Need done by tomorrow Tuesday 12/18 1pm! 5 full pages double spaced!

Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa

The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

and… Conundrum!!!!!

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Philip Roessler asks fundamental questions: • Why are some African countries trapped in vicious

cycles of ethnic violence and others not? • What causes civil wars in some African countries?

(p. i) In relation to the civil war issue, he argues that: • Successful or unsuccessful bargaining over power is

at the center of the equation; • Successful or unsuccessful bargaining over power is

much more important in these equations than issues of poverty, inequality, land conflicts, corruption, etc. (p. xv)

In other words, for Roessler, • Traditionally, analysts have seen civil wars as a

consequence of the need to forge order and peace out of anarchy; • Yet, competition for the control of the central

government has been surprisingly marginal in the analysis of the causes of civil wars in Africa, yet he believes that this is where we must look a little more carefully if we are to understand those causes. (p. xvi).

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Roessler focuses on the anarchic conditions that arose in Africa with the end of colonialism. According to him, the end of colonization triggered: •Fierce competition for the control of the extractive institutions left behind by the Europeans; •This competition often played itself out along ethnic lines (p. xvi)

Hence the following question: How could these ethnic groups, in the absence of absolute authority and strong cross-cutting institutions (and even economic alliances), forge a political covenant (agreement) that would allow them to govern the new countries that they inherited?

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

On the issue of power-sharing and coup d’états, Roessler suggests that: • Most leaders of the new African countries did

understand that they could not avoid sharing power with other ethnic groups. However, this realization came with a conundrum:

• When they decided to share power, they were inevitably but also paradoxically giving rival groups the ability to seize power in a coup. • And, this, in turn automatically created a coup-civil

war trap, which took effect immediately after the withdrawal of colonial powers.

• The Cold War (1946-1991) that was triggered after World War II then worsened this situation by creating permanent conditions of political instability through support to such or such other group, either by the United States and its Western European allies, or by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European and Asian allies (p. xvi)

The civil war conundrum, thus, represents the direct consequence of a strategic choice by rulers with an ethnic base of supporters to use such an ethnic base to coup-proof their regimes from ethnic rivals.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The coup-civil war trap: Most rulers ended up with only two merciless choices, that always ended up in a conundrum: • They could decide to share power: this opens the

door to coups by rival groups; • They could decide not to share power and decide

to exclude other groups: this opens the door to civil wars;

Rationale and calculation of many leaders: what is less costly? • A coup is more likely than civil war; • Ethnic inclusion and power sharing give rival ethnic

groups the ability to conduct coups (They are closer to the inner circles of power through members of government and military leaders to whom some power was given); • Ethnic exclusion deprives rival ethnic groups of the

ability to conduct a coup; • And since civil war is less likely than a coup, it

follows that in the longer run ethnic exclusion is a better choice since it is more likely to ensure preservation of power by only members of the dominant group (either sociologically or militarily when power is owned by a minority group) than ethnic inclusion; (pp. xvi-xvii)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Civil wars, in that case, are thus deemed the least threatening option and, as a consequence, their unlikelihood causes the ruling group to prefer to risk civil war by excluding others in order to avoid giving them the capability to conduct a coup: The lack civil war potential is thus an incentive for the ruling group: ethnic exclusion is seen in such a context as more likely to secure the political interests of the ruling group. (p. xvii) It follows therefore that, • Where the strategic cost of civil war is high due

to rival groups having the capability to mobilize an armed rebellion, this induces power sharing, especially if the rival group can credibly threaten the seat of power, which is the capital city. • So, where the ruling group and the rival group

are both endowed with strong and credible threat capability due to either their sociological size (ethnic population) and proximity to the capital city, power-sharing becomes almost self-enforcing. • In this case, each group will reluctantly trade

executive power and authority for peace and accepts the risk of a coup as a better option than a mutually destructive total war for the control of the state. (p. xvii)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Ethnic geography The problem with colonialism and its legacy is that it unduly created:

•Unusually large states; •That were also unusually divided.

So, in those large states (such as Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which are also three of the most failed African states that are also very large:

•Ethnic geography reduced incentives for power sharing, especially when rival groups that could pose a threat are too remote and far from the capital city to pose a serious and credible threat; •This remoteness had the consequence of

rendering these remotely located rival groups impotent as they had very little leverage to effectively and durably hold the group in power accountable. (xvii)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Preliminary solutions or considerations There are therefore essentially three dimensions of the coup-civil war trap that are worth exploring when thinking about solutions: The rules of the game must change: (pp. xvii-xviii) • For instance: • Role of the African Union in Changing the rules

of the game: The African Union has begun a policy of not recognizing rulers who came to power via a coup; this, according to them, would reduce the incentives for coming to power via a coup (My Take: But this is debatable since most of them are dictators who also came to power via a military coup or the overthrow of a regime after a successful civil war; and most of them rule over countries that are not democracies); • Such a decision, when well followed, promotes

change via elections (My Take: BUT here too, dictators and regimes have found a way to have multiparty-system with no democracy and, therefore, no possibility of alternation of power via free and fair elections)

