional

environment.

Overview of Risk Assessment

In the context of corrections, the term “risk” refers to an inmate’s potential for seri- ous misconduct within the prison setting, escape attempts, and recidivism and the level of threat the inmate poses to public safety. The goal of risk assessment is to reduce these incidents by studying the attributes of inmates who commit such acts and comparing them with those of inmates who do not pose such problems.

Such risk factors can be classified as either “static” or “dynamic.” Static risk factors tend to be historical and unchanging. For example, age at first arrest, history of vio- lent felony convictions, and the severity of the current crime are static risk factors that often appear in risk assessment measures. Dynamic risk factors are items asso- ciated with future behavior and can change over time. Current employment status, education level, and marital status are examples of dynamic factors that are situa- tional in nature and can change rapidly. There is some indication that dynamic fac- tors are more important in predicting risk than static factors, as the former better describe the individual’s current life situation (Wood and Cellini, 1999).

Risk assessment involves two types of classification: external and internal. The process of external classification involves two decisions: whether to place the pris- oner in the general population and to what custody level (minimum, medium, or close/maximum custody) within the general population the prisoner should be assigned. Both decisions are critical to the safe and efficient operation of the facili- ty. Internal classification involves intrafacility decisions about where and with whom a prisoner will be housed and the programs, services, and work assignments that are appropriate for the prisoner. Internal classification systems are intended to ensure that prisoners who are at risk of being placed in a special management population are supervised differently from other general population prisoners. Also, providing proper housing and treatment at the onset of confinement affords the prisoner the opportunity to eventually return to a less restrictive correctional environment.

Approaches to Risk Assessment

twoC h a p t e r

All risk assessment

systems, whether they

rely on professional

judgment, actuarial

scoring systems, or

a combination of

the two, are subject

to error.

and no tests for reliability and validity are needed. Unfortunately, professional judgment has been shown to be by far the least accurate risk assessment method (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1993; Morris and Miller, 1985). Too often, such judgments are no more than “gut” reactions that may vary from expert to expert with regard to the same prisoner. Corrections tends to rely on this risk methodology for some of its most important decisions, such as release to the community or place- ment in a high-security unit.

Dissatisfaction with relying on professional judgment has led to the development of actuarial-based assessments. Actuarial methods are common classification tools in correctional settings. Longitudinal studies of prisoners and offenders identify attri- butes associated with misconduct, escapes, and recidivism. These risk factors are translated into a scoring system that assigns a numeric score, which can then be con- verted into a risk category. A major advantage of actuarial assessment is levels of reliability (consistency in assessments) and validity (proof that a risk factor is asso- ciated with the behavior to be predicted) that are significantly higher than can be achieved with professional judgment. Furthermore, actuarial assessment can be per- formed by those without extensive professional experience.

The latter advantage is also a limitation. Because actuarial assessment does not allow for professional judgment, it may be overly rigid. Inmate populations cannot simply be scored. A third method, adjusted actuarial assessment, recognizes that neither professional judgment nor actuarial assessment is sufficient in and of itself. Adjusted actuarial assessment allows for modification of a scored assessment by consideration of supplemental information (e.g., input from a variety of correction- al specialists with expertise in disciplines such as security, medicine, and mental health) that is not incorporated into the scoring system.

Limitations of Risk Assessment

All risk assessment systems, whether they rely on professional judgment, actuarial scoring systems, or a combination of the two, are subject to error (false-positives or false-negatives). Factors that may lead to such errors include unpredictable situa- tional or environmental factors (e.g., chance meetings between members of rival gangs or the effect of a facility’s architectural design or the warden’s management style) and the inherent difficulty in predicting events with a low frequency of occur- rence such as prison escapes, suicides, and homicides. These limitations are dis- cussed in more detail below.

Types of Error

The key assumption in risk assessment is that high-risk inmates can be identified. However, any classification system is subject to two critical types of error: false- positives and false-negatives. False-positive errors occur when prisoners who pose little or no risk are assigned to a special population category. A docile prisoner who has been placed in administrative segregation for alleged gang behavior but who is

Chapter 2

Chance meetings

with another prisoner

belonging to a rival

gang and unexpected

decisions to cancel a

work detail are daily

events that may cause

a severe reaction that

is understandable in

retrospect but impos-

sible to predict.

not involved in such activities is an example of false-positive classification. Con- versely, false-negative errors occur when potentially disruptive prisoners are not identified and removed from the general population. The failure to detect and seg- regate an active gang member can be potentially dangerous for the rest of the pris- oners in general population housing and for staff.

False-positive classification errors can also lead to serious incidents, including assaults on staff and prisoners, suicides or suicide attempts, and escapes. Such episodes are disruptive and costly to a facility’s operation and expose the agency to expensive litigation.

Situational and Environmental Factors

Although there is evidence of the predictability of the behavior of groups (macro- level behavior), reliably predicting the behavior of individuals within groups (micro-level behavior)—for example, which prisoners will engage in serious destructive behavior and under what circumstances—is difficult, if not impossible. In part, this is because of a large number of situational or environmental factors that are unpredictable in terms of their effect on behavior. Modern physics developed chaos theory to explain the variable effects of such factors. Chaos theory holds that while patterns of phenomena exist within the physical sciences, a slight change in such patterns will produce other radical and large-scale changes (Gleick, 1988).

The often-cited example of chaos theory at work in daily life is predicting the weather. Because the phenomenon called weather is actually the product of a complex set of natural forces that have a deterministic quality, it is possible to forecast what is likely to be the weather at any given time. Yet weather forecasts often turn out to be incorrect when a minor fluctuation in one of the factors involved results in a weather pattern different from the one predicted—sometimes a severe storm, hurri- cane, or tornado (Gleick, 1988). Furthermore, the longer the forecast horizon (e.g., 1 week versus 1 day), the more tenuous the predicted weather pattern will be. It is the presence of too many factors that can behave in unexpected ways that compro- mises a weather forecast. In retrospect, however, it is always possible to explain why a storm did or did not materialize as expected.

In the context of prisoners and prison management, a chance encounter in the life of an inmate (or staff) can result in a serious incident that could not have been known in advance and prevented. For example, a chance meeting with another pris- oner belonging to a rival gang, a hostile interaction between a prisoner and staff, or an unexpected decision to cancel a work detail are examples of daily events that may cause a severe reaction that is understandable in retrospect but impossible to predict. Over time, a pattern to such incidents may emerge, suggesting they are determinis- tic in nature, but predicting them remains problematic. This is in part why seemingly chaotic major incidents like riots, escapes, suicides, and assaults on staff and pris- oners resulting in serious bodily injury are so difficult to prevent (Duguid, 2000).

Overview of Risk Assessment

Unfortunately, few

if any studies have

assessed the impact

of architecture on

suppressing or

controlling prisoner

behavior.

The influence of architectural factors on prisoner and staff behavior must be noted here. It would be difficult to find a correctional official, warden, superintendent, or line officer who does not agree that a facility’s architectural design has a corre- sponding influence on prisoner behavior. Facilities that rely on open views of hous- ing, dining, and recreation areas tend to produce fewer episodes of disruptive and potentially dangerous behavior than those with numerous “blind” spots. Unfortu- nately, few if any studies have assessed the impact of architecture on suppressing or controlling prisoner behavior, and it is unlikely in today’s fiscal environment that many of the antiquated prison facilities still in use will be replaced in the near future.

Corrections directors also have long known that similarly designed facilities with similarly situated prison populations can produce very different rates of prisoner misconduct, both within and across state prison systems. Each major system with multiple facilities has wardens who are able to handle problem prisoners who cannot be handled elsewhere. The field is also filled with stories of how prisoners who were transferred to another state correctional facility suddenly started behav- ing differently.

Such variations in misconduct rates for prisons that are equivalent in design and that house inmates with similar attributes are likely related to differences in the man- agement style adopted by each prison administrator. Again, no studies have sub- stantiated this observation, except for a few recent evaluations of the use of internal classification systems in a select number of states. (These systems, the Adult Inter- nal Management System (AIMS) and Prisoner Management Classification (PMC), are discussed in the next chapter.)

Accuracy of Measurement and Low Base Rates

Two other factors that limit the predictive capability of correctional systems are the accuracy of measurements and the low frequency, or base rates, of serious incidents. Accuracy is the function of reliability, or consistency in making assessments, and validity, or proof that a risk factor is associated with the behavior to be predicted. If the accuracy in a risk assessment system’s measurements is low, the system will be subject to a large amount of “noise” (that is, irrelevant or meaningless data).

The infrequency of several of the actions that correctional agencies seek to prevent make these actions inherently difficult to predict. The most obvious examples of this problem are escapes, suicides, and homicides. The base rates of these very serious incidents are so low that, coupled with the measurement problems noted above, they cannot be statistically predicted. As with rare events such as commercial airplane crashes, the causes can be pieced together after the fact, but it is impossible to pre- dict the event in advance. This is not to say that correctional systems should not strive to understand such incidents and reduce their occurrence—only that they must not have unrealistic expectations in such endeavors.

Chapter 2

Much more attention

is now being given

to consideration of

whether the lack of

transitional program-

ming for prisoners,

combined with the

accelerated number

of releases, poses an

additional public

safety threat.

Special Topics: Reentry and Medical and Mental Health Needs

Two issues have been identified as of special concern with regard to the manage- ment of prison populations: reentry of prisoners into the general prison population or the community at large—particularly prisoners who have served their sentences and are no longer subject to administrative supervision—and the disproportionately high rates of chronic physical and mental illness among prisoners. In particular, the management of mentally ill prisoners is crucial because their illness may make them more susceptible to committing violent and disruptive behavior and to victimization by other inmates. These two topics are discussed in more detail below.

Reentry

Reentry, the transition from a segregated inmate population to the general popula- tion or from incarceration to the community, is an issue of special concern with regard to special management prisoners. Recidivism rates for ex-convicts have been described as excessively high, although that conclusion depends on what definition of recidivism is being used and which states are included in the analysis. For exam- ple, two national studies of recidivism show that while nearly two-thirds of released convicts are rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor, only 40 percent are returned to prison, mostly for technical violations rather than new felony convic- tions (Beck and Shipley, 1989; Langan and Levin, 2002). Recidivism rates also vary depending on whether or not California is included in the analysis.

Nonetheless, much more attention is now being given to consideration of whether the lack of transitional programming for prisoners, combined with the accelerated number of releases, poses an additional public safety threat that could slow down or reverse the gains made in reducing the incidence of crime over the past several years. Exacerbating this problem is the growing percentage of released prisoners who have completed their full sentences and therefore are not subject to any post- release supervision requirements.

It is estimated that in 2002 nearly 600,000 prisoners were released from prison (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003). Such record numbers of discharged prisoners will inevitably lead to greater public attention to the issue of prisoner reentry to the community. Unfortunately, however, this issue has received little attention in terms of program planning, community preparation, or policy development (Petersilia, 1999).

Although most prisoners are released via parole or other forms of supervision, an increasing number are being discharged simply because they have served their entire sentence. This number is likely to grow as more states adopt truth-in-sen- tencing laws, which have been the topic of increasing discussion. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 20 states have adopted laws that require pris- oners convicted of violent crimes to serve, at minimum, 85 percent of their prison terms; 6 states have enacted truth-in-sentencing laws that require from 50 to

Overview of Risk Assessment

Given that most

administrative segre-

gation prisoners are

offered negligible

programming and

that few programs

are available to help

them navigate the

reentry process,

unsupervised release

should be viewed

as a major public

safety issue.

75 percent of the sentence be served; and another 14 states have abolished discre- tionary parole (Ditton and Wilson, 1999).

These trends, together with the increased use of mandatory minimum sentences and reductions in the use of early release, or “good time,” credits mean not only that prisoners will serve much longer prison terms, but also that they are less likely to be paroled or to serve any time under parole supervision (Ditton and Wilson, 1999). Some observers are concerned that the release of large numbers of prisoners who are not subject to supervision requirements that help control and monitor their behavior is a public safety problem. Moreover, prisoners serving time in truth-in- sentencing states may pose management problems for prison staff because the elim- ination of the possibility of earning early release credits may leave these prisoners little incentive to adhere to prison rules.

For example, a recent study of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s adminis- trative segregation system estimated that 2,000 prisoners are released from the var- ious administrative segregation units directly to the community with no parole supervision (Austin et al., 1998). In Nevada, more than half of the prisoners released—some of whom were confined in maximum-security units at the time of release—are discharged with no form of parole or community supervision (Naro, 2002). Given that most maximum-security and administrative segregation prisoners are offered negligible programming and allowed minimal exposure to normal human contact and that few programs are available to help these prisoners navigate the reentry process, unsupervised release should be viewed as a major public safe- ty issue (Austin, 2001).

Medical and Mental Health Needs

There is growing evidence that a significant portion of the prison population suffers from highly contagious and life-threatening diseases. As shown in exhibits 3 and 4, a significant number of persons who pass through America’s prisons and jail sys- tems are infected with AIDS, HIV, hepatitis B and C, and other diseases that are eas- ily transmitted through illicit drug use and unprotected sexual behavior. For prison systems, in particular, it is important to identify these prisoners, give them the nec- essary level of medical care, and educate them on how to avoid spreading the dis- ease further. It may be necessary to house some portion of these prisoners in segregated units where specialized forms of treatment can more readily be provid- ed. When these prisoners are released, it is important to ensure that medical treat- ment will be maintained while they are on parole or under community supervision. At a minimum, soon-to-be-released prisoners can be given information on where treatment can readily be obtained for a sustained period of time.