• My Take: unless admission to the African Union is made solely on the basis of being a democratic country, and the Union has an army that can go in a settle disputes, the incentive will not work; current policy is not likely to work since most of the member countries are ruled by dictators who fraudulently manipulate elections;

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

2. The structure of the post-colonial African state will have to change: For instance: The government must find a way to project state power and authority into the remote areas of the country that are not usually reached or where the presence of the state is not felt in a coherent way. And this means: • Move beyond the usual practice of projecting

(uneven) military or police power alone; • Investment in infrastructure will help to

project such state power, authority and presence (roads, hospitals, schools, etc.)

3. Finding ways to strengthen Social Mobilization: For instance: Find ways to strengthen interethnic social ties and bases for interethnic trust; this, in turn, will help to reduce political appeals based on ethnic mobilization and ethnic lines, and increase society’s capacity to hold rulers accountable: Sample tools: • Urbanization; (My Take: REALLY????????) • Technology diffusion; • Generational changes;

• My Take: Easier said than done????

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Limitations: (p. xviii)

• The rules of the African Union are debatable: the regimes who shun coups often rig elections and are dictatorships themselves. They are not likely to vote to encourage coups. • Political mobilization along ethnic lines remains,

unfortunately, the dominant form of social, political and cultural mobilization in Africa;

• Corruption and other malfeasance continue to limit diffusion of infrastructure;

• And all the above issues tend to feed each other as, for instance, political corruption (patronage) helps power sharing while depriving states of the resources needed to deploy infrastructure throughout the country.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan

• 2011: Independence • Broke away from the Sudan and became

independent after a bloody civil war. Sudan itself became independent in 1956 • Latest country in the world to acquire sovereignty. • Became the 54th country of Africa. • Capital City is Juba • Population 12 million

Oil: • 75% of all oil reserves that belonged to the whole of

Sudan before the break-up resides in South Sudan.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan

Tribal Warfare and Political instability:

• 9 of the 10 states that form South Sudan have been marred by political instability: The central government has been at war with various rebel groups (7 at least) operating from those 9 provinces. • South Sudan has 64 tribes, of which the Dinkas are

the largest (35%); the second largest are the Nuers (3.5 million people, with 3 million in South Sudan). • Tribal clashes between the Nuers (Nuer White

Army) and the Murle occurred in 2011

Note: A Ugandan rebel group, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), had been in operation in the region until 2008, and has been reported to still operate in and from South Sudan and, perhaps also, in the Congo (DRC) after the Juba peace talks of 2006- 2008 fell apart. The LRA is a tribal nationalist rebel group which, while claiming to be God’s spokesperson (and wishing to turn Uganda into a theocracy), promotes the interests of the Acoli people (Acoli nationalism) (The Acolis are part of the Luo ethnic group), who exist in both eastern South Sudan (45.000 in 2000 census) and Northern Uganda (2 million in 2016 census). The members of the Luo ethnic group can be found in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Congo (DRC), Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania).

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan

Civil War (Since 2013) • A result of the political power struggle between

President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his former deputy Riek Machar: • The president accused Machar and 10 other

“accomplices” for attempting a coup d’état leading to an all-out civil war, thus starting what is now known as the South Sudanese Civil War. • Ugandan troops were sent in to support the

government’s army. • 400.000 killed so far, with 4 million people displaced

in the region as a result if this war, including 1.8 million displaced internally in South Sudan. • Peace agreement signed in 2015 in Ethiopia,

allowing Machar to come back as vice president in 2016. • Conflict resumed in 2016 and Machar fled the

country.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan

President Salva Kiir

The Context Riek Machar

It has been argued that President Salva Kiir: •Invented a fake coup plot against himself in

December 2013 that he claimed was conducted by his vice president Riek Machar. •He wanted to justify a purge that would rid

his presidential guard of rival group members. (pp. 1-2) •Marchar is a member of the Nuer group •Kiir is of the Dinka majority group (35%)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan So, President Kiir actually was just:

•Fearing the very event that he was claiming was happening and •Took a preemptive step that would •Reduce the risk of a coup by his ambitious

vice-president, alongside whom he had fought to conquer the independence of South Sudan. •

(Note: They both headed the group called Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to conquer South Sudan’s independence (Riek now head the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition-in- Opposition (SPLM-IO) and Kiir the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Juba (SPLM- Juba)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan Even though the purge failed to kill his rival,

• It did neutralize his capacity to seize power via a coup from within. • It certainly disrupted his political network

inside of Juba, the capital city. • In this case, Kiir calculated or miscalculated

that the risk of civil war was less immediate than the risk of a coup. Note that Kiir being a member of the Dinka majority, he would tend to always win elections and the only sure way for Machar to become president would have been through a coup. •Unfortunately for him, this purge attempt

triggered a full-scale civil war. (pp. 2-3)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan What conditions, beyond the rivalry between the two men, favored the breaking out of Civil War in South Sudan? The very conditions that led to its creation: just a few years before, the peoples of Southern Sudan were at war against the central government of Sudan in Khartoum. So we already had a history of secession. But there is also the fact that South Sudan was a weak state from the start due to the facts that, as newly created country, it: • Had not yet had the time to consolidate its

authority (independent in 2011, civil war in 2013), • Had not yet had the time to create a neutral

bureaucracy of civil servants; • Had not yet had the time to build infrastructure

that would allow it to efficiently project state power in remote areas; • Had built state power and authority on the

precarious alliance of elites sitting at the top of the state structure; • (My Take: Role of oil and foreign actors interested

in this oil???)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan President Salva Kiir’s Miscalculation

Since Riek Machar was:

• a strong rival with credible threat capacity (he was one of the three rebel leaders who paved the way for South Sudan’s secession), and also

• a member of the Nuer group, which is the second most populous ethnic group in South Sudan, he was able to quickly mobilize allies in several states inside South Sudan (Unity State, Jonglei State) and organize a rebel counter offensive against the government.

• In just 5 days, the central government lost control of 2 states out of 10 due to defections. A third state fell later to Machar forces. (pp. 3-4)

• While president Kiir was able to stop the progress of the rebels, the country became engulfed in civil war: He would not be able to fully crush the rebellion, leading to a lasting civil conflict that continues today. (pp. 4-5)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan So, while the alliances were crucial in wrestling power from the Khartoum government at the time of secession and independence, • These alliances had not yet fully established their

legitimacy over the rest of the land and, thus, its power remained a structure most associated with the capital city than the countryside. • South Sudan itself (the territory) had been the

scene of many interethnic fighting for years, and this further weakened not only the central government, but also the country’s unity or unity potential. • Riek Machar whom President Salva Kiir was now

trying to kill had helped South Sudan wrestle itself from Sudan after he joined John Garang, the first leader of rebel group SPLA/M and Salva Kiir as as #3 of the rebellion. • Without the alliance of the three, South Sudan may

have never been born. • So, the purge by Kiir destroyed the fragile alliance

between the two remaining partners and, thus, caused a civil war (Garang gad died in a helicopter crash 2005)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan So, here, we see the coup-civil war trap at play: • Power sharing, at first, allowed various allied

groups to secede from Sudan (p.5-6); Note: this is similar to many groups in other parts of Africa muting their (European-induced) rivalries for the sake of gaining independence. • Power sharing ensured, while it lasted, an

equilibrium between the allied groups as long as the alliance lasted; • When Kiir felt that the potential for a coup was

great and, perhaps, too real due to his rival ally representing a credible threat, he felt it safer to reduce this potential by calculating that the cost of civil war might be too great for his rival to bear. • However, he miscalculated because he failed to

realize that his rival and his allies did indeed also have credible capability to threaten his authority and even to sustain a rebellion, even if such a rebellion was not ultimately able to conquer power. (pp. 5-6)

And so we get back the conundrum.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: South Sudan And so, it seems that: •The threat of violence is necessary to

guarantee power sharing. •But the very existence of this threat of

violence leads some rulers to anticipate the possibility of a coup. In acting against such a possibility, they create the very conditions of civil war if other rival groups have threat capacity. •So, in the end, it becomes a real gamble,

especially in the absence of an absolute authority capable of enforcing the principles of power sharing and imposing such principles onto all the partners. •So, some rulers gamble that the cost of

getting rid of potential rivals who might mount a coup is worth it due to civil war being a more distant possibility than a coup. The coup, in this case is seen as a more present and clear danger than civil war. (pp. 5-6)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Even if Sudan became the first sub-Saharan African state to become independent (1956)

At the time of Sudan’s independence (1956), more than 1/3 of civil wars in the world were in Africa. • This affected 1 in every 2 countries in the region. • The average civil war in Africa lasted 8 years, killing

thousands. • Between 1956 and 2005 (49 years), 1.7 million

people died of battlefield deaths due to civil wars (this does not include war-related consequences such as disease and starvation) (p. 7)

Of course, this pales when compared to the 9 million soldiers and 7 million civilians who died in just 4 years in World War I, and 50 to 85 million fatalities that were related to World War II, in just 5 years)

(Note: Ghana was actually in 1957, but Sudan is often seen as ruled by Arabs, especially because it was occupied/controlled by Egypt, which was then under British protectorate, and Great Britain, for a long time (1899-1956) and its location is midway between the Arab world and the African world, so people often make a distinction between black sub- Saharan Africa and Arab Africa where Islamized often blacks refuse to consider themselves as Blacks, but see themselves as Arabs; so it all depends on whether you see Sudan as a sub-Saharan African country or not).