The same recommendations apply to prisoners with major mental health problems. Based on prisoner self-reported data, BJS estimates that approximately 16 percent of the prison population suffers from a mental health problem that requires some method of formal treatment (Ditton, 1999). Although many may argue that this

Chapter 2

Growing evidence

shows that some

prisoners placed in

administrative segre-

gation because of

violent and assaultive

behavior suffer from

undiagnosed mental

illness.

figure underestimates the true level of mental health needs, it is certain that undiag- nosed and untreated mental health problems detract not only from the prisoner’s well-being but also from the safety of the prison system. Growing evidence shows that some prisoners placed in administrative segregation because of violent and assaultive behavior suffer from undiagnosed mental illness. For example, California and New Mexico have recently established separate administrative segregation units for prisoners who have severe mental health problems and require treatment.2 Thus, the handling of special management prisoners must include the ability to diagnose and treat mental health conditions related to their disruptive behavior.

Overview of Risk Assessment

Total Inmates Condition Prisons (%) Jails (%) Infected

Total HIV/AIDS — — 35,000–46,000

HIV infection (non-AIDS) 1.45–2.03 1.45–2.03 26,000–36,000

AIDS 0.5 0.5 9,200

RPR+ (syphilis) 2.6–4.3 2.6–4.3 46,000–76,000

Chlamydia infection 2.4 2.4 43,000

Gonorrhea infection 1.0 1.0 18,000

Current/chronic hepatitis B infection 2.0 2.0 36,000

Hepatitis C infection 17–18.6 17–18.6 303,000–332,000

Tuberculosis—disease 0.04 0.17 1,400

Tuberculosis—infection 7.4 7.3 131,000

Source: From Prison to Home: The Effect of Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Families and Communities. National Policy Conference sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Urban Institute, January 30–31, 2002 (http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2home02/).

Exhibit 3. Prevalence of Infectious Diseases Among U.S. Prison and Jail Inmates, 1997

Condition Released Inmates Total in U.S. Population

Total HIV/AIDS 151,000–197,000 750,000

HIV infection (non-AIDS) 112,000–158,000 503,000

AIDS 39,000 247,000

Current/chronic hepatitis B infection 155,000 1,000,000–1,250,000

Hepatitis C infection 1,300,000–1,400,000 4,500,000

Tuberculosis—disease 12,000 32,000

Exhibit 4. Estimated Number of Persons With Infectious Diseases Passing Through U.S. Correctional Facilities, 1997

Few risk assessment

tools currently exist

to determine internal

classification and like-

lihood for prison vio-

lence; most measures

are based on predict-

ing general criminal

behavior outside

prison.

Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments

The number and type of instruments available for use in screening for a variety of risks and dangerous behaviors have increased significantly. This section presents the major distinguishing attributes of the risk assessment systems and instruments that have been used, or are being promoted for use, within correctional agencies. The instruments are grouped in four categories: internal management systems, instru- ments to assess general criminality, instruments to assess sex offenders, and instru- ments to assess violence and dangerousness. Methods of identifying gang membership and STGs are also discussed.

Internal Management Systems

Internal management systems are used to determine how prisoners should be housed within a particular facility or complex. These instruments assume that prisoners have varying levels of aggressiveness or vulnerability that can be measured with a ques- tionnaire. Once classified, the different categories of prisoner must be separated from each other as much as possible, including by housing, programming, and recre- ation. Similarly, the staff assigned to these discrete housing units must be fully aware of the different types of prisoners under their care and be trained in management techniques appropriate for dealing with these prisoners. Few risk assessment tools currently exist to determine internal classification and likelihood for prison violence; most measures are based on predicting general criminal behavior outside prison.3

Adult Internal Management System

The Adult Internal Management System (AIMS), developed by Dr. Herbert Quay more than 20 years ago, is one of the best-known internal management systems. It attempts to identify inmates who are likely to be incompatible in terms of housing and who are most likely to pose a risk to the safe and secure operation of a facility. Potential predators can then be housed separately from more vulnerable inmates.

AIMS relies on two instruments to classify inmates according to a personality typol- ogy: the Life History Checklist and the Correctional Adjustment Checklist. The Life History Checklist focuses on the inmate’s adjustment and stability in the communi- ty. It includes 27 items designed to assess a number of personality dimensions known to be related to an individual’s potential to be housed successfully with other types of inmates. The Correctional Adjustment Checklist is designed to create a profile of

threeC h a p t e r

an inmate’s likely behavior in a correctional setting. Its 41 items focus on the inmate’s record of misconduct, ability to follow staff directions, and level of aggres- sion toward other inmates.

Raw scores, converted into t-scores, are used to classify inmates into groups. Orig- inally, the group labels described personality types (e.g., Aggressive-Psychopathic, Manipulative, Situational, Inadequate-Dependent, and Neurotic-Anxious). These designations have since been revised to reflect differential rates of institutional mis- conduct called Alpha I, Alpha II, Sigma I, Sigma II, and Kappa.

Alpha I and II inmates are those most likely to present management problems relat- ed to the safety and security of the facility. Alpha I inmates are more likely to open- ly exhibit aggressive or assaultive behavior than other types of inmates, whereas Alpha II inmates are more likely to be manipulative. Sigma I and II inmates are unlikely to be assaultive but pose other management problems, such as disregard for direct orders and disruption of the orderly operation of the facility. Alpha I and II inmates are likely to be predators, whereas Sigma I and II inmates are at risk of being victimized. Kappa inmates are those who are the least likely to present man- agement problems and are neither predators nor prey.

AIMS has received only limited evaluation. Preliminary findings showed that facil- ities using AIMS experienced significantly lower rates of staff and inmate assaults than facilities that did not use an internal classification system (Quay, 1984). In South Carolina, serious disciplinary incidents decreased by 18 percent after AIMS was implemented. Further research showed similar positive management outcomes with AIMS in facilities housing women prisoners (Quay, 1984).

As of 2002, AIMS was being used by several facilities in the Federal Bureau of Pris- ons system and by some facilities of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.4 The South Dakota and Missouri Departments of Corrections have fully implemented AIMS. The South Carolina Department of Corrections implemented AIMS but has discontinued its use as a housing assignment tool.

Prisoner Management Classification System

The Prisoner Management Classification (PMC) system was adapted from Wiscon- sin’s Client Management Classification (see page 20). Like AIMS, the PMC system attempts to identify potential predators and victims and inmates who require special programming or supervision, and it requires significant staff training for inmate assessment, supervision, and interaction.

To classify inmates, the PMC system uses a semistructured interview supplemented by ratings of 11 objective background factors that assess the inmate’s social status and offense history. The system also provides detailed guidelines for safe and appro- priate management of inmates within their designated housing units after they are classified. Equally important, these guidelines highlight programming approaches to prepare the inmate for readjustment to the community.

Chapter 3

Within the past

20 years, several

states have begun

testing and using

instruments that

assess criminal behav-

ior, likelihood of

recidivism, and the

success of rehabilita-

tive programs.

Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments

The PMC interview consists of 45 questions that require forced-choice responses. It is conducted at admission by a specially trained officer and requires approximately 45 minutes to complete. The questions address the inmate’s attitudes regarding the current offense; his or her criminal history (including juvenile offenses); family relationships; relationships with staff, inmates, and peers; current difficulties (e.g., psychological problems, sexual harassment); and plans after release from prison. The interviewer also completes eight behavioral ratings that assess the inmate’s demeanor during the interview and records his or her impressions of the inmate’s most and least urgent problem areas.

Inmates are then assigned to one of four groups: Limited Setting (LS), Casework Control (CC), Selective Intervention (SI), and Environmental Structure (ES). LS and CC inmates are expected to be more aggressive and more difficult to control, whereas SI and ES inmates require minimal supervision but should be separated from LS and CC inmates. When necessary, however, SI inmates may be housed with LS and CC inmates.

The PMC system was rigorously evaluated in Washington State and shown to be useful in identifying and separating potential victims from potential predators and in managing correctional populations. In facilities that implemented PMC, institu- tional misconduct decreased and staff and inmate safety increased (Austin, 1992).

Instruments To Assess General Criminality

Within the past 20 years, several states have individually begun testing and using a diverse array of risk assessment instruments that assess criminal behavior, likeli- hood of recidivism, and the success of rehabilitative programs. Many states are incorporating existing instruments into their own evaluative measures. For example, Iowa and Oklahoma are currently validating the use of the Level of Service Inventory– Revised in decisions regarding probation, custody level, and case management. Other states are using measurement tools designed to enhance supervision and treat- ment of sex offenders (Colorado and Pennsylvania); evaluate risk of criminality and recidivism for both general offenders and violent offenders (Iowa); and predict the success or failure of probationers or parolees (Illinois) (Justice Research and Statis- tics Association, 2001). The most commonly cited instruments in use by these and other jurisdictions are summarized below.

Level of Service Inventory–Revised

The Level of Service Inventory–Revised (LSI–R) is a risk assessment system that was initially developed by the Correctional Service of Canada as part of its overall effort to adopt a cognitive skills approach to rehabilitation.5 Over time, the early proponents and developers of the LSI–R formed a private consulting firm to market the system in the United States and other countries. The LSI–R consists of 54 items in 10 substantive areas relevant to future criminal behavior:

� Criminal history (10 items). � Education and employment (10 items). � Financial (2 items). � Family and marital (4 items). � Accommodations (3 items). � Leisure and recreation (2 items). � Companions (5 items). � Alcohol and drug problems (9 items). � Emotional and personal (5 items). � Attitude and orientation (4 items). The inventory is administered by an interviewer. The questions require either a yes/no answer or a response to a structured scale ranging in value from 0 to 3. The interviewer scores the offender on each item and then determines the offender’s overall risk level. The scoring is based on the assumption that parole and probation officers can be sufficiently trained to assess offenders properly on each of the inven- tory’s items; however, the training is intensive and requires staff to have strong inter- pretation skills.

Because many of the LSI–R items address the respondent’s social situation in the community, this system is best suited for probationers and parolees as opposed to those who are incarcerated. Most studies of the LSI–R have been done by researchers with a direct financial interest in its profitability. Few independent stud- ies have evaluated the system’s reliability and predictive value. One independent study conducted for the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole found a low level of interrater reliability in the scoring process (Austin and Davies, 2001). Another, more recent study of the LSI–Ontario Revision showed positive results (Girard and Wormith, 2004).

Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative

Sanctions

Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) is a privately owned risk and needs assessment system for adult corrections. It includes four major risk assessment scales (violence, recidivism, flight, and com- munity noncompliance) for use both in assessing an offender’s appropriateness for community corrections and in making decisions regarding release and case man- agement supervision. The COMPAS assesses a comprehensive set of more than 20 well-validated criminogenic factors, including criminal history, violence history,

Chapter 3

early onset of delinquency, substance abuse, criminal associates, criminal attitudes, criminal personality (impulsivity, low self-control), and criminal opportunity (high- risk lifestyle). It also evaluates several psychosocial stressors (e.g., residence in a high-crime community, poverty, vocational problems, social isolation, and scarcity of social supports) that may be useful in designing case plans.

The comprehensive COMPAS battery of tests requires 45 to 60 minutes to complete. However, jurisdictions can customize the assessment to fit their specific needs or staffing and timing constraints by deleting selected scales or questions. For exam- ple, an agency interested only in screening for risk of recidivism could limit the assessment to that scale, reducing the time requirement to about 8 minutes. The COMPAS software program also maintains a database of information that allows for the quick generation of reports and outcomes.

The COMPAS has not been independently evaluated. The Northpointe Institute for Public Management in Michigan, which owns the COMPAS program, reports that all risk factor items were developed using standard factor analytic and psychomet- ric procedures and that most reach highly acceptable levels of reliability (Cron- bach’s alpha greater than 0.70).6 Validation studies in more than 30 separate jurisdictions across the United States have accumulated considerable statistical evi- dence that supports the predictive and construct validity and generalizability of COMPAS scales across jurisdictions. For example, a recent 12-month study of recidivism in a sample of more than 600 New York State probationers found the area under the curve in a receiver operating characteristic analysis to be close to 0.80, which is comparable or superior in predictive validity to most existing risk assess- ment systems.

U.S. Board of Parole Salient Risk Guidelines

The U.S. Board of Parole (now the U.S. Parole Commission) first established parole guidelines in the early 1970s. The original goals of these guidelines were as follows:

� To enhance the reliability and validity of parole release decisions. � To reduce disparity in sentencing decisions. � To reduce recidivism rates by denying parole to high-risk offenders and/or by

enhancing the level of supervision and services to such offenders.

� To provide stability in projecting correctional system resources. To accomplish these goals, the U.S. Board of Parole developed an additive point scale to classify inmates by their risk level. The “salient factor score” is based on two sets of factors associated with recidivism rates for inmates released from federal prisons: the seriousness of the offense committed and the likelihood of success or failure under parole supervision. This scale continues to be used by the U.S. Parole Com- mission for the cases over which it still has jurisdiction and by states that have retained the use of discretionary parole (Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia,

Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments

Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas). The most common items analyzed in the current guidelines are:

� Age (current age, age at first arrest or conviction). � Criminal record (arrests, convictions, incarcerations). � Institutional conduct (disciplinary record, program participation). � Prior performance on parole or probation (prior technical violations, recommit-

ments).