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Consequences: •Stifling of democracy; •Stifling of economic growth; •Spread of conflict to neighbors (The Great Lakes Region due to the Rwandan and Congo civil wars; South African imperialism during the Apartheid era, wars of independence, etc.) •Displacement of thousands forced to flee from war zones, affecting neighboring countries dur to mass migrations. (p. 7)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories

1. The Weak-State Paradigm Traditionally, scholars had first focused on economic problems and competition over state resources by greedy elites or excluded groups as the source/cause of civil wars in Africa (p. 7) Then, after a while, the focus became political and the conclusion became that civil wars were due to the existence of weak states in Africa. And so the weak- state paradigm was born. (pp.8-9) The weak-state paradigm (or explanation) basically held that: • Decolonization between 1945-1975 (maybe 1994?)

gave birth to a large number of weak states (financially, bureaucratically, militarily), and, so, as a result, civil war became possible when the state lacked the capacity to police and control its territory; • As a consequence, civil wars were more likely to

occur in states where the government lacked the capacity to police and control its territory; • When civil wars erupted, they further weakened

the state’s capacity, leading to a vicious, self- replicating, and self-sustaining cycle. (pp. 8-9)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories

Problems with the Weak-State Paradigm:

• It assumes that where rebellion is materially feasible, it will necessarily and automatically occur (this is not the case since some countries with a rebellion capacity never experienced civil wars); • It has a deterministic logic that does not account for

other dynamic and variable phenomena; • Some weak states have civil wars, but others do

not;

• All African countries were built (by Europeans) based on very similar underlying issues, yet civil wars have occurred only in half of them. • It does not fully account for variations within the

same country and explain, for instance, why Omar al-Bashir in Sudan was able to defeat rebellion in the early 1990s, but 10 years later failed to contain the insurgency in a civil war that became long- lasting and more devastating. (pp. 9-10)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 2. The Micro-Comparative Theories of Civil War

Such theories seek to understand how underlying structural conditions breed explosive large-scale political violence, especially phenomena such as rebel formation, recruitment, territorial control, counter insurgency, etc. However, these micro-comparative theories lose sight of the overall picture. Just like the weak-state paradigm, they do not account for the ultimate causes of civil wars (the why), especially •How bargaining over state power ends in

large-scale political violence, and •Why when the central government lacks

the capacity to defeat rebels (potential or real), it does not choose to strike a deal with rivals to avoid a costly war. (pp.10-11)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 3. Ethnic Power Sharing Hypothesis

This hypothesis holds that:

•Groups that are marginalized and lack representation in the distribution of state resources, government jobs, and public goods have stronger motives to take up arms and violently challenge the government.

•So, politics, or the “struggle over state power” that has been posited in traditional studies is a central and valid component of the study of the causes of civil war in Africa.

•Researchers such as Wimmer and Cederman as well as others have, for instance, concluded that rulers can prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts by sharing state power with ethnic rivals. (p. 15) This is true, but incomplete.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 3. Ethnic Power Sharing Hypothesis Limitations: • Too much focus is put on the grievance mechanism

as the main source of armed rebellion; • The hypothesis, however, forgets that exclusion,

paradoxically, created opportunities for armed rebels to weaken central government grip on power and over society, giving them bargaining power; to acquire this bargaining power, violence specialists do not need specific grievances; it suffices that they decide that they want a share of the national pie to mount a rebellion, and this can occur even when they were part of the dominant coalition • So, a regime seeking to survive must elicit local

support through its own ethno-political networks to stamp out any attempt at armed rebellion; it does so by using cooperative counter insurgency mechanisms. • The theory also fails to account for why a ruler

would willingly choose to exclude a politically relevant ethnic group at the cost of risking civil war. (p. 16)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory Roessler proposes a theory that he calls the “Informal Institutions Theory”, which he wants to add to the two others in order to provide for a way to fully account for why some countries with similar underlying issues fall into civil war and why others do not.

• His theory, thus, seeks to take into account meso-level elements such as the informal institutions on which (real) political authority rests in weak states (Note: wink, wink à Benin and its attempt to give political voice to the country side and do away with the extractive institutions that exploited Beninese peasants?????)