� History of alcohol or drug use. � Time served (actual time, percentage of time served). � Parole/release plans (employment, residency). � Mental health status. Client Management Classification

The Client Management Classification (CMC) system is also referred to in the lit- erature as the “Wisconsin system” because it was developed by Drs. Gary Arling and Ken Lerner of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections for use in probation and parole services. It has since been adopted by many probation and parole super- vision agencies nationwide (Baird, 1981). CMC is essentially the same as the PMC system described above (see page 16). It is based on a questionnaire completed by probationers and parolees to determine both the level of supervision they should receive and the types of services they may require. Like the PMC, LSI–R, and COMPAS, the CMC system requires offenders to be reevaluated on a regular basis to account for any changes in risk factors that might alter their supervision require- ments or needs levels.

Risk of Reconviction Scale and Criminogenic Needs Inventory

New Zealand’s Risk of Reconviction (ROC) scale was designed to assess only an inmate’s risk and not his or her needs. It has been statistically accurate in predicting the likelihood of reconviction, seriousness of reoffense, imprisonment, and sen- tence. The Criminogenic Needs Inventory (CNI) is a further development of the ROC system. Its predictions are based on behavior during the criminal’s offending period (the day before and the day that the offense was committed) and a predis- posing period (the 6 months preceding the offending period). Both inventories include assessments of emotions, propensity toward violence, relationships, alcohol- and drug-related behaviors, impulsivity, and criminal associates. Although adminis- tration of the CNI requires some expert supervision, it was designed to be used by nonspecialist correctional administrators.

Chapter 3

Community Risk/Needs Management Scale and Case Needs

Identification and Analysis

The Community Risk/Needs Management Scale (CRNMS) is a Canadian model developed from the Case Needs Identification and Analysis (CNIA) instrument, which was designed to assess inmate needs at admission. The CRNMS built on information included in the CNIA and streamlined its design in order to evaluate criminal history risk, case needs, the likelihood of reoffending, and the level of com- munity supervision necessary per offender. The CRNMS has shown that the static variables included in the criminal history analysis are better predictors of recidivism during the early stages of release; dynamic variables, however, are more influential over time.

Instruments To Assess Sex Offenders

The public’s fear of predatory sex offenders, which has been fueled by several well- publicized crimes by released inmates, has led to legislation designed to extend prison terms for such offenders, mandate their treatment prior to release, and require their location to be made known to law enforcement officials and the public upon their release. The growing awareness and fear of recidivism among released sex offenders have led to increased interest in identifying and treating them. The instru- ments most frequently used in adult corrections today to assess the risk of recidi- vism in convicted sex offenders are discussed below.

Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism

The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR), like the LSI–R, was developed in Canada. It was designed to be a very simple but relative- ly accurate method for assessing the likelihood of convicted sex offenders to recidi- vate and return to prison. To avoid the need for a structured staff interview, researchers originally tested seven “static” items found in inmates’ case files that could be scored relatively easily by “nonprofessional” staff (Hanson and Thorton, 1999). Based on a series of validation tests, the researchers found that four items (prior sex offenses, age at release, victim gender, and relationship to victim) could be used successfully to predict recidivism rates for convicted sex offenders. The RRASOR was later used in the development of the Static–99.

Static–99

The Static–99 was developed jointly by researchers from Canada and the United Kingdom. It is an inventory of 10 static factors that reflect attributes of convicted sex offenders and that have been shown to be associated with recidivism in four sep- arate Canadian and U.K. samples (Hanson and Thorton, 1999). Like the RRASOR, the Static–99 does not require an interview, as these items can be obtained from the inmate’s case file. It is now being used by several parole boards, including the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole and the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Assessment Board, to screen inmates convicted of sex crimes who are also eligible for parole.7

Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments

Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool–Revised

The Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool–Revised (MnSOST–R) scores 16 items, most of which are similar to those in the Static–99 and RRASOR. However, the MnSOST–R requires more detailed data on the 12 static variables related to the offender’s criminal record and relationship to his victims. It also adds four dynam- ic components that measure factors associated with age and behavior while incar- cerated. No interview is required, as information on all 16 factors is drawn from inmate files.

Sexual Violence Risk–20

Canadian psychologist Douglas Boer is currently developing the Sexual Violence Risk–20 (SVR–20) as a basis for analysis and prediction of sexual violence. Simi- lar to assessments of general violence, the SVR–20 incorporates information per- taining to an offender’s psychosocial adjustment and future plans (Dunne, 2000). It also includes factors specifically related to the offender’s attitudes toward and his- tory of committing sexual offenses. The SVR–20, however, does not include a tool for classifying risk, but is intended rather to be used as a topical guideline for risk assessments linked with studying violent sexual offenders.

Instruments To Assess Violence and Dangerousness

A pair of instruments devised in Canada have been found to be useful in assessing inmates’ propensity to violent and dangerous behavior, and one also shows promise in predicting recidivism by sex offenders. Both instruments have serious limitations, however. They are both designed for use by mental health professionals, and neither has been tested independently by persons with no financial interest in the instrument.

Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised

The Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL–R) is an instrument developed in Canada by Robert Hare. It is now owned and distributed by the firm that controls the LSI–R. The PCL–R consists of 20 items that consider both static and dynamic factors. The assessment includes both a structured interview and a careful review of the inmate’s file. Training is required to use the PCL–R, and this instrument is designed for use only by a licensed psychologist or an individual with a master’s degree in psychology who is working under the supervision of a licensed psychol- ogist. Although there is no research showing independent testing of the PCL–R by persons without financial interest in the instrument, it is a widely accepted and used measure of psychopathy.

Violence Risk Assessment Guide

The Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG), also developed in Canada, is based on research conducted at a single maximum-security prison (Ontario’s Penetan- guishene). The VRAG has been promoted as an objective procedure to assess the risk of violent recidivism in mentally disordered offenders, but subsequent research

Chapter 3

BOP and the

Colorado Depart-

ment of Corrections

have developed sys-

tems that assign an

inmate points for

having certain attrib-

utes associated with

gang membership.

suggested that the scale could also be used to predict sex offense recidivism (Quin- sey et al., 1998). The assessment process requires a preexisting PCL–R score, com- pletion of an additional interview, and a review of the inmate’s case file.

The classification accuracy of the VRAG is reported to be about 75 percent (Quin- sey et al., 1998). However, correctional agencies concerned with cost and efficien- cy may not be interested in using the VRAG to measure the risk of sex offense recidivism, given that professionally trained interviewers and careful file review are required for the system to work properly. Little, if any, research shows that this instrument has been tested independently by persons with no financial interest in it.

Methods of Identifying Gangs and Security Threat Groups

In general, state prison systems do not have actuarial systems for assessing whether an inmate is in an STG or other type of organized street or prison gang. Typically, state policies require the designation of highly trained staff as specialists in the iden- tification of STG inmates, their movements, and illicit activities. These staff draw on multiple sources of information, including tattoos, prior affiliations with known gang members, gang-related literature, and the word of other prisoners.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Colorado Department of Corrections have developed systems that assign an inmate points for having certain attributes associ- ated with gang membership. For example, if an inmate has a history of active gang membership, certain types of tattoos, or is reported by another credible source as being associated with an STG, the inmate will be given points for each of these attributes. If the points reach a certain threshold, the inmate will be confirmed as a member of an STG. Outside these two jurisdictions, the identification of members of gangs and other STGs remains subjective.

Risk Assessment Systems and Instruments

Many agencies were

unable to fully com-

plete the survey be-

cause they either had

limited access to the

information request-

ed or stored their

records in a way that

prevented them from

retrieving the data.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

In 2002, a survey on the classification of high-risk and special management inmates was sent to the correctional agencies of all 50 states and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico (hereafter referred to as “states”). The survey (see appendix) was designed to obtain information on the procedures used to classify high-risk inmates, particularly those in protective custody or administrative segregation, and inmates with mental illnesses or medical problems. Several items requested information on high-risk inmates housed in the general population and special practices associated with their situation. The last section of the survey asked for information on new or model programs, including the name and location of the program, the target popu- lation, screening processes, programs and services offered, and staffing levels. Many of the jurisdictions that responded also provided detailed information on the nature and operation of these programs, including policy statements, manuals, sta- tistical reports, and program descriptions.

The survey responses demonstrated little consensus on the use of even the most basic classification terms such as “general population,” “protective custody,” and “administrative” as opposed to “disciplinary” segregation. Further, very few correc- tional data systems were able to aggregate quickly and accurately the numbers and types of prisoners in each of these discrete classification categories. Disagreement about prison classification terms and delay in implementing automated data systems are not new, but these issues made it difficult for some agencies to fully complete the survey. Many agencies either had limited access to the information requested or stored their records in a way that prevented them from retrieving the data. There- fore, most of the results reported in the exhibits that follow are based on a limited number of respondents.

Total Inmate Population

Forty-one states and Puerto Rico completed and returned the survey, yielding a response rate of 81 percent. Exhibit 5 presents the total inmate population, broken out by gender, for all 42 respondents. For Alaska and West Virginia, which did not report counts of women prisoners, 2001 data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics were used to estimate the total inmate population. The number of inmates ranged from 740 in Wyoming to 157,142 in California. The states with the next largest

fourC h a p t e r

The great majority

of the inmates were

housed in the general

population, indicating

that there are no spe-

cial security, medical,

or mental health needs

for most prisoners.

inmate populations were Texas, with 143,302, and Florida and New York, with pop- ulations of approximately 70,000 each. After Wyoming, the states with the smallest inmate populations were New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Vir- ginia, all of which reported fewer than 2,000 inmates.

General Population

In all states that reported general population data, the great majority of the inmates were housed in the general population, indicating that there are no special security, medical, or mental health needs for most prisoners (exhibit 6). With the exception

Chapter 4

State Total Population Male Female

Alaska 4,969 4,593 376

Arizona 27,165 25,133 2,032

California 157,142 147,391 9,751

Colorado 15,241 14,207 1,034

Connecticut 18,348 17,056 1,292

Delaware 5,460 5,084 376

Florida 72,509 68,217 4,292

Georgia 45,820 42,951 2,869

Idaho 5,535 5,013 522

Illinois 42,733 40,115 2,618

Indiana 20,802 19,343 1,459

Iowa 8,103 7,461 642

Kansas 8,574 8,074 500

Kentucky 15,805 14,794 1,011

Maryland 23,717 22,617 1,100

Massachusetts 10,197 9,562 635

Michigan 47,357* 45,242 1,933

Minnesota 6,626 6,234 392

Missouri 29,132 26,970 2,162

Montana 2,275 2,112 163

Nebraska 3,932 3,578 354

New Hampshire 1,381 1,276 105

New Jersey 22,657 21,478 1,179

New Mexico 5,781 5,268 513

Exhibit 5. Prison Population

There were no major

differences in the

proportion of male

and female prisoners

in the general popula-

tion in each state.

of Georgia, which reported that only 36 percent of its female prisoners were housed in the general population (45 percent fewer than male prisoners), there were no major differences in the proportion of male and female prisoners in the general pop- ulation in each state (exhibit 7). The apparent disparity between Georgia and the other reporting states may be the result of classification policies or the state’s defi- nition of general population; however, the percentage of male inmates in the gener- al population in Georgia’s prisons is more comparable to the percentages reported by the other states.

Because Alaska and West Virginia did not report counts of women prisoners, their general and special management population data reflect only their male prisoners.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

State Total Population Male Female

New York 67,554 64,392 3,162

North Dakota 1,131 1,021 110

Ohio 44,645 42,324 2,321

Oklahoma 22,274 20,112 2,162

Oregon 11,023 10,385 638

Pennsylvania 37,995 36,290 1,705

Puerto Rico 15,440 14,907 533

Rhode Island 3,295 3,093 202

South Carolina 21,684 20,219 1,465

South Dakota 2,864 2,623 241

Tennessee 17,587 16,693 894

Texas 143,302 132,655 10,647

Vermont 1,761 1,654 107

Virginia 33,976 31,632 2,344

Washington 14,871 13,819 1,052

West Virginia 1,338 992 346

Wisconsin 21,106 19,862 1,244

Wyoming 740 617 123

Total 1,063,847 997,059 66,606

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002. The counts of women prisoners in Alaska and West Virginia, which did not report this information, are 2001 data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Paige Harrison and Allen Beck, Prisoners in 2001, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002).

Note: Nine states and the District of Columbia did not respond to the survey: Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, and Utah. *Includes 182 inmates for whom information on gender was not available.

Exhibit 5 continued

Number of Inmates

Total General Percentage in State Population Population General Population

Alaska 4,969 4,340* 88

Arizona 27,165 19,438 72

California 157,142 124,620 79

Colorado 15,241 10,950 72

Connecticut 18,348 13,051 71

Delaware 5,460 4,967 91

Florida 72,509 63,758 88

Georgia 45,820 29,403 64

Idaho 5,535 5,212 94

Illinois 42,733 37,220 87

Indiana 20,802 16,562 80

Kansas 8,574 8,070 94

Kentucky 11,305† 7,771 69

Maryland 23,717 21,421 90

Massachusetts 10,197 6,379 63

Michigan 47,357 34,638 73

Minnesota 6,626 6,167 93

Missouri 29,132 20,660 71

Montana 2,275 2,101 92

Nebraska 3,932 3,717 95

New Hampshire 1,381 1,239 90

New Jersey 22,657 20,459 90

New Mexico 5,781 5,011 87

New York 67,554 58,290 86

Chapter 4

Exhibit 6. Prison Population Housed in General Population

Iowa did not define general population information for men or women in its response to the survey.