• In other words, Roessler suggests that there is an (informal) institutional basis for peace in weak states that do not experience civil war, despite such states having the same underlying problems as those that end up in civil war. (p. 11)

According to Roessler, thus, political institutions, whether formal or informal, have a mediating effect and role on the risk of large-scale political violence.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory And so while existing scholarship has relied on theories that identified political instability and incoherent political institutions (such as anocracy: a regime not fully democratic and not fully autocratic, such as in countries that hold multi-party elections, but that have rigged institutions not favoring alternation of power) as determinants that can help to predict the possibility of civil wars, their conclusion that such wars were the result of a power struggle between the elites and the citizens over democratization or autocratization, may have been misinformed or limited. In other words, the idea that these civil wars were due to contestation over the rules of the game was not entirely correct. (p. 11)

Roessler thus observes and agrees with other theories that: • In weak states, politics revolves not so much over

the rules of the game than over the redistribution of power and wealth between competing networks of “violence specialists”; • In weak states, stability relies on factors such as a

“dominant coalition” built upon such elements as elite accommodations, hegemonial exchanges, and “shadow state structures.” (p. 12)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory Dominant coalition

A dominant coalition, in multilayered ethnic societies as we see in Africa, is a series of informal bargains and deals that a group of violence specialists (mostly in the elites) makes in which they agree to refrain from violence and work together to share exclusive access to the central government and its control over state resources. Dominant coalitions are thus coalitions of profiteers and as long as the coalition holds and prevents other coalitions from acquiring power, the peace holds and works. (p. 12)

Problems:

In situations where dominant coalitions exist, most of the society is usually excluded.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory So, how does peace gets maintained?

Well, there is the central role that patronage plays in the structuring and maintenance of these coalitions: •Patronage is a transversal system whereby elites all sit on top of various social strands (ethnic, tribal, clanic, etc.) that each constitute patron-client networks, beginning from the top to the bottom; •Inside of each patron-client network of patronage-related corruption, trickle-down power and opportunities occur, thus providing the illusion of a transversal system of shared power and economic attainment.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories

4. The Informal Institutions Theory This works very differently in systems where only the elites are allied and there exists no patronage system. •Without an efficient patronage system, the coalitions would crumble. •This is because each leader of a coalition, whether at the top level or inside of the mini-coalitions that rely on the network, is left to maintain his own network while being watched and monitored by the other coalition members. (p. 12)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory Where patronage systems are efficient, they provide for the ability to mobilize counterinsurgency forces that are always ready to defend the network at all level of the coalition (to safeguard the interests of the coalition), and such solidary would not only allow them to quickly identify reactionary forces from within or from without, and weaken any attempt at rebellion, no matter where it comes from.(pp. 12-13).

Note: Rwanda failed to overthrow President Laurent- Désiré Kabila despite being the country that helped Kabila topple Mobutu in 1997 and become the third President of Congo (DRC); Kabila had managed to build internal Congolese coalitions that were able to save him from the planned Rwandan coup once he began to not abide by Rwanda’s commands; even as Rwanda had him assassinated in 2001, Rwanda failed to install another puppet, as the Congolese managed to keep power after the coup attempt, even though their choice was to install Kabila’s son as President. This inevitably means that Kabila had, before his death, managed to consolidate internal coalitions that were able to sustain his regime, which caused Rwanda to try to destabilize such and place another person. But the Rwandan coalition now lacked support in the country and, thus, failed. Kabila had at his disposal the diamonds and other minerals produced by his country to consolidate his networks through effective patronage.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory Patronage, Ethnicity, Civil War, and the Postcolonial State in Africa

Patronage networks have tended to be ethnically based in Africa:

•Tribalism as a legacy of both the slave trade and European colonialism has tended to define these networks and, thus, the resulting kinship associations have tended to dominate other elements such as class, party, national identity, state or even ideology. (pp. 13-14)

•So, to survive and maintain a viable postcolonial state, dominant coalitions within these states had to be able to federate different ethnic groups via a coalition of their elites. (p. 14)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory Ethnic power sharing based on coalitions of kinship associations that use patronage as their glue has, consequently, and paradoxically, turned out to be the most important institutional framework for preserving peace in weak African states. So, •Where ethnic power-sharing principles

work, they preserve peace. •But where ethnic power-sharing principles

break down, we get a recipe for civil war. In other words, for peace to be maintained in weak African states, there has to be: •a dose of both tribalism and efficient ethnic-

based patronage •built around a dominant coalition of elites

(most of them from different ethnic groups) •relying themselves on kinship associations

that they control, for peace to work and be maintained. (p. 14)

Wow!

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Some Civil War Theories 4. The Informal Institutions Theory Note: In Gabon, this has worked very well thanks to the oil revenue that allowed the Bongo regime to survive through virtually corrupting everyone in the country through money bags or positions in the government. Any leader who dared to express opposition was immediately lured into a post of Minister in the government, offered cars, villas, huge salaries, and their opposition quickly died after they got used to the high life. In Gabon, the patronage system has therefore worked very efficiently, so much so that Bongo, who is from a strong minority group, managed to subdue the Fang people (the majority group) into never attempting to overthrow him, thanks to the illusion of power sharing that made a Fang always Prime Minister (this changed in 2016). Fang leaders, however, became experts in faking opposition in order to be “noticed” and get their turn in government.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Postcolonial African elites that opted for ethnic power sharing to maintain peace used the same institutional model consisting of Big Men embedded in rival ethnic groups. This allowed them to mobilize support and collect information outside of their own group; this allowed them to thwart possibilities of armed rebellions. But there was a difference between the colonial state run by Europeans and the Postcolonial state run by Africans: • In the post-colonial state, there was lack of the

absolute institutional authority that Europeans used to maintain peace via police force and military brutality, and in a context in which Europeans had absolute monopoly on the production and acquisition of weapons of mass murder. • And so various groups in the African postcolonial

state were able to demand access to all levels of government and declare/defend their right to share of the spoils of the state, which the apartheid and exclusionary system of colonialism did not allow (Under the colonial state, Africans could only be used as agents of colonial control, but without power-sharing opportunities) (pp. 16-17)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The Coup Conundrum in Africa Power sharing, however, while providing a recipe for peace, also provided the potential for coups. By accommodating ethnic strong men (Big Men) within the central government structures and power circles, rulers lowered the cost that their rival faced for seizing power via a coup.

In other words, ethnic power sharing provided incentives for coup attempts by ethnic rivals. The old OAU model (Organization of Africa Unity (1963-2002), ancestor to the current African Union), which usually recognized regimes on the simple basis of who controlled power in the capital city (even when the new rulers had no control over vast regions of the country) unwittingly encouraged coups. (p. 17)

The statistics are thus mindboggling. In the 45 years between 1956 and 2001:

• 188 total coup attempts were registered in sub- Saharan Africa;

• 80 of those coups succeeded; (p. 18)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The Coup Conundrum in Africa • So, a ruler who took power in Africa via a coup or

even other means had to calculate how much power he wanted to share with rival groups in order to prevent them from growing strong enough to begin to represent a threat that could end up overthrowing him. To prevent this from happening, • Such leaders would give prominent military and

security positions to members and leaders of their own ethnic group (in fact, we have even seen cases of rulers importing soldiers from other countries to serve as their presidential guard or even presidential militia, to prevent coup and assassination possibilities) or their own family (nepotism). • Eliminating Big Men from rival groups from real

power would also allow such rulers to eliminate the coup threats and increase the cost (effort) that rivals faced to capture state power. This had the result of confining rivals to the difficult solution of armed rebellion. If they had no means of mounting such a rebellion, then the risk of civil war was reduced and the ruler’s bargain/gamble would potentially work; (p. 18)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The Coup Conundrum in Africa •While this was potentially a good strategy,

it did not often work where the ruling regime lacked the means of control over rival ethnic groups and the means to effectively counter a rebellion without resorting to indiscriminate ethnic violence (turning to tribal nationalism as a way of mobilizing his own kinship association against all others)

•And such strategies, in turn, had the paradoxical effect of leading to the opposite results: it increased the mistrust of rival groups that saw in such strategies an unwillingness to share real power. (p. 18)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The Coup Conundrum in Africa So, whether a leader makes a choice that leads to civil war or a coup, these are often the result of conscious strategic choices and calculations that rulers make in their attempt to secure power in the highly uncertain environment of the postcolonial state. And so: • When they try to coup-proof their regime from rival

ethnic networks (by excluding them), this often confines their country to civil war as the only remaining way of overthrowing them. In this case, exclusion of others from the circles of power may appear, even if temporarily, as the best option. • But, at times, rulers may even choose to risk civil war as

the best option if they think or know rival groups do not have the real capacity to take control of the capital; in this case, even if the war breaks out, they believe the rival may not be able to take the capital and all they risk is peace talks in which they would have the upper hand and, with time, they may win through mere war fatigue (p. 19) • But when civil war becomes as strategically costly as a

coup (in contexts where all rival groups have the capacity to be a credible threat in potentially mutually destructive fashion), BOTH inclusion and exclusion can lead to the same result of coup and civil war potential. (p. 19)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The Coup Conundrum in Africa This leads to a few overarching principles (which still lead to a conundrum): •When a rival group increases its

mobilization potential, the strategic benefit of excluding it from power sharing decreases; a leader may be well advised, in this case, not to exclude that group; •Power sharing can become the best option

if the ruler calculates the cost-benefits of both the threat level of the rival groups and his own group’s societal power and mobilization capability; in this case, if the threat level of the other group is credible and may lead to a civil war, then a leader might find it better to share power and risk a coup since the civil war and a potential defeat could prove too costly for himself and his entire group;