Special Management Populations

The survey asked respondents to report the numbers of male and female inmates assigned to the following types of special management units: administrative segre- gation, disciplinary segregation, protective custody, mental health/mental retardation,

On average, only

5 percent of the total

inmate population

was housed in admin-

istrative or discipli-

nary segregation,

although there is

considerable variance

among the reporting

states.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Number of Inmates

Total General Percentage in State Population Population General Population

North Dakota 1,131 842 74

Ohio 44,645 41,879 94

Oregon 11,023 8,953 81

Pennsylvania 37,995 28,859 76

Puerto Rico 15,440 14,741 95

Rhode Island 3,295 3,245 98

South Carolina 21,684 15,791 73

South Dakota 2,864 2,637 92

Tennessee 17,587 14,261 81

Texas 143,302 106,999 75

Vermont 1,761 1,702 97

Virginia 33,976 22,605 67

Washington 14,871 12,590 85

West Virginia 1,338 743* 59

Wisconsin 21,106 19,670 93

Wyoming 740 603 81

Total 1,055,744 847,178 80

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002. The total inmate populations of Alaska and West Virginia were calculated using Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001 counts of female inmates (Paige Harrison and Allen Beck, Prisoners in 2001, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002).

Notes: Iowa and Oklahoma did not report the number of inmates in the general population. Oklahoma, however, did report the gender distribution of its inmates housed in the general population (see exhibit 7). *Male inmates only. State did not report data on female inmates. †Excludes inmates housed in local jails, for whom classification data were not available at the time of the survey.

Exhibit 6 continued

and 24-hour medical infirmary. However, because of the variation in agency defini- tions of “administrative” and “disciplinary,” data on the segregated populations have been combined. The remaining special management population counts, though small, are reported separately.

Administrative and Disciplinary Segregation

Of the 40 states that reported inmate counts for these categories, 38 had less than 10 percent of their prison inmates in administrative or disciplinary segregation units (exhibit 8). At 16 percent, West Virginia had the highest percentage, followed by

Chapter 4

Percentage of Inmates

State Male Female

Alaska 94 NA

Arizona 70 89

California 79 83

Colorado 71 81

Connecticut 71 72

Delaware 92 82

Florida 88 93

Georgia 66 36

Idaho 94 99

Illinois 87 88

Indiana 79 89

Kansas 94 98

Maryland 90 90

Massachusetts 62 67

Michigan 73 83

Minnesota 93 93

Missouri 71 69

Montana 92 92

Nebraska 94 98

New Hampshire 89 96

New Jersey 90 94

New Mexico 86 96

Exhibit 7. Gender Distribution of Inmates Housed in General Population

New Mexico at 13 percent. Several states reported segregating only 1 percent of their inmates. These variations may reflect differences in how states classify pris- oners or in how they define administrative and disciplinary segregation. On average, only 5 percent of the total inmate population in the reporting states was housed in administrative or disciplinary segregation.

Protective Custody

Thirty-one states reported data on prisoners categorized as protective custody inmates (exhibit 9). The proportions are lower for this category than for administra- tive or disciplinary segregation, with states reporting from less than 1 percent to a high of 4 percent (Tennessee). Overall, the use of protective custody was relatively infrequent.

Several states provide

special programming

for mentally ill in-

mates, whether in a

segregation unit or

a mental health unit.

Mental Health Units

The number of inmates housed separately in mental health units was extremely small. Most of the 34 states that responded to this question reported that 1 percent or less of their total prison population was housed in such units (exhibit 10). The states with the highest rates were Georgia (12 percent) and Alaska (5 percent).

Several states reported that they provide special programming for mentally ill inmates, whether they are housed in a segregation unit or a mental health unit. For example, Washington State’s Special Offender Unit incorporates individual and group therapy, basic and psychological health education classes, and life skills training for inmates with a mental illness or those who are in acute distress and are

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Percentage of Inmates

State Male Female

New York 86 84

North Dakota 74 75

Ohio 100 100

Oklahoma 100 96

Oregon 82 74

Pennsylvania 76 82

Puerto Rico 95 98

Rhode Island 98 100

South Carolina 73 65

South Dakota 92 93

Tennessee 80 94

Texas 76 59

Vermont 97 96

Virginia 66 77

Washington 84 90

West Virginia 75 NA

Wisconsin 93 93

Wyoming 81 83

Total 80 79

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: Iowa did not report general population data. Kentucky reported the total number of inmates housed in the general population (see exhibit 6), but did not report the distribution of prisoners by gender.

NA = not available.

Exhibit 7 continued

Chapter 4

Exhibit 8. Inmates in Administrative or Disciplinary Segregation

Number in Segregation Percentage of Total State Male Female Total Prison Population

Alaska 159 NA 159 3*

California 5,908 219 6,127 4

Colorado 1,228 33 1,261 8

Connecticut 441 10 451 3

Delaware 344 25 369 7

Florida 4,854 78 4,932 7

Georgia 1,925 58 1,983 4

Idaho 200 0 200 4

Illinois 2,565 121 2,686 6

Indiana 1,092 27 1,119 5

Kansas 460 9 469 6

Kentucky 508 43 551 4

Maryland 292 18 310 1

Massachusetts 260 20 280 3

Michigan 2,101 31 2,132 5

Minnesota 393 20 413 6

Missouri 1,697 34 1,731 6

Montana 67 3 70 3

Nebraska 94 8 102 3

New Hampshire 8 2 10 1

New Jersey 1,428 31 1,459 6

New Mexico 748 22 770 13

considered suicidal. The program’s goal is to stabilize inmates and return them to the general population, although the length of participation can range from 6 months to 15 years. Ohio’s super maximum-security prison, which is described later in this report, is required to provide daily mental health treatment services, in recognition that many “acting out” behaviors are related to an undiagnosed and untreated men- tal health problem.

Medical Units

Thirty-two states provided counts of prisoners housed in a separate medical unit or facility. This category constituted the smallest of the special management popula- tions and the lowest percentage (less than 1 percent) of the total prison population

(exhibit 11). Several states reported that their agencies do not house medically ill inmates in separate units unless they have a life-threatening, contagious, or other severe illness. Some states transfer prisoners with these types of medical conditions to public medical centers outside the prison system.

In Michigan, five facilities have specialized units available for inmates with severe auditory or visual impairments in various custody levels. The state also uses com- munity providers, including hospitals and nursing homes. There also is one geriatric unit at a level II (medium security) facility that is designed to manage the special medical needs of elderly inmates.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Number in Segregation Percentage of Total State Male Female Total Prison Population

New York 4,458 44 4,502 7

North Dakota 52 5 57 5

Ohio 300 4 304 1

Oklahoma 338 210 548 3

Oregon 785 19 804 7

Pennsylvania 2,284 37 2,321 6

Puerto Rico 188 1 189 1

Rhode Island 161 7 168 5

South Carolina 655 20 675 3

South Dakota 190 15 205 7

Tennessee 1,050 11 1,061 6

Texas 9,028 99 9,127 6

Vermont 6 4 10 1

Virginia 1,994 51 2,045 6

Washington 564 29 593 4

West Virginia 161 NA 161 16*

Wisconsin 1,283 174 1,457 7

Wyoming 14 4 18 2

Total 50,283 1,546 51,829 5

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: Arizona and Iowa did not report counts of inmates in administrative or disciplinary segregation.

NA = not available. *Male inmates only. State did not report data on female inmates.

Exhibit 8 continued

The majority of sur-

vey respondents indi-

cated that both their

male and female

prison populations

were increasing. One-

third of the respon-

dents reported that

their prison popula-

tions had declined

or remained stable.

Chapter 4

Number in Protective Custody Percentage of Total State Male Female Total Prison Population

Alaska 11 NA 11 <1*

Arizona 759 10 769 3

California 18 0 18 <1

Connecticut 225 8 233 1

Delaware 19 0 19 <1

Florida 201 0 201 <1

Idaho 64 0 64 1

Illinois 508 3 511 1

Indiana 277 0 277 1

Kansas 34 1 35 <1

Kentucky 184 0 184 1

Massachusetts 30 0 30 <1

Michigan 370 0 370 1

Missouri 812 0 812 3

Montana 0 9 9 <1

Nebraska 106 0 106 3

New Jersey 51 0 51 <1

Ohio 181 0 181 <1

Exhibit 9. Inmates in Protective Custody

A model program in Washington State is designed to protect ill inmates without tak- ing up space in medical infirmaries. The Assisted Living Facility provides 24-hour medical care and handicapped-accessible accommodations for sick or disabled pris- oners and also teaches inmates to assist each other with their medical and daily needs.

Inmate Population Trends

The nation has witnessed considerable growth in the prison population since 1980. Although BJS data show that the prison populations of 9 states declined in 2002, nationwide, the prison population grew 2.6 percent—less than the average annual growth of 3.6 percent since 1995, but up from 1.1 percent in 2001 (Harrison and Beck, 2002, 2003). The National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates asked state correctional agencies whether, during the past year, their prison popula- tion had increased, decreased, or remained unchanged. As exhibit 12 shows, the majority of those who responded indicated that both their male and female prison

Most agencies report-

ed that the level of

violence and other

types of disruptive

behavior is either

stable or declining.populations were increasing (66 percent of respondents and 61 percent of respon- dents, respectively). Approximately one-third of the respondents reported that their prison populations had declined or remained stable.

A higher proportion of states indicated that their special management populations had either decreased or remained unchanged, although some respondents indicated that their responses were estimates based on agency officials’ recent experiences in managing special or high-risk prisoners. Similarly, most agencies reported that inmate-on-staff and inmate-on-inmate assaults had not increased. Of the states responding, 53 percent reported that inmate-on-staff assaults had decreased and 46 percent reported that inmate-on-inmate assaults had decreased. These declines were credited to an aging prison population, better inmate management and classification policies, increased inmate participation in counseling and other mental health pro- grams, and the institution of zero-tolerance drug and alcohol policies. States that reported increases in inmate assaults frequently attributed this trend to crowding, insufficient staff, and cutbacks in staff training (both initial and in-service).

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Number in Protective Custody Percentage of Total State Male Female Total Prison Population

Oklahoma 77 0 77 <1

Oregon 58 0 58 1

Puerto Rico 70 41 111 1

Rhode Island 22 0 22 1

South Carolina 14 1 15 <1

South Dakota 0 0 0 0

Tennessee 755 7 762 4

Texas 2,935 0 2,935 2

Virginia 68 0 68 <1

Washington 114 0 114 1

West Virginia 6 NA 6 1*

Wisconsin 6 0 6 <1

Wyoming 11 0 11 2

Total 7,986 80 8,066 1

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: Eleven states did not report counts of inmates in protective custody: Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Mary- land, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.

NA= not available.

*Male inmates only. State did not report data on female inmates.

Exhibit 9 continued

Chapter 4

Exhibit 10. Inmates in Mental Health Units

Number in Mental Health Units Percentage of Total

State Male Female Total Prison Population

Alaska 244 NA 244 5*

Arizona 339 31 370 1

Colorado 226 12 238 2

Connecticut 413 12 425 2

Delaware 33 42 75 1

Florida 101 0 101 <1

Georgia 4,560 1,063 5,623 12

Idaho 40 0 40 1

Illinois 382 18 400 1

Indiana 77 0 77 <1

Kentucky 166 0 166 1

Massachusetts 38 35 73 1

Michigan 860 62 922 2

Minnesota 39 7 46 1

Missouri 13 2 15 <1

Montana 12 0 12 1

New Hampshire 44 0 44 3

New Jersey 358 37 395 2

New Mexico 119 0 119 2

New York 723 32 755 1

High-Security/Maximum-Custody Populations

Several questions were directly aimed at the most visible special management pop- ulation: high-security or maximum-custody prisoners. The survey defined this cate- gory of prisoners as those who had been removed from the general population for an indefinite period of time because of their involvement in serious or repetitive rule infractions. General population prisoners classified as maximum, high, or close cus- tody were not included because, although subject to the restrictions associated with maximum custody, they have full access to the programs and work assignments available to other general population prisoners. Many general population prisoners classified as maximum custody do not present management problems and are so classified because of the crime they committed, their prison sentence, or a violent event that occurred many years in the past.

In 47 percent of the

responding states,

mentally ill inmates

who are disruptive

are subject to the

same maximum-

custody policies as

all other inmates.

As defined by the survey, high-security/maximum-custody prisoners are those housed in super maximum-security prisons, “high-control” units, or more tradition- al administrative segregation units. Exhibit 13 lists the basic policies governing inmates in such units and the proportion of states employing each policy. Nearly all the states restrict these prisoners to their cells for 22–23 hours per day, limit their contact with visitors, and require the use of restraints at all times when moving them. There was more variation in other policies related to maximum custody. Of the states that responded, 68 percent allow maximum-custody inmates to have con- tact with other high-security inmates. The amount of out-of-cell time allowed ranges from less than 1 hour per day (10 percent) to 3 or more hours per day (23 percent). The majority of the responding states (69 percent) allow 1–2 per day.

In 47 percent of the responding states, mentally ill inmates who are disruptive are subject to the same maximum-custody policies as all other inmates. Examples of states that make other provisions for mentally ill inmates who become disruptive

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Number in Mental Health Units Percentage of Total

State Male Female Total Prison Population

North Dakota 6 0 6 1

Ohio 249 0 249 1

Oklahoma 189 64 253 1

Oregon 48 0 48 <1

Pennsylvania 159 7 166 <1

Puerto Rico 47 21 68 <1

South Carolina 379 78 457 2

South Dakota 19 0 19 1

Texas 2,391 138 2,529 2

Vermont 7 0 7 <1

Virginia 319 102 421 1

Washington 214 6 220 2

West Virginia 27 NA 27 3*

Wyoming 24 0 24 3

Total 12,865 1,769 14,634 2

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: Eight states did not report counts of inmates in mental health units: California, Iowa, Kansas, Mary- land, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.

NA = not available. *Male inmates only. State did not report data on female inmates.

Exhibit 10 continued

Although special

management inmates

are eligible to return

to the general popu-

lation in every state

that responded to

the survey, only

69 percent of these

states provide some

type of transitional

program.

include Virginia, which assigns mentally ill prisoners to mental health programs rather than administrative segregation, and Colorado, where mentally ill inmates can be assigned to administrative segregation, but in a specialized facility with correc- tional staff trained to handle psychological illnesses.

Transition to the General Population

Special management inmates are eligible to return to the general population in every state that responded to the survey, most commonly when their segregation time has expired, they are no longer deemed a threat to institutional security, or staff has approved their return based on improved behavior. However, only 69 percent of the responding states provide some type of transitional program. Furthermore, most of the programs designed to help inmates readjust to the general population, including those instituted in Indiana, Massachusetts, and Arizona, serve only those who are mentally ill. Most of the programs in place are “stepdown” programs that gradual- ly reintroduce the inmate to the general population. In Florida and Nebraska, re- integration is based on earning increased privileges with positive behavior.

Chapter 4

Number in Medical Units/Facilities Percentage of Total

State Male Female Total Prison Population

Alaska 2 NA 2 0*

Arizona 62 0 62 0

Colorado 45 3 48 0

Connecticut 64 17 81 0

Delaware 29 1 30 1

Florida 20 4 24 0

Georgia 81 5 86 0

Idaho 12 0 12 0

Illinois 582 9 591 1

Indiana 51 0 51 0

Kentucky 2 0 2 0

Maryland 51 2 53 0

Massachusetts 38 20 58 1

Michigan 151 3 154 0

Missouri 46 0 46 0

Montana 6 0 6 0

New Hampshire 5 2 7 1

New Jersey 113 0 113 1

New York 581 30 611 1

Exhibit 11. Inmates in Medical Units or Facilities

Most of the programs

designed to help

inmates readjust to

the general popula-

tion serve only those

who are mentally ill.

The survey invited states that provide transitional programming to describe their programs. Several states, including the following, reported new programs:

� Michigan implemented a three-stage reintegration program in November 2000. The program essentially creates a new classification level: a modified general population for high-risk inmates.

� Florida implemented an innovative program based on cognitive behavioral learning and incentives called Rethinking Personal Choice (RPC). RPC facili- tates the transition from close management to the general population by inte- grating work experience, group learning and recreation, volunteer experiences, and personal expression (through writing a journal). After the program was implemented, the number of high-risk inmates who successfully made the tran- sition to the general population increased and the time an inmate spent in close management custody decreased (Moore, Dugger, and Nimer, 2002).

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Number in Medical Units/Facilities Percentage of Total

State Male Female Total Prison Population

North Dakota 6 1 7 1

Oklahoma 27 22 49 0

Oregon 23 0 23 0

Pennsylvania 140 14 154 0

Puerto Rico 697 47 744 5

South Carolina 42 3 45 0

South Dakota 2 1 3 0

Texas 122 0 122 0

Vermont 2 0 2 0

Virginia 135 6 141 0

West Virginia 18 NA 18 1*

Wisconsin 42 0 42 0

Wyoming 11 0 11 2

Total 3,208 190 3,398 0

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: Ten states did not report counts of inmates in medical or infirmary units: California, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington.

NA = not available. *Male inmates only. State did not report data on female inmates.

Exhibit 11 continued

Chapter 4

Number of Trend (% states reporting) States

Variable Increasing Decreasing Unchanged Reporting

Total prison population

Male 66 20 14 35

Female 61 24 15 33

General population

Male 58 26 16 31

Female 53 27 20 30

Maximum custody

Male 46 15 39 33

Female 17 20 63 30

Special management population

Administrative segregation

Male 33 17 50 30

Female 28 17 55 29

Disciplinary segregation

Male 31 19 50 32

Female 40 20 40 30

Protective custody

Male 25 22 53 32

Female 23 3 73 31

Mental health unit

Male 55 10 36 31

Female 48 7 45 29

Medical unit or facility

Male 39 19 42 31

Female 31 0 69 29

Assaults

Inmate on staff 24 53 19 42

Inmate on inmate 27 46 27 37

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding or errors by reporting agencies.

Exhibit 12. Estimates of Current Prison Population Trends

The use of special

management units

has given rise to a sig-

nificant amount of lit-

igation. Most consent

decrees in place con-

cern mentally ill or

medical populations.

� Iowa introduced a voluntary program for inmates with long-term disciplinary problems that provides courses on “thinking for success” and anger manage- ment as well as substance abuse treatment. Although the program was still in its first year at the time of the survey, 18–20 male inmates were enrolled and another 9 had completed it successfully. This program is similar to one in Colorado that provides mental and medical health services and focuses on cognitive strength- ening, vocational training, and education. The Colorado program graduates about 60 inmates a year.

Consent Decrees

The use of special management units has given rise to a significant amount of liti- gation, typically focusing on one of the following three issues: the criteria for des- ignation as a special management prisoner, the conditions of confinement in special management units, or the process for releasing the inmate back to the general prison population. Data on active and pending consent decrees involving special manage- ment inmates are presented in exhibit 14. Exhibit 15 lists the decrees by type of pop- ulation governed and state. The majority of consent decrees in place concerns mentally ill or medical populations.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Number of States With

States Policy in Place

Policy Reporting Number Percent

24-hour restriction 42 40 95

Contact with other high-security inmates allowed 41 28 68

Contact with visitors allowed 41 39 95

Restraints used when escorting prisoner 41 37 90

Out-of-cell time (hours/day)

Less than 1 39 4 10

1–2 39 27 69

3 or more 39 9 23

Same policies apply to disruptive mentally ill prisoners 38 18 47

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: “High security/maximum custody” is defined as removal from the general population for an indefinite period because of serious or repetitive rule infractions.

Exhibit 13. Policies Governing High-Security/Maximum-Custody Inmates

Screening and Assessment

Although inmate assessment and classification practices vary across states, most agencies screen for the same basic inmate characteristics, including membership in a gang or security threat group, escape risk, violent behavior, and suicide risk. Exhibit 16 shows the different factors assessed and the number and percentage of responding states that screen for each factor; the information is presented for both genders, although most states screen male and female inmates for the same factors.

All states responding reported that all prisoners are screened for suicide risk, mood disorders, and psychotic disorders. Nearly all of the responding states (95 percent) screen for mental retardation and escape risk. Mental health staff perform the psy- chological evaluations and base their conclusions on the results of interviews, psychological assessment and testing, and professional clinical judgment. Inmates found to have psychological disorders or mental deficits are eligible for special serv- ices and counseling provided by the mental health staff. Innovative methods are being used to deliver such services. Iowa, for example, has implemented “telemedicine”—consultation via two-way television—for inmate counseling and psychiatric services.

Chapter 4

Exhibit 14. Number and Percentage of States Reporting Consent Decrees

Active Decrees Pending Decrees

Number of Number of States

States With Decrees States

States With Decrees

Population Responding Number Percent Responding Number Percent

Administrative segregation 38 4 11 20 0 0

Disciplinary segregation 39 6 15 22 1 5

Mental health 41 11 27 20 0 0

Medical 40 10 25 22 0 0

Substance abuse 38 1 3 22 0 0

Other* 34 10 29 19 6 32

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002. *Several states have more than one consent decree in this category.

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Administrative Segregation California

Armstrong v. Davis Coleman v. Davis Madrid v. Wilson

Florida Osterback v. Moore

Iowa Goff v. Harper

Michigan Hadix v. Johnson

Mental Health/Mental Retardation Arizona

Casey v. Lewis

California Coleman v. Davis Clark v. Davis Madrid v. Wilson

Georgia Cason v. Seckinger

Indiana Anderson v. O’Bannon

Iowa Goff v. Harper

Michigan Hadix v. Johnson

New Hampshire Laaman

New Jersey C.F. v. Terhune

New York Harrell v. Senkowski Langley v. Coughlin

Oklahoma Battles v. Saffle

Washington Hallet v. Payne

Substance Abuse Michigan

Hadix v. Johnson

Disciplinary Segregation Arizona

Taylor v. Lewis

Indiana Taifa v. O’Bannon

Iowa Goff v. Harper

Michigan Hadix v. Johnson

New Hampshire Laaman

New York Anderson v. Coughlin Eng v. Smith Rivera v. Coughlin Salik v. Farrell

West Virginia Berry v. Painter

Medical California

Armstrong v. Davis Madrid v. Wilson Plata v. Davis

Connecticut Doe v. Meachum

Georgia Cason v. Seckinger

Indiana Cox & Carr v. O’Bannon Wellman et al. v. Faulkner et al. Taifa v. O’Bannon

Michigan Hadix v. Johnson

Minnesota Hines v. Anderson

Exhibit 15. Active and Pending Consent Decrees by Special Management Population and State, 2002

Exhibit 15 continues on next page.

Only 22 states re-

ported the number

of inmates they had

identified as gang or

STG members, which

ranged from as much

as 20–40 percent of the

prison population in

some states to less than

5 percent in others.

Most of the responding states screen their prisoners for STG membership. This screening is typically performed by classification or diagnostic staff, but several states, such as Arizona, California, Indiana, and Texas, employ officers or investi- gators specifically for this purpose. Although assessors typically use a gang validation checklist, they still rely on gang tattoos, interviews, and criminal history to make final determinations.

Only 22 states that responded to the STG survey question reported the number of inmates they had identified as gang or STG members. As exhibit 17 shows, gang/STG affiliation varied widely in these 22 prison systems, from as much as 20–40 percent of the prison population in some states to less than 5 percent in others. Some of this variation may be the result of differences in classification meth- ods or definitions of gang/STG membership used by the responding states.

Chapter 4

Medical, continued New Jersey

Rouse v. Plantier Row v. Fauver

New York Milburn v. Coughlin Todaro v. Coughlin Clarkson v. Coughlin

Oklahoma Battles v. Saffle

Washington Hallet v. Payne

Other Arizona

Does v. Stewart (protective segregation) Harris v. Caldwell (conditions of

confinement) Gluth v. Kangus (legal access) Hook v. State (inmate mail)

California Armstrong v. Davis (Security Housing

Unit) Coleman v. Davis (Security Housing

Unit) Madrid v. Wilson (Security Housing

Unit)

Idaho McKinney v. State (capital punishment)

New Jersey Lugo v. Middlesex (hearing impaired)

New York Pease v. Coughlin (conditions of

protective custody) Dumont v. Coughlin (media review

process) Hughes v. Goord (Native American

religious practices) Hamilton v. Goord (cross-gender

patdowns) Griffin v. Goord (conditions of

protective custody) Forts v. Ward (male correctional offi-

cers at a female facility)

Ohio Austin v. Wilkinson et al.

Washington Duffy v. Riveland (hearing impaired

services)

Humanists v. Department of Corrections/Lehman (inmate mail, legal access)

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Exhibit 15 continued

Findings of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates

Exhibit 16. Screening for Various Factors at Initial Assessment

Male Inmates Female Inmates

Number of Number of Factor States

States That Screen States

States That Screen

Assessed Responding Number Percent Responding Number Percent

Security threat group membership 42 37 88 40 34 85

Escape risk 42 40 95 41 39 95

Witness protection 42 36 86 41 34 83

Sexual assault protection 42 35 83 41 34 83

Potential violence in prison 42 34 81 41 33 81

Enemies 42 37 88 41 36 88

Predatory sexual behavior 42 35 83 41 34 83

Suicide risk 40 40 100 39 39 100

Mood disorders 40 40 100 40 40 100

Psychotic disorders 40 40 100 39 39 100

Personality disorder 38 32 84 37 31 84

Mental retardation 38 36 95 37 35 95

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Chapter 4

Exhibit 17. Inmate Population Classified as Gang or Security Threat Group Members

Number of Inmates

Total Gang/STG Percentage of Total State Population Members Prison Population

Arizona 27,165 3,792 14

California 157,142 1,300 1

Connecticut 18,348 485 3

Florida 72,509 2,457 3

Kansas 8,574 565 7

Kentucky 15,805 387 3

Maryland 23,717 1,223 5

Massachusetts 10,197 1,951 19

Michigan 47,357 50 1

Minnesota 6,626 1,953 30

New Jersey 22,657 5,700 25

New Mexico 5,781 2,100 36

North Dakota 1,131 82 7

Oregon 11,023 1,100 10

Pennsylvania 37,995 1,300 3

Rhode Island 3,295 390 12

South Carolina 21,684 774 4

South Dakota 2,864 277 10

Texas 143,302 6,175 4

Washington 14,871 1,647 11

West Virginia 992* 25 3

Wisconsin 21,106 9,045 43

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

STG = security threat group. *Male inmates only. West Virginia did not report data on female inmates.