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

The Coup Conundrum in Africa • Conditions must therefore be created so that power

sharing can become self-enforcing, so that no group would be able to derive an inventive to exclude the others; in other words, the cost of exclusion must be such that it would constrain both the ruling group and the aspiring group to a respect of the threat balance. In other words, where all groups have equal threat capability, the likelihood for peace to be maintained in greater. • In this last case, both the threat of a coup and civil

war are present, but the dissuasive effect of the mutual destruction threat creates self-enforcing mechanisms that can prevent both the coups and the civil wars. (pp. 19-20) • But for any self-enforcing relationship to work and

hold in a way that can increase the trust that rival groups would have in each other’s commitment to the power-sharing arrangements, there must be agreed-upon rules and these must be formalized to ensure the even distribution and peaceful transfer of sovereign power whenever such changes occur; • There is no guarantee of durable stability if each BIG

Mam would still want, at some point, to become the BIGGER man amongst them all! (p. 20) There has to be no commitment problem.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: The Darfur (Sudan)

• In the early 1990s, Sudan’s Islamic Movement had a well-developed political network in Darfur. This averted civil war. • In the early 2000s, the Islamic networks were

dismantled and civil war erupted.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: The Darfur (Sudan)

Explanation Omar al-Bashir had basically sought to coup- proof his regime when he dismantled these Islamic networks and this triggered exclusionary situations that caused the excluded rival groups to re-establish themselves as competitors for state power, especially the Hassan al-Turabi group, who had been co-conspirators with al-Bashir to seize state power in Sudan in 1989. Problem was that their earlier power sharing agreements had been informal and could only lead to distrust. This created a commitment problem.

Note: al-Bachir came to power in 1989 in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi; he had disagreed with the Prime minister’s attempt to begin negotiations with rebels in the south).

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: The Darfur (Sudan)

Explanation So, al-Bashir’s purge led to unintended consequences:

• Economic and political grievances among Darfurians increased: North vs. South schism was created.

• Incentives for rebellion by the non-Arab groups he had excluded increased: He lost their support networks and, thus, the capacity to benefit from cooperative counterinsurgency (pp. 23-24)

• In opting for exclusion, al-Bashir had in fact chosen the option of civil war as one that was more viable and beneficial to him than risking a power-sharing arrangement with al-Turabi that could create a credible coup risk: so, for him, the cost of civil war was outweighed by the risk of a coup. Al-Bashir calculated that the war could never result in al-Turabi seizing power via armed rebellion. (p. 24)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Case Study: The DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Sudan’s issue was mostly a political issue: But what if one added a natural resources issue to the equation, as in the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo)? (p. 26) But even considering the rest of the possible causes that led to the civil war in the Congo (DRC), the real issue often remains that of the breakdown of the informal alliance between co-conspirators. In other words, it is mostly the breakdown of the alliance between co-conspirators (Paul Kagamé of Rwanda and his Rwandan Patriotic Front and Laurent-Désiré Kabila of the Congo) that led to the Congo civil war, but with large regional consequences. Kagame tried to overthrow Kabila via a coup after first helping him take power in the Congo by helping his rebellion overthrow Mobutu. (pp. 26-27).

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap (according to Roessler) (p. 25) • Ethno-political networks are essential to

understanding the causes of civil war in Africa; • All sub-Saharan African countries potentially

face an ethnic coup-civil war trap conundrum; • Ethnopolitical groups incorporated into central

government structures through power sharing are less likely to rebel through armed conflict, but more likely to usurp power via a coup d’état; • Ethnic exclusion (and purge) may forcefully

neutralize the coup threat posed by rival groups, but will increase the risk of civil war as a result; • Ethnic inclusion may neutralize the civil war

threat by rival groups, but will increase the risk of usurpation of power through a coup d’état as a result;

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap • Rulers are significantly more likely to purge the

very allies and co-conspirators that helped them come to power than members of rival groups who did not participate in the process of power usurpation with them (purging of rival groups = ethnopolitical purge); • But when such ethnopolitical purges do occur, they

often lead to risks of civil war and/or large-scale political violence; • Rival groups often fail to agree on formalized

power sharing structures, preferring instead informal agreements that increase distrust and, thus, lead to a commitment problem; • In cases where there is a commitment problem,

each of the rival groups usually seeks to eliminate/purge the others from the power structures (ethnopolitical purge), thus triggering processes that inevitably increase the risk of civil war.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap • Where all groups have equal threat capabilities, peace

and power sharing are more likely to be sustained by self-enforcing principles inspired by the threat of mutual destruction. In this case, power sharing becomes self- enforcing, despite there being equal threats of coups and of civil wars. • In this last case, both the threat of a coup and civil war

are present, but the dissuasive effect of the mutual destruction threat creates self-enforcing mechanisms that help prevent both the coups and the civil wars. (pp. 19-20) • But for any self-enforcing relationship to work and hold

in a way that can increase the trust that rival groups would have in each other’s commitment to the power- sharing arrangements, there must be agreed-upon rules and these must be formalized to ensure the even distribution and peaceful transfer of sovereign power whenever such changes occur; • There is no guarantee of durable stability if each BIG

Mam would still want, at some point, to become the BIGGER man amongst them all! (p. 20) There has to be no commitment problem. So the self-enforcing mechanisms that guarantee mutual destruction must be dissuasive enough to discourage rebellions and coup attempts. (p. 25)

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap Most wars in Africa seem to result from this coup-civil war trap conundrum (p. 27)

Thus, the question becomes: What did those states where no civil war occurred do that managed to foster the conditions for sustained peace within their territory, despite having the same underlying structures as other African countries?

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap It appears that: •Power sharing is more likely to emerge

when both the ruling group and a given rival group mutually possess strong threat capability as measured by their respective size and distance from the capital city; •So, when both groups constitute large

groups that are also close to the capital, the incentive to share power is greater, despite the increase in the coup risk that comes with power sharing; in such a case, the coup risk is greater than the civil war risks, but there is incentive to share power despite such a risk. When the balance is well established, the civil war risk is muted.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup- Civil War Trap

• But when the issue is between a large group against small ones, especially those located far from the capital, the incentive to share power is not there and ethnic exclusion tends to become the norm; In this case, only a coup risk would exist among the elites in the capital and civil war risk would be replaced by coup risk since the smaller groups locate far from the capital are assumed to pose no significant coup or civil war risk if purged from power structures. In this case, the civil war risk is also muted. (p. 27-28) • Proximity to the capital and size of rival groups are

thus a good determinant that can help to predict if the likelihood of civil war exists are not; • For instance: if a group is sizable and, thus,

represents a credible threat, its situation far from the capital becomes a civil war risk, yet the same group, close to the capital, would paradoxically pose only a coup risk due to its proximity having likely forced a power sharing agreement with the ruling group. But that’s a civil war risk that some leaders might want to take because of the remoteness of the threat and its distance from the capital;

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup- Civil War Trap

• But when the issue is between a large group against small ones, especially those located far from the capital, the incentive to share power is not there and ethnic exclusion tends to become the norm; In this case, only a coup risk would exist among the elites in the capital and civil war risk would be replaced by coup risk since the smaller groups locate far from the capital are assumed to pose no significant coup or civil war risk if purged from power structures. In this case, the civil war risk is also muted. (p. 27-28) • Proximity to the capital and size of rival groups are

thus a good determinant that can help to predict if the likelihood of civil war exists are not; • For instance: if a group is sizable and, thus,

represents a credible threat, its situation far from the capital becomes a civil war risk, yet the same group, close to the capital, would paradoxically pose only a coup risk due to its proximity having likely forced a power sharing agreement with the ruling group. But that’s a civil war risk that some leaders might want to take because of the remoteness of the threat and its distance from the capital;

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap So, the main problem with current and previous scholarship on civil war, according to Roessler, is that: • It has not sufficiently incorporated the study of

informal political institutions into their civil war models; • Roessler believes that it is actually with the

informal alliances that the solution lies: these informal alliances may, in fact, constitute the main determinants that can best help to predict where civil wars and coups might occur. Where these alliances break down, coups and civil wars are likely to occur. • Rulers try to avoid civil wars as much as possible,

but their willingness to maintain peace through power sharing is constrained by the uncertainties that come with incorporating ethnic rivals into the power structures of the state. • And this may at times lead them to accept the risk

of civil war to avoid the risk of a coup, or vice versa, depending on the context.

Ethnic Pol. & State Power in Africa: Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap

Rationale for Africa as a whole: Principles of the Ethnic Coup-Civil War Trap In a nutshell, thus, Roessler is arguing that without rulers using the often invisible informal institutions that determine real authority and provide for some type of legitimacy through the creation of dominant coalitions and effective patronage, the simple exclusion and/or inclusion of rival groups will not often work and will eventually lead to either a coup and/or civil war. The building of dominant coalitions around effective patronage networks will, thus, be the best determinant for peace.