No state reported

model programs or

policies directed at

high-risk prisoners

housed in the general

population whose

actions had not yet

led to their removal

to a special manage-

ment population.

Identification and Review of Model Programs

Identifying best practices for classifying and managing high-risk and special man- agement prison populations was a major objective of this NIC project. Therefore, the final section of the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates asked the states to provide information on two types of model or innovative programs:

� Intervention programs designed to better identify, manage, and treat inmates who have been removed from the general population.

� Programs developed to reduce or avoid the need to remove high-risk inmates from the general population.

Only a small number of states responded, and most of the programs they described targeted inmates who had already been placed in administrative segregation. No state reported programs or policies directed at high-risk prisoners housed in the gen- eral population whose actions had not yet led to their removal to a special manage- ment population. None of the programs described had been formally evaluated to determine its effectiveness in reducing violence either among these prisoners or within the prison system at large.

A few states reported what they believe are model programs for addressing the gang/STG problem:

� Connecticut’s Gang Awareness Program is a mandatory 8-week program for inmates affiliated with a gang or other dangerous group. It is designed to help high-risk inmates reevaluate their current situations, the choices they have made, and the life they were leading prior to incarceration. Completion of the program is required before the inmate is released from the Close Monitoring Unit. A similar program for female STG members focuses on addictive behav- iors, unhealthy involvements, and decisionmaking skills while teaching the women the elements of a positive lifestyle.8

� California’s Sensitive Needs Yard (SNY) Program separates general population inmates from predatory or gang-affiliated inmates. The program allows nonvio- lent inmates who would otherwise be segregated in protective custody units the same opportunities available to the general population but without the threat of violence. Inmates are carefully selected for participation in SNY, and those with

fiveC h a p t e r

predatory, violent, disruptive, or unresolved gang behavior are generally exclud- ed. Approximately 5 percent of the male general population were participating in SNY at the time of the survey.

� Pennsylvania’s Long-Term Segregation Unit (LTSU) isolates combative, dis- ruptive, and violent inmates who have continually posed a threat to security and shown an unwillingness to comply with the rules governing the general popula- tion. Although privileges are limited in the LTSU, the unit provides inmates with in-cell classes on drug and alcohol abuse, stress management, and aca- demic subjects. Inmates are also permitted daily visits with the chaplain, twice- weekly visits with a correctional counselor, and psychological services as requested. The LTSU houses only a small portion of the prison population and is implemented only for male prisoners.

The project team also sought recommendations of potential model programs from the project Advisory Board, the Managing Disruptive Inmates Committee of the Association of State Correctional Administrators, and NIC staff. This information, combined with the experiences and observations of the project team—including informal contacts with prison administrators who have implemented new approaches— resulted in the identification of the model programs summarized in exhibit 18.

The project team made site visits to facilities of three jurisdictions that demonstrat- ed well-structured, highly effective or promising programs: Connecticut and Ohio, which have programs that focus on the disruptive prisoner who has been removed from the general population, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which operates an innovative program for female prisoners who have been traumatized by physical and sexual abuse prior to being incarcerated. These programs are described in the sec- tions that follow.

Chapter 5

State and Program Description

Alaska Youth Offender Program Targets high-risk offenders ages 15–20 who are involved in street and

gang cultures. Provides classes in cognitive skills, academic subjects, substance abuse, vocational skills, mental health, and anger management.

California

Sensitive Needs Yard Provides general population (GP) inmates who have concerns about Program safety or enemies an environment free of predatory or gang-affiliated

inmates. Allows nonviolent inmates who would otherwise require segre- gated placement full access to programs in a GP setting.

Violence Control Program Will provide an alternative to segregated housing for disruptive inmates and include self-help, educational, gang, and drug awareness programs. Designed to provide progressive steps based on inmates’ participation in programs and positive performance.

Exhibit 18. Potential Model Programs for Managing Disruptive and High-Risk Prisoners

Identification and Review of Model Programs

State and Program Description

Colorado Progressive Reintegration Targets inmates placed in administrative segregation and provides cog- and Orientation Unit nitive programs; academics; vocational, recreational, and work assign-

ments; and mental health services.

Connecticut Close Custody Gang Programs for gang management, chronic disciplinary problems, and Management Program, administrative segregation operate at multiple facilities throughout the Close Custody Chronic state, including the Hartford area. Programs target up to 500 male and Disciplinary Program, and 25 female inmates. Administrative Segregation Transition Phase Program

Florida Enhanced Close Targets closed management (CM) inmates housed in administrative seg- Management Program regation. Inmates are eligible for specific levels of programming based on

management level (CM1 = most restrictive; CM3 = least restrictive).

Indiana Residential Treatment Unit Serves 40 male inmates with mental health issues. Inpatient residential

treatment program provides individualized treatment plans, transitioning programming, and rehabilitation therapy. Program uses a needs assess- ment process and a mental health diagnostic screening interview.

Iowa Reintegration Program Targets inmates housed in administrative segregation for an extended

period of time. Provides classes in anger management, criminality, think- ing for success, substance abuse treatment, and recreation. Program is voluntary, with selection based on staff review and recommendations.

New Jersey Security Threat Group Provides psychological treatment, educational programming, and behavior Management Unit modification. Serves inmates identified as STG members. (No indication

of whether this is a GP or administrative segregation program.)

New Mexico Cognitive Re-Structuring Serves inmates in a variety of custody levels, including administrative Program segregation, protective custody, STG, high-risk GP, and disciplinary

segregation.

Oklahoma Mental Health Services Evaluates and classifies mental health of all inmates according to a five- Needs Classification level system ranging from MH–A (GP housing with outpatient treatment)

to MH–D (24-hour monitoring in a ward for inmates with acute mental health problems).

Oregon Close Custody Unit Serves inmates making transition from the maximum custody intensive

management unit (total lockdown) to an open GP unit.

Exhibit 18 continued

Exhibit 18 continues on next page.

Chapter 5

State and Program Description

Pennsylvania

Long-Term Segregation Unit Houses extremely disruptive, violent, and problematic inmates. Provides extremely high levels of security and sharply reduces level of privileges.

Special Management Unit Securely houses inmates who are continually disruptive, violent, or dan- gerous or who pose a threat to the orderly operation of the facility. In- mates assigned to this unit have been repeatedly subject to disciplinary action or investigation.

South Carolina

Stairway Treatment Program Provides housing and programming for HIV/AIDS inmates, who are screened and identified at the reception center. Inmates are housed in a segregated unit but interact with GP inmates when participating in pro- grams and other support functions.

Statewide Protective Custody Special management unit housing approved protective custody inmates, Housing Unit who are monitored by institutional and central office staff while in the

unit. Protective custody placement is validated through a series of inter- views and a formal investigation and is reviewed and approved by the Institutional Classification Committee.

Washington

Assisted Living Facility Provides assisted living for inmates whose medical condition requires such assistance.

Special Offender Unit Houses inmates who have a mental illness or are in acute distress (suici- dal). Seeks to stabilize inmates with mental illness and return them to GP through a diagnostic, treatment, and reintegration program.

Youthful Offender Program Houses juvenile offenders who have been sentenced as adults.

Twin Rivers Sex Offender Treats sex offenders who have been screened with multiple approved Treatment Program actuarial risk instruments.

West Virginia Stepdown Serves inmates who have been housed in the control unit for 6 months

or more and are making the transition back into GP. Inmates progress through a series of gradual stepdowns in the areas of supervision, secu- rity precautions, and privileges.

Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

Note: GP, general population; STG, security threat group.

Exhibit 18 continued

The Close Custody

Phase Program is

based on the belief

that gangs and their

associated problems

could be managed

and controlled

through a high level

of structure, regimen-

tation, and focused

programming.

Connecticut Department of Correction

Most jurisdictions manage and house all high-risk inmates through a single admin- istrative segregation structure, irrespective of differences in the nature of the risk they represent to the institution’s safety or in their security and programming needs. The Connecticut Department of Correction (CDC) has taken another approach and developed a model called the Close Custody Phase Program that it has adapted to the specific needs of different groups of high-risk inmates.

The development of the Close Custody Phase Program was a response to severe management problems and increased violence caused primarily by the infiltration and swift expansion of gangs in the CDC system in 1993. After identifying the gang leaders and removing them from the general population, the CDC created a new quasi-segregation status called close custody to manage this population at the Gar- ner Correctional Institution in 1994. Inmates sent to close custody were to be held there for as long as they remained affiliated with an STG.

At the direction of the CDC commissioner, an internal task force came together at Garner to consider how STG members in close custody might make the transition back into the general population. This task force, which included staff from the cus- tody, counseling, mental health, and educational departments, developed the struc- ture and programming for the Close Custody Phase Program. The program’s objective was to lead STG members to renounce their gang affiliation, based on the belief that gangs and their associated problems could be managed and controlled through a high level of structure, regimentation, and focused programming.

CDC has used the Close Custody Phase Program model in other programs designed to safely manage high-risk and difficult-to-manage inmates, such as those who repeatedly commit disciplinary infractions and those who require administrative segregation. The department’s three Close Custody Phase Programs for high-risk inmates are the Close Custody Gang Management Program (the original Close Cus- tody Phase Program), the Close Custody Chronic Disciplinary Program, and the Administrative Segregation Transition Phase Program. The structure and program requirements of each unit are based on examination of outcome data and consider- ation of each group’s needs and characteristics and are intended to facilitate the inmates’ return to the general population, if appropriate. The process includes regu- lar and frequent reviews by the classification staff and structured movement of the inmate through the levels, or phases, of the program until release.

To learn more about these programs and their outcomes, the project team visited the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution and the Northern Correctional Institu- tion. These site visits included presentations on the purpose and objectives of the program by department staff, a tour of the restricted housing units, and interviews with administrative and line staff. The project team’s observations are summarized in the following sections.

Identification and Review of Model Programs

Inmates who progress

to phase II are

grouped in squads

composed of differ-

ent STGs. They com-

plete all activities

together within the

squad, including

meals, recreation,

and programs.

Close Custody Gang Management Program

The gang management program was developed by an internal task force at the Gar- ner Correctional Institution in 1994 and has been expanded and replicated at multi- ple locations within the CDC, including the Northern Correctional Institution, where the project team observed it. CDC administrative directive 9.4 describes the program as a level 4 restrictive housing status that segregates inmates designated as STG members whose behavior poses a threat to the security and orderly operation of the facility or a risk to the safety of staff or other inmates.

The program is divided into phases, with each phase having specified security and program privileges and restrictions. Phase I, the entry level status, is the most restrictive. Inmates are housed with members of the same gang or nonrival gangs and are on lockdown 23 hours per day. In addition to 1 hour of out-of-cell activity per day, they are permitted three showers, three monitored phone calls, and two non- contact visits per week. In general, the operation of phase I parallels that of most administrative segregation units.

The strict security, supervision, and management of phase I allow staff to observe and evaluate the inmate for possible movement to phase II. Inmates in phase I are reviewed continuously and monitored for compliance with the program’s rules and regulations. To move to phase II, an inmate must complete a minimum of 120 days in phase I. He must also sign a “Letter of Intent” stating his desire to renounce his gang membership and an “acknowledgment of expectations” stating that he accepts and understands the rules, regulations, and expectations of the Close Custody Gang Management Program.

Inmates who progress to phase II are grouped in squads composed of different STGs. They complete all activities together within the squad, including meals, recreation, and programs. The squad concept is intended to enhance trust among the members of different gangs and also requires them to work together and cooperate in completing assigned tasks.

Inmates must remain in phase II for a minimum of 60 days and are expected to com- plete all required programs before they will be considered for promotion to phase III. Programs required during this phase include gang awareness, anger manage- ment, conflict resolution, and programs designed to structure and encourage living in a nonviolent manner.

Phase III is a transitional phase in which inmates are given work and program assignments both inside and outside the restricted housing unit. The programming emphasis continues and includes expanded cognitive restructuring programs, edu- cation, social skills training, and conflict resolution. Inmates who complete all the required programs and maintain an acceptable level of behavior are considered for review and reclassification to level 4 general population status.

Chapter 5

The Close Custody

Chronic Disciplinary

Program operates on

the assumption that

inmates who repeat-

edly violate institu-

tional rules need a

structured environ-

ment and structured

programming to alter

their behavior so that

they can return to the

general population.

During any phase of the program, an inmate who fails to participate in the required programming or violates the rules and regulations of the unit may be returned to phase I or reclassified to administrative segregation. Inmates who complete the pro- gram and are returned to the general population are monitored for possible re- involvement in gangs.

Close Custody Chronic Disciplinary Program

This restricted status housing program is designed to reduce the threat to the safety and security of the institution posed by inmates who commit serious and/or frequent disciplinary violations. Assignment to the unit is based on the seriousness and repet- itiveness of the disruptive behavior and is reviewed and approved by the director of offender classification. Most of the inmates placed in the program have completed punitive segregation sanctions and otherwise could be sent either to administrative segregation or returned to the general population. Inmates may also be placed in the first level of the program as a punitive segregation sanction.

The Close Custody Chronic Disciplinary Program operates on the assumption that inmates who repeatedly violate institutional rules need a structured environment and structured programming to alter their behavior so that they can return to the gener- al population. The program consists of two intervals, and each inmate is initially assigned to interval I. After meeting all established requirements, completing all required programming, and maintaining an acceptable level of behavior, the inmate is reviewed by the Unit Classification Review Committee for possible advancement to interval II. On completion of interval II, the inmate can be approved for return to the general population by the director of offender classification. The program poli- cy manual indicates that those who fail to complete the program within 6 months will be removed from the unit and recommended for administrative segregation.

Interval I. This stage of the program is designed to isolate and confine the inmate who has committed multiple and repetitive disciplinary violations within the insti- tutional setting. Inmates assigned to the chronic disciplinary program are initially moved in full restraints and are escorted by staff at all times when outside of the cell. After 1 week in the unit, the level of restraints can be modified, and removing all restraints becomes an option after an additional week. Inmates must complete a minimum of 30 days in interval I before they can be considered for promotion to interval II.

The privileges and programming in interval I are similar to those found in a typical administrative segregation setting. All inmates receive their meals in their cells. Out- of-cell time for recreational privileges is restricted to 1 hour per day, 5 days per week, and only two 30-minute noncontact visits per week are allowed. Phone calls are also limited, as is access to personal property. Work assignments are not per- mitted, and inmates have no access to televisions or radios.

Identification and Review of Model Programs

The Connecticut

Department of

Correction’s adminis-

trative segregation

program is unique in

that it incorporates

restricted housing

phases intended to

facilitate the inmate’s

return to the general

population.

Interval II. Fewer security restrictions are imposed on inmates promoted to inter- val II. For example, no restraints are used and inmates move in groups as large as 48 within the unit. They may be given work assignments within the unit and are paid in accordance with the established pay plan.

In interval II, inmates are required to participate in the curriculum developed for the unit, which includes orientation and communication, anger management, relapse prevention, problem solving/resolution, and transition planning. The curriculum is designed to address the causes of chronic disciplinary problems and to prepare the inmate for successful transition back to the general population.

Administrative Segregation Transition Phase Program

Administrative segregation is designed for inmates who can no longer be managed safely in the general population because their behavior or management factors pose a threat to the security of the institution or to the safety of staff or other inmates. Vir- tually every correctional system has some form of administrative segregation. The CDC’s administrative segregation program is unique in that it incorporates restrict- ed housing phases intended to facilitate the inmate’s return to the general population.

The CDC developed its two-level administrative segregation structure in response to a review of outcome data showing security deficiencies and programmatic short- comings in the existing strategy. Administrative directive 9.4 sets forth the policy and procedures that govern each level. The first level is a traditional administrative segregation status similar to that found in most jurisdictions. The second level is the department’s innovative Administrative Segregation Transition Phase Program, a specialized housing status program designed to prepare an inmate for placement back in the general population.

The structure of the Administrative Segregation Transition Phase Program is simi- lar to that of the Close Custody Gang Management Program. The transition program has three distinct phases designed to prepare the inmate for return to the general population and ensure that the transition does not jeopardize the safety and securi- ty of the institution. The program operates on the assumption that inmates who pose a risk to the public, staff, or other inmates must be housed in a highly secure and structured environment. The CDC believes that while inmates are housed in such a restrictive environment, they should receive training in the coping skills necessary to function successfully and safely in the general population. A major objective of the program is to reduce the return rate of those leaving administrative segregation. The operational procedures and programs of each phase are designed to achieve these objectives.

Phase I. The operating procedures associated with phase I are similar to those found in the typical administrative segregation unit. The objective of this phase is to inca- pacitate through controlled movement and intensive staff supervision. The security standards of phase I include use of restraints; controlled and escorted movement; limitations on showers, recreation, and visits; and limitations on property. All meals

Chapter 5

CDC data show

that violence has

decreased significantly

in both general popu-

lation and high-risk

units in department

facilities since it

began implementing

programs targeted to

specific groups of

high-risk inmates.

are served in the cell. Programs, including religious and counseling services, are offered through in-cell programming only. Promotion to phase II is considered only after a lengthy period of being discipline free and acknowledging and accepting the requirements that accompany phase II. The normal minimum period of time an inmate must remain in phase I is 6 months.

Throughout phase I and subsequent phases, the classification staff closely monitor the inmate’s behavior and progress. A classification review is conducted every 7 days for the first 2 months and every 30 days thereafter.

Phase II. The operating standards, privileges, and access to programs in phase II are designed to maintain the safety and security of the institution while initiating the process of transition from administrative segregation back to the general population. After 30 days in phase II, restraints are no longer required for routine movement out of the cell, movement within groups is increased, and group participation in pro- grams, recreation, and other out-of-cell activities is initiated. The program require- ments for phase II include anger management and communication skills. Inmates remain in phase II a minimum of 90 days. To be considered for promotion to phase III, an inmate must participate in and complete all program requirements while maintaining an acceptable disciplinary record.

Phase III. In the final phase of the program, the unit’s environment and security standards are further normalized to prepare the inmate for return to the general pop- ulation. Group activities are broadened to include a wider range of programs and more group movement. Inmates in phase III benefit from meals served in a group setting in the dayroom, expanded passive recreational programs, and increased gen- eral privileges.

The phase III curriculum includes relapse prevention, problem identification and resolution, and improvement of interactive skills. The final transition program is the Bridge Group, which is designed to ensure that inmates can communicate with oth- ers effectively and appropriately, deal with frustration, and see and understand oth- ers’ perspectives. The Bridge Group stresses staff involvement, including staff who may have been assaulted by the inmate in the past.

Inmates who complete all activities and programs required during phase III are reviewed by the unit classification committee, the facility classification committee, the warden, and the deputy commissioner of programs and treatment, who is the final approving authority.

Program Effectiveness

The CDC’s unique approach to managing its high-risk population has increased staff and inmate safety. CDC data show that violence has decreased significantly in both general population and high-risk units in department facilities since it began implementing programs targeted to specific groups of high-risk inmates. Serious assaults have decreased from 233 in 1993, the year before the Close Custody Gang

Identification and Review of Model Programs

All high maximum-

custody inmates are

housed at the Ohio

State Penitentiary,

which is regarded

as the department’s

most secure facility,

designed to hold

the most dangerous

inmates.

Management Program was launched, to 129 in 2001. Since 1994, 550 inmates have completed one of the CDC’s three programs for high-risk inmates and reentered the general prison population. As of May 31, 2002, the annual return rate to adminis- trative segregation was only 2.6 percent.

The CDC’s approach is being replicated to some degree in other systems. The proj- ect team reviewed units within the Colorado Department of Corrections and New Mexico Department of Corrections that were similar, although not identical, in their structure and programmatic objectives to CDC programs.

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

In response to a major prison riot that occurred in the 1990s and the ensuing litiga- tion, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) decided to con- struct and operate a super maximum-security facility to house its most difficult to manage prisoners. After this facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), opened in the late 1990s, a lawsuit was filed contesting various aspects of its operations, with particular focus on how prisoners are selected for admission and how they are able to gain release. These issues, along with the conditions of confinement, are common issues raised in litigation against high-security facilities like the OSP. This section describes the OSP and its operations as of 2001.9

The DRC has a total population of approximately 45,000 inmates assigned to 34 facilities. As in some other large-population states, Ohio’s prison population has been declining over the past few years and is not projected to grow in the near future. The state has a well-structured, well-validated inmate classification system that assigns inmates to five basic security levels: minimum, medium, close, maxi- mum, and high maximum. Approximately 33 percent of the inmates are in minimum custody, 40 percent in medium custody, 21 percent in close custody, 5 percent in maximum custody, and less than 1 percent in high maximum custody. Inmates in each security level may be assigned to a special management or segregation desig- nation, and about 6 percent of the entire inmate population is so designated. Com- pared with other states, this is a relatively low percentage, the national average being approximately 8–10 percent.

Approximately 2,200 inmates have been temporarily placed in a restricted unit due to disciplinary actions taken by the local facility. These include designations of administrative, security, disciplinary, and local control. Inmates sent to a security, disciplinary, or local control unit are returned to the general population within a rel- atively short period of time. Those whom the DRC believes should be removed and segregated on an indefinite basis are assigned to protective custody, administrative control, or high maximum custody. Only 182 inmates are in protective custody, 280 in administrative control, and 365 in high maximum. All high maximum-custody inmates are housed at the OSP, which is regarded as the department’s most secure facility, designed to hold the most dangerous inmates.

Chapter 5

Estimates based on

admission and release

data and daily popu-

lation figures put the

average length of stay

in the OSP at 3.5 to

6 years.

Overview of the Ohio State Penitentiary

The OSP was opened in 1998 to house high-security inmates who the DRC deter- mined could not be housed or managed within the general population. It has a bed capacity of 504 single cells. These beds are distributed in 4 separate housing units, each of which has 8 pods with 15–16 cells per pod. As of 2001, the population at the OSP had declined to the extent that one housing unit had been closed temporar- ily. Estimates based on admission and release data and daily population figures put the average length of stay in the OSP at 3.5 to 6 years (exhibit 19). If the number of admissions and the daily population remain constant, the average length of stay will be 6 years. Conversely, based on the larger number of releases, the average length of stay will be 3.5 years. OSP officials indicate that the expected length of stay is closer to 2–3 years, so inmates may move through the OSP more quickly than these numbers suggest. If this is true, then admissions will have to increase for the popu- lation to remain at its current level.

Assignment to the OSP. The process of assigning an inmate to the OSP has sever- al steps. First, staff at the inmate’s facility refer the inmate’s case for consideration to a three-person committee within the facility. This committee makes a recom- mendation to the warden or the warden’s designee, who has the option of rejecting the recommendation or forwarding it to the Bureau of Classification (BOC). If the warden forwards the recommendation and the BOC agrees, the inmate is transferred to the OSP. If the BOC disagrees, the warden can appeal the BOC’s decision to the regional DRC director, who can concur with or override the BOC’s decision.

At the time of this report, the DRC had drafted a new classification policy that would improve the current classification process for high maximum-security inmates. The new policy would establish a five-level classification system for all DRC inmates. Levels 1, 2, and 3 would mirror the general population levels of min- imum, medium, and close. Maximum and high maximum would be replaced by lev- els 4 and 5, each of which would have two privilege levels, A and B. Inmates would be assigned to level 4A, 4B, 5A, or 5B. The new policy would not allow the warden to appeal the BOC’s decision to the regional director. The policy also would allow

Identification and Review of Model Programs

Inmate population as of September 2001 365

Change in population July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001

Inmates admitted 61

Inmates released 103

Average length of stay (years)

Based on admissions 6.0

Based on releases 3.5

Source: Ohio State Penitentiary, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, September 26, 2001.

Exhibit 19. Average Length of Stay at the Ohio State Penitentiary

A treatment plan

established for each

inmate outlines the

types of programs the

inmate is expected to

participate in and the

areas of conduct in

which the inmate is

expected to improve.

inmates to be considered for level 4 or 5 placement either at reception or at any other DRC facility.

Each inmate’s file contains narrative data and forms completed by DRC staff that justify the designation of high maximum security. These reasons can be grouped into the following categories:

� Assault of a staff member. � Assault of another inmate. � Possession of or conspiracy to smuggle drugs. � Attempted escape from a secure facility. � Designation as an STG leader. Levels of confinement. The OSP has four levels of confinement with differing degrees of privileges. On arrival at the OSP, inmates undergo orientation and are placed in level 2 status, where they remain for 12 months or until their behavior war- rants a change in privilege status. Inmates who engage in serious misconduct can be assigned to level 1 status; otherwise, inmates can move from level 2 to level 3 with- in a year. They are likely to remain in level 3 another year before being transferred to the least restrictive status, level 4. Inmates assigned to level 4 have been approved for release from the OSP by the DRC and are awaiting transfer out of the OSP. Although staff report that inmates can be released from the OSP within a year, this policy suggests a minimum stay of 2–3 years for inmates who are recommended for release. However, as suggested above, a growing number of inmates will spend a considerably longer period at the OSP.

A treatment plan established for each inmate outlines the types of programs the inmate is expected to participate in and the areas of conduct in which the inmate is expected to improve. This treatment plan is reviewed and updated as part of the inmate’s reassessment at 6-month intervals. Movement from one privilege level to another appears to be under the control of the unit management team, which con- sists of a unit manager, case manager, and mental health and security staff.10 Other than being demoted directly to level 1 at any time for a serious misconduct, inmates are not permitted to jump two levels at a time.

A change in privilege level does not necessarily mean an inmate will be moved to another pod or block. Each pod and block at the OSP has the capacity to provide meals and recreation, and all inmates are housed in secure cells. Therefore, inmates can remain in place as their status changes. However, all level 4 inmates who are scheduled to be released from the OSP are housed in the same unit until the trans- fers are completed.

Chapter 5

Exhibit 20 shows the distribution of the OSP population by level and housing unit. Nearly 60 percent of OSP inmates were in level 3 and another 4 percent were in level 4 status. Conversely, only 13 inmates—3 percent—were in level 1, the most restricted status, suggesting that most of the OSP population was conforming to the facility’s rules and regulations.

Release from the OSP. Inmates are reviewed annually to assess their classification level and determine whether they can be released from the OSP. The process is relatively similar to the admission process. The three-person OSP classification com- mittee initiates the review and forwards its recommendation to the warden. The war- den’s recommendation is then forwarded to the BOC for its review and decision. Finally, the regional director conducts an assessment and makes a final determination.

Part of the review process entails completion of the DRC’s security scoring instru- ment, which was designed to be used for inmates who are in the general population, not for those assigned to high maximum custody. OSP inmates’ scores on this instrument can show dramatic fluctuations because serious misconducts are no longer counted after 12 months, which might result in a recommendation to decrease an inmate’s security level. The instrument also deducts points if the inmate has not been removed from a job assignment; however, there are no jobs at the OSP, except for a few porter positions for level 4 inmates.

Exhibit 21 summarizes the results of this multistage decision process. Of 369 inmates reviewed for release during a 12-month period, 71 were approved for release by the regional director. At each decision point in the review process, the number of inmates being recommended for release declined. Whereas the OSP clas- sification committee recommended 157 (43 percent) of the inmates under review for

Identification and Review of Model Programs

Number of Inmates in Each Total Inmates Housing Unit

Classification Level Number Percent A B C D

Assessment 4 1 0 3 0 1

Orientation 5 1 5 0 0 0

Level 1 13 3 3 3 2 5

Level 2 116 31 25 45 1 45

Level 3 223 59 67 82 2 72

Level 4 16 4 16 0 0 0

Total 377 100 116 133 5 123

Source: Ohio State Penitentiary, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, September 2001.

Exhibit 20. Ohio State Penitentiary Population, by Classification Level and Housing Unit, September 2001

The rate of serious

misconduct among

OSP inmates is

impressively low. A

review of randomly

selected cases found

that most inmates

had few, if any, disci-

plinary reports since

arriving at the OSP.

release, the warden reduced that number by nearly half. There was little change at the BOC level, but the regional director’s final decision reduced the approval rate to 19 percent.

Effectiveness of the Ohio State Penitentiary System

The DRC’s classification process limits the potential for inmates to be inappropri- ately classified as “high maximum” security and admitted to the OSP. The number of inmates designated as “high maximum security” is relatively small and appears to be declining. Review of a sample of cases found that the inmates’ misconduct at other facilities warranted their separation from the general population and place- ment in a special management or segregated setting.

The rate of serious misconduct among OSP inmates is impressively low, undoubt- edly because of the security precautions in effect at the facility. As shown in exhib- it 20, the majority of OSP inmates were in levels 2 and 3—those with the fewest restrictions—and only 3 percent were in level 1, the most restricted status, suggest- ing that most of the OSP population was conforming to the facility’s rules and reg- ulations. Other data support this conclusion:

� A review of randomly selected cases found that most inmates had few, if any, disciplinary reports since arriving at the OSP, and many of these were for non- violent behavior.

� OSP inmates had a lower rate of Class II violations (these are the more serious offenses an inmate can be reported and disciplined for) than inmates at the near- by OSP Corrections Camp (OSPCC). OSPCC is a facility for low-custody general population inmates, many of whom work at the OSP in trusty type posi- tions. Additionally, as shown in exhibit 22, the OSP rate of Class II reports resulting in a referral to the rules infraction board was only slightly higher than the OSPCC rate.

The absence of behaviors such as banging on cell doors, destroying cell property, flooding cells, or threatening staff is noticeable at the OSP, which suggests that placement in that facility stabilizes or suppresses the inmates’ institutional conduct.

Chapter 5

Inmates Recommended for Release

Number Review Stage (N = 369) Percent

Classification committee 157 43

Warden 88 24

Bureau of Classification 90 24

Regional director 71 19

Source: Ohio State Penitentiary, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, September 2001.

Exhibit 21. Ohio State Penitentiary Release Recommendations

A recent study by the

Federal Bureau of

Prisons found that 60

percent of its women

prisoners have been

the victim of either

sexual or physical

abuse, almost exclu-

sively committed

by men.

At the same time, OSP houses inmates who, by virtue of the severity of the offens- es they committed while incarcerated at another facility (e.g., assaulting a correc- tions officer, attempting to murder another inmate, participating in a riot, or leading an STG), will be held longer in high maximum custody, regardless of improvements in their behavior. The DRC is working on a separate management strategy for a fifth level of confinement at the OSP—inmates who pose no management problems but cannot be transferred to another facility for many years due to the severity of their past misconduct.

Federal Bureau of Prisons

A recent study by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) found that 60 percent of its women prisoners have been the victim of either sexual or physical abuse, almost exclusively committed by men. A significant portion of the abuse was inflicted dur- ing the women’s childhood, often by family or extended family members. These findings are similar to statistics reported by state correctional systems. Often, the abuse predates the prisoner’s involvement in criminal activities. In other situations, the abuse is linked to criminal behavior.

BOP’s New Pathways program has been in existence since 2001 and is still consid- ered a pilot effort. This program is included in this report because the incidence of lengthy histories of physical and sexual abuse among women prisoners is so pro- nounced and the response to the problem has been so weak.

New Pathways is offered at the Dublin Correctional Facility (DCF) in Dublin, Cal- ifornia. DCF is the major women’s facility for the BOP’s western region, with approximately 1,000 prisoners. Attached to the complex are a male detention facil- ity and a minimum-security camp for women. Most of the women incarcerated in DCF have been convicted of drug-related offenses.

Identification and Review of Model Programs

Class II Reports Referred Class II Reports to Rules Infraction Board

Rate per 100 Rate per 100 Facility Number Inmates Number Inmates

Ohio State Penitentiary (N = 375)* 967 258 247 66

Ohio State Penitentiary Corrections Camp (N = 160)* 544 340 88 55

Source: Ohio State Penitentiary, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, September 2001. *N = average inmate population.

Exhibit 22. Ohio State Penitentiary Class II Disciplinary Incidents, May 2000 to August 2001

In the treatment of trauma associated with sexual and physical abuse, professional mental health experts argue that there are two major stages of treatment. The first phase is designed to initiate discussions about sexual and physical abuse without going into specific details about the abuse experienced by the victim. The objective is to begin discussing the forms abuse may take and the effect it can have on men- tal health status. Sometime thereafter, it may be possible and desirable to initiate a second phase of treatment where the therapist and client address specific instances of abuse. Since this level of treatment can often be painful and discomforting for the client, it must be done in confidential, one-to-one sessions that may be needed for several years.

The New Pathways program addresses the first phase of treatment. Groups of 10 or fewer women meet under the guidance of a psychologist to discuss the general topic of sexual and physical abuse. The program provides opportunities for individual fol- lowup sessions with the supervising psychologist if issues raised in the group bring up painful or disturbing reactions.

New Pathways is not intended to be a vehicle for the treatment of mental health problems associated with the trauma of prior sexual and physical abuse. The feasi- bility of delivering such treatment in a prison environment is questionable, given that professional mental health services for one-to-one treatment are rarely avail- able. However, the program may be helpful in preparing a woman to enter more intensive treatment on release from prison.

Chapter 5

Research to develop

better classification

tools and a more

proactive approach to

managing high-risk

and special manage-

ment prisoners will

be hampered until

the states adopt a

common terminology

for classifying the

prison population.

Issues and Recommendations

In the United States, the prevailing approach to managing high-risk and special management prison populations has been to build larger, more secure, and heavily staffed administrative segregation and super maximum-security housing units. Pris- oners are typically placed in these units only after their destructive behavior has made it obvious that they should be removed from the general population. Much less consideration has been given to preventing violent incidents from occurring in the first place through the use of classification tools, aggressive management tech- niques, and programming and treatment services designed to modify prisoners’ behavior. Of the states that responded to the National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, only a small number answered the question about model pro- grams, and most of the programs they described targeted inmates who had already been placed in administrative segregation. Neither the survey nor the other efforts of the project team identified any programs or policies directed at high-risk prison- ers housed in the general population whose actions had not yet led to their removal to a special management population.

Research is needed to develop better classification tools and a more proactive approach to managing high-risk and special management prisoners. Such research will be hampered, however, until the states adopt a common terminology for classi- fying prison populations. The National Survey revealed the lack of consensus among the states regarding even the most basic classification terms such as “gener- al population,” “protective custody,” and “administrative” versus “disciplinary” seg- regation. To facilitate meaningful cross-jurisdictional comparisons of the types of prisoners held in state correctional systems and the effectiveness of methods for managing prison populations, states should agree, at a minimum, on a common def- inition of each of the following categories and to the use of these categories to des- ignate all prisoners:

� General population. � Special management:

❖ Administrative segregation.

❖ Disciplinary segregation.

❖ Protective custody.

sixC h a p t e r

Research into pro-

active methods for

preventing prison vio-

lence should examine

the effects of environ-

ment on prisoner

behavior and assess

the often advocated

but still highly con-

troversial super

maximum-security

facilities.

❖ Severe mental health care.

❖ Severe medical care.

The National Survey also revealed that few states had correctional data systems that could quickly and accurately aggregate the numbers and types of prisoners in their custody. States are strongly encouraged to upgrade their correctional data systems so that they can track and monitor the prisoner population daily according to the five basic categories listed above. State correctional data systems should also provide more detailed information about the basis for assigning a prisoner to a category and about the movement of prisoners from one category to another.

Research into proactive methods for preventing prison violence should include an examination of the effects of environment on prisoner behavior. It is well known among corrections professionals that prison architecture influences inmate behavior and also that similarly situated inmate populations can have very different rates of serious misconduct. However, these observations are not supported by research. States and the federal government are strongly advised to initiate studies to deter- mine the impact of architecture and prison management methods on inmate disrup- tive behavior.

Chapter 6

1. See California Department of Corrections, Data Analysis Unit, Inmate Incidents in Institutions: Calendar Year 2002, Sacramento: California Department of Correc- tions, 2003. Available at the California Department of Corrections Web site: http://www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/Annual/BEH1/BEH1d2002. pdf. California is one of the few states that openly report data on prisoners.

2. Personal communication with staff of the New Mexico and California Depart- ments of Corrections.

3. For more discussion of internal management systems, see Internal Prison Classification Systems: Case Studies in Their Development and Implementation (Hardyman et al., 2002).

4. Source: National Survey of the Management of High-Risk Inmates, National Institute of Corrections, 2002.

5. For a more detailed description of the Level of Service Inventory–Revised, see “Reliability and Validity Study of the LSI–R Risk Assessment Instrument” (Austin et al., 2003).

6. For more information about the COMPAS or to contact the Northpointe Institute, visit the company’s Web site at www.northpointeinc.com.

7. The Sex Offender Assessment Board, which is part of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, is also mandated to review all convicted sex offenders about to be sentenced by the courts.

8. See Connecticut Department of Correction, Program Services, Compendium of Programs and Services for Offender Population, available at the department’s Web site: http://www.doc.state.ct.us. Although the Gang Awareness Program is related to the Close Custody Phase Program discussed later in this chapter, it is a separate pro- gram that targets a different group of inmates.

9. Much of the information in this section is drawn from a report prepared by James Austin for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

10. Security staff assigned to each unit are under the supervision of the unit manager.

Notes

Austin, J. 1992. “Impact Evaluation of the PMC Classification System.” San Francisco: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

———. 2001. “Prisoner Reentry: Current Trends, Practices and Issues.” Crime and Delinquency 47(3): 314–334.

Austin, J., and G. Davies. 2001. PBPP Inter-Rater Reliability Analysis of the LSI–R: Preliminary Analysis. Washington, DC: The Institute on Crime, Justice and Correc- tions, The George Washington University.

Austin, J., D. Coleman, J., Peyton, and K.D. Johnson. 2003. “Reliability and Valid- ity Study of the LSI–R Risk Assessment Instrument.” Washington, DC: The Insti- tute on Crime, Justice and Corrections, The George Washington University.

Austin, J., S. Repko, R. Harris, K. McGinnis, and S. Plant. 1998. Evaluation of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Administrative Segregation Population. Washington, DC: National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Report funded by the National Institute of Corrections Cooperative Agreement 98P09G112.

Baird, C.S. 1981. “Probation and Parole Classification: The Wisconsin Model.” Corrections Today 43: 36–41.

Beck, A.J., and B.E. Shipley. 1989. Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2003. “Reentry Trends in the United States: Releases from State Prison.” Retrieved December 4, 2003, from the Web: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ bjs/reentry/releases.htm/.

Ditton, P.M. 1999. Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers. Spe- cial Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Pro- grams, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Ditton, P.M., and D.J. Wilson. 1999. Truth in Sentencing in State Prisons. Special Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Duguid, S. 2000. Can Prisons Work? The Prisoner as Object and Subject in Mod- ern Corrections. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Dunne, F. 2000. “A Framework for Reducing Reoffending: Differentiated Case Management in Victorian Corrections.” Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Department of Justice, Victoria.

References

Girard L., and J.S. Wormith. 2004. “The Predictive Validity of the Level of Service Inventory–Ontario Revision on General and Violent Recidivism Among Various Offender Groups.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 31(2): 150–181.

Gleick, J. 1988. Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Penguin.

Gottfredson, S., and D. Gottfredson. 1993. “The Long-Term Predictive Utility of the Base Expectancy Score.” Howard Journal 32(4): 278.

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Hardyman P.L., J. Austin, J. Alexander, K.D. Johnson, and O.C. Tulloch. 2002. Internal Prison Classification Systems: Case Studies in Their Development and Implementation. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections.

Harrison, P.M., and A.J. Beck. 2002. Prisoners in 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

———. 2003. Prisoners in 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Justice Research and Statistics Association. 2001. The Forum 19(4).

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References

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